Orientalism at home: Islamophobia in the representations of Islam and Muslims by the New Labour Government

Abstract

In the decade following 9/11, numerous studies have confirmed that anti-Muslim prejudice, commonly referred to as Islamophobia, has become a prominent feature of many societies. As a result, Muslims have been demonised and subjected to discrimination in various ways. While the role of sensationalist media and Far Right groups in perpetuating Islamophobia has been widely commented on, not enough attention has been given to the role played by mainstream politicians in fostering Islamophobia. In this article, I examine how British Cabinet ministers of the Labour Government represented Muslims and Islam in speeches given between 2001 and 2007. Using discourse analysis, I deconstruct the representations of Islam and Muslims in 111 speeches made by these influential ministers. I also consider the discourse surrounding related issues such as multiculturalism, Britishness, integration and terrorism. I argue that Islamophobia based on generalisations, assumptions and stereotypes of Islam and Muslims were present in the speeches. Thus, this article calls for an awareness of the way in which mainstream politicians in Britain have been involved in stigmatising Islam and Muslims, and perpetuating Islamophobia.

Keywords

Islamophobia Muslims representation Britain politics New Labour

There is huge and profound ignorance about Islam (Tony Blair, 2007).

Introduction

While suspicion and dislike of Islam and Muslims in Europe may have intensified after 9/11, even prior to 2001 it was recognised that Islamophobia is ‘prevalent in all sections of our society’ (The Runnymede Trust, 1997: 1). This includes within the political elite, as it has also been noted that ‘Islamophobia reaches all the way up to the highest levels of government[s]’ (Cesari, 2004: 41). One recent study has demonstrated that across the European Union, Far Right parties, some of whom have political seats in national parliaments and the EU parliament, have adopted a viciously Islamophobic mantra (Gündüz, 2010). Yet, there has been a lack of empirical analysis of how Islamophobia can be propagated by mainstream political actors. This article is concerned with the ways in which Islam and Muslims were conveyed in speeches by British Cabinet ministers of the Labour Government following 9/11 until the resignation of the former Prime Minister Tony Blair in 2007. I deconstruct the ways that these concepts and related issues were talked about, revealing the underlying connotations, assumptions and inferences that were generated. This article specifically focuses on the representations by Government ministers as prejudices are generally assumed to be confined to those with less education than those in the highest echelons of society. However, one commentator has described how ‘subtle forms [of Islamophobia] amongst the educated and well-placed elite are well-entrenched and proportionately more dangerous … [as] the elite formulates and disseminates racism to the grassroots, where it becomes more explicit and violent’ (Malik, 2004a: 9). Therefore, the potential for Islamophobia existing in these political elites must be treated very seriously because they are extremely influential at determining media headlines and setting national debates, as well as crafting policy and legislation. Mainstream politicians therefore have a huge influence on public opinion and should thus be expected to maintain high standards of responsible speech. As will be made clear in this article, such an expectation seems to have been unfulfilled and more accountability for the statements made by politicians is required.

Before explaining the methodology utilised in this research, it is important to clarify some points relating to Islamophobia. Much literature has debated the term and its definition in recent years (Allen, 2010; Esposito and Kalin, 2011; Poynting and Mason, 2007; Sayyid and Vakil, 2011). The debate has been just as active outside of academia with some on one side who are passionate about exposing Islamophobia and those on the other side who are passionate about discrediting the term. In this article, I do not consider Islamophobia as synonymous with criticism of Islam as a religion, as criticism of religion is not necessarily prejudiced. Rather, I consider Islamophobia as being about demonising Islam and/or Muslims by using stereotypes that are often historic such as that Islam/Muslims are violent, barbaric and oppressive. Islamophobia shares the same logic as racism because it essentialises a constructed group of people as having inherent qualities that cast them as inferior. Some commentators have suggested using alternative terms to Islamophobia such as ‘anti-Muslim racism’ or ‘Muslimophobia’ but I choose to use Islamophobia because it has more currency than any alternatives. Indeed, according to Brian Klug (2012) Islamophobia as a term has finally ‘come of age’ and is now accepted in academic and mainstream discussions as a legitimate concept to be understood rather than contested. The main criticisms of Islamophobia as a term are usually about its literal meaning being problematic (i.e. there is nothing wrong with opposing Islam and it is not a phobia). However, since I do not understand Islamophobia literally – just as is the case with terms like anti-Semitism and homophobia – I do not find it must be avoided. When analysing the ministers’ speeches, rather than considering whether they had an irrational fear for instance, I was more concerned with whether they essentialised Muslims as an Other and whether they stereotyped them as having innate negative qualities. Indeed, as will become clear, they did both of these.

Methodology

This article is based on an analysis of 111 speeches from 16 different Labour Cabinet ministers. These were gathered by searching on various governmental websites and news media archives for ministerial speeches in which either ‘Islam’ and/or ‘Muslims’ were mentioned between 2001 and 2007. This search located 111 speeches, some of which were quite long and some of which were fairly short. The speeches mainly mentioned Islam and Muslims briefly in the context of other issues, but there were also several high-profile speeches which were specifically about Islam and/or Muslims. The speeches were analysed using a discourse analysis approach which seeks a closer reading of a text than would normally be given. This approach considers the use of language as highly revealing about broader social processes and ideas. The speeches were deconstructed by considering the rhetorical devices used in the speeches, as well as the choice of words. In undertaking the discourse analysis, I did not only look at what was said, but just as crucially, I considered what was not said. That is because statements are not only about asserting some things but are also about not asserting others. Politicians’ statements are ideal for undertaking discourse analysis because they are carefully crafted ensembles used to articulate discourses about how the world should be seen and what solutions are the appropriate ones to the problems that are identified. The speeches were coded by identifying the common manner in which Islam and Muslims were spoken about. These reoccurring statements can be considered as discourse because they reflect a circulation of ideas conveyed as truth. The coding process was facilitated by the surprising amount of repetition of ministers’ points which is due to the UK Party political system which ensures that politicians from the same political Party express similar, if not identical, views.

