Ethnic groups and a dynamic of boundary making among co-ethnics: An experience from Croatian Istria

Abstract

In this article, we explore ethnic group boundaries within a context of contemporary Istria. It is maintained that the local population of Istria has a strong regional identity and that boundaries between the members of local Croat majority and the researched minority and immigrant groups are characterised by blurred group boundaries. It is argued that these people are engaged in multiple forms of boundary making which challenge the ethno-national understanding of entitlement to the in-group membership in a local imagined community. Among other things, it is indicated in the article that ethnic minority groups, such as Italians in Istria, who make a large effort in boundary making to maintain their cultural heritage, are preferred by the ethnic majority as full-fledged members of the local community than certain groups of co-ethnics. The study is based on extensive qualitative data material gathered in Croatia in the period 2009–2013. The ethnographic material comprises 45 interviews with domicile ethnic Croats, domicile members of the Italian minority and Bosnian–Herzegovinian migrants residing in Croatia and Istria.

Keywords

Croatia ethnic boundaries Istria migrants regional identities

Several studies on social distance in the contemporary Balkans show that members of the ethnic majority have negative attitudes toward other ethnic groups (Bieber, 2007; Hodson et al., 1994; Šiber, 1997). Interconnections between ethnicity and nationalism have influenced socio-political developments in Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia and other countries of the former Yugoslavia. Ethnicity and nationalism have impacted on developments in several social fields such as the process of post-war reconciliation, countries’ civic life, inter-ethnic friendships, political power sharing, countries’ foreign policies and the process of repatriation of refugees (Bieber, 2007; Mesić and Bagić, 2010; Mylonas, 2013; O'Loughlin, 2010). But can we find, within such contexts, cases in which social distance, preferences and cohesion do not follow ethnic boundaries? In this article, this question of boundaries looks at two different, but complementary, facets: (i) which ethnic minority is included in the Istrian imagined community and which segments of the ethnic and migrant community stand as negative reference groups?; (ii) which strategies of boundary making are deployed by the ethnic and migrant groups in order to be recognised as a legitimate part of society?

Guided by constructionist ideas of boundary making (Barth, 1969; Brubaker, 2004; Wimmer, 2009), we explore the dynamics of boundary fluctuations including the variations in social closure within the ethnic group. Although we acknowledge that ethnicity is significant in contemporary multi-ethnic societies, both in politics and in everyday life, it is nevertheless relevant to nuance simplified understandings of ethnicity as static, supportive and exclusive genuine community, which are often (mis)used by political elites (Brubaker, 2004; Skrbiš, 2005; Wimmer, 2009).

Inspired by the above theoretical perspectives, we assume that belonging and inclusion in the ethnic group are not static, but that inclusion is often negotiated. Ethnic groups are not hard, mutually exclusive entities. Perhaps even more importantly, we also assume that, even in ethnically delineated societies, some categories of the ethnic others will be preferred by the ethnic majority as full-fledged members of the local community rather than certain groups of co-ethnics.

In order to illuminate the dynamic relationship between inter-group distinctions and ethnicity, we have chosen to scrutinise contemporary constructions of the Croatian majority and two specific ethnic minority and migrant groups in Croatia: the Italian ethnic minority and Croats from Bosnia–Herzegovina. Our study is based on extensive ethnographic work carried out in Croatia/Istria in the period 2009–2013.¹ The choice of these two groups and the geographical context is intentional and strategic. We have chosen this particular case since, to our knowledge, there are few studies that illuminate the situation, identities and boundary making of these two groups, and there are even fewer studies, if any, that compare their position vis-à-vis the ethnic majority. Furthermore, the Istria peninsula is a part of Croatia characterised by a multi-ethnic population, including a visible Italian minority, a well-established bilingual education system and a considerable foreign-born population. According to the last census from 2011, 200,000 people live in Istria and 68% of the Istria population declare themselves as Croats. Italians are the largest minority group in Istria. According to the census, 14,000 Italians live in Istria. Drawing from previous relevant studies (Ashbrook, 2005; Banovac and Boneta, 2006; Čapo Žmegač, 2005), we assume that this particular case, and the above mentioned comparison, is especially suitable to use as an example that may illuminate the dynamic of ethnic boundary making (Eriksen, 1993; Wimmer, 2009).

The article is divided into three parts. In the first section, we outline relevant previous research and discuss our methodology. In the second part, we briefly outline the ethnic minority and migrant population in Croatia and discuss the group markers and structural factors that influence boundary formations. In the third, we place a major focus on how boundaries between the minority and majority are constructed and negotiated. Here, we use a modified version of Wimmer's (2008a) model of boundary making and -unmaking. The proposed model and typology are used to analyse which aspects of identity and social markers entitle the minority to inclusion in the local community and primary groups of the dominant ethnic group. In the last part of the article, we investigate minorities’ experiences and their attempts at ‘boundary maintenance’, ‘boundary redrawing’ and ‘boundary transcendence’ (Wimmer, 2008a).

Relevant previous research

A large number of studies discuss ethnicity and how boundaries between ethnic groups are constructed, negotiated and maintained (Barth, 1969; Brubaker, 2004; Wimmer, 2009). There are also large numbers of studies on ethnicity, ethnic (in)tolerance and nationalism in the Western Balkans (Eriksen, 1993; Hodson et al., 1994; Massey et al., 1999; Mylonas, 2013) and an increasing number of studies on ethnic distance which indicate how Croats perceive various minority groups (Ashbrook, 2005; Banovac and Boneta, 2006; Šiber, 1997). Some of the previous studies have direct relevance for our investigation into ethnic boundary making in Croatia and Istria while others provide the theoretical frame for our analysis. We can place the relevant studies roughly into three categories.

The first category includes studies that explore the position and identities of ethnic minorities and immigrants in Croatia (Ashbrook, 2005, 2011; Babić et al., 2011; Banovac and Boneta, 2006; Klemenčić and Zupančić, 2007). Here, we may also find surveys on ethnic distance and attitudes of the ethnic majority toward various ethnic minorities in Croatia (Banovac and Boneta, 2006; Šiber, 1997). Within this category, we also find several studies that discuss the position and identities of minorities and migrants in Croatia, including ethnic Croats who migrated to Croatia from neighbouring countries (Ashbrook, 2005; Čapo Žmegač, 2005; Gregurović, 2005).

