Cultural differences in conflict resolution strategies

Abstract

Cross-cultural differences in norms, values, and beliefs abound and impact preferred conflict resolution strategies. Potential differences in values and subsequent conflict resolution strategies can exacerbate the underlying conflict unless they are well understood. We study the case of differences in conflict resolution strategies between the United States and Mexico as well as studying the underlying value differences that explain their preferences. In a quasi-experimental study, we found that Mexicans, compared to US participants, appear to have a greater preference for both the use of social influence and negotiating when confronting a conflict. Moreover, it appears that collectivism helps explain these country differences as it mediated the relation between country and the likelihood of using social influence and negotiation. In addition, perceptions of fairness had a stronger influence on the preference that US participants had for negotiation as a conflict resolution strategy. The research helps illuminate the underlying mechanisms through which culture impacts conflict resolution strategy.

Keywords

Conflict resolution preferences cross-cultural individualism–collectivism Mexico values

Cross-cultural conflict resolution

As globalization continues to occur, individuals from different cultures will interact more and more. Indeed with the use of teams and groups in the workplace, conflict and disagreements are inevitable. Further exacerbating these disagreements, the most common or the most natural methods for conflict resolution in one country might be a complete anathema in another. Thus, the very differences in preferred conflict resolution styles can move parties farther apart, rather than closer together, as signals are misinterpreted and the parties struggle to understand each other’s communications. Therefore, research that can enlighten us on differences in conflict resolution style preferences across cultures can help us build on previous findings and better navigate these situations. Furthermore, understanding the underlying reasons for these differing preferences can further develop our body of knowledge regarding cross-cultural differences. By studying the role of cultural values, we can generalize to other cultures that show the same value orientations. Such knowledge can help us build a stronger theoretical understanding of cross-cultural differences, while also significantly aiding managers and organizations doing business cross-culturally.

Culture can be defined as “the unique character of a social group” and it refers to the values, beliefs, norms, and institutions of that group (Brett, 2007). National culture, or culture defined at the country level, affects both a negotiator’s interests and priorities (i.e. what they want and how much they want it), as well as their preferred conflict resolution strategy or style (i.e. the behaviors they use to try to achieve those goals; Brett, 2000). Perhaps the most widely studied cultural difference that impacts one’s negotiating strategy is the dimension of individualism versus collectivism (Bazerman et al., 2000; Brett, 2007). In more individualistic cultures, the needs and autonomy of the individual are more important than those of the larger group, while in more collectivist cultures, the needs of the group tend to take precedence (Hofstede, 1980). This difference in cultural norms can lead to differing conflict resolution styles because of what they imply about a negotiator’s goals and feelings about direct confrontation (Brett, 2007). Thus, it is important to explore how cultural norms, such as collectivism, impact conflict resolution strategies and through what underlying mechanisms.

Developing an understanding of the differences in dispute resolution styles and motivations between the United States and Mexico would be quite beneficial to many organizations engaged in doing business cross-culturally. Moreover, the two cultures have been found to be on opposing sides of the individualism–collectivism spectrum, with the United States as predominantly individualist and Mexico predominantly collectivist (Gomez et al., 2000; Hofstede, 1980; Maznevski et al., 2002). Much of the research that compares cultures based on their orientation on this value takes as given the general difference in individualism–collectivism and does not include the measurement of the value itself, so as to test whether indeed the value explains the preference for a specific negotiating style (e.g. Holt and Devore, 2005). The current research begins to bridge this gap and allows us to then generalize to other cultures who also differ on this value.

Research has shown the potential contribution that is possible at the individual level if we have individual level scales (Maznevski et al., 2002). Triandis (1995) has noted that a key difference comes in whether the individualist or collectivist culture values hierarchy (Shavitt and Cho, 2016; Vargas and Kemmelmeier, 2013). Therefore, horizontal collectivism is a cultural orientation where the self is viewed as equal to others while vertical collectivism views the self in a more hierarchical perspective and may be associated with individuals sacrificing for the good of the group (Shavitt and Cho, 2016; Vargas and Kemmelmeier, 2013). Similarly, horizontal individualism views the self in a manner that emphasizes uniqueness and social equality while vertical individualism may emphasize more personal achievement and competition (Shavitt and Cho, 2016; Vargas and Kemmelmeier, 2013). This differentiation within the individualism–collectivism orientation is proposed to be helpful in understanding areas such as consumer behavior (Shavitt and Cho, 2016) as well as organizational behavior and perceptions such as work–family conflict (Billing et al., 2014) and communication (Pekerti and Thomas, 2015). While Mexico is reflective or a more vertically oriented collectivism, the United States is more oriented toward a vertical individualism.

This article seeks not only to examine the general country differences in negotiating style between the United States and Mexico, but to determine whether it truly is individualism–collectivism that leads to the differences in negotiating style and motivation. Research has continued to demonstrate direct relationships between individual level values and behaviors, in areas such as team reward allocations (Gomez et al., 2000) and attitudes toward teams (Mockaitis et al., 2012). Moreover, individual level analysis has also allowed researchers to test how such individual level values moderate relationships in areas such as the relationship between voice and organizational commitment (Brockner et al., 2001), for example. To that end, this article specifically compares preferences for three conflict resolution strategies—ignoring the situation, using social influence, and negotiation—between a Mexican and a US sample of respondents. These chosen conflict resolution strategies are believed to differ significantly between participants from cultures that differ in collectivism/individualism, and indeed, we find significant differences. We follow previous research on national differences and the role of cultural values set by Brockner et al. (2001), by first predicting national differences based on expected cultural value differences. Then we subsequently test the effect of the cultural value used to predict the expected national differences. As depicted in Figure 1, this study looks at collectivism and other variables as potential moderators and mediators to the relationship between country and conflict resolution style preferences. While we study the case of differences between the United States and Mexico, the structure of the model could be applied more broadly. The model could apply to other cultures that differ on collectivism. Similarly, the proposed process model of mediation could be applied to other values and how they might affect conflict resolution style preferences. Next, we briefly review the literature to develop our hypotheses and then present the study methods and results. Finally, we end with limitations and conclusions of the research.

