Deserving citizenship in Germany and The Netherlands. Citizenship tests in liberal democracies

Abstract

Between 2003 and 2008, Germany and the Netherlands have replaced informal interviews with local officials by formalised language and knowledge of society tests (‘citizenship tests’) to determine whether long-term resident immigrants have sufficiently integrated to become citizens. In this contribution, the questions of why the citizenship tests were introduced and of which effects these tests have produced in Germany and the Netherlands will be answered. By doing so, the author aims to contribute to answering the question of whether language and cultural requirements can be considered liberal, which, as has been claimed, remains an unresolved issue relating to civic integration policies. Scholars disagree on whether citizenship tests can be justified in the liberal model for citizenship. Liberal minimalists oppose the introduction of requirements barring permanent residents from full-fledged citizenship. Liberal nationalists think citizenship tests can be justified in case they encourage the acquisition of competences that play an important role in creating or sustaining a reasonably just society. The author concludes that proponents of introducing citizenship tests have indeed asserted that these tests are required for prospective citizens to be able to develop the competences that play an important role in creating or sustaining a reasonably just society. Far more important explanations for the introduction of citizenship tests can however be sought in the linking of naturalisation policy to integration policy, and in the desire to promote uniformity in the application of the language and integration requirement as a condition for naturalisation. As regards the effects produced by the tests, the author shows that the tests permanently exclude certain categories of immigrants from becoming full-fledged members of society. The conclusion can therefore be drawn that the citizenship tests applied by Germany and the Netherlands cannot be justified in the liberal model for citizenship.

Keywords

Citizenship,civic integration,integration requirements,immigration,naturalisation,liberalism

Introduction

In the past two decades, a number of Western European countries have formalised or introduced language and knowledge of society tests for immigrants applying for citizenship (Van Oers et al., 2010). This contribution will analyse why two of these countries, the Netherlands and Germany, have replaced informal interviews with local officials by formalised language and knowledge of society tests (‘citizenship tests’) as a condition for naturalisation. It will furthermore provide insight into the effects produced by these formalised tests in the countries under consideration.

According to Goodman (2019: 175), one of the unresolved issues relating to civic integration policies is whether language and cultural requirements are liberal. By analysing the reasons for introduction of the citizenship tests and the effects they produce once they are applied in practice, the article aims to contribute to answering the question of whether citizenship tests are a justifiable means for determining whether immigrants can become full-fledged members of the liberal-democratic states they permanently reside in.

There is no consensus in academic literature about whether citizenship tests can be justified or not. Considering equality as the highest good, a liberal conception of citizenship entails that exclusion of long-term residents from full-fledged citizenship is hard to justify, and that naturalisation is by consequence a right that should be made available to all residents. However, scholars on opposite ends of the liberal spectrum have different ideas on whether citizenship tests can be defended. On the one hand, ‘liberal minimalists’ such as Joseph Carens argue that migrants have a moral right to citizenship, since they become ‘de facto’ members of the society after a certain period of time (independent of whether they contribute to it or not) (Carens, 1989: 3). Requiring integration beyond residence in order to obtain the status of citizen is to violate the principle of toleration and respect for diversity to which all liberal-democratic states are committed and calls into question the equal status of current citizens who differ from the majority (Carens, 1989: 40). Kostakopoulou associates the introduction of citizenship tests with concerns to reduce (unwanted) migration and numbers of naturalisations, and with exclusionary practices and restrictive migration control (Kostakopoulou 2010a: 17). In a similar vein, Carrera and Guild have claimed that reducing the numbers of naturalisations is one of the core functions of citizenship tests (Carrera and Guild, 2010: 33). They observe a paradox in the testing of liberal democratic principles and values, which lies therein that the principles and values ‘are operationalised in a testing fashion and therefore become exceptions or derogative clauses for foreigners to have access to the very same liberal democratic entitlements and fundamental rights that citizenship tests are said to uphold’ (Carrera and Guild, 2010: 29).