‘We need to work much harder to integrate Moslems’

That I am able to draw upon so many speeches that involved Muslims and Islam is a telling observation that should not be overlooked. Throughout the ministers’ speeches, Muslims were consistently focused on in a way that other minorities were not. That Muslims were singled out in discussions concerning multiculturalism, integration and other social issues has been recognised in the literature as one way in which Muslims are specifically demonised (Ameli et al., 2007: 93; Kundnani, 2007: 6–7, 123; Malik, 2004a: xi; Modood, 2007: 4–5). The ministers seemed aware of this and so tried to counter this by repeatedly emphasising that they are not seeking to single them out. Rather, they often portrayed themselves as friends of Muslims instead. A common strategy to challenge the idea that they were disproportionately focusing on Islam or Muslims was to reject the concepts ‘Islamic terrorist’ and ‘Muslim terrorist’, such as when Tony Blair said:

[T]his is not a war with Islam. It angers me, as it angers the vast majority of Muslims, to hear Bin Laden and his associates described as Islamic terrorists. They are terrorists pure and simple. Islam is a peaceful and tolerant religion, and the acts of these people are contrary to the teachings of the Koran. (Blair, 2001)

Despite this, there were many instances when Blair and other ministers spoke of ‘Islamic extremism’, ‘Islamic terrorism’, ‘Islamic radicalism’, ‘Muslim terrorism’ and ‘Muslim fundamentalism’. To add to this, there were occasionally reminders that the extremists draw upon Islam to justify their actions. For instance, Blair (2006e) said: ‘The terrorists base their ideology on religious extremism – and not just any religious extremism, but a specifically Muslim version’. As well as this, the implication that extremism/terrorism is explicitly linked with Islamic teachings was insinuated when the ministers called on Muslims to assist the Government to put an end to extremism/terrorism by condemning it. So, for example, Hazel Blears (2007b), the former Labour Party Chair, asked Muslim leaders ‘to support the police and condemn any terrorist activity’; Ruth Kelly (2007b), the former Communities and Local Government minister, stated that ‘we ask Muslim leadership organisations to be unequivocal in their rejection of extremism’; and Jack Straw (2002), the former Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs minister, stated that ‘it should be incumbent on those who profess Islam to challenge the fanatics who cite Islam as a justification for appalling acts of violence’. So, despite there being instances when ministers rejected the idea that Islam and Muslims were the problem, there were numerous examples of them labelling Islam and Muslims as particularly problematic in relation to extremism/terrorism.

Muslims were also singled out in the 2006 furore about the Islamic face veil (niqaab), primarily by Jack Straw. He chose to describe the face veil as a ‘visible mark of separation and difference’ even though one could also say the same thing about Scottish kilts, Sikh turbans, Jewish kippahs, Japanese kimonos and Indian saris which probably have as many – if not more – people who wear them in Britain. Patricia Hewitt, the former Health minister, also targeted Muslims when she accused Muslim GPs of betraying patient confidentiality by speaking to the relatives of ladies who come to discuss private issues with them. She felt comfortable making this serious allegation without providing any evidence. Harriet Harman, the former Social Security minister, also singled out Muslims when she lamented that 60,000 Muslims were not signed up to the electoral register and were therefore undermining democracy. What is remarkable about this is that Harman failed to realise – even though she provided the figures herself in the same speech – that this equates to only around 3% of Muslims in Britain not being registered on the electoral register. When one considers that around 7% of the overall British population are not registered on the electoral register, it suggests that Muslims are ‘participating in democracy’ to a greater extent than the national average, leaving a distinct impression that this is another example of Muslims being targeted for unwarranted criticism. Other general comments that show how Muslims were repeatedly criticised were witnessed when Blair (2006c) said ‘[p]eople want to know that the Muslim community in particular, but actually all minority communities, have got the balance right between integration and multiculturalism’; when Kelly (2006b) said ‘religious forms of identity are growing – particularly among Muslims … it is hardly surprising that people in some areas feel uncomfortable’; when Peter Hain (2002), the former Welsh Secretary, said ‘we need to work much harder to integrate Moslems, in particular, with the rest of society’; and when Straw (2007b) said ‘[t]he trend towards greater segregation is most marked in some areas with large Asian, principally Muslim, populations’. Throughout the speeches then, in several ways, the ministers expressed the view that Muslims posed numerous problems. They gave the impression to the nation that Muslims are a unique strata of society that burden us. It would not be too far-fetched to say that the ministers had an obsession with Muslims and the supposed problems that they cause.

A prominent stereotype about Islam and Muslims is that they are static and monolithic, unable to change or accommodate diversity. This stereotype of Muslims as monolithic has been rejected by many who have reminded us of the diversity of Muslims around the world, including within Britain. For instance, Ibrahim Kalin (2004) has reminded us that we should ‘consider the Islamic world not as a monolithic unit but as a diverse, dynamic, and multi-faceted reality’ (p. 177). There was a conscious effort by Government ministers to show that they recognised Muslims are not one undifferentiated bloc, such as when Tony Blair (2007) said ‘Islam is not a monolithic faith, but one made up of a rich pattern of diversity’. However, in many instances, the ministers often implied Muslims are one homogenous mass by speaking of ‘the Muslim community’. This is concerning because The Runnymede Trust (1997) identified that the foundation of Islamophobia is to imagine Muslims as sealed off from other communities. Rather than having a nuanced view then, the ministers were complicit in representing Muslims as one body without recognising the different Muslim experiences that exist. It is also concerning that the ways in which Muslims were essentialised were often in negative terms as we will come to see in the subsequent sections. For example, there is a widespread stereotype that Islam is innately backward and opposed to anything modern including modernity itself (Ameli et al., 2007: 30; Kundnani, 2007: 138; Poole, 2000: 158; Ramadan, 2001: 11, 57; Waardenburg, 2003: 28). Although this has been contested by numerous Islamic scholars, the ministers repeatedly said that Muslims need to ‘modernise’ or adapt to a ‘modern culture’ in a ‘modern Britain’ or a ‘modern world’. For example, Blair (2006c) encouraged more thinking to be done ‘about Islam itself and how Islam comes to terms with and is comfortable with the modern world’. This is one example of many that show how the ministers essentialised Muslims as all suffering from the same inadequacies, by frequently juxtaposing Islam and Muslims with the notion of ‘modern’.