Figure 1.

Proposed model.

Background literature and hypotheses

Conflict resolution styles

In his book, Bargaining for Advantage, G Richard Shell (2006) discusses the five basic negotiating styles or “personality types”—competitors, problem solvers, compromisers, accommodators, and conflict avoiders—derived from the Dual Concerns model of bargaining (Blake and Mouton, 1964; Thomas and Kilmann, 1974). When attempting to resolve conflicts, one can focus to varying degrees on either his or her own gains or on preserving the relationship, both or neither. For example, competitors will do almost anything to win, while accommodators try to solve the other person’s problem, and avoiders go to great lengths to avoid conflict altogether and may even ignore the situation. Compromisers look for fair outcomes for both parties, even if they settle for a less than optimal outcome for themselves, while problem solvers brainstorm to find the best overall outcome (Shell, 2006).

In their study of the effects of ethnicity and gender within a US sample, Lind et al. (1994) also investigated a number of dispute resolution procedures, some of which mirror those of Shell and the Dual Concerns model. They explained that, while the United States has a legal system based on European values, many other cultures have different values, which lead to preferences for different methods of dispute resolution. They investigated preferences for seven different conflict resolution methods—Using Social Influence, Ignoring the Situation, Giving In, Persuasion, Negotiation, Mediation, and Arbitration. Mediation and arbitration are specific solutions that involve the use of a third party. The use of social influence was defined as using your persuasion and power from other people (e.g. pressure from friends) to try to get the other person to do what you want. Ignoring the situation included avoiding having contact with the person and disregarding what they say. Giving in referred to giving the other person what they wanted (accommodating their wishes), while persuasion referred to trying to convince the other person you are right by using strong arguments. Finally, negotiation was defined by Lind et al. (1994) as working on an acceptable solution.

There are a number of other definitions of negotiation, perhaps most notably that it is “an interpersonal decision making process necessary whenever we cannot achieve our objectives single-handedly” (Thompson, 2011: 2). Nevertheless, the idea of working out a mutually acceptable solution rings true as a commonly accepted definition that might be used by those attempting to resolve conflicts in the real world.

Cultural values and conflict resolution styles

There is sizable literature on general differences between national cultures in terms of values (e.g. Hofstede, 1980; Javidan et al., 2004; Maznevski et al., 2002). A value is a tendency to prefer certain end-states over others (Hofstede, 1980) because these end-states are personally or socially preferable (Rokeach, 1973). Our behaviors are framed by our cultural values as they translate to attitudes about appropriate behavior. Hofstede’s seminal work (1980, 1991) identified a number of value dimensions—power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, masculinity, and long-term orientation—which can be used to differentiate among national cultures. This original line of inquiry then spawned a cottage industry of explorations of cultural differences and how these differences lead to different attitudes and behaviors. One of the areas most frequently explored with relation to cultural differences relates to how these value differences impact conflict resolution styles.

Much of the literature on culture and conflict management styles shows Asian cultures valuing harmony, avoiding conflict, and using avoiding or accommodating conflict resolution styles, with Americans (US culture) being more competitive or problem-solving (e.g. Jehn and Weldon, 1997; Tang and Kirkbride, 1986). Yuan (2010) further elaborates on these differences and finds both groups using a variety of strategies, but the Chinese participants were less likely to engage in direct confrontation than were the Americans. Also, quite interestingly, the interpretation of and reason for using the styles differed between the two cultures. For example, the avoidance strategy was not generally seen by the Americans as an effective way to handle a conflict; however, to the Chinese participants, who valued harmony and saving face, this style showed concern for oneself and others.

Individualism and collectivism in the United States and Mexico

Gabrielidis and colleagues (1997) also used the individualism–collectivism dimension to explore conflict resolution styles in the United States and Mexico, but they explain that collectivism in a Latin American culture might be different from that in an Asian culture. Importantly, Mexicans are thought to have greater loyalty to their in-group and to have a stronger need to build close friendships than do those in Asian cultures. Therefore, they propose that Mexicans (wishing to achieve some of their own personal goals while also maintaining harmony) would use collaboration or accommodating styles, while Americans (who would pursue their own needs over those of others) would use more competitive and collaborative styles. In a survey of students in both countries, they found that the Mexicans scored higher on both accommodation and collaboration, which are the two conflict resolution styles that show the greatest concern for the outcome of the other person in the conflict situation. Interestingly, however, this study did not show a greater competitiveness by the US sample.

Continuing in this vein, Sadri and Rahmatian (2003) investigated the conflict resolution style preferences of Asian, White, and Mexican or Mexican American students and proposed that the White students would use more assertive styles than would the other groups. As expected, they found that Asians were the most likely to use avoidance strategies, followed by the Mexican and Mexican American groups, with White being the least likely to use avoidance strategies. They also found that those born outside of the United States (who were more likely to be in the Asian or Mexican groups) were more likely to use avoidance than were those born in the United States. Lastly, they found some age and gender differences, with younger students being more competitive than older ones, and women being less competitive and more avoiding than males.

