Abstract
This article proposes a critical reflection on the concept of social innovation, arguing that it can be understood as a ‘magic concept’ as theorized by Pollitt and Hupe. It is a pervasive and positive notion in academia, policies and politics. The notion of social innovation is therefore deconstructed into the characteristics that make it so seductive: the multiplicity of meanings it can take on, its positive normative charge, its ability to generate consensus and its global marketability. This investigation underlines the way in which the understanding of social innovation may have profound repercussions in the ways in which decision-makers are reshaping urban governance.
Introduction
As many scholars have acknowledged, the concept of social innovation has recently re-emerged in a pervasive way in academic, policy and public debate (Jessop et al., 2013; Moulaert et al., 2013, 2017; Moulaert and MacCallum, 2019; Moulaert and Mehmood, 2020; Nyseth and Hamdouch, 2019). Social innovation is not a new term. Godin (2012, 2015) points out that this term already appeared in the 19th century, 1 and then consolidated in the first half of the 20th century with the theories of Tarde (1898) and Schumpeter (1934), as an engine of social change. As Jessop et al. (2013) and Moulaert and MacCallum (2019) point out, the turning point between the old theories of social change and the new theoretical conceptualizations of social innovation began with the emancipation and social movements in the 1960s and 1970s. After this first wave of ‘radical social innovation’ following the Second World War, a second wave occurred between the 1980s and the 2000s, with a particular focus on neighbourhood and community development issues (see Moulaert et al., 1990, 2010).
Currently, we are experiencing a new wave of social innovation, in which governments and public authorities attempt to institutionalize this concept in political agendas and through policy tools.
In the last 20 years, the concept has taken root in a robust manner not only in academia but also in the policy agendas of European liberal democracies, partly due to the central role of the European Union (EU) in promoting policies and research projects in this domain. It is no coincidence that in the early 2000s the number publications containing the term ‘social innovation’ on Google Scholar 2 was in the order of a few dozen, while in 2019 alone there were 556 publications on this topic.
There are several reasons that can explain this increased interest in social innovation. Above all, the economic crisis and the spending review policies
3
that many European countries have had to adopt have forced them to rethink their economic and governance models. In a context of scarcity of public resources and private investments, the ‘social’ connotation of innovation has been considered as a possible and quick-fix and low-cost solution to contemporary economic, social and spatial issues (Van Der Have and Rubalcaba, 2016). The general confidence in the resolving powers of social innovation that has emerged in Europe is clearly expressed in the speech made in 2011 by the former President of the European Commission, José Barroso (2011): [&] Social innovation is for the people and with the people. It is about solidarity and responsibility. It is good for society and it enhances society’s capacity to act. [&] Social innovation, in particular, is an opportunity not to be missed to generate new solutions, to connect with the citizens and to promote a better quality of life. Social innovation should be at the core of our social market economy and also contribute to make our social market economy more competitive [&] (pp. 2–3)
Barroso’s argument underlines a conception of social innovation that is intrinsically linked to the notion of ‘public interest’, 4 where the ‘social’ dimension is understood as a trigger towards community well-being. At the same time, social innovation is also seen as a lever to boost competitiveness and reduce public spending through self-responsibility. Therefore, it is no coincidence that at the European level, the concept of social innovation has been so pervasively promoted under the Barroso European Commission Presidency, which had a clear neoliberal orientation (Tortola, 2016). Some authors have pointed out that in the last decade, many policy-makers at the European, national and municipal levels have been ‘seduced’ by social innovation (see, for instance, Jessop et al., 2013; Vigar et al., 2020). The ‘official discourses’ on social innovation, especially after the global recession, have tended to promote a vision of social innovation as a sort of contemporary panacea. This article aims to investigate by virtue of which characteristics social innovation has become such a pervasive concept in policy-making and the socio-spatial repercussions of this discourse.
