Politics of multiculturalism in East Asia: Reinterpreting multiculturalism

Introduction

Multiculturalism has been defined as a social integration strategy or approach, as well as an overall cultural milieu where society consists of multiple ethnic groups with a mainstream culture that represents a multicultural consensus of norms, values and mores that have been coalesced through an organic compromise with the existing cultural influences or institution-led coalescence (Nagayoshi, 2011: 561–562).

It has also been described by scholars as a society in which a multicultural and multiethnic identity has been graphed to a mono-cultural institution and cultural framework which has gradually inculcated new legal and cultural norms and values creating space to accommodate, integrate and synthesize a new mainstream culture that represents the ever-evolving cultural fabric of a society (Nagayoshi, 2011: 563). For Kymlicka (2005: 31–36), multiculturalism falls within the realization of civil rights for all racial groups, provides the impetus to extol liberal values in a broader context, and encompasses a reservoir of minority group rights including that of women, homosexuals and cultural minority groups which, in most cases, formed the body of the immigrant roots. In other words, liberal democratic multiculturalism, by necessity, ensures the rights of all cultural, ethnic, religious and racial groups through a legal framework which is transparent and guarantees and protects all citizens and residents from discrimination based on the aforementioned categories. In a similar vein, Parekh (2006: 231) suggests that ‘national identity in a multicultural society should be defined in politico-institutional rather than ethno-cultural terms, so that all citizens can be expected to participate as equal members of a civic community’.

The latter case is best exemplified by the so-called traditional countries of immigration such as Australia, Canada and the US. The UK and France would also fit into this categorization as they had pre-existing cultural and legal frameworks which gradually evolved to include more diversity and meld many new traditions from newcomers to these societies. The Sikh RCMP in Canada who was permitted to wear his traditional Sikh turban as part of the RCMP’s uniform is a good example of this kind of multicultural synthesis (Mutalib, 2012: 48).

The former case of multiculturalism is more representative of countries new to immigration such as Singapore, Malaysia or Indonesia. From the outset of their national genesis, these countries had to accommodate many cultures and ethnic groups without a historically embedded cultural and institutional framework (Hefner, 2001: 4). As Furnivall wrote in 1944, at the outset of Singaporean, Indonesian and Malaysian multiculturalism, each society was marked by being pluralistic societies with no common ‘social will’ (Furnivall, 1944: 446).

Drawing a comparison between multiculturalism found in traditional countries of immigration and new countries of immigration such as Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and China, is problematic as many of these countries have no immigration policies, or have a policy that lies somewhere on the continuum between immigration and migrant policies. The difference is with migrants who can, and do, permanently attach themselves to a new country/region and migrants who remain, from the state’s perspective, temporary. In this sense, a study of multiculturalism in East Asia, by that I mean the Northeastern States of Japan, South Korea, China and Taiwan as well as the members of ASEAN are interesting case studies in how states manage migration policy and create migrant policy.

This review essay aims to draw attention to the different types of migrant policies in the region by engaging in a dialogue on ‘multiculturalism’ in East Asia. Employing the works of migration scholars related to multiculturalism in the region, the author hopes to provide insight into the complexities that exist in terms of multiculturalism in East Asia. In connection with the parenthesizing of multiculturalism, the author wishes to explicitly state that multiculturalism in East Asia consists of many terms including, but not exclusive to, incorporation policies, migrant policies, multicultural coexistence, migration policy, social integration policies and multiculturalism. In each national context, the aforementioned terms symbolize different policies related to societies with migrant populations in East Asia. Moreover, the author recognizes that countries such as India and China are also multicultural societies located in the geographical sphere of Asia; however, the author wishes to limit his discussion to the aforementioned countries in line with the focus of this review article.

