Nationalism is dead,long live nationalism! In pursuit of pluralistic nationalism: A critical overview

Liberal nationalism

In much of the 20th century, social scientists treated nationalism as a historical subject. Some have anticipated the obsolescence of nationalism and the rise of a post-national phase (Soysal, 1994), whereas others have argued that the nation-state as the prevailing political organization has endured globalization (Brubaker, 1996; Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008), globalization has even reinforced national feelings and national identities (Calhoun, 2007; Kaldor, 2004). The demise or revival of nationalism as a subject has been a popular theme in nationalism studies (Greenfeld, 2016) ² . In particular, beginning from the early 1990s, scholars of nationalism have reframed and notably distinguished various forms of nationalism: ethnic nationalism (Hobsbawm, 1990; Smith, 1994); cultural nationalism (Hutchinson, 1987, 2015; Leerssen, 2006); civic nationalism (Ignatieff, 1993; Pfaff, 1993); and liberal nationalism (Kymlicka, 1995; Miller, 1995; Tamir, 1993). Even though socio-political trends of nation-building and minority rights have been long neglected, notably by liberal political theorists in much of the 20th century, since the early 1990s there has been a growing interest among liberal theorists to reconcile liberalism and nationalism with a particular emphasis on national identity and cultural diversity (Kymlicka, 1995, 2001a; Miller, 1995, 2008; Tamir, 1993, 2019) ³ .

Considering its historical trajectory and conventional scholarship on nationalism, one might conceive liberal nationalism as an oxymoron. At first, it certainly strikes as one. Yet, liberal nationalists (Miller, 2020; Tamir, 1993, 2019) and its critics (Levinson, 1995; Mason, 2000) have argued that liberalism and nationalism can be reconciled ⁴ . Tamir (1993: 6), for instance, claims that ‘the liberal tradition, with its respect for personal autonomy, reflection, and choice, and the national tradition, with its emphasis on belonging, loyalty, and solidarity, although generally seen as mutually exclusive, can indeed accommodate one another’. Liberals can concede some societal aspects, including ‘belonging, membership and cultural affiliations’ that they have long overlooked, whilst nationalists ‘can appreciate the value of personal autonomy and individual rights and freedoms, as well as sustain a commitment for social justice both between and within nations’ (Tamir, 1993: 6–10). The liberal nationalist project, in essence, is an endeavour to tame (ethnic, monoculturalist) nationalism through adapting basic liberal values and principles – for example, basic human rights, minority rights.

Liberal nationalists have exclusively focussed on the tenacious question of how to come to terms with, and respond to, demands for a shared national identity and a common sense of attachment on the one hand, and demands for equal citizenship, recognition and respect for diversity, on the other. They are not satisfied with the answer provided by multiculturalists, characterized as the politics of identity and recognition. Liberal nationalists strongly emphasize national identity and national culture to ensure solidarity among citizens, which they believe is the only way to maintain community and culture. Many of the scholarly debates on liberal nationalism are, therefore, concerned with the forms and limits of nation-building, on the one hand, and fair terms of accommodation of difference, on the other.

Here I focus on some of the underlying conceptual themes that are central to liberal nationalism and post-war diversity, including nation-building and admission of newcomers, national culture, right to culture, national identity and a sense of belonging.

Nation-building and admission of newcomers

From a liberal point of view, nation-building is not an illegitimate project for democratic states (Kymlicka, 2001a: 1). Nation-building projects inevitably entail ethno-cultural minorities (e.g. immigrants) who ‘often feel threatened by state nation-building, and fear that it will create various burdens, barriers, or disadvantages for them’, and who have ‘limited options when confronted with such a nation-building state’. (Kymlicka, 2001a: 1). Minorities seem to have three basic routes: (1) accept accommodation requirements and integrate into national frameworks and institutions, (2) retain or build their own institutions (e.g. schools), and (3) live in segregated ghettos. In a nutshell, Kymlicka (2001a: 2–3) argues that nation-building and minority rights are legitimate in liberal democratic states; whereas the former ensures continuity of the nation and culture, the latter (e.g. granting specific rights to minorities) is imperative for preventing injustice. Although liberal nationalists well established the validity of nation-building and the necessity of granting rights to minorities, this neither ensures a shared national identity inclusive of all nor translates into an open public deliberation where all take part equally.

As for immigration control, the liberal position is against restrictive approaches in the admission of newcomers, whereas the (conventional) nationalist position is largely restrictive: the liberal position rests on the idea of freedom of movement, while the latter focusses on preserving the nation and the right of the state to limit/control immigration (Lægaard, 2009). Still, liberal nationalists argue that, insofar as protecting and maintaining ‘the viability of existing national cultures’ is an essential responsibility of liberal democratic states, it gives them a ‘legitimate right to limit the numbers of immigrants and to encourage their integration’ (Kymlicka, 2001a: 219). Some liberal nationalists, for example, Miller (1995: 128), defend limiting the number of newcomers as well as regulating selection criteria based on instrumental arguments. For liberals, the state has the right to select and ‘it should [1] frame its policy by considering the interests of its present members. […] [2] be justified as fair’ (Miller, 2008: 374, 377). That is, liberal nationalism can be the source of legitimacy of both immigrants becoming a member of the receiving nation and restriction of immigration per se ⁵ .

National culture

One of the most challenging questions in multicultural societies relates to national culture. Some oppose the very idea of a national culture based on the risk of one culture (i.e. of the core ethnic group’s) dominating and subordinating the others. Therefore, it is believed that ‘patriotism without nationalism’ is the best way forward; that is, a political community can only be inclusive (towards difference) through not favouring, let alone endorsing, a particular culture (Soutphommasane, 2012: 43).

Liberal nationalists disagree. For them, the principle of individual freedom of choice is strongly associated with the presence of a cultural structure. Kymlicka (2001a: 209) writes that ‘people make choices about the social practices around them, based on their beliefs about the value of these practices. And to have a belief about the value of a practice is […] a matter of understanding the meanings attached to it by our culture’. In fact, for liberal nationalists, the national culture not only provides a plethora of options to choose from but also makes them meaningful (Tamir, 1993: ch2; Kymlicka, 1995: 83–84, 92–93; Miller, 1995: 85–86) ⁶ .