Several of the aforementioned studies indicate that Croats express considerable intolerance and social distance toward certain minority groups (Banovac and Boneta, 2006; Bieber, 2007). Negative attitudes seem to be strongest toward ethnic Serbs, Roma people and Albanians (Banovac and Boneta, 2006; Šiber, 1997), while other ethnic minority groups, such as Italians, seem to have a much better image among the Croatian majority (Banovac and Boneta, 2006). Several studies also show that co-ethnics, who migrated to Croatia from neighbouring countries, in particular Bosnian–Herzegovinian Croats resident in Croatia, often struggle to gain recognition as fully fledged members of Croatian society (Ashbrook, 2005, Gregurović, 2005; Valenta et al., 2011). Ashbrook's study (2005) is of direct relevance for our analysis as he also discusses how Istrian Croats perceive Croats from Herzegovina and Central Bosnia. However, it should be noted that our analysis goes beyond Ashbrook's study as he focuses exclusively on the perceptions and experiences of the Istrian majority (Ashbrook, 2005).

The second category of studies of relevance for this article includes research that focuses on the socio-political characteristics of contemporary, post-communist Istria (Ashbrook, 2005; Cocco, 2010). Here, we find studies that discuss the relationship between Istria and the state of Croatia in the post-Yugoslav period. Among other things, the studies focus on the identities of Istrians and Istrian regionalism (Ashbrook, 2005, 2011; Cocco, 2010). Within this category, we also find studies that analyse how Istrians perceive themselves vis-à-vis other Croats, and researchers who compare the attitudes of domicile Istrians with the attitudes of Croats in other regions of Croatia (Banovac, 2009; Banovac and Boneta, 2006). The aforementioned research provides important knowledge about the social field within which the group boundaries are constructed. Among other things, it indicates that Istrian regional sentiments stand strong and that they sometimes may oppose and exhibit resentment toward the ethno-nationalist attitudes that dominated Croatian politics and society in the 1990s (Ashbrook, 2005; Cocco, 2010). It is also evident that Istrians experience less social distance toward ethnic minorities compared to other parts of Croatia (Banovac, 2009; Banovac and Boneta, 2006). There are several factors that may impact on how ethnic minorities are perceived locally in Istria. It is acknowledged that Istria is among the most developed parts of Croatia and some authors discuss the degree of Istrian tolerance to others with reference to modernisation theories (Banovac, 1997; Banovac and Boneta, 2006). It is also maintained that Istria has, for centuries, been a borderland between states. In this borderland region, various ethnic groups have had a long and mainly positive experience of inter-ethnic interaction. These good inter-ethnic relationships were not undermined during the period of disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation (Cocco, 2010).² However, it seems that most authors explain the relatively greater ethnic tolerance in Istria with Istrian regionalism, and point out that the regional political elites focused on multiculturalism and ethnic tolerance in order to strengthen their local position through distinguishing and distancing themselves from the national political elites (Ashbrook, 2011; Banovac, 2009; Banovac and Boneta, 2006; Cocco, 2010). Also, Ashbrook's aforementioned study on Istrian perceptions of the co-ethnic is compatible with the regionalism thesis (Ashbrook, 2005). Among other things, he argues that Istrians use the co-ethnics as negative reference groups in the process of strengthening their regional Istrian identity. In the words of the author:

As did Croatian nationalists during the war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina when describing the essential social and cultural features of the Serbian nation, Istrian Croats, too, were guilty of the perpetuation of same stereotypes in separating themselves from their co-nationals. (Ashbrook, 2005: 478)

Ashbrook (2005) indicates that many Istrians view the co-ethnics from Bosnia–Herzegovina as nationalistic, rural, backward and Balkan-oriented while they see themselves as sophisticated, urban, tolerant, multicultural and Western. As we will soon see, our findings concur with Ashbrook's study. Yet, reading Ashbrook's analysis, one may get the impression that negative attitudes produce clear, impenetrable boundaries between Croats in Istria and their co-ethnics from Bosnia–Herzegovina. In what follows, we argue that boundaries between the two co-ethnic groups fluctuate and that they are, rather, blurred and negotiable. We maintain that a nuanced understanding of group boundaries between various ethnic categories and sub-categories presupposes a detailed focus on the experiences of those involved. It also requires a larger focus on differences in people's resources, as well as a contextualised analysis of boundary markers and boundary shifts. In other words, a nuanced analysis presupposes the use of constructivist theoretical perspectives on ethnicity, which leads us to the third category of studies relevant for this article (Barth, 1969; Brubaker, 2004; Fox and Jones, 2013; Morosanu and Fox, 2013; Wimmer, 2009).

The third category of studies relevant for this article includes several theoretical discussions on ethnicity and ethnic boundaries. Barth's (1969) seminal work on ethnic boundary making has reintroduced and modernised the classical Weberian argument that ethnic groups are subjectively constructed in relation to, and interaction with, other groups (Sekulić, 2007; Wimmer, 2009). The core of Barth's arguments is that it is not the common culture of the ethnic group that creates the group, but that that the groups emerge and develop their own self-understanding in relation to each other. As Barth (1969) pointed out, the cultural characteristics that are used as relevant markers of group distinction and cultural dissimilarity are arbitrary and do not necessarily have any relation to a cultural act. In line with boundary-making arguments, several researchers show how the usage of markers involved in boundary making in the former Yugoslav republics is influenced by social, political and other structural processes (Eriksen, 1993; Sekulić, 2007). Among the best-known examples are an increase in focus on religion as a marker, and in focus on linguistic and dialectal differences and the construction of new ones, in the process of boundary making (Bugarski, 2012; Eriksen, 1993; Sekulić, 2007; Vrcan, 2006).

There is also a large number of constructivist studies following the ‘boundary-making paradigm’ (Fox and Jones, 2013; Wimmer, 2009), which argue that shared ethnicity does not necessarily produce community solidarity and social closure. According to the same line of thought, social preferences and solidarity between people are flexible, situational and, in some cases, may be based on ethnicity while in others these are based on shared class position, local belonging, political orientation, lifestyle and values (Brubaker, 2004; Eriksen, 1993; Fox and Jones, 2013; Sekulić, 2007; Wimmer, 2009). There are also other relevant concepts and distinctions that are frequently mentioned in the studies which may be of relevance for our investigation, such as a distinction between different strategies aimed at boundary shifting, as well as distinctions between ‘stigmatised and symbolic identities’, and ‘blurred and bright/salient ethnic boundaries’ (Alba, 2005; Gans, 1979; Valenta, 2009; Wimmer, 2008a).

In what follows, we link several of the aforementioned ideas and concepts in our analysis of constructions and boundary making of the local majority and the two selected minority groups. In line with above mentioned social constructivist paradigm, we acknowledge that ethnic groups are not hard, mutually exclusive entities (Brubaker, 2004; Sekulić, 2007; Wimmer, 2009). Although we use the group concept throughout the paper, it is demonstrated that group identities are dynamic constructs. Guided by the above mentioned research and perspectives, we try to identify markers involved in the construction of various group identities, how the people who ascribe to Croatian and Italian identity perceive each other and which boundary-making strategies they use, if any.