Employing nine selected works related to multiculturalism in East Asia, it is my intention to argue that multiculturalism in the liberal democratic model that we are accustomed to seeing in traditional countries of immigration is not the preferred model utilized in East Asia. Rather, as this article will show, multiculturalism in East Asia has to meander through a host of different factors and histories that have required them to understand multiculturalism in different ways that are not directly linked to a rights-based approach to liberal democratic multiculturalism. Four of the volumes examined in this paper are on the highly ethnically and culturally homogeneous societies of Japan and Korea. Their ethnic and cultural reality and their high degree of group-oriented behavior and their predilection for group identity continue to be barriers to inclusion of diversity of which migrants represent the most extreme form. These articles continue to stress how the inclusion of migrants is still hampered by attachments to the idea of being ethnically and culturally homogeneous societies (DeWind et al., 2012; Lim, 2012; Nagayoshi, 2011; Oishi, 2012). Hsia’s (2009) article shifts the focus of conceptualizing multiculturalism and migration policy from the loci of ethnic and cultural homogeneity to how the state, in this case Taiwan, carefully manages and implements policy that inculcates the political considerations found in their cross-strait relations with China. The Taiwanese migration and multiculturalism calculus is inherently linked to the need to maintain political independence, ideological difference and a population that aspires to maintain the status quo in political relations. The remaining cases are centered on the former colonies of Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. Here, Hefner (2001) and Mutalib (2012) provide us insight into the continuum of privileged-multiculturalism found in Indonesia and Malaysia to the relatively egalitarian-multiculturalism found in Singapore. Ma’s (2007) paper on Hong Kong shifts the discussion of multiculturalism and migration away from the continuum of privileged multiculturalism and egalitarian-multiculturalism, to one in which co-ethnic discrimination and differentiation has manifested with the influx of mainland migrants from China. Lastly, Yamamoto’s (2007) article on the Philippines provides insight into how a multiethnic and multilingual society has come into fruition despite the failure of the state’s integrating tool, a common language.

Multiculturalism and ethno-cultural homogeneity in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan

States such as Japan and South Korea have maintained restrictive migration policies as part of a two-pronged approach to maintain ethnic and cultural homogeneity as well as consolidate territories and national cohesion following the destructive aftermath of WWII (Parrenas and Joon, 2011). Limiting the flow of migrants into Japan and denaturalizing ethnic Koreans, which resulted in their return exodus to the Korean peninsula in the post-WWII period, allowed Japan to rebuild their devastated state along ethno-cultural homogenous lines while ensuring that communist supporters from Korea did not sway Japan’s pro-American, pro-capitalist economic development. Similarly, after 35 years of brutal colonial rule by the Japanese and the devastation of the Korean War, Korea consciously excluded migrants in its development to consolidate, reconstruct and reinvent the political, economic and cultural institutions that were banned under Japanese colonial rule and destroyed during the Korean conflict (DeWind et al., 2012: 373).

Other states such as Taiwan have constructed their migrant policies based on the complexities, which are associated with cross-strait relations (Hsia, 2009). Labor shortages, declining birthrates and a graying population have driven Taiwan to develop migration policies that take into account the ideological divide between Mainland China and Taiwan (Hsia, 2009: 27–31). With national security concerns over the influx of ideological migrants from the Mainland as wives, Taiwan has a twofold strategy of limiting the effects these ideological migrants by: 1) limiting their political rights for a period of time; and 2) encouraging Taiwanese men to take brides from Southeast Asian countries (Hsia, 2009: 27–32). Importantly, Taiwanese recent multicultural initiatives that attempt to weave diversity into Taiwan through migrant, indigenous people, and the recognition of Chinese language groups (not as dialects of Mandarin but rather as mother tongues and cultures in their own right) has been used to inculcate diversity into Taiwan while, at the same time, inculcating diversity into the narrative of the Chinese monolithic state/people and culture in an attempt to manage a perceived cultural imperialism from the Mainland and to strengthen their own state identity (Brubaker, 2012).

Hong Kong and Singapore: Social polarization and multiculturalism

Hong Kong and Singapore both offer us pragmatic ideas of multiculturalism in East Asia. Both being former British colonies, they inherited strong legal traditions and their associated institutions and populations that were, from their outset, multiethnic or pluralistic. Where they differ, of course, is their post-WWII development strategy and geographical pressures.

In the case of Singapore, the initial post-WWII ethnic cocktail primarily consisted of three ethnic groups, the Chinese, Indians and Malays/Muslims. Singaporean authoritarian policies when dealing with multiculturalism have been focused on maintaining ethnic harmony through state policies that support language and cultural policies, housing policies and representation of all ethnic groups with in mainstream Singaporean society (Chua, 2003; Mutalib, 2012).

