Graphic rules in planning: A critical exploration of normative drawings starting from zoning maps and form-based codes

Abstract

This article is focused on the rules that we create using drawings (designs, pictures, paintings, etc.) which will be termed ‘graphic rules’. Its attention is therefore not simply on the use of images in normative documents but also ‘as law’. We will delve into one of these types of graphic rules: that is, graphic rules used in urban planning. The fact that graphic rules are widespread in planning practices, and indeed typical of them, makes rules of this kind a particularly significant field of interest for planning theory. An important point to stress is that while analysis of images used descriptively has been under way for some time (although in many respects it is anything but conclusive, despite what is generally thought), analysis of images used as rules is still in its infancy. To gain deeper understanding of these particular and widespread forms of (graphic) rules is therefore both theoretically and practically important.

Keywords

form-based codes graphic rules non-sentential thought normative drawings normativity planning theory zoning maps

Marumda was a man-like being who lived in a cloud house […]. He called Kuksu a brother […]. Marumda suggested to Kuksu that they make the world […]. Marumda had a pipe with designs on it. Everything on the pipe corresponded to things as they would appear on the earth. Marumda pointed out where everything should be. In one place the forests, in another the brush, in still another place the water. All this as marked on the pipe […]. Marumda went around the earth to see if the water and mountains were placed correctly, according to the designs he had upon his pipe.

Loeb (1926)

Introduction: graphic rules in planning

This article¹ is focused on the rules/regulations that we create using drawings (designs, pictures, paintings, etc.) which will be termed ‘graphic rules’ or ‘graphic regulations’ (other terms that may be used are ‘iconic rules/regulations’, ‘drawn rules/regulations’, ‘pictorial rules/regulations’). In short, we are not interested here in the use of images in normative documents but as law. As Ruth Millikan (2009) writes, ‘Most theories of representation deal with descriptive representations only – with representations that are designed to represent facts. But directive representations are certainly equally important’ (p. 396).

In today’s world, we are surrounded by graphic rules of all kinds, for instance, political maps (that specify jurisdictional boundaries); particular aeronautical charts (e.g. ‘no-fly zones’ maps); specific flood maps determining, for instance, the applicability of insurance programmes; traffic signs and other kinds of visual cues (e.g. the ‘No smoking’ sign in a public space); certain elements of land-use plans and of building codes (Monmonier, 2010).

In this article, we will delve into one of these types of graphic rules: that is, graphic rules used in urban planning.² As well known, this is a field in which graphic rules are usually widely used. Stephen Miller (2013) notes,

It is expected that law […] is a textual discipline, and that no matter what the law’s subject, the legal discourse will be conducted in words, and that the meaning of law will depend upon textual interpretation. There are several areas of law, however, that challenge that general supposition, and where the visual is as important as the text in framing the law and rendering legal decisions. Among those are the allied fields of law that deal with building, construction, architecture, planning, developing, preserving, and otherwise creating the places where we live. (p. 183)

In short, ‘More than the law generally, the law of cities has embraced the visual’ (Miller, 2013: 191).³

The fact that graphic rules are widespread in planning practices, and indeed typical of them, makes rules of this kind a particularly significant field of interest for planning theory. An important point to stress is that while analysis of images used descriptively has been under way for some time (although in many respects it is anything but conclusive – Camp, 2007; Johnson, 2014; Maynard, 2005 – despite what is generally thought), analysis of images used as rules is still in its infancy – both in general and in the specific field of planning theory.⁴ As Patrick Maynard (2014) observes, ’graphic norms seems an original topic’, which ’has to date received little attention’.

There is clearly a form of ‘verbal-centrism’ dominating the general discussions on the mechanisms of interaction and communication (De Rosa and Farr, 2001) and in the area of rules and legal regulations in particular (Boehme-Neßler, 2011; Braverman, 2010; Dudek, 2015; Feigenson and Spiesel, 2009). As Irus Braverman (2010) observes, ‘Text, rather than images or visions, is … the center of legal attention’ (p. 174).⁵ However, as we will seek to show, conceptions of interpretation of law ‘which adopt a vision that a legal norm … is an object of purely linguistic nature are inadequate’ (Dudek, 2015: 363).

