The failure of state multiculturalism in the UK? An analysis of the UK’s multicultural policy for 2000

Abstract

If the 1997 New Labour’s winning election seems to correlate with an upsurge in both the political arena and in public favour for multiculturalism in the UK, the overall decade and a half that ensued took the very opposite path. For example, Prime Minister David Cameron declared in 2011 that state multiculturalism was a failure. In this article, I question the impact of such declarations onto the UK’s immigrant multicultural policy. In particular, using and updating the Multicultural Policy Index, I show evidence of the evolution, between 2000 and 2015, of the UK’s multicultural policy. In turn, this provides a satisfactory framework for having a clear understanding of the public policy dynamic in matters of multiculturalism in the following of David Cameron’s declarations concerning the failure of state multiculturalism. Then, echoing Meer and Modood’s argument of a ‘civic-thickening’ for the UK’s integration policy, I discuss citizenship education programs of the four constituent nations of the UK – where such integration policies have been implemented. This shows that while such curriculums all put forward approaches for ‘thickening’ togetherness, it is nonetheless consistent with a ‘multiculturalist advance’. Hence, one must invalidate the thesis following which multicultural policy and integration policy should be understood through the strict prism of a zero-sum game.

Keywords

Multiculturalism United Kingdom public policy David Cameron Multicultural Policy Index citizenship education civic integration civic thickening

Introduction

Debates over belonging in Europe and in the UK, in particular, consumed a significant portion of political discussions since New Labour was elected in 1997 – replacing a series of Conservative governments. During the election campaign, Tony Blair’s party had effectively put emphasis onto Britain’s inherent racial diversity (Blair, 1997), telling the British people that ‘every colour is a good colour’ (Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (CFMEB (The Runnymede Trust), 2002: 40), and celebrating the Cool Britannia (Leonard, 1997). Soon after this government took office, the Runnymede Trust – ‘an independent think-tank devoted to the cause of promoting racial justice in Britain’ (CFMEB (The Runnymede Trust), 2000: iix) – established the CFMEB in 1998. Chaired by political philosopher Bhikhu Parekh, the CFMEB made several recommendations in order to counter racial discrimination. One of its comprehensive goals was for the UK to embrace racial diversity anew, in the making of a truly vibrant multicultural society. With the recently elected New Labour and the implementation of the CFMEB, the politics of belonging and of multiculturalism were of central concern at the turn of the century within public debate (Goodhart, 2004; Modood, 2013: 9). Yet, 2001 was a turning point on that matter. Shortly after David Blunkett became Home Secretary, serious ‘race riots’ occurred in some northern cities of England (Home Office, 2001), adding to the international climate of fear over immigrants – and particularly over Muslim immigration – resulting from the 9/11 New York attacks.

If the 1997 New Labour’s winning election seems to correlate with an upsurge in both the political arena and in public favour for multiculturalism in the UK (Fleras, 2009: 172; Grillo, 2010: 53; Poulter, 1998), the overall decade and a half that ensued took the very opposite path. Be it related to national events – the 2001 riots in some Northern England Cities, the 2005 London bombings or other international ones: the 9/11 New York attacks, the 2004 murder of Theo van Gogh in Holland, the 2004 Madrid train bombings, and so on, leading to the 2015 Charlie Hebdo shooting and the Stade de France explosion in Paris – UK political discourse was, as of then, increasingly less favourable toward the promotion of multiculturalism. That said, criticising ‘a policy of multiculturalism […] can occur while endorsing a long-held multiculturalist goal’ (Uberoi and Modood, 2013: 36). Therefore, one shall not ipso facto equate political statements criticising multiculturalism with the actual retreat of such multiculturalism policy. As Uberoi and Modood (2013: 36) put it, whether multiculturalism has retreated or not ‘can only be discerned by examining how various components of Britain’s policy of multiculturalism have changed over time’.

In this article, I thus question the impact of declarations that openly devaluate multiculturalism, both as a theoretical or as a normative ‘doctrine’ and as a ‘policy’, onto the UK’s immigrant multicultural policy. Since the beginning of the 21st century, multiculturalism went from being a policy which has helped the election of New Labour in 1997 to a ‘wrong-headed doctrine’ and a mistake as a public policy, as has been suggested many times by former Prime Minister, David Cameron. Hence, do we observe, between 2000 and 2015, a retreat or at least a substantial revision on the matter of immigrant multicultural policy in Great-Britain? In particular, is the post-2011 – i.e. after Cameron’s declarations concerning the failure of state multiculturalism – marked in the UK by a revision of its multicultural policy framework?

Christian Joppke has suggested (in 2004) that Britain had moved ‘beyond multiculturalism’ since David Blunkett took office as Home Secretary (Joppke, 2004). Joppke claims that the UK has retreated from multiculturalism, moving onto more of a ‘civic’ model of integration, arguing that political leaders have understood that ‘recognition’ ‘was less the solution than part of the problem itself’ (Joppke, 2004: 252). In a similar fashion, Liav Orgad (2015: 114) argues that the implementation of civic integration policies ‘suggest[s] that the retreat from multiculturalism in Europe […] is real; it is not mere rhetoric, but has become law and policy’.

Whilst Joppke (2008: 537) did backtrack from this claim, he nonetheless argued ‘that the new policy of civic integration and of citizenship tests for immigrants represents a real move away from multiculturalism’ (Joppke, 2014: 286). Then, in Is Multiculturalism Dead?, Joppke contends that ‘civic integration’ – which ‘mostly consists of obligatory language and civic knowledge courses or tests as a condition for legal residence’ (2017: 61) – is ‘replacing multiculturalism in retreat’ (2017: 64). In other words, ‘[t]his is why this retreat is closely connected with the new civic integration policies’ (Joppke, 2017: 74). Hence, if Joppke’s long-standing interpretation is right, one should observe between 2000 and 2015, a retreat from, or at least a significant revision of, the UK’s immigrant multicultural policy. Otherwise put, since the UK did implemented civic integration policies over the past two decades (cf. Goodman, 2010: 766; Kostakopoulou, 2010; Mouritsen, 2013; Squire, 2005), one should indeed witness a retreat from multiculturalism policy between 2000 and 2015.

