The problem of equal moral status

One of the central puzzles of contemporary moral and political philosophy is that while most of us believe that all or almost all human beings enjoy the same moral status, human beings possess the capacities that supposedly ground moral status to very unequal levels. ¹ The puzzle is induced by the fact that we also tend to believe that differences in the status-grounding capacities are at least sometimes relevant for moral status attribution. This is why less rational ² nonhuman animals and severely cognitively impaired humans are often thought to have lower status. ³ A full statement of the puzzle may be formulated as follows:

Moral status is grounded in the possession of rational capacities.

My main goal here is to develop a novel strategy to vindicate the idea of moral equality against this challenge. My central argument is this. The difficulty just summarized emerges only if one accepts an unstated further premise about value and the proper response to value. The premise, which I will call the Response Co-variation Thesis, or Co-variation Thesis for short, can be invoked to support the view that differences in the status-grounding capacities always provide reasons for granting different status. Accepting the Thesis constrains the argumentative space of possible justifications of the idea of equal moral status. I will argue that despite its intuitive appeal, the Co-variation Thesis is not plausible as a general view about value and the proper way of responding to it. In particular, I will propose an account of the proper manner of valuing rationality and rational beings that shows that the Co-variation Thesis is not plausible in this context. Finally, I will argue that this conception of valuing rational beings can be enlisted in support of a distinctive version of the so-called threshold approach to justifying equal moral status.

The defense of equal moral status I develop involves a reorientation of our perspective. The Co-variation Thesis proposes a formal analysis between properties and the proper response to their bearers. The analysis is formal in that it does not explore the content of the responses warranted by different valuable properties but asserts the co-variation simply on grounds of consistency. For instance, in describing the puzzle, Christiano writes that “[i]f we value the capacity then we must value the greater capacity even more,” simply assuming the intuitive force of the inference without regard to what valuing a capacity in particular instances may amount to, in substantive terms (Christiano 2015, 56). ⁵ The reorientation urged here involves exploring the content of the proper response to the value of rationality, i.e. the proper manner of valuing rational beings. It urges us to notice that there is no reason, in advance of such an exploration, to assume that the Co-variation thesis should be accepted, or that it should be rejected, for that matter. The rejection of the Co-variation Thesis falls out of this substantive analysis: it is shown that the proper response to the value of rational beings, at least in some crucial dimensions, does not plausibly vary with every variation in their rationality. It attempts to show that an appreciation of the value of rationality and its bearers itself reveals that the proper response to rational beings is not (or not always) sensitive to their level of rationality.

I will proceed as follows. Section 1 introduces the Co-variation thesis and shows how it limits our understanding of the available defenses of equal moral status. In Section 2, I discuss the most prominent strategy in the current literature to diffuse the challenge, the strategy that relies on the idea of a threshold. In the same section I raise a doubt about the most detailed elaboration of the threshold approach, developed by Ian Carter. The discussion in this section does not serve an exclusively critical aim; it also helps to motivate a different way of vindicating the threshold approach. Sections 3 and 4 explore a novel way of defending the threshold approach. Section 3 provides reasons for doubting the correctness of the Co-variation Thesis as a general view about value through various examples. Section 4 invokes an understanding of the value of rationality and of the proper manner of valuing rational beings and shows how it lends support to a version of the threshold approach. Section 5 discusses contexts where variations in rationality (or its successful exercises) can constitute reasons for differential response.

To clarify the scope of the discussion, I note that I am not focusing on human beings with significant cognitive impairments. My concern is variation within the normal range, or normal variation. ⁶ Within that range, there are still significant differences between individuals’ rational capacities and yet the common view holds that these differences do not affect moral status. Another scope restriction is that the paper focuses on capacity-based views of moral status only. I will not discuss membership-based, relationship-based or potentiality-based views here. I believe they all suffer from serious flaws, but I cannot defend this claim here. ⁷

1. The response co-variation thesis

I begin by noting that the “tense quad” introduced in the previous section does not generate the puzzle automatically. The difficulty emerges only if one accepts a further, theoretical claim, which is usually unstated but implicitly assumed in current discussions of the problem. The thesis may be reconstructed as follows:

Response Co-variation Thesis: if there is a valuable property P, such that its presence constitutes a reason for a certain kind of response R towards its bearers, then every variation in the degree of P necessarily constitutes a reason for a corresponding variation in R. ⁸