The idea of ‘magic concepts’ was theorized in 2011 by Pollitt and Hupe in relation to buzzwords in public management. Following these authors, this article suggests that today social innovation is entering policy agendas as a new ‘magic concept’. This interpretative key can also be extremely useful in planning theory. In this field, a number of contemporary buzzwords are currently widely discussed (for instance, the concepts of sustainability, social capital, resilience or the ‘smart city’ imperative) which can be considered ‘magical’ by virtue of their possible rhetorical advantages and the broad alliances that they are capable of triggering. In this respect, these concepts are also increasingly appealing to national and international institutions and policy-makers.
This article suggests that social innovation can be included among the ‘magic concepts’ through a critical discussion based on the four characteristics identified by Pollitt and Hupe (2011).
According to these authors, the following are the four features that identify a ‘magic concept’:
The broadness of the concept. Namely, the fact that it is not to be attributed to a specific domain, and thus its ability to be a cross-cutting concept, characterized by many different definitions, sometimes even in conflict with each other.
The normative attractiveness of the term. It is a term that embodies a positive connotation, so it is difficult to be against it. It is also characterized by the idea of progress and improvement compared to a previous condition.
The implication of consensus. Closely related with being a broad concept, and having a positive connotation is the fact that this type of concept generates great consensus, and it is difficult to find a conflicting concept.
The global marketability of the concept. The fact that it is a very fashionable notion is used both in academia as well as in policy documents and in public debate. It is often the subject of conferences and new sections or research units within universities and governmental departments.
Social innovation encompasses all the characteristics of a ‘magic concept’, and this perspective is useful in order to understand why and how it is getting increasing attention from policy-makers. In general, being a ‘magic concept’ does not undermine the scientific robustness of social innovation and of the theoretical frameworks that have conceptualized it. Rather, it serves as a warning that these kinds of concept can be easily used for ‘white magic’ as well as ‘black magic’ (Pollitt and Hupe, 2011: 652).
Urban studies and planning theory provide one of the oldest, most grounded and prolific investigations of social innovation processes and practices (see, for instance, Brandsen et al., 2016; Christmann et al., 2020b; Hillier et al., 2004; MacCallum et al., 2009; Moulaert, 2000; Moulaert and Mehmood, 2020; Moulaert and Nussbaumer, 2005; Moulaert et al., 1990, 2013, 2017; Nyseth and Hamdouch, 2019). Research in this field has focused extensively on social innovation as a bottom-up practice and process and, more recently, on ‘bottom-linked’ approaches to social innovation (Eizaguirre et al., 2012; Mehmood, 2016; Pradel et al., 2013), which recognize how institutions can support and facilitate bottom-up initiatives and make them more stable over time. This article suggests, however, that social innovation as a ‘magic concept’ fits into a further strand of inquiry, that of social innovation decided from above. Social innovation promoted by governments precisely because of its ‘magic’ is a relatively unexplored line of research, but it has profound repercussions for urban governance. The opening up of ‘institutional spaces’ for social innovation certainly has the merit of innovating governance models. Nevertheless, it is not clear whether the transformative power of social relations (Avelino et al., 2019) typical of the most radical and ‘bottom-linked’ forms of social innovation is present also in the social innovation promoted by governments or dissolved in mere rhetoric.
To support this argument, the article is divided into three main sections. The first section outlines the concept of social innovation on the basis of the four dimensions that place it among ‘magic concepts’. In this section, the concept of social innovation is analysed in broad terms because it is the fact of having confused disciplinary boundaries that is part of its ‘magic’. Moreover, what influences policy-makers is not a specific conceptualization of social innovation, but the more general (and generic) meanings that social innovation can take on.
The second section explores the consequences of social innovation as a ‘magic concept’ for urban governance. In particular, it argues that the recent attempt by many European national and municipal governments to promote social innovation projects ‘from the top’ is opening up a new line of investigation in the field of urban studies and planning theory.
Finally, in the closing section, the article outlines some perspectives for future studies and warns against possible perversions of the concept – intended as ‘magic’ – in the perspective of the contemporary tension between mere devolution of responsibility to civil society and genuine civic empowerment.
