A kin-state’s responsibility: Cultural identity,recognition,and the Hungarian status law

Abstract

In the last 30 years, many European states have assumed a form of responsibility for recognition concerning the cultural identity of the members of their kin-minority groups. Despite the increasing number of states assuming such special trans-sovereign duties relating to individuals who are neither citizens nor residents, and the endorsements given by the Council of Europe and the EU, a conceptual analysis and normative evaluation of identity recognition as a kin-state’s duty remains absent from the literature on liberal multiculturalism. Focusing on the case of the Hungarian Status Law, this article problematizes identity recognition as a kin-state’s responsibility, examining its legitimacy, place and limits in liberal multiculturalism. Against the current consensus in liberal multiculturalism, I argue that, although the primary responsibility for identity recognition lies with the home-state, a kin-state can complement the home-state’s duties.

Keywords

Cultural identity Hungarian Status Law kin-state responsibility multiculturalism recognition

As a result of an arbitrary drawing of borders, most states today have incorporated groups that continue to identify by culture and history with the titular groups in the states bordering their current home-states. For this reason, such groups are referred to as kin-minority groups or external minorities. In Europe, the disintegration of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empire, the peace settlements after the First and Second World Wars and, more recently, the breakup of the Soviet Union created a high number of kin-minority groups, such as Hungarians in Romania, Slovakia, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia and Ukraine. Other examples include Russian-speakers in the former Soviet Republics that have gained independence in the last two decades, Greeks in Albania, Turks in Bulgaria and Greece, Norwegians in Sweden and Finns in Russia. However, kin-minorities are not exclusively a European phenomenon. The arbitrary drawing of borders in Asia and Africa has also led to the emergence of kin-minority groups there.

What distinguishes some European kin-minorities from those around the world is the response of their kin-states to their living conditions. In the last two decades, many European kin-states have adopted legislation on their kin-minorities, including Austria, Italy, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, Greece, Russia, Hungary and Poland.¹ Even though there are substantive differences between them, all states have assumed trans-sovereign responsibility for recognition directed at the cultural identity of the members of their kin-minority groups. Many kin-states, such as Hungary, Romania, Russia and Poland, have taken a positive approach and engaged in supporting the cultural reproduction of their kin-minority groups. Some states, such as Hungary and Greece until recently, also transferred socioeconomic resources aimed at improving the economic conditions of the members of their kin-minority groups. However, there are a few states, such as Italy, Romania, Bulgaria and most recently Hungary, which have awarded citizenship to members of their kin-minority groups. Despite the high number of such policies and the impact they have on the accommodation of cultural minority groups, conceptual and normative analyses of a kin-state’s responsibility remain relatively absent from the liberal literature on multiculturalism.

This article examines identity recognition as a kin-state’s duty, which remains the most salient aspect in the legislation on kin-minorities. First, it contrasts a kin-state’s duty of identity recognition to the understanding of recognition in liberal multiculturalism. The responsibility assumed by kin-states in relation to the cultural identity of the members of their kin-minority groups challenges the dominant view in liberal multiculturalism that culture-related duties are contained within a state’s borders and tied to citizenship. Precisely, the current legislation on kin-minorities articulates a trans-sovereign responsibility for identity recognition. Moreover, while liberal multiculturalism has focused on the home-state as the exclusive bearer of cultural duties vis-à-vis its citizens, the current policies on kin-minorities define identity recognition as a kin-state’s duty. The nature and allocation of such responsibility prompt questions about its legitimacy and relationship to a home-state’s duties in liberal multiculturalism.

Second, this article discusses the conception of a kin-state’s responsibility for recognition advanced under the Hungarian Status Law. The law gained normative significance in 2001 when it became the subject of the first authoritative evaluation of the legitimacy of a kin-state’s involvement in Europe. The Hungarian Status Law was implemented during a period in which Hungary’s bordering states significantly improved the accommodation of their cultural minority groups, and more than the other policies on kin-minorities, it raised concerns over the legitimacy of a kin-state’s special obligations, and the potential conflict between the obligations assumed by the kin-state and those of the home-states. However, the international endorsement of policies such as the Hungarian Status Law and home-states’ acceptance of kin-state involvement in the accommodation of their kin-minority groups suggest that there are cases in which home-states’ politics of recognition are not sufficient, and that a kin-state’s intervention is welcome.

Cases such as the Hungarian Status Law bring to the fore the question of whether a home-state should share its culture-related obligations with the kin-state. Third, the article addresses the allocation of the responsibility for identity recognition. I endorse the view that a kin-state’s responsibility for identity recognition ought not to replace the home-state’s obligations. Rather, I argue that it should complement a home-state’s commitments to fairly accommodate its cultural minority groups.

