Cultural sovereignty in the Balkans and Turkey: The politics of preservation and rehabilitation

Abstract

This article explores preservation and restoration projects in the Balkans and Turkey in light of current Turkish and American foreign policy initiatives. Of specific interest are the political goals of the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TİKA) and the United States Ambassadors Fund for Cultural Preservation. The focus on the rehabilitation of Islamic heritage in the Balkans by the Republic of Turkey illustrates a strategic decision to weave cultural heritage programs into foreign policy as part of a larger agenda to increase its presence (and thus influence) abroad, notably under the arc of former Ottoman territories. This targeted approach in the Balkans differs in critical ways from the rhetoric of the United States and their partners in Europe and Turkey, which promote idealized notions of diversity, pluralism, and tolerance through a mosaic of heritage projects (Islamic, Jewish, Christian, museum displays, archaeological research, etc.). The Ambassadors Fund projects are staged in moral terms as part of reconciliation and EU integration. These patterns demonstrate the ability of cultural heritage projects to affect symbolic geographies of power; in so doing, heritage programs continue to offer viable and successful platforms in shaping claims of cultural sovereignty beyond the boundaries of nation-states.

Keywords

Balkans cultural policy development heritage İzmir Sandžak sovereignty Turkey

Introduction

According to the Council of Europe and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage Centre, tangible heritage (e.g. buildings, parks, houses, museums, objects) and its conservation, preservation, and rehabilitation have the potential to foster stability and democracy by creating a sense of place and enhancing individual dignity, thereby improving the quality of life. Over the last decade, municipalities throughout the Balkans and Turkey have made concentrated efforts to revitalize historic sectors of villages, towns, and cities. The hope, for development agencies and government sectors funding the work, is that rehabilitated areas become spaces for contemporary, civic events. Such programs also, however, reflect strategies of power to enlist places of heritage as not only cultural brokers in-country, but also across landscapes in hope of bridging political borders, crossing social boundaries, and fostering economic networks. When heritage discourse and cultural policies intervene in living and collective memories, they often (re)define one’s sense of place and thus meddle in local politics in ways that disrupt (often drastically) everyday life (see Barthel, 1996; Herzfeld, 2009, 2010; Mitchell, 2002; Tunbridge and Ashworth, 1996). In regions where history offers particularly painful memories attached to religious association and/or programs of ethnic social and political engineering, preservation programs increasingly mirror cultural policies attached to their respective political constituencies. This situation is especially true in the Balkans and Turkey. As cultural policies evolve, there is increasingly strong evidence that the ‘chosen heritage’ emulates geographies of power.

JP Singh (2010: 9) writes, ‘cultural policies may still not be at the top of policy markers’ agendas, but the importance of their influence on international and national politics is undeniable’. The funding of archaeological and preservation projects represents an important part of cultural diplomacy (Luke and Kersel, 2012) and the geopolitical heritage landscape. The primary organization responsible for producing the global heritage map is the World Heritage Centre at UNESCO World Heritage, implementing the 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. Countries may submit dossiers for cultural and natural sites (and cultural landscapes) deemed to be of Outstanding Universal Value as defined by a set list of criteria. De Cesari (2010, 2011) has illustrated the Eurocentrism embedded in UNESCO’s World Heritage Centre footprint. More recently, Meskell (2012) has argued that priorities represent those of the respective World Heritage Committee members (i.e. their respective nation-states). With regard to Turkey, Atakuman (2010: 127) has illustrated the highly politicized nature of the process and concludes that nomination is tied to ‘thick history of national narratives conveyed through the nation-states’ self display of its heritage canon’. The recent scholarship and current patterns demonstrate that in order for places of heritage to be seen on the global stage, the host nation must first recognize them as worthy of global status. This type of political performance can be found in the recent patterns of UNESCO’s World Heritage Centre tentative lists for the BRIC-MIST group: Brazil, Russia, India, China, Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey. Turkey is among the most active, now with 41 sites on the tentative list (see below); the Ministry of Culture and Tourism will put additional dossiers forward for full status in 2013. In the Balkans there is a slow, but steady, focus on the World Heritage status. In all of the Balkan countries, as well as Turkey, international development plays a critical role in shaping the official and unofficial heritage landscape.