The co-variation need not be linear for the difficulty to arise. It is sufficient that every variation in P necessarily provides some reason for some corresponding variation in R. ⁹ It is also consistent with the possibility that sometimes the reasons for differential response putatively constituted by different degrees of P are outweighed or otherwise defeated (e.g. excluded) by other considerations. But if the Co-variation Thesis is correct, then there is always some reason to attribute different moral status to beings that possess different levels of rationality. This does not by itself rule out the possibility of justifying the equal moral status of differentially rational beings. Yet it severely limits the argumentative space of available strategies. If the Thesis is correct, then equal moral status is defensible only through one of three avenues. First, one may try to identify a binary property as status-grounding. ¹⁰ Second, one may hope to find a scalar property of the right kind that just happens to be possessed to an equal degree by all humans. I am not aware of anyone pursuing this approach. The third avenue is to identify an independent set of reasons that normally defeat the reasons constituted by the variations in P for variations in R. As I just noted, acceptance of the Thesis does not rule out the possibility of defending the equal moral status of differentially rational beings, because the reasons provided by variations in P for variations in R need not be normally decisive. But accepting the Thesis does imply that the equal moral status of differentially rational beings can be vindicated only if certain further considerations are identified that normally defeat the reasons for granting them unequal status. The search for such further considerations constitutes the basis of the most developed version of the threshold approach, which will be the subject of the next section. I will argue that despite its promise, it is unsatisfactory. Then, I will argue in Sections 3 that the Co-variation Thesis should be rejected. This opens the logical space for an alternative account of the relation between the valued property P and the response R that it makes appropriate, which in turn provides the basis of my favored version of the threshold approach.

2. The threshold approach

The threshold approach holds that there is some threshold on the scale of rationality, such that differences across the threshold are relevant for moral status attribution, but differences above the threshold do not matter from the point of view of status. Proponents of the view sometimes explain it after Rawls (1999, 444) with reference to the notion of a “range property”, suggesting that the property of personhood supervenes on scalar properties but only above some threshold. A range property is like being inside the perimeter of a circle. Those within the range are equally within the range, no matter how close they are to the perimeter.

The idea of a threshold is a formal one. In order to vindicate it, one must provide substantive arguments as to why differences of rationality above the threshold do not matter even though they are relevant below the threshold (Carter 2011, 549). Such arguments may come in two kinds. First, they may hold that although there are reasons for attributing different status to differentially rational beings above the threshold, there are other reasons that defeat reasons of the first kind. Second, they may hold that degrees of rationality above the threshold do not provide any reason for attributing different status. They just are irrelevant. On the first approach, there are some important grounds for evaluative abstinence (Carter 2011, 550) regarding differences in the status-grounding capacities above the threshold. There are two independent sources of reasons regarding status that pull in different directions. By contrast, on the second approach there are no two sets of reasons pulling in opposite directions: the same considerations that are called upon to explain the significance of rationality for moral status in the first place are also meant to show that differences in rationality do not make a difference for moral status above the threshold. The difference between the two approaches may seem subtle, but it is in fact quite significant. The first approach puts the burden of proof on the defender of equal moral status to produce special considerations showing that the reasons for differential status are in fact defeated. The second approach creates no such burden, because it denies that there are reasons of that kind. I will argue in favor of the second approach below. But first I briefly examine Ian Carter's account, which is perhaps the most elaborate version of the first one. ¹¹

Carter's account relies on an analysis of the attitude fitting towards rational agents given the importance of what he calls “outward dignity”. Outward dignity is an empirical and variable property that may be undermined in various ways. One way to undermine an agent's outward dignity is to expose her to certain kinds of appraisal or scrutiny by others (Carter 2011, 555). In particular, an appraisal of the very capacities that make her an agent can undermine outward dignity (Carter 2011, 558). Agents have a strong claim to be able to preserve their outward dignity, and at least in some contexts this claim is weighty enough to defeat whatever reasons we may have for appraising their agential capacities. Therefore, the attitude fitting towards persons is “opacity respect”, which requires us to treat agents as though they were “opaque” and to refrain from assessing the degree to which they possess the capacities that make them agents (Carter 2011, 557-558). ¹² It involves a kind of evaluative abstinence: it instructs us to refrain from treating certain considerations as reasons for actions and attitudes that would normally constitute such reasons. Opacity respect, which is the fitting response towards beings capable of outward dignity can purportedly explain why we should disregard inequalities in the properties that ground moral status exactly because it requires us not to scrutinize differences in those properties.

I will not engage with Carter's analysis of outward dignity and opacity respect in detail. I will just note that one natural way to construe opacity respect and the claims of evaluative abstinence is as holding that two distinct sets of reasons apply to our response to rational agents. On the one hand, differences in rationality constitute reasons to respond differently to their bearers. On the other hand, the concern with outward dignity constitutes reasons for disregarding reasons of the first kind. Therefore, the success of this strategy depends on whether the reasons provided by the concern with outward dignity are normally decisive. However, I will not be concerned with whether opacity respect can meet this burden, because I will argue that the resulting picture would still not fully match our considered judgments regarding moral equality even if it did.

