What’s in a name again? The identity frames and mobilisation strategies of Czech Romani and Pro-Romani activists

Abstract

The aim of this study is to empirically analyse the relationship of collective identity frames to the mobilisation strategies of the Czech Romani and pro-Romani activists over the past two decades. After all, most existing analyses merely implicitly assume that this relationship exists, and explain the relationship as the result of a given political opportunity structure, but they do not examine these frames more closely. Using frame and claim-making analysis, the text traces the diachronic and synchronic development of self-naming frames and the collective action repertoire in five-year intervals (1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2012). It shows that, whereas self-naming significantly changes, the activists’ action repertoire does not. Thus, the frequently postulated relationship between self-naming, strategies and activists’ priorities is not confirmed. However, the analysis does reveal that certain claims and frames are connected with certain strategies and repertoire patterns. The paper concludes with a discussion of reasons for this diversification of activist framings, which may be the result of efforts to focus on different target audiences within the multiplicity of opportunity structures and a response to the (new) availability of external sources of funding in Central and Eastern Europe countries.

Keywords

Frames collective identity mobilisation social movements Roma EU funds opportunity structures Czech Republic

Introduction

Identity formation, social mobilisation and political representation are the three conceptual axes of discussions on Romani inclusion (Tremlett et al., 2014: 728) and activism (McGarry, 2008, 2010, 2014; Renouard, 2014; Trehan and Sigona, 2009; Vermeersch, 2006; for an overview, see Tremlett and McGarry, 2013). This text is devoted to the first two of them. Identity frames should be ‘central to the definition of interests and elaboration of strategies of collective actors’ as Jenson (1995: 108) stated in her article entitled ‘What’s in a name?’, in part because ‘mobilization does not always require pre-existing collective identities’ (Polletta and Jasper, 2001: 291) and thus ‘activists’ efforts to strategically ‘frame’ identities are critical in recruiting participants’ (Polletta and Jasper, 2001). This ‘self-naming’ generates strategic resources and solidarity necessary for successful action, draws discursive boundaries that prioritise some claims and demands and not others, identifies the movement’s allies and opponents, and has consequences for the routing of claims through state institutions (Jenson, 1995: 116).

Interestingly, far fewer studies devote themselves directly to the relationship of these self-designation frames and mobilisation on the basis of empirical research. However, mention is often made of ‘the importance of … empirical knowledge of how Romani identities become implicated in and through different modalities of mobilisation’ (Tremlett et al., 2014: 727).

Even among analyses of the framing of the collective identity of Romani and pro-Romani activists (Guy, 2001a; Krizsan, 2012; Marushiakova and Popov, 2013; van Baar, 2015; Vermeersch, 2003, 2006), not many studies analyse the frames and their synchronic and diachronic development in more detail. In other words, several rather static frames have been identified that may resonate in a given environment and/or may be based on a given political opportunity structure. However, we do not know whether and how these frames developed over time, how they resonated among activists, and which of them are dominant. And, most importantly, what relationship do they have to the action repertoire of Romani and pro-Romani activists? Other questions also arise in that ‘a social movement must not only mobilize a collective identity within the movement. It will also, if it is strategically appropriate, seek to compel recognition of that identity by public institutions’ (Jenson, 1995: 115). What then is the role played by the context of a post-communist environment of the Czech Republic? How do various target audiences in a multi-organisational field (Evans, 1997; Koopmans and Statham, 1999) relate to activists’ strategies of collective action? In other words, can we ask once again, ‘what’s in a name?’.

This paper is organised as follows. It briefly introduces existing theoretical concepts of framing theory and Roma mobilisation with a focus on analyses of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. This is followed by a description of the methodology of the conducted frame and claim-making analysis of Czech Roma and pro-Roma activists’ framing and collective action. The paper then describes the synchronic and diachronic development of self-naming frames in reference to activists’ action repertoire, accompanied by a description of the development of surrounding structural and discursive context and the activists’ action field over time. The conclusion is devoted to a discussion and the research implications for framing theory and studies of ethnic relations.

What’s in a name (in CEE countries)?

A movement’s actors may name or present themselves, for example, as citizens of a given country, a national minority, a community or ethnic group, a European nation, or as nomads and travellers. These self-designation interpretative frames (Benford and Snow, 2000; Snow et al., 1986), or ‘schemata of interpretation’ (Goffman, 1986: 21), can be understood as ‘intersubjectively determined and relationally imagined … culturally located things’ (Berbrier, 2002: 558) in different spaces of the discursive field (Steinberg, 2002: 211). Therefore, ‘self-naming’ (Jenson, 1995) is more of a discursive expression of ‘a political identity’ (McGarry, 2014: 758) and relates to the process of frame transformation (Snow et al., 1986) and specifically stigma transformation (Berbrier, 2002; McGarry, 2014). It denotes the process in which minorities or groups that present themselves as having been stigmatised or ostracised, or otherwise have assigned status in a deviant social space, try to counter this (Berbrier, 2002: 557) and transform and/or frame their self-designation in a (discursive) space that does not have these connotations. This paper thus analyses how ‘the choice of a name will configure the space available to the extent that it generates resources, identities, allies and opponents, and directs the routing of claims’ (Jenson, 1995: 115).

The articulation of an identity (‘who we are’)¹ is followed by the articulation of interests. Together, what is articulated in these two areas, form ‘the two main elements around which mobilisation is defined’ (Marinaro and Daniele, 2014: 777; see also Polletta and Jasper, 2001: 292). And a fragmentation, or even an absence, of a collective identity² is, in this regard one of the most frequently mentioned interpretations (see, e.g. Barany, 1998: 309; McGarry, 2010: 170; Vermeersch, 2006: 181) as to why ‘it seems unlikely that the Romani movement in Central Europe will soon reach higher levels of mass mobilization’ (Vermeersch, 2006: 228). Similarly, self-naming is not a unified and coherent process free from any internal contradictions. Frames are interactive processes and frame disputes—‘conflicts regarding such interpretive matters’—do arise (Benford, 1993: 677). Movement factions, groups or organisations ‘struggle’ over the dominant frame, and consciously or unconsciously present their interpretation with the aim of broadening its resonance (Benford and Snow, 2000; Snow and Benford, 1988; or Noakes and Johnston, 2005), both internally and externally, for other audiences. And while ‘frame transformation’ focuses more on the diachronic development of frames, ‘frame disputes’ analysis has a synchronic dimension.