Singapore’s egalitarian approach to multiculturalism has been fuelled by the need to maintain harmony and balance among its existing ethnic groups while including migration policies for lowly and highly skilled workers (Chua, 2003: 67–71). The outsourcing of child care and elderly care duties to domestic helpers from Indonesia and the Philippines has been one route to deal with temporary migration in Singapore (Yeoh et al., 1999). The second has been developing routes to bring in high-skilled/professional migrants into Singapore. In both cases, egalitarian-multiculturalism in Singapore has been primarily targeted at the original three ethnic groups and not the so-called newcomers who fill the above two categories (Mutalib, 2012: 31).

The success of Singapore’s migration and multiculturalism policies has not been without friction. Today, a growing number of locals voice the opinion that Singapore’s government has systematically given preferential treatment to foreigners settling in Singapore and has contributed to social inequality (Mukhopadhaya, 2003). These laments demonstrate growing nationalistic tendencies in protest over the Singaporean government’s proposal to accept an additional 15,000–25,000 new citizens each year, increasing its total population from 5.3 million to as high as 6.9 million by 2030 (National Population and Talent Division, 2013; Neisloss, 2013). Ordinary Singaporeans argue that Singapore’s cultural milieu will be dramatically affected, that the small city-state has insufficient resources, and that the continued preference and privilege of the newcomer and mostly professional class will further polarize Singapore.

In the Singapore context, not all ethnic groups have succeeded to the same degree. The Malay population, in particular, remains in a low socio-economic position compared to their compatriots (Mutalib, 2012: 33–34). This ethnic-based social inequality under Singapore's multicultural policies has been attributed to the existing agency of the Malay ethnic group in choosing education regimes and lifestyles that are strongly Islamic leaning, which may act as an economic hurdle in Singapore's globally oriented, capitalist economy.

Mutalib’s findings in Singapore underscore some of the challenges that states involved in multiculturalism face. First, how to create a multiculturalism in Kymlicka’s (2002) sense where individuals in a society, whatever their ethno-cultural backgrounds are, have at least equal opportunities in terms of social mobility in coexistence with fellow citizens. Singapore’s Malay social inequality dilemma may reflect Kymlicka's (2002) conclusions that, even in multicultural societies in which multiculturalism is espoused as a major tenant of government social cohesion policy, some cultural groups may intentionally abandon their equal opportunity position to preserve their cultural and or religious traditions.

Along with the polarizing nature of Singaporean multiculturalism at the social inequality level, recent highly skilled migrant policies have also contributed to the polarization of Singapore's multicultural society. (Mukhopadhaya, 2003; Ng, 2011: 267) At the first level, the influx of highly skilled and financially able migrants into multicultural Singapore has resulted in a new population addition without the traditional pressures faced by lower-skilled migrants in assimilating into new host societies (Yeoh et al., 2012). Financially secure, gainfully employed and situated in the highly skilled professional hubs found in Singapore, these new migrants remain privileged in terms of their economic position in Singaporean society and in terms of access to services and dynamic socio-cultural delights without the obligations of mandatory military service and learning the local culture and language (Yeoh et al., 2012). At a deeper level, there is growing resentment in the native population that these new migrants (with their privileged status) remaining outside Singapore’s multicultural prescriptive policies, have contributed to social inequality through property investments (Ng, 2011: 266–267; Yeoh et al., 2012).

Hong Kong’s status as a former British colony and major transit point of migrants from many backgrounds has seeded its initial migrant cocktail with ethnic Chinese (from mostly Southern China), Indians and British who are hold-overs from Hong Kong’s time as a British colony. What makes Hong Kong different in terms of migration policy needs to be discussed within the context of its relationship with China. For most of the 20th-century, domestic political chaos in Mainland China resulted in large flows of migrants into Hong Kong (Wong et al., 2008, 3–4). Upon the consolidation of the CCP’s position as head of government of Mainland China, Hong Kong had to close its borders to ensure that it would not be over-burdened by a flood of migrants seeking to escape the domestic chaos that was occurring in the Mainland (Wong et al., 2008: 4–5). The establishment of migration control between the Mainland and Hong Kong has resulted in the creation of a Hong Kong identity that incorporates internationalism, multiculturalism and rule of law, not to mention an identity strongly associated with Cantonese as their mother tongue and Hong Kong as their cultural identity (Ma, 2007).