The strategy of evaluative abstinence assumes that the differences that we purportedly ought to disregard in fact constitute good reasons for attributing different status to people with different levels of rational capacities; it is only that there are other reasons that defeat these reasons, and therefore, we ought to grant people equal status. ¹³ It seems to me that this picture does not match our understanding of the idea of equal moral status. When I reflect on this problem and the specific judgments that the idea of equal moral status supports, I am firmly in the grip of the thought that considerations related to differences in rational capacities (within normal variation) are not simply defeated in determining moral status but are in fact irrelevant for it and therefore do not even enter that determination. Take the case compellingly presented by Jeff McMahan as a paradigmatic expression of equal moral status, the thesis that all wrongful killings of persons are equally wrong, when the usual factors (numbers, defeaters, mode of agency, excuses, etc.) are the same: it is equally wrong to kill a miserable, unloved and unlovely eighty-year-old person of average rationality and a happy, widely loved and admired person of exceptional intelligence in the prime of her life, with full of worthy plans and ambitions for her future (McMahan 2002, 235–240). When I consider this thesis, I am in the grip of the thought that it is equally wrong to kill (or rape, etc.) both persons, and that the difference in rationality is in fact irrelevant from this respect, rather than something whose relevance is defeated by other considerations. Far from arising out of evaluative abstinence, the equal wrongness of killing persons is something that we can recognize eyes wide open, as it were, with differences in rationality fully in view. ¹⁴ One need not avert one's gaze from these differences to reach this judgment. Were it not so, it would be natural to feel that there is something regrettable about the fact that the two sets of reasons cannot be satisfied simultaneously. Yet I fail to find any trace of such regret when I reflect on the issue. If this is correct, then the evaluative abstinence strategy will not yield an analysis that fully captures the idea of moral equality.

It might be suggested that I misconstrued Carter's reasoning. What he may be claiming is that reasons related to differential agential capacities are excluded from consideration rather than simply outweighed, and therefore there are no two sets of competing reasons. Only reasons related to the range property of personhood are relevant (Carter 2011, pp. 553-554). If so, then perhaps my view is closer to Carter's than suggested above. ¹⁵ However, even if these reasons are excluded rather than, say, outweighed, they do not fully vanish from the picture. It would remain the case that the excluded reasons could be the basis of regret that we cannot comply with them. ¹⁶ Consider the canonical case of exclusionary reasons. Suppose a legitimate political authority makes a law that is defective from the moral point of view. The fact that it is the law provides those who are subject to it with exclusionary reasons for compliance; the moral reasons to act otherwise are excluded. ¹⁷ Yet we still have reasons to regret that it is not possible to satisfy both the exclusionary and the excluded reason simultaneously. But there is no analogous sense of regret in the case of the equal wrongness of killing. Therefore, the fact that these reasons are excluded rather than outweighed does not affect my argument.

Anyway, my goal in the remainder of this paper is to develop the second approach, which holds that the differences above the threshold are irrelevant from the point of view of status attribution. I will do so by examining the Co-variation Thesis, which makes it natural to assume that differences in degrees of rationality always provide at least pro tanto reasons for action.

3. Revisiting the co-variation thesis ¹⁸

The Co-Variation Thesis provides an initially plausible understanding of the link between the ground of moral status in certain capacities and the content of status itself, i.e. the reasons for action, belief and attitude that status mandates towards its holders. Suppose property P is valuable, such that its presence constitutes reasons for treating its bearers in certain ways and refrain from treating them in other ways. The relevant treatments may include respecting their rights by not interfering with their activities and decisions in certain privileged spheres and providing various benefits. If so, then if a being possesses P to a higher degree, this fact provides reasons for superior treatment, which may include a broader sphere of rights or higher level of benefits. ¹⁹ Perhaps the thesis is unstated because it appears self-evident and needing no defense. ²⁰ However, I will argue that it is not self-evident and in fact conflicts with widespread intuitions about particular cases. This opens the logical space for a hitherto unnoticed option for vindicating equal moral status.

In arguing against the Co-variation Thesis, I will neither propose an alternative thesis with general application, nor suggest that the Thesis is linked to some broader theory of value. Instead, my approach is more incremental. It allows for the possibility that the relationship between valuable properties and the appropriate response to them is pluralistic, and so depends on the particular value in question. ²¹ In fact it seems correct to me that to properly understand the value of something – of friendship, of knowledge, of a work of art, of natural beauty, etc. – is primarily to understand the kind of actions, beliefs, or attitudes it provides reasons for. ²² Accordingly, my analysis progresses by adducing examples instead of developing an alternative framework. The Thesis has a great deal of intuitive plausibility, especially when it comes to examples such as the absence of pain and suffering. It is quite plausible to hold that ceteris paribus a state of affairs is more valuable the less suffering it contains. However, in several other contexts the thesis looks less plausible. I will start by briefly considering examples that are not immediately related to the value or worth of people to show that the Thesis is not compelling in some contexts. Then I will turn to the issue of valuing rational beings.