In recent years, much interest for restoration and documentation as part of development programs in southeastern Europe has come through the Council of Europe, European Commission, the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) Task Force on Culture and Society, the World Monuments Fund, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations Development Programme (MDG, UNDP) and the World Bank (among others). These are the large-scale funding engines. In addition, there are small-scale, yet highly effective, funding initiatives. In this article I explore the patterns and agendas of the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (hereafter, TİKA) and the US Ambassadors Fund for Cultural Preservation. TİKA began in 1992, yet only in the last decade has the agency begun to expand operations on a significant and global scale (Özkan and Demirtepe, 2012; Petrović and Reljić, 2011). It is part of the Republic of Turkey’s commitment to invest in development abroad and enhance its public image. Agency reports (found on TİKA’s website) and news outlets confirm that restoration of Islamic heritage in the Balkans is among the key platforms. The US Ambassadors Fund for Cultural Preservation was launched in winter 2001; the initiative was promoted as apolitical, with the intention of presenting the softer side of the United States abroad (Luke and Kersel, 2012: 98–127). While the annual awards of the Fund are modest (under $100,000), there are occasional large grants ($500,000 or more) and the sustained funding over the last decade, as reported in the annual reports (2001–2009) and award postings (2010 to present), reveals specific, long-term initiatives in the Balkans and Turkey.

Foreign policies and cultural heritage in the Balkans

The policy of the US Department of State in the Balkans hinges on efforts to solidify ‘peace and build stability and prosperity by deepening cooperation and advancing their integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions, including NATO and the EU’ (US Department of State, n.d.; emphasis added). Former US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton voiced great conviction during her November 2012 tour to the Balkans for Bosnia and Herzegovina to be members of European Union (EU). This follows many statements over the years by State Department officials, such as that made in 2002 by Douglas Ebner, then Public Affairs Officer in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the 2002–2003 Ambassadors Fund report:

The Sarajevo Haggadah is a vivid symbol of Sarajevo’s tolerant and multi-religious heritage. Preservation and public display of this cultural masterpiece in the Zemaljski Museum of Bosnia and Herzegovina both recognizes that heritage, and symbolizes the importance of religious freedom in fully integrating into the Euro-Atlantic community.

In this case it is not only the historical significance of the Sarajevo Haggadah, but its public display that complements contemporary US foreign policy.

The EU has long been seen as a beacon of hope for what the USA and the Council of Europe view as a fragmented, struggling region, even if such generalizations have been and continue to be contested (see Bakic-Hayden and Hayden, 1992; Donia and Fine, 1994; Hayden, 2002, 2012; Quandt, 2002). In the Preface of the 2009 Council of Europe publication, Heritage and Beyond, Robert Palmer, Director of Culture and Cultural and Natural Heritage for the Council of Europe, asks how project directors ensure ‘that heritage contributes to the social and cultural dynamics of the community’. His remarks follow the Council of Europe’s 2003 Regional Programme on Cultural and Natural Heritage in South East Europe, a program that seeks to harness regional cooperation and integration through preservation programs under the Integrated Rehabilitation Project Plan/Survey of the Architectural and Archaeological Heritage (IRPP/SAAH). A ‘Priority Intervention List’ has been posted for each country. Throughout the texts of the reports and the respective publications as well as visual cues (in photos and video), these initiatives operate within idealized notions of connectivity to a venerated European standard, as described in the 2010 National Geographic Traveler special issue (funded by USAID) and the 2012 Council of Europe clips, ‘Discovering the other’ and ‘So different, so similar, so European’. Finally, the Compendium of Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe (Council of Europe/ERICarts, n.d.) and the Introduction to Cultural Policy in Turkey (see Ada and İnce, 2009) speak to European protocols regarding best practices of preservation, archaeology, museum studies, and other types of cultural programming that foster connectivity and collaboration.

Stability in the Balkans has and continues to be of primary concern not only for the European Union and the United States, but also for the Republic of Turkey. Turkey has always been and remains a ‘strategic political’ partner to the EU and the USA, yet it is a non-EU member. The waxing and waning of Europe’s commitment to EU accession for Turkey has led to political tension, particularly entangled in recent years with Turkey’s growing prominence as a global economic and political power (see Derviş et al., 2004). The 2013 Turkish Foreign Ministry website states, ‘Turkish foreign policy is pursued by mobilizing many and complementary political, economic, humanitarian and cultural means and its sphere of interest has achieved a global scale’ (Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013). The Ministry will pursue ‘active diplomacy’ through ‘robust’ legitimacy. Commitments to ‘a humanistic foreign policy vision’ will be ‘pre-emptive’ and ‘[take] initiatives rather than merely watching them unfold’. One component of this work requires active participation in the development sector; TİKA is charged with implementing and coordinating programs abroad. Turkish-backed activities in all spheres – education, economy, security, and culture – exhibit the expanding web of Turkish commitments in the Balkans.

In 2005 Turkey co-sponsored (with Spain) the National Strategy of the Alliance of Civilizations. Aigner (2011: 5) summarizes (nestled in a footnote) the organization’s mission: ‘The initiative seeks to galvanize international action against extremism through the forging of international, intercultural and interreligious dialogue and cooperation. The Alliance places a particular emphasis on defusing tensions between the Western and Islamic worlds.’ In 2006 Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu further clarified the intended goal of Turkish policy in his remarks for the conference, ‘Ottoman Legacy and Balkan Muslim Communities Today’, as described by Petrović and Reljić (2011: 162): ‘Turkey would “reinvent” and “re-establish” this “golden age of the Balkans”.’ Among the most conspicuous footprints of Turkey in the Balkans is the heritagescape of Islamic monuments fully realized with support from TİKA.