In addition to the literature on multiculturalism in the UK, I argue for Joppke’s analysis of a ‘civic turn’ – or of a ‘civic-thickening’ as suggested by Meer and Modood (2009, 2013) – to be accurate. Nevertheless, I provide new evidence in this article showing that it is mistaken to equate this with the formal policy retreat from multiculturalism in Great Britain between 2000 and 2015. In this article, I show that a ‘civic-thickening’ dynamic in matters of policy related to integration may still be consistent with a ‘multiculturalist advance’. In doing so, with a special focus on citizenship education programmes in the UK, I build on the literature that suggests that, while most ‘civic integration’ policies in the UK are undeniably thickening ‘citizenization’ (cf. Goodman, 2010), it is misleading ‘to equate this with a retreat from multiculturalism’ (Kymlicka, 2012: 19) since it ‘retains a very multicultural flavour’ (Mouritsen, 2013: 96).

For the upcoming argument, I shall first recall the basic policy structure around which multicultural policies are implemented in the UK. Second, I present the methodological framework of Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka’s Multicultural Policy Index (MPI) which I am using for gathering and presenting evidence (MPI, 2016). Third, I show data of the evolution between 2000 and 2015 of the UK’s immigrant multicultural policies. Finally, I discuss the results and consider citizenship education programmes in the UK as an example of how a ‘civic-thickening’ dynamic in public policy may still be consistent with a ‘multiculturalist advance’.

Hence, the contribution of this article is twofold. Since the MPI has already collected evidence for the UK’s immigrant multicultural policies in 2000 and 2010, the first original contribution to the literature that I propose consists of updating the Index for 2015. In turn, this provides a satisfactory framework for having a clear understanding of the public policy dynamic in matters of multiculturalism in the following of David Cameron’s declarations concerning the failure of state multiculturalism. Then, echoing Meer and Modood’s (2013) argument of a ‘civic-thickening’ for the UK’s integration policy, I discuss citizenship education programs of the four constituent nations of the UK – where such civic integration policies have been implemented. This shows that, while such curriculums all put forward approaches for ‘thickening’ togetherness, it is nonetheless consistent with a ‘multiculturalist advance’.

Multicultural policy in the UK

Contrary to, say, Canada, there is no central or official law stating the core principles upon which multiculturalism would rest upon in the UK. Nonetheless, it seems undeniable that Britain’s contemporaneous political landscape is characterized by a ‘multicultural sensibility’ (Kivisto and Faist, 2007; Tolley, 2011: 100–104). As Steven Vertovec shows: ‘[s]ince the 1970s multiculturalism has emerged as a term increasingly called upon in parliamentary debates and political party manifestos, the rhetoric of ethnic group leaders, the logic of local government structuring and budgeting, social scientific analyses, popular media, and commercial marketing’ (Vertovec, 1996: 50).

If multicultural policy usually emerges as a counter model or rejection of the politics of assimilation, i.e. the ‘Anglo-conformity’ or ‘Jacobin’ model (Gagnon, 2014; Kymlicka, 1995), the UK has made a turn during the 1960s whilst Roy Jenkins was Home Secretary. Jenkins famously stated in 1967: ‘I define integration, therefore, not as a flattening process of assimilation but as equal opportunity, coupled with cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance’ (quoted in Fleras, 2009: 181). This follows the UK’s long-standing tradition of not being a formal ‘citizen state’,

either in the sense of national belonging (with more than one nation included), or in a republican sense of a citizen’s body democratically united before a state. Civic membership was territorially and hierarchically structured ‘allegiance’ to a monarch, and democratic gradualism, which left the King-in-parliament, produced a weak sense of popular sovereignty and constitutionalism. (Mouritsen, 2013: 93)

Overall, the British multicultural policy consists of multiple public programs and regulations that emphasize the recognition of newcomers as ethnic and racial minorities, for which the state arranges specific treatment, allowing immigrants to fully and fairly exercise their rights as British citizens without any discrimination. In so doing, the gradual implementation of a multiculturalism policy in the UK adds up to a specific and rooted British integrationism–liberalism–(multi)nationalism nexus. It is also worth noting that multiculturalism and multicultural policy in the UK refers only to immigrant minorities, with no reference whatsoever to minority nations such as the Scots, the Northern Irish, or the Welsh.

Since Jenkins’ 1967 declaration, the British multicultural policy has followed an ad hoc ‘heavily evolved and politically subtle rationale’ (Favell, 2001: 135) making it hard for one to retrace its trajectory (Vasta, 2007). Yet, some key public policy sites or programs have principally contributed to the implementation of multicultural policies (Fleras, 2009: 166–167). Basically, the UK’s multicultural policy framework gravitates around two public endeavours.¹ Foremost, Britain’s multicultural policy has found a natural milestone in the Race Relations Acts (RRAs). Largely influenced by the American civil rights movement (Modood, 2010: 9; Pitcher, 2009: 20), legislations bearing the short name of RRAs were first adopted in the mid-1960s, for which multiple amendments have since been applied. Favouring ‘good race relations’, the RRAs are motivated by the impetus to criminalize both direct and indirect racial or ethnic discriminations and hatred discourse in the UK (Hansen, 2007: 362–366; Meer et al., 2015: 710).

Then, the multicultural policy in Britain has been applied through the educational system (Mathieu and Laforest, 2015; Modood, 2010: 77). Although largely decentralized, one can observe that since the 1970s the British educational system has effectively recognized the plural routes and differentiated identities of its pupils (Gill, 1993: 277). In 1985 the Swann Report Education for All was published – a report which has received massive popular support (Favell, 2001: 131) – which explicitly argued for a multicultural education within the general curriculum (King, 1993: 4). In response to the Swann Report, the UK government implemented in 1988 its Education Reform Act. The Reform was dedicated to ‘cultural pluralism’, for ‘multicultural cross-curricular dimension is [henceforth] an accepted entitlement for all pupils in all maintained schools, and multicultural education is [now] defined as the professional responsibility of all teachers’ (King, 1993: 3; Tulasiewicz, 1993). The Education Reform Act has also been refined more than once with the contribution of the Department of Education and Science and of the National Curriculum Council.