Finding the right cultural symbols that resonate and elicit a response from potential supporters is a key attribute of frames (Valocchi, 2005: 54). However, not much attention has been devoted by studies on frame resonance to different target audiences or their specific mobilisation strategies within a multi-organisational field. This field constitutes a diversified social network of institutional and non-institutional actors, activists’ allies, opponents and enemies, and the activists’ demands, frames and claims relate to all these actors. However, analyses tend to describe a unified strategy shared by actors. But various frames may be produced by activists within a multiplicity of opportunity structures to resonate with different target audiences because ‘the framing needs of the different targets may be different or even contradictory’ (Evans, 1997: 452). This leads to the development of various discursive strategies, which is equally the case for the strategies of collective action.

Methodology

Two different research methods were used: micro-frame and claim-making analysis. Both were chosen given to the longitudinal design of the research and the need to capture appropriate discursive elements of those days without possible distortion resulting, for instance, from the interviews mapping the past.

Micro-frame analysis (Johnston, 1995, 2002) of Romani and pro-Romani periodicals was used to analyse self-designation frames and self-naming. The unit of analysis was the ‘micro-frame’ identified in published articles selected at five-year intervals (1992, 1997, 2002, 2007 and 2012). The reason for using micro-frame analysis is that this method sheds light on the process of frame formation that is essential to this investigation, rather than just looking at the product of this struggle (or the already formed collective action frames (Snow and Benford, 1988). It is a method that reveals how ‘frames change over time, how much, and how these variations might be related to the other factors in mobilization’ (Johnston, 2002: 66).

A micro-frame analysis was carried out on all the periodicals published in the selected years and archived in the Museum of Romani Culture in Brno (see List of periodicals). The last analysed year (2012) included all relevant articles published on www.romea.cz, which has become the biggest (pro-)Roma media server in the Czech Republic. The periodicals in the analysis do not represent an exhaustive overview of all activists’ positions and opinions, but the selection covers the majority of Czech Romani media (most of which depend on external funding). The research therefore contained statements by well-known Romani activists as well as pro-Romani activists and participants and by Romani journalists, and also included statements made in reports or surveys by ordinary Roma activists participating in demonstrations. However, it is important to note that this analysis includes texts written mainly by more experienced Roma activists or journalists.

Three stages of coding were done in Atlas.ti (for a similar method, see, e.g. Friese, 2014: 131; Saldaña, 2009). The interpretive frames and micro-frames were classified according to subject matter into three broader horizontal areas (social/economic, civic/political, and cultural; see also Entzinger, 2003: 107), according to their collective/individual character (Jenson, 1995) with a pluralism/assimilation dichotomy as the two integration masterframes (Berbrier, 2004). In total, 481 self-designation micro-frames in 246 documents/periodicals were identified and classified.

The following self-designation micro-frames were identified in the process of coding: in the civic-political sphere ‘national minority’³ was observed as a micro-frame that utilises available discursive, legal, and institutional means and instruments to establish (and later, to take advantage of) the legal status of the Roma minority in an effort to improve the position of the Roma people as a full-rights Czech minority and thereby broaden their potential (non-Roma) allies and (institutional, financial) resources and opportunities (similarly Vermeersch, 2006: 164). A micro-frame with a related interpretive line is ‘citizens’⁴ (of the state), which represents the Roma people as individuals with full rights and as equal citizens of the Czech Republic (and the Czechoslovak Federative Republic until 1993). This micro-frame differs from the ‘national minority’ by its individual rather than collective focus. This distinction may derive from activists’ fears of the majority population viewing the Roma people as one single ‘unadaptable’ group in society. ‘European nation’⁵ varies from the preceding two micro-frames by its transnational character and extension beyond the scope of the national state. It reflects the status of the Roma as a specific nation inside Europe, which was explicitly stated, for example, at the 5th World Roma Congress in Prague (2000) and its ‘a-territorial European nation’ agenda. The activists thus seek opportunities, not in a national space, but in a European one, and there expect positive changes (see also McGarry, 2011).

The ‘socially excluded’⁶ was identified as a micro-frame in the socio-economic sphere and it places emphasis on individual socio-economic predispositions and characteristics. Thus, this micro-frame partially overlaps with Vermeersch’s ‘underclass’ frame (2006: 167) describing ‘Roma who favored diminishing the importance attached to ethnic differences, and chose instead to demand economic support for poor communities’. This self-designation frame is discursively tied to several opportunities. One of the main of these was undoubtedly the expansion of European funding in CEE countries and their NGO sectors. European programmes often identified the beneficiaries of funding as individual ‘persons at risk of social exclusion’ and so the Czech NGOs even though, in fact, their activity was aimed mostly at the Roma. Important from an analytical perspective is the individualistic and assimilationist character of this micro-frame which reflects in the Czech Republic,

a growing liberalistic concept of social exclusion and inclusion concentrated around individual rights: the conviction that people are excluded as individuals, and not as members of certain collectives … the civic integration of its members is more contingent on the weakening of this identity. (Mareš, 2006: 32)

The last detected self-designation frame in the socio-economic area, but collective in character, is the Roma ‘community’.⁷ The emphasis in the ‘community’ (or later, ‘communities’) frame is placed on mutual local and also wider family bonds but with no stress, for example, on a common culture and language.

In the cultural area, the micro-frames ‘ethnic group’, ‘nomads’ and ‘Roma folk’ were identified. The main emphasis in the ‘ethnic group’ micro-frame⁸ was on a common language, identity, and culture. The frame referred to the present day, the surviving collective characteristics of the Roma, and their exclusivity and specificity. Thus, the frames ‘community’ and ‘ethnic group’ are singled out on the basis of different principles: ‘community’ is based on geographical and social characteristics, while ‘ethnic group’ is based on anthropological ones. The ‘Nomads’⁹ micro-frame simply presents the Roma in their ‘traditional’ image as travellers or nomads. The last cultural micro-frame, ‘Roma folk’,¹⁰ highlights the common history, traditions, art and literature of the Roma (‘nation’), with a focus on music, dance, solidarity and crafts. It differs from ‘nomads’ by its collective character and from the ‘ethnic group’ micro-frame (which referred to the present) by its focus on history. In the Czech context, this micro-frame does not overlap with the civic-political sphere (or does so very little) (cf. Vermeersch, 2006: 160) and its main attribute is cultural—e.g. the Roma as a nation of musicians and artists.