Major changes to Turkish regulations have bolstered TİKA’s ability to participate in cultural heritage initiatives abroad. The Foundation Law of 2008 and expansion of the General Directorate of Pious Foundations, which oversees preservation of structures built during Ottoman rule, have resulted in increased resources and development-friendly policies (such as Renovate-Operate-Transfer) regarding the rehabilitation of such structures in and outside Turkey (see Pulhan, 2009). The current strategic plan for 2010–2014 of the Directorate of Pious Foundations (2009) includes an emphasis on Ottoman-period structures outside Turkey, a policy endorsed by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Among the most recent commitments of the Prime Minister is restoration of the ‘sacred Ottoman porches’ in Mecca, as reported in the Hürriyet (17 February 2013). In March 2013, TİKA and the Foreign Ministry underwrote the ‘International Conference on Great Silk Road Diplomacy: From History to the Future’, held in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan. This focus follows the Pax Ottomana (Ottoman Peace) policy of the Republic of Turkey as endorsed by Davutoğlu, which seeks to balance a multi-vocal past within current political agendas aimed at fluid cultural boundaries.

There is no question that Islamic heritage in the Balkans attests to the cosmopolitanism of the Ottoman period (Kiel, 1990; Merdjanova, 2013; Stubbs and Makaš, 2011). However the current restoration projects demonstrate targeted patronage indicative of Turkish interests and thus the leveraging of cultural capital for strategic political goals. The recent trail of money makes the case: in 2012 the Pious Foundation directed unprecedented resources (over US $50 million) to restoration efforts for Islamic heritage in the Balkans (see also essays in Kurtoǧlu, 2012). Despite the many Islamic cultural monuments and landscapes in the region none are listed as fully inscribed World Heritage Sites in Greece, Macedonia, Bulgaria, or Montenegro. There is one in Serbia, the Historical Place of Bač and its Surroundings, inscribed in 2010 on the tentative list; but the Islamic heritage is only one lens in a mosaic of cultural history. The exceptions are the Mehmed Pasha Sokolović Bridge in Višegrad and the Old Bridge Area of the Old City of Mostar in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) – the only fully inscribed sites in the country. The nomination dossiers for these projects to UNESCO World Heritage, as posted on the respective inscription pages of the World Heritage Centre, illustrate an international effort (with specific mention of Turkish involvement) and present a hopeful view of the future. The result, however, has not yielded the positive, holistic response that heritage practitioners had anticipated.

Today, a replica of the historic Mostar bridge connects the Bosnian-Muslim East with the Bosnian-Croat West. The Old Bridge stood for 427 years; it fell on 9 November 1993 during the Bosnian-Croat conflict. The World Heritage Status of the Old Bridge was conferred in 2005 and has come to symbolize as much a commitment to architectural styles as a political move on the part of the international community to garner support for the Muslim community. With funding from the World Bank ‘The Project Coordination Unit’ (Croatia, Italy, Netherlands, and Turkey), the replica of the Old Bridge was put into place. According to Armakolas (2012), prior to the war the bridge served as ‘the pride of Mostarians’, and an icon for Yugoslavia, yet it was not politicized. The reconstruction, he argues, has promoted ‘symbolic competition of group identity’ and continued conflict in peacetime, now waged through cultural heritage reconstruction associated with ethnic territories in cities and across landscapes. The process of engagement in the historical and/or created contemporary narratives further confronts the communities of the city (see Krishnamurthy, 2012).

The ‘My Bosnia and Herzegovina – My heritage’ project found support from the Council of Europe and the US Ambassadors Fund. In the 2010 Millennium Development Goal (MDG) Impact Assessment for BiH we learn that this project focuses on ‘raise[ing] children’s awareness of the importance of the country’s heritage in the building of a European and world identity with regard to diversity… [and promoting] sites for inscription on the [UNESCO] World Heritage List’ (Council of Europe, 2010). Historic towns that receive call-out in this report are Jajce, Blagaj, and Stolac – all currently on the UNESCO tentative list for BiH and all areas embedded in projects by the United States Ambassadors Fund for Cultural Preservation USAID, UNDP MDG, and/or the European Commission and Council of Europe programs. The point organization for the majority of these projects, and many others, was the BiH Commission to Preserve National Monuments. The EU seal of approval to this organization came with the 2010 European Heritage Award, given by the European Commission and Europa Nostra, for ‘dedicated service’. Europa Nostra’s pledge (as described in their mission statement) to a pan-European commitment to safeguard natural and cultural heritage firmly positions the politics of the award.