Consider the following:

“Historical significance”: I take it to be obvious that historical understanding is of value. It makes sense to try to achieve historical understanding for its own sake. Significant historical events, figures, or transformations raise important questions that constitute good reasons to study them, to try to understand them. I also think it plausible that a figure or event or transformation, etc. needs to have some threshold level of significance in some sense to be a worthy object of historical scholarship; we rightly expect students of history to be able to give us reasons for the choice of their objects of scholarship. And even among subjects that are clearly worthy of studying, there may be stronger reasons to engage with more significant phenomena. However, once one made a worthy subject the focus of one's scholarship, the standards of seriousness and honesty, of evidence and professional care are the same, regardless of how significant the object of study exactly is. The fact that a certain figure or event is in some suitable sense less significant (though still worthy of being studied) does not seem to imply in any way that the reasons that apply to those who decide to engage with it, as far as the norms of intellectually inquiry are concerned, are different or less stringent than as they apply to the study of a more significant figure or event. In other words, the reasons that govern intellectual engagement with the subject does not vary together with variations in its significance, the property that makes it worthy of engagement in the first place. The Co-variation Thesis does not seem to apply to this particular valuable property.

Or take “philosophical understanding”. Philosophical understanding is valuable for its own sake. We engage with this value when we study philosophical problems in appropriate ways. There are surely more and less significant problems in philosophy, and perhaps there are stronger reasons to engage with the more significant ones. At the same time, the fact that one's chosen problem is in some sense less significant than some others does not in the least alter the norms of seriousness, devotion, sincerity, clarity, and precision that we rightly expect of any attempt at philosophical understanding. A less significant problem should be studied (if that is what one decides to do) with the exact same intellectual seriousness as any other for the attempt to show a proper appreciation of the value of philosophical understanding. To take a well-known example: probably most philosophers do not believe that the fact that “there is so much bullshit” in our culture is among the most significant social issues to be studied. Nor do many believe that remedying the lamentable fact that “we have no clear understanding of what bullshit is, why there is so much of it, or what functions it serves” is among the most urgent tasks of philosophical understanding. Yet, if one decides to “give a rough account of what bullshit is and how it differs from what it is not”, ²³ then one should carry out this exercise of philosophical analysis with as much seriousness and dedication as she would invest in understanding the structure of reality, the nature of knowledge, the value of democracy, or the basis of equal moral status. In other words, when we engage with the value of philosophical understanding through studying various philosophical problems, the fact that some are less significant than others does not affect the proper manner of valuing (i.e. studying) them.

Perhaps it helps to illuminate these examples if we distinguish between different ways that variations in P may in principle affect what we have reason to do regarding its bearer, B. It may affect whether there are reasons to engage with B, and it may affect how we engage with B, i.e. the specific actions and attitudes the presence of P is a reason for:

How do variations in the degree to which P is present in B affect our reasons whether to engage with B?

However, one may object that all the examples so far are of a rather specific kind concerning scholarly activities. Therefore, it may help to consider a different case, that of an ordinary conversation. This is one of the most common and basic forms of engaging with people, central to human relationships from the most casual to the most committed, thus anticipating the theme of the next section. What I have in mind is not a functional exchange such as asking for directions or the price of something, but one involving inquiry about the wellbeing of another, getting to know each other, getting the latest updates about work, family, and so on. Engaging in conversation creates a shared space, however fleeting, where the questions asked and answers given have some significance. One is to ask questions to which one is interested in the answers, because one wants to understand how the other sees certain things, and so on, and to give answers that in fact enable the other to understand how one sees those things. It is rightly perceived as inappropriate if one's questions reveal no genuine interest, or one's answers show disregard for the (appropriate) interest of the questioner. Of course, what questions are appropriate to ask and in what depth the answers are expected to go is highly sensitive to the particulars of the relationship. Furthermore, one may have entirely respectable reasons not to engage in conversation on any given occasion. The point is that insofar as one does engage, the norms of attentiveness, openness and sincerity that are integral to conversation are not sensitive to variations in the rational capacities of the participants, even though they are sensitive to a whole range of other factors. Other things being equal, the level of attention to be paid to the person of average intellect is the same as that to be paid to someone perceived as more rational. To be sure, if our partner turns out to be someone of extraordinary achievements, it may be proper to show a heightened level of curiosity. But this is a case of reasons being sensitive to differential exercises of rational capacities, not differential capacities per se.