Cultural identity and the responsibility for recognition

In the last two decades, recognition has grown from the common denominator of a wide range of claims and struggles pertaining to distinct forms of identification and differentiation to occupy a prevailing position in political theory. Originally a category of Hegel’s philosophy, the empirical and analytical content given to recognition has expanded its meaning and scope beyond the original confines. For Hegel, recognition is a norm of moral psychology that refers to the intersubjective formation of individual identities (Benhabib, 2002: 49–52). However, one can observe the multiplication of the meanings attached to recognition in contemporary social and political science. Following Ricoeur’s distinction,² Seymour notes that political theory now refers to recognition in three different ways. First, recognition refers to an action of external identification. In contrast to the meaning of the lay term, the action is characterized by repetition and is directed at a single object or individual (Seymour, 2010: 4). Second, recognition is understood as self-identification: ‘one recognizes oneself in what one does or in the things that other people do’ (Seymour, 2010: 4). Last, recognition describes a process of mutual identification: ‘the expression can refer to the mutual ‘acknowledgement’ that individuals or groups choose to give to one another’ (Seymour, 2010: 4).

In this article, recognition refers to a norm of multicultural justice and is defined as a commitment on the part of a state to acknowledge specific cultural identities. However, it is accurate to say that the relationship between the politics of recognition and multiculturalism remains ambivalent. By citing the case of France, Parekh notes that not all the advocates of recognition give support to multicultural policies (Parekh, 2006[2000]: 3).

In contemporary political theory, recognition is not exclusively viewed as a norm of multicultural justice. According to Seymour, the political theory of recognition has developed in two additional directions. The issue of recognition has also been central to the contemporary shift in political theory from a Kantian to a Hegelian paradigm (Seymour, 2010: 1). Moreover, in recent years, recognition has become an important concept of critical theory and essential to the discussion of domination and exclusion in the contemporary world (Seymour, 2010: 2).

Central to the debates in liberal theory has been a focus on defining those characteristics that ought to be either mutually or externally recognized, and the forms recognition should take. Liberal theorists distinguish between two objects of recognition – status and identity – to which three forms of recognition are associated: respect, esteem and representation. It is commonly accepted that respect is a universal form of recognition that occupies a central place in liberalism. Respect addresses features that are universally shared: either the moral status as persons or the political one as citizens. Esteem is a particular form of recognition and represents a response to individuals’ particular identities or the social contribution of a group. It translates as the public affirmation of the value of one’s identity and, generally, it concerns individuals’ cultural identity. Thompson introduces a third form of recognition that refers to individuals’ identity as political actors. According to him, recognition as representation responds to individuals’ demand to enjoy the rights and powers of citizenship (Thompson, 2006: 128–158).

Recognition as a duty directed at individuals’ particular identities was introduced by Charles Taylor in his seminal essay on the politics of recognition (Taylor, 1992: 25–73, 1995: 225–256). Taylor objects to the prevailing view among liberal theorists that the object of recognition ought to be restricted to the moral status as persons and/or the political one as citizens. He argues that such a conception of recognition undermines the ethical importance of people’s particular identities. For him, a liberal theory of recognition should also address the value of the ways people live and, thus, should require the positive acknowledgement of their specific identities (Taylor, 1992: 25–73, 1995: 225–56).

Taylor famously argues that the positive affirmation of one’s identity is not only essential for the constitution of one’s personal identity, but also protects the individual against harm. He states:

… our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. (Taylor, 1992: 25)

Taylor adds: ‘[N]onrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being’ (Taylor, 1992: 25). In situations such as those described by Taylor, one’s difference may unjustifiably restrict one’s capacity for self-realization and negatively affect one’s well-being.

In my view, Taylor’s conception of recognition runs into five difficulties. First, the political implications of Taylor’s model of recognition remain underspecified. For example, Benhabib notes that Taylor’s conception of recognition only offers a remedy for damaged subjectivities (Benhabib, 2002: 51–9). Second, Taylor’s account of recognition raises tension between the ideals of autonomy and authenticity. Both Cooke and Habermas challenge the assumption that liberalism glosses over difference (Cooke, 1997: 258–88; Habermas, 1993: 128–155, 1995: 849–853). Against Taylor, Habermas argues that a demand for recognition of individuals’ particular identities remains a demand for recognition of one’s capacity to define one’s own conception of well-being (Habermas 1993: 128–55, 1995: 849–853).

Third, even though Taylor’s approach to particular identities continues to exercise a strong influence over the liberal responses to cultural plurality, his conception of recognition as esteem for people’s distinctive identity is not viewed to be fully consistent with liberalism. It has been criticized by liberal neutralists for going against the liberal principle of neutrality, and for its hierarchical nature by liberal egalitarians, many of whom consider it essentially illiberal. Theorists such as Fraser, Galeotti, Habermas, Jones and McBride have generally argued that equality of status is a satisfactory response on the part of a state to its citizens’ demands for recognition of cultural identities. If Habermas, Jones and McBride reject the politics of esteem recognition arguing that is neither demanded by egalitarian liberalism nor reasonable (Habermas, 1993: 128–155, 1995: 849–853; Jones, 2006: 23–46; McBride, 2009: 96–108), Galeotti and Fraser advance arguments according to which a state’s duty of esteem recognition is instrumental for achieving equality of status among its citizens (Fraser, 1995: 68–93, 1998: 1–14, 2000: 107–120, 2003: 86–108, 2008; Fraser and Honneth, 2003; Galeotti, 2002).