‘Moderate Muslims and moderates everywhere’

Although Muslims were frequently treated as one homogeneous group, there were occasions when the ministers engaged in drawing fault lines amongst Muslims. Throughout the speeches, it was extremely common for the Government ministers to talk about ‘true Muslims’ and ‘real Islam’. They often constructed two categories of ‘good Muslims’ and ‘bad Muslims’, the good ones being described as the ‘moderate’ ones and the bad ones as the extremists. For instance, Gordon Brown (2006a), the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, called for ‘partnership with moderate Muslims and moderates everywhere’. This moderate Islam was said to be characterised by being peaceful, non-violent, tolerant, respectful and loving. There has been much debate by commentators about what is meant by ‘moderate’ Islam. Many have understand ‘moderate Islam’ to be one that is reformed to abide by secular and liberal principles which reinforces the assumption that Islam is inherently problematic (Abou El Fadl, 2007: 106–107; Ramadan, 1999: 197; Waardenburg, 2003: vi). Prince El Hassan Bin Talal of Jordan has revealed the assumptions that lie behind calling for ‘moderation’ as follows:

There has been much talk of promoting ‘moderate’ Muslim belief. ‘Moderate’ is an ambiguous term. It hardly seems appropriate at this time to contemplate a wavering or uncertain approach in promoting centrist Islamic principles – such as human dignity, respect for life, justice, and generosity – as part of a wider humanitarian effort. On the contrary, such a humanitarian effort must be undertaken with vigor and certainty. We do not strive for just a moderate belief in human rights or a moderate desire for peace. (Bin Talal, 2004: 4–5)

To be a moderate Muslim is to keep one’s faith private which insinuates that any Muslim who allows their Islamic beliefs to influence their political activity is extreme. The rise of the word ‘Islamist’ in recent years as someone who allows Islam to shape their politics has thus been given negative connotations. Therefore, it appears that Muslims are expected to consider their religion as ‘of a secondary nature and pertain to their private life which means hidden, invisible, almost non-existent … In short, the Muslims should be Muslims without Islam’ (Ramadan, 1999: 184). Some suggest that these constructions of Islam are to serve political purposes, mainly in making Islam more passive by weakening the ideological resistance that Islam can muster by emphasising Islam’s spiritual dimension and reducing its political dimensions (Ameli et al., 2007: 24; Waardenburg, 2003: 361). It has also been suggested that this is why the New Labour government favoured working with the Sufi Muslim Council who adhere to the most secular, spiritual and passive form of Islam (Cesari, 2004: 50–51; Geaves, 2004: 67; Kundnani, 2007: 182).

In discussing ‘the real Muslims’ and ‘the true Islam’, extremists/terrorists were said to be abusing Islam and twisting its ‘real’ teachings as a way of justifying their political grievances. For example, David Blunkett (2003), the former Home Secretary, said ‘We tackle those who distort and destroy the name of Islam by using terrorism in a way that was never authorised by the Koran’. The ministers repeatedly called on ‘moderate’ Muslims to isolate those non-conformist Muslims they consider extreme. For example, Brown (2006a) said ‘we must take steps to isolate extremists from the moderate majority’. The ministers were unashamed in promoting a specific type of Islam then. They openly admitted that they were funding hand-picked Islamic scholars and organisations to promote a certain version of Islam. They also spoke about their role in directing mosques and giving specific syllabi to Islamic schools for them to teach. In one instance, Blair confessed that he has used certain Muslims to promote a specific version of Islam:

I am probably not the person to go into the Muslim community and persuade them that this extreme view of Islam is completely mistaken and completely contrary to the proper tenets of the religion of Islam. It is better that you mobilise the Islamic community itself to do this. (Blair, 2006a)

This interference has been described by Tariq Modood (2007) as ‘the State imposing upon Muslims its own template, plans, modes of partnership and chosen imams and leaders’ (p. 81). This interference has been criticised by some who believe it leads to Muslims feeling their religion is being distorted by outsiders thus giving more legitimacy to those who advocate extreme interpretations of Islam (Lumbard, 2004: xvii, 66; Malik, 2006: 22). This may be why some Muslims see those who consider themselves as ‘moderate Muslims’ as traitors who do not practise Islam properly. The central point in this section is not to ask whether true Islam exists or what it is. Rather, the point is to demonstrate that the ministers considered themselves to have authority in intervening with Islamic theology. In this sense then, one might describe the ministers as engaging in Orientalism since ‘[t]he Orientalist, then, sees his [sic] task as expressing the dislocation and consequently speaking the truth about Islam’ (Said, 1978: 281). Despite her involvement in defining a ‘real Islam’ and the ‘true Muslims’, Ruth Kelly (2007b) understood this point well when she said ‘Government cannot intervene in theological debates – that is for faith groups themselves’. The ministers not only saw themselves as authorities on Islamic scholarship but wandered into the territory of imposing ideological narratives on Muslims citizens by demanding that they conform to state-sanctioned interpretations of Islam. In a society which claims to respect freedom of religion and operate on secular principles, this is quite a remarkable undertaking.

