Abstract
The “Halo Effect” suggests that people impart positive traits to others based on initial impressions of characteristics such as physical attractiveness. In Muslim communities, this phenomenon may be extrapolated to the positive evaluation of women who wear the Islamic headscarf (or hijab). The present study focuses on the “Hijab Effect” and its impact on the relationship between Islamic religiosity and perceived attractiveness. South Asian Muslim women living in the United States and the United Arab Emirates were surveyed. Hijabis rated themselves as more religious than nonhijabis. Additionally, Muslim women, regardless of their personal hijab status, rated hijabis as more attractive than nonhijabis. Results further indicated that religiosity, controlling for personal hijab status, did not have an independent influence on perceptions of hijabis in either the United States or the United Arab Emirates. However, in the United Arab Emirates, women who were more religious did rate nonhijabis as less attractive. Discussion of the analysis focuses on the possible factors involved in the complex relationship between Muslim women and the hijab.
Introduction
People make judgments regarding the character traits of others, often using limited information. Positive inferences based on initial judgments prime subsequent evaluations, whereas negative inferences prime negative evaluations of other characteristics (Brown, 1986). The “Halo Effect” refers to the association of positive traits, such as attractiveness, with other positive qualities, such as kindness or religiosity. A number of studies have shown that physically attractive people are perceived to have more positive characteristics (Chia et al., 1998; Crandall et al., 2007; Lorenzo et al., 2010). Additionally, meta-analyses of attractiveness research have confirmed the link between physical attractiveness and the attribution of positive traits to others (Eagly et al., 1991; Feingold, 1992).
Whereas the Halo Effect suggests that people impart globally positive characteristics to those whom they perceive to have positive traits, this phenomenon may be extrapolated to Muslim communities as the “Hijab Effect,” where Muslim women who wear the Islamic headscarf are imputed to have more positive attributes. Unlike the “Turban Effect” (Unkelbach et al., 2008, 2010) which positions wearers of the hijab (or any headgear that may be mistaken as denoting a Muslim identity) as outsiders, the Hijab Effect represents Muslim attitudes toward Islamic symbols from an insider perspective. Droogsma (2007) noted that the hijab not only signifies a Muslim identity, but allows Muslim women to negotiate their behaviors and interactions in the public sphere. As a visible marker of group membership, the hijab may be used to promote the social prestige of its wearers, thereby increasing their self-esteem, especially within stigmatized populations who often embrace their “otherness” to promote cohesion within the group (Abdurraqib, 2006; Ali, 2005; Gole, 2003; Rana, 2007; Yakin, 2007). Thus, women who wear the hijab are likely to have higher status in Muslim communities. In addition to perceptions of greater piety, higher levels of prestige may partly be attributed to the additional burden that hijabis hold in representing their faith in non-Muslim contexts. The “re-Islamization” of Muslim women after 9/11, for example, seems to have elevated perceptions of hijab among Muslims (Haddad, 2007). As a result, many Muslims underwent a religious renaissance after the 9/11 attacks, asserting their religion as a declared identity to strengthen their self-image, promote a positive image of Islam, and counter the stereotypes and public misconceptions that were being propagated ad hominem (Peek, 2005).
Secular and religious discourse on hijab
As women who wear hijab use pro-hijab discourse to validate their use of the hijab, Muslim women who do not wear the hijab tend to use themes from the antihijab discourse to defend their choice. Both, however, relate the use of the hijab as a response to male sexuality, with hijabis noting that a hypersensitive male sexuality makes hijab a necessity that has been ordained by God to allow women to interact in the public sphere without being unduly harassed. In contrast, nonhijabis tend to place the responsibility for hijab on the men themselves, rather than on God, emphasizing that it is men’s inability to control their sexual desires that creates a need for women to cover (Read and Bartkowski, 2000). Additionally, as hijabis often focus on the religious tenets of Islam as the basis of the practice, nonhijabis are more likely to discuss veiling as a practice that predates Islam and is more connected with politics and culture (Bartkowski and Read, 2003; Mernissi, 1991; Read and Bartkowski, 2000). Despite the differences in attitudes toward hijab, Read and Bartkowski (2000) note that both hijabis and nonhijabis are reluctant to pass judgment on the other’s viewpoints.