Initiatives by the Turkish General Directorate of Pious Foundations (2013) and TİKA, in contrast, target areas that many would consider non-European heritage: Islamic monuments and cultural landscapes. The policy represents not only a concentrated focus on Islamic heritage in the Balkans, but also the general sentiment by the Turkish Republic of regional unification, rather than separate nation-states (Petrović, 2011). The presence of TİKA amongst the political jockeying of UNESCO World Heritage inscriptions, the Council of Europe, and the Ambassadors Fund heritage projects is clear in the region of Sandžak (Figure 1), a former Ottoman province (the Sanjak of Novi Pazar) that today sits at the southern border of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the northern borders of Albania and Kosovo and covers large areas of northern Montenegro and southwestern Serbia (see Duda, 2011). In the north, the restoration of the Old Mosque in Pljevlja (in Montenegro; Figure 2) came with support from the Council of Europe, the US Ambassadors Fund (2007–2008), and TİKA, among others (Luke and Kersel, 2012: 117–126). The importance of cultural heritage in the area of Novi Pazar (the largest city in Sandžak) is summarized in the 2004 European Commission IRPP/SAAH report. We learn of ‘multinational and multiconfessional, important orthodox and Muslim sacral and profane buildings’ (European Commission, 2004: 90) that imbue the city with historic depth and a mosaic of communities. According to the UNESCO World Heritage listing for the area, ‘[t]he monastery at Sopoćani is a reminder of the contacts between Western civilization and the Byzantine world’, and the region surrounding Stari Ras represents a place that at one time represented ‘an important crossroads, influenced by its contacts with both Eastern and Western influences’. The 2008 US Ambassadors Fund project focused on wall paintings at the Studenica Monastery followed the Fund’s 2006 support for the Altun Alem Mekteb sixteenth-century complex (school) in Novi Pazar. In the Fund’s 2006–2007 annual report, the complex is celebrated as the oldest examples of Islamic architecture in this area, including a call-out to Ottoman architect Müslihüdin Abdülgani. Yet, nowhere in this report, or any of the others between 2001 and 2009, do we find explicit mention of the wider US agenda or the role of the USA in setting cultural policy for the region; for this type of analysis we need to dig a bit deeper and explore parallel development initiatives.

Figure 1.

Map showing the area of Sandzak. Prepared by Emmanuel Moss, Program in Global Studies, Brandeis University.

Figure 2.

Shadrvan (Fountain) of the Old Mosque in Pljevlja (Husein-paša Mosque). Photograph by author, October 2008.

The concentration of US and European support for cultural heritage rehabilitation projects in Sandžak complements larger-scale development initiatives launched by USAID to assist with a variety of programs, including tourism (Travers, 2012; USAID, 2006, 2007). The 2006 USAID report prepared by the Emerging Markets Group refers to the cultural heritage of the region (‘mosques, churches, cloisters and monasteries, castles, etc.’) and the ‘austere naturalness of the Balkans’ as an ‘interesting mixture’. More recently USAID Serbia has supported a media series, Riznica. The convergence of ethnically diverse heritage landscapes creates a sense of inclusivity and bolsters the project’s credibility: ‘eight shows which use cultural-historical sites, including the oldest Serbian Orthodox monasteries and historically important Islamic mosques located in southwest Serbia, to highlight traditions’ (USAID Serbia, 2011). The reports themselves are the hard evidence for the calculated nature of the program. While the Serbian Orthodox heritage is described as the ‘oldest’ (and thus more firmly rooted in this place), the Islamic heritage is given a favorable nod as ‘important’. The encompassing irony is that the revitalized built heritage creates a visual display on the urban and rural landscapes that supports the sanctioned narrative of multi-ethnic tolerance, when, in fact, tensions run high among ethnic and religious communities. To believe that by creating a contemporary multi-ethnic cultural landscape through rehabilitating the very structures that served to embolden cultural and ethnic ideological disputes and land claims (and conflicts) in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries reflects the grave naivety of US and EU cultural policies.

TİKA’s approach to enliven the historic Islamic landscape to leverage their cultural capital is far less subtle. Their philanthropic activities include the rehabilitation of mosques in Maglaj, Bugoyno, Mostar, and Tesan in BiH as well as a much wider, regional initiative; these projects showcase the display of the Islamic past throughout the Balkans. From newspaper reports, in footnotes and appendices of the Millennium Development projects and UNESCO World Heritage activities, we find TİKA projects focused on Islamic heritage in Kosovo, Albania, Serbia, and Montenegro. As discussed above, with the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Islamic heritage in these countries has limited representation by UNESCO World Heritage (full or tentative status); yet it is not necessarily because the World Heritage Centre does not value Islamic and Ottoman-period heritage per se. On the contrary, the fully inscribed World Heritage Sites in Turkey of the City of Safranbolu, Great Mosque and Hospital of Divriğı, and the Selimiye Mosque and its Social Complex, and the tentatively listed sites in Birgi, Bursa, Diyarbakir, and Mardin, as well as the fully inscribed Historic Centres of Berat and Gjirokastra in Albania and the tentatively listed Historic Urban Site of Počitelj in Bosnia and Herzegovina, all point to the politics of nominations (i.e. as prepared and submitted by the respective nation-state) linked to the Ottoman past.