Method

This article is based on qualitative data material collected in Croatia between 2009 and 2013. By means of qualitative interviews and participant observation, we obtained information from 45 people regarding their perspectives on the Italian minority and migrants from Bosnia–Herzegovina in Croatia, and their Croatian counterparts (friends, relatives, spouses, neighbours, etc.).³ Twelve were migrants from Bosnia–Herzegovina, while 19 were domicile Croats and 14 were members of the Italian minority in Istria. Informants’ gender ratio was roughly equal (24 men, 21 women), and their average age was 36 (range: 21–66). As both researchers and informants speak Croatian, all interviews were carried out in the Croatian language.

Glaser and Strauss pointed out that ‘joint collection, coding, and analysis of data should “intertwine continually”’ (2008: 43). We have adopted the inductive nature of grounded theory, but with certain reservations: we did not hesitate to associate emerging categories and hypothesis with theoretical discussions on ethnicity and ethnic boundaries (Barth, 1969; Brubaker, 2004; Wimmer, 2008b).

The coding ranged from open coding to axial and selective coding.⁴ The questions in interview guides were designed with the aim of exploring two major topics: (i) markers, identities, perspectives on social distance; and (ii) the boundary-making strategies. In the earlier stages of our data gathering, the open coding involved the use of particularly meaningful phrases from participants as codes. An identity-related typology emerged as the most significant. The typology included four key concepts: (i) regional identity; (ii) ethnic identity; (iii) stigmatised identity; and (iv) symbolic identity.

We have gathered data in different parts of Croatia/Istria as it was assumed that we would find certain local differences between constructions of identities in rural and urban areas, and in northern and coastal areas. However, we have not indicated any clear categories which would contribute to the arguments of researchers who study the rural–urban divide regarding boundary making or other regional and local geographical differences in construction of ethnic boundaries in Istria (Banovac, 2004, 2009; Sujoldžić, 2008). As we did not manage to indicate any clear rural–urban differences in Istria regarding the above mentioned typology, we gradually departed from this assumption.⁵ In the later stages of our data gathering, we tried instead to extend our understanding of the above mentioned typology and investigate the links between the aforementioned concepts and varieties of boundary-making strategies. Between 2012 and 2013, our questions were designed with the primary aim of exploring the regional dimensions of boundary making in Istria. During the fieldwork in 2012–2013, we carried out 25 targeted qualitative interviews with domicile Istrians (17) and with migrants from Bosnia–Herzegovina (8). Three separate, but compatible, sets of interview guides were developed. At the same time, we adjusted the use of the guidelines in line with the local logic of the interview situation and used them in a semi-structured manner. At this stage, the initial, general themes and typologies were nuanced and new ones emerged (such as topics related to differences between boundary blurring, crossing and redrawing). In the last stage of our analysis, the interviews and the selective and axial coding were primarily related to more specific interconnections between boundary-making strategies and informants’ ethnic and regional identities, and how they are linked to resources and the surrounding structures.

At this point, we should mention that the largest focus in Croatia has been on the construction of ethnic boundaries between the Serbs and Croats (Ramet, 2006; Ramet et al., 2008; Sekulić, 2007). Disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation in the early 1990s marked the start of several bloody conflicts, both in Croatia and Bosnia–Herzegovina, which have resulted in a heightened sense of ethnic awareness and attachment (Eriksen, 1993; Sekulić et al., 2006; Šiber, 1997).We acknowledge that there are also many other group boundaries in Croatia that follow various ethnic and regional lines or that are related to social background, place of birth and the above mentioned urban–rural divide (Ashbrook, 2005; Banovac, 2004; O'Loughlin, 2010; Sujoldžić, 2008). However, our fieldwork and the subsequent analysis of the gathered qualitative data had a more selective focus. Our analysis started with two rough distinctions. The first distinction was between constructions of autochthonous ethnic minorities and immigrants, and the second was between constructions of co-ethnic and members of other ethnic groups. The following pages will be organised in line with these constructions. Later in the analysis, the initial typology is developed in order to create a version of Wimmer's (2008a, 2008b) boundary-making model. Here, we relate the categories proposed by Wimmer to other theoretical distinctions such as distinctions between: (i) ‘stigmatized and symbolic identities’; (ii) ‘boundary maintenance’ and ‘boundary transcendence’; and (iii) distinction between boundary redrawing on regional and ethnic principles.⁶

Ethic and migrant groups in Croatia and Istria

Before World War II, approximately 200,000 Italians lived in Istria, and other parts of Croatian coastal area which, during the period 1918–1943, formed part of the Italian state. Most of these people migrated during the period 1947–1953, when these territories become part of Yugoslavia (Klemenčić and Zupančić, 2007). According to the last census from 2011, there are 17,000 Italians in Croatia and 12,500 of them live in the Istrian County.⁷ Although the Italian community in contemporary Croatia and Istria is relatively small, the Italian language, schools, kindergartens, newspapers and organisations are an integral part of Istrian daily life (Centro Di Ricerche [CRS], 2009; Klemenčić and Zupančić, 2007). This is especially the case in the western, coastal parts of Istria and parts of Istria that are close to the border with Slovenia, where between 30 and 50% of population are native Italian speakers.

It seems that the Italian minority in Istria, and Croatia in general, has a positive image (Banovac, 2009; Banovac and Boneta, 2006). The studies show that the Croatian majority experiences considerably lower social distance from Italians than from any other minority groups that were mentioned in the studies (such as Serbs, Albanians and Roma), and that the distance from Italians is lowest in Istria (Banovac, 2009; Banovac and Boneta, 2006). Our qualitative findings also suggest that Italians in Istria do not experience ethnic stigmatisation in daily life. It seems that focus on their Italian heritage does not undermine the Italian minority's entitlement to membership in the majority's in-group which may be related to several structural factors which we discuss later in the article. But before we analyse these factors in detail, we should stress that, in addition to the historically old (autochthonous) ethnic minorities, Croatia and Istria have relatively large migrant populations.

According to the census from 2001,⁸ 600,000 people residing in Croatia were born outside the country, but 461,000 of the foreign-born are ethnic Croats. The specificity of Croatia's and Istria's migrant population is that it is largely dominated by foreign-born co-ethnics who migrated to Croatia from neighbouring countries, primarily Bosnia–Herzegovina. According to the census, 456,000 individuals in Croatia were from Bosnia–Herzegovina, and of them 384,000 were ethnic Croats. Also Istria has a considerable migrant population. In Istria, including the city of Rijeka, there lived 31,000 individuals from Bosnia–Herzegovina.⁹

Migrants from Bosnia–Herzegovina arrived in Croatia within different contexts of migration. Some migrated while both countries were part of the Yugoslav Federation, while others migrated during the armed conflict in the 1990s and the post-war period. Here, we find a mixture of education-propelled migration, refugee migrations, economic migration, different forms of chain migration and what we could call periphery–centre, or rural–urban transnational migrations. As a consequence, the Bosnian–Croat migrant community in Croatia and Istria includes people who have lived in Croatia for decades, but also newcomers, seasonal workers and transnationals who maintain strong links with Bosnia and other countries (Valenta et al., 2011). Earlier in the article, we assumed that different categories of Croats from Bosnia–Herzegovina had different identities and positions related to group boundaries. In what follows, we argue that some of the migrants have transcended the boundaries while others experience a stigma related to low-status migrants and culturally distant and unwanted co-ethnics. These migrants have the same ethnicity as the domicile Croats. However, they are in a less favourable position than the members of the Italian minority.