The argumentation of the liberal minimalists is clear: citizenship tests will bar a part of the permanently resident immigrant population from becoming full-fledged members of the community, which cannot be defended with liberal arguments. Or, in Carens’ words ‘the most liberal citizenship tests is none at all’ (Carens, 2010: 19–20).

On the other side of the liberal spectrum, ‘liberal nationalists’ have, however, attempted to justify arguments for exclusive membership in the liberal model. Hampshire has for instance argued that it is unreasonable to disqualify all current naturalisation policies in Western states for being illiberal (Hampshire, 2010). According to Hampshire, when applying for a status, we generally think it reasonable that we are required to demonstrate some understanding of what that status entails, and some commitment to its constitutive values. Since naturalisation is the process by which the status of citizenship is obtained, this is no different. It is, in Hampshire’s view, consequently quite legitimate for liberal states to institutionalise the formal rights and responsibilities of citizenship and the ideals of liberal citizenship in their naturalisation policies (Hampshire, 2010: 87). The imposition of language and knowledge of society requirements can, in Hampshire’s opinion, be justified on the basis of the fact that we should accept that the stability of liberal institutions and the pursuit of social justice also depend on the dispositions and capacities of citizens (Hampshire, 2010: 90).

In a similar vein, Mason has asserted that citizenship tests can be justified in case they encourage the acquisition of competences that play an important role in creating or sustaining a ‘reasonably just society’ (Mason, 2014).¹ He contends that there can be four arguments that can provide a strong case for citizenship tests: the political participation argument (citizenship tests encourage applicants for citizenship to develop the competences required for effective political participation), the societal participation argument (asking for skills that are deemed valuable by the receiving society or encourage applicants to develop the competences without which they cannot enjoy equality of opportunity or be economically self-sufficient), the societal cohesion argument (tests encourage applicants to acquire competences needed for meaningful contact) and the shared values argument (tests encourage citizens to adopt the values of the society they are joining).

The above shows that the liberal nationalists’ line of reasoning offers room for the imposition of extra naturalisation conditions beside residence in order to safeguard the flourishing of liberal democracies as reasonably just societies. Mason, however, stresses that citizenship tests may only be justified as long as they do not prevent permanent residents from naturalisation or in case they ‘occur within a process that aims at inclusion’ (Mason, 2014).²

Liberal minimalists and liberal nationalists hence give different answers to the question of whether citizenship tests are a justifiable means of determining who belongs and who does not. What the above-mentioned studies have in common though is that they have assessed the question of whether citizenship tests can be justified or not from a theoretical perspective. Empirical studies examining this question on the other hand mainly focused on the content of the tests applied by several EU countries (see, for example, Joppke, 2010; Michalowski, 2011; Orgad, 2010, 2019). When applying a liberal nationalist point of view, whether a citizenship test may be defensible in the liberal model, however also depends on the reasons why it was introduced. Moreover, a citizenship test can only be considered liberal in case it does not lead to exclusion. These questions will be answered below as far as the citizenship tests in the Netherlands and Germany are concerned. It puts the argumentation of liberal nationalists to the test: can the citizenship tests applied in practice by the Netherlands and Germany be considered liberal because they have been both introduced for the right reasons and refrain from producing selective effects?

From interview to formalised tests: The introduction of citizenship tests in The Netherlands and Germany explained

The Netherlands

A formalised language and knowledge of society test was introduced in Dutch nationality law on 1 April 2003, which can be seen as the marker of a restrictive turn in Dutch citizenship policy (De Hart and Van Oers, 2006: 326–327). The Dutch Nationality Act (DNA) of 1985 after all was meant to increase the numbers of naturalisations, as the idea behind the Minorities’ Policy the Dutch government then applied was that a strong legal position would benefit the integration of immigrants in society (Heijs, 1995). Naturalisation was consequently seen as a means for integration.