In sum, there is an active, strategic Turkish cultural policy to endorse preservation of Islamic heritage in the Balkans. On the one hand, the funding of Islamic monuments and places calls attention to the minority Muslim communities and their contested political and social situation in the region; on the other hand, the support from TİKA offers clear evidence, according to Turkish agendas and politicians, that Turkey is now a fully ‘developed’ nation, and thus willing and able to provide assistance to less developed countries. The blatant focus on Islamic heritage in the Balkans by the Republic illustrates a strategic decision to weave restoration programs into foreign policy as part of a larger agenda to increase its presence (and thus influence) abroad, notably under the arc of former Ottoman territories. This targeted approach in the Balkans differs in strategic ways from the actions of the United States and their partners in Europe: we find endorsement of US and EU cultural policies and development programs under the rhetoric of diversity, pluralism, and tolerance; accordingly, the restoration and presentation of heritage (Islamic, Jewish, Christian, museum displays, archaeological research, etc.) should reflect this mosaic of history in moral terms and thus move towards reconciliation and EU integration. A similar guise (diversity/ plurality/ tolerance) justifies US (governmental agencies and US-based organizations) and European support of Jewish and Armenian heritage in Turkey.

Cultural policies and cultural heritage in Turkey

In 2009 Ömer Taşpınar wrote, ‘Turkey often falls between the cracks in the European versus Middle East bureaucratic division of the [United States] State Department and the Pentagon. The result is a crucial ally of the United States that is consistently neglected’ (2009: 14). In the 2012 report, US–Turkey Relations: A New Partnership, the US Council on Foreign Relations had refined their view:

Given the emerging changes in the international order, especially the political dynamism in the Arab world, a new partnership is needed between the United States and Turkey, given their shared interests in Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus, the eastern Mediterranean, and Central Asia.

In this same year, the international community gave Turkey a nod for their potential contribution in stabilizing the crumbling EU economy. While cultural heritage may not be the feature that makes national headlines, it constitutes part of the long-term foreign policies that the USA and the EU would like to see promoted in both the Balkans and Turkey. In this way, it is an important vehicle through which to reframe history and soften the realities of the past under newly constituted political and social engineering.

The Republic’s 2023 tourism strategy (Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2007) focuses on faith-based routes, as promoted by the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism and reflected on the recent nominations to the World Heritage List. As of April 2013, Turkey has 11 fully inscribed sites (nine cultural and two mixed) and 41 tentatively listed sites, which include areas linked to the Bronze Age, Hellenistic, Roman, and Selcuk periods, as well as those associated with Alevi and Armenian heritage. In addition, there is increased attention on Islamic monuments for political purposes, contrary to the earlier focus on the deep past (Atakuman, 2010; Tanyeri-Erdemir, 2006). I now explore how external sources provided the catalyst for sustained support for rehabilitation and stabilization of Armenian and Jewish cultural landscapes.

Armenian heritage

The historic center of Ani represents not only a contemporary gateway to the east but also among the most important cultural centers for Armenian history. The initiatives here have been on promoting cross-boundary programs between Turkey and Armenia. Among the key priorities is reconciliation. Two major players in this sphere are the World Monuments Fund and the United Nations Development Programme. In 1996 the World Monuments Fund launched its watch list for cultural heritage sites in critical condition. Ani was among the sites listed. The 2004 launch of VirtualANI has brought the history of this site to the global community. Since this point a number of programs have followed, including the 2008–2012 ($3.8 million) Spanish-led UN Millennium Development project, Alliances for Culture Tourism.¹ According to the program’s mission, cultural tourism will promote ‘social cohesion’ and ‘pluralism’ by encouraging ‘a dialogue of cultures’. Among the visions for the program is ‘the establishment of a culture of peace in Eastern Anatolia and with peoples of neighboring countries’. Further signs of development are found in Ani’s connection to the Republic’s ‘Brand City’ program.

In 2010 the Ambassadors Fund for Cultural Preservation stepped in with $625,000 to support the restoration work at Ani. Also in 2010, the incoming US Ambassador to Turkey, Francis J. Ricciardone, stated, ‘we will support programs that build understanding between Turks and Armenians’. This policy parallels the 2010 dialogue between President Obama and then US Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, regarding US policy and Turkish–Armenian relations. In 2012 we see the first recognition of Armenian heritage on the UNESCO World Heritage tentative list. Thus, the World Monuments Fund, the Millennium Development projects, and the US Ambassadors Fund (among others) have all contributed to in-country development, the virtual presence of Ani, and the global awareness of Turkish–Armenian relations. These efforts are matched by increased recognition by the Republic of Turkey regarding the repatriation and rehabilitation of Armenian property (e.g. Church of the Holy Cross on Akdamar Island, Van; and the Armenian Surp Haç Tıbrevank Foundation in the Üsküdar district of Istanbul). Turkey showcases these projects as evidence of in-country tolerance and pluralism, yet these ‘results’ reflect an idealized narrative and generalize the complexities associated with Armenian–Turkish relations. Reconciliation between living communities is a far more complex reality.