Ethnic boundaries and markers

Markers and boundaries toward the Italian minority

There are no formal boundaries that hinder incorporation of the Italian minority in the Croatian/Istrian society. They have Croatian citizenship or dual citizenship and the same rights as other Croatian citizens. In addition, the Italian minority in Croatia and Istria enjoys relatively high protection from the Croatian state (Klemenčić and Zupančić, 2007). The minority is well organised and partly financed by the Italian state which results in an extensive education system and various programs within the field of culture and media (Centro Di Ricerche, 2009; Klemenčić and Zupančić, 2007). Members of the Italian minority also have a tight relationship with Italy and are engaged in several forms of transnationalism. For example, all Istrian Italians we met were bilingual.¹⁰ They watch and read both Italian and Croatian TV and newspapers. Most of them have dual citizenship, which gives them an opportunity to study, work and resettle permanently in Italy. Many also have Italian retirement pensions, close relatives and other formal and informal connections with Italy.¹¹

Boundaries between the Italian minority in Istria and the Istrian Croat majority are, in many cases, blurred. Our findings suggest that blurriness of the boundary is related to three major factors: (i) the lack of usual markers of distinction; (ii) a large degree of family assimilation; and (iii) the context of interpretation of Italian identity which frames the relationship between the two groups. In respect to markers, it is maintained that Istrian Italians and Croats share the same Roman Catholic faith and the minority and majority are physically undistinguishable from each other. Furthermore, in daily contact with their Croatian neighbours, Istrian Italians speak the same Croatian, Istrian dialect. Due to these factors, Istrian Italians may, in everyday life, choose between identities of mainstream Istrians, even ethnic Croats, and their Italian minority identity.¹² Another factor that contributes to the blurriness of the boundary is a large degree of family assimilation between the two groups, or ‘amalgamation’. There is a long tradition of intermarriages between the two groups which may be seen as indicator of intergroup homophily, but it also contributes to strengthen cohesion across ethnic lines. We met several Istrians who have an Italian father, grandmother, uncle, grandfather, etc. Some of these people had Italian names and others had Slavic. People in both categories could have Italian citizenship. However, some of the people with Italian citizenships defined themselves as Croats. For example, some of our informants had Italian surnames and Italian citizenship. They were entitled to Italian citizenship since one of their parents or grandparents had Italian origins. One informant said:

I have Italian citizenship, but I am Croat. I got Italian citizenship because my grandfather is Italian … In my family, only my grandfather, my father's father, is Italian. He is active in the local Italian club where people who define themselves as Italians generally socialize. Grandfather only watches Italian TV and all people in the club speak Italian with each other … My father also speaks Italian and has a lot of business contacts with Italy … However, I am Croat … I applied for Italian citizenship few years ago not because I feel Italian, but because at that time I planned to study in Italy. (Domicile Istrian)

As this informant indicates, he has Italian citizenship and is partly of Italian origin, but he defines himself as Croat. The informant's relation to Italy and Italian citizenship is loose and used in an instrumentalist manner. However, we also met people of mixed backgrounds who defined themselves as Italians for different reasons. Those persons who originate from such multi-ethnic families have hyphenated identities and the dynamic of actualisation of their Croatian, Italian or regional sub-identities is context-dependent. The frequent identity shifts described above contribute to the blurriness of the boundaries between the two groups. Even more important, it seems that Istrian Croats are not involved in boundary making against the Italian minority. The ethnicity of the Italian minority is usually not actualised by the majority, but by the minority itself in its attempts to maintain its cultural characteristics and minority rights. However, our informants claim that the above mentioned minority's boundary making does not generate animosity amongst Istrian Croats. Indeed, informants’ accounts clearly indicate that Istrian Italians are seen as an integral part of Istrian society. These accounts are representative for most of our informants:

We are a border area between different states. We were part of Austria and Italy and Yugoslavia and now are in Croatia … Our history and our position make us different from the rest of Croatia. Istrian culture is most influenced by Italian culture and we are proud of our heritage … Italians are Istrians as us. (Domicile Croat from Istria)

We are Istrians in same way as Domicile Istrian Croats. People are used to our language, culture and schools. Our kindergartens and schools attract also ethnic Croats, and some of the parents are prominent members of community, which also says something about our status here in Istria. (Member of Italian ethnic minority in Istria)

I have never felt that my Italian roots have given me some advantages or disadvantages. People in Istria really do not care who is who, most of the people here are mixed anyway. Almost everybody has somebody with Italian roots. (Domicile Croat from Istria)

According to our informants, both Italian and Croatian, the Istrian Italians are not a stigmatised group in Istria. On the contrary, as the informants indicate, they are considered to be an important aspect of the Istrian ‘in-group’ and Istrian ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1983; Tajfel, 1987). But which factors do contribute to such positive interpretations? The interpretations of the Italian minority that the quoted informants indicate seem to be influenced by two major structural factors. Firstly, the image of the Italian minority is influenced by Croatian general perceptions of Italy and of Italian culture. In the eyes of Croats, Italy is a large European country, which, in comparison to Croatia, is a wealthier and more developed neighbour. Consequently, various aspects of Italian culture, economy and society are admired and interpreted by Croats in a positive manner. Secondly, the majority's perception of the Italian minority is influenced by the long and important role of Italians in the region. Italian influences on local dialects, cuisine, architecture, music and other local traditions are seen by the Croatian majority as part of their own regional culture and identity. Indeed, the Italian influence on Istrian culture, together with the Austrian influence,¹³ was mentioned by our Istrian informants as they tried to emphasise that they were more Western-oriented than other parts of Croatia and the former Yugoslavia. In sum, the above mentioned factors prevent animosities and construction of salient ethnic boundaries between the two groups. Our findings indicate that the boundaries between Istrians and the others are rather directed toward other ethnic and migrant groups, such as migrants from other republics of former Yugoslavia.¹⁴