That said, since 2001 the UK multicultural policy framework ‘has seemed increasingly problematic, whose principles underpinning that governance as of the 1960s, were widely questioned’ (Grillo, 2010: 50). Declarations such as Robin Cook’s celebration of multiculturalism stating that ‘[c]hicken Tikka Masala is now a true British national dish’ – which shows for Cook how Britain ‘adapts external influences’ (The Guardian, 2000) – were indeed quite atypical for the 2000s. For example, David Blunkett stated in 2002 that he was weary of an ‘unbridled multiculturalism which privileges difference over community cohesion’ (Blunkett, 2002: 6); Trevor Phillips, head of the Commission for Racial Equality, stated in 2004 that multiculturalism should be discarded, ‘as it suggests separatism when there is an increased need for common British identity’ (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010: 5); next year, the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, Ruth Kelly, says the ‘near uniform consensus on the value of multiculturalism’ is now of a bygone era, as she questions whether multiculturalism encourages more ‘separateness’ than togetherness (Chapman, 2006). Most importantly, the then Tory leader and future Prime Minister David Cameron declared in 2007 that the ‘creed of multiculturalism’ had contributed to a ‘deliberate weakening of our collective identity’ (The Economist, 2007), therefore dividing British society (Cameron, 2007), for he adds, in 2008, ‘I believe multiculturalism is a wrong-headed doctrine that has disastrous results’ (Daily Mail, 2008). Once elected as the UK Prime Minister, heading a Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition, David Cameron famously declared at an international conference on security matters in Munich that state multiculturalism had failed, and that it would be the ‘time to turn the page on the failed policies of the past’ (Cameron, 2011). More recently, reacting to the murder of soldier Lee Rigby by a Muslim extremist David Cameron stated in 2013 that the policy of multiculturalism had been a ‘mistake’ (Daily Mail, 2013).

I therefore propose to systematically observe the evolution of Britain’s multicultural policy between 2000 and 2015, allowing the evidence to show if, and how, it has changed. Beforehand, however, I shall present an adaptation of Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka’s MPI methodological framework (cf. Tolley, 2011).

Methodology

Like others, I am using Banting and Kymlicka’s MPI (cf. Banting, 2014; Banting and Kymlicka, 2006; Bloemraad and Wright, 2014; Brady and Finnigan, 2014; Koopmans et al., 2012; Meer et al., 2015; Soroka et al., 2015). The MPI is a ‘scholarly research project that monitors the evolution of multiculturalism policies in 21 Western democracies. The project is designed to provide information about multiculturalism policies in a standardized format […]. The [MPI] and supporting documentation are freely available for researchers’ (MPI, 2016). To measure the state and evolution over time of multicultural policies, the MPI suggests a qualitative standardized composite index consisting of eight indicators. For the benefit of the Index, each indicator is of equal value. The documents required to gather evidence are mostly laws and public regulations adopted by the government, although it is sometimes relevant to review academic literature and official public reports.

As previously stated, the MPI has already collected data for the UK’s immigrant multicultural policy in 2000, and 2010. My original contribution consists of updating the UK’s immigrant multicultural policies on the MPI for 2015. I chose to narrow the analysis to the sole expression of immigrant multicultural policy rather than cross-analysing it with the evolution of both immigrants’ and minority nations’ multicultural policy, because debates over multiculturalism in the UK only refer to immigrants (Joppke, 2004: 247). By focusing on the evolution of the UK’s immigrant multicultural policy between 2000 and 2015, the observation begins at the time when multiculturalism is experiencing a positive resurgence within the discourse, and ends four years after David Cameron declared that state multiculturalism had failed. Moreover, the time period ends as David Cameron’s Conservative Party won the 2015 general election.

Every MPI indicator can take three qualitative values: Yes (1 point), Partially (0.5 point) and No (0 point). Depending on the MPI’s decision rules, one might determine whether policies, laws, public regulations and institutional mechanisms for a given country are corresponding to it in a satisfying manner (Yes, 1 point), partially (Partially, 0.5 point), or not corresponding (No, 0 point). The MPI composite index thus consists of the addition of all eight scores on each indicator, for a maximum total score of 8 points. For a country at a given time, to obtain a total score of 6 or higher would correspond to a strong multicultural policy arrangement; a total score between 3 and 5.5 corresponds to a modest multicultural policy arrangement; and a total score lower than 3 corresponds to a weak multicultural policy arrangement (cf. Kymlicka, 2007: 74).

Since multiculturalism policy Indices’ ‘main source of misinterpretation stems from the aggregation of scores and not from incorrect measurements of individual indicators per se’ (Duyvendak et al., 2013: 601), I will not derive my conclusions based on the sole significance of the UK’s total score on the MPI. Nonetheless, the several indicators that compose the MPI are still very instructive to observe the evolution of various key policy areas in matters of multiculturalism. Therefore, if we are to witness a general retreat from multiculturalism policy in the UK (cf. Joppke, 2004, 2009, 2014, 2017), this should somehow appear over the observation of the evolution of multiculturalism policy between 2000 and 2015. That said, one must acknowledge that some changes in the way public authorities make use of multiculturalism policy may fall short of the MPI’s radar – for example, what Ragazzi (2016) coined as ‘policed multiculturalism’. However, using alternative Indices – say, Koopmans et al.’s (2005) Indicators of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants (ICRI) – would not outweigh that limit (cf. Duyvendak et al., 2013).

To be clear, the MPI is an imperfect analytical tool. For one thing, the fact that the value of each indicator comes first by a qualitative interpretation and is then translated in one out of three possible quantitative values leaves the door wide open for criticism about false precision, as to how exactly a given phenomenon is allocated one or other property according to the scale. For another, it is debatable whether each indicator should possess an absolute equal value. Is having an official multicultural policy for a country really is equivalent to funding bilingual education? Can a country have a ‘strong multicultural policy arrangement’ while not having an official multicultural policy? I think these are just some of the legitimate criticisms one may direct to the MPI methodological framework (cf. Duyvendak et al., 2013). Whilst I am not refuting such critiques – which Banting and Kymlicka might need to address seriously – I am using the Index for what it is: an instructive analytical tool to observe systematically in a standardized framework the evolution of multicultural policy over a certain amount of time. Also, I indicate as much detail as possible while interpreting the score each indicator shall obtain, for one may easily replicate my reasoning. Decision rules for each indicator are understood as follows:²

Affirmation. Constitutional, legislative or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism at the central and/or regional and municipal levels and the existence of a government ministry, secretariat or advisory board to implement this policy in consultation with ethnic communities. Yes: The country has affirmed multiculturalism and has an implementing body; Partially: The country has not affirmed multiculturalism explicitly, but has a relevant body; multiculturalism may also have been affirmed in some municipalities, but not nationally; No: The country has not affirmed multiculturalism and does not have an implementing body.

School Curriculum. The adoption of multiculturalism in the school curriculum. Yes: The country has included multiculturalism in its curriculum; Partially: The country has not formally or extensively adopted multiculturalism in its curriculum, but has engaged in rhetoric supporting such an inclusion, implemented it in some districts, or developed intercultural or anti-racism educational initiatives; No: Multiculturalism is not included in the school curriculum.