In order to compare ‘self-naming’ with the collective action repertoire of Romani and pro-Romani activists, it was necessary to perform a claim-making analysis (Koopmans and Rucht, 2002; Koopmans and Statham, 1999). Two daily newspapers (the right-wing Mladá Fronta DNES (Young Front) and the left-wing Právo (Right); for a similar approach, see also Koopmans et al., 2005) were chosen as data sources in the same intervals (1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2012). Instead of protest event analysis and ‘protest event’, the more inclusive ‘political claim-making’ (Koopmans and Rucht, 2002: 235) was defined as the unit of analysis. The reason for using this broader definition is the assumption that, owing to the given type of access activists have to the political system (e.g. via government advisory bodies) there may be a significant institutionalised dimension to their collective action repertoire and ‘the unit of analysis should be defined broadly to include discursive forms of protest, most importantly press conferences and public statements’ (Koopmans and Rucht, 2002: 235). For this reason, one more form of action was tracked and identified in the analysis—the various outcomes of publicly declared grant funding (associated with e.g. public launch of a funded project, an opening a funded social centre, a start of funded social work, etc.)¹¹—and consequently, a special supplementary category was added.

Furthermore, it was not just Roma claims that were tracked in the coding process, because ‘by coding all actions by all actors which are relevant to our political issue field, so that the focus shifted from “movement to multi-organizational field”’ (Koopmans and Statham, 1999: 204). In total, 228 relevant Roma or pro-Roma (action) strategies and 365 frames (in 216 claims) were identified.

In order to clarify the structure and arguments of the paper, in the claim-making analysis only frames over five occurrences analysis were involved.¹² Further analysed were 21 diagnostic and prognostic frames (and their 280 occurrences) in total, whereas self-designation and motivational frames were almost never found in the claim-making.

Last but not least, we need to describe the social field of Czech Romani and pro-Romani activists (for a more detailed description, see Guy, 2001b; Holomek, 1999; Pečínka, 2004, 2005, 2009; Šiklová, 1999). This needs to be specified because they are not a unified group and they form a highly fragmented environment where there are often personal and organisational conflicts that significantly shape this field and influence what goes on it. However, these lines of conflict cannot be reduced simply, for instance, to a cleavage between Romani and non-Romani actors¹³ or to differences in the radicality of their action repertoires. There are also cleavages that stem from changes in the wider social context, from disputes between individual Roma actors, communities, families, and/or from generational changes. In the 1990s, these cleavages manifested themselves in a gradual fragmentation of the Romani movement and the decline of the main Roma party; in the new millennium they were expressed through a heated debate about Czech integration policies; and more recently they have become apparent, for example, in the differences between actors who lean towards ‘long-term participation in governance structures based on the expert knowledge on one side’ (i.e. collaborative policy work—Cada and Ptácková, 2014: 137) and those who favour ‘confrontation, media work and political empowerment of the excluded minority on the other’ (and critical policy work—Cada and Ptácková, 2014).¹⁴ Therefore, given the specific nature of these cleavages, the most marked dividing lines in the period under observation will be briefly introduced below.

The development of the activists’ frames and collective action repertoire

1992: Post-revolutionary hopes

The Roma civic initiative (Romská občanská strana (ROI)) was registered in March 1990, in an atmosphere of post-revolutionary euphoria, when people could be heard chanting at demonstrations slogans such as ‘long live the Roma’. The ROI brought together all Romani elites and presented itself as ‘a non-ideological, emancipatory and social political party’ (Pečínka, 2004: 116) with tens of thousands of members. Romani activists achieved their first (and only) success in parliamentary elections when 11 Romani representatives were elected to the Federal Assembly and the Czech and Slovak National Council in 1990. Nevertheless, after the next elections in 1992 only one Roma MP was left.

Emil Ščuka, the leader of ROI, together with other Roma representatives tried to re-establish links with broader Romani movement at the 4th World Romani Congress (1990) where he was elected secretary general to the International Romani Union (IRU) (Guy, 2001b: 294). But the ROI, to which strong expectations were initially attached, eventually and somewhat surprisingly, profiled itself as a right-wing party and supported the policies of the government of Vaclav Klaus.¹⁵ Instead of unity within the movement, rivalry and dividing lines began to form between Romani leaders and the gradual disintegration of the movement was also abetted by the ‘caste barriers between the numerically larger Slovak (Roma), the numerically smaller Olach Roma (Vlachike), and the utterly marginal, settled Czech and Moravian Roma’ (Pečínka, 2004: 127).

The Slovak Government formally affirmed the status of the Roma as a national minority (Resolution 153/1991), and the Czech Government followed soon afterwards with a similar step. Roma integration policies began to be drawn up on the governmental level, and so discussions also began to arise about (Roma) citizenship, human rights, and, for example, the education of Roma children (Sulitka, 1999: 225). However, because of the impending elections in June 1992, these policy materials were not finished and the subsequent right-wing Klaus government never went back to finalise them. The policy of the Czechoslovak state towards minorities was premised on the ‘civic principle’—‘undifferentiated citizenship status for all its [Czech state] citizens, and that the expression of ethnic difference was regarded as a private matter’ (Vermeersch, 2006: 80). In the social sector:

the state did not consider the fact that the Communist regime had disrupted not only the identity and culture of the Roma, but above all the internal potential of the Roma population to solve the problems and threats they encountered in the period of economic transformation. The state thus did not pay any attention to the fact that the needy and inadequately integrated Roma would still, for a certain period of time, need special attention, because for these people a loss of employment was associated with a high risk of remaining in a state of long-term unemployment. (Vašečka, 2005: 153)

The expectations attached to the political emancipation of the Romani movement and to the Roma having obtained the status of a national minority were reflected in the self-naming frames of the activists. The most frequent self-naming frames were ‘ethnic group’ (25.9%), ‘citizens’ (22.4%), and ‘national minority’ (24.1%). Overall, more than 50% of all self-designation frames related to the civic-political sphere, while socio-economic frames were comparatively absent accounting for approximately just 4% (see Table 1).

Table 1.

Self-naming micro-frames over time.