Markers and boundaries toward co-ethnics from Bosnia–Herzegovina

There are few formal boundaries that hinder the incorporation of migrants from Bosnia–Herzegovina into the Croatian mainstream. Most Croats from Bosnia–Herzegovina have dual citizenship – Bosnian–Herzegovinian and Croatian – which places them in a favourable position compared with other, non-Croatian, migrants from neighbouring republics. Due to their Croatian citizenship, Croats from Bosnia–Herzegovina are allowed to migrate to Croatia and, when they settle in Croatia, they become formally equal to any other Croatian citizens in Croatia. There are also relatively few visible markers between Istrians and migrants from Bosnia–Herzegovina, compared to other migrant groups that may be used in boundary making. Most other immigrant and minority ‘groups’ in Croatia, such as Albanians, Roma, Bosniaks and Serbs, may be distinguished from the Croatian majority by distinguishable names, dialect and religion.¹⁵ Croats from Bosnia–Herzegovina have the same appearance and names as Croatian Croats, they are of the Roman Catholic faith as are Croatian Croats, and both ‘groups’ speak the same language, although with some differences in vocabulary and expression (Valenta et al., 2011).

Due to the above factors, Croats from Bosnia–Herzegovina could, at first glance, appear as ‘ethnically-privileged migrants’ (Čapo Žmegač, 2005; Valenta et al., 2011), in both formal and social senses. However, our findings concur with Ashbrook's argument that the majority population has ambivalence toward migrants (co-ethnics) from Bosnia–Herzegovina (Ashbrook, 2011). On the one hand, the domicile Istrians we met claimed that they had positive attitudes toward the migrants from Bosnia–Herzegovina. On the other hand, we could perceive underlying prejudices among domicile Croats and Italians against the migrants. We could also perceive an equivalent sense of rejection and stigma among migrants. The following quotations illustrate some of these experiences and perspectives:

We have been here a long time, but we are still Bosnians to them … We often feel isolated … They have never accepted us completely … Maybe it is partly our fault since we did not acquire the local, Istrian dialect … We are maybe too stubborn and are not open for adjustments. (Croat from Bosnia-Herzegovina)

When I tell them that we had approximately same standard in Bosnia as they have here, they look surprised. Many Croats consider Bosnia and Bosnians as inferior and less civilised. It is expressed both in media and in daily life … They cannot or do not want to see all the positive things with Bosnia. Many do not even know that first Croatian king was crowned in Herzegovina. (Croat from Bosnia-Herzegovina)

These quotations indicate the sense of rejection and non-belonging to the Istrian mainstream which migrants relate to their Bosnian–Herzegovinian origin. With reference to Barth's theory (Barth, 1969; Wimmer, 2008b), we may argue that the boundary making may be related to the structural context which frames inter-group perceptions and relationships between the Croats/Istrians and their co-ethnics from Bosnia–Herzegovina. What influences the majority's perception of their co-ethnics, and indicated feelings of stigma among immigrants? Here, we may mention that large numbers of Croats from Bosnia–Herzegovina entered Croatian society in the 1990s as refugees (Sujoldžić, 1999). Several studies on refugees in Croatia and elsewhere point out that exile, and refugee status itself, may result in stigmatisation (Sujoldžić, 1999; Valenta et al., 2011). The accounts of our informants indicate that attitudes toward the migrants may be also related to regional animosities toward central government policies. In that regard, our informants, including a man quoted below, referred to the policies of central authorities toward a resettlement of Croatian refugees in 1990s.

Large migrations of Bosnian Croats to Istria that happened in 1990 were politically motivated and we did not like it … Istrians are open-minded and more easily accept new-comers … It takes a longer time for the first generation of migrants to integrate, but their kids do it swiftly. (Domicile Istrian)

Although this informant expresses a positive attitude toward Bosnian Croats, he also refers to the refugee resettlement policy in 1990, which was at times seen by domicile Istrians as the central government's attempts to ‘strengthen the Croatian stock in Istria’ (Ashbrook, 2005; Klemenčić and Zupančić, 2007). Indeed, several researchers indicated that the refugee resettlement policy in 1990 was interpreted by Istrian regionalists as the central government's attempt to undermine Istrian regionalism as refugees seemed to be more in support of the central government (Ashbrook, 2005; Klemenčić and Zupančić, 2007).

As earlier noted, Istria did not experience ethnic conflict on its territory as did most other parts of Croatia during 1990s. On the one hand, this may have had a positive influence on ethnic relations in the region (Banovac, 2004, 2009). On the other hand, there emerged during the same period an aversion toward co-ethnics who were engaged in the ethnic conflicts. Here, an important part of emerging regional identity is related to support for demilitarisation, a sense of belonging to the West, and to Istrian multicultural traditions (Ashbrook, 2005; Cocco, 2010). In this boundary-making process, the negative reference group were ‘co-ethnics from East’, especially those from Bosnia–Herzegovina. As Ashbrook pointed out, these compatriots were associated with everything Istrians tried not to be associated with, such as ethno-nationalism, armed conflict and ethnic intolerance (Ashbrook, 2005, 2006). Furthermore, as Ashbrook (2005) has also indicated, one common perception of Bosnians and Herzegovinians, at least in 1990s, was that they often were involved in corruption, smuggling and other forms of criminality. When it comes to criminality, several of the domicile Croats and Istrians we met mentioned episodes in which migrants from Bosnia–Herzegovina were involved in criminal activities. However, most of our informants were able to go beyond the common stereotypes and distinguish between ‘honest hard-working migrants’ and ‘criminals’, and it seems that image of ‘hard-working migrants’ prevails. The most of the domicile Istrians we met stressed that migrants from Bosnia–Herzegovina were hard-working people. Informants often referred to concrete examples of migrants who worked hard in different professions and who contributed to the local community.

We had some other indications that the attitudes of the Croatian majority toward Bosnian immigrants in Istria had softened with time.¹⁶ For example, when our Istrian informants discussed and criticised the Herzegovinian lobby and the threatening political power of co-ethnics from Bosnia–Herzegovina they referred exclusively to the 1990s. Furthermore, the refugee identity of Bosnians and the refugee policy of the 1990s are more or less forgotten in contemporary Croatia (Valenta et al., 2011). None of our informants believed that Bosnians and Herzegovinians are still used to ‘strengthen the Croatian stock in Istria’. The common perception is that Croats from Bosnia–Herzegovina have lost most of their political power. Therefore, they are not considered to be a threatening political force any more.