In contrast to these studies proposing that collectivism would lead Mexicans to either use more accommodating or more avoiding strategies, Posthuma et al. (2006) expected Mexicans to use more competing conflict resolution styles. Their logic was that Mexicans’ higher level of collectivism and close interpersonal space would actually foster less trust due to the increased social comparisons. Their study of coworkers in the United States and Mexico found Mexicans were more likely to use competing strategies than Americans. However, they also found that Mexicans were more likely to meet a contending strategy with accommodating or compromising strategies. Overall, Mexicans were thought to be highly concerned about the feelings of others, but not necessarily willing to yield to others in their negotiating positions. Other research studying Mexican Americans showed that both older and younger adolescents reported using solution-oriented conflict resolution strategies the most, followed by nonconfrontation and control-oriented strategies (Thayer et al., 2008). However, having a greater Mexican cultural orientation was positively related to the use of nonconfrontational strategies.

In an effort to synthesize some of this disparate literature pertaining to culture, gender, and organizational role as they apply to conflict resolution style, Holt and Devore (2005) conducted a meta-analysis of 123 paired comparisons within 36 empirical studies. They found some interesting gender differences in preferred conflict resolution styles, as well as interactions between culture, gender, and organizational role of the dispute counterpart. Most germane to our research, however, they found that people from individualistic cultures chose forcing (competitive) strategies more than those in collectivistic cultures, while the reverse was true for avoiding, compromising, and problem-solving strategies which were more strongly preferred by those in collectivist cultures. However, many of the cross-cultural studies included in Holt and Devore’s meta-analysis compared Asian collectivist cultures, rather than Hispanic ones, to more individualist western cultures. In addition, while they found differences between individualist and collectivist cultures on avoiding and compromising strategies, their research did not include the use of social influence across cultures. Finally, their research does not test whether the value itself explains the differences.

Building upon this literature and extending the Lind et al. (1994) work from within one culture to across cultures, we propose to compare samples of participants between the United States and Mexico on their use of three conflict resolution strategies—ignoring the situation, use of social influence, and negotiation. Based on the literature cited above, and given the cultural values of the Mexican culture including their collectivistic nature noted by Hofstede (1980) as well as more recent research (Gomez et al., 2000; Maznevski et al., 2002), we expected the Mexican participants when compared to US participants to choose the less forceful strategies of using social influence as well as ignoring the situation. In contrast, we expected the US sample or the more individualistic participants to favor negotiation which is a more direct approach. The resulting hypotheses, then, are the following:

H1: Mexicans, compared to Anglo-Americans, will have a stronger preference for the use of social influence.

H2: Mexicans, compared to Anglo-Americans, will be more willing to ignore the situation.

H3: Anglo-Americans, compared to Mexicans, will have a stronger preference for the use of negotiation.

One important difference between individualist and collectivists is the role of the in-group within these cultures. In both individualistic and collectivistic cultures, people distinguish between others whom they perceive as their in-group versus out-group. Nevertheless, in collectivistic cultures, people have few in-groups and these are stable over time (Triandis et al., 1988), whereas, in individualistic cultures, people may easily belong to many in-groups. Moreover, in collectivistic cultures, people may discriminate against out-group members while favoring their in-group. Such differences in treatment have been shown to influence reward allocations (Gomez et al., 2000; Hui et al., 1991) and social loafing (Earley, 1993).

With regards to reward allocations, Hui et al. (1991) found that Chinese respondents were more generous when allocating rewards to close friends (i.e. in-group members) rather than to out-group members. Similarly, Gomez et al. (2000) found that in a US and Mexican sample, when a team member was an in-group member, collectivists evaluated the member more generously than did individualists. In addition, Earley (1993) found that while collectivists work better in a group than individualists, this relationship was moderated by the group composition (e.g. whether the group was made up of people from a person’s in-group or out-group). Hence, the performance of individualists who thought they were working in a group (in-group or out-group) was lower than those who thought they were working alone; in contrast, the performance of collectivists was lower when they thought they were working alone or in an out-group.

Given the importance of the in-group status to collectivists, we expected that the status of the coworker would affect the strategy preference for Mexicans. We expected Mexicans to be more willing to ignore the situation when their conflict was with an in-group member than an out-group member. Therefore:

H4: There will be a significant country by group status effect on propensity to ignore a situation. Specifically, Mexicans will be more willing to ignore a situation when the potential conflict is with an in-group member than with an out-group member, while group status will not have an impact on use of this strategy for Americans.

The logic leading to hypothesis 1 through hypothesis 3 suggests that any differences in the preferences for different conflict resolution strategies across Mexico and the United States will be due to these countries’ differences with regard to collectivism. As noted earlier, recent literature has suggested a vertical and horizontal dimension to individualism and collectivism, with the vertical focused on hierarchy and the horizontal focused on equality (Singelis et al., 1995). Research is beginning to show differing effects for the newer facets. For example, Billing et al. (2014) found that vertical individualism was a predictor of work–family conflict across several cultures. Pekerti and Thomas (2015) studied communication behaviors among Asians and New Zealanders and found that argumentativeness was related positively to independent self-construal, which is characteristic of horizontal individualism, while negatively related to interdependent self-construal which is characteristic of vertical collectivism. Nevertheless, our interest lies in the focus on the group versus the individual and not the hierarchical versus equality orientation. As such, we believe using a one-dimensional measure of collectivism here, as has been used successfully in previous research (e.g. Gomez et al., 2000), results in understanding the influence of the group versus individual focus of these cultures.

