Towards a new ‘old’ theory for planning in China: The potential of Huang-Lao thought

Abstract

In China, where rapid urbanisation has been accompanied by the reform of planning legislation and practice, planning theory has struggled to inform or explain policy and practice adequately. This paper makes a proposal that could provide Chinese spatial planning with a theoretical base that is culturally embedded. Confucianism, Legalism, Daoism and Huang-Lao thought are appraised as potential frames for new theory, highlighting planning-relevant concepts of jingshi (经世, statecraft), shi (势, propensity), li (礼, right action) and li (理, pattern or coherence). Ideas for spatial planning methodologies inspired by Huang-Lao thought are explored. Conclusions suggest that Huang-Lao, as a disjunctive synthesis of the other philosophies, offers a potentially rewarding approach for spatial planning theory and practice in China which grounds legal and sociopolitical order within a natural order of being.

Keywords

China Huang-Lao Confucianism Daoism Legalism spatial planning theory

Introduction

In ancient China, urban planning thought was closely related to traditional philosophy (Huang and van Weesep, 2021; Liao and Yang, 2013). Philosophies defined the form and content of urban plans and practices and afforded understandings of the cosmic or natural world, predominantly in capital cities which were planned to reflect cultural systems and ethical values. At this time, China was an agricultural society, with urbanisation confined largely to administrative, commercial and port cities until industrialisation and urban development increased from the late Qing dynasty, especially after the Second Opium War (1856) and the Westernisation Movement (1861-1895), World War 2 and the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949.

Over the past thirty years or so, China has experienced massive changes in land use due to rapid urbanisation. Several reforms of planning legislation have occurred in attempts to manage the challenges associated with such large-scale urban development. A shift in terminology from jihua (计划), implying mandatory managed planned economy, to guihua (规划), instructive managed socialist market-economy spatial planning, illustrates a well-documented change in thinking from government to governance (Bray, 2016; Cao and Zhang, 2020).

Alongside such practice-related changes are discernible trends in the development of planning theory in China. Cao and Hillier (2013) indicate three broad trends in Chinese planning theory debates: from the early post-1978 reform years when theories often borrowed Western positivist ideas; through a late 1980s/early 1990s phase of ‘theory localisation’ inspired by ancient Chinese philosophy teachings and writings (Zhang, 2008); to a more hybrid current stage in which imported ideas of, for instance, collaborative planning, resilience and uncertainty (Cao et al., 2021; Gao et al, 2021; Hu et al., 2013; Li G. et al, 2020; Li X. et al, 2020; Shao and Xu, 2017) are entwined and reconceptualised with concepts drawn from Confucianism, Daoism and so on (de Jong, 2012; Hillier, 2016; Zhang et al., 2012; Zhuang, 2015). Chinese scholars, including Zhang (2008) and Liao and Yang (2013), argue that, since spatial planning is context-based, the contributions of Chinese planners and planning scholars should be more than knowledge dissemination of Western planning theory, but engaged in knowledge production of planning theory with Chinese characteristics, grounded in Chinese culture.

An aim of this paper is to broaden views of planning theory as it relates to wider debates in the physical and social sciences and to fundamental philosophical discussions. In particular, we aim to propose a culturally embedded, contextually appropriate, theoretical framework which may be adapted for spatial planning in China. We argue that a theoretical frame should be appropriate to the transversal issues which spatial planning engages. We suggest that, since theory should offer a platform to understand and speak into important debates, it should come out of a sense of the way the world is, and should provide a ‘quilting point’ for social concerns, especially about the environment (after Watkin, 2022).

President Xi Jinping (习近平) of the People’s Republic of China has stated that ‘the worth of any plan is in its implementation’ (Maupin, 2018, online). What is referred to as ‘Xi Jinping Thought’ draws on notions from Marx and Mao, but also on Confucius’ ideas and values (van Norden, 2017), identifying a possible ‘ideological continuity between Confucianism and Chinese Socialism’ (Mayer, 2018: 1227). Despite the revival of Confucianism in contemporary China, as we explore below, several scholars question its anthropocentric nature, its promotion of hierarchical orders based on patriarchal authority and subordination and its interpretation in relation to socio-political planning issues, including those relating to administration, law and environment (for example, Gonzalez-Vicente, 2021; Wang and Fan, 2019).