Thus, the perceptions of Muslim women with regard to the hijab may not necessarily be as dichotomous as the debate between secular feminists and Islamic feminists. Whereas secular feminists tend to equate the hijab with oppression and subjugation of women, Islamic feminists perceive the hijab as a symbol of freedom from materialism and the imperialism of Western ideals (El Hamel, 2002).
In the context of Western feminist struggles, one conceals only in submission to a patriarchal authority. Because Western feminists have fought these battles decades ago in the context of bloomers, corsets, and sexual revolutions, such submission is understood as having been imposed by an external authority, or as the consequence of a false consciousness (Sheth, 2006).
As a result, Western assumptions of female empowerment inherently do not fit with the belief that a woman may choose to cover without the coercion of a patriarchal authority or that those women who do choose to cover could possibly feel liberated as a result. Thus, there is an inherent clash between Western feminist notions that often call for unveiling as a sign of liberation and Islamic feminist notions that often incorporate veiling as a form of resistance to Western imperialism (Fair, 2003).
The Hijab Effect
The Hijab Effect implies that women who wear the Islamic headscarf would receive higher ratings for other personal characteristics within Muslim communities. However, as a main goal of Islamic attire is to limit the physical exposure and attractiveness of women to men in their immediate family (“mahram”), would the Hijab Effect influence the perceived attractiveness of Muslim women? Studies addressing this are limited and show the possible influence of mainstream contexts on impression formation. Research conducted by Mahmud and Swami (2010), for example, supports the notion that religious attire affects perceptions of attractiveness. The researchers surveyed Muslim and non-Muslim men in Britain to study the effect of the hijab on men’s perceptions of attractiveness and intelligence. The results showed that women wearing the hijab were rated lower for both attractiveness and intelligence. The researchers attributed their findings to the negative perceptions of religious markers among Western observers.
However, as Muslim women do not have to wear the hijab in front of other women, it is possible that the hijab may have a different effect upon Muslim women. In a study by Dunkel et al. (2010), Muslim women who wore a headscarf and non-Western dress showed a preference for a larger body shape. This goes against the Western ideal of thinness as a marker of attractiveness. Older nonhijabis, on the other hand, had greater preference for thinness than hijabis in the same age range, which the authors suggest may indicate a greater acceptance of Western ideals of beauty.
Mahfoodh’s qualitative study (2008) on the practice of hijab among Arab Muslim girls (aged 9–12) in Michigan and Bahrain emphasizes the vast differences in individual interpretations of the hijab in both Muslim and non-Muslim contexts. As the hijab is part of the norm in Bahrain, girls are trained early on to view the hijab as a part of the rite of passage to adulthood. Thus, a woman wearing hijab is equated with goodness and morality, whereas a woman without hijab is considered “less Muslim” (Mahfoodh, 2008).
Witkowski (1999) studied the perceptions of hijab among Lebanese and Kuwaiti women. He found that Lebanese women were perceived as more “Western” than Kuwaiti women in that Kuwaiti women were more likely to wear Islamic dress and less likely to wear makeup and jewelry. Higher religiosity in the study was positively correlated with wearing Islamic dress and negatively correlated with wearing jewelry and cosmetics. The study further revealed that Arab women who wore the hijab were perceived to be more traditional in their social and gender relationships, more family-oriented and submissive to men, more patriotic and communal, and possibly more virtuous. Women in Western attire, on the other hand, were perceived to be more individualistic, materialistic, career-oriented, physically fit, and possibly more self-absorbed.