	%	1992	1997	2002	2007	2012	N
POL	national minority	24.1	12.5	20.9	16.3	13.5	86
	citizens	22.4	16.7	12.1	4.1	9.6	63
	European nation	4.3	1.4	5.5	5.1	1.9	18
CUL	ethnic group	25.9	33.3	20.9	10.2	14.4	98
	nomads	12.1	6.9	3.3	0	1	23
	Roma folk	6.9	1.4	5.5	3.1	10.6	28
SOC	community	1.7	23.6	27.5	21.4	16.3	82
	socially excluded	2.6	4.2	4.4	39.8	32.7	83

	N	116	72	91	98	104	481

POL: civic-political sphere; CUL: cultural sphere; SOC: socio-economic sphere.

The collective action repertoire of the Romani movement in 1992 was more focused on protest activities and violent direct actions (mainly clashes with the skinhead subculture) than in the other years analysed here. This focus can also be attributed to the fact that it occurred in the aftermath of the 1989 protest cycle. However, public statements and press conferences (35%) and meetings (29%), as negotiations between Romani representatives and local municipalities began to take place, also figured frequently in the repertoire. ‘Cultural-political’ activities such as performances, festivals and exhibitions were rarer (3%, see Table 2; but see Pečínka, 2004: 121). There was no repertoire relating to funding as the mechanisms of grant funding had not yet been created. The most frequently articulated frames and causes of Roma problems were ‘racial discrimination’ and attacks from ‘skinheads’. Hope and solutions were seen as lying in a united ‘Romani movement’ in the civic-political arena/sphere and the need for ‘education’ for the Roma was also highlighted (see Table 3).

Table 2.

Collective action strategies and claim-making over time.

	%	1992	1997	2002	2007	2012	N
17	violent direct action (attack)	12	3	0	0	2	6
16	demonstration, rally, march- violent	3	0	2	0	0	2
15	demonstration, rally, march- non-violent	12	15	0	8	15	22
14	strike	0	0	0	0	0	0
13	blockades, sit-ins, building occupations	0	0	0	0	3	2
12	performance, happening	0	3	0	0	10	7
11	protest camp	0	0	0	0	0	0
10	petition	0	5	3	3	3	7
9	boycott	0	0	0	0	0	0
8	festival, street party, exhibition	3	3	29	14	20	36
7	criminal complaint	0	3	5	11	0	8
6	meetings	29	8	5	8	8	24
5	press conference/public statement	35	25	14	28	15	49
4	press release/public record	3	20	9	3	0	15
3	seminars, debates, conferences	0	5	5	3	7	10
2	projects and funding	0	0	24	11	7	22
1	Other	3	13	3	11	10	18
	N	34	40	58	36	60	228

Table 3.

The frames and thematical focus of activists’ action repertoires over time.

		%	1992	1997	2002	2007	2012	N
Diagnostic frames	SOC	ghettos/housing	4.6	6.1	29.0	21.9	21.6	28
		poverty	4.6	2.0	3.2	9.4	5.4	8
		unemployment	0	0	3.2	12.5	0	5
	P	politicians responsibility	9.1	16.3	16.1	9.4	2.7	19
	CUL	racial discrimination	27.3	40.8	19.4	31.3	32.4	54
		skinheads	36.4	16.3	3.2	3.1	27	28
		social discrimination	13.6	10.2	22.6	3.1	5.4	18
		discrimination in the workplace	4.6	6.1	3.2	3.1	0	6
		discrimination in the education	0	2.0	0	6.3	5.4	5
		N	22	49	31	32	37	171
Prognostic frames	SOC	help for Roma from society	13.3	0	11.1	4.8	9.1	10
		success in market/employment	13.3	0	4.4	23.8	4.6	10
		requalification	6.7	0	2.2	14.3	0	5
		community and social work	0	0	8.9	9.5	0	6
	P	unity of the Romani movement	33.3	16.7	2.2	0	0	7
	CUL	support of the Romani identity	6.7	0	17.8	0	22.7	14
		multicultural education	0	33.3	24.4	19.1	31.8	24
		education in general	20	0	13.3	14.3	4.6	13
		tolerance	6.7	50	15.6	14.3	27.3	20
		N	15	6	45	21	22	109

1997: Racism and the first conception of integration

The second year analysed, 1997, was preceded by the division of the federation and the formation of independent Czech Republic in 1993. Sulitka (1999: 230) has spoken about a ‘repeated beginning’ as the government’s policies towards the Roma after 1993 did not tie in with what was developed in the federal state. For the majority of Roma (many of whom are from Slovakia) who reside on Czech territory, the division of Czechoslovakia posed a serious problem as the new Czech state immediately introduced the Act on the Acquisition and Loss of Czech Citizenship (Act No. 40/1993 Coll.). This legislation established criteria for citizenship (see Šiklová and Miklušáková, 1998) that, for some Roma, were difficult to meet and many of them consequently became persons without any state citizenship because they ‘did not have documentation to prove citizenship, had criminal records that prevented successful applications, or could not understand or afford the administrative procedures and costs required by the new law.’ (Linde, 2006: 342). The Act was condemned as intentionally denying Roma Czech citizenship (Fawn, 2001: 1193; Guy, 2001b: 299) and Vaclav Klaus government’s adoption and support of it was strongly criticised by Czech and international NGOs and other institutions (e.g. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, European Union, the Council of Europe, UNHCR, etc.). Notably, the ex post facto penal sanction of the Roma by denaturalisation for (intentional) crimes committed within the preceding five years was considered ‘the most blatant violation of international law’ (Linde, 2006: 349).

Romani representatives and activists continued to be unsuccessful at winning support at the polls, even though they changed their strategy and, instead of creating their own political party, sought to be included on as many candidate lists of mainstream parties as possible (Pečínka, 2004: 130). Racial violence against Roma, including racially motivated murders, escalated¹⁶ and the success of the far-right political party SRP/RSČ (Coalition for the Republic—Republican Party of Czechoslovakia) in the elections to the lower chamber of the Czech Parliament did not make the situation any easier. Unsurprisingly, in August 1997, after the most popular Czech TV channel (Nova) broadcast a story showing the ‘trouble-free lives of Roma people in Canada’, many Roma responded with an exodus.¹⁷ All of these led to recurring and increasing criticism of the ineffective measures and policies of the Czech government. Pressure even began to emerge from the European Commission which, in 1997, defined the status of the candidate countries for EU membership as generally satisfactory ‘except for the situation of the Roma minority in a number of applicants’ (European Commission 1997 cited in Vermeersch, 2006: 197). Solving Roma issues therefore started to be understood as an integral part of the accession process and the acquis communautaire and thus created further opportunities for activists.