Having the individuals’ measure of their orientation to collectivism allows us to test whether any differences in preferences are in fact attributable to this cultural difference (i.e. whether collectivism mediates the effect of country on the conflict resolution strategy preferences). Brockner et al. (2001) found that power distance mediated the effect of country on the relationship between participation and commitment. Similarly, we want to test whether collectivism explains country differences. Therefore, when we control for collectivism, we expect that the effect of the country on preferences will no longer be significant. In other words, it is not whether an employee comes from Mexico or the United States, but rather it is his/her values that dictate his/her preference. Thus, we predict:

H5: Collectivism will mediate the effect of country on conflict resolution strategy such that country differences in conflict resolution preferences will be due to differences in collectivism.

Collectivism and harmony

One potential explanation for why one style of conflict resolution might be chosen over another may be that as noted earlier, collectivists may believe that choosing a style may lead to more harmony in their relationships. Wright and Drewery (2002) looked at interactions within culturally heterogeneous groups of students. They referenced the notion that more collectivist cultures try to avoid direct disagreement and seek to maintain harmony within the group, while those from individualistic cultures prefer resolving disputes more directly. In a mixed culture group, it is likely that some members would raise issues of disagreement directly, while others in the group, who would wish to solve disputes in a more indirect fashion, may become uncomfortable with the direct confrontation. The researchers proposed, and found, that this mismatch would cause those from more collectivist Asian cultures to feel that the group was more disconnected and less cohesive than did those from Anglo cultures.

Furthermore, Parks and Vu (1994) conducted a cross-cultural examination of social dilemmas, situations in which if each individual does what is best or easiest for themselves (such as not recycling or using a lot of natural resources), the collective result is far worse than if each takes action for the common good (such as conserving resources or recycling). They hypothesized that there would be a significant effect of culture on whether individuals cooperated or competed (by choosing the individually superior, but collectively harmful, action), for those cultures which were on the extreme ends of the individualism dimension, such as the United States and Vietnam. As expected, Parks and Vu (1994) found that the Vietnamese cooperated at a much higher rate than the Americans, and the Vietnamese participants persisted with their cooperative strategies even when they encountered extremely competitive strategies. One might expect that this comes from an attempt to maintain harmony.

Given the findings noted above, we expected the Mexicans’ preference for the use of social influence and ignoring the situation to be explained by their belief that this strategy would allow them to maintain harmony with their coworker. More specifically, since we expect country differences in conflict resolution styles to be attributed to collectivism, we expect collectivism to interact with the perception that a specific conflict resolution strategy would lead to harmonious relations. In particular, those high in collectivism will be more likely to choose to use social influence and/or ignoring the situation when they believe it will lead to harmonious relations than when they do not; for those low in collectivism, their belief about whether or not a strategy will lead to harmonious relations will not impact their use of these strategies. This leads to the next prediction.

H6: There will be a significant interaction between collectivism and perceptions that social influence and ignoring the situation will lead to harmonious relations.

Country differences related to fairness

Much of the impact of culture on preferences for conflict resolution strategies has been attributed to differences in individualism–collectivism. However, due in part to differing legal systems in different cultures, there are also differences in the perceived fairness and efficacy of the different strategies. In the Lind et al. (1994) piece, although there were differences in preferences between the participants with more of a collectivist cultural background (e.g. Asian and Hispanic Americans) and those with more of an individualist background (European Americans), these differences were small compared to the effect of perceived fairness of the procedure. That is, for their respondents (who were US participants from different ethnicities), the perceptions of whether a strategy could produce an effect on a fair outcome, its procedural fairness, affected their preference for using that strategy.

White and Lee (2004) analyzed the historical context of the legal systems of the United States and Korea and proposed that, for the most part, people in the United States believe in the notion of disputes having a right and wrong, trust in the legal system and believe that it can determine who is in the right. In contrast, Koreans distrust the legal system and believe that all parties are both partly wrong and partly right, and that disputes should be handled in indirect, nonconfrontational ways. Koreans prefer processes that maintain peace and harmony over those which determine justice or truth.

Volkema (1998) specifically studied professionals in the United States and Mexico and their judgments of the ethicality of various negotiations behaviors. He proposed that Mexicans would view strongly competitive and even unethical behaviors as less appropriate, but that they would be more likely to engage in these behaviors, than would the US sample. While he did not find a difference in terms of likelihood of engaging in the various behaviors, he did find both that the Mexican sample judged the various behaviors as less appropriate and also that they had a larger gap between their judgments of appropriateness and likelihood of using a behavior than did the US sample. The American respondents’ likelihood of using a particular behavior was more in line with their judgments of the ethicality of that behavior than were the Mexican respondents’ likelihoods. Based on those findings, as well as the plethora of research on the importance of procedural justice in the United States (e.g. Harrison et al., 2013; Lind and Tyler, 1988), we would expect that for the US participants, a major explanation of their preference of conflict resolution styles would come from their belief that a given style would lead to a fair outcome. Specifically, the US participants with a higher belief that negotiation will lead to a fair outcome should show greater use of that strategy than those with less belief in its fairness, while there should be little difference for the Mexican participants. Therefore:

H7: There will be a significant interaction between country and perceptions that negotiation will lead to a fair outcome.