It is suggested that a national community can only be realized when ‘it exhibits both a sufficient number of shared, objective characteristics—such as language, history, or territory—and self-awareness of its distinctiveness’ (Tamir, 1993: 66); and ‘whose members […] are connected by feelings of fraternity’ (Tamir, 2020: 423). Every nation, Tamir (1993: 88) argues, desires to ‘assur [e] its continued existence’ and ‘the flourishing’ and ‘partaking in the continuous re-creation of its culture’. Therefore, liberal nationalists conclude, ‘the foundational liberal commitment to individual freedom can be extended to generate a commitment to the ongoing viability and flourishing of national cultures’ (Kymlicka, 2001a: 227). In sum, insofar as national culture provides options for the individual to choose from, it both underpins individual freedom and provides meaning for their practices; therefore, national cultures need to be nurtured to flourish and, if need be, protected from ‘decay’ (Dworkin, 1985: 230–233).

However, liberal nationalists seem unenthusiastic about clarifying which goal should be prioritized as bearers of minority cultures could be under pressure to the extent that they can hardly participate in the national dialogue. Furthermore, some liberal nationalists (notably Kymlicka) offer a thin definition of national culture. Indeed, Kymlicka (2001b: 55–56) claims that liberal states need to embrace a thinner conception of national identity, nation-building, and national culture so that ethno-cultural minorities can easily fit in and become equal members. Yet, it remains to be explained the extent to which a thin national culture can be a common ground for solidarity, let alone the risk of it becoming trivial. A thin conception of national culture, as multiculturalists would argue, would eventually weaken, and over time, diminish minority cultures, which seems at odds with a general affirmative liberal position towards cultural diversity.

Right to culture

Under the increasing influence of globalization and cultural diversity, Miller (2008: 375) argues, ‘preserving distinct national cultures [is] an increasingly precarious business, and gives the state a greater responsibility for the self-conscious defence and reproduction of national culture’. This has largely manifested itself in the debates on national identity and minority rights. Liberal democratic states, it is argued, are inherently tolerating and ‘even encouraging the co-existence of different cultural groups within their borders, and this ties their hands when it comes to promoting a common national identity across the various groups’ (Miller, 2008: 376). In as much as newcomers arrive as the bearers of distinctive national cultures, liberal nationalists are puzzled with the question of the extent to which immigrants can be required to integrate into the existing national culture.

Liberal nationalism is responsive towards diversity. It allows and encourages minorities to maintain their distinctive cultures with two reservations: that minorities should be willing to integrate into the national culture – embraced by all liberal nationalists; and distinctive cultures belong to the private sphere – embraced by Miller, not Kymlicka and Tamir. Although affirmative of the presence of diverse cultures, Miller (2008) demands newcomers to ‘adopt and follow the social and political norms of the host society’ in the public sphere (Miller, 2008: 375). By going beyond mere civic toleration of difference in the private realm, however, Tamir (1993: 8) articulates ‘right to culture’ in a way permitting ‘individuals to live within the culture of their choice, to decide on their social affiliations, to re-create the culture of the community they belong to, and to redefine its borders’. Therefore, Tamir (1993: 8) maintains, a ‘right to culture thus entails the right to a public sphere in which individuals can share a language, memorise their past, cherish their heroes, live a fulfilling national life’.

National identity and belonging

There is a widespread conviction that national identity is vital for the realization of a ‘stable liberal political community […] – in effect, form a national community’. (Mason, 2000: 115). For liberal nationalists, the idea of a stable nation, and a well-functioning society requires a sense of common nationality is not simply valid, but central. Going beyond mere institutional attachments, liberal nationalists often emphasize that societies need various mechanisms that will work as glue or cement via pointing out to the essentiality of a shared national identity and national culture (Miller, 1995; Tamir, 1993). It is even argued that only national identity can sustain (1) trust (Kymlicka, 2001a: 226–227) and (2) solidarity (Miller, 1993: 9). Indeed, solidarity, trust, mutual commitment and fellowship feeling are among the central concepts that liberal nationalists persistently, though often opaquely, emphasize.

Liberal nationalists do not take national identity for granted in its conventional monocultural form. They promote re-formulating it in a way to include minorities. National identities, Miller (1995: 127) writes, ‘above all “imagined” identities, where the content of the imagining changes with time’; the change, he notes, ought to include different voices within the nation, and, no single ‘voice should [have] a privileged status’. For Miller (1995: 128), it is also necessary to insert immigrants into the national conversation on what a shared national identity might mean, which ‘must proceed on the basis that no one should be penalized or excluded for expressing views that challenge the traditional understanding of national symbols and historic events’. For liberal nationalists, it is key to bear in mind, the intrinsic value of shared national identity and national culture is tied to ends that they hopefully generate: solidarity and trust; yet, admittedly, mounting empirical studies show little if any, correlation between solidarity and national identity (cf. Miller and Ali, 2014).

The relations between majority and minority identities, liberal nationalists maintain, necessitate reciprocal modifications. Such modifications may include majority culture to underemphasize ‘certain specific cultural attributes considered central to national identity (say, Catholicism in France)’ (Erez, 2018: 502). Insofar as national identity is considered essential for a liberal democratic state to function successfully, the liberal state has also makes various demands on immigrants. First, it demands newcomers accept foundational liberal principles, for example, embracing freedom of conscience and abandoning illiberal practices such as ‘the oppression of women, intolerance of other faiths’ and so on (Miller, 2008: 384–385). Beyond this, a liberal state can require immigrants to adopt various cultural elements such as the national language and history, and the political system of the settlement country, which, he believes, immigrants will achieve spontaneously out of self-interest (Miller, 2008: 385). It is precise that national identity has a thick cultural component for Miller (1995: ch4–5, 2000: ch4).