Social innovation and the four dimensions of a ‘magic concept’
First: a broad concept
Defining univocally what social innovation stands for is impossible and probably also a pointless effort because, as many authors have already acknowledged (see, for instance, Brandsen et al., 2016; Cajaiba-Santana, 2014; Grimm et al., 2013; Montgomery, 2016; Moulaert, 2009; Pol and Ville, 2009; Van Der Have and Rubalcaba, 2016), this concept is essentially ambiguous and transdisciplinary in nature. Social innovation as a concept thus ranges across many different disciplines and interpretations in academic and policy literature. Moreover, Moulaert and MacCallum (2019) point out that as the concept of social innovation has gained momentum in contemporary debate ‘formal (and not-so-formal) definitions have multiplied seemingly endlessly according to the specific concerns of authors working within particular disciplines’ (p. 18).
In academic literature, social innovation has been introduced in the domains of economics and business, management studies, creative economy, urban and regional studies, sociology, psychology and political science and other domains, each with its own research perspectives. Among the different ‘academic tribes and territories’ (Becher and Trowler, 2001), each domain proposes its own interpretation of the concept of social innovation (for extensive discursive analysis of social innovation, see for instance: Brandsen et al., 2016; Howaldt and Schwarz, 2010; Rüede and Lurtz, 2012).
In this current wave of social innovation, economic-related conceptualizations of social innovation based on an idea of a solidarity-based economy have become particularly pervasive in the debate (see, for instance, Murray et al., 2010; Pol and Ville, 2009). Some of the most popular definitions of social innovation in this field are very general and even tautological, such as the one proposed by Mulgan (2006): Social innovation refers to innovative activities and services that are motivated by the goal of meeting a social need and that are predominantly diffused through [existing or newly created] organizations whose primary purposes are social. (p. 146)
Within its fuzziness, Mulgan’s definition tends to emphasize the broad dimension of the concept of social innovation. However, in other academic fields such as urban studies and planning, there are more precise and consistent conceptualizations of this term, although with different shades of meaning and/or sub-fields of application. For instance, over the years, Moulaert et al. (2005, 2010, 2013, 2019) have built up a robust theoretical conceptualization of social innovation that considers it as a practice and a process to meet the needs of local communities, in a perspective of bottom-up empowerment and neighbourhood development. Some of the most interesting recent research ramifications in the field of urban studies concern, for example, the linkages between social innovation and sustainable development (Baker and Mehmood, 2015; Mehmood and Parra, 2013), and between social innovation and culture-driven transformation (García et al., 2015; Tremblay and Pilati, 2013). The various applications of this concept show how social innovation can also be a way of understanding a multiplicity of phenomena, processes and practices.
However, the pervasiveness of the discourse on social innovation is not only due to a prolific academic debate but also to a new flourishing of EU grey-literature. Indeed, the EU has played a pivotal role in spreading this concept among member states. Further stimulated by the global economic crisis, social innovation has gained increasing attention in the European Commission agenda (Bonifacio, 2014), in particular, through EU policies and funds, research studies 5 and networking.
The EU’s discourse on social innovation tends to favour a broad understanding of this concept. In the European Commission (2013) ‘Guide to Social Innovation’, this concept is generically defined ‘as the development and implementation of new ideas to meet social needs and create new social relationships or collaboration’ (p. 6). This definition highlights a rather elastic view of the concept of social innovation and it is no coincidence that the European Commission (2013) itself underlines its uncertain meaning by describing social innovation as a quasi-concept, ‘simultaneously characterized by an indeterminate quality that makes it adaptable to a variety of situations and flexible enough to follow the twist and turns of policy that everyday politics sometimes make necessary’ (p. 15). As Moulaert and MacCallum (2019) recognize, it is precisely the ‘malleability’ of the concept that has made social innovation so popular in academic and EU discourses. It is therefore clear that the chameleonic character of social innovation also suits the political sphere, in which the ‘magic’ dimension of social innovation emerges with increased force.