Methods

Sample

The sample consisted of both part-time and full-time MBA students from Mexico and the United States. Specifically, the total sample of 225 was composed of 85 Mexicans and 140 US Americans, approximately half of whom were female (52% in Mexico; 45% in the United States), and all of whom were citizens of their respective countries and representative of the respective universities and countries. In Mexico, the participants came from the main campus of the largest private university in Mexico, located in the northern part of the country, with approximately 14,000 students. In the United States, the citizens came from two schools: a medium-sized, southeastern, state-supported university with an enrollment of about 13,000; and a large, southwestern, state-supported university with an enrollment of about 31,000 students. In the United States, ethnicity was measured and we only used those who were White non-Hispanic Americans. Age was measured using specific ranges. Within the US sample, the majority of the students (59%) were between 26 and 35, 27% were 25 or younger, and a much smaller percentage (11%) fell in the 36–45 age group. The Mexican students were younger overall, with 98% falling in the 25 or younger age group and the additional ones falling in the 25–35 age group.

Study design

The study used a quasi-experimental design where different variables were manipulated as part of a larger study. Specifically, a 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 (country × in-group/out-group × maintenance inputs × task inputs) factorial design where country of origin was measured while the other variables were manipulated. The task and maintenance inputs were varied (as described below) to create different hypothetical situations, some of which involved a potential conflict. The three dependent variables measured the degree to which the participant was likely to use social influence, ignore the situation, or engage in negotiation. In addition to the manipulated independent variables, we measured participants’ collectivism as a predictor variable. The operationalizations of all the study variables are described subsequently.

General procedure

In this study, we employed a scenario methodology (adapted from Bond et al., 1982) with different versions of a one-page scenario to set the stage for the conflict. The Spanish versions of the scenarios and questionnaires were translated and back-translated by native speakers to ensure accuracy. Each scenario described a work situation in which the respondents have been working in a team, and the readers are told that teamwork has become a significant part of each member’s job. To make the scenario close to real-life work conditions, we kept the descriptions general enough to be applicable to projects in many different types of jobs and industries. Specifically, the scenario read “Imagine that you have been working in a group on a special project related to improving the quality of the work in your area”.

Subsequent to this description came the manipulations. We explicitly manipulated in-group/out-group membership, as well as maintenance and task inputs, while we measured collectivism and individual preferences for the three different conflict resolution strategies—use of social influence, ignoring the situation, and negotiation. The task and maintenance manipulations that created the conflict scenario were adopted from the Bond et al. (1982) study and were used as part of a larger study in which reward generosity of a team member was also studied. Instructors randomly distributed the scenario-based survey as a voluntary in-class exercise.

Measures and manipulations

Independent variables

Country, collectivism, task inputs, maintenance inputs, and in-group–out-group membership were the study’s independent variables. Country, reflecting the nationality of the students, was coded 0 and 1 for the United States and Mexico, respectively.

Collectivism was measured using a shortened version of the scale developed by Wagner (1995). Respondents indicated, using 7-point scales (1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree), the extent to which they agreed with statements such as “I prefer to work with others in a group rather than working alone,” and “Working with a group is better than working alone.” The coefficient α for this 5-item scale was 0.73.

Manipulations

Participants read one of two descriptions of a team member’s (“Pat” in the United States or “C. López” in Mexico) contributions to a group project. To create a conflict situation, the coworker either provided low task-related contributions or low maintenance-related contributions or both. For example, in the low task condition, the coworker was described as providing irrelevant and misleading suggestions and low quality work. The scenario read “Pat often made irrelevant and misleading suggestions to the group. Pat rarely corrected or sharpened other members’ ideas. The quality of Pat’s finished work was typically low and had to be improved by the other group members.” Similarly, in the low maintenance condition, the coworker was described as being unfriendly and inconsiderate. Here the scenario read:

Pat was not very friendly nor considerate toward other members in group meetings. Pat did not encourage other members to make suggestions nor did Pat help them when they were mistaken. Moreover, Pat was not helpful in trying to resolve conflicts among group members nor maintain the harmony of the group.

We specifically analyzed only the scenarios that represented low levels of either maintenance or task contributions or both, as these were the scenarios which created a potential conflict to be resolved.

Participants also read one of two possible paragraphs that described the coworker as either part of their out-group, that is, they did not know each other outside the project or as an in-group member, that is, the coworker was a colleague who is also a good friend. This manipulation is consistent with previous operationalizations of in-group–out-group membership (Earley, 1993) in stable groups, including friendships (Triandis et al., 1988). The in-group and out-group conditions were dummy coded using effects coding (0 and 1).

Dependent variable

Using the Lind et al. (1994) study as a model, we choose to study the use of social influence, the possibility of ignoring the situation, and negotiation. As noted earlier, these were chosen given expected differences based on collectivism/individualism. After participants read their scenario, they were given descriptions of the three conflict resolution strategies. We had participants rate their willingness to use each procedure to deal with the conflict. Following this rating, we also asked participants to rate the degree to which using a specific strategy would likely lead to a fair result or help maintain a harmonious relationship. This would allow us to understand the degree to which these perceptions affect their preferences for different conflict resolution strategies.

Manipulation checks

To ensure our manipulations had their intended effects, we conducted manipulation checks. To check for maintenance inputs, we included a question that asked participants whether their coworker was considerate. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) yielded a main effect for maintenance inputs (F _1,223 = 306.06, p < 0.001). The means showed that participants’ responses in the high maintenance condition were significantly higher (Xs = 5.36 and 1.75, respectively). Similarly, a question was included with regards to whether the coworker contributed to the group’s work. An ANOVA showed a significant main effect for task inputs (F _1,223 = 166.68, p < 0.001), and the participants’ means in the high task condition were significantly higher (Xs = 5.85 and 3.08, respectively). We subsequently only used the conditions where the task or maintenance input was low as this created the conflict situation. Finally, to confirm the in-group–out-group manipulation, an ANOVA was conducted on two questions that asked respondents whether the target member was similar to them, with group manipulation as a main effect. The main effect for in-group–out-group was significant (F _1,222 = 112.76, p < 0.001); the means showed that participants in the in-group perceived Pat (in the United States) or C. López (in Mexico) to be more similar to them (Xs = 4.87 and 3.08, respectively).