My hope is that the last example helps to make it plausible that the range of contexts in which co-variation does not apply is not restricted to the narrow and special one of scholarship. ²⁴ With that in mind, I now turn to the problem of valuing rationality and its bearers, rational beings.

4. Valuing rational beings

The previous section points to the possibility of a logical space for a novel account of equal moral status relying on the idea that the proper response to bearers of a valuable property need not co-vary with differences in the extent to which they bear the property in question. The burden of the present section is to show that the value of rational beings is located in this space as well. This involves, first, outlining the sense of rationality in question as well as of its value, and second, an account of the proper manner of valuing rational beings. The idea that the proper response to the value of rational beings need not track every difference in their rationality should emerge from these accounts.

In my outline of the value and proper way of valuing rationality, I make no claim to novelty. The account suggested here is familiar from the well-known analyses of Scanlon (1998), Raz (2001), Velleman (1999) and others. ²⁵ The contribution lies not in the understanding of rationality or of the proper manner of responding to it, but in the way these analyses are linked to showing that the proper response does not vary together with variations in rationality.

To be rational is primarily to be capable of understanding aspects of the world as reason-giving, as constituting reasons for beliefs, attitudes, and actions. It is to be able to understand how certain features of the world give us reasons to respond to them in certain ways, and to actually respond to them in those ways. To be practically rational is to act for reasons, to perform (some of) the actions that aspects of the world constitute reasons for performing. Since many features of the world constitute reasons for action and engagement, and not all of them can be effectively pursued within a single life, part of what it is to be rational is to select among these reasons, to adopt certain ends and thereby give some reasons a special organizing status in our lives. Ultimately, it is to organize our lives in light of the reasons that the various aspects of the world constitute. Insofar as we act in light of reasons provided by the world as we understand them, we attempt to appreciate and realize value, and to the extent that our understanding is correct and our actions are adequate, we succeed in appreciating and realizing it. ²⁶

This sketch of a conception of rationality already contains the core of the explanation of its value. When we respond appropriately to valuable aspects of the world and successfully organize our lives around worthwhile ends, we make our lives better by incorporating in it the value of our valuable pursuits. In engaging with philosophical problems in appropriate ways, for instance, we make the value of philosophical understanding part of our life. In establishing and maintaining valuable relationships with other people, we make the value of people part of our life (and ours part of theirs). And since the value of rational life is objective, it has reason-giving force for everyone. Everyone has reason to be concerned with how well each rational life goes. But what actions, attitudes, and beliefs does this concern give reason for, exactly? The answer will proceed in two steps. First, I provide a general characterization of the main kinds of reasons for actions that the value of rational beings licenses. Second, I suggest reasons for thinking that the proper response as developed here does not co-vary with variations of rationality. This completes the defense of the basic moral equality of persons.

The proper manner of responding to the value of a valuable property and its bearer must track the kind of value it has (Theunissen 2020, 127). Rational beings are valuable because they are capable of valuing, of making the value of worthy pursuits and activities part of their lives, and as a result, of living well. Therefore, the proper manner of valuing rational beings tracks their value as valuers. A natural thought is that in a fundamental respect, the proper response to the value of rational beings who attempt to appreciate and respond to the reason-giving aspects of the world is to allow them to engage with value in their own ways, to treat their own determinations of reason, of what they have reason to do, as reason-giving for ourselves as well. The central part of valuing rational beings is to recognize each as a “locus of reasons, […] the force of their reasons for wanting to live and for wanting their lives to go better” (Scanlon 1998, 105). ²⁷ As far as each rational being's own life is concerned, their decisions about which of the many rationally eligible goals to adopt should be treated as authoritative. We should treat rational beings as authorities regarding their own lives. Their decisions in these matters give us normally conclusive reasons not to interfere with them in certain ways. It also gives us reasons to protect them, to prevent harms to them, and even to assist them in their pursuits in some ways, to adopt shared pursuits with them, though these reasons are plausibly more complicated and may be defeated in a broader range of circumstances than reasons of non-interference.

It may be helpful to distinguish between different modes of responding to the value of rational beings. Following Raz, we may distinguish between respecting and protecting the value of something or someone as basic modes of responding to their value, and engaging with their value as the fullest form of valuing (2001, 161–164). ²⁸ We respect and protect the value of rational beings, in particular, when we treat their own understanding and determinations of reasons as they apply to their own lives as something generally to be deferred to. Rational beings ought not to be destroyed and interfered with, and they should be protected from destruction and harm if this can be done without significant sacrifice for ourselves. Second, rational beings may be engaged with. Engagement with the value of rational beings may include assisting them in their pursuits or making sure that they have adequate opportunities for achieving their goals. Being attentive to the reasons of others, seeking to understand how they make sense of their own lives and the world, are also forms of engagement. Perhaps more importantly, engagement with the value of rational beings may involve seeking and maintaining personal relationships with them in the form of shared goals, ideals, interests, and activities. We engage with the value of persons in fullest when we pursue shared aims, join with them in a shared attempt to make sense of the world, and join our lives in partnerships, friendships, and so on. These last forms differ significantly from the previous ones in that they are mostly optional and selective, since we cannot sustain relationships with more than a tiny fraction of all rational beings. By contrast, the reasons for respecting and protecting persons are not selective in this way. (I will return to this difference shortly).