Finally, a sense of belonging is an important part of liberal nationalist argument –that is, overall, a national identity is a necessary condition for developing a sense of belonging (Mason, 2000: 118). A sense of belonging is often associated with the claims that a shared national identity is key (1) to connect citizens with political institutions, (2) to maintain stability of liberal democratic institutions, (3) for solidarity and trust among citizens and (4) ‘for a politics of the common good’ (Mason, 2000: 118). For liberal nationalists, belonging does not only entail submitting to basic principles coming with the constitution, but also citizenship and shared past as essential parts of nationality (Banting and Kymlicka, 2017). Fostering a shared national identity might not lead to coercive cultural assimilation of minority groups, it may simply result in promoting the dominant culture – for example, its language (Mason, 2000, 2012). That is, for some liberal nationalists, national identity ‘must be thicker’ than mere ‘civic commitments’ (Chin, 2019: 722; Gustavsson, 2019: 696), and wide enough to include diversity. Still, the question of how and to what extent a shared national identity can solely generate belonging in multicultural democracies remains inconclusive.

For liberal nationalists, national identity is the basis for modern liberal democratic states; hence, they argue, one must seek an inclusive form of nationalism instead of opposing it. However, one must be vigilant (1) against dark sides of nationalism, (2) overstretching nationalism – so that it becomes trivial (3) and be self-reflexive regarding the possibility of inclusive nationalism. In her latest book, Yael Tamir (2019), for instance, appears over-optimistic about the capacity of nationalist movements doing good for societies, such as advancing social democratic goals and distributive justice. If she were right, we would have seen evidence of growing solidarity in societies where nationalism is prevalent for some time now, including the USA, India, Turkey and Hungary. Therefore, Tamir is overstating the role that liberal nationalism as the way forward in establishing solidarity, and that ‘nothing else works’ (Tamir, 2020: 538). Equally, especially in her latest book (2019), she is largely unresponsive, if not entirely neglective, of various phenomena including racism, anti-immigration and Islamophobia, which have only to a small extent to do with economic hardships or fear of competitive labour market, yet remain essential to the debates on, and processes of, re-formulating national narratives. Furthermore, Tamir overlooks other types of identities, including ethnic and transnational religious identities (cf. Benner, 2020). She is too concerned with rebuilding national identity to fight against what she calls globalism, to the extent that it is unclear how minorities and their identities will be respected.

Multicultural nationalism

The idea of multiculturalism has been mainly concerned with the claims of minority groups (i.e. post-war immigrants), which are generally conceived ‘as a natural response to majority nation-building and the cultural homogenisation’ (Sabbagh, 2005: 102) projects. Nationalist critiques of multiculturalism often underline the possible risks of ‘the corrosion of political unity and social stability’ [emphasis in the original]; therefore, they urge the rejection of multiculturalism on the ground that it undermines a sense of (national) community and social trust (Sabbagh, 2005: 102). As such, some liberal critics of multiculturalism argue that multiculturalists understate, if not entirely omit, the value of national identity (Barry, 2001: 77). Advocates of multiculturalism, however, reject these criticisms and assert that their emphasis on the value and importance of national identity since the 1970s has been overlooked (Meer and Modood, 2009; Modood, 2013, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c; Parekh, 2000a, 2008; Uberoi, 2008, 2018). For multiculturalists, the relationship between multiculturalism and nationalism, although intricate and potentially conflicting, is not necessarily antagonistic or incompatible.

Multiculturalists underline the significance of national identity often via using the language of a macro-symbolic aspect of minority accommodation – for example, ‘symbolic framework of integration (identity, religion, perception of the other, collective memory and so on)’ is as important as functional ends (e.g. housing) (Modood, 2019b: 309). Modood (2019b: 309), for instance, highlights that ‘multiculturalism is a mode of integration that does not just emphasise the centrality of minority group identities but argues that integration is incomplete without re-making national identity so that all can have a sense of belonging to it’. Therefore, nationalism and multiculturalism, when considered ‘as modes of belonging’, are not incompatible insofar as multiculturalism ‘is a reconstruction of the symbolic terms of social unity’ of nationalism (Chin, 2020: 113).

Two trends seem to explain why Modood, a leading multiculturalist, has now ‘started to paying more explicit attention to majority identities, not merely as a problem but as objects of attention in their own right and of their potential contribution to a common multiculturalist national identity’ (Modood, 2019c: 8) ⁷ . The first is the rise of populist-majoritarian nationalist trends, movements and political parties as well as growing anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiments, practices, and policies across the Western countries. The second is the mounting liberal and cosmopolitanist corpus that strongly underline majority anxieties via drawing on national identity.

Resting on Taras’s recent study (2018), which emphasizes an essential move towards a sense of nationhood in various countries from Peru to India, the USA to the UK, Modood embraces and submits the idea that ‘enlarging the nation so that it consists of different integrated ethnic parts’ (Taras, 2018: 102). The main premise of the idea of multicultural nationalism, in a nutshell, is to make ‘minority accommodation a feature of acceptable nationalism’ (Modood, 2019a: 233). The central objective of multicultural nationalism is to reconcile: (1) concerns of majority groups about national identity – for example, a sense of eroding national identity led some towards populist-majoritarian nationalism; and (2) concerns of minority groups about cultural assimilation, and the desire to become an equally recognized and respected part of the nation.

The liberal nation-state, multiculturalists argue, already recognizes majority culture via affirming various cultural rights such as a national language, national holidays, the teaching of a certain religious tradition, and so on; thus, it can and should extend such cultural recognition to minority cultures, too. The multiculturalist position does not have any problem with embracing or promoting an inclusive form of nationalism and national identity based on the cultural aspect as long as ‘the predominance that the cultural majority enjoys in shaping the national culture, symbols, and institutions [is not] exercised in a non-minority-accommodating way’ (Modood, 2019a: 235).

Before moving to central themes that multicultural nationalism delves into, it is imperative to draw on another form of nationalism that can be categorized as multicultural nationalism: plural nationalism (Triandafyllidou, 2013, 2020). An advocate of multiculturalism, Anna Triandafyllidou (2020) has recently proposed that, in the face of persistent challenges by diversity and globalization, there is a need for a new theoretical framework of nationalism responsive to contemporary challenges since classical theories of nationalism have become obsolete. She (2020: 794) claims that a plural form of nationalism acknowledging and responding to diversity and mobility – considering challenges both within and outside the national borders – can be the answer.