Hand-in-hand with the economic development in Hong Kong, we saw the transformation of the Hong Kong economy from a center for cheap manufacturing to a service-centered hub that attracted professionals and the highly skilled as well as migrant domestic workers from the Philippines and Indonesia (Wong et al., 2008: 18–27). In the former case, migration policies have facilitated the migration of the highly skilled/professionals to work in Hong Kong’s finance and service sector. In the latter case, permitting migrant domestic workers to come into Hong Kong to work as maids/helpers has liberated Hong Kong women from the demands of balancing work and care-giving. The inclusion of more females in the work force in Hong Kong has allowed Hong Kong families to double their income, increase their capital while maintaining the integrity of their household (Wong et al., 2008: 18).

Although Hong Kong has no formal multiculturalism policy, its independent immigration policy and strong emphasis on economic integration as being the most effective means to promote the peaceful coexistence of a society with many ethnic groups has had mixed results. In the same vein as Singapore, Hong Kong is witnessing a polarization of its society in part due to migration policies. As Hong Kong transformed itself from a primarily manufacturing-based society to a knowledge- and service-based society focusing on finance, Hong Kong needed the highly skilled migrants from abroad to work in its financial hubs, resulting in an influx of highly skilled professionals from around the world and heavily, from Mainland China. The flow of migrants from the Mainland was further accelerated following the 2003 SARS crisis as Beijing used the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) to help the Hong Kong economy recover resulting in an increase in the number of Mainland professionals coming to work in Hong Kong, an increase in the number of Mainland tourists and property investors as well (Tsoi, 2012).This influx has had a polarizing effect on Hong Kong’s society in that the professional class and large investor migrants from Mainland China have contributed to growing social inequality through their acquisition of properties (Tsoi 2012; Drew, 2012; Government of HKSAR, 2012: 1). With regard to social inequality, instead of growing resistance to migrants from abroad and the growing nationalism as seen in Singapore, Hong Kong’s reaction to the effects of migration on their society has been an increase of co-ethnic-related discrimination and the strengthening of localism, of their local Hong Kong identity (Ma, 2007: 150; Public Opinion Programme at the University of Hong Kong, 2012).

Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia: Religion, pluralism and multiculturalism

While the above-mentioned countries and city-states can be characterized as largely ethnically and culturally homogeneous states (except for Singapore), the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia represent another brand of multiculturalism within the East Asian context as, at their outset, ethnically pluralistic societies. In the case of the Philippines, an archipelago of islands with different languages, ethnic groups and religion, the Philippines has successfully used its Catholic faith as a cohesive force to bring Philippines people from throughout the archipelago under one umbrella, as Philippinos (Lorenzo, 2007).

Other integration tools have also been employed in the Philippines to manage its multiethnic and multilingual society. According to Yamamoto (2007: 195–196) the state has also been active in using a common language and education system to forge commonality amongst the existing ethnic groups while at the same time attempting to create systems for interethnic power sharing. Critical of the Philippine state, Yamamoto argues that, despite strong language and education policies inspired by the US in the post-WWII period, rather than a full assimilation of all Philippine ethnic groups under one language and culture, the Philippines remains deeply multicultural and multiethnic requiring a new national integration, multiculturalism approach that stresses the coexistence of various ethnic groups (Yamamoto, 2007: 210) The most recent example of this kind of multiculturalism in practice may be how the state used the mantra of multiculturalism to strike a peace deal with the separatist Muslim groups in the South island of Mindanao to advocate for a single Philippines with room for diversity of identity and religion (UNHCR, 2012).

Indonesia’s multiculturalism is firmly rooted in its pluralistic history. In the case of Indonesia, Thung (1998: 23) argued in the period immediately following the downfall of the Suharto regime that the ‘discursive competition between assimilationism, multiculturalism and the subjectivity of conditional belonging has not yet taken place in Indonesia. So far an assimilationist discourse rules. The possibility of developing multiculturalism is still remote.’ The Suhartoian assimilationist approach to integration built civic structures that contributed to ethnic chauvinism which prevented different ethnic groups from forming interethnic power-sharing mechanisms and understandings. Still today, ethnic Chinese Indonesians remain politically and culturally marginalized despite their large economic footprint in the nation’s economy. In this sense, the privileged-multiculturalism practiced by the Indonesian state publically espouses its multicultural and multiethnic nature (based on the commonality of Islam) while simultaneously disadvantaging the ethnic Chinese segment of Indonesian society.