Supposing that these are the most important modes of responding to the value of persons, do they support the thought that the responses should be modulated in a way that tracks variations in levels of rationality, suitably understood? It is worthwhile to attend to the different modes of responding to the value of rational beings separately. It seems to me that when it comes to respecting and protecting rational beings, the considerations accounting for these responses provide no such support. These considerations may be summarized as follows. Rational beings are valuers capable of incorporating value in their lives in a distinctive way, i.e. through engaging with it. The crucial point is that it is only through their own valuing activity that rational beings can realize this distinctive form of value, which explains the reasons for “respect”, i.e. treating their own determinations of reason as far as their own life is concerned as authoritative. Deferring to their decisions and not intervening in how they engage with value is therefore normally a necessary condition of this value being realized. ²⁹

Furthermore, the worthy lives realized in this way are valuable and to be valued for their own sake, rather than for making the world better by bringing more value into it (Scanlon 1998, 103–107). The bearers of value are primarily the rational beings themselves, rather than the states of affairs that their rationality brings about. The actions the value of rational beings constitute reasons for are owed to the rational beings themselves, rather than being owed impersonally. If one acts contrary to these reasons, one does not merely do something wrong, but wrongs someone (Kamm 2007, 230; Wallace 2019). If the significance of a rational life consisted in the value that it added to the world, that might imply that we have stronger reasons to defer to and protect people who are more accomplished valuers and therefore more likely to realize value in their lives. However, if they are to be valued for their own sake, and deference is owed to them, then this implication does not get off the ground. Call this the Directedness Claim. ³⁰ The Directedness Claim does not logically entail that the reasons to respect and protect each are equally strong. But if they are not to be valued because their life adds to the value of the world, then one important motivation for thinking that the strength of such reasons varies with their rationality is removed. ³¹

Nonetheless, there is also a positive consideration to think that the reasons for respecting and protecting rational beings does not vary together with differences in their rationality. So far, I have emphasized that the distinctive kind of value at stake here can be instantiated only by the valuing activity of the rational being whose life it is. I have not yet exploited the fact that each rational being has only one life in which to instantiate value. Call it the Singularity Claim. This is significant because it suggests that the reason for each rational being to make that one life valuable has the same strength, regardless of how valuable the most valuable life that is available for each of them actually is. ³² The worthiest life that is available to the uncertain valuer who thinks less clearly about what is important and why, and who is unsteady in responding to his reasons, may be less worthy than the worthiest life available to someone highly thoughtful in reflecting on what matters, and careful and thorough in her pursuits and dedicated in her relationships. But since those are the worthiest lives available to each in the one and only life they have, the reasons there are for him to realize it are just as strong as the reasons that there are for her. Consider an analogy: suppose person A has three more fulfilling, meaningful years to live if she receives a life-saving treatment now, whereas B has ten more equally fulfilling, meaningful years of life if he receives treatment. It seems plausible that the reasons there are for both to insist on receiving the treatment are equally strong, other things being equal, despite the different length of the remaining life in question. By the same token, the reasons for insisting on the treatment is equally strong if the difference shows up in the quality (value or meaning) of the lives rather than their lengths, provided that both are sufficiently worthy and meaningful. This point is made by Frances Kamm in her Sufficiently Good Only Option Argument, claiming that if each of two persons has only one option that is sufficiently good, then both have equally strong reasons to insist on retaining that option even if their options are neither equally good nor incommensurably good (Kamm 2009, 163–165). Consider another example. Suppose the best life available to A is one of constant but moderate pain that is consistent with having meaningful pursuits, while the best life available to B is otherwise similar but without the pain. It strikes me that they have equally strong reasons to insist on going on living. And it seems that the strengths of these reasons as they apply to them translate directly to the reasons others have when responding to them. That is, we have equally strong reasons not to interfere with their realizing the worthiest lives each of them can realize, no matter how worthy exactly that is. ³³