Second: the normative attractiveness of the concept
A common trait of the multiple conceptualizations of social innovation is their strong normative aspect, namely the positive valuation intertwined with their definition (Ayob et al., 2016; Fossati et al., 2017) and of the terms that compose the concept. The term ‘innovation’, of whatever kind it is, is always linked to an idea of novelty and improvement. The ‘social’ connotation represents a range of other ‘good things’ (Brandsen et al., 2016: 5), in particular, linked to the collective dimension of action and the improvement achieved over a previous condition. It is therefore sufficient to dwell on a purely linguistic analysis of the concept of social innovation to understand the positive meaning that is accorded to it. In addition, most of the scholars of the current debate on social innovation have further strengthened the normative attractiveness of this concept through their definitions. As a matter of fact, in social sciences, the search for value-neutral definitions or truth claims is a chimera (see, for instance, Cosgrove, 2004; Eagleton, 2003), especially with concepts such as social innovation, which already etymologically have a positive connotation.
For Phills et al. (2008), social innovation represents ‘more effective, efficient, sustainable, or just than existing solutions and for which the value created accrues primarily to society as a whole rather than private individuals’ (p. 36). Similarly, one of the most cited economics-related definitions of social innovation, that of Murray et al. (2010), clearly underlines the positive connotations of this concept: [W]e define social innovations as new ideas (products, services and models) that simultaneously meet social needs and create new social relationships or collaborations. In other words, they are innovations that are both good for society and enhance society’s capacity to act. (p. 3)
The positive normative aspect of social innovation can also be found more or less explicitly in urban-related definitions of social innovation: for instance, Brandsen et al. (2016) claim that ‘social innovations [&], raise the hope and expectations of progress towards something better (a more socially sustainable/democratic/effective society)’ (pp. 6–7). Gerometta et al. (2005) argue that in urban studies social innovation is ‘understood as both a normative and analytical concept in the formation and analysis of solutions to social exclusion problems in European cities [&]’ (p. 2007).
However, the normative character of social innovation in urban studies literature often relies on empirically informed processes and practices. On the contrary, in the European policy discourses, the ‘positive aura’ of this concept is often amplified and takes on the contours of a panacea to all contemporary issues. For instance, the report ‘Empowering people, driving change: Social innovation in the European Union’ by the Bureau of European Policy Advisers provides the following definition: Social innovation relates to new responses to pressing social demands by means which affect the process of social interactions. It is aimed at improving wellbeing. It covers wide fields which range from new models of childcare to web-based social networks, from the provision of domestic healthcare to new ways of encouraging people to exchange cars for bicycles in cities, and the development of global fair-trade chains [&] (p. 7)
This definition given by the Bureau of European Policy Advisers perfectly sums up the confidence social innovation inspires to improve the human condition in an indeterminate number of fields of application. Social innovation, therefore, seems to assume the role of a ‘normative good’ 6 (Larsson and Brandsen, 2016; Meeuwisse, 2008), aimed at the ‘public interest’ in order to reform urban governance within a context of austerity that implies the need to do more with less (Bartels, 2017). Fougère et al. (2017) stressed that within post-2008 European policy discourse, social innovation has been represented as ‘always a better solution or, put differently, whatever the cure’, thus feeding the idea of a ‘magic’ recipe to contemporary issues (p. 9). At a policy level, it is depicted as an instrument ‘to solve the crisis of the welfare state’ and to deal with significant global issues under the new label of ‘grand challenges’ (Edwards-Schachter and Wallace, 2017; Moulaert et al., 2013: 17).
Third: a concept that generates consensus
The concept of social innovation – presenting multiple definitions, but sharing an essentially positive dimension and linked to an idea of improvement over a previous condition – is able to catalyse great consensus. This is well emphasized by Pol and Ville (2009) who argue that ‘social innovation is a term that almost everybody likes but nobody is quite sure of what it means’ (p. 881). In light of the characteristics presented, it is clearly extremely difficult to be against this concept. For this reason, the concept of social innovation has entered very pervasively into the public and political debate. However, of the many strands of thought that characterize the contemporary discourse on social innovation, the one that has permeated most strongly in the post-crisis institutional and political context is an essentially (socially) entrepreneurial approach to social innovation. It is, in fact, in the abstract vision of social innovation as ‘ideas that work’ (Mulgan, 2006) that this concept is so seductive to governments (p. 6).