Whereas Indonesia has managed a multiculturalism, past and present, in which Muslims represent most of the archipelago’s population, Malaysia’s multiculturalism shares similarities with both Indonesia and Singapore. Pluralistic Malaysia is largely Muslim and has three dominant ethnic groups: Malay, Chinese and Indian. In contrast, the Singaporean system strives to keep ethnic proportions static or at least growing in concert. Malaysia has taken a decidedly different stance on multiculturalism by giving preferential privilege to the Malay populace while espousing Malaysia’s multicultural character (Yilmaz, 2010: 137). Malaysia’s privileged-multiculturalism can be seen as a conflictual, coexistent relationship between ethnic groups with the Malay majority using the state and religion to enhance their privilege to the detriment of non-Muslims (Hefner, 2001: 11). Counterintuitively, multiculturalism that was meant to privilege the Malay ethnic group and balance economic wealth has remained only partly effective as conservative Muslim Malays still remain economically underdeveloped (Mutalib, 1990: 101).

Discussion

It is clear that East Asia provides us with several models of multiculturalism, albeit with different interpretations. The ‘homogeneous’ societies of South Korea and Japan have remained resistant to immigration and, as a result, they have developed divergent approaches to dealing with migrants/foreigners in their respective societies. In the Japanese case, restrictive immigration policies and a focus on the control of migration at its borders has resulted in strong migration policies for entering Japan but no supporting mechanism at the state level for migrants when in Japan. Migrant policies for those who have legally entered Japan have mostly been taken up by local governments in the post-WWII period as migrants had to register at the local government office where they lived. Upon registration as a resident in a particular administrative district, it was local government that became responsible for the migrants’ access to social welfare programmes, education, medical information, etc.

In the absence of policies at the state level, local governments began to initiate incorporation policies, foreigner policies, multicultural coexistence policies and today’s social integration policies (Nagy, 2012a: 127–128). These policies are targeted primarily at newcomers to Japan, providing language assistance, cultural training and information in a variety of languages about each local government service and the rights and obligations of legally residing foreign residents. These are service centered policies rather than a multiculturalism policy that serves to forge a multiethnic or multicultural identity (Nagy, 2012b: 12). There are no policies at the local or state level that prohibit ethnic-based discrimination, either. In short, these policies are meant to provide help to migrants/foreign residents so that they can adjust to the Japanese society; they are not settlement strategies or avenues for naturalization. Furthermore, they are not strategies to inculcate more diversity into the pre-existing cultural and institutional frameworks.

That being said, the local government in Japan, in particular, provides us with examples of how local governments are conceptualizing multiculturalism at the local level. For instance, out of the growth of social-welfare rights and recognition at the local level, ethnic Korean minorities, called Zainichi Kankokujin, have advocated for, and received, representation at the local level through Foreigner Advisory Councils. ¹ Although not a binding body with political power, this consultative council reports directly to the local city council to provide recommendations and updates on the status of migrants and foreigners living in their administrative boundaries. Other cities, Tokyo such as Tachikawa and Adachi and in other parts of Japan, have also formed consultative, multinational bodies which report to each respective local government. In this sense, Japanese local governments are pursuing a local form of citizenship that attempts to provide local representation of all residents within a particular community’s boundaries. Although, this is not multiculturalism in a liberal democratic understanding of the concept, these initiatives demonstrate a degree of rights-based multiculturalism through representation of minority interests. Whether this will expand into national-level representation, even in its consultative form, is still an open question at the time of writing this article.

South Korea’s approach to multiculturalism has been interpreted as both similar to Japan, and pro-active, compared to Japan. On the first point, South Korea remains highly restrictive in terms of immigration rules, employing a similar argument to Japan that its ethnic and cultural homogeneity (Lim, 2012: 510–511) and requiring a migration approach that places an emphasis protecting the delicate ethnic balance that exists. This approach to immigration has remained in place for much of South Korea’s post-WWII history. The rapid increase of migrants since the 1990s and associated rampant abuses of migrants, ranging from lack of payment for industrial accidents to low wages and clear violations of the Labor Standard Act in Korea, also brought to light the societal discrimination faced by migrants in Korea. As a result, Korea’s Ministry of Labor announced initiatives to protect the rights of migrant laborers (legal and illegal), including the enforcement of the Labor Standards Act on companies that hire illegal foreign workers (Ministry of Labor, 1998).