Although the literature on hijab in Western contexts continues to grow due to the association of a Muslim appearance with the threat of terrorism (Ajrouch, 2007; Haddad, 2007; Hassan, 2001; Jackson, 2010), less is known about the practice of hijab in Muslim majority contexts. Although the hijab signifies a religious identity, the different ways in which the headscarf is worn can also provide visual clues to the cultural background of its wearers and in turn, a glimpse into the influence of cultural norms on the practice of hijab. Farrell (2008), for example, attributed the use of hijab by Emirati women as a sign of the patriarchal culture in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). However, the significance of the Emirati dress may go beyond traditional gender roles. The national dress for local women in the UAE consists of a headscarf and an abaya, a long black robe that is worn over a woman’s clothing and serves to lessen the appearance of feminine curves. The abaya and headscarf may be embroidered with jewels and colorful threading to create a fashionable and elegant ensemble which can often distinguish locals from other Muslims. In fact, the use of the national dress by non-Emiratis can be a contentious issue among the locals who are increasingly threatened by the influence of expatriate culture on their national identity. Dress may thus be one way of encouraging self-segregation among ethnic groups in the UAE (Beuthe, 2008).
Religiosity and perceptions of attractiveness
Literature on the effect of religiosity as a moderator of perceptions of attractiveness is severely lacking. Levels of religiosity may be related to the division between hijabis and nonhijabis, thus highlighting the importance of variability within religious groups. As dress is a marker of group affiliation, the Hijab Effect would imply a greater degree of perceived piety toward those who wear hijab. Blades and Gillum (2010) found that the perceived religiosity of the interviewer affects the respondents’ expressions of personal piety. Muslim respondents in the study reported higher levels of religiosity when the interviewer wore the hijab. As piety is considered to be a positive trait for Muslim women, more pious women tend to adopt more conservative dress, including the Islamic headscarf, to differentiate themselves from less pious women (Patel, 2010). Harper’s study (2007) of the perceptions of religious students toward nonreligious people emphasizes this dichotomy. The results suggest that nonreligious people may be subject to certain negative stereotypes, including perceptions of being hard-hearted, cynical, rebellious, faithless, and nonspiritual. Although the study was based on a largely Christian population, it nonetheless may shed some light on the use of hijab as a tool to differentiate between those who are perceived as pious and those who are not. Additionally, Mussap (2009) found that the strength of religiosity may serve as a buffer that protects Muslim women from appearance-based scrutiny and Western media images of the ideal body type.
Research questions
In order to delve into the phenomenon of religiosity and attractiveness, a cross-national study was conducted that addressed perceptions of both hijabis and nonhijabis in a Muslim majority context (the UAE) and a Muslim minority one (the US). As an exploratory study, the project followed a quantitative design to gather initial information about Muslim women’s perceptions of hijab and religiosity. The quantitative design was chosen for the purpose of gathering data from a large, international population that would allow generalizability across the cultural group being studied. The following research questions served as a guide: Research Question 1: How do hijabis rate themselves in terms of Islamic religiosity compared to non-hijabis? Research Question 2: How does hijab and Islamic religiosity affect perceptions of attractiveness for Muslim women in the US and the UAE?
Participants
The present study analyzed responses from a total of 341 participants who completed an online survey. Out of the completed surveys, 198 were US residents and 143 were UAE residents. In order to minimize variability due to ethnic composition, only South Asian Muslim women living in either the US or the UAE were asked to participate. Participants were recruited through a variety of methods, including the use of social networking sites, university listservs, emails to Islamic Centers in the US, as well as emails to South Asian women’s associations in both the US and the UAE. Additionally, Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi schools and consulates in the UAE were contacted to recruit participants living in the country. Researchers attempting to study Islamic religiosity have reported difficulty in recruiting participants after the 9/11 attacks due to the nature of the questions and the fear within American Muslim communities that the research may be used to disparage the religion or its followers (Jana-Masri and Priester, 2007; Rippy and Newman, 2008). As such, a snowballing technique was also utilized wherein personal acquaintances were requested to forward the survey link to potential participants who fitted the demographic criteria for this study.