Media. The inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in the mandate of public media or media licensing. Yes: Ethnic representation, inclusion, sensitivity or diversity is included in the mandate of the public broadcaster or media licensing; No: Ethnic representation is not mentioned in the mandate of the public broadcaster or media licensing.³

Exemptions. Exemptions from dress codes (either by statute or court cases). Yes: The country has granted exemptions or accommodations on religious grounds; Partially: Some exemptions have been granted, but others have been explicitly denied; No: The country does not grant exemptions or accommodations on religious grounds.

Dual Citizenship. Permitting dual citizenship. Yes: Dual citizenship is permitted; foreign nationals may retain their original citizenship even after acquiring the citizenship of the host country; Partially: Dual citizenship is officially prohibited, but tolerated in practice; No: Dual citizenship is not permitted; foreign nationals must renounce or relinquish their original citizenship before acquiring the citizenship of the host country.

Funding Ethnic Groups. The funding of ethnic group organizations or activities. Yes: Ethnic groups are provided state funding in the form of core- or project-based support; Partially: Some ethnic groups receive state funding, but the practice is not widespread and the funding may be restricted for supporting the delivery of integration and settlement programs; No: Ethnic groups do not receive state support.

Bilingual Education. The funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction. Yes: The country funds bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction for both children and adults; Partially: Available in some provinces, states or areas, but not offered as a general rule; No: The country does not fund bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction; refers also to cases where bilingual education is provided, but only as a means of facilitating the learning of the country’s official language.

Affirmative Action. Affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups. Yes: The country has an affirmative action policy targeting immigrant minorities; this may be either in the public or private sector or both. Initiatives will extend beyond human rights policies and include targeted action aimed at removing barriers or more positive affirmative action measures such as quotas or preferential hiring; No: The country has no affirmative action policy for immigrant minorities.

Results: The evolution of the UK’s immigrant multicultural policy, 2000–2015

Within this section, I present data showing the evolution of the UK’s immigrant multicultural policy by observing the score of all eight indicators of the MPI for 2000, 2010, and 2015. After which I show the evolution between 2000 and 2015 of the UK’s total score on the MPI.

Affirmation

2000: No (0 point)

2010: No (0 point)

2015: No (0 point)

Be it for 2000, 2010 or 2015 the UK has not affirmed multiculturalism and does not have an implementing body. To be fair, however, the CFMEB Report had strongly recommended such a measure (CFMEB (The Runnymede Trust), 2002: 277). Moreover, the UK does provide relevant public bodies – most significantly the Department for Communities and Local Government (2009) and the Equality and Human Rights Commission – to tackle race inequalities and discriminations, but none is formally run by the very principle of ‘multiculturalism’ (Tolley, 2011: 100).

School Curriculum

2000: Yes (1 point)

2010: Partially (0.5 point)

2015: Partially (0.5 point)

In the wake of the reception of the Swann’s Report (1985) and of the implementation of the Education Reform Act (1988), the Local Education Authorities had formally included, by the end of 1990s, multiculturalism and multicultural education to the curriculum (Bleich, 1998). Nonetheless, during the 2000s until 2015 the Local Education Authorities and the Department for Children, School and Families have not consolidated the ruling notion of ‘multiculturalism’ nor of ‘multicultural education’ in the curriculum.⁴ Although the Department for Children, School and Families published in 2007 its Children’s Plan (Department for Children, School and Families, 2007), which requires primary and secondary schools to promote both social cohesion and ethnic and racial diversity, ‘multiculturalism’ is conspicuous in its absence – that is not to say that there is no ‘multiculturalist advance’ (cf. Uberoi and Modood, 2013) whatsoever with regard to citizenship education programs throughout the UK.

Indeed, a collective of researchers has shown that the English and the Scottish national experiences – Northern Ireland and Wales were not part of the study – in the matter of citizenship education were strongly oriented by a ‘pluralist approach’ (Collective, 2009). As the next section shows, that is also the case for Northern Ireland and Wales. Moreover, one should keep in mind that in virtue of the RRAs the Local Education Authorities have the obligation to promote equality of opportunity for all children (Tolley, 2011). Since 2010, the Department for Education also proceeded to an update of the curriculum, in the field of citizenship education, in particular, which is still significantly related to a multicultural sensibility (Mathieu and Laforest, 2015: 91) – since its approach is marked by respect and tolerance over racial and ethnic diversity (Hayden, 2013: 9) – although there is no reference whatsoever to multiculturalism per se.

Media

2000: Yes (1 point)

2010: Yes (1 point)

2015: Yes (1 point)

As the 1983 report, Ethnic Minority Broadcasting of the Commission for Racial Equality shows, the UK has a long history of encouraging its networks to reflect within media content the ‘multi-racial’ reality of the British society (Zolf, 1989). Herein the UK does include in the mandate of the public broadcaster the obligation to represent racial and ethnic diversity.

What now stands as the lawful regulation on that matter is the Communications Act 2003 – for which only a few technical amendments have been added since. The Communications Act 2003 is mostly directed toward the Office of Communications, which manages and grants broadcaster licencing in the UK (Office of Communications, 2015). In particular, the section 1 (3) (4(l)) of the Communications Act 2003 (United Kingdom, Communications Act, 2003) dictates that the Office of Communications must have regard to promoting ‘[…] the different ethnic communities within the United Kingdom’.

In addition, section 2 (1)(4) of the Equality Act 2010 (United Kingdom, Equality Act, 2010) stipulates that the public sector – including public broadcasters – must work to counter any discrimination on the grounds of race, religion or belief. Moreover, the major public broadcaster, BBC, mentions as one of its core principles the objective of reflecting within its media contents the ethnic and racial diversity of British society (BBC, 2014).

Exemptions

2000: Yes (1 point)

2010: Yes (1 point)

2015: Yes (1 point)

In a similar fashion, the UK has already granted exemptions and accommodations on religious grounds for a few decades. Partly as a collateral effect to the implementation of the RRAs (United Kingdom, Race Relations Act, 1976) – which forbid since their 1976 amendment any discrimination, direct as well as indirect, on the grounds of race, religion, or belief – the UK has granted several exemptions for religious matters, especially for dress code accommodations. The Motor Cycle Crash Helmets (Religious Exemption) Act 1976 (United Kingdom, Motor Cycle Crash Helmets (Religious Exemption) Act, 1976) formally granted the exemption to a Sikh from sporting a protection helmet while motor-cycling so he does not have to remove his turban and, in turn, relinquish his religious beliefs. The obligation to not discriminate, directly or indirectly, on the ground of race, religion or belief has also been consolidated within section 29(4) of the Equality Act 1989 – as it is still lawful with the amended Equality Act 2010. Section 3 of the 2003 Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations (United Kingdom, Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations, 2003) also consolidates the Motor Cycle Crash Helmets (Religious Exemption) Act 1976 argument.