After clarifying three preliminary points, we will focus on two particularly relevant examples in the planning realm (orthodox zoning maps and recent form-based codes) (section ‘Three preliminary clarifications and two main examples’). We will then adopt a typological approach to suggest three possible classifications of graphic rules in land-use plans and building regulations (section ‘Three possible classifications of graphic rules: according to degree of iconicity, kind of normativity, form of coercion’). Thereafter, we will discuss four main questions raised by this phenomenon (section ‘Four main questions on graphic rules: logics, semantics, pragmatics, philosophy-of-mind’) and consider some lessons to be learned for the planning field in particular (section ‘Conclusion: implications for planning theory and practice’).

The main theses of the article are the following. First, graphic rules are more widespread and important than usually recognized by, in particular, philosophers of law and legal thinkers (who generally assume, explicitly or implicitly, that rules are formulated in words). Second, investigating further the nature and peculiarities of graphic rules is not only theoretically important but also essential for planning practices. As evidenced, graphic rules have been traditionally used in planning practices; today, there is even an increase in their use.⁶ This calls for a more critical understanding of them and their specificities: for instance, of the advantages of using them as well as the risks.

In general terms, we believe it is time to accept the idea that pictorial communication is not necessarily ‘parasitic’ on verbal communication (i.e. always subordinate to language and conceivable as possible only after linguistic communication has been taken for granted: Frixione and Lombardi, 2015: 139). Rather, we can use both words and pictures in order to communicate – even normative contents. In this perspective, the main purpose of this article is not to suggest using more normative images than normative linguistic sentences in plans and building codes; it is instead to advocate greater awareness of the peculiarities of both and of how they can complement each other.

Three preliminary clarifications and two main examples

Which power, which stage, which prescriptivity?

In order to prevent misunderstandings, it is important to clarify three crucial points in advance.

First, it is important to stress that drawn rules exercise power in two main ways: first, they shape, influence, public opinion (i.e. they have a sort of rhetorical power, a persuasive role; they are parts of ‘storytelling’ activities about desirable socio-spatial futures; they construct ‘narratives’: Ivory, 2013; Van Dijk, 2011); second, they indicate to people what are the contours and the content of the (legal) ‘nomosphere’ (e.g. what they can or cannot, must or must not, do in certain places: Lorini, 2014). Here, we will focus only on the latter aspect.

Second, we are not interested here in the wider planning process within which drawings and designs are used in a plurality of ways (to explore possible futures, to imagine alternative scenarios, to test the physical effects of certain choices in advance and so on: Van Assche et al., 2012), but merely on their final normative role. In short, we are not focused here on the process of arriving at a plan, but on the final plan as a normative (legal) act. We do not assume that one can – and must – conflate planning and legal planning documents; the legal dimension of plans is simply our selective focus in this article.

Third, in the case of graphic rules, we do not simply have ‘signs’ that merely evoke or defer to other word-made regulations: graphic rules directly state prescriptions and influence possible behaviour. This is indisputably the case of traffic signs: ‘When one sees an arrow bearing left he [sic] bears left. For all practical purposes the arrow is the law’ (Nutting, 1964: 781). But it is true for land-use planning as well: In a lawsuit regarding district boundaries, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US) stated, for instance, that ‘the Map, not the accompanying text, defines the districts and must be used to determine their boundaries’ (Coastal Property Associates, Inc. v. Town of St. George, 1992). In brief, in many counties and cities, the zoning map is the legal means that identifies district boundaries and district options and constraints (Miller, 2013). According, for instance, to the 2014 Delaware Code (Title 9, Chapter 49, Subchapter II ‘The Quality of Life Act’, § 4951), ‘The land use map or map series forming part of the comprehensive plan … shall have the force of law’. Similarly, in many countries, subdivision maps legally subdivide single parcels into lots. In a lawsuit regarding this kind of subdivisions, the Court of Appeal of California (US) stated that the acceptance ‘of a final tract map for a normal subdivision automatically converts what was formerly a single parcel into as many separate lots as appear on the tract map’ (County of Los Angeles v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 1970).

Orthodox zoning maps and recent form-based codes

Clearly, traditional land-use planning is not just about mapping the current land covers and land uses through ‘descriptive maps’; land-use planning typically determines also how the land will be used in the future through what have been named ‘normative maps’, ‘prescriptive maps’, ‘imperative maps’ or ‘restrictive maps’.