Results

Prior to testing the hypotheses, it is important to note that we assumed Mexicans are more collectivistic than their US counterparts. To verify this, we conducted an ANOVA in which the independent variable was country identification and the dependent variable was collectivism. This ANOVA showed that Mexicans were generally more collectivistic than US participants (Xs = 5.32 and 4.74, respectively), and this difference was significant (F _1,222 = 26.29, p < 0.001).

The correlations for all the variables, their means, and standard deviations are shown in Table 1. Because our experiment used a mixed model design, we conducted a repeated measure ANOVA of the procedural preferences ratings. This mixed model factorial analysis was used to test hypotheses 1–4. We first conducted overall tests of each main effect and interaction and then ran individual effects tests if the overall test was significant. Regression analyses were used to tests hypotheses 5–7.

Table 1.

Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix.

Variables	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Country of origin	0.38	0.49	—
2. Gender	0.51	0.54	0.10	—
3. Age (>25)	0.46	0.50	−0.69**	−0.11	—
4. Collectivism	4.96	0.87	0.33**	−0.09	−0.09	—
5. Group status manipulation	0.48	0.50	−0.00	0.05	0.07	−0.031	—
6. Task manipulation	0.32	0.47	0.01	−0.04	0.07	0.08	0.01	—
7. Maintenance manipulation	0.33	0.47	0.03	0.07	−0.11	−0.02	−0.01	−0.49**	—
8. Use of social influence	3.36	1.97	0.32**	−0.18*	−0.19**	0.38**	0.09	−0.07	0.04	—
9. Ignore the situation	2.49	1.76	−0.07	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.13	0.07	−0.03	0.08	—
10. Negotiate	5.57	1.33	0.31**	−0.16*	−0.18**	0.37**	0.05	0.06	0.12	0.10	−0.25**

Note: N = 225.

*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.

Hypothesis 1 predicted that Mexican participants would favor the use of social influence more than US participants. Hypothesis 2 predicted that Mexicans would also be more willing to ignore the situation. Finally, hypothesis 3 predicted that US participants would be more likely to prefer to engage in negotiation with their coworker. The analysis showed a significant procedure main effect (F(2, 211) = 196.51, p < 0.000 as well as a significant country by procedure interaction (F(2, 211) = 9.417, p < 0.000.) The effect size for the procedure main effect is significantly larger than the other effects. This was also the case in Lind et al.’s (1994) experiment. It does appear that subjects distinguish among the procedures and prefer some of them above others. To better understand the interaction between country and procedure preference, we conducted separate ANOVAs on the preference ratings for each procedure. A follow-up ANOVA on social influence indicates that country of origin was a significant predictor of the likelihood of using this conflict resolution strategy. Consistent with hypothesis 1, Mexicans were generally more likely to prefer using this strategy than US participants (Xs = 4.16 and 2.86, respectively), and this difference was significant (F _1,224 = 25.44, p < 0.001). An ANOVA on the likelihood that a participant would ignore the situation indicated that country of origin was not a significant predictor, so hypothesis 2 was not supported. Finally, an ANOVA on the likelihood that a participant would use negotiation showed that country was a significant predictor of the preference to negotiate (F _1,224 = 23.34, p < 0.001) but contrary to our expectations in hypothesis 3, the Mexican participants were more willing to engage in negotiation (Xs = 6.09 and 5.25, respectively).

Hypothesis 4 predicted a significant country by group status effect, such that Mexicans will be more willing to ignore a situation when the potential conflict is with an in-group member than an out-group member. We ran an ANOVA including both country and group on this conflict resolution strategy. The interaction was not significant, indicating that hypothesis 4 was not supported. Overall, it appears that our hypotheses related to ignoring the situation as a conflict resolution strategy were not supported.

To test hypotheses 5–7, we ran regression analyses entering age, gender, and country in the first step; collectivism, perceptions that the conflict resolution strategy would lead to fair outcomes or harmonious relationships in the second step; and where appropriate, predicted interactions in the third step. Given the interaction effects and potential for multicollinearity issues, we centered the variables that would be used in interactions. We also entered gender as a control, given previous research that has shown gender differences in negotiating styles (e.g. Babcock and Laschever, 2009; Sadri and Rahmatian, 2003). Age was also entered as a control due to the differences in age between the two samples. Results are shown in Table 2.

Table 2.

Results of regression analyses.

Variables	Use of social influence			Negotiation
	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3
	β(t)	β(t)	β(t)	β(t)	β(t)	β(t)
Age	−0.01 (−0.18)	−0.10 (−1.72)	−0.10 (−1.52)	0.01 (0.14)	−0.02 (−0.26)	−0.02 (−0.30)
Gender	−0.23 (−3.65)**	−0.07 (−1.41)	−0.06 (−1.30)	0.08 (1.22)	0.06 (0.94)	0.04 (0.68)
Country	0.34 (4.41)**	−0.10 (−1.54)	−0.10 (−1.66)	0.30 (3.71)**	0.13 (1.66)	0.15 (1.91)*
R ²	0.16			0.08
Collectivism		0.17 (3.41)**	0.18 (3.50)**		0.2 (5.12)**	0.19 (2.82)**
Fair outcomes		0.54 (8.08)**	0.55 (8.12)**		0.17 (2.39)⁺	0.18 (2.55)**
Harmonious relations		0.18 (2.93)*	0.18 (2.89)*		0.24 (3.14)	0.2 (2.56)**
R ²		0.54			0.27

Collectivism × harmonious relations			0.04 (0.9)
Country × fair outcomes						−0.15 (−2.46)*
R ²			0.54			0.29
Overall model F	13.74	43.66	33.06	7.75	14.8	13.85
Adjusted R ²	0.15	0.54	0.54	0.08	0.27	0.29
Standard error	1.82	1.35	1.34	1.25	1.11	1.10
Degree of freedom	3,220	6,217	7,216	3,218	6,215	7,214

Note: United States = −1, Mexico = 1.