Dual Citizenship

2000: Yes (1 point)

2010: Yes (1 point)

2015: Yes (1 point)

Foreign nationals in the UK may retain their original citizenship even after acquiring citizenship in the host country. With the 1948 British Nationality Act (United Kingdom, British Nationality Act, 1948), citizens of the member-country of the Commonwealth were automatically subjects of the British Crown. Therefore, they had access to British citizenship if they were to migrate to the UK, without having to relinquish their original citizenship (Voici, 2009). Restrictions have since refined the British Nationality Act 1948, yet dual citizenship is still allowed (Tolley, 2011). In fact, the Home Office official website states clearly that ‘[d]ual citizenship (also known as dual nationality) is allowed in the UK. This means you can be a British citizen and also a citizen of other countries’ (Home Office, 2016).

Funding Ethnic Groups

2000: Yes (1 point)

2010: Yes (1 point)

2015: Yes (1 point)

Early in the 1980s and the 1990s, the Art Council of Britain as well as the Ethnic Minority Grant Program have concentrated a significant amount of their respective budgets for programs aimed at the funding and realization of sociocultural activities that would promote and valorise ethnic and racial communities in the UK (Tolley, 2011). As for the first decade of the 21st century, the Commission for Racial Equality has provided funds for activities with such objectives (Commission for Racial Equality, 2009: 71–72). That said, when the Commission for Racial Equality merged with the Equality and Human Rights Commission in 2007, no more funds were planned in the budget for that matter (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2015).

Nonetheless, the British government funded in 2009 the two-year program Tackling Race Inequality Funds which has had as a primary objective to finance projects and activities for ethnic and racial groups, without consideration given the particular group, to promote ‘good race relations’ (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2010: 12). Another, yet permanent public program which provides state funding in the form of core- or project-based support, was set up in 2006 with the Awards for All program within the Big Lottery Fund (Big Lottery Fund, 2015a). The Big Lottery fund – made up of 40% of the funds collected by the National lottery – financed projects and initiatives aiming at improving socio-economic conditions of UK communities, and particularly of ethnic and racial ones (Big Lottery Fund, 2015a). Any granted initiative of the Fund must actively promote the ethnic and racial diversity in Britain as well as encourage all communities to ‘live together’ while fighting against any form of racial, ethnic, or religious discrimination (Big Lottery Fund, 2015b).

Bilingual Education

2000: No (0 point)

2010: No (0 point)

2015: Partially (0.5 point)

As Li Wei puts it, the UK school system has not historically funded bilingual education nor mother-tongue instruction; it is rather characterized as ‘predominantly monolingual and unicultural’ (Wei, 2006: 82). Local Education Authorities sometimes provide a linguistic assistant to temporarily accommodate children of newcomers (Department for Children, Schools and Families, 2007: 89; Tolley, 2011), yet the bilingual education provided is only as a means of facilitating the learning of the country’s official language. Otherwise, a few ‘complementary schools’ do exist in the UK, for which teaching lessons are provided in a language other than English (Tolley, 2011). However, those schools really are ‘complementary’ as time slots for their lessons are supplementary to the curriculum, as they are not necessarily state-funded (Bonacina and Gafaranga, 2011: 322; Creese et al., 2006; Wei, 2006: 78).

That said, the UK school system has changed since the arrival, in 2010, of the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition led by David Cameron. In particular, to its Free Schools the state has integrated bilingual ones. Free Schools are state funded but do not answer to Local Education Authorities. Therefore, they tend to be more autonomous and, as a consequence, hold significant freedom on the pedagogical approach privileged for applying the curriculum. Since 2012, Anglo-Spanish, Anglo-German and Anglo-French bilingual Free Schools have been implemented in the UK (BBC, 2012; Bilingual Primary School, 2015; École de Wix, 2015; Judith Kerr Primary School, 2015). Those state-funded bilingual schools are available in a few cities, although they are not offered as a general rule.

Affirmative Action

2000: Yes (1 point)⁵

2010: Yes (1 point)

2015: Yes (1 point)

As already repeatedly stated, since the 1976 amendment to the RRAs, the UK formally prohibits direct and indirect discrimination on racial, ethnic and religious grounds, thereby making it a country which has an affirmative action policy targeted for immigrant minorities. Particularly, in virtue of section 71(1) (a and b) of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 (United Kingdom, Race Relations Amendment Act, 2000) the British state must work ‘to eliminate unlawful discrimination [and] to promote equality of opportunity and good race relations between persons of different racial groups’. Moreover, section 2 (2) of the Equality Act 2010 (United Kingdom, Equality Act, 2010) has consolidated British laws on the matter of unlawful discriminations, rendering race, religion or belief as ‘protected characteristics’.

Discussion: The failure of state multiculturalism in the UK?

After the 1997 UK general election multiculturalism has demonstrated an upsurge in political debates as the New Labour was putting the emphasis on the multicultural reality of the British society during the campaign. However, this positive representation of multiculturalism was short-lived, for as soon as 2001–2002 it was seen rather as that ‘M-Word’ not to be pronounced other than for criticism (Vertovec, 2010: 92).

Sociologist Christian Joppke argued that the UK has retreated from its multicultural policy by moving ‘beyond multiculturalism’ (Joppke, 2004: 251, 2014) – more recently, Joppke (2017: 154) nonetheless suggests that this move might still be consistent with a ‘multiculturalism of the individual’, which basically refers to liberal constitutionalism. At first sight, Joppke’s analysis of a retreat from multiculturalism ought to be right, since even Prime Minister David Cameron had described multiculturalism as being a failure and a mistake. Given the fact that, for a parliamentary democracy as the UK’s, the Prime Minister has significant control over revision of its public policy (Gosselin and Fillion, 2007: 124–133), one could effectively and with legitimacy, be led to think that, after declaring the failure of state multiculturalism, the same ruling government should have revised the whole of its multicultural policies. At the very least, this scenario seems probable.