Triandafyllidou (2020: 799) argues that, today ‘nationalism re-emerges with new force, filling the cracks of a liquid modernity’. Yet, this is not a one-way road. It can lead to ‘neo-tribal identities’, characterized by two current trends: (1) anti-immigrant nationalism movements; and (2) the pressure on national identities under increasing European integration (Triandafyllidou, 2020: 801). To tackle neo-tribal nationalism, which rests on the rejection of diversity and mobility, she proposes plural nationalism. Plural nationalism, she (2020: 800–801) articulates, recognizes that every nation has a ‘majority group that to a large extent has given its imprint on the national identity’; yet, it ‘does not monopolise the national identity definition and the relevant dominant discourse.’ Plural nationalism, as with multicultural nationalisms, recognizes and ‘makes a commitment to engage with diversity’ (Triandafyllidou, 2020: 800). Admittedly, it is almost identical to Modood’s multicultural nationalism. Indeed, just as Modood’s (2019a) multicultural nationalism is a national identity re-making project, Triandafyllidou’s (2013: 178) plural nationalism refers to ‘self-reflexive reconsideration and negotiation of national identity’. Both aim to convince the majority to recognize and include minority identities into national identity via thickening it. Triandafyllidou’s focus on transnationalism slightly differentiates her account from that of Modood. Even though she claims that her plural nationalism goes beyond multicultural nationalism in terms of acknowledging local, national and transnational challenges, she is yet to develop what these transnational challenges might be. It is imperative that she recognizes forces outside national boundaries; still, one needs a more nuanced account of how she, say, responds to normative desirability of dual nationalities. In sum, except for its brief emphasis on transnationalism (specifically, EU as a supranational force), it is unclear the extent to which it is different from multiculturalism. Therefore, it would not be a mistake to categorize it as multicultural nationalism.

Now, the following discussion critically engages with some of the central premises and themes that multicultural nationalism is concerned with.

Multiculturalism nationalism as a national identity re-making project

Unlike liberal nationalism, multicultural nationalism does not offer itself as a nation-building project. It is, however, designated as ‘a national identity re-making project’ (Modood, 2019a: 243). Advocates of multiculturalism (e.g. Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain [CMEB], 2000; Modood, 2013; Parekh, 2000a) have established that re-thinking the national story and re-making national identity in a way to include post-war ethnic, cultural and religious minorities into national societies is of critical importance. Modood (2019a: 233), for instance, articulates multiculturalism as ‘a mode of integration that does not just emphasize the centrality of minority group identities, but rather proves incomplete without the re-making of national identity so that all citizens have a sense of belonging’. Accommodating minorities into a national citizenship framework, the hallmark of the idea of multiculturalism, entails re-imagining the national story and re-making prevailing national identity so that minorities are recognized, respected and included. Only such a shared multiculturalized national identity, it is believed, can underpin a well-functioning liberal democratic state and society. Although multiculturalists offer a somewhat inconclusive account of national identity, they concur that liberal nation-states have the right to maintain nation-building projects with a reservation that it should be designed and implemented in a diversity-friendly way. This middle ground seems appealing for some, yet its viability is yet to be seen.

Immigration control?

Despite the widespread perception that multiculturalists advocate an open border immigration policy, it is in fact ‘nationally-focused and not against’ non-discriminatory immigration controls or policies (Modood, 2019a: 233; also see Kymlicka, 2017). Controlling immigration and asylum, the prominent Parekh Report (2000: 221) emphasized, is ‘needed but must be operated fairly, openly and without ethnic or racial discrimination’. Unlike the cosmopolitanist form of multiculturalism, which endorses open borders, multiculturalism is firmly grounded on the idea of the liberal nation-state. Multiculturalism was, in fact, ‘developed in the context of immigration control and does not challenge the right of the state to control immigration’ (Modood, 2019a: 242–243). Canada, Australia and the UK are among the leading countries that have both the strictest immigration control policies and selection criteria, and multicultural policies. That is, multicultural nationalism is content with immigration control and installing admission criteria as long as they are not based on the identity of individuals. Therefore, as with liberal nationalism, multicultural nationalism can be a source of legitimacy of both immigrants becoming equal members of the receiving nation and restriction of immigration per se.

National identity

According to Parekh (2000a: 230–236), national identity is imperative at two levels: (1) for a person’s self-identification (being/feeling a part of a polity); and (2) its role in a multicultural society as a vision (alias unity in diversity). Multiculturalists argue that a shared national identity can underpin a sense of togetherness and mutual loyalty in a community (Parekh, 2000a; Uberoi, 2018). Such a national identity, they maintain, cannot be static but dynamic, cannot privilege a certain group but must be inclusive of all. For multiculturalists, national identity ‘is both given and constantly reconstituted’, and thereby, it ‘is alterable within limits and in a manner that harmonises with its overall character and organising principles’ (Parekh, 2000b: 6).

Multiculturalists recognize the contemporary pressing demand for a shared national identity increasingly expressed both by ‘those currently sympathetic to majoritarian nationalism’ and ‘those who are pro-diversity and minority accommodation’ (Modood, 2019a: 233–234). It is claimed that multicultural nationalism is better equipped against monocultural populist nationalism vis-a-vis liberal nationalism insofar as it ‘recognizes the importance of national identity to citizenship, and therefore to multicultural citizenship’ (Modood, 2019a: 243). Modood, therefore, presents multicultural nationalism as a viable alternative to: (1) populist nationalism; as well as (2) liberal nationalism and cosmopolitanism.