‘The lack of precision of what it means to us to be British’

In a great number of the speeches, issues of national identity were raised. This reflects how Muslims have been a key feature in recent discussions about national identity in a changing world that is more globalised and diverse than ever before. Indeed, it has been recognised that ‘since Blair became leader of the Labour Party and even more since he became Prime Minister, notions of national identity have been a core part of the New Labour project’ (Dodd, 2002: 3). This has been elaborated on by Ian Bradley who has explained:

Notions of national identity have been a key part of Tony Blair’s New Labour project since its inception. Among his first priorities on becoming Prime Minister in 1997 was a personal crusade to re-brand Britain as a new, modern, forward-looking and self-consciously young country. … [There has been a] carefully thought out and historically rooted attempt to define and promote British identity in the interests of social cohesion. (Bradley, 2007: 6)

In the speeches it was argued that patriotism towards Britain needed to be increased by emphasising Britishness and British values. However, it was recognised that Britishness and British values are not well defined and need to be clarified. Jack Straw (2007a, 2007b) even went as far as suggesting that there is ‘a crisis of identity … and it shows in the lack of precision of what it means to us to be British’. The ministers often suggested that Britishness is best summed up as being about justice/the rule of law, tolerance, fairness, democracy and freedom/liberty. These discussions about Britishness were often held in relation to discussions about Muslims. More specifically, the ministers seemed to construct ideas of Britishness as something opposite to what it meant to be Muslim. It is been argued with great tenacity that historically, Muslims have been perceived as the Other of Europeans, meaning that British – and generally European – identities have often been understood as everything that Muslims are not (Ameli et al., 2007: 26; Kalin, 2004: 163, 166; Lockman, 2004: 36–37; Sajid, 2006: 7; Walker, 2005: 26, 85). Throughout history then, ‘Islam helped Britain, and especially England, in defining her own identity through a multidimensional relationship’ (Malik, 2004a: 79). After understanding that identity is constructed in relation to the Other, then it is interesting to note how the values defined as being central to Britishness (justice/the rule of law, tolerance, fairness, democracy, and freedom/liberty) are all ones which are commonly perceived as absent in Islam (Abou El Fadl, 2002: 3; Himmat, 2004: 85; Kalin, 2004: 171, 173; Kundnani, 2007: 126). This corresponds with the idea that there is a conflict between Islamic values and British values that cannot be reconciled, and that the presence of Muslims in Europe is actually threatening these values. For example, Samuel P Huntington claims Muslims are guilty of maintaining their values which contradict with ‘Western’ ideals:

Western culture is challenged by groups within Western societies. One such challenge comes from immigrants from other civilizations who reject assimilation and continue to adhere to and to propagate the values, customs, and cultures of their home societies. This phenomenon is most notable among Muslims in Europe. (Huntington, 1997: 304–305)

In the speeches, the Government ministers seemed to dispute these views by explicitly denying that Islamic values and British values contradict with one another. So, for example, Ruth Kelly (2007b) claimed that ‘Islamic values and core citizenship values are not in conflict’. British values were also frequently described as ‘common values’, ‘global values’, ‘universal values’ and ‘shared values’. The notion that British values are universal is not only contradictory (since they cannot be adopted by everyone at the same time as being unique to British national identity), but was also undermined by a constant focus on the duty of Muslims to learn and then abide by ‘core British values’. For example, Tony Blair, speaking in the context of Muslims living in Britain, warned that Muslims must adopt British values:

[W]e expect all our citizens to conform to [‘our common values’]. Obedience to the rule of law, to democratic decision-making about who governs us, to freedom from violence and discrimination are not optional for British citizens. They are what being British is about. Being British carries rights. It also carries duties. And those duties take clear precedence over any cultural or religious practice. (Blair, 2006d)

Furthermore, Hazel Blears (2007a) said that ‘we respect religious differences, but are united in a transcendant [sic] belief in democracy, human rights and the rule of law’, thus implying that some religious differences (she was talking in the context of Islam as well) are opposed to such values. A specific example of Muslims being expected to adopt values that are seen as alien to them was expressed by Kelly (2007a), who claimed ‘making [British values] resonate with some people, including a small group of younger Muslims, is a genuine challenge’, and on another occasion she suggested that Muslim children needed to be taught ‘about how to live out the values of justice, peace and respect both as a person of faith and as a citizen’ (Kelly, 2007b). Following this, she launched a project which ‘encourages young British Muslims to identify and live by the shared British values of justice, peace and respect’ (Kelly, 2007a). In these regular statements, the ministers were telling Muslims in Britain, but also the nation in general, that Muslims need to be taught morality, a trope reminiscent of the white man’s burden, a trope which singles Muslims out as inferior and in need of being civilised.

Despite this, numerous commentators have argued that values such as justice/the rule of law, tolerance, fairness, democracy and freedom/liberty can easily be derived from Islamic scriptures as most of them are fundamental Islamic principles (Abou El Fadl, 2002: 14–15, 99, 2004, 2007: 183, 208; Bin Talal, 2004: 33, 37; Voll, 2003: 125). In fact, Ian Bradley (2007) has argued that Muslims actually embody British values more than ‘indigenous’ Britons do (pp.15, 174, 199). Others point out that throughout history, the British have regularly contravened the values of justice/the rule of law, tolerance, fairness, democracy and freedom/liberty, whether in the form of the Crusades, slavery, colonialism, neo-imperialism, or the ‘War on Terror’ (Abukhattala, 2004: 168; Jenkins, 2000: 14–15, 43, 137–138; Kundnani, 2007: 177–179; Modood, 2007: 5; Said and Sharify-Funk, 2003: 23). This has been understood by Paul Gilroy (2004) who has written: ‘In Britain, our sternest leaders have comforted us with a new rule that any new arrivals will henceforth be expected to learn and to adhere to traditional norms and values even though they may not be widely practiced in the country at large’ (p. 28).