Jewish heritage

To date, a site dedicated solely to Jewish importance is not on the full or tentative World Heritage UNESCO list for Turkey or anywhere in the Balkans, despite the very rich Jewish history in the region from the fifteenth through to the early twentieth centuries (Dumont, 1982; Epstein, 1980; Levy, 2002) as well as in antiquity (Ascough, 2005; Bonz, 1990, 1993). The 15 April 2013 listing of The Ancient City of Sardis and the Lydian Tumuli of Bin Tepe includes a nod to the synagogue (discovered, excavated, and restored in the 1960s) as well as the other highlights at Sardis. Yet this call-out to Jewish heritage is certainly not the primary feature of the listing. Two organizations focused on the cultural significance of Jewish landscapes in Turkey are the World Monuments Fund and the European Association for the Preservation and Promotion of Jewish Culture and Heritage (a Council of Europe program). The European Routes of Jewish Heritage focuses on the built heritage (such as synagogues and cemeteries) that has, according to the program’s website, ‘been left to us by the Jewish communities across Europe’. The program hopes to ‘tackle the wider issues of Judaism, Jewish culture and Jewish traditions… to make the Jewish sites more visible… [and] the cults in Judaism more apparent, transparent and accessible to European citizens’. These routes are part of an in- depth exploration of the theme of cultural diversity and [more specifically] the recognition of ‘the Other’. The multi-country visual exhibition will focus on in-situ remains and parallels the Heritage Tourism and Nostalgia Trade agenda of USAID’s ‘Diasporas and Development Policy Project’ (Newland and Taylor, 2010). The juxtaposition of ‘us’ and ‘them’ by the Routes project and the focus on transnational communities in the USAID report make clear that contemporary, resident Jewish communities are not a critical aspect of either program. Marcy Brink-Danan (2010) has documented the political platforms for both the Istanbul Jewish community and the Republic of Turkey in proclaiming ‘Jewish’ diversity (see also Mills, 2010). The following paragraphs explore briefly the social context of Jewish heritage projects in Edirne and İzmir.

As the former Ottoman capital, as well as a key entry point into modern Turkey, support for heritage projects has poured into Edirne from the EU, the European Commission, and the Council of Europe. The 2004 Council of Europe’s Europe Museum Award for the Sultan Beyazıd II Health Museum, the rehabilitation of the Ekmekçizade Ahmet Paşa Kervansarayı, and the 2011 World Heritage Inscription of the Selimiye Complex illustrate a commitment to Islamic heritage. Yet programs focused on other histories, too, receive support. These projects, according to local communities, celebrate Edirne’s ‘cosmopolitan past’. As I toured rehabilitation projects in what the current owners (all self-identified as Muslim Turks) referred to as ‘Armenian’ or ‘Greek’ houses, I listened to stories of the Armenian and Greek doctors, merchants, and schoolteachers who once lived in these houses. People described the current policies in place regarding rehabilitation work (e.g. preservation of wallpaper, woodwork, windows) as necessary in order to preserve the ‘soul of the house’. I was told that the cultural heritage of Edirne’s past represents ‘all things European and Turkish – not either or’. Yet, when asked if kin of the respective Armenian and Greek communities might return and lay claim to their ancestral heritage, people were quick to respond, ‘they are gone; they don’t live here any more’. This example demonstrates that ancestry pervades historical narratives only under certain conditions and agendas. In addition to Greek and Armenian houses, rehabilitation of the Great/Big Synagogue in Edirne (Figure 3) has begun. Abutters look forward to having a restored ‘place with Jewish history’ in the neighborhood for tourists. Their statements demonstrate the layers of complexity: it is not their heritage, it is Jewish heritage, and ‘the Jews are gone’ (i.e. from Edirne). The remains of synagogues present opportunities for economic development, yet developers and those pushing such agendas (i.e. the EU and the USA) must balance commercialization of cultural heritage in Edirne that lacks an integrated association with the very communities (Greek, Armenian, Jewish) that built and identified with these spaces. We find a similar situation in İzmir, yet with an added layer of complexity associated with urban renewal.

Figure 3.

Great/Big Synagogue in Edirne, Turkey. Photograph by author, April 2011.