Multiculturalism is claimed to be better equipped in addressing ethnic, cultural and religious ‘group identities [that entails] critically re-forming, but not displacing, the narrative of the majority’ (Modood, 2019a: 236). Multiculturalists advocate that minorities should be allowed to challenge the prevailing national story that excludes them, ‘but they do not compete with the majority in a zero-sum game’ (Modood, 2019a: 236). It is claimed that ‘both justice and political wisdom’ suggest resisting the majority claiming ‘cultural ownership of the political community’ while acknowledging that jettisoning majority cultural precedence might not be ‘always practical’ either (Parekh, 2000a: 235). For instance, it is argued that expecting Britain ‘to leap out of its cultural skin’ and ‘deny the Christian component of its identity a privileged status’ is ‘wrong’ and might ‘provoke widespread resentment’ (Parekh, 2000a: 235, 259).

Equally important is, multiculturalists emphasize, that national identity cannot be ‘culturally neutral’ since it pleases ‘nobody and lacks the power to evoke deep historical memories, nor biased towards a particular community as it delegitimizes and alienates others, nor culturally so eclectic as to lack coherence and focus’ (Parekh, 2000a: 235). That is, inclusivity does not necessarily translate into a thin national identity or national culture.

National culture

One of the hallmarks of multicultural nationalism refers to the multicultural thickening of national culture vis-a-vis liberal thinning national culture. It is explicitly emphasized ‘that a national identity or a national public culture has a plural or composite character without connecting that to a presumption of national thinness.’ (Modood, 2019a: 240). The Opening Ceremony of the 2012 London Olympics was an example of multicultural thickening of national culture, and multicultural nationalism as it not only laid out ‘symbolic and highly dramatic representation of a national history’, but also ‘emphasized historic continuity and cultural richness in a multicultural nation, not a post-national cultural hollowing out’ (Modood, 2019a: 240). Multicultural nationalism, in this sense, suggests ‘a kind of egalitarian levelling up, not a form of dispossession’ (Modood, 2019b: 310).

Modood (2019a, 2019b), for instance, is not in favour of disestablishing the Church of England, or even, say, the removal of bishops from the House of Lords. Contrary, he proposes to install other faith representatives (e.g. Hindu, Muslim) in the house. Such accommodations of minority groups, he believes, enhance national culture and do not simply undermine national identity. With its symbolic and practical characteristics, the Church of England is a historical and institutionalized fragment of national identity in the UK. The role of the Archbishop of Canterbury in the coronation of a new head of the state and the presence of 26 bishops in the House of Lords are a part of Britain’s national story; hence, Modood claims, this should neither be ignored nor downplayed, instead, minority faiths should be levelled up to hold a similar position, not ‘rigid parity’, to represent all segments of the society (Modood, 2019a: 238). Equally, Modood (2019a: 239) does not support the idea of abandoning majority (i.e. Christian) religious instruction or worship in schools due to the presence of minority faiths (e.g. Muslims, Hindus) – rather some minority faith aspects, such as celebrating Diwali and Eid in addition to Christmas, can be included. Pupils’ rights regarding appropriate dietary needs to be recognized, respected, and met by schools. Such examples are claimed to be a ‘pluralistic thickening’ of national culture (Modood, 2019a: 239) unlike the liberal nationalist thinning ⁸ .

Is multicultural nationalism a child of liberal nationalism?

In his seminal book, Multiculturalism, Modood (2013[2007]: 7) writes that ‘Multiculturalism is a child of liberal egalitarianism but, like any child, it is not simply a faithful reproduction of its parents.’ A similar analogy strikes as valid for multicultural nationalism, too. Both liberal nationalism and multicultural nationalism agree on various fundamental principles including, but not limited to, that: (1) nationalism is inevitable and desirable (they differ on its form); (2) a shared and reformed national identity is indispensable for a well-functioning liberal state; and (3) national identity has a strong cultural aspect (i.e. it cannot be culturally neutral).

Both liberal nationalism and multicultural nationalism emphasize that an inclusive, pluralistic or moderate (aka a morally acceptable and valuable) form of nationalism is desirable ⁹ and essential (1) to form and maintain liberal democratic states and societies; and (2) to sustain trust and solidarity among people. As such, insofar as ethnic, cultural and religious minorities pose a challenge to the nation-building projects, a shared and reformed national identity that includes minority difference is of critical importance to maintain solidarity and prevent injustices in multi-national and multicultural societies. Finally, liberal nationalists and multiculturalists concur that cultural components such as language, history, etc. are foundational parts of a sense of nationhood. Both agree that ‘the liberal state is not culturally neutral [… meaning] that the majority culture already has [the] recognition of some sort’; for the former, then, the point ‘is a matter of extending this valued condition to minorities’. (Modood, 2019b: 310). In sum, both underscore that there is no problem with an overarching national culture predominantly shaped by the majority as long as it is implemented in a minority-friendly manner.

However, they also differ on certain issues. First, while liberal nationalism is mainly concerned with national identity concerning solidarity and redistribution; multicultural nationalism is concerned with making minority differences an inclusive part of it with reference to common belonging and the common good. Multicultural nationalism, in this sense, appears more responsive towards injustices (e.g. racism and discrimination) occurring based on difference and coercive forms of assimilation. Second, unlike liberal nationalists, who offer little consideration to religion or the value of religious identities, multiculturalists suggest that religion can be an aspect of group identity, and people might want to see flourish and transmit it. Finally, whilst liberal nationalism envisions a thin societal/national culture (notably Kymlicka), multicultural nationalism promotes multicultural thickening. Despite the latter’s appeal, one has to be self-reflexive about the limits of such thickening practices. As I discuss later, it might be easier to install, say, dietary requirements (e.g. halal meals) in schools, yet it would be much more challenging to teach, say, history in a way to both underpin nation- and identity-building projects, and de-emphasize certain national narratives (e.g. the transatlantic slave trade, colonialism) that otherwise would damage a sense of togetherness.

A persistent challenge: nation-building and the limits of multicultural education

Insofar as education is widely conceived as a facilitative vehicle for nation-building, national culture and national identities, which now entail a hard task of balancing diversity and solidarity, re-forming national education, curriculum, and the teaching of certain subjects like history and religion have become imperative. Indeed, it has been a vital challenge for both liberal and multicultural nationalist arguments to frame education based on solidarity–diversity nexus. This section briefly draws on nation-building and the limits of multicultural education.