The above three factors have been instrumental in Korea’s about-face approach to migrant policies including an antidiscrimination policy in 2004. In 2004, the Ministry of Labor implemented the ‘Employment Permit System (EPS)’ as a response to foreign migrant workers organizing unions to protect themselves from labor standards’ violations (Korea Immigration Service, 2009). Protecting migrant workers from discriminatory wage treatment, the EPS regime ensures that migrant laborers do not settle in Korea by making the EPS a three-year, non-renewable permit. The EPS was then followed by several initiatives directly related to the plight of spouses and children of international marriages, including the 2006 establishment of the ‘Council for the Protection of Human Rights & Interests of Foreign Nationals,’ the 2006 ‘Plan for Social Integration of Mixed Bloods and Migrants,’ the 2006 ‘Plan for Social Integration of Marriage Migrants,’ and the 2006 ‘Basic Act on the Treatment of Foreigners’ (effective 18 July 2007) (Immigration Bureau of Korea, 2008). Importantly, in 2005 the South Korean government revised voting laws to allow permanent residents to vote in local elections after three years of permanent resident status (Tanaka and Kimu, 2006: 76–77).

The acts and plans being promulgated by the Korean government, like those of Japan, are less of what we would call a multiculturalism plan and more of what policy-makers might call a migrant policy; that is policies for migrants once they enter Korea or Japan to protect the rights of migrants and provide them with some kind of language and cultural tools to negotiate their new societies. The advent of local voting rights for permanent residents is an important step forward for the official inclusion of minorities’ interests in South Korea at the legislative level. It will contribute to the enfranchising of the growing number of foreign brides settling in South Korea as spouses to Korean men along local-citizenship lines and perhaps result in an expansion of representation of migrants’ (who cannot vote at the local level) interests in South Korea. It must be said that these local voting rights are, in part, connected to Korea–Japan relations. The intention is that, by providing local voting rights for permanent foreign residents in South Korea, the Korean government is hoping for reciprocation of voting privileges for the more than 500,000 permanent ethnic Korean residents in Japan.

In each of the above categories of multiculturalism we have seen scholars investigate the various modus operandi of different governments in terms of conceptualizing multiculturalism in East Asia. The states of South Korea, Japan and Taiwan have deliberately constructed their multiculturalism policies based on ethnic–cultural preconceptions of homogeneity and along political–ideological lines. Lim (2012), Chapman (2008) and Oishi (2012) highlighted that South Korea’s and Japan's propensity to build multicultural and migrant policies that consolidate the perceived ethnic and cultural homogeneity of the host population are deeply linked to their historical experiences in the post-WWII period. Oishi’s policy approaches to migration policies in Japan bring attention to the structural and organizational barriers that act as hurdles to inculcating permanency for the most highly skilled and able migrants under highly skilled migrant acts. Chapman (2008) digs deeper in his analysis of the structural barriers to create a multicultural Japan focusing on how the family registration system has been a major hurdle to inclusion of the ‘other’ because of its paternalistically centered structure that reinforces the male centrality within the family, consolidates traditional concepts of family and offers the state opportunities to control and maintain the ethnocentric-based Japanese identity. This ethno-cultural based identity has been embedded in the Japanese psyche as Nagayoshi (2011: 570) demonstrated in his survey of Japanese citizens in which he asked what was the most basic aspect of being a Japanese, in which they answered ‘having Japanese ancestry’, a much more objective criterion for nationality and identity compared with cultural and language literacy. In this sense, Nagayoshi’s survey demonstrates the success in binding Japanese identity and subsequently exclusionism to ethnic lineage, a lineage that is further consolidated in the family registry system that prohibits non-naturalized citizens from being included in the registration system (Chapman, 2008).