Nevertheless, there are some negative general perceptions among domicile Croats and Istrians that seem to be unchanged. It seems that the boundary making toward ‘neighbours from East’ should also be seen in light of the general perceptions that the domicile population in Croatia and Istria have had about Bosnia–Herzegovina and Bosnians and Herzegovinians since pre-war times. As many domicile Croats and Istrians acknowledged, Croatia was among the more developed republics in the Yugoslav Federation, and Istria was one of the most developed parts of Croatia, while Bosnia–Herzegovina was officially classified as ‘under-developed’ by the government of socialist Yugoslavia (Babić et al., 2011). These economic differences have persisted in the post-Yugoslav period, resulting in Croatia and Istria attracting large groups of manual workers from Bosnia–Herzegovina who find employment in Croatian and Istrian construction work, mining and the tourist industry (Valenta et al., 2011). Common perceptions of Bosnians and Herzegovinians among the domicile population, both among locals who ascribe Croatian and Italian identity, seem to be influenced by above mentioned structural frame.

The dynamics of making and unmaking ethnic boundaries

Indeed, the context of migration and the stereotypical images of Bosnia–Herzegovina as a less developed, eastern neighbour contribute to strengthening the negative image of the migrants from Bosnia–Herzegovina (Ashbrook, 2005).¹⁷ Among domicile Istrians, the general self-image of ‘us’ as tolerant and inclusive competes with the underlying negative stereotype of their eastern neighbours. However, most domicile Istrians seemed to be able to overcome this stereotype. Informants referred to various and extensive first-hand experiences of interaction with co-ethnics from Bosnia–Herzegovina which gave them an ability to go beyond the stereotype and diversify the co-ethnics’ image. Several informants, including the man we quote below, mentioned that Croats from Bosnia–Herzegovina have low social status, but at the same time he acknowledged that many of migrants are well-integrated, educated and highly resourceful:

Istrians can identify migrants from Bosnia easily from the way they speak … . My impression is that Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovina have much lower status than Croats who origin from other parts of Croatia … Many work in construction and seasonal work, while others have been very long time here and are well educated and respected. (Domicile Croat from Istria)

Domicile Croats and Istrians, those who ascribe to both Croatian and Italian identity, may easily spot Bosnian and Herzegovinian accents and in this way manage to categorise the other. However, the image of the other is composed of several dimensions and sub-categories. As the informant implies, we may make a rough distinction between two images of migrants. The first group does not have a salient Bosnian–Herzegovinian identity. For example, they have been in Croatia for decades, first as students and later as well-established professionals. Assimilation into Croatia's middle class and family integration influenced their identities in Croatia and Istria. At the opposite end of the scale, we find a larger group of Bosnian Croats who entered Croatian society from ‘below’, as unskilled or semi-skilled manual workers and seasonal workers. These people are primarily referred to as a part of majority's boundary making (Valenta et al., 2011). In the next pages, we introduce a typology of boundary making and argue that these two categories of migrants do not only have different identities and resources but are also engaged in different forms of boundary making.

The typology of boundary making

According to several studies on boundary making (Lyman et al., 1973; Wimmer, 2013) individuals engage in different individual and collective strategies in order to enhance recognition of their dignity, identity and the ‘honour and prestige of belonging to a respected community recognised as a legitimate part of society’ (Wimmer, 2013: 5). Wimmer distinguishes between two types of boundary-related strategies: those strategies that aim to change the topography of boundaries, and those aimed at modifying the meaning and implication of boundaries for a person's own life (Wimmer, 2008a: 1037). The first strategy includes redrawing a boundary ‘by either expanding or limiting the domain of people’ included in one's own group. The second strategy includes modifying ‘existing hierarchal ordering of groups’, or ‘changing one's own position in boundary system’, or ‘emphasising other non-ethnic forms of belonging’ (Wimmer, 2008a: 1025). While some of these strategies contribute to boundary making of salient ethnic boundaries, the others focus on boundary unmaking or on erosion of ethnic boundaries (Wimmer, 2008b). Detailed and systematic discussion of all mentioned strategies is beyond the scope of this article. Yet, the general distinction between ‘boundary redrawing’, ‘boundary blurring’ and ‘boundary transcendence’ may be helpful as point of departure for our analysis of boundary making, as suggested in our version of Wimmer's model below.

In line with Wimmer, and other constructivist researchers who critique the ‘groupist’ type of analysis (Brubaker, 2004), we want to stress that boundaries between ethnic categories identified in the model are not sharp, but are open for negotiation and change. We have argued that the differences in constructions of identities of anticipated groups that we compare in this article may be linked to their different structural frames. However, it should be stressed that this dynamic of boundary making also depends on the individual resources of actors, and on the context of interaction as proposed in the model in Figure 1. We also want to stress that Wimmer's original model does not have an explicit focus on the relationship between boundary work and people's stigmatised and symbolic identities. We believe that this link, including the above mentioned distinction, may be relevant in an analysis of the Istrian context. As it is suggested at the right side of the model, boundary transcendence may be also associated with stigmatised identities, and combined with coping strategies we associate with the work of Goffman (1963).¹⁸ It seems that members of Italian minority are not primarily engaged in these strategies, but in two closely related forms of boundary maintenance (see the left side of the model). The first includes the already mentioned attempts to maintain their Italian-ness in relation to the Croat majority. The second includes ‘boundary-blurring’ through emphasising other non-ethnic forms of belonging (Wimmer, 2008b: 989).¹⁹ Italians in Istria express these strategies though their emphasis on regional dimension of their identity, and sometimes even include active political engagements in parties that promote Istrian regionalism.²⁰ It is also expressed through their strong focus on bilingualism and regional multicultural markers. The following quotation illustrates the above regional aspect of boundary making:

We feel proud of being Italians! … There are even some Italians here who feel superior to ethnic Croats … However, most of us have the sense of belonging to Istria and we share the same feelings with ethnic Croats who are real Istrians. We have shared sense of togetherness. (Domicile Italian from Istria)

Figure 1.

The dynamic of making and unmaking of ethnic boundaries.

The quotation implies two important aspects of boundary making: ethnic and regional. As an ethnic group, Italians maintain the boundary vis-à-vis Croats, and at the same time they redraw it, emphasising the regional principle of shared ‘Istria-ness’. The quotation also implies that Italian heritage scores high in Istria.²¹ Indeed, we have not found among Italians indications of strategies that we usually associate with stigmatised identities. Italians have a good image and they are proud of their Italian heritage, as the quotation above also indicates. Therefore, it is not surprising that certain strategies that often are involved in boundary transcendence, such as ‘passing’ and ‘covering’ (Goffman, 1963; Valenta, 2009), seem not to be common for Italians in Istria.

In the case of Istrian Italians, the boundaries between majority and minority are drawn in such a way that the Croatian majority in Istria accept Italians in Istria as members of the in-group. The minority members’ boundary making, with a focus on their ‘Italian-ness’ in most cases, is seen as an expression of their ‘symbolic identity’.²² Perceived as such, the minority's boundary making does not lead to boundary redrawing which would undermine their membership in the Istrian (imagined) community. On the contrary, within the existing structures, their Italian ‘symbolic identity’ contributes to the maintenance of the boundaries. It strengthens their identity as Istrians, since bilingualism and Italian-ness are interpreted in the local narrative as important aspects of Istria-ness.