Fourth, Taylor’s theory has divided liberal theorists of recognition over the answer to the modes of recognition that can be reasonably pursued to achieve multicultural justice within liberalism, and their limits. If recognition is central to conceptions of multicultural justice, only a few liberal theorists, such as Parekh, openly defend a state’s responsibility for recognition as esteem, arguing that it is required by multicultural justice for its inclusionary role (Parekh, 2006[2000], 2008). Moreover, even though some scholars, such as Cooke, defend the importance of Taylor’s account of recognition in that it addresses the concern for the value of something that is not universally shared, but significant to those who share it (Cooke, 2009: 76–95), there is a general consensus that a responsibility for recognition as the public affirmation of one’s cultural identity should be limited.

Some liberal communitarians such as Taylor and Honneth argue that even though multicultural justice may require recognition as esteem for individuals’ cultural identity, reservations should be shown in relation to appraising the value of all cultures independent of scrutiny of their content (Honneth, in Fraser and Honneth, 2003: 168; Taylor, 1992: 69). Taylor’s account of esteem recognition as a norm of multicultural justice starts from the assumption that cultures are of equal value (Taylor, 1992: 61–73). According to him, knowing that the politics of equal dignity and the norm of equal respect to which it is associated do not protect the specificity of an individual or a group, recognition defined as positive affirmation may be owed to specifically authentic identities, of which cultural identities represent such a type (Taylor, 1992: 42–3 and 67–73). However, prior to assuming an obligation of esteem recognition, Taylor recommends an evaluation of the content of cultures: ‘what the presumption requires of us is not peremptory and inauthentic judgements of equal value, but a willingness to be open to comparative cultural study of the kind that must displace our horizons in the resulting fusions’ (Taylor, 1992: 73). He admits that the development of inter-cultural criteria for this purpose remains problematic (Taylor, 1992: 61–73), and dismisses applying the standards developed by the North Atlantic civilizations elsewhere, which he judges to be homogenizing, and to unfairly undermine the worth of other cultures (Taylor, 1992: 71). According to Taylor, in the absence of criteria to assess the value of cultures one has to presume their equal worth, and to value the merits of the derived particular identities (Taylor, 1992: 68–72). However, he concludes that public acknowledgement of the importance of a culture is dependent upon an evaluation of its worth, and it does not automatically arise from the value the identification with a culture has for its bearer.

Honneth’s discussion arrives at the same conclusion as Taylor’s. He states that the necessity of publicly affirming the value of particular identities is determined by considerations over their contribution to broader societal goals. However, his arguments support the view that a response to demands for recognition ought to anticipate a societal conception of good life (Honneth, in Fraser and Honneth 2003: 114).

However, Fraser, Galeotti and Jones reject both Taylor’s and Honneth’s arguments that a responsibility for recognition of cultural identities should be made dependent upon an evaluation of the content of the cultures in which they are embedded (Fraser, 2000: 107–120; Fraser, in Fraser and Honneth, 2003: 198–236; Galeotti, 2002: 53–84; Jones, 1998: 28–62, 2006: 34–6). Jones argues that the lack of evaluative criteria does not justify Taylor’s presumption that all cultures are equally valuable. Some cultures may be comparable, while others may not. More than that, he notes that the recognition of one’s cultural identity should not require recognizing the merit of one’s culture. Jones sharply stresses that cultures remain primarily important for their bearers and not for the value they have for the outsiders (Jones, 2006: 36).

And fifth, not only Taylor, but all liberal scholars have generally addressed the responsibility for recognition of particular identities as a duty of domestic justice. Recognition is instrumental to achieving equality, strengthens the freedom of individuals, or is a means for rectifying those social conditions that impede the realization of liberal domestic justice. Furthermore, Kymlicka notes that, in spite of the global diffusion of liberal multiculturalism in the last decade, international intergovernmental organizations have promoted a similar perspective according to which culture-related duties are obligations exclusively owed by home-states to their minorities (Kymlicka, 2007). In a novel way, the legislation on kin-minorities in Europe articulates a trans-sovereign responsibility for recognition of particular cultural identities, which involves a state different from the home-state, and which addresses a category of people who are neither citizens nor residents. If the partiality and trans-sovereign character of a kin-state’s responsibility for identity recognition challenges its legitimacy as a duty of justice, the allocation of this duty to a state different from the home-state calls into question the relationship between a home-state’s and kin-state’s cultural duties.

The following sections examine the response of a kin-state to the cultural identity of the members of its kin-minority groups in the context of the Hungarian Status Law. The enquiry addresses the source of identity recognition as a kin-state’s duty, its conceptualization, and further discusses its limits in liberal multiculturalism.

