Abstract
Simin Davoudi’s (2015) essay gives readers of Planning Theory an insightful and instructive reflection on the practice of knowing. How, in effect, knowledge should be linked with action is aptly summarized in her diagram that clusters four kinds of knowledge—“Knowing what (theories, concepts),” “Knowing how (crafts, skills),” “Knowing to what end (moral choices)” and “Practical judgment (wisdom)” around “Doing (action).” I can’t think of a better conceptualization of the application of the different kinds of knowledge there are, to deciding and committing ourselves to personal and collective action.
My only question is: why is this essay addressed specifically to planning—as in its title: “Planning as practice of knowing”? This implies an undeserved limitation of her conceptualization, which in my view is of much wider and more general (if more abstract) relevance, and why not Law as practice of knowing, Politics as practice of knowing, Design as practice of knowing, Teaching as practice of knowing, Healing as practice of knowing, even Cooking as practice of knowing.
I think I know the answer to my question: the popular definition of planning as linking between knowledge and action (Friedmann, 1987: 38–44). But this definition is problematic: not that it isn’t true, but that it can be just as well applied to other fields (Alexander, 2005). That is why this otherwise excellent essay is replete with statements about knowledge in planning that are equally valid with a substitute subject.
For example (p. 318) “Planners do not uncover facts like geologists, but rather, like lawyers … organize facts … engage in persuasive rational arguments … attached to value objectives” (Hoch, 1994: 105). Why not: Advocates do not uncover facts like geologists, but rather, as lawyers … organize facts … engage in persuasive rational arguments … attached to value objectives. Or: Statespersons-policymakers/Designers/Teachers/Therapists/Chefs do not uncover facts like geologists, but rather, like lawyers … organize facts … engage in persuasive rational arguments … attached to value objectives.
Again (p. 319) “… understanding from within what? In the context of planning … from within the mind of each individual planner … and from within the social rules which render planner’s action with meaning …” Why not: In the context of legal practice…from within the mind of each individual lawyer…and from within the social rules which render lawyers’ actions with meaning … Or: … In the context of politics/design/education/healing/cooking from within the mind of each individual politician/designer/teacher/therapist/chef and from within the social rules which render politicians’/designers’/teachers’/healers’/cooks’ actions with meaning … Similarly, on page 321 “ … praxis … about actors’ (planners’) values and … norms.” The qualification of actors is meaningless and redundant, as is the designation of “planners” in “ … what planners know is … embodied in the actions that they are engaged in.”
On page 322, Davoudi suggests that “Conceptualizing planning as practice of knowing implies that everyone is knowledgeable …” This may be true for one model of planning practice, as it could be for other fields: Conceptualizing law/politics/design/teaching/healing/cooking as practice of knowing implies that everyone is knowledgeable.
But would we as readily agree with “Conceptualizing public health-epidemiology as practice of knowing implies that everyone is knowledgeable … ; Conceptualizing economic monetary policy as practice of knowing implies that everyone is knowledgeable …; Conceptualizing structural-steel bridge design/engineering as practice of knowing implies that everyone is knowledgeable …”; or even “Conceptualizing world-league poker as practice of knowing implies that everyone is knowledgeable …”
I suggest that Davoudi’s wise exposition is really for everyone, and is needlessly addressed to planners. A better title would be “Action as Practice of Knowing,” and the essay would gain by simply substituting “action” and “actors” for “planning” and “planners” wherever they appear in the text. Clearly, it applies to planning—as an identifiable activity—just as it does to other such generic practices as shown in the examples above. But, as the examples also show, it hardly applies to planning in particular—more or differently than to the others.
But is planning this kind of generic practice? If, instead, we think of planning as a set of diverse knowledge-based practices—similar to epidemiology, applied economics, structural design, or championship poker—planners really practice in specified fields: for example, spatial, environmental, transportation or community planning, or social or housing policy. These planning practices are epistemic practices (Alexander, 2016), where planners’ main contribution to the co-construction of knowledge (as illustrated in Davoudi’s diagram) is their epistemic knowledge. This epistemic knowledge (for all her well-founded critique of its limitations) of “what” and “how,” in their respective fields, is the added value of their engagement—as planners—in participative planning for collective action.