‘The Italian heritage’ is also often mentioned by domicile Croats and Italians as part of their boundary making and distancing from other, less Western co-ethnics. One Croat from Istria expressed regional fellowship with Italians, and distance toward co-ethnics from Bosnia–Herzegovina, in the following manner:

Italians are as us. There is no difference … We are all Istrians … The other, imported, Croats are different … The imported Croats are those who came from Bosnia-Herzegovina … I do not have much contact with them. I generally avoid them. (Domicile Croat from Istria)²³

At this stage of our analysis, we may summarise that boundary making of the Italian minority in Istria is based on a regional principle. Even more importantly, their boundary making is compatible with the ‘boundary contraction’²⁴ of Istrian regionalists, and the political rhetoric and iconography of regional political elites. As already indicated, migrants from Bosnia–Herzegovina are in a less favourable position. The identities of the migrants from Bosnia–Herzegovina, and the structural frameworks that influence them, are dissimilar from those we find among Italians. Consequently, we assumed we would find differences in boundary-making strategies when we compared the two groups.

Individual resources, structural factors and the boundary making among the migrants

The model presented in Figure 1 suggests that migrants from Bosnia–Herzegovina are engaged in boundary making, but in a different way from the Italians. Italians in Istria are primarily engaged in boundary blurring and the maintenance of their symbolic ethnicity within the framework of their regional, Istrian identity. Unlike them, migrants from Bosnia–Herzegovina in Croatia and Istria engage in two major forms of boundary work. The first strategy may be associated with the already mentioned concept of ‘boundary-transcendence’, while the other focuses on the struggle with regionalists’ ‘boundary contraction’ (Eriksen, 1993; Wimmer, 2008a).

With reference to Wimmer, we may argue that the migrants’ attempts at ‘boundary-transcendence’ or ‘repositioning’ may be associated with ‘a strategy in which the principles of hierarchy are not contested’ (2008b: 988). Our findings suggest that the strategies of ‘boundary-transcendence’ of Bosnian migrants may involve both assimilation and situational strategies such as passing and covering (Eidheim, 1969; Valenta, 2009; Wimmer, 2008b), applied in situations where migrants feel that a focus on Bosnian–Herzegovinian identity may lead to stigmatisation. These strategies may include gradual adjustments that result in a total change in markers of distinction. For example, in order to remove the only visible marker of difference several Bosnian Croats we met tried to appropriate local Croat dialect or neutral ‘literary Croatian parlance’ which is commonly used by the educated, urban, population in Croatia. One informant said:

My dialect has change gradually … Some people change their way of speaking gradually and unconsciously, while others do that deliberately in order to fit in … There are people who have a lot of contact with domicile Istrians, while others seek to other Bosnians. (Croat from Bosnia-Herzegovina)

Another informant said:

My boss is a Croat from Bosnia … She is very well integrated … I would never tell that she is from Bosnia, maybe only when she speaks with other Bosnians. For example, when she speaks with our vice director, who also is Bosnian you can hear a Bosnian accent. Otherwise, you would never tell. You would think that she is from other part of Croatia, for example Dalmatia, but not Bosnia. (Domicile Croat from Istria)

Gregurović (2005) points out that, in cases where the interactions and relationships between Croatian Croats and Bosnian Croats are formal, occasional and impersonal, the perceived differences will be emphasised, while in cases where people have established friendly connections, the fact of their common ethnicity, religion and traditions will be emphasised (2005: 240). Not only did we find similar process of ‘breakthrough’ (Goffman, 1963) in social relationships among the Bosnian Croats in Istria but also that the opportunity for breakthrough may be related to migrants’ strategies and position vis-à-vis mainstream society. Here, the analysis yields two conceptual categories (or ideal types): (a) collective segregation strategies; and (b) individual assimilation strategies. The collective segregation strategies include clustering in Bosnian and Herzegovinian networks, which may be seen as a reaction to the prejudices they experience in interactions with Croatian and Istrian Croats, but also as a natural development in local environments in Croatia where there were large numbers of Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croats (Valenta et al., 2011: 290). The above mentioned process of migrant segregation is described by several informants. One man said:

In parts of Istra, such as in Pula, there are a lot of people from Bosnia. In Pula, people call certain part of the city for Little Bosnia since a lot of people from Bosnia-Herzegovina live there. (Domicile Italian from Istria)

Another said:

Bosnians who live here use to cluster in churches. They go to the church where there are a lot of other people from Bosnia-Herzegovina and where the priests have the same background. For example, Bosnians in Pula use to cluster in the church of St. Anton. In the church, they meet other Bosnians, and in St Anton, the Franciscan priest is also from Bosnia-Herzegovina. (Domicile Croat from Istria)

These segregation-oriented strategies reduce the possibility of breakthrough in relationships with the locals. On the opposite side of the scale, we find individual assimilation including intermarriages with locals and selective and strategic distancing from other Bosnians, combined with different passing strategies. One of the most efficient strategies of repositioning or boundary transcendence is through mobility to professions that are not usually associated with migrants. Indeed, the experience that domicile Croats ‘look down on Bosnians’ or ‘do not like Herzegovinians’ was most emphasised among newcomers and people operating at the bottom of the labour market in Croatia, either in temporary contracts, seasonal jobs, or in the informal economy. Their dialects and sociolects made them ‘visible’ and their low-status position in the Croatian labour market reinforced the pre-existing prejudices that existed in Croatia against Bosnia–Herzegovina. The domicile population in Istria, and in other parts of Croatia as well, referred to this visible category of Bosnians and Herzegovinians when they spoke about them (Valenta et al., 2011). These people were often described in terms of being culturally distant others, and were not perceived as Istrians.

On other side of the scale, we find Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croats who have achieved prominent positions in Croatian society and cultural life. These people were seen primarily as Croats and Istrians like any others. We met individuals who belong to this category who seemed to be accepted by Croatian Croats, and embraced as ‘genuine Croats’. They implied that they were fully accepted by locals even in cases when they did not try to engage in a ‘modification of the topography of boundaries’ (Wimmer, 2008a: 1025) via emphasis on their ‘Croatian-ness’ and playing down their Bosnian origin. It seems that these people could afford to emphasise their ‘Bosnian-ness’. For example, they could proudly refer to their Bosnian background when the positive aspects of Bosnian humour, music or food were actualised. But in their case, their Bosnian-ness did not undermine their in-group position in the local community. In other words, it seems that through their attainment of prominent positions in Croatian society, the migrants’ Bosnian-ness or ‘Herzegovinian-ness’ was not salient anymore; it became their ‘symbolic identity’ (Valenta et. al., 2011).