The source of Hungary’s kin-state responsibility, its understanding, and the Status Law

With Hungary’s dismemberment following the implementation of the Treaty of Trianon in 1920,³ the attachment of its former territories to the neighbouring states and the creation of two new states, Czecho-Slovakia and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the Hungarians residing in the ceded territories became citizens of Hungary’s bordering states against their wishes. However, their shared identity with the citizens of Hungary has since been viewed as a source of special obligations on the part of Hungary. At times, Hungary’s obligations towards its kin abroad have been stronger than its humanitarian duties, and aimed at the protection and promotion of the cultural specificity of the Hungarian minorities in its bordering states. However, only after 2001, under the Hungarian Status Law, the responsibility of a kin-state is clearly defined as one of recognition of cultural identity. This section examines the source of Hungary’s kin-state obligations and the conception of a kin-state’s responsibility for recognition advanced by its Status Law.

Despite regional proximity, not only did the home-states’ policies in relation to their Hungarian minorities vary, but also the response of the kin-state. For Hungary’s neighbouring states, the interwar period was characterized by a process of national state building, during which the majority consolidated a privileged economic, political and cultural position at the expense of that of their cultural minority groups that inhabited their territories. In Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Romania, the Hungarian minorities were subject to cultural policies of assimilation and economic policies that led to their pauperization. In response to the grievances of the Hungarian minorities from its neighbouring states, Hungary criticized in international fora the treatment of its kin-minority groups in Yugoslavia and Romania (Rothschild, 1974: 163–166), but resorted to revisionism in the case of Czechoslovakia (Rothschild, 1974: 163–166). The First Vienna Award (1938) and the Second Award (1940) temporarily restored southern Slovakia and northern Transylvania to Hungary until the end of the Second World War. In 1941, Hungary also occupied and annexed Bačka and Baranja, two regions of Vojvodina situated in the northern part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (King, 1973: 42–43).

After the Second World War, Hungary assumed an active role in relation to the accommodation of its kin-minorities. However, according to King, the case of Hungarian minority groups served well Moscow’s desire to strengthen its political power and control in the region after the Second World War. If no change in the treatment of the Hungarian minorities in its satellite states was considered without the Soviet Union’s approval,⁴ the USSR’s responses to pressure from Hungary for a better treatment of its kin-minority groups differed (King, 1973: 163). King argues that this ambivalence is explained by the fact that the terms of accommodation were constrained by the Soviet Union’s desire to punish or reward Hungary’s policies and those of its neighbouring states (King, 1973).

Moreover, in the period following the end of the Second World War, Hungary’s bordering states attempted to cut off the ties between the Hungarian minorities and their kin-state. Yugoslavia and Romania provided generous terms for the accommodation of their Hungarian minorities aiming to gain their support against Moscow’s interference in their internal politics and its manipulation of the minority grievances to create unrest, but also to weaken the destabilizing power of Hungary (King, 1973: 51–75). Furthermore, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia (in relation to the Hungarian minority from Vojvodina), and Romania actively engaged in redefining the identity of their Hungarian minorities from kin-minorities to cultural minority groups (Arday, 1996: 477–478; King, 1973: 146–169; Magocsi, 1996: 527–529).

The collapse of the communist regimes in 1989 brought about important changes regarding the accommodation of Hungarian minorities from Hungary’s neighbouring states. Following the overthrow of the authoritarian regime in Romania in 1989, and the independence of Ukraine in 1991 and Slovakia in 1993, the three states engaged in processes of state rebuilding. Throughout the 1990s, the majorities’ attempts to construct national states were actively counteracted by their national minorities. However, if in Ukraine, the new government generally treated its Hungarian minority well (Stroschein, 1996: 153–176), and granted cultural autonomy to a number of minorities including the Hungarian one,⁵ in Romania and Slovakia, the negotiations followed a thorny path and, towards the end of the 1990s, only provisions that guaranteed the use of minority languages, education in the mother tongue, and political representation were implemented. Distinctively, in the former Yugoslavia, a tradition of constitutional nationalism⁶ coupled with the Bosnian, Croatian and Kosovo wars in the 1990s led to a general deterioration in the living conditions of cultural and religious minorities, which also affected the Hungarian minorities. During the 1990s, Slovenia remained the only state that did not step back from its previous commitments to its cultural minorities. After it became an independent state in 1991, the rights of cultural minorities were even expanded there.⁷

In spite of the improvements in the conditions of accommodation of the Hungarian minorities in Hungary’s bordering states in the last ten years, the object and extent of their policies of recognition continue to be an issue of discontent. In the case of the Hungarian minority groups from Hungary’s neighbouring states, complex cases of recognition can still be formulated in relation to their identity and culture, as well as the asymmetries of status. For example, in Slovakia and Romania, the demands of the Hungarian minorities continue to address the privileged position of the members of the cultural majority, the public devaluation of Hungarian identity and culture, and their territorial autonomy. However, the 2009 Language Law in Slovakia proves that any advance can be easily reversed.⁸ Most importantly, although the relation between the Hungarian minorities and their kin-state no longer raises controversies in Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Romania and Ukraine, it is only Slovenia that has recognized the importance of the ties between the Hungarian minority and their kin-state (Székely, 1996: 486–489).