Both descriptive maps and normative maps use graphic signs and symbols. They serve as graphic codes for storing and retrieving data in a two-dimensional framework (Monmonier, 1991). Graphic symbols on maps usually have three geometric categories and six visual variables. The geometric categories are point symbols, line symbols or area symbols. Point symbols mark the location of something; line symbols show contours and shapes; area symbols depict the form and size of plots of land. As regards the six visual variables, map symbols (point, line or area symbols) can differ in size, shape, grey-tone value, texture, orientation and hue (Monmonier, 1991: 18–24).

Turning to the effect of normative maps on the urban landscape, three typical kinds of graphic rules in orthodox land-use plans are, for instance, the following. First, there are graphic rules that section up the territory into zones of a similar nature (marking borders and subdivisions on a map). Second, there are graphic rules introducing different options – for instance, different development rights – in the various zones (introducing grids or different colours on the map where the various zones are marked out). Third, there are graphic rules that identify land (marking out a particular plot of land by means of a two-dimensional graphic sign on a map) that should be expropriated for reasons of the public interest. Together, these kinds of graphic rules create traditional comprehensive zoning maps (Figure 1). Observe that this traditional way of regulating – and of thinking about regulation – is typically two-dimensional, while the city is a three-dimensional reality (Kim, 2013).

Figure 1.

Zoning map, Seattle, 1923.

It is interesting to note that the recent ‘innovative’ (zoning-integrative) transfer of development rights device (Chiodelli and Moroni, 2016) also depends upon normative maps defining the sending and receiving areas. Effectively, it is the map that defines the sending and receiving areas. See, for instance, the Village of Los Ranchos (New Mexico, US) Transfer of Development Rights Regulations (chapter 9): ‘The residential sending area and commercial receiving area map is attached to this Section. The sending areas and receiving areas shown on that map are hereby created, established and adopted’.

Apart from normative maps like zoning maps, land-use plans employ also more iconic drawings, such as diagrams and pictorial images. This is a more recent trend, linked in particular with the spread of the New Urbanism movement. In this perspective, new, prevalently visual codes are employed to regulate the form of the built environment, but not necessarily – as in conventional zoning – its uses (Russell, 2004). In short, New Urbanism regulation provides more flexibility as regards uses while being more prescriptive about urban design. In these cases, ‘it is often the visual diagram itself that conveys the regulations that define proposed development’ (Miller, 2013: 217).

Figure 2.

Wall sign, Redmond Zoning Code, 2011.

Typical of New Urbanism are so-called form-based codes (Duany and Talen, 2001; Geller, 2010; Parolek et al., 2008; Sitkowski and Ohm, 2006; Talen, 2013; Walters, 2007). In 2013, there were over 200 adopted form-based codes in the United States and about 120 in the development stage (Talen, 2013). Form-based codes ‘are very graphic in their presentation. This is in direct contrast to previous generations of codes that were not only excessively long and bureaucratic but failed to provide any clues as to how rules would translate into physical form’ (Talen, 2012: 187). In the case of form-based codes, there is a closer ‘plastic proximity’ between the graphic rule and the reality that should correspond to it. In short, ‘form-based codes are graphics laden’ (Garvin and Jourdan, 2008: 420); they are ‘picture laden codes’ (Garvin and Jourdan, 2008: 421).⁷

Three possible classifications of graphic rules: according to degree of iconicity, kind of normativity, form of coercion

Following the above analysis of certain land-use and building regulations, we can now suggest three possible classifications of graphic rules (each time taking a different feature into consideration).

First typology: degree of iconicity

A first possible classification is represented by the degree of ‘iconicity’ of graphic rules (Gabellini, 1996a; Judge, 2006; Krampen, 1983).⁸ As well known, signs are usually distinguished among symbols, icons and indices (Peirce, 1906); the third category, indices, is of least relevance to our discussion, so we will focus on symbols and icons.

Symbols, such as spoken or written language signs, are arbitrary, purely conventional and have no resemblance to the thing being signified. Icons, such as drawings and pictures, in some way resemble the signified thing. In other words, some features of icons are partially constrained by the referent itself: ‘Each icon partakes of some more or less overt character of its object’ (Peirce, 1906: 496).

Figure 3.

Screening of utility vaults and mechanical equipment, Redmond Zoning Code, 2011.