Leveraging the innovative capabilities of civil society and collective action rather than the need to invest financial resources, this particular discourse on social innovation seems to fit perfectly within the spending review policies implemented in many European countries. Not by chance, social innovation is often presented in the public debate as an ‘anti-crisis recipe’ or the ‘acceptable face of spending cuts’. Fougère et al. (2017) argue that in the EU context, social innovation ‘is presented as a win-win solution to virtually all the European ills’ (p. 820).
Social innovation seems to be able to trigger new alliances and collaborations between governments and people. This is characteristic of challenging times, such as the current post-crisis era in which public resources are not always sufficient to ensure a ‘just city’ (see Marcuse et al., 2009) and efficient public services and the risk of social conflict is evident (Swyngedouw and Wilson, 2014). The ‘magic’ of social innovation can be seen for instance in the central role of this concept in the transition to the Dutch ‘Participatory Society’ and the ‘Big Society’ in the United Kingdom (see, for instance, Bartels, 2017). Both are examples of political programmes that have used the social entrepreneurial approach to social innovation to define new models of governance that have profound spatial repercussions.
Fourth: the global marketability of the concept
The flexibility of the concept of social innovation and its ‘positive and consensual aura’ in the public debate has facilitated the rapid spread of this concept and its global marketability. This is also evident from the number of departments and research groups that have emerged in recent years on this issue. Just to name a few, the University of Cambridge has established the ‘Cambridge Centre for Social Innovation’ and the Training Centre of the International Labour Organization has recently launched the ‘Master in Social Innovation for Sustainable Development’. The ‘European School of Social Innovation’ was founded in Vienna in 2011, and, in 2017, the ‘Social Innovation Academy’ was created, an online course entirely dedicated to social innovation co-funded by the EU. In addition, the number of international conferences on social innovation in both academia (e.g. the International ‘Social Innovation Research Conference’ or the ‘International Conference on Social Enterprise and Innovation’) and business (e.g. the Social Innovation Forum organized every year by the private company Hitachi) has grown exponentially. Of the eight major international conferences – entirely dedicated to social innovation – reported by the ‘Social Innovation Academy’, only one was launched before 2008. In all other cases, the conferences were founded in the last decade, and this is symptomatic of the global appeal of social innovation. Some national and local governments have strongly promoted social innovation within their own organizational apparatus, through new structures and dedicated funding. Consider, for instance, the examples of Barcelona or Milan, which have significantly invested in promoting social innovation; 7 or the Big Society Capital, launched in 2012 by the then Prime Minister David Cameron to finance social innovation practices.
Moreover, the EU has played a fundamental role (Haxeltine et al., 2013) in making this term globally marketable, not only through numerous research projects (for a very accurate analysis of European projects on social innovation, see Moulaert et al., 2017; Pelka and Terstrip, 2016), but also through ‘European Social Funds’, networking platforms such as the ‘Social Innovation Europe’, and international awards (e.g. the ‘European Social Innovation Competition’).
The concept of social innovation has been able to catalyse a great academic, political and mediatic attention, as well as a high number of human and economic resources for its pursuit, and this has further accentuated its seductive power. Like many of the ‘magic concepts’, social innovation is no longer just a concept, it is also a product, and as such, it is marketed globally through conferences, masters and postgraduate courses, state and private funds.
Implications for urban governance
The deconstruction of social innovation in the typical characteristics of ‘magic concepts’ seems to support the notion of social innovation as a ‘magic concept’. However, claiming that social innovation is a ‘magic concept’ for policy-makers does not mean that it is exclusively attributable to this kind of concepts. As presented in the introduction of this article, urban studies literature has extensively investigated social innovation as a bottom-up and ‘bottom-linked’ process and practice, and in this context, social innovation remains a solid concept, rooted in the specific contexts in which it is developed and in the work of activists and engaged scholars. However, it is essential to stress that by virtue of the features presented in the previous section, social innovation also presents some rhetorical advantages that have made it particularly attractive to policy-makers.