In this article, I have questioned the validity of such an interpretation by providing evidence supporting the evolution of the UK’s immigrant multicultural policy between 2000 and 2015. If Joppke’s long-standing analysis is to be valid, one should therefore find evidence of it during that period. Also, the evidence would show if and how the UK’s immigrant multicultural policy has changed in reaction to David Cameron’s official devaluation of multiculturalism, and to the implementation of civic integration policies. By 2005, both David Blunkett, the Home Secretary, and Ruth Kelly, the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, were officially questioning whether multiculturalism was suitable or not for the UK. Since 2010, with the arrival of David Cameron’s coalition in office, multiculturalism was officially declared a failure and then a mistake. Hence, is the ‘failure of state multiculturalism’ and the implementation of ‘civic integration policies’ consistent with a formal retreat of multicultural policy in the UK? Do we observe, between 2000 and 2015, a retreat or at least a substantial revision on the matter of immigrant multicultural policy in Great Britain? In particular, is post-2011 – i.e. after Cameron’s declarations concerning the failure of state multiculturalism – marked in the UK by a revision of its multicultural policy framework? Table 1 shows the evolution of the UK’s immigrant multicultural policy between 2000 and 2015.

Table 1.

The UK’s immigrant multicultural policy in 2000, 2010 and 2015.^a

Indicator	2000	2010	2015
1. Affirmation	0	0	0
2. School Curriculum	1	0.5	0.5
3. Media	1	1	1
4. Exemptions	1	1	1
5. Dual Citizenship	1	1	1
6. Funding Immigrant Groups	1	1	1
7. Bilingual Education	0	0	0.5
8. Affirmative Action	1	1	1
Total Score	6	5.5	6

The UK’s immigrant multicultural policy in 2000, 2010 and 2015 is an original creation of the author, yet largely inspired by Banting and Kymlicka’s MPI tables.

As the evidence shows, rather than observing a retreat from, or a significant revision of the UK’s immigrant multicultural policy between 2000 and 2015, the overall policy framework is stable over time, with a higher MPI total score in 2015 than in 2010. For that matter, the UK multicultural policy began as a ‘modest’ arrangement when Cameron’s Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition took office in 2010, it then became a ‘strong’ multicultural policy arrangement when its political mandate comes to term in 2015. However, it seems legitimate to question whether the UK truly possess a ‘strong multicultural policy arrangement’, for it has never officially affirmed multiculturalism nor a multicultural policy. That said, what is of significance for the present argument is that the score on every indicator of the MPI is relatively stable over time, and that it has been slightly consolidated while David Cameron was governing the country between 2010 and 2015.

In fact, indicators 1, 3 to 6, and 8 are either stable or have been consolidated with new laws, public programs, or regulations. As for the second indicator concerning the presence of multiculturalism within the school curriculum, one observes that multiculturalism or multicultural education is no longer part of official programs, yet its pedagogical content is still marked by a multicultural flavour – I will come back to this issue. Finally, the seventh indicator concerning bilingual education has met a positive variation since 2012, as the state has integrated a few bilingual schools to its Free ones.

Facing such evidence, one must infirm Joppke’s analysis of a formal retreat in the UK from its initial multicultural policy. In fact, the very opposite has occurred: between 2000 and 2015, rather than observing a retreat from the UK’s immigrant multicultural policy, it has been relatively stable, with a slight increase for the MPI total score during Cameron’s Conservative–Liberal Democrat mandate. To be fair, though, Joppke argues that the UK has moved from multiculturalism as it has adopted civic-oriented integration policies. In particular, Joppke suggests that ‘the introduction of an oath to be sworn at American-style naturalization ceremonies, the toughening of the English language requirement when acquiring citizenship, and the introduction of mandatory ‘citizenship and democracy’ education at English schools’ are but a few indicators showing the down-scaling of multiculturalism in the UK (Joppke, 2004: 252, 2014: 286, 2017). None of Joppke’s ‘indicators’ match those of the MPI, which leaves one with two plausible interpretations.

Foremost, one could interpret that the eight indicators of the MPI are simply not representative of multicultural policy. Put differently, the first interpretation would question the validity of the MPI for the study of multicultural policy. As a matter of fact, the MPI cannot reach perfect validity as it is designed to compare several countries with significant differences on the matter of multicultural policy. Nonetheless, the MPI has been applied to 21 countries, and multiple scholars have reached significant conclusions with it (cf. Banting, 2014; Banting and Kymlicka, 2006; Bloemraad and Wright, 2014; Brady and Finnigan, 2014; Koopmans et al., 2012; Meer et al., 2015; Soroka et al., 2015). That does not infer, necessarily, the validity of the MPI, yet it gives one considerable justification to reject that first interpretation until proven of the contrary – which has not been done. That said, it is worth stressing that indicators on the MPI all share the same absolute value (i.e. 1/8 points). Therefore, as I already suggested, it would be legitimate to argue that, even though the UK has a total MPI score of 6 out of 8, the fact that it has no official multicultural policy imposes serious limits to the accuracy of qualifying Great Britain as benefiting from a ‘strong multicultural policy arrangement’. Also, whether the UK publicly starts funding bilingual education for the French, Spanish and German communities in England – but not (yet?) for its Arabic ones, for example – hardly shows the country has adopted a substantially stronger multicultural policy arrangement. Nonetheless, even without consideration of these two indicators that might be problematic, there is no sign the UK would have retreated from its multicultural policy arrangement.

The second plausible interpretation, then, is that Joppke understands the tension between multicultural policy and integration policy as being a zero-sum game. In so doing, this avenue of reflection would suggest that ‘the introduction of an oath to be sworn at American-style naturalization ceremonies, the toughening of the English language requirement when acquiring citizenship, and the introduction of mandatory ‘citizenship and democracy’ education in English schools automatically means a retreat from multicultural policy, for the gain (or loss) on the former must theoretically be balanced by the losses (or gains) of the latter. That second interpretation seems more accurate than the first in understanding the delay between Joppke’s analysis and the evidence presented in this article. For Joppke is not alone in proposing such an interpretation. Similar accounts can also be found elsewhere (cf. Fomina, 2006: 421; Orgad, 2015).

As previously stated, Joppke’s account for a civic-turn, or what Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood have coined a ‘civic-thickening’ of the UK integration policy (Meer and Modood, 2013), is correct. The UK did implement a few civic integration policies (Goodman, 2010; Squire, 2005). Indeed, the ‘Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 “thickened” naturalisation policy by including “integration” requirements, such as “sufficient knowledge about life in the United Kingdom”, in addition to language proficiency. It also modernised the current oath of allegiance and introduced a citizenship pledge to be taken during citizenship ceremonies’ (Kostakopoulou, 2010: 832). However, it is unwise to understand the adoption of such ‘civic integration’ policies as a necessary retreat from multicultural policy.