Nation-building and national education

One of the underlying premises behind mass public education in modern states is to underpin national-building projects via homogenizing people (Smith, 2002). Public education is considered foundational for cultivating loyal and virtuous citizens sharing a common culture and tradition. To this end, modern nation-states have established national education philosophies, national education institutions, national curricula and a ‘compulsory, standardized, hierarchical, academy-supervised and diploma-conferring’ mass schooling system (Smith, 2002: 91).

Designing national education is especially challenging in ethnically, culturally and religiously diverse societies. To address diversity in education and schools, some have proposed a ‘multicultural education’ (Blum, 2000; Parekh, 2000a), whereas others explicitly expressed discomfort with the idea and rhetoric of multiculturalism in schools (Glazer, 1997: ch1). Multicultural education implies ‘a more expansive view of the nature of citizenship and diversity’; yet, it does not necessarily aim to ‘elevate multicultural sensitivity above all other values’, that is, transmitting ‘a common history and culture should not be dismissed as excesses of assimilation’ (Soutphommasane, 2012: 181). A multicultural education, therefore, can be utilized in re-making nations and national identities. An underlying objective of a multiculturalist model of education should also be ‘the goal of maintaining the distinctiveness of children’s ethnic and cultural identities and boosting [the] self-esteem of minority students’ (Soutphommasane, 2012: 181). Equally, multicultural education, fostering recognition of difference, equality and national cohesion, is a critical agenda for diverse societies in achieving a sense of common belonging (Blum, 2014).

Still, some argue that such a multiculturalist approach undermines national unity. Nathan Glazer (1997: 20), for instance, argued that, when the past of a nation is largely condemned for the sake of multiculturalist education, it might lead to ‘a sense of resentment among many students’, and greater divergences between majority and minorities. Making exclusive emphasis on certain national heroes or grander inputs of ‘their ancestors in order to bolster their self-esteem [...] may come at the cost of undercutting mutual respect between citizens’ (Soutphommasane, 2012: 182). Today, in sum, liberals and multiculturalists largely concur that national education is key for re-making nations and national identities, and should be responsive towards diversity – not simply to prevent racism, discrimination, hatred, etc. in schools, but also to reinforce pupils’ sense of self-esteem who come from minority backgrounds. This position, however, must be fortified via more non-elusive practical propositions – for example, should some minority cultural elements (i.e. music) be included in national education? As it stands, both liberal nationalists and multiculturalists have yet to respond to increasing demands by antiracists concerning the decolonization of education (and public spaces).

Diversity and multicultural education

Ethnic, cultural and religious diversity poses a distinctive challenge for host nations at two levels. On the one hand, minorities demand respect for and accommodation of (some of) their distinctive cultures or beliefs, which translates into (1) installing various cultural practices (e.g. halal diet) and (2) exempting some pupils from attending other practices (e.g. Christmas). On the other hand, a more intricate and compelling issue relates to the teaching and content of some subjects like history and religion. One could assume that the teaching of other subjects like science and math has not been controversial – for example, immigrants, as widely observed, have no problem with accepting the national language of the settled country.

Multiculturalists have hitherto largely focussed on the accommodation of religious diversity, and separate (faith) schools; they rather put little emphasis on the teaching of, say, history and religion, and potential conflicts that might lead one to recognize the limits of inclusion ¹⁰ . Nation-building and identity re-making projects do not only entail installing/adding up some minority cultural elements such as holidays and dietary regulations in schools, vital though they are, but they also involve the teaching of certain subjects like national history. It may be relatively easier to install some minority dietary regulations for pupils coming from, say, non-Christian dispositions, yet it is unclear how to teach, say, history in a multicultural way. In this respect, hard cases that are often articulated by liberal nationalists and multiculturalists do not simply entail war-time decisions of immigrants and host nations, but they increasingly involve nationhood re-making projects and processes in schools too. One needs to address how, and the extent to which, one can reconcile multiple, perhaps conflicting, visions of history and memories insofar as re-making a shared past is a part of re-making the nation and national identities.

National curriculum and the teaching of history

National identities are tied to various factors including a shared past and memories, among others. The teaching of national history is of vital importance for generating a shared sense of a nation’s ‘past greatness, of its heroes and virtues, and its pre-eminent place among the nations’ (Smith, 2002: 91). Equally, history education is imperative in helping pupils to grasp the nation in the past by defining and re-making it, if necessary, which inevitably lead students’ perspective on the nation in the present, and help them to understand the direction of the nation or the nation in the future rendering actually nationalism so banal that it becomes invisible (Billing, 1995). That is, cultivating new citizens inevitably involves the teaching of national history; hence, how it is taught is immensely relevant for 21st century multi-national and multicultural democracies.

Multicultural education must reflect on how collective memories of history should be taught to students as part of its self-set task of re-thinking national story – which can take the form of reinforcing and underpinning or challenging and re-forming (cf. CMEB, 2000). The teaching of history deserves special attention as indiscriminate teaching of history might lead to internal conflicts within pupils coming from, say, ex-colonial familial backgrounds. A nationalist approach to history teaching, for instance, might lead to national identities becoming ideological weapons, and might politicise education (Soutphommasane, 2012: 178). This might entail favouring (e.g. conservatism) and/or de-emphasizing (e.g. plurality) various socio-political parts of national history. Moreover, with this approach, pupils will inevitably be ‘predisposed to dismiss any claims for cultural recognition by minorities: they would be bound to see them as inevitably destructive of a national tradition, which they are bound by duty to protect’ (Soutphommasane, 2012: 179). This can be highly controversial in multicultural societies. For example, should Rudyard Kipling’s poems be included in the national curriculum in Britain insofar as he is an important national figure for some part of the society, whereas the other part (coming from ex-colonial countries) might conceive him as the epitome symbol of colonialism and imperialism?