One may object that if we must choose which one of two persons to save from death, we have stronger reasons to save the one with more years left, other things being equal. And exploiting the analogy suggested in the previous footnote, one may claim that the same applies to the case when the difference is in valuing capacity of the two persons concerned. If so, then this shows that the strengths of the reasons that there are for people to realize the worthiest life available to them does not translate directly to the strengths of the reasons that others have when responding to them. In response, three points can be made. First, I don’t find it generally plausible that other things being equal we have more reason to save the one with more time to live, other than in cases where one of them has only an insignificant time left. ³⁴ It seems to me entirely plausible that there are equally strong reasons to save one with three years to live and one with ten years. The objection begins to get some pull only when one of them has only days or weeks left, perhaps because that period is unlikely to make a difference to that person's reasons regarding her life as a whole. ³⁵ My intuitions about this case are therefore entirely consistent with the idea developed throughout this paper that some differences in the status-grounding capacities matter from the point of view of status attribution, but quite large differences above some threshold do not. Second, it seems to me that whatever force the objection has when the difference between the two persons is in quantity of life left, it does not carry over to cases where the differences is in quality, as understood in the present context (within normal variation). And third, the objection invokes a situation in which by hypothesis, it is permissible not to save one of the two. However, when we are not forced to make such a choice, it appears that the wrongness of not saving is the same regardless of how old or how good valuers the affected persons are. That is, the range of excusing conditions, defeaters, and the appropriateness of negative reactive attitudes such as blame and indignation would be the same in both cases. ³⁶

Therefore, I conclude that the Directedness and Singularity Claims, taken together, provide strong support for the idea that the proper response to the distinctive value of rational beings does not track variations in their levels of rationality, at least as far as these modes of responding to value are concerned.

Suppose that this account of the value of rational beings and the proper modes of valuing them is sound. Now the threshold approach may appear suspect from the opposite perspective: if the proper response to the value of rational beings does not vary with their levels of rationality, does not that imply that we ought to treat minimally rational nonhuman animals the same way as we treat human persons? To adopt McMahan's terminology, a full justification of the threshold approach requires addressing two distinct problems, the “separation problem,” which involves identifying morally relevant differences between (nearly) all humans and (nearly) all nonhuman animals, and the “equality problem,” which involves explaining why (nearly) all humans are morally equal despite their differences (McMahan 2008). The focus of this paper is the “equality problem” only; addressing the “separation problem”, which the present objection invokes, requires a discussion of its own. Nevertheless, it seems to me that the conception of the value of rational beings endorsed here has the resources to provide answers to this issue, and in any case the separation problem usually appeared to most who engaged with the issue as the easier one to solve (Christiano 2015, 61–63).

The view developed here is not committed to the claim that differences in rationality never matter. It points to an understanding of rationality – being able to appreciate reason-giving aspects of the world, to make decisions about which of these aspects to engage with, and to organize one's life around the selected engagements and in this way incorporating value into one's own life – that are characteristic of typical human beings. In particular, it seems to me that the view suggests an important divide between beings who are responsive to reasons in a way that enables them to make sense of their lives as wholes, to have a broadly temporally extended sense of their own existence that is capable of being organized in response to reasons, on the one hand, and beings who are responsive to reasons in more immediate and localized ways, without a sense that their lives as wholes could hang together on the basis of long-term pursuits and relationships. Beings in the first group can see not merely their short-range actions in light of reasons, but their whole lives as something that is answerable to the reason-giving aspects of the world and therefore that can go better or worse. This appears to be a significant divide between different regions of rationality. ³⁷

5. When differences matter

So far, I have argued that the distinct way in which rational beings are valuable and to be valued provides no support for the idea that the proper response to their value tracks every difference in their rationality. At this point, however, an important doubt may surface. Surely, there are some contexts in which differences in the rationality of persons lead to differences in reasons for actions, beliefs, and attitudes, even above the threshold. We have reasons to admire especially successful engagements with aspects of the world—great artists and scientists, for example, or political activists whose actions have inspired many and whose life is rightly seen as particularly meaningful, such as Martin Luther King, Jr. or Gandhi. Or people with no such public profile but whose lives nevertheless demonstrate their appreciation of the value of friendship or of parenthood, or of teaching, in an especially profound way. People whose lives embody successful engagement with different values in these ways are fitting objects of certain attitudes such as admiration or praise. If we are philosophers, for instance, we have special reasons to seek the company of other philosophers who have shown a special sense of philosophical problems and analysis. There are reasons for us to interact and discourse with them, or to develop professional relationships with them. And perhaps all of us have special reasons to engage with people whose lives instantiate successful fight against injustice and oppression. These reasons for engagement are special in that they single out as their object people who have shown distinctive success in their engagement with value. They do not apply in the same way to everyone.