One of the reactions to the strong international and domestic criticism was the ‘Bratinka report’ (see also Vermeersch, 2006: 83). As a chairman of the Council for National Minorities, Pavel Bratinka presented (in spite of strong opposition from Vaclav Klaus) a comprehensive and critical report highlighting the growing social problems of the Roma, most notably unemployment and the discrimination of the Roma community in the labour market, and formulated demands for more significant protection of ethnic minorities (and specifically Roma) in the Czech Republic. As a response, the first government advisory body on Roma issues (the Interdepartmental Commission for Roma Community Affairs) was established; its task was to represent the Roma minority and to participate (at least formally) in creating Roma integration concepts and policies.

Nevertheless, the Bratinka report was met with reservations by the community itself (or, more precisely, by those activists who were not involved in its preparation). The final report was rejected, for example, by an assembly of Roma representatives from Bohemia and Moravia, headed by Ondřej Giňa, and they made their own recommendations, which were allegedly a better reflection of the minority’s current circumstances. The lack of clarity in how the authority and roles of the Commission were defined, the limited impact the Commission had on policymaking, the confusing way in which representatives of the Roman minority were appointed and the consequent claims that the Commission was unrepresentative, led to further criticism. Another question was whether the Commission’s primary task should be that of developing a new, better Roma minority policy, or whether it should merely represent Roma (Vermeersch, 2006: 85).

The preparation and the events surrounding the Bratinka report may be one explanation for the changes that can be observed in the strength of self-naming micro-frames (see Table 1). With the release of this report, Roma started to be discursively designated as a community and the discursive denomination changed (in 1992 only 1.7% of self-naming frames referred to ‘community’ but by 1997 the figure was 23.6%). However, as the ‘multicultural policies practiced by the Czech government’ became more prominent (Ramadan, 2008: 186), ‘ethnic group’ remained the most popular micro-frame (33.3%). All in all, the cultural micro-frames and cultural sphere became more dominant, but the civic-political micro-frames ‘national minority’ (12.5%) and ‘citizens’ (16.7%) continued to be significant.

Regarding the collective action repertoire, violence decreased (from 12% in 1992 to 3% of activists’ repertoire in 1997), as did that of a transactional repertoire (Císař, 2008; Tarrow and Petrova, 2006)¹⁸ and ‘meetings’ specifically (from 29% to 8%). During this year, petitions and public reports became much more visible as a result of the aforementioned criticism of racial discrimination and the government’s inability to face it (Table 2). The focus of the action repertoire reflects the tense atmosphere in Czech society at the time, when the biggest frame was ‘racial discrimination’ (40.8%) followed by frames referring to the culprits: ‘skinheads’ and ‘politicians’ (16.3%), who bore responsibility for the state of affairs at that time. Surprisingly, the ‘unemployment’ frame received 0% although reported rates thereof in the Czech Republic were estimated at 70–90% in some places (Guy, 2001b: 295–296). The small number of prognostic frames (N = 6) is probably indicative of this atmosphere and shows the need for ‘tolerance’ in society (Table 3).

2002: The turning point—From politics to funding and social work

A certain change came after the fall of Vaclav Klaus’s government (2 January 1998), which took a dismissive and negative view of NGOs (Fagin, 2000) and civil society on the whole, which he called ‘aberrant’.¹⁹ Minister without portfolio Vladimír Mlynář in Toškovský's caretaker government (1998) and then the Social Democratic cabinet of Miloš Zeman (1998–2002) defined the topic of human rights as one of its priorities.²⁰ And with the end of the 1990s, the earlier civic principle approach was partly replaced by the active protection of minority culture, without, however, self-government rights or any far-reaching cultural autonomy (Vermeersch, 2006: 87). In the new government’s concept of Roma integration (2000), argumentation was no longer made in terms of the transformation process, and instead there began to emerge ‘equalising measures’ (Vašečka, 2005: 159), especially in the areas of education and business. These measures included scholarships for Roma students, prior to primary school, benefits for Roma companies, and more. The aim was also to direct these equalising measures and policies at the local level. However, many local politicians and governments took a negative view of these measures, so merely delegating the task to the local level did not ensure policies would be implemented and did not produce the expected results (see also Cashman, 2008). Czech society's hostile attitude to Roma people, moreover, initiated another waves of exodus. The numbers of racially or ethnically motivated crimes also grew (from 51 in 1993 and 273 in 1997, to 544 in 2002)²¹ and in the town of Ústí nad Labem a wall to separate the Romani community from its non-Romani neighbours in Matičná street became (in 1999) a well-known negative symbol of the direction the Czech society.²² Also among Romani representatives, conflicts grew stronger before the 2002 parliamentary elections in reaction to the incomprehensible behaviour of the chair of ROI, who cooperated with the far right National Democratic Party (Pečínka, 2005).

At the turn of the millennium, external grant funding was becoming an important factor in the activist social field. In terms of funding for the Romani community, on top of the donors that existed in the 1990s in the Czech Republic (for an overview see Šiklová, 1999) there were also funds from the European Union (and programmes such as PHARE and TACIS). Despite their size, these programmes were also largely criticised for the surprisingly little attention they gave to the tackling unemployment (only 9% of PHARE assistance), for their ‘top-down’ interventionist approach or failure to build durable alliances between national and local partners (see e.g. EMS, 2004; Guy, 2011) and one of the main challenges was that these ‘initiatives and programmes confronted a lack of political will, both at national and local level’ (Guy, 2011: 16).

The large volume of funding from these programmes also began to give visibility to one of the cleavages between Romani and pro-Romani NGOs. While Romani NGOs sometimes had difficulties with the administration and accounting of projects and with drawing up annual activity reports, pro-Romani NGOs managed to administer and finance the projects better and raised more funds and did so repeatedly. The Roma and Romani activists viewed these pro-Romani NGOs with some ambivalence. They were regarded as ‘a foreign element that is helping them, but that at the same time seeks not only to integrate them but to assimilate them in a way that the majority considers to be appropriate’ (Šiklová, 1999: 278). On the other hand, the Roma sometimes viewed Roma NGOs with the concern that they would use the funds entrusted to them to improve the socio-economic status of only their own families or those in their own immediate community (Šiklová, 1999).