Ministers did not only call on Muslims to subscribe to values that they probably already subscribe to, but it was implied that they were refusing to enact these supposed British values. For instance, it was often stated in the speeches that British values are ‘non-negotiable’. Arun Kundnani (2007) of the Institute of Race Relations understood this as a way of saying that Muslims have nothing to contribute in the search for noble values (p. 137), but it may also be read as suggesting that Muslims are uncomfortable with adopting values such as justice, democracy and fairness and therefore want to question them. This may also be why the ministers conveyed themselves as standing against ‘political correctness’ on numerous occasions with repeated references about the need for ‘open’, ‘honest’, ‘frank’, ‘sensible’, ‘mature’, ‘proper’, ‘reasoned’, ‘calm’ and ‘direct’ discussions about issues relating to Muslims and Islam using ‘common sense’. Blair was so adamant to make this point that he repeated it several times in one speech:

[T]here is a debate that we need to have [concerning the veil]. … There is a whole question to do with integration, and my view is that we try and deal with this debate sensitively, but we have to deal with the debate. … Now we need to conduct this debate in a sensitive way, but it needs to be conducted. … I think we need a way of having this debate because I am sure it is there, … so we need to have it and we can have it I think in a sensitive way … we need to have that debate in a sensible and serious way. And even though probably most people wouldn’t have chosen that the debate started in this way, it is under way so we should engage in it. … you have got to have an honest debate about it. … So look it is a very, very sensitive issue. All I am saying is we need to have this debate about integration. (Blair, 2006c)

Remarks about the necessity of having an open debate and not being shy to discuss any issues suggest that the stereotype of Muslims being reluctant or even unable to engage in rational discussion was assumed by the ministers. Muslims are thus represented as not only trouble makers but also as unwilling to engage in dialogue.

In constructing Muslims as needing to adopt British values, the ministers propagated a clash of civilisations thesis. For instance, they claimed that there are distinct ‘Western’ and ‘Islamic’ civilisations, as was evidenced in their numerous references to ‘the Muslim world’ and ‘the Islamic world’, in distinction from ‘the West’ and ‘the Western world’. This construction has been criticised by Christopher Stonebanks (2004) who has argued that ‘creating this belief that there actually is an ‘[Islamic] world’, perhaps floating around somewhere between Venus and Jupiter [is the best way] to dehumanize a culture and a people [since it] creates a world for them, apart from our own Western world’ (p. 91). The ministers further reinforced the idea of a clash of civilisations by using personal pronouns such as ‘us’ and ‘we’ when talking about Britain and ‘they’ and ‘them’ when talking about Muslims, even if they were talking about British Muslims, thus casting Muslims as alien from an imagined ‘we’. For example, in a response to the 2001 riots that involved many Muslims in northern towns, David Blunkett (2002a) said ‘[t]hese maniacs actually burned down their own businesses, their own job opportunities. They discouraged investment in their areas’. Similarly, Tony Blair (2006c) talked about ‘the relationship between our society and how the Muslim community integrates with our society’. Muslims were treated less as British citizens and more as members of an alien civilisation, one which often was portrayed as innately different at best, and threatening at worst.

The assumption that there is a ‘clash of civilisations’ culminated in the idea that there is an ideological ‘battle for global values’ where Britain and the rest of the ‘civilised’ countries need to prove that their values are superior since the terrorists and extremists want to attack these values. So, for example, Blair (2005a) stated that ‘[w]e will show by our spirit and dignity and by a quiet and true strength that there is in the British people, that our values will long outlast theirs’. This fight over values was often described as ‘a battle for hearts and minds’. Blair has described this overall process as follows:

[I]t is a global fight about global values; it is about modernisation, within Islam and outside of it; it is about whether our value system can be shown to be sufficiently robust, true, principled and appealing that it beats theirs. … This is not just about security or military tactics. It is about hearts and minds about inspiring people, persuading them, showing them what our values at their best stand for. (Blair, 2006b)

In talking of ‘fighting’ and ‘battles’ an aggressive tone emerges that pits ‘Western civilisation’ against ‘Islamic civilisation’. Comments of this nature, during a time when Britain was engaged in highly controversial military occupations of Muslim-majority countries (Iraq and Afghanistan), can be considered as rather inflammatory.

‘In the heart of our Muslim communities’

Throughout their speeches, the ministers suggested that Britain was a victim that was under threat, and it was quite easy to draw the conclusion that the threat originated with Muslims en masse. This enabled positive self-presentation that suggested the Government only acts in self-defence to provocation rather than initiating any aggression themselves. This was exemplified in Tony Blair’s (2001) comment that ‘the al-Qaeda network threatens Europe, including Britain … [s]o we have a direct interest in acting in our self-defence to protect British lives’. These ‘new threats’ were made even more threatening by the common assertion that they are going to last for many years to come. This discourse about a ‘new and unprecedented threat’ was summed up by Ruth Kelly (2007b), who explained extremism as ‘a complex and deadly threat … It will be a major challenge to our security for a generation to come. And it is growing … It is also a new kind of threat’. The threat came from Muslims, an accusation which draws upon historical prejudices that considered Muslims as ‘an invading threat’ to Europe (Clifford, 2006: 11; Kundnani, 2007: 11; Phillips, 2007: 47, 285; Poole, 2000: 158, 162; Ramadan, 2001: 264; Said, 1997: 144; Waardenburg, 2003: 30). The ministers would be right to highlight the threat of Al Qaeda, who do want to attack Britain, but where the ministers’ statements became more problematic was when it seemed Al Qaeda and Muslims in general were used interchangeably. In this regard, the ministers were vague enough when discussing the threat that it was not clear that it was a tiny minority of Muslims who have adopted political extremism that may engage in terrorism. Rather, they implied that Muslims per se were a potential threat, adding to the already existing hysteria around terrorism that the news media propagate. Thus, the whole Muslim community was stigmatised as it was claimed that there are Al Qaeda ‘imitators in the heart of our [Muslim] communities’ (Brown, 2006a) and that extremists can be found in ‘training camps, in prisons, in bookshops, or in places of worship’ (Clarke, 2005). The ministers then were replicating Islamophobic narratives that Muslim extremists ‘are ahead of us, behind us, and within us’ (Blankley, 2005: 28–29). Due to this general suspicion of all Muslims, Hazel Blears (2005) openly admitted ‘that some of our counter-terrorism powers will be disproportionately experienced by the Muslim community’. It has been argued that the fear generated by all these claims that Britain faces a ‘new age of insecurity and uncertainty’ (Reid, 2006b) has led to the loss of civil liberties for Muslims who are all imagined as potential extremists or an ‘enemy-within’ (Allen, 2003: 9; Ameli et al., 2007: 29–30, Cesari, 2004: 35; Choudhury, 2005: 19–20; EUMC, 2006: 6; Fekete, 2006: 36, 39; Kundnani, 2007: 8, 128; Malik, 2004a: 99, 182; Modood, 2007: 4–5). For example, Nadeem Malik (2004b), a Muslim solicitor, recently reviewed several key pieces of legislation in Britain, coming to the conclusion that ‘when considering even fleetingly a few recent legislative developments, that British Muslims are not being given the same rights and freedoms that others enjoy’ (p. 66). The response by the ministers to these types of accusations was either to dismiss them by claiming ‘Muslims in the UK enjoy the same rights and legal protection from abuses that all other citizens do’ (Blears, 2006) or to claim that they are necessary as the need to maintain security takes priority over the liberties of Muslims.