In 1993, the Dutch government introduced a proposal to further liberalise the conditions for naturalisation. Besides formally deleting the provision which asked naturalisation applicants to renounce their original nationality, the bill proposed a reformulation of the language and integration requirement. Whether someone had sufficiently integrated was at the time tested by a local official in a short informal interview. The language and integration requirement was criticised for its vagueness, leading to a divergent application of the requirement in practice, which the government considered detrimental to a fair treatment among applicants (Jessurun D’Oliveira, 2005: 39).³

During the debates on the proposed amendments, the Christian Democrats (CDA) started referring to the acquisition of Dutch nationality as the ‘legal and emotional completion of the integration’. Rather than a means of integration, they saw naturalisation as a ‘crowning’ of the integration process.⁴ According to a Dutch CDA parliamentarian Dutch nationality should therefore not be handed out ‘too easily’:

If Dutch citizenship is desired for the rights and duties that come along with it, the person who becomes a Dutch citizen should be able to fully make use of these. What use are voting rights for him, in case he is unable to exercise them? What use is the right to be appointed in certain functions, in case he can’t execute this right due to an insufficient knowledge of language or society?⁵

In 1998 the debates became more emotional and ‘nationalist’ (Entzinger, 2003: 75), one of the explanations being the outcome of the 1994 elections, which were won by the Conservative Liberal VVD. This outcome is sometimes ascribed to prominent VVD-member Frits Bolkestein’s call to address immigrant integration ‘with guts’ and to replace the supposedly non-committal Minorities Policy (Entzinger, 2003: 71).⁶ Perhaps to prevent voters from switching to the VVD, shortly before the 1994 elections, the coalition government consisting of the Social Democratic PvdA and the CDA replaced the Minorities Policy by the ‘Integration Policy’ which required immigrants to participate in the labour market and educational system, to learn the Dutch language and to become acquainted with Dutch society (Klaver and Odé, 2009: 44). In 1998, the Newcomers Integration Act (NIA) entered into force. It obliged immigrants from outside the EU who had settled in the Netherlands for a non-temporary purpose to follow an integration course, provided by the government at no cost. The language skills acquired would be measured in a ‘profile test’.

In the debates concerning the changes in the conditions for Dutch nationality, CDA Parliamentarians used the introduction of a formalised test in the framework of the NIA as an argument for the introduction of a formalised language and integration test for naturalisation. According to the CDA, the fact that more was required from newcomers than from future citizens was ‘the world turned upside down’.⁷ Verhagen claimed that Dutch nationality should be something to be ‘proud of’ instead of a consumption article, referring to a report from which he drew the conclusion that half of all naturalised citizens did not feel Dutch, which he qualified as being undesirable.⁸ Eventually, a revised Dutch Nationality Act entered into force on 1 April 2003. A decree provided that naturalisation applicants had to pass a partially computerised ‘naturalisation test’, measuring whether applicants would have sufficient knowledge of Dutch society and would be able to speak, understand, read and write Dutch at level A2 of the Council of Europe’s Common European Framework for Reference (CEF).⁹ Taking this test cost €260. The replacement of the informal interview by a formalised test hence meant an increase in both the level of skills required and to higher costs to fulfil the language and integration requirement for naturalisation.

After the turn of the century, concerns regarding the results of the policies concerning immigrant integration arose and the call for a more obliging, result oriented integration policy grew, inter alia due to growing popular and scientific concern about the representation of immigrants in ‘wrong’ statistics on unemployment, crime, and school drop-out rates (Schinkel and Van Houdt, 2010: 703). Furthermore, a major influence on the changes in the political perspectives on immigration and integration was constituted by the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Bonjour, 2009: 237–238, 242; Groenendijk, 2008: 116). In its coalition agreement of May 2003, the Government, consisting of CDA, VVD and the Progressive Liberal D66 stated that