Icons therefore ‘parallel’ the real world, offering a more direct connection to the object to which they refer, but this is a graded feature. In other words, certain designs have a low degree of ‘iconicity’ (such as the subdivisions of areas in a zoning map), while others have medium ‘iconicity’ (such as the diagram of maximum and minimum heights of a building), and still others have a high degree of ‘iconicity’ (such as a drawing that prescribes or suggests certain aesthetic features).

In short, less iconic graphic rules are typical of orthodox land-use plans, while more iconic graphic rules (Figures 2 and 3) are typical of recent form-based codes.

Second typology: kinds of normativity

From the point of view of normativity, we can distinguish three fundamental types of graphic rules: regulative, constitutive and technical. This typology of graphic rules is based on a macro-typology of normativity. In this sense, the categories that apply to graphic rules are similar in kind to those generally used for verbal rules, suggesting that this typological division into three has an inherent significance. This typology is of particular interest because it shows that the normative realm cannot be reduced merely – as many times happen in planning theory and practice also – to the deontic realm (i.e. the realm of regulative or deontic rules that qualify our actions in terms of ‘obligatory’, ‘forbidden’, ‘permitted’, etc.: Lapintie, 2007: 48–49).

Regulative graphic rules are those graphic rules that ‘regulate antecedently or independently existing forms of behavior’ (Searle, 1969: 33). Those rules signal to people what they can or cannot, must or must not, do in certain places. For example, in land-use regulations, they include plan indications prescribing the position of new buildings or infrastructures (e.g. private parking areas or private streets). In light of these rules, a behaviour receives a deontic qualification and becomes ‘compulsory’, ‘forbidden’ or ‘permitted’.

Constitutive graphic rules are those graphic rules that, unlike regulative graphic rules, do not regulate behaviours directly. Constitutive rules are rules ‘that “constitute,” that is, in one or another sense “give rise” to, or “create,” new things, mainly, new social (legal, cultural …) things’ (Żełaniec, 2013: 9). Constitutive graphic rules do not produce an event by exerting ‘pressure’ on an individual’s behaviour (i.e. there is no recipient who either must or can conform to the instruction); instead, they alone produce the desired effect, which is their purpose and content: such signs are ends in themselves at the moment when they are created (Carcaterra, 1974). Constitutive graphic rules of this type include what we may call ‘constitutive maps’. These are maps that neither describe (objects) nor prescribe (behaviour), but instead constitute something. This is the case, for example, of maps drawn by legal authorities with the power to define the borders among nation-states. For instance, as Smith and Varzi (2000) observe, when in 1922 Sir Percy Cox (the British High Commissioner) drew lines on a map defining the boundaries of Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Kuwait, ‘he thereby added new non-physical ingredients to the world’ (p. 485). The power of drawing boundaries has been widely recognized in geographical studies.⁹ Included in this category of constitutive rules are also graphic rules indicated in a zoning map that sections the territory off into zones/districts. Barry Smith (1995) suggests the term fiat objects to denote those entities which owe their existence to acts of human decision or fiat: fiat objects are ontologically dependent upon human fiat. To conclude, it is evident here that the performative function conceptualized by J. L. Austin (1962) can be accomplished not only by sentences but also by drawings: rephrasing Austin’s expression, one may thus speak of performative drawings (‘how to do things with drawings’).

Technical graphic rules are those graphic rules that prescribe behaviours so that the aims of the agent can be achieved, that is, rules of the kind ‘If you want K, you must do W’. These rules are conditional in two ways; the formula ‘If you want K, you must do W’ prescribes a certain behaviour that is conditioned both subjectively and objectively: subjectively in that the individual wants to achieve a certain aim, and objectively in that the individual must act in a particular way in order for this aim to be achieved (Conte, 1985). In this sense, technical rules of the type ‘If you want K, you must do W’ can be differentiated from normative prescriptions (i.e. the above-mentioned regulative rules) of the type ‘You ought to do W’. In the former example, we have a technical ought; in the latter, we have a deontic ought (Conte, 1991; Lorini, 1993; von Wright, 1983). Technical regulations therefore prescribe a behaviour not in itself but as the condition for achievement of a possible end. This category comprises, for example, the graphic rules contained in the assembly instructions for furniture – as in the well-known case of IKEA – and technical diagrams – for example, diagrams for the construction of an electric circuit (on technical rules with specific reference to planning, see Chiodelli, 2011).