‘There are many young people in Muslim communities’

As explained in the previous section, it was often implied that Muslims in Britain are a threat to the nation, and in an earlier section, it was also highlighted that Muslims are seen as a threat to British values. In other instances, it was common for the ministers to describe Muslims as ‘vulnerable’, ‘disaffected’, ‘disillusioned’, ‘alienated’ and ‘susceptible to indoctrination, radicalisation and brainwashing’. For example, Ruth Kelly (2007b) talked about extremists who ‘seek to groom the disaffected and vulnerable [using] techniques to turn young people into tools for extremist violence’ and John Reid (2006a), the former Defence minister, warned Muslim parents that ‘there are fanatics who are looking to groom and brainwash children in these communities, including your children’. This portrayal suggests Muslims lack the critical thinking skills to evaluate extremist ideology and make an informed judgement about its content. This dovetails with a common representation of Muslims, and minorities in general, who may be viewed as lacking agency and simply being a product of their culture (Baumann, 1998: 1; The Runnymede Trust, 1997: 5, 7). This has been rejected as it is argued that ‘Muslim communities in Britain and Western Europe are not mere mute spectators on the sidelines but constitute active constellations negotiating several strategies of cooption and resistance’ (Malik, 2004a: 97). This portrayal of passive and again, uncooperative Muslims, seems unfair.

It was often ‘young Muslims’ who were specifically patronised – as can be seen in the above comments by Kelly and Reid – who were considered the most susceptible to extremist influences. For example, Kelly (2007a) asked ‘are we doing enough to reach those most at risk from extremist messages – particularly disaffected young men?’. Hazel Blears (2007b) answered that by saying ‘it’s really important to reach out to young people – and there are many young people in Muslim communities’. Perhaps this stigmatisation of young Muslim men is why they are the ones who are often affected most aggressively by Islamophobia, which is why ‘it is bearded young Muslim men that are likely to be stopped and searched by the police and experience arbitrary arrest’ (Modood, 2007: 61). Peter Mandaville (2002) has dismissed the accusations that Muslim youth are weak minded by arguing that they are adept at constructing their creative, complex and fluid identities by drawing upon aspects of their religion (pp. 219–220). Therefore, he concludes, one should not ignore ‘the complicated and creative richness of the contemporary Muslim youth culture in Europe’ (Mandaville, 2002: 220). The ministers, however, were guilty of demonising Muslim youth as a group that the rest of society should be concerned about. The stigmatisation of young Muslims has recently also been apparent in debates about universities being ‘hotbeds of extremism’ (Abbas, 2006: xvi–xvii;Phillips, 2007: 149), but the major way it materialised in the speeches was through the suspicion of madrassahs (Islamic schools), which were perceived as places where extremism could be forced onto young people. Madrassahs became key sites which the Government planned to intervene in by closing the ones deemed extreme and proscribing a standard curriculum for the rest. This is reminiscent of Britain’s colonial era in India, when the British authorities established their own madrassahs to ensure Muslims were being educated ‘the correct’ way (Seddon, 2004: 24). Here is another example of non-Muslim ministers dictating to Muslims what they can, and cannot believe in, as if they are undertaking imperialism at home.

‘The veil is about radicalisation’

One of the most predominant stereotypes about Islam and Muslims is that they are excessively patriarchal and oppressive of females (Abou El Fadl, 2007: 250; Kalin, 2004: 173, 18–20; Malik, 2004a: 102; Poole, 2000: 158; Ramadan, 1999: 113–114; The Runnymede Trust, 1997: 28–29; Waardenburg, 2003: 28). This view has been challenged by numerous scholars who, whilst recognising that some Muslim women – like women in all societies and cultures – are exploited and subjugated, identify that not only does Islam provide the potential resources for an interpretation that values women, but also that many Muslim women are assertive in how they engage with Islam (Abou El Fadl, 2007: 262–264; Abukhattala, 2004: 161–163; Jawad, 2003: 9–11; Kundnani, 2007: 138; Malik, 2004a: 86–87, 105; Werbner, 2002: 263–264). Loubna Skalli (2004) has explained how Muslim women have been considered by ‘Westerners’ as victims of their Islamic heritage without even being consulted first. She explains that some believe Muslim women are in need of liberation from ‘the West’, to the extent where they have become the site where the battle between ‘East’ and ‘West’ is played out, by Muslims who try to ensure Muslim women abide by Islamic traditions, and by ‘Westerners’ who try to ‘modernise’ them in order to provide, what she calls, ‘pseudo-liberation’. Skalli goes on to explains how this was played out in colonial times:

The colonial regimes revealed an exaggerated interest in the life and conditions of Muslim women. They professed to educate them and liberate them from the oppressive yokes of their religion and men. The colonialist logic attributed the backwardness of Muslim societies and the inferiority of their cultures particularly to two main observed practices: veiling and seclusion of women. These became the emblem of both women’s oppression and their culture’s backwardness. (Skalli, 2004: 46–47)