The Act LXII of 2001 on Hungarians Living in the Neighbouring Countries, known as the Hungarian Status Law, was adopted by the Hungarian Parliament on 19 June 2001. With the exception of the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), the only party to vote against the Act, all the parties represented in the Hungarian Parliament unanimously supported it. Initially, the Act was strongly criticized by international organizations such as the European Union (EU) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),⁹ and created a lot of friction between Hungary and its neighbouring countries, primarily with Romania and Slovakia, which have the largest Hungarian minority groups.¹⁰ Compared to the legislation of other kin-states, the Hungarian Status Law primarily stands out in relation to the number of its beneficiaries. The law targets as many as 3 million members of the Hungarian minorities, citizens and residents of Romania, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Slovakia and Ukraine. A second amended version was adopted by the Hungarian Parliament on 23 June 2003. Even though only few changes were brought in, the conflict attenuated and the Act was implemented in Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine, Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia.

The Hungarian Status Law appears to have been developed independently of progress in the conditions of the accommodation of Hungary’s kin-minority groups. It is generally agreed that the Hungarian Status Law finds its legitimacy in Article 6 Section 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, according to which ‘[t]he Republic of Hungary bears a sense of responsibility for what happens to Hungarians living outside of its borders and promotes the fostering of their relations with Hungary’ (Hungarian Government, 1995). I agree with Kis that the generic formulation of Hungary’s kin-state responsibility in the Constitution only articulates a special responsibility vis-à-vis the members of the Hungarian minorities abroad, but does not specify either its nature or extent (Kis, 2004: 156; Küpper, 2006: 161). Some scholars, such as Ieda and Bárdi, argue that the Hungarian Status Law represents a continuation of Hungary’s policies towards its kin abroad (Ieda, 2004; Bárdi, 2004). For Ieda, the Act of 2001 only regulates the transfer of services and benefits from the Hungarian state to the members of the Hungarian minorities from its neighbouring countries that has already been carried out occasionally since the 1980s (Ieda, 2004). Distinctively, Waterbury associates the Status Law to the political programme of the Federation of Young Democrats (Fidesz) and their success in the 1998 elections (Waterbury, 2006: 483–515, 2010). She argues that, in the absence of a broad ideological content, organization and long-term strategy of governance, Fidesz’s Nation Policy, which represents the foundation of the Hungarian Status Law, remains primarily its party-building strategy. However, an argument that a Hungarian Status Law was bound to be articulated and implemented following the strengthening of the Hungarian state after the fall of communism, and independent of Fidesz’s political programme, can be advanced with reference to the following four reasons. First, subsequent to the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1920, the Hungarian state has been actively involved in improving the living conditions of its kin-minority groups. Thus, it was to be expected that following the restoration of its full sovereignty after the fall of communism in 1989, Hungary would reinforce its responsibility as a kin-state. Second, the importance given by the members of the Hungarian minorities from Hungary’s bordering states to their ties with the Hungarian state gave impetus to Hungary to strengthen its responsibility as a kin-state. Third, there had already been precedents elsewhere: other Status Laws had already been implemented across Europe.¹¹ And fourth, the almost unanimous parliamentary support given to the Hungarian Status Law at the moment of its adoption suggests a consensus vis-à-vis the direction taken by Hungary’s policies in relation to its kin-minority groups.

The formulation of Hungary’s responsibility in relation to the cultural specificity of its kin from the bordering states is best articulated in the second version of the Hungarian Status Law from 2003. In the first version put forth in 2001, the preamble of the Act on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring States indicates as central to its scope ‘to promote and preserve their [the Hungarians living in Hungary’s neighbouring countries’] well-being and awareness of national identity within their home country’.¹² However, the amended version of 2003 clearly identifies a case of shared identity to be the source of Hungary’s kin-state obligations, and explicitly locates the aim of such obligations in the need to protect and affirm the identity of its kin abroad. Article 2 asserts that promoting the ties of the Hungarians from the neighbouring states with Hungarian culture and their kin-state is necessary to secure their belonging and well-being:

In order to ensure the well-being of Hungarians living in neighbouring states in their home-states, to promote their ties to Hungary, to support their Hungarian identity and their links to the Hungarian cultural heritage as an expression of their belonging to the Hungarian nation. ¹³

The most prominent aspect of the Hungarian Status Law remains those provisions that define Hungary’s responsibility in the field of education, culture and science beyond its borders. The Hungarian Status Law ensures that Hungarians from the bordering states enjoy the same cultural rights and equal access to cultural and educational benefits as Hungarian citizens. In addition, the law states that the persons working on the territory of Hungary are also eligible for social security and health services upon their contributions. However, the most controversial provision in the initial version of 2001 was the one that entitled only the members of Hungarian kin-minority groups to obtain a three-month work permit, a provision that was modified in the amended version from 2003 to reflect consistency with the regulations governing the employment of foreign nationals on the territory of Hungary.¹⁴ In the case of Romania, the limited right to work was extended to all citizens without any reference to their ethnicity.