‘whoever wants to permanently settle in our country will have to actively participate in society and master Dutch language, be aware of Dutch values, and observe the norms.’¹⁰

A proposal for an Integration Act (IA) to replace the 1998 NIA was introduced in Parliament in 2005. In the explanatory memorandum to the bill, the responsible Minister (Verdonk (VVD), Aliens Affairs and Integration) stated that the ‘continuity of the society would be threatened’ in case ‘large parts of the population would not participate actively in society and the economy’.¹¹ The Minister did not have a hard time getting the bill adopted, as several events served as catalysts for the introduction of a more demanding integration policy. These were the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a Moroccan-Dutch terrorist in 2004 and the criminal proceedings that had been started against a small group of Islamist extremists called the Hofstad-group, which inter alia led to three fundamentalist imams being expelled a year before (Groenendijk, 2008: 127).

Eventually, the IA entered into force on 1 January 2007. The integration examination it introduced replaced the naturalisation test. In the debates that preceded its introduction, the content of the new exam could not count on much attention as other issues drew the attention of the Parliamentarians.¹² The level of language skills required received some attention. The introduction of the new exam as a condition for newcomers triggered Christian Democratic parliamentarians, together with the small Christian parties Christian Union and SGP, to ask the Minister for Alien Affairs and Integration to raise the level of language skills required for naturalisation.¹³ The Minister was however not willing to do this, as the test for naturalisation should not ‘unintentionally’ function as a selection instrument.¹⁴ The new act however provided that immigrants would have to pay for their integration (voluntary preparatory courses and the examination) themselves, which lead to a sharp decrease in the number of immigrants starting an integration course (and passing the examination) immediately after the act entered into force (Groenendijk, 2011: 337).¹⁵

The Government subsequently decided to start paying for the integration courses, until a revised Integration Act entered into force on 1 January 2013. This Act is currently still in force, although a proposal of law containing amendments to the Act is expected to enter into force in July 2021.¹⁶ The revised Act stipulates that the government will again start paying for the integration courses, but only for asylum seekers. At the same time, the language skills required to pass the integration test (and consequently to become a Dutch citizen) will be raised to level B1 of the CEF.¹⁷

Germany

Until the beginning of the 1990s, German citizenship law almost exclusively relied on ius sanguinis citizenship attribution, thereby making Germany the prototype for the notorious ‘ethnic nation’ (Brubaker, 1992; Koopmans et al., 2005: 7; Winter and John, 2010). Although immigrants had the possibility to make an application for naturalisation, the granting was at the state’s discretion. The exclusive citizenship regime resulted in the lowest naturalisation rate in Europe (Joppke, 1999: 202).

To open up access to German nationality, the social democratic SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) and the Greens successfully called for a change in German nationality law. In 1990 a simplified naturalisation procedure was introduced for two groups of immigrants: those residing in Germany for a period of 15 years or longer (article 86) and those aged between 16 and 23 (article 85). When fulfilling the required conditions, applicants for naturalisation were to be naturalised ‘as a rule’ (Regelanspruch). Language skills were not required, and neither were applicants required to acknowledge Germany’s free and democratic basic order, both requirements for discretionary naturalisation.¹⁸ At the same time, the fees for naturalisation were reduced from 5000 to 100 DM (Carle, 2007: 152). Both groups acquired a definitive right to naturalise (Anspruchseinbürgerung) in 1993 (Green, 2000: 111).