In line with the above-mentioned governmental policies and measures, ‘community’ (27.5%) and ‘ethnic group’ (20.9%) self-naming was preferred. ‘National minority’ (20.9%) was also significant and the analysis also shows a slight growth in the ‘European nation’ (5.5%) micro-frame. This can be attributed to the Czech preparations for EU accession. However, this micro-frame is not widely used (see also Vermeersch, 2006: 161). As in 1997, in 2002 pluralistic and collective micro-frames dominate, but there is almost a balance between all three thematic spheres: socio-economic (32%), civic-political (39%) and cultural (30%) (see Table 1).

Protest participation continued to decrease with only one coded demonstration, in contrast to the 17 festivals coded, which were often supported by grant funding (and were referred to as cultural festivals of ‘mutual understanding and tolerance’ or ‘dialogue between the majority and the Romani culture’), and consequently the number of coded claims associated with grant funding also grew (see Table 2). As in the previous years analysed, in 2002 the cultural sphere still dominated on the diagnostic and prognostic levels.

2007: The growing domination of social exclusion discourse

Regularly updated government policy on Romani integration (from 2000) started to be formulated from three (interconnected) perspectives (human-rights related, national, and socio-cultural/socio-economic). On the European level the Decade of Roma Inclusion (2005) was begun, and as part of this initiative the Czech Republic committed itself to addressing the poverty and social exclusion of Romani communities on both national and regional levels. On this basis the government drew up a National Action Plan for the Decade and a National Action Plan on Social Inclusion (NAPSI) based on the Lisbon programme. The National Plan for Employment lay in the same discursive field of social exclusion and did not speak about a solution to unemployment and the Roma minority specifically, but rather used terms such as ‘individuals experiencing employment difficulties’ (Vašečka, 2005: 164).

Concurrently, as a constituent part of the financial opportunity structure, programmes of the European Commission (such as EQUAL Community Initiative) came to be used in this period (2002–2007). After the Czech Republic’s EU accession, other programmes, such as the Human Resources Development Operational Programme, were launched ‘to achieve high and stable levels of employment based on a qualified and flexible workforce, integration of socially disadvantaged population groups and on the competitiveness of businesses whilst respecting the principles of sustainable development’.²³ These programmes have been partly targeted to remedy the shortcomings of previous PHARE funding, and thus focus mainly on socio-economic priorities such as employment, housing, and health care (but also education) (Marushiakova and Popov, 2015: 28) and favour an individual approach to Roma integration (Mareš, 2006).

The topic of social exclusion and the issue of socially excluded localities and ghettos is reflected in the activists’ action repertoire (and in Roma periodicals) where diagnostic frames like ‘ghettos/housing’ grew stronger. In this connection, in the years 2003–2005 in particular, the activists’ field became marked by disputes between advocates of the social approach to integration, tied to the issue of social exclusion and the concept of ‘culture of poverty’,²⁴ and advocates of the (liberal) multi-cultural approach.²⁵ The heated debate between these two sides drew participation from activists, social workers, and anthropologists, as well as politicians, political scientists and other academics. This dispute was essentially about who should be considered a Roma and whether the emphasis should be placed on improving the socio-economic status of ‘socially excluded persons', among whom there happened to be a large number of Roma, or whether the focus should also be to seek the cultural and political emancipation of the Roma. The distinction between these two views came to be symbolised by the use of quotation marks around the word Roma (‘Roma’ in the case of the social approach) to indicate which point of view the author espoused (for an overview, see Koubek, 2012; Pečínka, 2009; but compare the use of quotation marks in the Czech context with, e.g. Popova, 2015). It is no surprise that, after some advocates of the social approach stated ‘the Roma do not exist’ (as a single ethnic or social group), a statement then frequently cited and sometimes abused, they were opposed by many Romani activists. The debate was then sharpened even more when they spoke against Romani activists (and labelled them the ‘Romani ethno-nationalist or revitalisation movement’), whose main objective was supposed to be only that of obtaining financial resources resulting from grant funding.

Finally, in 2006, the combination of more pro-socially oriented, social-democratic governments and the active governmental Council for Roma Community Affairs led to the first comprehensive analysis of socially excluded Roma localities (GAC, 2006). Nine years after Bratinka’s report, this research, led by Ivan Gabal, was a next step that laid the groundwork for mapping the real scale of Roma social exclusion, especially in the Czech Republic—the country that for a long time had been one of the most ardent opponents of ethnically disaggregated statistics and data (OSF, 2010).

Racist speeches and statements continue to influence the themes and frames in the activists’ action repertoire. There are frequent mentions of the mayor of Ostrava/Mariánské Hory and Hulváky Liana Janáčková and of Jiří Čunek, the leader of the Christian Democratic Party, the mayor of the town of Vsetin and deputy prime minister in Mirek Topolánek's government (2007–2009). In 2006, Čunek ordered the forced eviction of several hundred Roma flats in the centre of the town of Vsetín and moved them into unsatisfactory ‘container housing’ on the town’s periphery, describing these evictions as ‘the removal of an ulcer’.²⁶ And in the field of education, the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights against the Czech Republic, which was found to be systematically discriminating Roma children by segregating them in ‘special’ or ‘practical’ schools (Complaint No. 57325/00 D.H. and Others v the Czech Republic) was brought up.

A slight increase in the protest repertoire compared to 2002 was coded within the collective action repertoire. The targets of the protests and public statements, speeches and criminal complaints were the forementioned politicians and their racist statements. However, the profile of the collective action repertoire as a whole remained unchanged with its main focus on conventional and institutional strategies. The same was not true of self-naming. It underwent a discursive shift and the centre of the self-designation micro-frames was transformed (see Table 1), whereby ‘socially excluded’, an assimilationist and individualised micro-frame, became the strongest frame by far (39.8%). Conversely, such multicultural micro-frames as ‘ethnic group’ (10.2%) and ‘Roma folk’ (3.1%) occurred the least and there were no occurrences at all of the micro-frame ‘nomads’. This discursive change is partly reflected in the thematical focus and frames of the Romani collective action repertoire, but the change has no significant effect on activists’ strategies (see Tables 2 and 3).