In spite of the common, rather than the exceptional articulation of a kin-state’s responsibility in Europe, both the Slovak and Romanian governments voiced strong criticism against the legitimacy of the Hungarian Status Law, accusing Hungary of revisionism and irredentism (Ieda, 2004: 3–57). The European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) of the Council of Europe was called in by the parties involved in the conflict to assess the compatibility of the Hungarian Status Law with the practices, norms and principles of international law. Its Report No. 19/2001 ‘On the Preferential Treatment of National Minorities by their Kin-State’ (19 October 2001) came to represent both the Council of Europe’s and the EU’s legal stand on the legislation on kin-minorities. First, the report acknowledges a kin-state’s support for the cultural flourishing of its kin-minority groups to be democratic and legal according to European Law and to contribute to their protection (Council of Europe – Venice Commission, 2001a; Sólyom, 2004: 365–70). Prior to this, the international legal instruments that ensured the protection of cultural minority groups were restricted to bilateral or multilateral agreements and the 1995 Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities. Status laws represent a novel legal approach. However, the report asserts that the states in which minorities live have the primary responsibility for protecting their own national minorities (Stewart, 2004: 140). Second, even though it is not a legally binding document, the report ratifies the Status Law practice and sets out the four principles that limit a kin-state’s obligations vis-à-vis its kin abroad, namely territorial sovereignty, pacta sunt servanda, respect for friendly relations between states, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Council of Europe – Venice Commission, 2001a; Ieda, 2004: 45–48; Sólyom, 2004: 366).

Prima facie, the conception of a kin-state’s responsibility for recognition articulated by the Hungarian Status Law appears to be consistent with Taylor’s response to particular identities. The law affirms the cultural specificity of the members of the Hungarian kin-minority groups. Moreover, the obligations assumed by Hungary to promote Hungarian culture in the bordering states indicates that its responsibility is one of esteem. The object and scope of recognition under the Hungarian Status Law clearly differentiate it from respect and representation, the two other forms of recognition identified in the first section of this article.

Furthermore, in line with Taylor’s defence of the ethical value of esteem recognition, the Hungarian Status Law promotes the importance of identifying with Hungarian culture for the well-being of the members of the Hungarian kin-minority groups. However, in my view, the model of recognition as a kin-state’s duty articulated by the Hungarian Status Law distances itself from Taylor’s conception of recognition in relation to two main aspects.

First, in agreement with Taylor’s theory of recognition, the Hungarian Status Law differentiates cultural identity as its object of recognition from the political status conferred by citizenship. More than that, it clearly articulates a cultural conception of identity that does not converge with citizenship. The members of the Hungarian minorities, citizens of Hungary’s neighbouring states, are considered to belong to the Hungarian nation, and their cultural membership is defined as important as, but different from, other types of allegiances, such as citizenship (Kántor et al., 2004: viii). Even though the importance attributed by Hungary to the cultural identity of its kin abroad set by the Status Law has remained unaltered, the extent of its kin-state’s responsibility has expanded following the implementation of two policies regarding its kin-minority groups in the last decade. In December 2004, a referendum took place on the issue of non-resident citizenship for the Hungarians from Hungary’s neighbouring states. The referendum failed due to a low turnout. However, in 2005, the left-wing government implemented a new policy, called Hungary’s Renewed Nation Policy. The policy shows an extension from the obligations regarding the identity of Hungary’s kin abroad to regional economic development and, according to Waterbury, an attempt to annihilate the informal and clientelistic cross-border networks created by Fidesz that tie the Hungarian minorities to the Hungarian state (Waterbury, 2010: 117–142). However, Hungary’s Renewed Nation Policy does not alter either Hungary’s responsibility in relation to the identity of its kin or its content, but it restructures the institutional framework of its support. Fidesz’s return to power in April 2010 brought about an amendment of the Hungarian Citizenship Law that now facilitates the access to non-resident citizenship of Hungary’s kin from its neighbouring states. Although it is too early to tell what the impact of the new Citizenship Law is on the conception and extent of Hungary’s kin-state responsibility, if the Hungarian state will award non-resident citizenship to a significant number of the members of the Hungarian minorities from its bordering states, it is reasonable to assume that the distinction between identity and status set by the Hungarian Status Law will become blurred.

More importantly, the separation between cultural identity and political status in the Hungarian Status Law weakens liberal arguments that limit a state’s response to particular identities to safeguarding equality of status. It also challenges the instrumental value of esteem recognition to achieve equality of status that is defended by liberal scholars, such as Galeotti and Fraser (Fraser, 1995: 68–93, 1998: 1–14, 2000: 107–120, 2003: 86–108, 2008; Fraser and Honneth, 2003; Galeotti, 2002). In a distinct way, the Hungarian Status Law advances a duty of recognition that affirms the cultural specificity of its beneficiaries, but it is separated from a commitment to ensure their equality of status.