As Bifulco and Dodaro (2018) stress, social innovation ‘seems to be able to nourish not only the social dimension, but also the political one of governance’ (p. 173). It is through the understanding of social innovation as a ‘magical recipe’ that institutions are reshaping urban governance, with obvious socio-spatial implications.
Social innovation is intrinsically intertwined with spatial dynamics. Observing social innovation in spatial contexts does not merely mean looking at ‘space-as-container ontology’ (Gotham, 2003). Social innovation in the field of urban studies has often been presented as a modification of the socio-spatial relations between the stakeholders of a specific territory. This dimension has been examined in the urban studies literature according to two main perspectives identified by Parés et al. (2017). A ‘geographical’ perspective, interested in the spatiality of social relations (e.g. MacCallum et al., 2009; Moulaert et al., 2005; Moulaert and Nussbaumer, 2005; Van Dyck and Van Den Broeck, 2013), and a perspective closer to ‘political science’, which instead observes how social innovation reconfigures forms of governance (e.g. Bartels, 2017; Brokking et al., 2017; González and Healey 2005; Novy et al., 2009). However, as also Moulaert and MacCallum (2019) stress, these two perspectives should not be considered as silos. The socio-spatial and governance dimensions are, in fact, deeply interrelated in social innovation processes and practices. If social innovation allows to reshape socio-spatial relations, then its ‘magic’ can be invoked by governments to drive the change (BEPA, 2010) towards new paradigms of urban governance based on civil society’s action (BEPA, 2010).
Social innovation as a ‘magic concept’ is particularly seductive for decision-makers in search of new solutions to contemporary urban issues, and this entails the necessity to address two interlinked issues:
Is social innovation in the field of urban development still to be understood as an essentially bottom-up process and practice?
What does the emergence of the ‘co’ paradigm 8 in the management and production of space at the local scale imply for urban governance?
These two issues are the focus of the following sub-section since they are central in the current discourse in planning theory and practice (see Vigar et al., 2020 on social innovation in planning theory, and Albrechts, 2013 on co-production). How the state and civil society are engaged on issues concerning urban governance is a decisive topic for planning (see Hillier and Healey, 2008; Watson, 2014), and the perspective of social innovation promoted by governments is a challenge to be investigated.
Social innovation: still a bottom-up matter?
It is commonly recognized that social innovation can potentially arise in any context and with the input of any stakeholder, be it public, private or civil society.
However, in urban studies, an idea has prevailed of social innovation as an essentially bottom-up process and practice, originating from civil society and then evolving into forms of dialogue with institutional actors or remaining tied to a dimension of pure self-organization and planning theory (Christmann et al., 2020a; Gerometta et al., 2005; Harrisson, 2012; Moulaert et al., 2010; Nyseth and Hamdouch, 2019; Rabadjieva and Butzin, 2020).
In a seminal book entitled Can Neighbourhoods Save the City? Community development and social innovation, Moulaert et al. (2010) argue that there are three dimensions to socially innovative initiatives:
The satisfaction of human needs that are unmet by the state and market;
The change in social and power relations in order to make governance more inclusive;
The empowerment of local communities in the form of increasing socio-political capability and access to resources.
In this conceptualization of the key dimensions of social innovation, the exquisitely grassroots dimension of these initiatives is implicit, while Caulier-Grice et al. (2012) explicitly argue that being ‘grassroots and bottom-up’ is one of the features that characterize social innovation.
However, the seductive power of social innovation as a ‘magic concept’ has made this concept increasingly difficult to define from this point of view. There is no doubt that the last decade has seen a new and renewed wave of activism and ‘social ferment’ from below, often symptomatic of the difficulties of the traditional planning tools and territorial governance in responding to the needs of the inhabitants. However, in the same years, the ‘magic’ of social innovation has also been promoted by governments to incorporate the energies of civil society within institutional boundaries. So, the very nature of social innovation is being reshaped. While on the one hand there are myriad bottom-up or ‘bottom-linked’ initiatives of social innovation, on the other hand, there is an attempt – from a top-down perspective – to promote social innovation or to channel already existing civil society capabilities. Thus, it is essential to study these new forms of top-linked social innovation as they can represent a great opportunity or a serious risk for urban governance and, in any case, a great challenge for urban planning which must be remodelled according to the of co-productive perspective 9 (Albrechts, 2013; Ostrom, 1996).