β coefficients reported are from each step of the hierarchical regression.

⁺ p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.

To test hypothesis 5 whereby collectivism is expected to mediate the relationship between country and the likelihood of using a conflict resolution strategy, we conducted a Sobel test (MacKinnon et al., 1995). It is worth noting that the ANOVAs above show that country is related to both the use of social influence and negotiation. In addition, our correlation matrix shows a significant relation between collectivism and both the use of social influence and negotiation. Given that country was not a predictor of the likelihood of ignoring the situation, we did not test for mediation in this relationship. As shown in Table 2, country as a predictor of the likelihood to use social influence was significant in step 1 of the regression but became insignificant in step 2, once collectivism was entered. This suggests a full mediation effect. In addition, the Sobel test statistic (Z = 2.65, p < 0.01) revealed that collectivism mediates the relationship between country and the use of social influence. Furthermore, we ran the mediation test suggested by Preacher and Hayes (2008). We used the MEDIATE macro developed by Hayes to run the Monte Carlo confidence intervals. This method generates 90% Monte Carlo confidence intervals for the indirect effect using 10,000 samples. This additional analysis was conducted given recent recommendations on testing mediation effects (Hayes, 2009; Preacher and Hayes, 2008). The analysis showed a significant indirect effect from country to preference via collectivism and the 90% confidence intervals excluded zero (lower: 0.1365, upper: 0.4252). Results indicate that the indirect effect of country on the dependent variables via collectivism was significant.

Similarly, country as a predictor of the likelihood to engage in negotiation became a nonsignificant variable in step 2 when collectivism was entered into the regression and collectivism was a significant predictor. These results suggest a full mediation effect, as country was no longer a significant predictor. The Sobel test statistic (Z = 2.28, p < 0.05) revealed that collectivism mediates the relationship between country and the use of negotiation. Furthermore, the mediation test developed by Hayes using Monte Carlo confidence intervals showed a significant indirect effect from country to preference via collectivism and the 90% confidence intervals excluded zero (lower: 0.2214, upper: 0.5667). Thus, results indicate that the indirect effect of country on the dependent variables via collectivism was significant.

Hypothesis 6 predicted a significant interaction between collectivism and the perception that a conflict resolution strategy would lead to a harmonious relations for both the use of social influence and ignoring the situation, as these were predicted to be of a stronger preference for Mexicans due to their level of collectivism. Given the lack of findings on the strategy of ignoring the situation, we did not test this relationship on that strategy. We did test the interaction on the use of social influence. As shown in Table 2, the interaction is not significant; it appears that a belief that it would lead to more harmonious relationships is not the reason that collectivists prefer to use social influence. Indeed, individuals might be aware that a strategy such as using pressure from friends may lead to the desired outcome while not necessarily leading to more harmony and respect among the individuals.

Finally, hypothesis 7 predicted a significant interaction between country and the perception that engaging in negotiation would lead to a fair outcome. There was a significant country by perception of fair outcome interaction. To interpret the significant interaction effect, we performed a median split on perceptions of fairness and crossed it with the country of origin variable. When US participants believed that negotiation was unlikely to produce a fair outcome (low fairness perceptions), their preference for negotiation was lower (X = 4.82) as compared to when they believed it would lead to a fair outcome (X = 5.8). In contrast, there was no real difference in preference for negotiation for Mexicans regardless of their beliefs that negotiation would lead to a fair outcome.

Discussion

This study sought to investigate differences among Mexican and US participants in their use of conflict resolution or negotiating styles but more importantly, the study investigates what factors explain the preferences. Our study includes but is not limited to studying collectivism but also understanding the role of perceptions of fairness and likelihood of achieving a harmonious outcome. Our results lead us to three major conclusions. First, Mexicans, compared to US participants, appear to have a preference for both the use of social influence and negotiating when confronting a conflict with a coworker. Moreover, collectivism helps explain these country differences. More specifically, it appears that collectivism mediates the relation between country and conflict resolution strategy preference in the case of social influence and negotiation. Third, as previous research indicates, fairness is a critical component of the US culture; perceptions of fairness had a stronger influence on the preference that US participants had for negotiation as a conflict resolution strategy. On the other hand, for Mexicans, such beliefs that negotiation would lead to a fair outcome did not make a strong difference in their preference for negotiation as a conflict resolution strategy. Interestingly, the degree to which a specific strategy would lead to harmonious relations did not help explain the choices of collectivists. Each conclusion is discussed as follows.