In addition, during the 2020 anti-racism (Black Lives Matter) protests in the UK, protesters tore down a public statue of Edward Colston, a 17th century slave trader, in Bristol city centre, once a slave trade hotspot. Whereas the city’s mayor expressed ‘no sense of loss’, PM Boris Johnson articulated it as a ‘criminal act’ ¹¹ . Indeed, growing popular attempts to settle with the colonial past of Britain, partly manifested in respective protest movements, do not have a free ride in the face of conservative politicians’ resistance ¹² , who disavow the most recent anti-racism mobilisations as part of the so-called ‘culture wars’ ¹³ . Interestingly, amid the Bristol and London cases, the mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, announced that new panellists will be selected to the new Landmark Commission that will not tear statues down but will address ‘the dearth of statues of people’ coming from different ethno-cultural backgrounds ¹⁴ . Can this be conceived an example of multicultural thickening? I do not see why it should not. This is a noteworthy attempt to reshape the public sphere in London in a diversity-friendly way. Then, one could ask liberal nationalists and multiculturalists to address the following questions more explicitly: are minorities entitled to tear down such historical figures (heroes, for some) in history textbooks too? Would this undermine nation-building projects? What does a diversity-friendly national education mean? How can national education be reformed to the extent that it maintains underpinning nation-building projects and does not become trivial?

Liberal nationalists and multiculturalists have hitherto under-theorized the education–nation-building nexus. Liberals demand a more open-minded and self-confident education acknowledging an affirmative place for minorities and a truthful teaching of history (Kymlicka, 2001a); multiculturalists assert schools are obliged to foster critical thinking and promote cultural diversity by including it in curricula and emphasizing it as a defining character of the nation (Parekh, 2000a). Unlike conservatives and liberal nationalists, who have emphasized that the nation consists of a group of people sharing a belief in a ‘collective life’ and ‘forgetting divisive episodes in their history’ by following Ernest Renan (Uberoi, 2015: 514, 519), multiculturalists (CMEB, 2000; Parekh, 1999) have advocated ‘truth telling’ regarding national history, for example, episodes of imperialism, colonialism, discrimination and so on through publicly funded common education. Here, multiculturalists must be heard. Yet, decolonizing the political community through antiracist education requires a carefully crafted, constructive approach to the national history that underpins an inclusive national identity and belonging – not reproduce divisions or underpin hatred and bigotry. Although multiculturalists firmly believe that policies of multiculturalism may well be regarded ‘as nation-building policies’ Uberoi (2015: 514), their emphasis on multicultural education remains to be developed.

Overall, one can demand more open-minded and self-confident teaching of history. When, for instance, articulating the past of a country, one has to reflect on the contributions of minorities too. Say, whilst the socio-economic history of Britain in the 20th century is articulated, contributions of minorities coming from India, Pakistan, the Caribbean, etc., must be reflected; as such, when Germany’s post-war economic miracle is explained, one should not disregard the contributions of guest-workers. Still, such inclusion is bound to be limited. In the last regard, nation-building is a legitimate right for liberal nation-states; this project inevitably involves national education, which is vital for making and re-making the nation and nationhood; the teaching of history is particularly imperative for re-forming national identity and retelling the national narrative; diversity must be reflected and included in national curricula so that minorities can become a part of national identity and narrative, yet there is a limit for inclusion of diversity – that expecting the majority to de-emphasize figures and events that have been central to the national story would be naïve – hence, a reformed national education or multicultural education must inform its limitations.

A growing predicament: Transnationalism and dual citizenship

The idea of transnationalism ‘refer [s] to sustained ties of persons, networks and organizations across the borders of multiple nation-states, ranging from little to highly institutionalized forms’ (Faist, 2000: 189). It has captured the attention of many scholars while explaining the processes and outcomes of globalization. Human mobility and cross-border reality pose potent challenges and are becoming a predicament for nationalist approaches. Advocates of liberal nationalism and multicultural nationalism have hitherto failed to provide a robust account of transnationalism, although they seem inclined to affirm dual citizenship rights. In the 21st century, those in pursuit of a pluralistic/inclusive/moderate form of nationalism must also draw on the normative desirability and practical implications of dual citizenship, and transnationalism writ large.

With the proliferation of advanced technologies of communication and transportation alongside the spirit of globalization, borders have become much more fluid, enabling people to move freely across states. Mobility of people as much as goods and finances has become a defining characteristic of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Growing numbers of people pursue ways to gain a second, often premium (e.g. Western), citizenship to achieve practical ends, for example, work benefits, travel privileges (Harpaz, 2019). As such, many sending countries, including Mexico, Turkey, Morocco and Pakistan, have introduced new laws to enable dual citizenship to maintain their co-nationals’ attachments towards their motherlands/fatherlands in addition to consolidating (human, financial etc.) capital transfer. Interestingly, this has led to tangible ways for transnational engagements, and dual citizenship has become popular, not just among individuals and sending-states but also at the level of host states too. About four-fifths of countries in Europe and the Americas allowed dual citizenship by 2010, whereas it was less than a third in 1990 (Harpaz and Mateos, 2018: 462). Therefore, dual citizenship has not only become an ‘institutional expression of and the basis for transnationalism’ (Kastoryano, 2005: 694), but also has further strengthened fluidity of borders, mobility of people (e.g. immigrants), and duality of identities and belongings. In sum, dual citizenship rights, bilateral agreements, and supranational arrangements (e.g. Schengen) have further consolidated transnationalism, triggering debates on the nature of citizenship, nationality, and identity.

From the perspective of host states, citizenship largely implies the incorporation of newcomers into the political community through national institutions, whereas for immigrants it denotes a way of achieving equality and ‘a way to claim recognition […] through which the attachment and loyalty to both a national and ethnic community are expressed’ (Kastoryano, 2005: 693). Such a formulation of membership in a political community, then, inevitably brings the concepts of citizenship, nationality and identity together connecting political and cultural community (Kastoryano, 2005).

The practice of citizenship is further complicated by the inclusion of cross-border reality by means of the relationship between citizenship and nationality. Developing multiple attachments and belongings has puzzled scholars of nationalism, resulting in resistance towards dual nationalities. Multiplicity of allegiances is often interpreted as conflicting allegiances on the part of nationalists. Whereas the traditional nationalist position insists on an us-versus-them formulation (see Huntington, 2004), an increasing number of people, including transnationalists, multiculturalists and liberal nationalists, underscore the viability of multiple belongings and loyalties. In fact, they articulate dual citizenship, not just as a sociological reality but also as an essential human right (Faist and Kivisto, 2007; Harpaz and Mateos, 2018).