After the SPD won the 1998 parliamentary elections, the time seemed right for a further liberalisation of German citizenship law. However, as the Christian Democratic Parties CDU (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands) and CSU (Christlich Soziale Union) had obtained a majority in the Bundesrat, parliament’s upper house representing the states, a compromise with these conservative parties had to be reached in order for the bill to be successfully guided through both houses of Parliament. While the bill on the one hand provided for ius soli acquisition of German nationality for children whose parents had a permanent residence status, it on the other hand strengthened some of the conditions for naturalisation.¹⁹ A language requirement was introduced. As a justification, the Government put forward that integration required future German citizens to be able to understand German media and to communicate with the German people. Without language skills, integration, which included participation in the process of political opinion making (Beteiligung am politischen Willensbildungsprozess), would not be possible.²⁰ Those applying for citizenship would furthermore be required to have an ‘inner orientation towards the Federal Republic of Germany’ (innere Hinwendung zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland). The bill thus required applicants for naturalisation to ‘acknowledge the free and democratic basic order of Germany’s Basic Law’.²¹ Furthermore, the bill raised the naturalisation fee fivefold, from 100 to 500 DM. At the same time, the period of residence required was reduced from 15 to eight years. Furthermore, the number of exceptions regarding the requirement to renounce one’s original nationality upon naturalisation were extended, offering more room for future citizens to have dual nationality.

The explanatory memorandum stated that the bill intended to achieve two aims: to increase the number of naturalisations of the large number of permanent residents in Germany and to improve the integration of immigrants who were permanently living in Germany and of their German born children, by facilitating access to German nationality.²² According to Minister of the Interior Schily, integration could only succeed when citizens of foreign descent have the possibility to equally participate in social life in Germany.²³ Naturalisation was hence seen as a means for integration, and nationality law was to be used as a means to pursue aims of integration policy, something which the explanatory memorandum stated explicitly.²⁴

As these were the most controversial issues, most attention in the debates in Parliament was paid to the issue of ius soli and dual nationality, to the detriment of the introduction of the language requirement and the declaration of loyalty. Two points of view can be discerned. Left of centre political parties criticised the new bill for introducing new obstacles for naturalisation by adding requirements as they would form barriers to equal treatment. At the same time, CDU/CSU parliamentarians blamed the government for giving away naturalisation for free (Einbürgerung zum Nultarif).²⁵ Edmund Stoiber, president of the Land Hesse, opposed to the bill by emphasising the importance of nationality law as a means to maintain the identity and cohesion of the German society, established by a common history, culture and coherence in nation and homeland (Heimat). He claimed that integration consequently not only required the foreign population to learn the language, but also the decision to ‘clearly join our nation, being a cultural community, a community of values and solidarity.’²⁶

Contrary to the fears of those opposing the supposed opening up of access to German citizenship via naturalisation, after 1 January 2000, the numbers of naturalisations quickly decreased (see below), meaning that one of the official goals of the new Act, to increase the number of naturalisations, was not achieved.

After the introduction of the new act, Union led Länder feared ‘naturalisation tourism’ by immigrants filing their naturalisation applications in Länder that applied the requirements in a lenient way.²⁷ They therefore called for uniform naturalisation requirements. In 2007, an article proposing to formalise the language requirement by requiring applicants to have oral and written language skills at level B1 was introduced as part of a bill aiming to implement several EU directives on immigration into German law. The proposed Act furthermore required ‘knowledge of the juridical and social order and of the living conditions in Germany’.²⁸ Next to the need for harmonisation, the need perceived by the government to ‘observe a gradual rise in integration policy’ – naturalisation being the ‘end point’ (Schlußstein) - was referred to as a justification for the introduction of these requirements.²⁹ The Immigration Act (Zuwanderungsgesetz) of 1 January 2005 after all required applicants for permanent residence to have language skills at level B1, as well as a basic knowledge of the juridical and social order and the living conditions in Germany.³⁰ These requirements were introduced following a series of violent attacks such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the bombings in Madrid in March 2004 and in London in July 2005 (Triadafilopoulos, 2019: 110). Many members of parliament hoped that knowledge of German language would hinder the arising of ‘parallel societies’ (Parallelgesellschaften), thereby forming an antidote to segregation (Davy, 2008: 34).