First, we expected Mexicans to be more prone to prefer the use of social influence as well as ignoring the situation, whereas we expected US participants to prefer negotiation. Indeed, Mexicans did prefer the use of social influence. Moreover, and key to understanding the use of this tactic, subsequent analyses indicate that it is their levels of collectivism that explain their likelihood of using social influence. Such results support previous research indicating that collectivist societies such as Mexico and several Asian countries appear to prefer less confrontational and direct conflict resolution strategies as compared to their Western, specifically US counterparts. It seems logical that rather than confront coworkers directly, a collectivist might choose to resort to having others intervene and ensure that the process saves “face” (Ting-Toomey, 1985, 1988). It is important to note that by measuring an individual’s collectivistic orientation at the individual level, we are able to test that the country effects are specifically attributable to this cultural value. This finding may apply to collectivists in general. Thus when dealing with conflict, a collectivist may choose to use less confrontational means and in fact resort to using their social networks to resolve the conflict. Future research should measure and test the cultural value and expand to include different types of collectivistic and individualistic orientations (e.g. both vertical and horizontal). In addition, newer orientations such as contextualism, which focuses on the importance of context, and has been tied to in-group favoritism, trust, and corruption (Owe et al., 2013) can be studied with relationship to conflict resolution preferences.

Surprisingly, Mexicans did not have a stronger preference than their US counterparts in terms of their willingness to ignore a situation. Indeed, both groups had a very low preference for the use of this technique. Furthermore, we had expected an interaction between country of origin and group status on this conflict resolution strategy. Specifically, we expected Mexicans to be more willing to ignore a situation when the coworker was an in-group member, and this prediction was not supported.

Contrary to our expectations, Mexicans, and not US participants, were also more likely to prefer using negotiation to deal with a conflict with a coworker. We expected US participants to prefer this strategy given that it is perceived to be more confrontational and direct, and previous research indicates US samples appear to prefer such strategies. Furthermore, collectivism also explained the preference that Mexicans had for this strategy. In looking back at the definition given of negotiation, we realized that the focus of the definition was “negotiate with the other person to try to find a compromise that both of you will find acceptable.” In hindsight, this is reflective of research that notes that Mexicans are more willing to use collaborative styles (Gabrielidis et al., 1997). Our hypothesis was based on the belief that negotiation was a more direct approach and, therefore, Mexicans would be less willing to use it, given that previous research using Asian samples has found a preference for less direct approaches. However, the definition given of negotiation is in alignment with a collaborative approach that may be preferred by collectivists. By measuring and testing the effect of collectivism, we are able to support previous findings and generalize these results past the Mexican culture to individuals with a collectivist orientation.

It may also be that the key difference is in a competitive, more aggressive negotiation approach which was not reflected in our description of negotiation. Hence, a more competitive or aggressive negotiation strategy may be preferred by US participants (e.g. Jehn and Weldon, 1997), whereas a more collaborative negotiation approach may be preferred by the Mexican participants. One final potential explanation lies with Posthuma et al.’s (2006) research that showed that Mexicans used more competing strategies and that, while they were concerned for others, this may not translate to them being willing to concede to others. Future research should try to tease out the reasons behind the choice of negotiation strategy.

Interestingly, our study also showed that for US citizens, the degree to which a conflict resolution strategy may lead to a fair outcome does seem to have a strong influence on their preference for using such a strategy. When US participants believed that negotiation was less likely to lead to a fair outcome, their preference for that strategy was much lower than when they believed that negotiation would lead to a fair outcome. Thus a country’s institutional history may affect preferences in conflict resolution strategies and other attitudes and behaviors in a way above and beyond the role of cultural values.

These findings have important practical implications given the increase in cross-cultural interactions resulting from the globalization of business. Companies could better prepare their employees for dealing with conflict with Mexicans, in specific, but also other collectivists by explaining the different preferences and the cultural value that helps explain such a preference. Indeed, expatriate training could benefit from an understanding of what types of conflict resolution styles are preferred by Mexicans or other collectivist counterparts, but more importantly, understanding the role of the collectivistic value in mediating the preference. This knowledge can even be applied to cultures within the United States. For example, Hispanics within the United States are also considered to hold collectivistic values (Gomez, 2003). These findings may be generalizable to Hispanics within the United States and other ethnic or cultural groups that hold collectivistic orientations. From this study, it is important to note that collectivists will potentially use any collaborative approach or resort to social influence. When negotiating with collectivists, this may be a way to deal with conflict by using people within the person’s social network to influence them. Hence, companies can also better prepare their employees even within the United States about the relationship between values held by other cultures and their preference for certain conflict resolution strategies.

Limitations and conclusions

This study has its limitations. Certainly the use of a scenario-based study, while common in negotiation literature, may be seen as one limitation. The unequal sample size represents another limitation. Furthermore, the use of students might also be seen as a limitation. Nevertheless, these students represent part-time and full-time MBAs. The part-time MBAs are dealing with similar conflict situations at work, while the full-time MBAs will be confronting such situations soon and there is no reason to believe they would act differently from what they indicate in these scenarios. Hence, the results should reflect their cultural orientations. Previous research has successfully used student samples for similar research (Pekerti and Thomas, 2015). In addition, the specific choice of three conflict resolution strategies may be seen as too limiting.

Nevertheless, our study provides clear evidence that there are differences among US and Mexican participants on their choices of conflict resolution strategies. Importantly, collectivism appears to be a critical value in explaining some of these preferences while for the US sample perceptions of fairness are key. While cultural values are often assumed based on the country level, it is important, both theoretically and managerially, to measure these values at the individual level to determine whether they do account for differences in conflict resolution styles. Moreover, these values can operate through different mechanisms, which also need to be better understood in order for negotiators to understand and adapt to cross-cultural negotiation situations. Future research should continue to investigate the reasoning behind specific conflict resolution strategy choices.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

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