The distinction among regulative, constitutive and technical (graphic) rules makes it possible to visualize a general typology of drawings that highlights three different kinds of normative drawing (see Figure 4).

Figure 4.

A typology of drawings.

Third typology: Forms of coercion

In regard to the form of coercion, we can distinguish between at least two different kinds of graphic rules.

First is mandatory graphic rules. These entail direct negative sanctions if they are not observed. An example is a colour on a map indicating that no one can build in a certain urban zone.

Second is non-mandatory graphic rules. In such cases, behaviours are not imposed, but only proposed (Gabellini, 1996a, 1996b).¹⁰ An example is a particular architectural shape that a picture suggests as desirable for certain kinds of buildings. We can distinguish two sub-classes. In the first case, no sanction at all (neither direct nor indirect, neither negative nor positive) operates. In the second case, only indirect positive sanctions operate (for instance, conforming to these rules grants a simplified and faster permit process).

Four main questions on graphic rules: logics, semantics, pragmatics, philosophy-of-mind

Our discussion on graphic rules prompts five more general classes of questions: ontological, logical, semantic, pragmatic and philosophy-of-mind questions. The first question (i.e. What kind of ‘entity’ is a rule? In what does the ‘reality’ of rules consist?) is mentioned here only for the sake of completeness; it is not thoroughly addressed because it is only indirectly relevant to planning theory and practice.¹¹ The main focus will be on the other four questions, which have much more direct implications for the latter field.

Logics: contents and moods, logical inferences, conflicts

We have three crucial logical questions. The first question is this: Is it possible to distinguish between the phrastic and the neustic¹² of images as can be done for the sentences of language? We may say that the phrastic of an image is what we normally take to be its content independently of the mood (descriptive or imperative), for example, (the depiction of) a particular plot of land, while the neustic is the attitude that its author wants us to take towards this content (Guter, 2009: 91). In this regard, one may also inquire as to what is – and where is – the ‘sign’, ‘the indicator’, of normativity in this case, that is, the element which characterizes deonticity in normative drawings. (As well known, in norms expressed in words, such indicators are, for instance, certain verbs: ‘must’, ‘ought to’, etc.) In the case of drawings, ‘indicators’ of normativity are particular colours or hatchings, superimposed pictorial signs like a diagonal line and so on.¹³

The second question is as follows. Since the work of Georg Henrik von Wright (1951), numerous systems of deontic logic have been devised to grasp the logic of deontic sentences. Actually, it is usually assumed that logical relations are relations between (linguistic) sentences. The problem is this: Might there not also be a logic of deontic drawings, a logic of graphic rules? Inquiry into this question is still at its beginnings. Some first indications on how to proceed are provided by the pioneering works by Franciszek Studnicki (1970), Jan Westerhoff (2005) and Elisabeth Camp (2007). These studies suggest that pictorial systems – and not sentential systems alone – employ recurrent parts and use systematic combinatorial rules. Diagrammatic representational systems, for instance, Euler circles and Venn diagrams, combine formal elements (circles, lines, arrows, etc.) according to systematic rules and are governed by formal rules of inference (Goel et al., 2010; Gurr, 1999; Gurr et al., 1998; Howse et al., 2001). Cartographic representational systems also employ recurrent elements (point signs, line signs, area signs, etc.) and systematic combinatorial rules to express systematically related contents (Blumson, 2012; Camp, 2007).

The third question (obviously connected with the second) is this: As happens for written rules, can a possible clash – conflict, contradiction – arise between two graphic rules? The answer is that a real contradiction is possible between graphic rules. This issue is particularly important in the implementation of urban plans, in which graphic rules at different cartographic scales may conflict with each other (urban plans often include normative maps drawn on different scales for purely functional reasons). We might also ask whether a conflict might arise between the graphic rules and the verbal ones. Here too there are frequent instances of divergence, as in the case of land-use plans, in which discrepancies sometimes arise between the written rules and graphic rules contained in the same plan. Because, as argued, graphic rules are true rules (and not simple materials supplementary to written legal texts), this is a real conflict/contradiction. We cannot escape this problem by simply ‘downgrading’ the nature and role of graphic rules, as for instance happens in certain court- and high-court decisions: see, for instance, the Italian Consiglio di Stato’s ruling no. 673 of 2014, which states

in the case of conflict between graphic indications and the regulatory provisions of the PRG [local land-use plan], the latter shall prevail, for in the interpretation of planning instruments the graphic results may clarify and supplement what is normatively established in the text but not overlap with or gainsay the content of the latter.¹⁴