As several authors point out (e.g. Haxeltine et al., 2013; Howaldt et al., 2015; Nyseth and Hamdouch, 2019), bottom-up social innovations are characterized by a strong transformative potential, capable of redefining socio-spatial and power relations. A crucial question is, therefore, to understand whether the social innovation promoted by decision-makers contains the same transformative potential, or instead if it is a mere ‘flanking mechanism’ (Brenner and Theodore, 2002) of the traditional asymmetrical relationship of power and a strategy for ‘governing through citizenship’ (Rose, 2008).
The fact that the attractiveness of the concept of social innovation has allowed it to reach the top of urban and national agendas of governments is potentially a great chance. However, social innovation must not be considered in an instrumental way to co-opt and domesticate the energies of civil society.
Governments in search of their civil society: the ‘co’ paradigm and its implications
The discourses on social innovation in the urban domain bring with them the emergence of a new paradigm based on co-production. According to Pestoff and Brandsen (2013) in the field of governance, ‘co-production is one way that a synergy could occur between what a government does and what citizens do’ (p. 4). The active involvement of citizens in co-production (co-managing, co-planning and co-design 10 ) at the local level is one of the areas in which the co-paradigm has been implemented most. This attention to the local scale can be seen for instance in the guidelines for citizen involvement in spatial development recently launched by the Berlin Senate for the co-production of the city between administration and inhabitants. 11
Assuming that citizens and civil society become co-creators of spaces and services together with the public and private actors means going far beyond the traditional models of participation. This new attention that institutions are paying to volunteer and active citizens seems to be the symptom of an epoch-making change – at least in theory – from an idea of ‘providing state’ to that of an ‘activating state’ (Rosol, 2012). To the extent that the new co-governance and co-planning mechanisms re-formulate the relationship between the government, market and civil society (Wacquant, 2012), they also redefine and reshape the meaning of citizenship (Mazza, 2015). Consequently, the very nature of democracy itself is also reshaped (Swyngedouw, 2005). This means recognizing at an institutional level that the role of citizens is not only that of space users but also of space producers and space managers. So, if in the past, the role between state, market and civil society were for a long time pitched in a conflictual relationship with each other ‘with clearly demarcated and relatively sharp boundaries’ (Swyngedouw and Moulaert, 2010: 222), today these boundaries are increasingly blurred. New solutions to contemporary urban and social issues are more and more characterized by overlapping roles and responsibilities between public, private and civil society actors (e.g. public–private partnerships, social-enterprises, forms of collaboration between public administrations and the civil society, etc.).
At the various administrative levels, in Europe and elsewhere, governments are introducing new co-operative methods for civic involvement in urban planning (Boonstra and Boelens, 2011) and spatial management, apparently offering more power to the local community in taking control of local assets. An emblematic example is the case of the Neighbourhood Plans, introduced in the United Kingdom with the Localism Act of 2011, as part of the wider project of the ‘Big Society’, strongly promoted by the then Prime Minister David Cameron. A somewhat similar approach is that of the Conseils Citoyens (Citizen Councils) in France, foreseen by the ‘Loi de programmation pour la ville et la cohésion urbaine’ of February 2014, to rethink the future of ‘quartiers prioritaires’ (priority neighbourhoods) through the direct mobilization of their inhabitants.
Likewise, even in the absence of national policies, many cities are launching policies and projects to promote social innovation and the ‘co’ paradigm. The city of Turin in Italy has recently launched the project Co-City – financed through the European funding programme ‘Urban Innovative Actions’ (UIA) – for the collaboration between administration and civil society for co-management and regeneration of urban commons.