Daoist-influenced approaches to spatial planning have been proposed as alternatives to Confucianist-inspired perspectives. These include the Chinese Daoist Association (CDA 2018) and Zhao et al. (2013), relating to environmental planning; Hillier and Cao (2011), relating to strategic spatial planning; and Chia (2014) and Chia and Holt (2009), relating to management. Nevertheless, such projects have been criticised as being impractical and out of touch with contemporary reality (Wawrytko, 2014).

In order to progress towards a contextually meaningful, theoretical and potentially practicable foundation for spatial planning in China, we turn to another school of thought drawn from what is known as Chinese pre-Qin philosophy¹. Emerging before the unification of ancient China² by the Qin dynasty in about 221 BCE, pre-Qin philosophy flourished at a time of significant intellectual development during the Eastern Zhou dynasty (770 – 257 BCE). This ‘Hundred Schools of Thought’ (诸子百家) period included, not only what became the major philosophical schools in China - Confucianism and Daoism - but also other philosophies, such as Legalism, Mohism, Logic and, of most interest here, Huang-Lao (黄老).

Named after Huangdi or the Yellow Emperor (黄帝), the legendary earliest emperor of China, and Laozi (老子), legendary founder of Daoism, Huang-Lao (黄老) thought emerged in about the 4th to 3rd Centuries BCE during what is known as the Warring States period. It became the dominant school of thought during the early Western Han dynasty (202 BCE-8 CE), until Emperor Wu (汉武帝, reigned 141-87 BCE) gradually established Confucianism as official state philosophy after 134 BCE. Huang-Lao is a syncretic or hybrid philosophy which develops elements of Confucianism and Legalist administrative practice in a Daoist framework (Graham, 1989), whilst achieving its own conceptual independence (Zheng, 2018). We suggest that its breadth and, in particular, its unique philosophical theorisation between ritual and law (Zheng, 2018) offers Huang-Lao as a potentially rewarding theoretical framework for spatial planning in China.

We stress, at this point, that this is not a philosophical paper, but one aimed at planning scholars interested in theory. While philosophy is often concerned with the definition of issues and the fundamental nature of onto-epistemologies, we suggest that the emphasis of a theoretical contribution is to offer contemplative or speculative understanding which may assist in dealing with issues in practice. It is impossible for us to fully embrace all the debates about pre-Qin philosophies. Our emphasis, therefore, is to propose a discussion which is new, supportive and, hopefully, inspiring from a spatial planning perspective. As such, we only briefly outline some selected key tenets of Confucianism, Legalism and Daoism to provide a context for our proposed framework. We follow Huang and Wood (2018) in identifying the concepts of statecraft (jingshi, 经世), together with propensity (shi, 势), ritual or right action (li, 礼) and pattern or coherence (li, 理), as driving forces in Chinese historical development. In doing so, we seek not to essentialise these terms, but to recognise the situated nature of their meanings and implications. Huang-Lao thought is then explored in similar fashion.

It is important to emphasise that no school of pre-Qin philosophy contains strict demarcations. Thinkers within the same school may have discrepant opinions, while there is frequent cross-fertilisation of ideas across schools of thought. Our word limit precludes detailed analysis across the Hundred Schools of Thought, or indeed, within our selected schools of Confucianism, Legalism, Daoism and Huang-Lao. Suffice it to say that, with regard to the four schools, ‘the stable entity that later scholars have called Confucianism [or Daoism, Legalism or Huang-Lao] has never really existed. Confucianism [Daoism, Legalism, Huang-Lao] is an abstraction and a generalisation – apparently useful but always obfuscating – a product of an ongoing intellectual engagement’ (Nylan, 2001: 3). We, therefore, use the terms Confucianism, Legalism, Daoism and Huang-Lao in a broader sense to describe modes of thought rather than in the narrower sense of a school of thought with a distinct lineage.³ In progressing our aim of broadening the view of spatial planning theory, we take pre-Qin Chinese philosophy as our inspiration. We concentrate on concepts and arguments which we perceive as relevant to planning and which potentially offer building blocks towards alternative, yet realistic, visions that can support spatial planning in China as well as the international planning debate. Our focus is not on linguistic discussion or nuances of interpretation⁴, so we rely predominantly on translations of Chinese texts into English, together with international planning-related texts which apply Chinese philosophical thought.