Semantics: discussing informational and expressive equivalence

In the second place, we have semantic questions. For instance, are linguistic rules and graphic rules interchangeable, or is something lost in translation between one medium and the other;¹⁵ if so, is it a question of ‘contents’ or ‘impact’? It is usually stressed that images have an evocative, emotional force (in general, see Boehme-Neßler, 2011; as regards drawings and designs in plans, see Van Dijk, 2011, and Ivory, 2013) that can be lost if we translate them into conventional linguistic terms. But is this ‘evocative force’ a really crucial issue for rules? Moreover, images have surely an evocative, emotional force, but this is true also as regards words. Hence, it is perhaps better to recognize that images have their specific evocative/emotional force. A difference – more relevant than the evocative force – is that drawings are better in communicating lots of information simultaneously in a compact form (a map, for instance, can easily conjoin information about the location of objects and their properties), while sentential systems are better in dissecting and manipulating abstract concepts (Camp, 2007). As a consequence, even if images and sentences can in principle be translated from one into the other and vice versa, something may be lost in the translation (Boehme-Neßler, 2011; Dudek, 2015; Sober, 1976). On the one hand, as Elliott Sober (1976) writes,

The expressive power of analog pictorial representations extends beyond that of language, which contains at best a countable infinity of distinct representations … Hence, not all pictorial systems are reducible to impoverished linguistic systems of a certain kind. The relation of analog pictorial systems to language is more complicated: With respect to logical operations on representations, linguistic systems are more powerful, but with respect to expressing specifically visual relations between posited objects, linguistic systems can be more impoverished.¹⁶ (p. 139)

On the other hand, it is quite difficult to express on a map – for instance – a power-conferring norm, that is, a meta-norm (of the kind ‘the town council must – or can – revise the land-use plan when conditions X and Y occur or are satisfied’) that we usually easily formulate through words.

Pragmatics: accessibility and appropriateness

In the third place, we have pragmatic questions. At what point and in what case does it become more useful or appropriate to employ graphic rules? In particular, do graphic rules really furnish greater comprehensibility, accessibility and immediacy with respect to lexical ones – as argued, for example, by certain exponents of New Urbanism who advocate their wider use for this reason?

The New Urbanist idea is that in this case, people can see and more easily understand urban rules. ‘Form-based codes are graphic and designed to be easy to use and understand’ (Purdy, 2006: 4). In other words, ‘Form-based zoning codes rely on images, diagrams, and matrixes to make the requirements and physical vision understandable to the general public, government officials, developers, and the professionals who work with them’ (Geller, 2010: 81). Moreover, ‘Use of easy-to-comprehend diagrams and graphics reduce the amount of paper work in a form-based zoning ordinance … The clarity that form-based codes afford alleviates the burden imposed on a developer during the administrative approval process’ (Barry, 2008: 317).

To sum up, are graphic rules really easier and more immediate to grasp? Are they, for instance, more transcultural?¹⁷

The use of zoning maps to divide a territory into districts is usually far easier to understand than an equivalent detailed verbal description of the boundaries and relative location of each zone (moreover, in cases like this, graphic rules are certainly a way to reduce wordiness in law: Dudek, 2015). But is this also true of more iconic graphic rules like axonometric projections or perspective views?¹⁸ The answer seems to be that this is not always true. Especially, normative instructions expressed by axonometric projections or perspective views may be difficult to understand for some. In particular, ‘The more the graphics become too technically detailed … the more they lose the appeal to simplicity’ (Judge, 2006: 1621).

An important point to be stressed here is that, since Aristotle,¹⁹ we tend to think that seeing (objects, images, etc.) is a more immediate and direct activity than reading or hearing (words). But vision is a very complicated process and consists of several passages (Gregory, 2009).²⁰ Visual signals are initially processed by the retina and then interpreted by the brain, for which purpose it uses memories of images and objects already seen, the abilities consciously or unconsciously possessed or acquired and so on (Gregory, 2009). In short, the brain does not receive ready-made images, but only fragments of evidence with which to hypothesize on how matters stand (Arnheim, 1969; Popper and Eccles, 1977). Hence, vision is not passive reception; it always involves active construction. The fact that there are optical illusions able to deceive our visual perception shows that there is nothing immediate, easy and direct in vision. Optical illusions are possible precisely because visual perceptions are hypotheses or conjectures (and as such they may be mistaken because certain of our conscious or unconscious assumptions are wrong, because we inadvertently follow conflicting rules when we interpret something, because we receive ‘data’ through several channels) (Gregory, 2009). Also, visual perception is therefore an interpretation.²¹

As a consequence, graphic rules are not per se more comprehensible, nor are they per se less comprehensible. It depends on habits, contexts and situations that the rule-maker must take seriously in consideration.