According to the government, introducing the requirement of knowledge of Germany’s juridical and social order as a condition for naturalisation would improve immigrant integration.³¹ During the parliamentary debates, again little attention was paid to the integration requirements for naturalisation, which can be partially explained by the fact that members of parliament were pre-occupied by the rather far-going alterations that were proposed in the field of immigration law.³² The bill became law on 19 August 2007, with the paragraph introducing the naturalisation test as a condition for naturalisation entering into force on 1 September 2008.³³

Whereas the language and integration requirements were strengthened, the government has always denied that the new requirements were meant as hurdles to naturalisation: ‘The wish that no one should fail the test is intentional’.³⁴

Effects of knowledge testing for citizenship acquisition

Effects in numbers

The absolute number of naturalisations

The Figure below (Figure 1; naturalisations in the Netherlands and Germany) depicts the absolute number of naturalisations in the two countries under consideration.

The Netherlands

The number of naturalisations in the Netherlands in 2004 (15,000), a year after the introduction of a formalised language and integration test, halved compared to 2002 (29,000), the year prior to the introduction of the test. The stricter conditions indeed form a barrier, which can be derived from the permanent character of the decrease in the number of naturalisations: in 2017, i.e. fourteen years after the introduction of the revised act, the number of naturalisations still is half as low as the number of naturalisations prior to the introduction of the revised act in 2002.

The question now is to what extent the formalisation of the integration requirement in the Netherlands has been responsible for the decrease in the number of naturalisations. Analysing the pass rate in the naturalisation test and its successor, the integration examination, will provide insight into the answer to this question. As far as the naturalisation test, which applied from 2003–2007, is concerned, 60% of all those who registered passed this test. The pass rate increased when the integration examination was introduced on 1 January 2007. The level of the integration examination equals the level of the naturalisation test (A2 of the CEF), but an important difference is the existence of preparation courses. For the years 2007–2009, the average pass rate was 79% (Van Oers, 2014: 158). In the years that followed, the pass rate however dropped. From 2011 to 2014, the average pass rate of all those taking the integration examination was 67,5%.³⁵ An explanation for the decrease can be found in the fact that when the Integration Act came into force, in the first instance mainly highly motivated or longer resident candidates who were convinced of their chances of passing took the test (Significant, 2010). After a while, the candidates who were less motivated and less educated took part in the test as well. Another explanation are the costs: as of 1 January 2013 the government no longer pays for the integration courses. Apparently, newcomers are less inclined to follow (expensive) integration courses when they have to pay for them themselves.³⁶ Consequently, they are less well prepared when taking the examination.

Germany

The numbers of naturalisations in Germany have more or less continuously decreased since the introduction of the revised act in 2000. Starting in 2010, the number of naturalisations has however not been below 100,000, which might indicate that the restrictive effect of the formalised language requirement (introduced in 2007) and the Einbürgerungstest (introduced in 2008) and other restrictive measures is starting to wear out. The naturalisation rate in the years 2010–2017 has however decreased. Whereas in 2010, 1.47 per hundred non-national citizens were granted citizenship, rising to 1.81 in 2012, the naturalisation rate sank to 1.25 in 2017.³⁷ This might mean that the relatively high absolute number of naturalisations in Germany since 2010 could have been hidden by a rise in the pool of potential applicants.³⁸

What has been the influence of the formalised language requirement on the number of naturalisations in Germany? The formalised language test has applied since August 2007. Data about the way in which applicants for naturalisation fulfil the language requirement, which asks applicants to prove they have language skills at least level B1 of the CEF, are not provided. Those who pass the test in the framework of the Zuwanderungsgesetz however fulfil the language requirement for naturalisation, and these numbers are published. An analysis of the pass rates between 2005 and 2018 shows that on average 60% of all test candidates passed the test.³⁹ In the years 2018 and 2019, half of all those taking the test reached level B1.⁴⁰ Reaching level B1 can hence be considered problematic, even for those who participated in a course. The conclusion can therefore be drawn that the language requirement constitutes a barrier for naturalisation for a certain part of the immigrant population. Which part will become clear in the paragraph below.