And, second, the allocation of responsibility for identity recognition to a state different from the home-state challenges Taylor’s response to particular identities and, more generally, liberal multiculturalists’ defence of identity recognition as a home-state’s duty. In cases in which not only the home-state, but the kin-state also assumes a responsibility to promote particular cultural identities, a kin-state’s obligations may overlap with a home-state’s cultural duties towards its citizens. Thus, the allocation of responsibility for esteem recognition to a state different from the home-state raises questions regarding the relationship between a home-state’s and a kin-sate’s cultural duties. The last section examines the limits of identity recognition as a kin-state’s duty in liberal multiculturalism.

In conclusion, the case-study shows that the existence of a shared identity between the citizens of Hungary and the members of Hungarian minorities in the bordering states has normally generated special obligations on the part of the kin-state directed at the cultural specificity of the latter. The evidence here indicates that the Hungarian Status Law defines a kin-state’s responsibility for recognition as an obligation to esteem the cultural identity of its kin abroad. It addresses a need to protect and promote their identity. Moreover, the endorsement of a kin-state’s responsibility for recognition from the Council of Europe and EU have established its legality, and its acceptance by many home-states of kin-minority groups, including Hungary’s bordering states, has strengthened it.

The limits of a kin-state’s responsibility for recognition

The report of the Council of Europe ‘On the Preferential Treatment of National Minorities by their Kin-State’ legitimizes a kin-state’s responsibility, stating that Status Laws contribute to a better protection of kin-minority groups (Council of Europe – Venice Commission, 2001a; Sólyom, 2004: 365–370). Although a kin-state’s positive responsibility for recognition impacts upon the accommodation of its kin-minority groups in their home-states, the report does not address the extent of a kin-state’s responsibility in relation to that of home-states. In spite of the fact that the case of the Hungarian Status Law shows that a kin-state’s and home-state’s responsibilities for recognition were reconciled, and none of the home-states has stepped back from its commitments to a fair accommodation of its cultural minority groups, the recent withdrawal of Lithuania from its obligations towards its Polish minority, which forced Poland to step in and assume a stronger responsibility towards its kin-minority group represents a worrying case (Hyndle-Hussein, 2011). It shows that the dual allocation of responsibility for recognition of the cultural identity of the members of kin-minority groups may weaken or replace a home-state’s obligations towards its cultural minority groups. This section addresses the relationship between a home-state’s and kin-state’s cultural duties in the context of the Hungarian Status Law and the Hungarian kin-minority groups. I show that a kin-state’s responsibility for recognition is at odds with liberal nationalist and liberal cosmopolitan accounts of state responsibility. If the focus of proponents of liberal nationalism is to strengthen a state’s duties towards its citizens, while that of liberal cosmopolitans is to assign unallocated duties, cases of dual allocation remain unaddressed. In line with the liberal nationalist defence of priority for compatriots, I support the view that the duties that arise from citizenship ought to have priority over other associative duties. I argue that a kin-state’s responsibility for identity recognition should not replace but complement the home-states’ commitments to a fair accommodation of their cultural minority groups.

It is central to liberal theory that demands for recognition stem from membership in a group. Raz notes that many of our attachments are a source of status, rights or responsibilities (Raz, 2001: 10–40). Nonetheless, the multiplication of memberships in the contemporary world and the proliferation of demands for recognition associated with them have become rather common. A kin-state’s responsibility for recognition is also grounded in a notion of membership. According to the Hungarian Status Law, the members of the Hungarian minorities, citizens of Hungary’s neighbouring states, are considered to belong to the Hungarian nation, and their membership is defined to be as important as other types of allegiances, such as citizenship (Kántor et al., 2004: viii). Although this allegiance may be valued as important as citizenship and a kin-state’s responsibility may be legitimized by the existence of a shared identity, the strength of the ties with its kin-minority groups and their need for culture-related support, the foundations of a home-state’s responsibility for recognition, are different from those of a kin-state. For the proponents of identity recognition, an obligation of recognition for particular identities is rooted in a robust conception of liberal domestic justice, according to which the realization of equality among the citizens of a state and the protection of individual freedom are central. In contrast, the Hungarian Status Law generates a different case of recognition, one that solely addresses cultural authenticity.

It is beyond any doubt that being a citizen of a state is often undeserved or a matter of brute luck; it is commonly accepted by many liberals that the obligations that arise from citizenship are strong. If Dworkin defends the view that the right to treatment as an equal is a special and indispensable right exclusively owed by governments to their citizens (Brown, 2007: 255–291), liberal nationalists such as Walzer (1983), Tamir (1993) and Miller (1995, 2000, 2007) affirm that a sense of common belonging that arises from citizenship prioritizes a home-state’s duties towards its citizens over those concerning non-citizens.