It is remarkable that the two issues identified by Skalli as ways in which colonial authorities would undermine Muslims were also present in the ministers’ speeches. The ministers spoke about the abolition of the veil and the need for women to be more prominent in the public sphere. So, for example, there were calls by numerous ministers for Muslim women to remove their veils. The strongest proponent of this was Harriet Harman, who said:

I want women to be fully included. If you want equality, you have to be in society, not hidden away from it. … [I am concerned about] the young women whose mothers fought against the veil, and who now see their daughters taking it up as a symbol of their fervent commitment to their religion. … [The veil] is about radicalisation and solidarity with community. But I don’t want people to show solidarity by [wearing] something that prevents them taking their full role as women in society. … The veil is an obstacle to women’s participation, on equal terms, in society. (Harman, 2006)

What is implied by Harman, as well as by Jack Straw (2006) when he said that he tells ladies with veils on ‘that this is a country built on freedoms’ (Straw, 2006), is that women who wear veils are being forced to wear them, reiterating the stereotype that Muslim women are exclusively and always oppressed. This could also be witnessed when Straw (2006) claimed that ‘most I ask [to remove the veil] seem relieved I have done so. Last Friday was a case in point. The veil came off almost as soon as I opened my mouth’ and also when he said that he encountered ‘some surprises’ when he discovered ‘that the husband had played no part in her decision [to wear the veil]’. The ministers not only encouraged a removal of some aspect of clothing that some Muslims hold precious, but also demanded that Muslim women join the workforce in greater numbers. Jacques Waardenburg has a different take on the plight of Muslim women in Britain today:

An increasing number of Muslim women [in Britain] are now working with paid jobs outside the home. … Muslim women associations, parallel to the existing Muslim men associations, attract members. Women are now playing a greater role in the public domain, also in representative functions for Muslim communities. (Waardenburg, 2003: 318)

Despite this observation, the stereotype of Muslim women being prevented from working was still present in the ministers’ speeches as it was often claimed that Muslim women need to be liberated into the public domain. For example, when addressing a Muslim audience, John Reid (2006a) said, ‘I am glad to see that there are so many women here to engage in this discussion today’. Elsewhere, Hazel Blears said:

I believe that Muslim women should, and will, play an increasingly important role in their communities. At the end of this month a report will be published that will outline a strategy for increasing engagement with Muslim women across the country. This type of engagement is the key to further improving understanding with Muslim communities. (Blears, 2006)

It is worth noting how Blears suggested that Muslim women are part of the solution to extremism. This was also apparent in other speeches, such as when Tony Blair (2006d) said ‘the extremism we face is usually from men not women’. This ‘privileging’ of Muslim women has been theorised by Nada Elia (2006) who has argued that Muslim women in ‘the West’ are viewed in a more favourable light than Muslim men because Muslim women are not seen as a threat in the way that Muslim men are, but rather as redeemable and helpful in the desire to modernise Islam. Concern for women’s rights is usually an honourable endeavour, but in these cases it appears as though the ministers were simply reinforcing stereotypes of Muslim women as passive, and of Muslim men as repressive. They failed to recognise that Muslim men and Muslim women do not always conform to these stereotypes and also that there are non-Muslim women who suffer significant sexism, and non-Muslim men who are oppressive of women.

‘For too long we overvalued what makes us different’

Throughout the ministers’ speeches, there were contradictory statements that made it difficult to decipher what they were trying to convey. On the one hand ministers often made positive, liberal and welcoming statements, but then went on to undermine these very statements through providing other statements with a much more sinister undertone. This is captured in a statement by Blair (2006d), who said: ‘Our tolerance is part of what makes Britain, Britain. So, conform to it; or don’t come here’. Various other examples throughout this article have shown how the ministers shifted regularly between inclusive statements and prejudicial ones. Yet, it was in the ministers’ discussion of multiculturalism and diversity that these contradictions were most apparent. So, on the one hand, the ministers sometimes celebrated multiculturalism and diversity, but, on the other hand, were critical of it for preventing ‘community cohesion’. So, while there were positive messages such as by Hazel Blears (2007a) who said: ‘I believe that Britain is an exemplar of how a multi–faith, multi–ethnic nation can work in practice … Britain remains a fair, tolerant country, where communities respect one another and people live in peace’, there were also more depressing messages from the likes of Gordon Brown (2006b) who said: ‘[P]eople yearn for a Britain of stronger, safer and more cohesive communities … for too long we overvalued what makes us different, it is time to also value what we believe in common a shared national purpose for our country’. The ministers seemed unclear about whether multiculturalism had been successful or detrimental. Tony Blair’s comments reveal the confusion and discomfort that appeared in relation to multiculturalism:

I never know, although I use the term myself occasionally, quite what people mean when they talk about multiculturalism. If they mean people living in their separate cultures and never integrating at any point together, I think that’s actually certainly not what I mean by the word and I don’t think it’s what most people would regard as sensible. (Blair, 2005b)