We do not offer a strict comparison of the philosophies. Rather, given the nature of Huang-Lao thought, we explore the concepts as elements of an inclusive disjunctive synthesis (Deleuze, 2004) which affirms the disjointed terms without either conflicting them or excluding one from the other. An inclusive disjunctive synthesis regards elements as divergent, rather than as incompatible. Important for our argument, it highlights the possibilities of harmony in diversity rather than the differences which separate.

We then engage elements of the recently reformed Territorial Spatial Planning system in China, highlighting aspects of hierarchy and legislative control, of urban development, protection of basic farmland and ecological preservation, before exploring some ideas towards practice methodologies grounded in a Huang-Lao-inspired frame. These would be practices rooted in principles of flexibility, propensity, restrained application of law and systematic order symbiotic with the natural world. Recognising inherent difficulties in connecting philosophical concepts from the pre-Qin period with planning methodologies and practices in contemporary China, we suggest that pilot schemes for experimental innovation might be established. Critical comment is made on various development projects claiming philosophical inspiration, but which appear in actuality to be precariously entangled with development economics and politics. In conclusion, we suggest that Huang-Lao-inspired planning practice might begin to engage core principles of responsive and purposeful action, cognisant of conditions of possibilities, fitting plans and designs to materialities and their properties, rather than the other way round.

Three Schools of Thought: Confucianism, Legalism, Daoism

Confucianism

Master Kong, Kongzi or Kongfuzi (孔子, Confucius, 551-479 BCE), sought an ideal socio-political system in order to solve the apparent problems of his time. In pre-modern China, society was pyramid-like and hierarchical in structure where the top levels were occupied by the rulers, aristocrats and Chinese literati or intellectuals. Many pre-Qin thinkers, themselves aristocrats and/or literati, developed their politics in the context of this social structure and advocated to maintain it. For instance, for Confucius the ideal society was a harmonious state in which everyone in a hierarchical society had their proper place and role and performed their proper function by exemplifying the virtues advocated by Confucianism. Virtues included the ritual practice of actions, subordination to hierarchical authority, respect for one’s superiors and correct following of ritual practices. Spatial planning systems have been correlated to social and political structures which were hierarchical and related to ritual practices since their pre-Qin inception in China (Huang and van Weesep, 2021).

Several scholars have identified a recent renaissance of Confucianism in China, called Mainland New Confucianism as distinct from civic Confucianism (Jiang, 2018) or variants in Hong Kong and Taiwan (Angle, 2018; Guo, 2018; Tang, 2018). Since the 1990s, and particularly in the second decade of the 21^st Century, Confucianism has taken on new significance. Jiang (2013) and others advocate a form of ‘political Confucianism’ (Angle, 2018: 86) focused on the institutional maintenance of political order through interpretation of Confucian classical writings. Proponents support the use of Confucian culture to respond to the problems of building the state and nation in a modern way which reconnects to China’s old values and traditions (Guo, 2018: 162), including loyalty, propriety, benevolence, patriarchy, harmony and meritocracy, summarised as ‘humane authority’ (Yan, 2016).

An inherent demand of Confucianism is its being put to use in statecraft (jingshi, 经世) (Tang, 2018: 129). The craft of jingshi is enjoying resurgence. Its application expresses a Confucian commitment to ‘practical solutions for the improvement of the world whilst carrying “simultaneously a moral orientation, a repertoire of practical activity, and a category of knowledge”’ (Brook, in Liu, 2014: 124). In Confucian tradition the legitimacy of powerful individuals and groups determining the behaviour of people is accepted. The hierarchical culture emphasises the necessity of strong authority figures to persuade people how to behave in society using controls and constraints. Confucian statecraft, then, is a fairly authoritarian form of ordering the world through ‘responsible governance’ (Yeophantong, 2013: 332).