The mean age of US participants was 28.2 years and 44% were hijabi. The majority of US participants were born either in the US or in Pakistan (38.9 and 31.8%, respectively). The remaining participants were born in India (11.6%), Bangladesh (8.6%), the UAE (2%), or in another country (7.1%). Most had earned at least a Bachelor’s degree and about 60% were employed either full-time or part-time. Of those participants that indicated an Islamic sect, 80.1% were Sunni Muslims and 13.6% were Shiite Muslims.
The mean age of the UAE participants was 26.2 years and 57% were hijabi. Sixty percent of the participants were born in Pakistan and 16.8% were born in the UAE. A smaller number of participants were born in India (5.6%), Bangladesh (7%), or in another country (8.4%). A majority of the respondents (70.6%) reported Pakistan as their country of citizenship. In terms of educational attainment, the majority of UAE participants had earned at least a Bachelor’s degree and 51% were employed either full-time or part-time. Regarding Islamic sects, 91.6% indicated that they were Sunni Muslims, while 3.5% reported being Shiite and another 3.5% reported “Other” as their Islamic sect.
Measures
Surveys were distributed to South Asian Muslim women in the US and the UAE via the internet. While both American and Emirati mainstream societies have multicultural populations, South Asians have become part of the fabric of both societies through migration. As such, the study was limited to one cultural background while studying the perceptions of Muslim women in both a Muslim majority and a Muslim minority society. Both South Asian Muslim women who wear the hijab, and those who do not, were asked to participate. In this way, the researcher hoped to present a more balanced picture of the experience of hijab.
The survey for this study was divided into three sections: the first section addressed the demographic characteristics of the participants, the second section utilized the Muslim Attitudes Toward Religion Scale (MARS) developed by Wilde and Joseph (1997), and the final section used a five-point Likert-type scale which asked respondents to rate photos of women both with and without hijab in terms of their attractiveness. Full-face photographs of five Caucasian and five South Asian women were utilized. Two photographs of each woman were taken, one with hijab and one without hijab. All women in the no-hijab condition had dark hair which was either very short or pulled away from her face. As was done in the study by Mahmud and Swami (2010) to minimize the effect of skin tone and ethnicity, the photos were rendered in gray scale with a white background (see Figure 1). The following question was utilized to assess participants’ perceptions of attractiveness with regard to the photographs presented: “In your opinion, how attractive is the woman in the photo? (1 = not at all attractive to 5 = highly attractive).”
Experimental condition.
With regards to the measurement of religiosity, the MARS was chosen because of its validity for assessing Islamic religiosity among Muslims of diverse cultural backgrounds, including South Asians (Ghaffari and Çiftçi, 2010; Ghorbani et al., 2000; Khan et al., 2005; Wilde and Joseph, 1997). Internal reliability of the MARS in the original study by Wilde and Joseph (1997) was adequate (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.93). In the current study, the alpha score for the MARS was 0.96. The tool is composed of 14 items that assess Muslim attitudes toward Islamic beliefs and practices using a five-point Likert-type scale. All 14 items were utilized in this study and higher scores represented greater levels of religiosity.
Results
Hijab and religiosity
ANOVA results for religiosity by hijab and by country.
**p < .01.
Descriptive statistics for religiosity by hijab and by country.
Effect of hijab on perceived attractiveness
Research question 2 addressed the impact of hijab and religiosity on Muslim women’s perceptions of attractiveness. As hijab and religiosity were positively correlated, mixed 2 (hijabi and nonhijabi) × 2 (photos—hijab and photos—no hijab) ANOVAs were first conducted to test for the effect of the hijab on participants’ perceptions of attractiveness. By splitting the data by country of residence, the researcher was able to conduct one mixed ANOVA for each dependent variable instead of separate mixed ANOVAs for each country of residence.
Hijab and attractiveness—US
Mixed ANOVA results for attractiveness ratings by hijab status for US participants.
Note: Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.
p < .05, **p < .01.