Boundary transcendence and border redrawing: Regional versus ethnic principle

The typology in Figure 1 proposes also a distinction between regional and ethnic-oriented boundary work. With respect to this distinction, our data suggest that boundary transcendence and assimilation-oriented Croats from Bosnia–Herzegovina do not primarily choose to focus on shared Croatian-ness in order to gain acceptance by Istrians. Our findings suggest that they rather focus on inclusion in an Istrian regional ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1983). An integral part of the Istrian imagined community is its Italian heritage, together with the region's long bilingual tradition, which in Istria is largely maintained through Italian nursery schools, schools, cultural events, newspapers, etc (Centro Di Ricerche, 2009; Klemenčić and Zupančić, 2007). At this point, we have to stress that most of these bilingual arenas are not exclusively reserved for members of the Italian minority, and according to several informants, it is not unusual that non-Italian minorities seek entry to these arenas. Some do this in order to learn Italian, which may be an advantage in the case of migration to Italy, but according to our informants, this practice is also a way of securing their children's entering into Istria-ness. As one domicile Istrian pointed out: ‘When their children finish these schools, they will not need to struggle any more with proving to others that they are Istrians’.

However, different categories of migrants engage in different strategies. Our findings suggest that strategies differ depending of migrants’ individual resources, the local context and the length of residence in Istria and Croatia. Not all migrants from Bosnia–Herzegovina have the desire, opportunity or resources to transcend the boundary in this regional manner. We also met migrants from Bosnia–Herzegovina who would rather engage in ‘ethnic boundary-redrawing’. These engagements find their expression through support for Croatian ethno-nationalist parties, such as the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ). They are also expressed through claims that the boundary between ‘us and them’ should rather be made using ethnic or religious criteria (as one informant emphasised: ‘we are all Croats and Catholics!’), while regional sub-identities, including Istrian, and their own Bosnian–Herzegovinian should be seen as less relevant (Valenta et al., 2011). However, such attempts of boundary-redrawing contest ‘the established hierarchical order’ of boundaries (Wimmer, 2013: 57). In order to change the boundary, such redrawing presupposes a broader change in the structural frames we outlined in the previous section, including the change in context of migration, regionalist political rhetoric and socio-economic differences in the sending and the receiving countries. Therefore, such strategies do not seem to lead to inclusion, but may even be counter-productive as they may confirm the stereotype and reinforce the boundary between Istrians and the migrants. An important part of the present Istrian regional identity construction includes a notion that Istrians are ‘tolerant and Western’ (Ashbrook, 2011). Within such a construct, migrants’ focus on shared ethnicity may contest the Istrian regionalist narrative and be interpreted as confirmation of their intolerance, support for centralist ethno-nationalist political elites and ‘nesting Balkanism’ (Ashbrook, 2011).

Conclusion

In this article, we have focused on the dynamic of ethnic boundary making in Istria. It was argued that boundaries between the domicile Croats in Istria and the researched minority groups are characterised by blurred boundaries, and that the dynamic of boundary making between the groups should be seen in light of Istrian regionalism and the domicile population's stereotypes about their ‘culturally distant migrants and co-ethnics’ (Valenta et al., 2011). It is maintained that the Italian minority in Istria and Croatian migrants from Bosnian–Herzegovina have different structural positions vis-à-vis the Istrian Croats. On the one hand, boundaries between the local Croatian majority and the Italian minority are not salient. The Italian-ness of the Italian minority is perceived by Istrian Croats as a symbolic, integral aspect of the Istrian imagined community. On the other hand, the regional identities of domicile Croats and Italians in Istria are maintained through contrasting constructed images of culturally distant eastern neighbours (Ashbrook, 2011). In line with Ashbrook (2011), we maintain that co-ethnics of Bosnian–Herzegovinian origins are included in the negative reference group. We have argued that the different structural positions of the two mentioned groups vis-à-vis Croats of native origin result in two distinctive trends of making and unmaking of ethnic boundaries: while the Italian minority is engaged in the maintenance of their Italian-ness combined with an focus on Istrian regionalism, migrants from Bosnia–Herzegovina engage in different kinds of boundary crossings (such as passing, covering and assimilation in the mainstream society) or they attempt to contest and redraw the regional boundary with an increased focus on shared ethnicity with domicile Croats.

What can be learned from the Istrian case? The Istrian case contributes to the general argument that constructions of boundary and perceptions of who are insiders and who outsiders are not necessarily set along the ethnic lines. This argument may even be applicable in societies, such as Croatian, where ethno-national sentiments still play a dominant role. Furthermore, the experience of Bosnian–Herzegovinian Croats in Istria, and Croatia in general, teaches us another important lesson: in a context where the boundaries between the domicile population and the immigrants are highly blurred due to the absence of markers usually used in boundary making (such as differences in language, appearance, names and religion) other related ‘distinctions’ become a crucial factor in boundary making (such as dialect, sociolect, education, profession, class position and regional anchorage). Therefore, migrants who are in a middle class position and who acquire the equivalent lifestyle, sociolect and manners, seem to be in much better position to achieve ‘repositioning’ (Wimmer, 2009), which results in an identity transition – a transition from stigmatised to symbolic identities. At this point, it should be emphasised that people engage in multiple boundary-making strategies. We stress that the suggested typologies are not sharp, but include many nuances. Therefore, the version of Wimmer's model and the typology we deployed in this article does not exclude the possibility that the boundary making we primarily associate with certain segments of Bosnian–Herzegovinian migrants also may be found among the Italian minority and vice versa.

In line with Wimmer, we acknowledge here that the question of which boundaries are salient and which are not, and which of identities, ethnic, regional, professional or political, etc., are relevant, depends on the local logic of the situation (Wimmer, 2008b). Nevertheless, this article may contribute to literature on ethnic relations in Croatia, and to general literature on ethnicity. It adds new insights to an analysis of ‘others’ in Croatia and Istria by contrasting the experiences and strategies of the Italian ethnic minority and the ‘ethnically privileged migrants’, and may thus be of relevance for researchers who are interested in ethnic relationships and boundary making in the region. We have demonstrated that our version of Wimmer's model may be applied in analyses of boundary-making processes in contemporary Croatian/Istrian society. We also believe that our version of Wimmer's model and the deployed typology may be applied outside the Istrian and Croatian context and thus be of interest to researchers who want to use similar analytical approaches in comparative analysis of inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic relations of blurred boundaries in other multi-ethnic societies.²⁵ Last, but not least, the experiences from Istria may also be of relevance to researchers with broader theoretical interests in discussions on ethnicity, regionalism and ‘making and unmaking of ethnic boundaries’ in post-conflict societies.²⁶

Footnotes

Notes

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