Dual citizenship and integration

Citizenship was considered as an exclusive allegiance, and thereby overlapping nationalities were strongly discouraged prior to the 1990s; since then, however, there has been a growing acceptance of dual citizenship in the West (Baubock, 2018). Nevertheless, debates around it are still inconclusive. Insofar as dual citizenship consolidates transnational ties and engagements with the country of origin, it is argued to be damaging for engagement in, and development of, a sense of attachment to the country of settlement. Host states often conceive dual citizenship as a factor leading to dual loyalties, thereby undermining minority integration. Hence, through underscoring its adverse effect on naturalization, solidarity and trust among co-nationals, some scholars discourage (Joppke, 2010) and oppose (Spiro, 2007) dual citizenship, whereas others argue that it does not simply facilitate transnational connections and engagements (Basch et al., 1994; Faist et al., 2013; Fox, 2005; Glick Schiller, 2015), but reinforces integration into host societies (Dikici, 2021a; Levitt, 2003; Portes, 2001; Zhou and Lee, 2013).

Indeed, an important part of scholarly works on dual nationality focuses on the implications of dual citizenship on minority integration processes (Jones-Correa, 2001; Mazzolari, 2009; Portes et al., 2008). Jones-Correa (2001) has demonstrated that, while immigrants and sending-states are affirmative of dual nationality based on positive outcomes, the state in the USA maintains its discontent by referring to dual citizenship’s adverse impacts on American citizenship. Jones-Correa’s (2001: 998) findings, however, suggest that ‘immigrants from countries recognizing dual nationality average higher naturalization rates in the United States than countries that do not’. He (2001: 1023) therefore concludes that dual citizenship ‘has relatively small, but positive, effects on immigrants’ naturalization as U.S. citizens’. In sum, transnationalist and multiculturalist scholarships have established that people can develop multiple attachments at the same time and navigate their ways around them (cf. Dikici, 2021a); hence, dual citizenship does not necessarily impede identification with either homeland or settled country (Schlenker et al., 2016).

Dual citizenship, dual loyalties

Historically, ‘loyalties to different territorial political communities are often seen as irreconcilable’ (Jones-Correa, 1998: 5). The concept of dual nationality is conventionally considered at odds with the idea of sovereignty. Modern nation-states resisted the demands. Minority communities have been obliged to show their allegiance to either place (of origin or destination). However, in practice, the globalization process eased and tolerated multiple citizenship practices based on benefits generated through immigrant cross-border activities. Equally, the prevalence of globalization trends such as the rise of human rights as well as ‘the erosion of sovereignty as an insulating principle’ has weakened nationalist positions (Spiro, 2018: 880).

Citizenship rights are imperative for people’s ‘autonomy and chances to lead a good life as well as for governments’ capacity and legitimacy to rule them.’ (Baubock, 2018: 1026). From a liberal point of view, then, is not dual citizenship providing more autonomy and choices for individuals of especially disadvantaged backgrounds such as immigrants? Indeed, the possibility that dual citizenship undermines solidarity among citizens while allocating them a wider plethora of choices and autonomy is enough to make liberal nationalist position indecisive, and certainly make advocates of liberal nationalism nervous.

David Miller’s (2008: 382–383) take on immigrant dual nationality and loyalty clearly shows the liberal tentativeness. He (2008: 382) argues that, in the face of ‘the multicultural character of the receiving state’, it would be ‘anachronistic’ to expect immigrants to entirely uproot themselves from their origin country and eradicate their emotional attachments or loyalties towards them. Then, he concentrates on the possibility of conflicting loyalties via drawing on hard cases such as a war between origin and host countries. After stating that any individual has the right to reject taking part in a war that she/he thinks is unjust, Miller (2008: 383) emphasizes that minorities can be expected to protect their new homeland based on citizenship being, among other things, ‘a compact for mutual protection, and so by entering a political community and taking the path to citizenship status a person acquires the obligation to contribute to the community’s defence’. He (2008: 383), then, argues that host nations ‘should act towards immigrants on the basis that they are committed citizens until in the case of any particular individual there is clear evidence to the contrary’. Here, Miller does not delve into this critical issue in length; this rather brief account does neither say much beyond basic liberal position, nor the normative desirability and implications of dual citizenship regimes.

In a nutshell, from a practical aspect, liberal nationalists would not presumably have a huge problem insomuch as acquiring premium citizenship (e.g. immigrants gaining Western passports) could empower individuals through autonomy and choice. From an identity aspect, however, liberal nationalists seem either unenthusiastically affirmative or silent about it. Multiculturalism, however, is more flexible and accommodative towards dual citizenship (Dikici, 2021b), though largely under-stressed by multiculturalists.

Social scientists have long been inclined to study social phenomena within the national context, with a nation-state framework of thinking, which is now largely named methodological nationalism (Glick Schiller et al., 1995; Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004; Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002, 2003). Liberal nationalists and multiculturalists (except Triandafyllidou, 2020) omit transnationalism to a large extent and hence, suffer from methodological nationalism. That is, they take the national context as the sole unit of analysis and exclusively disregard cross-border reality.

In sum, dual citizenship has become an increasing practice, and is largely conceived at these levels: for immigrants and sending-states, it is an opportunity to obtain practical ends; and for the receiving countries, it is potentially facilitating dual (conflicting) loyalties, thereby, undesirable. It is this last category, that liberal and multicultural nationalists should provide a thorough account on, for example, whether dual citizenship inevitably or automatically leads to conflicting loyalties, undermining solidarity, feeding distrust and so forth. Indeed, insofar as dual citizenship has been an increasingly widespread practice among immigrant communities in the West, it needs to be located in the political philosophy of diversity, identity and integration; thus, its normative desirability and implications need to be addressed by those in pursuit of a pluralistic/inclusive/moderate form of nationalism.