It is thus clear that national and local governments are increasingly calling upon the civil society to manage spaces, services and to plan urban space in a co-productive manner. However, some scholars point out the potential ambiguities (see, for instance, Martinelli, 2012; Swyngedouw, 2005) of this new ‘horizontalism’. The risk is that more than a real devolution of powers, these new instruments of co-production at the urban/neighbourhood scale will be transformed into a mere strategy to devolving responsibilities, from governments to civil society. Indeed, the relationship between power and governance is a crucial issue (Bifulco and Dodaro, 2018). The transformative dimension of co-production lies in the possibility of giving power to local communities. If, on the other hand, these instruments absorb civil society resources without questioning power relations, there is a risk of a mere co-optation and de-politicization of civic resources in times of lack of public resources. Martinelli (2012: 356) points out that in a context of shrinking public resources as the post-2008 scenario, social innovation can potentially become ‘an alibi for the state to abdicate its social responsibility while cutting public spending’, within a new credo based on ‘smaller government’ and ‘bigger societies’ (Kisby, 2010).
In other words, the ‘magic’ of social innovation promoted by national or local governments should not turn into a trojan horse to reduce public intervention and merely improve cost-efficiency. New policies and practices of co-production at the urban scale, promoted through the social innovation narrative, should therefore not simply reassign responsibility to citizens, but also redistribute power. Governments are in search of an increasingly self-responsible civil society, 12 but this society also needs to be empowered in the sense of Arnstein’s (1969) work.
Concluding remarks
In the past decade, social innovation has become a steering principle in policy discourses, especially within European countries, as a key tool for reshaping governance (Jenson and Harrisson, 2013; Jessop et al., 2013; Moulaert and MacCallum, 2019; Sabato et al., 2017). The interpretive key of social innovation as a ‘magic concept’ (Pollitt and Hupe, 2011) provides insight into why the concept of social innovation has become so fashionable at institutional level. If social innovation is promoted by governments through the creation of highly institutionalized initiatives of spatial co-production, this will open new perspectives in social innovation research in the field of urban studies and planning theory.
The fact that social innovation is understood as a ‘magic concept’ in policy-making can potentially be a great opportunity to further spread the new credo of social innovation among public debate and to re-institutionalize new forms of relations between governments and citizens (Moulaert et al., 2019). Much depends on the capacity of governments to genuinely embrace the transformative powers of social innovation. This implies that the new governance tools for the urban co-production of spaces and services must confer not only new responsibilities on citizens but also new concrete powers. In a context in which social innovation can be considered a ‘specific form of political governance’ (Schubert, 2018), the study of practices and policies through which governments support the new ‘co’ paradigm becomes crucial (p. 375). It is only through the study of the results of co-production experiences at the urban scale that it is possible to understand if the ‘institutional’ social innovation is an opportunity to create new spaces of deliberative democracy in cities, or if it is a seductive trick to invoke the alliance of civil society in times of crisis.
There are two possible perversions of an instrumental approach to social innovation. On the one hand, a possible risk is that, by leveraging the active involvement of civil society, it could become an argument in support of neoliberal logic that aims to transfer the greatest number of responsibilities to the hands of individuals (Grimm et al., 2013). On the other hand, another risk is that these forms of co-produced governance are promoted rhetorically (because they can generate great consensus), but are effectively hampered, especially if they require devolution of power from the state to the citizens. This suggests that it is dangerous to consider social innovation as a panacea per se, as often proposed in recent EU policy documents and in the political agendas of many European national and local governments. Social innovation is not good in itself but depends on how it is understood by its promoters and how much it is able to redistribute not only responsibilities but also genuine powers to the society, in order to find new shared solutions to urban problems. Only in this condition can the social innovation promoted by policy-makers be considered a win-win solution and a trigger for a radical transformation of urban governance.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
The author would like to acknowledge and thank the editor of Planning Theory and the three anonymous reviewers, whose insightful and valuable comments helped improve the article. The author would also like to thank Umberto Janin Rivolin for his precious suggestions.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