Even from a theoretical account that interpretation does not hold up. For example, for multiculturalism theorists Anne Phillips (2007), Bhikhu Parekh (2006, 2008), Charles Taylor (1992, 1994), Seyla Benhabib (2002), Tariq Modood (2005, 2013) and Will Kymlicka (1995, 2007), to cite a few, integration is understood as a core principle for a multicultural policy. In particular, Kymlicka holds firmly that language requirements for acquiring citizenship do fit within the principles of a liberal multiculturalism (Kymlicka, 2001: 25). Otherwise put, ‘“prohibitive’ citizenship strategies, based on coercive and assimilative civic integration policies’ (Kymlicka, 2012: 20) – as if the UK would henceforth restrict dual citizenship, for example – would indeed be contrary to multiculturalism, and therefore engage the UK in a certain retreat from multicultural policies. Nevertheless, I would argue that the civic integration policies that the UK has been introducing for the past two decades still promote an ‘open-ended identity and pragmatic liberal pluralism’ (Mouritsen, 2013: 105). In turn, while ‘thickening’ citizenization, the UK nevertheless balances further towards a liberal and ‘pluralist-multiculturalist’ paradigm than a restrictive and ‘monist-assimilationist’ one (Goodman, 2010: 757–758; Koopmans et al., 2005: 51–54). Then, in accordance with its long-standing tradition, the UK ‘civic turn’ still retains a clear ‘multicultural flavour’ in which ‘celebration of diversity is strongly emphasized’ (Mouritsen, 2013: 97).

Moreover, I can hardly understand why Joppke argues for the introduction of an American-style naturalization ceremonies to be contrary to multiculturalism, since the CFMEB – openly promoting multiculturalism and the strengthening of multicultural policy for the UK – makes in its final report the recommendation of implementing a similar naturalizing ceremony as in the United States’, for it ‘dramatises the importance of someone being welcomed and accepted as a fellow citizen into a network of rights and obligation’ (CFMEB (The Runnymede Trust), 2000: 55). Besides, as Meer et al. (2015: 712) show, explanatory documents of the Home Office indicate clearly that ‘the tests aim at “integration,” but without this meaning “complete assimilation”’ (Home Office, 2004: 14). Finally, I would stress that the new ‘citizenship tests’ are ‘relatively easy, publicly encouraged and, importantly, applicants may adopt a parallel citizenship course route where the language requirement is lower’ (Mouritsen, 2013: 103). In 2007, the evidence indeed shows that only 16% of refused applications for British citizenship were attributed to ‘insufficient knowledge of English and/or knowledge of life in the United Kingdom’ (Home Office, 2008: 7). This number reached 3.9% in 2010, 3.4% in 2013, and 8.6% in 2015 (Blinder, 2016: 3).

Therefore, one indeed observes between 2000 and 2015 a ‘civic-thickening’ of the UK’s integration policy, yet it is wrong to ipso facto equate this observation with the formal retreat of its immigrant multicultural policy. In fact, rather than hindering the UK’s multicultural policy, the adoption of civic integration policies may complement this ‘multicultural flavour’ on related public policy fields. For example, if one considers citizenship education curriculums in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, it is obvious that such programs, while they aim at fostering social cohesion and integration, they do so by also putting the emphasis onto the inclusiveness of ethnocultural differences for thinking of togetherness and citizenship – which reflects a form of ‘multiculturalist advance’ (cf. Uberoi and Modood, 2013). Otherwise put, considering the ‘civic-thickening’ dynamics in citizenship education programs in the UK shall invalidate the thesis following which multicultural policy and integration policy should be understood through the prism of a zero-sum game. Citizenship education programs in the four constituent nations have been revised and developed considerably within the past two decades following devolution from the Parliament of the United Kingdom to the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly of Wales, the Northern Ireland Assembly and in England (Greater London Authority and other combined authorities). It is therefore instructive to consider how such programs have indeed implemented a ‘civic-thickening’ dynamic while also leading to a ‘multiculturalist advance’. In addition to the evidence provided with the updating of the MPI for the UK’s immigrant multicultural policies, this reveals another blind spot of the multicultural policy retreat thesis.

Citizenship education is a central mechanism for political communities to express the desired model of citizenship they wish their youth to adopt (Mathieu and Laforest, 2015), for it ‘reinforces certain ways of thinking and de-legitimates others’ (Bickmore, 2006: 360). Also, as Bloemraad (2015) shows, there are significant linkages between the ideas and implications of multiculturalism and citizenship as such. Therefore, considering citizenship education curriculums in the UK should indicate some trends of what ways of thinking – with regards to, say, multiculturalism, multi-ethnic Britain, Britishness, identity, social cohesion, inclusiveness, etc. – are put forward and, if such a civic-thickening process seems to be complemented by a ‘multiculturalist advance’ or not.

Education, as citizenship education more specifically, in Britain is not centralized or homogeneous throughout the country. Since the devolution processes introduced at the end of the 1990s, such legislation has been indeed decentralized to Scotland, Northern Ireland, Wales and England. Following the reception of the Crick Report (1998) the Labour government, which was anxious about the political engagement of young people, elevated citizenship education as a statutory foundation subject within English secondary schools in 2002 (Andrews and Mycock, 2008: 143). Basically, the program sought to ‘restore a sense of common citizenship, including a national identity that is secure enough a place for the plurality of nations, cultures, ethnic identities and religions long found in the United Kingdom’ (Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA), 1998: 17). Then in 2007–2008, the curriculum has been revised, for ‘[t]he main revisions are a greater emphasis on the development of concepts, such as democracy and justice and rights and responsibilities and, more significantly, the addition of a new strand entitled Identities and diversity: living together in the UK’ (Kerr et al., 2008: 255).

In Scotland, citizenship education per se is taught via Values and Citizenship, which is one of the five National Priorities in Education (Kerr et al., 2008: 252; Learning and Teaching Scotland, 2002). Aimed at developing the ‘capability for thoughtful and responsible participation in political, economic, social and cultural life’, it is argued that citizenship education ‘cannot be encompassed within a single subject, whether an existing one or a new subject labelled “citizenship education”’ (Kerr et al., 2008: 257). That is, in accordance with Scotland’s long-standing tradition preferring to rely on ‘national guidelines’ rather than on a fixed statutory curriculum, ‘education for citizenship is seen as a core overarching purpose of schooling’ (Munn and Arnott, 2009: 451). Hence, stressing Scottishness rather than Britishness, citizenship education in Scotland is promoting a national, yet civic conception of citizenship (Kiwan, 2011: 276), putting the emphasis on the rights and responsibilities one has within local, national and global communities (Andrews and Mycock, 2007: 78). That is, one encompassing goal of citizenship education in Scotland consists of promoting ‘an attitude of respect and inclusiveness towards diversity’⁶ (Collective, 2009: 4).