Descriptive statistics for attractiveness ratings by hijabi status for US participants.
Hijab and attractiveness—UAE
Mixed ANOVA results for attractiveness ratings by hijab status for UAE participants.
Note: Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.
**p < .01.
Descriptive statistics for attractiveness ratings by hijab status for UAE participants.
Effect of religiosity on ratings of attractiveness
To further test research question 2, a hierarchical regression analysis was conducted on US and UAE participants with religiosity as the independent variable and photos of hijab attractiveness as the dependent variable. A separate hierarchical regression analysis was also conducted with photos of no-hijab attractiveness as the dependent variable. Both analyses controlled for participants’ hijab status in step 1 and tested the effect of the predictor (total religiosity) in step 2.
Hierarchical regression with perceived attractiveness of no-hijab regressed on hijab status and religiosity.
Note. US – R2 = .004 for Step 1; ΔR2 = .005 for Step 2 (p > .05); UAE – R2 = .033 for Step 1; ΔR2 = .030 for Step 2 (p < .05).
p < .05.
Discussion
The Hijab Effect implies that within Muslim communities, women wearing hijab would be rated higher for their perceived personal attributes by Muslim women. As a great deal of research on the impact of hijab has been conducted by positioning Muslim women as the “Other” (Abdurraqib, 2006; Ali, 2005; Gole, 2003; Mahmud and Swami, 2010; Rana, 2007; Yakin, 2007), the current study adds to the existing body of literature by focusing on Muslim women’s perceptions of each other. The results showed that the hijabis did report greater religiosity than nonhijabis, but would this translate into higher ratings for perceived attractiveness? In fact, the present study revealed that both hijabis and nonhijabis rated photos of hijab higher in terms of attractiveness than photos of no-hijab. These findings are contrary to the results in the Mahmud and Swami (2010) research where British men rated photos of hijab as less attractive than photos of no-hijab.
As the present study focused on women in the US and the UAE, the results may reflect differences in gender perceptions of attractiveness as well as differences based on mainstream contexts. It is possible that the decision to have Muslim women rate photos of women with and without hijab would stimulate a greater sense of belonging to the religious group and possibly even a sense of protection toward the women who visibly represent that group. With regard to attractiveness, for example, Muslim women in general (regardless of their personal hijab status) may feel that by rating photos of hijab higher in attractiveness than photos of no-hijab, they are protecting the self-esteem of the religious group to which they belong. This also supports the findings of Read and Bartkowski (2000) wherein hijabis and nonhijabis were reluctant to negatively appraise the other, despite their differences in attitudes toward the hijab.
Additionally, Muslim women may feel more hesitant to negatively rate an image that is representative of Islam, such as a woman wearing hijab, if they feel a threat to their group identity from non-Muslims. Stephan et al. (2009) state that a symbolic threat would be most likely to increase group conformity and Murphy et al. (2007) suggest that situational cues may activate social identity threat. Thus, it is possible that a task requiring Muslim women to rate hijabis and nonhijabis on physical attributes would trigger feelings of intergroup and social identity threat, thus creating a space wherein intragroup differences such as the participants’ own hijab status would be considered less important than the need to protect the group and those that most closely and visibly define that group.
Research has explored the effect of intergroup threat on anti-Muslim sentiment in Western countries such as the Netherlands and Britain (Jaspal and Cinnirella, 2010; Smeekes et al., 2011; Velasco González et al, 2008); however, future research may want to pay attention to the effect of intergroup threat on Muslim perceptions of Western secular contexts as well as to the behavioral responses of Muslims to perceived threat. Comments provided by participants highlight the emotionally charged nature of the discourse surrounding hijab and hint at the possibility of intergroup threat as a motivator for group cohesiveness, but further research is needed to determine if intergroup and social identity threat are indeed involved. Although the present study followed a quantitative design, comments such as the following which were sent via email to the researcher indicate the level of contention that discussion of the hijab can elicit: The perceptions of hijab or no hijab are very different here [in the US] vs the UAE. You obviously know that. But US law is very strict about discrimination and stereotyping… How will you overcome the variables that are societal perceptions? People think VERY differently here [in the US] as opposed to anywhere else in the world. They (hijabis) look more beautiful than the uncovered ones – so I know I answered truthfully. For the people who are taking the survey and are biased towards hijabis – do you really think they will be honest in this survey, I don’t think so! I think the questions you are asking all are useless. The hijab nowadays is very useful for women. Don't you see what the West is doing with women? I think it’s ridiculous… You can do a survey…but please make sure your views are strong enough about the right teachings of Islam, my dear sister. I hope you understand.