Surely, a proper account of the value of rationality (as understood here) must make sense of and support these thoughts. But then, it must square them with the suggestion that our reasons to protect and respect persons do not vary with their level of rationality above the threshold. It seems to me that the account developed here can accommodate the considerations invoked in the previous paragraph. The answer begins with recalling the distinction between different modes of responding to value invoked earlier. The mode of responding to the value of rationality where differences such as these seem relevant is that of engagement with value. Engaging with the value of persons typically involves seeking their company in appropriate ways, the intention to develop various kinds of relationships with them, to have shared experiences with them, to listen to them and being listened to by them, to pursue common goals with them, to try to make sense of the world together with them, and so on. As Raz says, value is ultimately realized only when it is engaged with, and the first two stages are “mere preliminaries” (Raz 2001, p. 163). ³⁸

Three salient points emerge from this discussion. First, engagement with value is necessarily highly selective. We cannot read all great novels or develop friendship with all persons, or even all those with whom there could be mutual appreciation. We cannot explore every alpine hike. Reasons as provided by aspects of the world underdetermine what in particular we should engage with. Second, while the reasons for respecting and protecting rational beings are binding, reasons for engagement are usually not. Everybody must refrain from destroying what is of value, but no one must engage with everything that is of value (Raz 2001, 163-164). ³⁹ This follows directly from the selectivity of engagement. Respecting and preserving what is valuable does not impose such constraints; here, reason in fact determines what we should (and should not) do.

The third salient point is that the reasons for “engagement” with the value of persons can sometimes properly track differences in the successful exercises of rational capacities; there are sometimes stronger reasons to develop friendships with people who have some distinctive characteristics, whom we can learn from, conversing with whom is fulfilling, etc. But even here, the picture is complex. When engaging with other people is not optional either because one has a professional obligation to do so or because engaging in certain ways is inescapable, as is the case in shared social and political structures, often the proper manner of engagement will not vary along these dimensions. Professors ought to engage with their supervisees in the same depth, regardless of differences in their academic promise. Fellow citizens sharing a political community ought, when they engage with each other in the act of voting, must treat everyone as equally important. This feature of engagement recalls the point made in connection with the value of historical or philosophical understanding: different problems may provide stronger or weaker reasons for engagement, but once one engages with a problem, the norms of engagement provided by the value of philosophical understanding are the same. The parallel point here is that when engaging with others in some context is not optional for some reason, the proper way of engaging does not vary along with the variations in the reasons whether to engage, were it optional.

Last and most importantly, the examples invoked in this section do not support the idea that reasons for engagement with other people is sensitive to their level of rationality itself. Rather, they suggest that they can be sensitive to differences in the successful exercises of rational capacities. Gandhi and MLK are not primarily distinguished by their exceptional rational capacities, but rather by the depth and seriousness with which they deployed them. It is on these grounds that they are proper objects of admiration. Therefore, the fact that we have special reasons for seeking engagement with people like them does not undermine the overall thesis of this paper. ⁴⁰ The account of the value of rationality along the lines sketched here can explain both when differences in rationality (or properties related to them) constitute differences in our reasons for action, attitudes, and beliefs, and when they do not.

6. Conclusion

The main motivating thought of this paper is that the puzzle of equal moral status is puzzling primarily because of a certain formality with which we tend to approach the problem. We tend to take it for granted that if a property constitutes reasons for a certain kind of response towards its bearers, then the presence of the same property in a higher degree provides stronger reasons for response of the same kind. This approach is formalistic insofar that this assumption is made without an analysis of the content of the response that different properties warrant. I suggested to approach the problem in a different manner, by taking a closer look at the content of responses warranted by the presence of rationality towards its bearers, and to see if this substantive analysis provides any support for the formal idea that differences in rationality always constitute differences in our reasons towards its bearers. More generally, I asked if this is true for other valuable properties. I found several examples suggesting that although variations in the valuable property may constitute variations in our reasons whether to engage with its bearers, the same variations often do not affect the proper manner of engagement. Similarly, I found that while in certain dimensions our engagement with the value of rational beings may track differences in their rationality, or at least successful exercises thereof, in other dimensions the response need not and should not vary in this way. Specifically, our reasons for respecting and preserving rational beings does not track differences within the range of normal variation.

Therefore, this reorientation towards the content of the proper response to the value of rational beings provides support for the threshold approach in a distinctive manner. It supports the conclusion that differences in rationality above the threshold (within normal variation) are in fact irrelevant from the point of view of moral status attribution. This justification of the threshold view is different from some of the existing ones (proposed by Kagan and Carter, e.g.), which appear to suggest that the reasons to disregard differences above the threshold are different from the ones that explain how we should respond to differentially rational beings. My approach suggests that the same considerations that explain the proper response to the value of rational beings themselves explain why differences with normal variation often do not matter. Thus, the threshold approach is vindicated in a novel way.