The Welsh citizenship education program neither is on a statutory footing, for it has been provided since 2003 within Personal and Social Education (PSE), which nevertheless is part of the basic statutory curriculum in Wales (Kisby and Sloam, 2012: 74). Basically, citizenship education is taught in Wales through two key programs – ‘community understanding’ and ‘curriculum cymreig’ (Phillips and Daugherty, 2001: 9). The ‘cymreig’ dimension of the curriculum conveys to history, language and cultural matters that relate specifically to Wales which ‘need to be developed in every school in Wales, as part of the entitlement of all children’ (CCW, 1991: 3, 2003; Kisby and Sloam, 2012: 74). On the other hand, central to the very concept of ‘cymreig’, the ‘community understanding’ aspect of the curriculum ‘will help pupils to identify and appreciate the common experience of their cultural heritage as well as understand its diverse and distinctive aspects’ (CCW, 1991: 2, 2003; Phillips and Daugherty, 2001). In one word, citizenship education stresses both the importance to develop Welsh aspects of culture as it emphasizes the importance of celebrating diversity (Jones and Roderick, 2003; Kisby and Sloam, 2012: 74).

Finally, following the devolution process that resulted from the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement (1998), citizenship education in Northern Ireland has been introduced to foster mutual understanding, tolerance and respect (Kisby and Sloam, 2012: 79). Echoing the core principles of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement, it is argued that citizenship education can develop ‘the idea of a “shared citizenship” in the minds of young people, [which] could be a potent force for promoting partnership and understanding’ (DENI, 1999: 6). Then, in 2007, Northern Ireland made Local and Global Citizenship a new statutory subject in schools, a program that ‘takes an enquiry-based approach to exploring four core areas (Diversity and Inclusion; Equality and Justice; Human Rights and Social Responsibilities; and Democracy and Active Participation)’ (CCEA, 2010; Kerr et al., 2008: 256).

All in all, this short and non-exhaustive inquiry into citizenship education programs in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland suggests that the civic-thickening process that occurs in the UK still is consistent with a ‘multiculturalist advance’, for it indeed balances further towards a liberal and ‘pluralist-multiculturalist’ paradigm than a restrictive and ‘monist-assimilationist’ one (Goodman, 2010: 757–758; Koopmans et al., 2005: 51–54). Clearly, an emphasis is put onto celebrating Britishness (mostly in England), Scottishness, or Welshness, yet this is systematically balanced by also celebrating diversity and mutual understanding, and promoting inclusiveness. Indeed, subsections of citizenship education curriculums in the UK – Identities and diversity: Living together in the UK (England), Values and Citizenship (Scotland), Community Understanding (Wales), Diversity and Inclusion (Northern Ireland) – all promotes civic-oriented identities open to, and changing with diversity.

Hence, facing the evidence presented in this article, one can now reach three conclusions. First, one must invalidate Joppke’s analysis of a formal policy retreat from multiculturalism in the UK, whilst acknowledging he was nonetheless right about the civic-thickening of its integration policy. Second, in accordance with this, one must invalidate the thesis following which multicultural policy and integration policy should be understood through the strict prism of a zero-sum game. Third, while it is obvious that the UK witnessed a retreat from celebrating multiculturalism in the mainstream political discourse, one must conclude that there is no sign whatsoever that such discourse condemning multiculturalism has had any significant impact onto the UK multicultural policy arrangement between 2000 and 2015. This suggests that the ‘civic turn’ most European countries adopted in the past two decades indeed shows the resilience of particular citizenship traditions (cf. Mouritsen, 2013). Hence, as I argued in this article, the implementation of new civic integration policies in the UK still is consistent with how the specific British integrationism–liberalism–(multi)nationalism–multiculturalism’s nexus plays out.

Concluding remarks

In this article, I have sketched the basic structural and institutional outline of the UK’s immigrant multicultural policy since the 1960s. I then recalled how multiculturalism in the 2000s, after manifesting a positive upsurge with the 1997 general election, has been massively condemned and rejected both in the political arena and within the mass public. In particular, a year after being elected as Prime Minister in 2010, David Cameron (2011) declared that state multiculturalism had failed and that it was now ‘time to turn the page on the failed policies of the past’. However, evidence shows Cameron’s government (2010–2015) did not formally turn the page on multiculturalism.

I herein presented evidence of the evolution of the UK’s immigrant multicultural policy between 2000 and 2015. Then, by considering citizenship education curriculums in the UK, I indicated some trends of how a ‘civic-thickening’ dynamic can still be consistent with a ‘multiculturalist advance’. As a contribution to the literature on multiculturalism in the UK, this article reveals three conclusions. First, even though one should concede to Joppke that the UK has indeed implemented a few integration policies in the past two decades or so, one must nonetheless invalidate Joppke’s analysis of a formal policy retreat from multiculturalism in the UK. Second, whilst acknowledging the civic-thickening of the UK’s integration policy, one must invalidate the thesis following which multicultural policy and integration policy should be understood through the strict prism of a zero-sum game. Third, as discussed in the first section, there is no doubt the UK witnessed a retreat from celebrating multiculturalism in the mainstream political discourse. Nevertheless, one must still conclude that there is no sign that such a discourse as David Cameron’s condemning multiculturalism has had any significant impact on the UK’s multicultural policy arrangement. Indeed, the multicultural policy framework has been relatively stable through time.

Also, rather than functioning as a zero-sum game, multicultural policy and integration policy may coexist and complement each other without being radically opposed. For instance, while citizenship education programs in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and England all aim at fostering social cohesion and integration through a certain dynamic of ‘civic-thickening’, this trend is systematically balanced by also celebrating diversity. Otherwise put, a ‘civic-thickening’ dynamic in matters of policy related to integration may still be consistent with a ‘multiculturalist advance’.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers of this Journal, as well as Stephen May and Tariq Modood for their truly instructive comments and suggestions. I would also like to thank Guy Laforest, Alain-G Gagnon and Audrey Brennan for their insights on a previous version of this paper.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research received funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC), Joseph-Armand Bombardier Canada Graduate Scholarships Program.

Notes

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The failure of state multiculturalism in the UK? An analysis of the UK’s multicultural policy for 2000–2015

Abstract

Keywords

Introduction

Multicultural policy in the UK

Methodology

Results: The evolution of the UK’s immigrant multicultural policy, 2000–2015

Discussion: The failure of state multiculturalism in the UK?

Concluding remarks

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

Declaration of conflicting interests

Funding

Notes

References