By tying the duties of multicultural justice to citizenship, liberal multiculturalists such as Kymlicka and Parekh also defend a position which suggests that home-states’ culture-related responsibilities towards their compatriots are not only strong, but also exclusive (Kymlicka, 1995; Parekh, 2006[2000]). I agree with the proponents of multiculturalism that home-states have a strong duty of justice to protect the cultural specificity of their citizens and, where necessary, should repair the cultural disadvantages they suffer. However, the case-study of the Hungarian Status Law shows that a state different from the home-states may assume cultural duties. If one agrees that a home-state’s culture-related duties remain primary and strong, but not exclusive, an ideal response to cases such as that of Hungarian kin-minority groups consistent with liberal multiculturalism should be one where home-states’ cultural duties are complemented by a kin-state’s responsibility for recognition of the cultural identity of the members of kin-minority groups, where these are not interchangeable.

Although the trans-sovereign nature of a kin-state’s obligations suggests that they are closer to liberal cosmopolitan accounts of state responsibility than to the liberal nationalist ones, their object and extent is not consistent with the impartiality defended by liberal cosmopolitans. For liberal cosmopolitans, all individuals have equal moral standing. Irrespective of their particular loyalties to a community of identity, they are equal subjects of global justice. Consequently, liberal nationalist accounts of responsibility are particularly contested by liberal cosmopolitans for the importance they confer on ethical particularism at the expense of moral universalism. Generally, liberal cosmopolitans question whether or not the special ties and commitments that exist among citizens are in conflict with global justice, and identify the tension in the notion of membership employed to defend special responsibilities. Scholars such as Benhabib (2002, 2008), Pogge (1992a: 48–75, 1992b: 79–98) and Waldron (1992: 751–793) reject the notion of shared identity on which such liberal nationalist models of responsibility rely, arguing that it does not capture the diversity of individual experiences of a group identity. In contrast, other proponents of liberal cosmopolitanism, such as Scheffler (2001), Miller (2007), Tan (2004, 2008: 449–464) and Bader (2005: 83–103) defend the value of associative duties that arise from the existence of special ties and commitments. If Scheffler, Miller and Tan argue that a state’s partiality is not in conflict with liberal cosmopolitanism, Bader notes that, not only global duties, but other associative duties at the sub-national and trans-domestic levels compete with a state’s obligations towards its compatriots.

A kin-state’s obligations towards the members of its kin-minority groups may indeed compete with the duties towards its citizens and residents, as well as its global ones. However, the case-study shows that Hungary has neither withdrawn from its obligations towards its citizens nor its humanitarian duties. Moreover, Hungary’s associative duties beyond its borders remain important and, at the same time, its bordering states continue to uphold their commitments towards their cultural minority groups. The case-study proves that a state’s universal impartiality is consistent with forms of partiality within and beyond its borders.

In conclusion, I stress that home-states should hold the primary responsibility to accommodate fairly their minorities in a way consistent with liberal multiculturalism. A shared identity, the existence of strong ties between a kin-state and its kin-minority groups, and the need for identity protection and promotion may justify a kin-state’s responsibility for identity recognition, but it ought to complement the home-state’s cultural duties. More importantly, it should not replace a home-state’s obligations to accommodate fairly their cultural minority groups.

Conclusion

This article examined identity recognition as a kin-state’s responsibility. It addressed its legitimacy and place in liberal multiculturalism focusing on the case of the Hungarian Status Law that represents Hungary’s response to the cultural identity of the members of its kin-minority groups. The first section contrasted a kin-state’s duty of recognition to the understanding, allocation and limits of a responsibility for recognition in liberal multiculturalism. It was shown that a kin-state’s responsibility for identity recognition challenges the dominant perspective in liberal multiculturalism that culture-related duties are contained within a state’s border and tied to citizenship. The second section examined Hungary’s understanding of its kin-state’s duties under the Hungarian Status Law. It showed that the existence of a shared identity between the citizens of Hungary and the members of Hungarian minorities in the bordering states has normally generated special obligations on the part of the kin-state directed at the cultural specificity of the latter. This section pointed out the fact that the Hungarian Status Law defines a kin-state’s responsibility for recognition as an obligation to esteem the cultural identity of its kin abroad, which addresses a need to protect and promote their identity. It further discussed the legitimacy of the conception of recognition formulated by the Hungarian Status Law within liberal multiculturalism. The last section examined the relationship between a home-state’s and a kin-state’s cultural duties in the context of the Hungarian Status Law and the Hungarian kin-minorities. I argued that a kin-state’s responsibility for identity recognition ought not to replace the home-state’s cultural obligations, but to complement its commitments to fairly accommodate its cultural minority groups.

The current developments in Hungary, in particular its recent Citizenship Law of 2011, which facilitates the access of the members of its kin-minority groups to Hungarian citizenship, suggest that its kin-state responsibility for recognition could now become closer to liberal egalitarianism and may contribute to achieving equality of status. However, the rather illiberal direction pursued by the current government in Hungary makes it difficult to predict both the impact and future of Hungary’s kin-state policies.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Sherrill Stroschein, Camil Ungureanu, Gwen Jones, Katerina Mantouvalou, Andreea Cârstocea and the three anonymous reviewers for their very helpful and stimulating comments on earlier drafts of this article.

Notes

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