In the same manner as Nagayoshi, Lim (2012: 507–508) stresses Korea’s longstanding ethno-cultural-based post-WWII identity, ‘tending to believe that Korea has a unique (cultural) dynamic that sets the country apart from others.’ DeWind et al. (2012: 376–377) argue that this concept of ethno-cultural homogeneity was rooted in Korea’s pre-colonial isolationist past which was turned on its head with Japanese colonialization resulting in the influx of non-Koreans and the movement of ethnic Koreans throughout Japan and Manchuria. The chaos of the post-WWII period and start of the Korean War further consolidated the real and perceived ethno-cultural homogeneity with the chaos of war acting as a pull factor for any remaining non-ethnic Koreans on the peninsula.

In contrast to South Korea, Japan and Taiwan in which ethno-cultural homogeneity lies at the core of their multiculturalism policies, the ASEAN states of Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia have post-WWII multiculturalism policies closely linked to the post-colonial issues of state building within ethno-cultural plural contexts. The religiously centered states of Indonesia and Malaysia have used Islam as the common denominator to bring together disparate ethnic groups that are seen as not having originated from the region, in particular ethnic Chinese and Indians. Strong authoritarian governments in both states have promoted assimilatory policies which privileged one ethnic group over the other in order to secure political legitimacy.

Political liberalization following the end of strong authoritarian rule in the Indonesian context has provided more space for a less assimilative multiculturalism policy to evolve. So has the experience with East Timor. Today’s Indonesian government is fully conscious of the difference between political plurality and cultural plurality in rhetoric as well as in practice. The secession of East Timor from Indonesia has left a legacy for the kind of multiculturalism being espoused and put into practice by the state. Instead of political liberalization as a means to promote a multicultural, yet cohesive state, Indonesia’s approach is to consolidate political control at the national level while encouraging more multicultural plurality in the public sphere. The end result has been a gradual decline in tensions between ethnic Chinese and ethnic Indonesians while at the same time an increase in tensions between the various ethnicities that form the non-Chinese Indonesian population (Thung, 2013).

Whereas political liberalization has allowed Indonesia to move towards a multiculturalism that allows for multicultural plurality in a politically cohesive state, Malaysia’s multiculturalism remains rooted in a multicultural state rooted in privilege for its ethnic Malay core. In effect, differentiated citizenship continues to dominant Malaysian multiculturalism in order to rebalance the economic fruits of a growing economy. What is more, the Malaysian multicultural journey provides us insight into the schizophrenic nature of Malaysian multiculturalism. On the one hand, the dominant Malay ethnic group wishes to further cement its central role within the nation-state through advocacy of pro-Malay policies (Nagata, 1984: 234). On the other hand, we have both Islamic organizations and Malay elites arguing for more plurality in the cultural and political sphere (Hefner, 2001: 44–45).

In the case of the religious organizations, they argue on religious grounds that preferential treatment of Malay’s is non-Islamic. In contrast to religious organizations, Malay elites understand the necessity of ethnic Chinese Malaysians as key economic actors within the Malaysian state and they argue that more needs to be done to so that Malaysian Chinese ‘feel that they have a full and equal share in the project of Malaysia if the country is to make the transition from a low-wage manufacturer to a knowledge-based economy’ (Hefner, 2001: 44).

The Philippines provides us another perspective on multiculturalism in Southeast Asia. Like Indonesia and Malaysia, the Philippines consists of many ethnic, cultural and language groups. The state has been proactive in trying to build a common identity using language and education policies, however, it has been largely unsuccessful in creating a non-ethnic-based Philippine society (Yamamoto, 2007: 210). While Indonesia and Malaysia had to contend with large numbers of ethnic Chinese and Indians in their multicultural society in addition to different religions, the Philippine multiculturalism experience has not had to contend with ethnic Chinese or Indians to the same degree. Also, the largely Catholic population, despite its ethnic background has already provided a framework for integrating disparate ethnic groups under the umbrella of a multiethnic and multicultural, Catholic, Philippine state. The outlier of this statement has been the Muslim minority in Mindanao province in the south.

Multiculturalism in Singapore and Hong Kong provide us with exceptional cases of multiculturalism within East Asia because of their colonial past, state-city status, size and autonomous immigration policies. Both cities have highly pragmatic immigration policies that seek to meet the needs of their knowledge/service sector-based economies. With limited domestic human resources, both cities must actively attract global talent to their communities to remain competitive. At the same time, both cities must mobilize all existing human capital, which includes women, to accrue capital that goes toward to purchase of property. This mobilization of human capital leaves the doors open for large numbers of migrant domestic workers to work as helpers and maids, serving as care-givers for children and the elderly.