Effects: Interviews

Data obtained through interviews provide insight into which immigrants are barred from citizenship because of the existence of tests. Interviews will furthermore provide information about the ‘dark numbers’, i.e. those who do not or only to a certain extent show in the statistics because the tests made them give up their wish to become naturalised.

Based on an analysis of interviews with immigrants, their representatives working for immigrant organisations, language teachers, municipal officials and policy makers, the conclusion can be drawn that the obligation to pass knowledge tests is particularly harmful for immigrants in disadvantaged positions, who are experiencing trouble finding their way in society.⁴¹

The interviews showed that the tests had negatively affected the elderly, the low-educated and people with little or no formal education, women in disadvantaged positions, and traumatised refugees.

To illustrate the above, a 74 year-old Iraqi couple, in the Netherlands since eight years at the time of the interview, voiced their objections to the naturalisation test in the following manner:

We had a really good laugh when we heard that we needed to take the test. We only came to the Netherlands when we were aged 66. My wife speaks a little bit of Dutch, but I don’t speak Dutch at all. I speak good English, and that is why I have always managed well. If we are not exempt from the test via the doctor, we will need to forget about Dutch nationality. We will not take the test, that’s a waste of time.

As far as immigrants who have little or no education in their countries of origin go, German migration psychologist Jan Kizilhan claims that not only the level of the language test, but also the fact that language is tested in an examination may constitute a barrier: ‘a large group only has three or four years education – they don’t even know what tests are’ (Janz, 2006). And as a language teacher interviewed for this study pointed out, those who have little education will have lost the ability to write texts, something which is required to pass the language test.

A 33-year old Iranian national living in Germany, who had little education in his country of origin, stated that he was ‘devastated’ when finding out that he had to pass knowledge tests to qualify for naturalisation:

I only went to school for four years in Iran. I now have a family and I have to make sure that there is enough money. I cannot learn what is required and I know that many with me have no possibilities to learn everything […] From what I’ve heard, the language test is really hard. My language and script are totally different. I have learnt it a little bit, it is enough to cope at work. But it is too much for me to learn everything.

The above shows that a certain part of the immigrant population is being excluded from fully fledged membership based on their level of education or their abilities to study for and pass tests.

Conclusions

Between 2003 and 2008, Germany and the Netherlands introduced formalised citizenship tests to replace informal interviews by local officials to determine whether long-term resident immigrants have sufficiently integrated to become citizens. Above, the reasons for this replacement and the effects produced by the citizenship tests have been analysed. It is now possible to answer the question of whether the tests applied by the countries under consideration can be considered liberal.

In terms of the reasons for introducing the tests, proponents of strengthened language and knowledge of society requirements for naturalisation have claimed that this was necessary. The analysis of political debates shows they claim this strengthening is required in order for prospective citizens to be able to develop the competences that play an important role in creating or sustaining a, as Mason has put it ‘reasonably just society’. Those in favour of tests have used versions of the political participation argument by claiming that future citizens need to be able to make use of the rights and duties that come along with citizenship (Netherlands) or participate in the process of political opinion making (Germany). The societal cohesion argument becomes apparent from the statement that future citizens should be able to understand media and communicate with the native people (Germany). Emphasising the importance of being able to participate actively, proponents of the introduction of a formalised test in the Netherlands used the societal participation argument. Lastly, the shared values argument becomes apparent from statements emphasising the importance for future citizens to be proud of their newly acquired nationality and ‘feel Dutch’ or to clearly decide to ‘join our nation, being a cultural community, a community of values and solidarity’ (Germany). These arguments could be qualified as arguments that can provide a strong case for citizenship tests as they encourage the acquisition of competences that play an important role in creating or sustaining a ‘reasonably just society’ (Mason, 2014).