The World Monuments Fund and the Ambassadors Fund set the stage for a concentrated effort to recognize the Jewish heritage of İzmir with the launch of the World Monuments Fund 2004 Central İzmir Synagogues Program, the funding for rehabilitation of the Shalom Synagogue, and the 2010 Ambassadors Fund award to the Ets Hayim Synagogue (Figure 4). Current population estimates of Jews in the city are approximately 1200, and, as of summer 2012, the majority of the Jewish population was in residence only during the winter months. All reports are that this community (like the Levantine community) is essentially endangered. Members of the Jewish community describe current policies as ‘less than tolerant’ and constrained by the current ‘religious Turkish government’. Yet, the rhetoric of outside support focuses on tolerance and collaboration in İzmir, as exemplified in this statement posted on the website of the World Monuments Fund (2004):

Hidden behind walls and gardens, along the alleyways of the colorful historic bazaar, the Central Izmir Synagogues are an unparalleled testament to the city’s rich Jewish heritage. The oldest district in Izmir, Kemeralti dates back to Roman times and is home to the densest concentration of Jewish landmarks in all of Turkey. The six mosques surrounding the synagogue complex evince the centuries of peaceful co-habitation among the local Ottoman and Jewish communities. The Izmir Project, led by the Mordechai Kiryati Foundation, has been working closely with the local municipality and Jewish community to restore the seven extant synagogues of the Central Izmir Complex.

Figure 4.

Street of Hevra and Ets Hayim synagogues in İzmir, Turkey. Note the disrepair of the Hevra Synagogue (the roof is completely gone). Photograph by author, June 2012.

The majority of the remaining synagogues in the (old) Jewish quarter in İzmir are in dire condition; rehabilitation efforts have only been able to focus on a select few, largely dictated by their present condition (i.e. which buildings can be salvaged). Jak Kaya (2010), President of İzmir Jewish Community, described failure to protect this heritage as ‘a tragedy’. Access, regardless of condition, is difficult at best. In summer 2012 armed guards stood in front of the Shalom Synagogue as crowds of shoppers en route to the covered bazaar hurried past. The only indication of the Shalom Synagogue was a small sign and well-kept exterior door. Recognition of the World Monuments Fund project is found only after one has passed by the guards, through the exterior door and the interior courtyard and then another locked door into an intimate exhibition space. A similar lack of recognition is found at the Ets Hayim Synagogue several blocks over – nothing indicates the support of the 2010 US Ambassadors Fund project (yet compare the large sign in front of the Mosque in Pljevlja, Montenegro, that recognizes the role of the US Ambassadors Fund for Cultural Preservation; and the nearby [İzmir] Konak Salepçioğlu Mosque boosting collaboration between the municipality, the chamber of commerce, and the firm doing the restoration work). According to officials and the respective organizations (i.e. World Monuments Fund and the Ambassadors Fund), posted recognition of support is at the discretion of the partnering organizations and local communities.

The juxtaposition of hidden heritage in a city once known for its ‘co-habitation’ of multiple ethnic and religious groups is made more explicit in the remarks posted by the US Department of State on the US Embassy in Turkey (2011) website regarding Ambassador Ricciardone’s visit in late October 2011 to the Ets Hayim Synagogue:

Ambassador Ricciardone, who was accompanied by Konak Mayor Dr Hakan Tartan and İzmir Sephardic Cultural Heritage Association representatives, said such initiatives were important to show the entire world Turkey’s 500-year history of tolerance and for the co-existence of different beliefs, cultures and languages.

Similar sentiments were invoked in the materials accompanying the project proposal. Prof. Dr Eti Akyüz Levi, Dokuz Eylül University, Head of Department of Architecture, supported the project as ‘a reflection of multiculturalism’ that is important ‘to future generations’ and ‘essential for the continuity in the collective memory of the city and the sustainability of cultural diversity’ (2010).

Yet, when walking through the Jewish area and talking with prominent members of the current residential population on multiple occasions during the 2010–2011 academic year and during follow-up visits in summer 2012, I heard nothing of cultural diversity. I learned about US Ambassador Ricciardone’s visits as instrumental in promoting awareness of dilapidated places that were Jewish. I heard also that Jews did not live here any more. Local residents (i.e. the non-Jewish residents who live in the neighborhood) have never been inside the synagogues. Shopkeepers and others told me that ‘the Jews from Alsancak only come on Saturday’. A few key people associated with ‘the Jews from Alsancak’ were referred to (by first name only) as those ‘who give tours [to groups of tourists], who know, who have keys’. The real ‘value’ of this district for local residents, then, is purely economic, and according to locals, the US Ambassador’s visits are the primary reason that the municipality took notice of potential monetary return to be gained from rehabilitation. This perspective is corroborated by İzmir Mayor, Hakan Tartan’s 2010 letter of support to the US Ambassadors Fund application: ‘While using the structures for the purpose of museum and culture is important in terms of “city culture,” it has importance for increasing the touristic and economic activities for employees in tourism sector.’