Philosophy of mind: the possibility of non-sentential thinking

At this level, and taking a deeper perspective, the crucial question is the following: Do we think in words or through images? The idea that we think ‘in words’ is effectively an old idea. The presupposition that all thinking is in words is widespread (as Hurlburt and Akhter (2008) and Willard (1973) underscore).²² This view assumes that there exists an isomorphism between the structure of language and the structure of thoughts, where language has to be a public language (Bermúdez, 2003: 22). In short, thought is language-like.

However, the possibility of thinking without words has been recognized by recent research, particularly in the fields of cognitive archaeology, developmental psychology and cognitive ethology. Developmental psychologists discovered that pre-linguistic infants possess theories about the surrounding physical world (for instance, about the solidity of objects) and test and refine them through trial-and-error steps. Even in this pre-linguistic period, they do not operate in an unstructured perceptual universe but act as ‘little scientist’ employing a sort of primitive physics (Bermúdez, 2003: 3–4; Hespos and Spelke, 2004). Cognitive archaeologists discovered evidence of thinking behaviours long before the emergence of language. Prehistoric hominids went through evolutionary stages of high-level non-linguistic cognition. Some forms of instrumental cognition were the precondition for the emergence of language, not the other way round (Bermúdez, 2003: 4–5). Cognitive ethologists also recognize the presence of sophisticated thoughts in non-linguistic creatures (Bermúdez, 2007; Fragaszy and Cummins-Sebree, 2005; Watanabe and Huber, 2006).²³ To conclude, we actually engage in various types of non-sentential thinking (Arnheim, 1980; Bermúdez, 2003; Camp, 2007; Fridland, 2015; Pinker, 1994; Vigo and Allen, 2009).

Does this mean that we do not think in words but in images?²⁴ Perhaps not even this is the right answer. Recent research on unsymbolized thinking, for instance, shows that we can have experience of an explicit and differentiated thought that does not include the experience of any symbols (i.e. no words, no images, etc.) (Hurlburt and Akhter, 2008: 1366). Consider also the studies on subsymbolic processes of thought: certain capacities – in particular, categorization, that is, the ability to group together and differentiate items – seem more fundamental for reasoning than any kind of language or symbolism (Vigo and Allen, 2009).

In the end, it seems reasonable to accept the thesis that both words and images are merely aids to our thinking processes (and actions), and not inherent to them.

Conclusion: implications for planning theory and practice

Planning theory has for some time concerned itself primarily with processual aspects to do with interaction (dialogic, communicative) between actors and stakeholders. It seems important to resume critical examination also of planning instruments and tools in themselves. In light of our previous arguments, one may in particular observe as follows.

First, the dichotomy between ‘descriptive drawings’ and ‘normative drawings’ is explained by their different direction of fit (Anscombe, 1957; Austin, 1953; Searle and Vanderveken, 1985). In the case of descriptive drawings, the direction of fit goes from the drawings to the world. It is a drawing-to-world direction of fit: the drawings must ‘correspond’ to the world.²⁵ A geographical map that does not correctly reproduce the geographical area which it represents (i.e. the elements of that area which it represents) must be corrected. In the case of normative drawings, instead, the direction of fit is the reverse: it is a world-to-drawing direction of fit. It is the world that must ‘correspond’ to the drawings, as in the case of the graphic rules of urban plans.

Second, the normative dimension of planning requires attention and particularly close scrutiny. For instance, it is essential to recognize that regulative rules (i.e. deontic rules) represent only one side of normativity; constitutive rules are another crucial (and often underrated) element, and technical rules as well. Constitutive graphic rules are of particular interest. In this case, the fundamental point is that plans and building regulations do not simply prescribe behaviour; they also create new ‘frameworks’ and ‘objects’ (e.g. zones, districts). Observe how, in the case of some constitutive graphic rules, the world cannot but correspond to the drawings. Moreover, the relevance of non-mandatory rules also requires closer attention. Their role – in particular, the role of graphic non-mandatory rules – could be greater than it is today. Non-mandatory graphic rules may, for instance, be very helpful in suggesting architectural solutions without necessarily imposing them.