So, the ministers on the one hand praised multiculturalism and claimed Britain was a successfully functioning multicultural society, and then on the other hand criticised it for ‘emphasising difference’. The ministers seemed to reconcile their position by talking of celebrating diversity in the same breath as calling for the need to promote ‘core British values’. Thus, there were several examples of the same minister claiming in one instance that ‘[p]eople must be free to choose how to lead their lives, what religion to follow, and so on’ (Blunkett, 2002b) but elsewhere saying ‘[w]e have norms of acceptability and those who come into our home – for that is what it is – should accept those norms just as we would have to do if we went elsewhere’ (Blunkett, 2001). Similarly, Blair said on one occasion that ‘Christians, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs and other faiths have a perfect right to their own identity and religion, to practice their faith and to conform to their culture. This is what multicultural, multi-faith Britain is about’ (Blair, 2006d), but elsewhere said people who ‘come [to Britain must] play by our rules and our way of life. If they don’t then they are going to have to go’ (Blair, 2005b). The mixed messages about whether multiculturalism works, whether minorities are entitled to participate in their own cultures and what integration really means left much unanswered. Some prominent commentators argue that what is really sought from Muslims when ‘integration’ is talked about is ‘assimilation under the guise of multiculturalism’, since New Labour – which championed multiculturalism when they first came into power in 1997 – later retreated from mulitculturalism and expected minorities to conform to ‘Britishness’ (Bradley, 2007: 7; Holohan, 2006; Kundnani, 2007: 6–7, 123; Mason, 2000: 2; Modood, 2003: 13, 2007: 47–48). Assimilation can also be understood to be the desire of the ministers, since the speeches place overwhelming emphasis on the ‘duty’ and ‘responsibility’ for Muslims to do the work of achieving ‘community cohesion’ by such things as learning about British history, engaging in British culture, learning English, contributing to society and developing a sense of belonging, without any mention of what ‘indigenous Britons’ must to do accommodate minorities. These concerns were often specifically targeted towards Muslims since, to bring us full circle back to the first section, it was Muslims who were singled out for attention with regard to discussions about the shortcomings of multiculturalism and the need for integration. For instance, Blair (2006c) expressed concern about ‘how we make sure that the Muslim community integrates with British society’ and elsewhere Kelly (2006a) said, ‘we underline [Muslims’] responsibility to integrate and contribute to the local community’. Throughout all of the speeches then, there were very few instances where any ‘duty to accommodate’ was mentioned, but there was a significant amount of emphasis on the ‘duty to integrate’ for Muslims.

Conclusion

This article has investigated the representations of Islam and Muslims by Labour Cabinet ministers between 2001 and 2007. Writing in 2000 when the Labour government was still in its early years, Yasmin Alibhai-Brown wrote:

In the latter half of the 1990s there are some optimistic indications that we are getting at least the domestic leadership we deserve. Gordon Brown is only one of the voices making the kind of statement the nation needs to hear, frequently and passionately, from all our leaders. It is important to note that between 1997 and 1998, three British Prime Ministers, three leaders of opposition parties, the Queen and Prince Charles, all made speeches which rejoiced in multicultural Britain... The language used by key figures is at last moving on. … (2000: 116–117)

In this passage, Alibhai-Brown, a long time anti-racist activist, reflects the hope that existed at the dawn of the new millennium that with New Labour, Britain was embarking on a period when racism would be stamped out and diversity would be embraced since it appeared to be such a key feature of the New Labour project in the early years. Following the 2001 riots that involved many Muslims in northern towns, as well as 9/11, the Labour government’s approach seemed to drastically shift towards a much more intolerant one. Derek McGhee has argued in The End of Multiculturalism? (2008) that the New Labour government have been complicit in demonising Muslims in Britain even since 2001, specifically under the ‘War on Terror’. The analysis conducted of the ministers’ speeches in this research would concur that the ministers often perpetuated Islamophobia.

The ministers often spoke about Muslims rather than to them, reflecting a tendency to treat Muslims as outsiders rather than as respected citizens. Muslims were often portrayed as troublemakers who require special attention because of their inadequacies. Although the ministers often spoke about Al Qaeda and extremists as the problem makers, the generalised discussion of Muslims often implicated the broader Muslim community as just as dangerous as the very small extreme minority. More specifically, I have shown in this article that Muslims were often treated monolithically, that the ministers took it upon themselves to dictate to Muslims which Islamic beliefs they should believe in, that Islam was presented as opposed to Britishness, that Muslims were insinuated to be alien, that Muslims were perceived as a threat to British values and British security (especially young Muslim men) and that Muslims were implied to be sexist. Overall, the ministers painted a picture of a multiculturalism which has failed because of Muslims choosing to live separate lives. Their proposed solution was for Muslims to ‘integrate’, which appeared to mean ‘assimilate’, as no discussion was made of how to accommodate Muslims, but much was made of the need for Muslims to make drastic changes. Overall, their representations of Muslims were not only negative, but were arguably inaccurate. The ministers seemed out of touch with Muslims who live in Britain, as if they wanted to believe in the stereotypes that exist about Muslims instead of represent Muslims accurately. In light of this, a further study could examine Muslims’ responses to negative representations to assess whether negative representations lead to self-fulfilling prophecies, thus meaning that the ministers were part of the problem rather than the solution

It was apparent from the 111 speeches that the ministers were often adhering to a ‘Party line’, meaning that they were not speaking as individuals but had been briefed centrally with what to say. That was evident because so many of the statements were almost identical even when made by different ministers on different occasions. The ministers therefore echoed each other and it remains unclear who orchestrated the messages and whether any of the ministers were aware that they were involved in producing Islamophobic generalisations, stereotypes and misrepresentations. As numerous examples throughout this article have shown, the ministers were highly skilled in delivering contradictory points that seemed to welcome Muslims in one instance, but then deride them in others. That is why one can find examples of the ministers collaborating with Muslims in some instances but making rather offensive comments in others. Moreover, the prejudice contained within the speeches was not as blatant as it could have been. Instead, it was more polite in nature but nonetheless, still present. Overall, this ambiguity could be related to the New Labour project which has often been described as ‘centrist’, or seeking to ‘have it both ways’.

In summary, according to the interpretation of the speeches in this analysis, Islamophobia was common in the New Labour ministers' speeches. The seminal report that introduced the severity of Islamophobia in Britain explained that ‘[t]he UK Government’s official stance [towards Muslims] is one of welcome and inclusion … It is a fine aspiration. The reality, however, frequently falls short’ (The Runnymede Trust, 1997: 1). I would endorse this statement, as this article has demonstrated that varying forms of Islamophobia existed in the ministers’ statements. Since negative representations of Muslims and Islam can lead to Muslims experiencing unacceptable prejudice and discrimination in their everyday lives, especially when undertaken by society’s respected elite, Islamophobic representations by mainstream politicians must be challenged by pointing out the inconsistencies, misconceptions and contradictions that are contained within them.

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