Arguments encouraging the acquisition of competences required to promote the conditions for a reasonably just society however do not form the main explanation for the introduction of citizenship tests in the Netherlands and Germany. Two other explanations can be discerned.

The first, and more important explanation for the introduction of citizenship tests can be found in the linking of naturalisation law and policy to integration policy, in the sense that nationality law and policy are used as a means to achieve the ends of integration policy. In times where a strong legal position is thought to improve immigrant integration, as was the case in the Netherlands in the 1980s, the linking of integration and naturalisation policy implied an opening up of access to citizenship. Similarly, in Germany, one of the main reasons behind the naturalisation reform of 2000 was the prevention of segregation through the inclusion of immigrants by offering them full membership rights. However, in times where immigrant integration, due, inter alia, to worries about the existence of parallel societies (Germany), and over-representation of immigrants in the ‘wrong’ statistics (the Netherlands), is perceived a failure, naturalisation criteria are being made more restrictive. The idea that immigrant integration had failed received an extra impetus with the attacks of 9/11, a political murder in the Netherlands in 2004 and the bombings in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005. Rather than being a step in the integration process, naturalisation was more and more seen as ‘the crowning’ (the Netherlands), or ‘end point’ (Germany) of the integration process. Only if they were able to prove their knowledge of language and society in formalised tests were immigrants considered sufficiently integrated to become citizens. Hence, in both the Netherlands and Germany, tests have been introduced under the influence of an atmosphere of growing tension between the native and immigrant populations. As integration policy had been linked to naturalisation policy, the changing ideas on immigrant integration which ensued from these tensions could find their way directly into nationality law.

A consequence of the linking of naturalisation policy to integration policy is that the question of what may be required of future citizens in terms of the competences to integrate properly and what the content of citizenship tests should be has only been dealt with superficially in the political debates that lead up to the introduction or alteration of citizenship tests. Being the result of a ‘path dependent process’, tests and requirements introduced for newcomers in both Germany and the Netherlands exerted an upward pressure on the level of skills required for acquiring citizenship, which in the course of the years was more and more perceived as the end point of integration.

A second explanation for the introduction of citizenship tests is the wish to increase uniformity in the application of the language and integration requirements for naturalisation. If the same rules and level required would apply, according to the reasoning of those in favour of formalising the language and integration requirement, equality between the applicants for naturalisation would increase (the Netherlands) and ‘naturalisation tourism’ between the Länder would be prevented (Germany). Proponents of introducing citizenship tests in the countries under consideration stressed that the tests were not meant to produce a selective effect. They thus underlined that the formalisation of the requirements would not lead to exclusion, thereby implicitly claiming the tests would fit the liberal model.

An analysis of the relevant statistics, however, shows that after the introduction of the tests, the number of naturalisations has decreased in both of the countries under consideration. The decrease is most significant in the Netherlands, where the halving of the absolute number of naturalisations after the introduction of a citizenship test in 2003 appears to have a permanent character. Furthermore, interviews have shown that in both Germany and the Netherlands, certain groups of immigrant are barred from obtaining citizenship because of the requirement to pass a citizenship test. As the level of language skills required for citizenship will in the Netherlands be raised to level B1, the exclusionary effect the Dutch citizenship test produces will probably be increased.

According to Goodman (2019: 175), one of the unresolved issues relating to civic integration policies is whether language and cultural requirements are liberal. Based on an analysis of the political debates leading up to their introduction and of the effects they produce, the conclusion can be drawn that the citizenship tests applied by Germany and the Netherlands cannot be justified under the liberal model for citizenship. Considering the above, the claim made by Carens that ‘the most liberal citizenship test is no citizenship test at all’ still appears to hold true, at least for the countries dealt with in this contribution (Carens, 2010: 19–20).

Figure 1.

Naturalisations in the Netherlands (1994–2017, with the exception of 2012 and 2013) and Germany (1994–2017).

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Ricky van Oers

Notes

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