As Muslim women who wear the hijab reported a higher level of religiosity, it is not surprising that the correlation between hijab and religiosity would not yield separate independent effects of religiosity alone. However, in the UAE, it would seem that Muslim women can hold high levels of religiosity without necessarily wearing the hijab in the public sphere and that a higher level of religiosity can influence their perception of the attractiveness of women who do not wear the hijab. As UAE participants rated themselves as more religious than US participants, it is possible that living in a Muslim majority society such as the UAE that has a great deal of Western cultural influences may lead to greater disparity between Islamic attire and perceptions of physical attractiveness of Muslim women.
A study of British Muslim women found that, after controlling for religiosity, nonhijabis placed more importance on physical appearance than women who wore the hijab (Swami et al., 2013). In a similar vein, religious nonhijabis in Muslim majority contexts may place more emphasis on the use of Islamic attire in public spaces. Even though they may not feel ready to wear the hijab personally, they may perceive women who do wear it as having more desirable attributes. Thus, even though religiosity and hijab are linked, the Hijab Effect may be pertinent for nonhijabis as well. Whereas the wearers of hijab living in non-Muslim contexts may feel a greater sense of “Otherness” due to the disconnect between their physical appearance and the social expectations of dress in their country of residence (Abdurraqib, 2006; Ali, 2005; Gole, 2003; Rana, 2007; Yakin, 2007), nonhijabis may have a similar dilemma in Muslim majority contexts. Considering that Muslim women often have similar views on modesty, regardless of their personal hijab status (Siraj, 2011), further research is needed to explore the role of religion and Islamic symbols among religious nonhijabis, especially in Muslim countries.
As the current study utilized responses solely from South Asian Muslim women, it is not possible to generalize the findings to Muslim women of other cultural backgrounds. Additionally, as a purely quantitative study, it did not delve into the subjective experiences of Muslim women or explain their choices at a deeper qualitative level. However, it does add to the limited extant literature on religiosity and physical appearance, especially as it is one of the few studies to explore the attitudes of Muslim women living in both a Muslim majority context and those in a Muslim minority one. As freedom of religion and freedom of expression are key components of American mainstream philosophy, at least in theory, future researchers may want to gather data from people living in Western contexts where secularity and assimilation have a greater influence on social norms than multiculturalism. In the same vein, it is possible that people living in Muslim majority contexts that have less of a multinational population than the UAE and where hijab is considered a mandatory part of public life may have differing views on religiosity and attractiveness. Future research may want to utilize a more qualitative or mixed-methods approach to gain a deeper understanding of this phenomenon across a variety of social contexts, both Muslim majority and Muslim minority ones.
The results of the present study have implications for better understanding the relationship between religiosity, hijab, and the physical attractiveness stereotype within Muslim communities. Although Muslim women who are more religious do tend to adopt the hijab in public, the controversial nature of the discourse around hijab reflects the multiple roles to which Muslim women adhere and how these roles interact with societal norms and expectations. Physical attractiveness lends itself to the Halo Effect stereotype. Similarly, the use of the hijab as a religious marker imparts positive attributes to the wearer within Muslim communities. Understanding the importance of hijab can thus help bridge communication between Muslims and non-Muslims as well as initiate dialogue within Muslim communities to allow diverse perspectives to be openly discussed and debated.