2012: Back to anti-Roma marches

The second programme period of European funding (2007–2013) was already well under way before 2012. Compared to Czech national grants, it focused on strengthening internal resources and the skills of Czech Romani communities, rather than on external support for coexistence with the majority. Funding targeted unemployment and social exclusion and focused on supporting requalification training, the competitiveness of businesses, and education (e.g. the Education for Competitiveness Operational Programme) or flexible workforce and employability (e.g. the Human Resources and Employment Operational Programme), if the most important EU funding programmes for Czech NGOs are mentioned.

At the beginning of 2008, the government Agency for Social Inclusion was set up. The agency approached Roma integration as a social not an ethnic problem, and focused primarily on socially excluded localities in cooperation with local governments. The agency did not designate ‘the Roma’ explicitly as its target group but rather ‘people at risk of social exclusion’. Its approach to Roma integration came to be criticised (along with some large NGOs, e.g. People in Need/Člověk v tísni, which have an influence on the agency work) by some pro-Romani activists as ‘paternalistic’²⁷ when the agency and forementioned NGOs operationalised it as (individualised) social work with clients. Not all activists, however, agreed with this criticism.

The number of ghettos, however, failed to decrease.²⁸ Ministers belonging to the right-wing Czech governments at that time were frequently criticised by activists and NGOs—such as Jiří Čunek (since 2012, controversially, the chairperson of the Senate Sub-Committee on Human Rights and Equal Opportunities) and Jaromír Drábek (Minister of Labour and Social Affairs in Petr Nečas’ government 2010–2013²⁹), who implemented a series of neoliberal reforms (see also van Baar, 2012). These reforms primarily impacted the socially disadvantaged, the unemployed, and persons with the lowest economic status, many of whom were Roma. In this atmosphere of government budget cuts and harsh neoliberal reforms, the Roma started to be portrayed as ‘inadaptable’ people abusing social benefits and living at the expense of the society. And then began the contentious episode (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007) of the anti-Roma marches (2011–2013).

In this context, longitudinal opinion polls continue to show no progress in the minority–majority coexistence (which was evaluated as bad by 81% of respondents in 1997 and by 82% in 2012³⁰) and the Roma was repeatedly rated by respondents as the least favourite minority. Even the media became in 2012 a target of criticism for contributing to the escalation of social tension and publishing unverified and negatively phrased news against the Roma.³¹ It was no surprise that, in the last official population census (2011), only about 0.2% (13,150) of Czech citizens claimed to be of Roma nationality, even though the estimated number of Roma living in the Czech Republic is 200,000³² people. This fact was mentioned by the Czech media, which noted that this number in the census was even smaller than the number of citizens who claimed they belonged to the religion of Jedi Knights from the Star Wars movies.³³

The number of festivals coded (20%) increased slightly in 2012 and for the first time happenings and performances (10%) appeared in the collective action repertoire. This new strategy was mainly the result of the activists’ efforts to take non-violent and witty action against the violent anti-Roma marches. Non-violent (anti-) demonstrations were also found to be on the rise (15%), despite the fact that, out of nine planned and conducted non-violent demonstrations, six were cancelled.

Even though in 2012 the ‘socially excluded’ micro-frame fell within the stigmatised discursive space associated with ‘inadaptable’ people, anti-Roma marches, unemployment and ghettos it remained by far the strongest micro-frame (32.7%) along with the socio-economic sphere in the self-designation framing (see Table 1). Conversely, the most widespread frames used by activists in their collective action repertoire were cultural (‘racial discrimination’ and ‘skinhead’) and multicultural (‘multicultural education’ and ‘support of the Romani identity’) ones (Table 3), as it was the case during the anti-Roma rallies in 1997. And on the contrary to the activists’ self-naming, in the whole 20-year period there was no significant shift in the activists’ action strategies and the prevailing framing of their action repertoires despite the onset of the discourse associated with European funding.

Discussion and conclusion

If the framing and formation of a collective identity is supposed to influence ‘the definition of interests and elaboration of strategies of collective actors’ (Jenson, 1995: 108), this cannot be said to be true in the case of the Czech Romani and pro-Romani activists—at least not from what we can see by tracing how their self-naming and collective action repertoire have changed over time (Figure 1). While the discursive character of self-naming (Table 1) changed dramatically after the year 2002 (towards the more individualist and assimilationist ‘socially excluded’ micro-frame), the (pro-)Romani activists’ collective action repertoire (Table 2) and its thematic focus and frames (Table 3) did not change significantly. Thus, the change in the activists’ self-designation does not appear to be a decisive factor here, even though here it is impossible to analyse in more detail all the changes that may have influenced the strategies of mobilisation of Czech Romani and pro-Romani activists or the outcomes of the movement.

Figure 1.

Comparison of the evolution of collective action strategies and self-naming over time.

Moreover, these self-designation micro-frames and thematic focus and frames of the activists’ repertoire are at the opposite ends of the assimilation/pluralism masterframe scale. The evolution of the socio-economic focus of self-naming micro-frames reflects the development of the financial and discursive opportunities that came with the introduction of European funding. On the contrary, the activists’ action repertoires were dominated (with one exception in 2007) by cultural frames on both the diagnostic (‘discrimination/skinheads’) and prognostic (‘multicultural education/multiculturalism’, ‘tolerance/good coexistence’) levels for almost the whole 20 years. And there has not been any major change or any significant radicalisation or deradicalisation in strategy since the aftermath of the 1989 protest cycle. The repertoire is, overall, rather moderate and institutionalised in character, and does not much seek to engage in confrontational activities despite a slight increase in protest tactics associated with the anti-Roma marches (2011–2013).

But the different focuses of the self-naming and the action repertoire of Czech Romani and pro-Romani activists may be explained by the multi-organisational field in which they operate. The actors in that field do not work with a single unified opportunity structure and can develop several different framing strategies aimed at various target audiences. Therefore, paradoxically, the reasons why there was a clearly visible transformation of self-naming and yet no significant change in the action repertoire may be identical. While there have been important changes (the advent of European funds) in the financial opportunity structure that is attached to the target audience of donors (as revealed in the micro-frame analysis and activists’ self-naming in Roma and pro-Roma periodicals, which are often grant-funded), since the early 1990s there have been no significant changes in the key target audiences: the ‘public’ and ‘political representatives’. The general public has continued to maintain a negative view and politicians have continued to adopt populist positions on the Roma. So why should the action repertoire, which is aimed mainly at these two targets audiences, fundamentally change?