Third, graphic rules are really rules, and not subsidiary materials. All this means that contradictions between written rules and graphic rules are possible and generate real conflicts. The possibility that real contradictions may be generated requires greater awareness and attention when preparing the various normative components of a plan or a building regulation.

Fourth, both words and images can be useful in building the normative apparatus of a plan: in this regard, it is important to acknowledge the distinctive features of each. For instance, sentential systems are surely better at expressing highly abstract and hierarchically structured (normative) content, but sentential systems have expressive limitations:

Sentential systems are highly digital: they combine discrete, arbitrary symbols in an abstract hierarchical structure. But this in turn means that at any given moment, a given sentential system only has the expressive resources to represent countably many contents: those formed by all the combinations of its syntactic constituents. By contrast, because pictures and maps are analog modes of representation, they are potentially continuous; and as such, they can represent continuously many contents. (Camp, 2007: 172)

In short, sentential systems are prevalently atomistic, while drawings like pictures or maps are prevalently holistic systems with accumulative qualities. Recognizing the strengths and limitations of different expressive systems (linguistic, pictorial, etc.) enables better exploitation of ways to integrate them: Hybrid systems are in many cases useful exactly because they combine the expressive advantages of distinct systems (Camp, 2007: 167).²⁶

Fifth, it is incorrect to believe that graphic rules possess an intrinsically greater immediacy and comprehensibility: also, vision is a form of interpretation that is based on conscious and unconscious knowledge, assumptions and memory. This must be necessarily taken into account both to construct comprehensible and efficacious plans – in a certain period and context – and to prevent possible controversies (also legal: Judge, 2006). The point is not that images are in themselves more opaque; it is rather that both words and images have to be (correctly) interpreted in the relevant context (Frixione and Lombardi, 2015).

Sixth, our mental processes are not intrinsically constituted by words or images; they simply use words and images as tools. We may therefore consider our mind as endowed with a plurality of abilities and tools (Gardner, 1989; Mithen, 1996); it is an intrinsically multi-modal system (Camp, 2007). Essentially, we think neither with words nor with images, but by problems. This confirms the idea that language is not ‘naturally’ prior (and, therefore, that verbal rules have no ‘natural’ priority in themselves), nor are images ‘naturally’ prior (and graphic rules too). Consequently, both languages and images, verbal rules and graphic rules, are mainly ‘instruments’ that we use according to a more fundamental ‘thinking competence’.

To conclude, the aim of this article, with particular reference to the theme of planning regulations, has been to suggest that we broaden our outlook and give greater ground to graphic rules: It seems essential to gain deeper understanding of these particular and widespread forms of regulation. As Michał Dudek (2015: 371) observes, graphic rules are crucial, but, maybe because of their mundane character, they seem to be insufficiently relevant as objects of in-depth study. On the contrary, fulfilling this gap seems to be a valuable enterprise, not only for purely theoretical reasons (Dudek, 2015).

Some observers might consider that certain technological innovations have rendered obsolete some of the distinctions and issues considered here: for example, in the field of planning, advanced GIS (Geographic Information Systems) technology used to create maps (Zui et al., 2014). The reality is that attempts to use GIS technology not only to produce descriptive maps but also, and increasingly, to introduce and express restrictions and rights concerning geospatial objects are encountering problems of the same kind as those raised here (Boer et al., 2007; Hoekstra et al., 2010).²⁷ As Alexander Boer et al. (2007) write in this regard,

A major part of the high quality geospatial data used in GIS actually represents normative statements and positions (claims, titles) relating to space and not existing ‘real’ geographic features. This has consequences for representation and storage of this data … that merits separate research … Work in this area is fairly rare. (p. 58)

Footnotes

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Author biographies

Stefano Moroni is Professor in the Polytechnic University of Milano. He is a member of the Department of Architecture and Urban Studies and writes on planning theory and ethics.

Giuseppe Lorini is Professor in the University of Cagliari. He is a member of the Department of Law and writes on philosophy and theory of law.

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