The rehabilitation of historic spaces in İzmir took on new vigor in fall 2010 and spring 2011 when the large-scale systematic removal of residential populations and demolition of their homes from the slopes of Kadifekale for the rehabilitation of the castle and a ‘green space’ began, part of the Konak Urban Renewal project. As documented by journalist Alexander Christie-Miller on his website Turkey Etcetera and the scholarship of Saraçoğlu (2010), the community, largely Kurdish, resettled from the east in the mid-twentieth century. The demolition from September 2010 to August 2012 resulted in an almost complete transformation of tight, closely spaced homes and communities along the very steep streets to large tracks of bulldozed land (dirt and rubble) with trees planted in neat lines and park benches placed so that viewers overlook the city below and beyond to the Aegean.

Among the long-term proposals is a tourist route that will connect the castle with the Roman Agora and the historic market of Kemeraltı, the Jewish Synagogues nestled in between. As regards the Jewish quarter, Mayor Tartan (2010) writes:

Protection of the historical and cultural inherit of Jewish’s in Turkey will promote the tolerant and pluralism all over Turkey and İzmir will serve as an example among other cities. In this context, in the multi-cultural dialogue centre in which there is also museum, works and conferences of the Turk and foreign academician and researchers will be allowed.

The irony is rich: the destruction of the ‘gecekondu’ (shanty town) of ‘little Mardin’ was done under official cultural policy aimed at rehabilitation that includes an area (i.e. the Jewish quarter) that no longer has a sustainable residential population and the current residents have little (if any) understanding of Jewish history. On the contrary, access is limited and distrust pervades the İzmir-based Jewish community, even as their ancestral heritage is elevated on the development map, and other communities, with much larger and vibrant populations, are cast aside.

Discussion

As rehabilitation projects move forward and international organizations continue to ramp-up funding for cultural heritage, issues of access and respect will not necessarily fade. The past is never completely divorced from the human condition or politics. The contradictions and abuse of political power to garner support for some, yet not other, preservation projects display the politics behind the blatant, strategic use of heritage in promoting specific histories. Programs endorsed by the EU and the USA through their large-scale development arms (USAID and UNDP) aimed at Islamic heritage in the Balkans and Jewish and Armenian heritage in Turkey are pursued under the rhetoric of ‘tolerance’, despite years of oppression and political engineering that have led to the demographic decline of the respective communities and the policies that have, over the years, endorsed neglect of the respective neighborhoods. Yet today, these areas are branded as ‘cultural heritage’ and receive increasing recognition and monetary support from high-profile individuals and organizations, including the US Ambassadors Fund for Cultural Preservation. This pattern points to the strategic use of heritage funding to foster awareness of contested places of heritage and their associated cultural (and urban) historic landscapes in countries that may not recognize let alone fund restoration of such places. In the Balkans, the Republic of Turkey, through TİKA, endorses a highly targeted initiative to rehabilitate Islamic monuments. How much support, if any, these initiatives bring to the local communities is a subject of ongoing and future research. What is clear at this time is that cultural heritage represents an increasingly politicized medium. Tacit agreement to allow for the rehabilitation of spaces associated with contested histories provides opportunities for stakeholder groups to leverage cultural capital that endorses specific agendas that are in line with their respective foreign policies (e.g. TİKA support of Islamic heritage in the Balkans and US and EU support for Armenian and Jewish heritage in Turkey). In these ways, heritage programs are increasingly inseparable from the historical legacies and contemporary ambitions of their sponsors.

Footnotes

Funding

Much of the field research in Turkey was conducted in 2010–2011, when I received a fellowship from the American Research Institute in Turkey/National Endowment for the Humanities (ARIT-NEH).

Declaration of conflicting interest

The author declares that there is no conflict of interest.

Acknowledgements

The research presented in this article is part of a larger project focused on cultural policies and sovereignty in western Turkey and the Balkans. Students in my Spring 2012 ‘Cultural Heritage and Diplomacy’ course at Boston University offered feedback on earlier versions of this manuscript, especially Casey McNeil and Kate Machet. Colleagues Lorenc Bejko, Brian Daniels, Deborah Durham, Morag Kersel, Emanuel Moss, James Pasto and Elenita Roshi provided valuable feedback on earlier drafts of the manuscript. My discussions with Tuğba Tanyeri-Erdemir regarding the Pious Foundations, too, were invaluable, as were my discussions with the Manisa and İzmir branches. I am grateful also to the anonymous reviewers. Much of the field research in Turkey was conducted in 2010–2011, when I received a fellowship from the American Research Institute in Turkey/National Endowment for the Humanities (ARIT-NEH).

Note

Author Biography

Christina Luke is a Senior Lecturer in the Writing Program at Boston University. One aspect of her current research explores cultural policies in the Balkans and Turkey as part of large-scale development programs. Her recent publications include (with Morag Kersel) US Cultural Diplomacy and Archaeology: Hard Power, Soft Heritage (Routledge, 2013).

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