The importance of diversifying the framing in response to multiplying opportunity structures increases if we focus on the articulation of activists’ interests and priorities due to their different target audiences. While socio-economic frames (and social exclusion issues) tend to be aimed at a target audience of donors, on the public and/or state representatives focus frames connected with discrimination and solutions in the form of multi-cultural frames (Table 4). This has been confirmed in claim-making analysis, which indicated that 64.5% of frames in the cultural sphere are directed at the ‘public’ target audience and roughly a similar figure was found for target groups linked to politicians. And vice versa, a ‘socially excluded’ target audience is largely associated with socio-economic frames (87.5%). They are also dominant in the ‘local government’ target group (44.7%), which, inter alia, also represents a specific group of donors, as NGO funding for social or community field work, for example, often comes from municipal sources. The Czech example thus shows the importance of the multiplicity of opportunity structures, where there is no single overall change in (framing) strategy. Rather there is a diversification of (framing) strategy and the changes are related to the specific opportunity structures and target audiences.

Table 4.

Ties of frame spheres to target audiences.

	% CUL	% SOC	% POL	N frames	% of target
president	25	25	50	4	1.1
parliament	50	0	50	2	.5
government	52.7	14.5	32.7	55	15.1
ministries	33.3	33.3	33.3	3	.8
politician	70	0	30	10	2.7
political parties	55.6	0	44.4	9	2.5
municipalities, local governments	18.4	44.7	36.8	38	10.4
regions, county governments	50	0	50	2	.5
administration	42.9	14.3	42.9	7	1.9
courts	58.3	16.7	25	12	3.3
army	100	0	0	1	.3
police	75	0	25	4	1.1
Czech state (in general)	58.3	8.3	33.3	12	3.3
public	64.5	12.1	23.4	107	29.3
media	50	0	50	2	.5
corporations	100	0	0	1	.3
institutions of foreign states	20	40	40	5	1.4
Romani movement	0	0	100	1	.3
Roma party	0	100	0	1	.3
Roma (in general)	58	20	22	50	13.7
socially weak/excluded	12.5	87.5	0	8	2.2
skinheads subculture	84.6	7.7	7.7	13	3.6
other	72.2	16.7	11.1	18	4.9
N	199	68	98	365	100

This diversification is further evidence of how certain mobilisation strategies and repertoire patterns are associated with specific frames (Table 5). Protest or more radical strategies in the collective action repertoire are mainly associated with the specific diagnostic cultural frames: (racial) ‘discrimination’ and the related ‘skinheads’ frame. And vice versa, frames within the socio-economic sphere are not connected with protest, extra-institutional mobilisation, or the mobilisation of broader support. Instead, they tend to be tied to a conventional institutionalised repertoire, which may be more transactional (e.g. meetings) and/or a grant-based (e.g. seminars, conferences, the launch of a project or social services, the opening of a social centre) in character. But not only that, research shows that different actors apply different mobilisation strategies that reflect their position within the highly fragmented social field. For example, Romani NGOs almost never engaged in more radical strategies which are observed more in self-organised or informal forms of protest participation.

Table 5.

Ties of strategies to frames (frames >= 5, ties >0.2 = 20%).

	Skinheads	Social discrimination	Racial discrimination	Ghettos	Multi-cultural education	Tolerance	N frames/ N strategies
violent direct action (attack)	0.75						8/6
demonstration, rally, march- violent	0.50	0.50					2/2
demonstration, rally, march- non-violent			0.38				32/22
strike							0/0
blockades, sit-ins, building occupations	0.33		0.33	0.33			3/2
performance, happening	0.50			0.25			8/7
protest camp							0/0
petition				0.50			8/6
boycott							0/0
festival, street party, exhibition					0.28	0.21	47/27
criminal complaint		0.33	0.22				9/8
meetings							50/21
press conference/public statement			0.22				81/48
press release/public record							43/15
seminars, debates, conferences					0.24		21/10
projects and funding							34/21
other							36/14
N	30	18	55	29	26	21	382/209*

• The different numbers of frames and strategies (from number of claims) are due to the fact that it was not always possible to identify the frame in every claim and, conversely, some claims contain more than one form of action (strategy) that involves more than one frame.

The research findings thus can be applied to the debate within ethnic relations and Romani studies. Some opportunity structures and the attitudes of some target audiences (e.g. public, politicians) have not changed much over time, nor has there been any change in the activists’ strategies towards them. The result is that, even after extensive financial investments (especially from EU funds), the position of the Roma minority has not improved, and owing to various mutually reinforcing mechanisms of discrimination ‘one would be better advised’ to focus evenly on these audiences and remedying exclusion of Roma people before offering (financial) mechanisms for Roma communities’ empowerment (Agarin, 2014: 748). The question is how these programmes could actually succeed given the often negative attitude of politicians and anti-Roma prejudices in public space that are often backed by the media? The discourse in the Czech Republic that spoke of the ‘socially excluded’ when it was in fact referring specifically to the ‘Roma’ promoted, paradoxically, an image of the Roma as ‘a privileged group that undeservedly enjoys privileges not available to the majority’, and as a community that ‘not only parasites on the labour of the society, but is also supported to do so’ (Marushiakova and Popov, 2015: 27). And all of this tends to reinforce the hostile environment in which the preferred approach to integration is assimilation and dissolution of the Romani identity within the majority society.

This indeed shows the development of self-naming in the Czech Republic. The issues of political emancipation and participation that dominated the self-naming in 1990s have been superseded by socio-economic sphere and social exclusion issues. And rather than being full citizens with rights and obligations, the prevailing (somewhat depoliticised) self-definition is based primarily on the socio-economic characteristics of the socially excluded (beneficiaries).

Nevertheless, if we go back and answer once again the main question in the title of this article, the changes of self-naming do not always mean a change in the strategies and tactics in the activists’ action repertoire. But these framing strategies do react to the changes in the discursive context and may be aimed at different target audiences in the multi-organisational field. And one way in which to strengthen the impact of integration policies may be to take into account the mutual relationships between the different target audiences in a multi-organisational field and to not focus only on one side of this relationship associated with the Roma minority.

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the Czech Science Foundation (grant no. GA 14-10884P).

Notes

List of Periodicals

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