These factors have contributed to economic and multicultural polarization in these cities with elite professionals financially and culturally at the core of each city. The low-skilled migrants from the Philippines, Indonesia and Mainland China occupy the economic and cultural periphery of each city with little, if any, chance for social mobility because of legal limitations on the length of their stay in these global cities. Sandwiched in between the highly skilled professionals and the low-skilled migrants are a growing number of dissatisfied locals who see social mobility becoming more and more challenging. Linked to this growing social inequality is the view that the trajectory of their multicultural society has somehow been hijacked at the top by the wealthy professional class and from below by the low-skilled workers who are increasing in number but are refusing to integrate into the current multicultural societies through language and cultural learning. The growth in nationalism in Singapore and localism in Hong Kong and a growing backlash against government migration policies is reflective of these sentiments. In both cases, the growth of nationalism and localism in response to growing numbers of migrants, both permanent and non-permanent, presents a challenge to multiculturalism in these societies if growing numbers of migrants continue to be linked to social inequality and a segmentation of the political, economic and cultural spheres of each society.

Conclusion

When examining multiculturalism in East Asia, we must consider the ideas that multiculturalism is open to interpretation based on which society and culture we are considering. Japan, South Korean and Taiwan represent examples of societies with a pre-existing high degree of ethnic and cultural homogeneity that makes integration of migrants challenging from the point of view of what kind of social integration strategies to use. To date, assimilation has been the preferred method as these highly collectivistic and group-oriented societies are challenged with social diversity, even when that diversity is of a co-ethnic nature. Thus, we could argue that the predilection for migrant policies that are centered on cultural and language learning are, in part, related to pre-existing cultural norms. Taiwan’s situation is further complicated by its cross-strait relationship and the need to select migrants who will not undermine its political independence.

In contrast to the more ethnically and culturally homogenous states above, the culturally and ethnically plural societies of Indonesia and Malaysia have shown us that multiculturalism in a plural context can have political dimensions when the state privileges and/or discriminates against different ethnic groups within society. In both cases, Chinese Malaysians/Indonesians are peripheral members of these multicultural states in part because of their ethnicity but also their religion. The permanent exclusion or prolonged differentiated citizenship we have seen in both cases may, in the long run, be detrimental to both states considering their economic influence within each country.

The Philippines is an outlier in terms of being a pluralistic state without a government policy that privileges one ethnic group over the other. Multiculturalism in the Philippine context has evolved from a language and education policy to forge national unity to one that celebrates plurality based a common language(s) core.

Examining the city states of Hong Kong and Singapore and the multicultural societies, we are left with the impression that a multiculturalism policy based on economic integration has a polarizing effect at economic and cultural levels. Local populations are squeezed between the influential highly skilled professional class and the non-integrating low-skilled class. Overcoming this multicultural conundrum is not an easy one considering that prosperity in each city is related to existing immigration policies.

Within this context, it is difficult to apply the terminology of multiculturalism to explain the various policies that states in East Asia are using to integrate new migrants and to manage their pluralistic societies. What can be argued, though, is that the states in East Asia with the most interest in developing coherent, integrative and empowering multiculturalism policies are the ones faced with stark demographic challenges, specifically, societies with low birth rates and graying populations. Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Japan are at the vanguard of this inevitable demographic challenge and they will necessarily develop future oriented multicultural policies that are linked to these challenges. In contrast, Malaysia and Indonesia will have to develop multiculturalism policies that recognize the economic and cultural contributions of all members of their societies to maintain their economic growth and development. The Philippines, although not faced with the same interethnic tensions and inequalities that Indonesia and Malaysia face, will need to continue to develop a multiculturalism policy that creates political and cultural spaces for outlying province such as Mindanao to avoid conflict and possible separation. Hong Kong, in many ways one of the more complex cases in this multiculturalism discussion, faces a similar demographic challenge to Singapore but a more immediate identity challenge associated with its current multiculturalism policies. It will need to balance attracting migrants to its city who can continue to contribute to its economic prosperity, to help deal with its own graying population and low birthrate while maintaining its unique Hong Kong identity forged under colonial rule and in the post-1997 reunification period.