Active formulation of a Confucian statecraft agenda across broad policy areas is illustrated throughout history, from the Western Han dynasty, when Confucius’ philosophy was venerated in a moral system centred on a hierarchical social structure and respect for superiors, to Qiu Jun’s (邱濬) 15^th Century Supplement to the Exposition of the Great Learning (大学衍义补), which explains that all problems in the public realm are addressable through appropriate analyses and procedures. Later, He Changling (贺长龄) and Wei Yuan’s (魏源) Imperial Statecraft Compendium (皇朝经世文编, 1826) and its several sequels were concerned with making and communicating laws and policies, stressing the importance of rites (li, 礼) in a synthesis of ritual and law, while President Xi Jinping recently produced a treatise on statecraft in The Governance of China (习近平谈治国理政, 2018). Domestic statecraft tends to envision lay people as objects of governance rather than as active participants.

One of the key elements of Confucian statecraft is ritual (li, 礼). Li means social custom, convention, propriety, rites and so on, which should be adhered to if harmony is to prevail. Li embraces the complete spectrum of interactions between humans, nature and materialities. In the Analects or Lunyu (论语) (probably compiled between 150-140 BCE, see Makeham, 1996), li functions predominantly as a social regulator. Li embraces both formal and informal rules of society. Pre-dating and encompassing the formal concept of law, li serves as a moderating force or practice of applying specialised knowledge in the right manner in situations for mutual benefit. Conflicts are managed through li, remembering that whilst harmony in diversity (和而不同) is an important Confucian value, it never supersedes values of benevolence and rightness. Tan (2011: 484) thus suggests that li should be recognised as ‘tacit models of exemplary conduct’ rather than as ‘customary or interactional law’. Confucianists would believe that acting and governing appropriately cannot be achieved by merely applying universal rules and following rituals, although laws are useful in constraining imperfect government (Peerenboom, 1998).

The recent Confucian revival in China has been critiqued as out of step with demands of the 21^st Century (Gonzalez-Vicente, 2021). Throughout its repeated historical formulation, actually-existing Confucianism tends to be anthropocentric, paternalistic, patriarchal, bound by ritual, hierarchy, authority and subordination. Described as anthropocentric pragmatism, Confucian thought does not conceive of natural law. Its practices tend to ignore a more-than-human agenda (Peerenboom, 1993).

Li (理) as coherence or pattern became a core term in neo-Confucianism in the 11^th Century CE, representing the intelligible way in which things fit together. Such principles express ‘rules’ to which issues conform. Li can also mean a pattern or network of interdependencies; a disputed concept within Confucianism implying either order or a thing’s ultimate nature (See Angle and Tiwald, 2017).

Confucian thought favours stability and harmony. Conflict avoidance is common in Chinese society, even if harmony is superficial and deep-rooted conflicts remain. This gives rise to the expression of harmony with difference. ‘The Master said, the true gentleman [junzi,⁵ 君子] is conciliatory but not accommodating. Common people are accommodating but not conciliatory’ (Analects, Ch. 13.26, Waley, 2005: 177). Confucianism may thus be regarded as incapable of dealing with uncertainty and change. In a world described as no longer ‘is’ but ‘becoming’ (de Roo, 2018), responding to uncertainty requires flexibility, adaptability and experimentation. Change stems from power or force relations and the conditions of possibility and propensities which they forge and which forge them.

For Confucians, causality does not lie outside of events, but is a function of the creative nature of the event relations themselves. The concept shi (势) or propensity describes ‘the always particular and inclusive manifold of spatial, temporal, and existential factors as they unfold in an emerging situation’ which can be ‘calibrated and adjusted to produce welcome outcomes’ (Ames, 2011: 156-157). Shi may also be understood, particularly in the social sciences, as situated dispositions of power/knowledge (Farquhar, 2017; Law and Lin, 2018).

Legalism

Legalism was one of the competing Hundred Schools of Thought which proliferated during the chaos of the Warring States period (c4^th to 3^rd Centuries BCE). Legalist philosophies were partly derived from Confucianism, largely in response to perceived problems with the limited effectiveness of rulers to control their subjects and a form of governance linked to moral patterns grounded in the heavens and human nature. Confucian ideas that good government is based on ethical or moral persuasion, ritual and omen did not appear to be working.

Legalist philosophy has three original strands or groups, which respectively focus on power or authority, regulation, and law. A student of Confucianism who became a key founder of Legalism and advisor to the Qin governmental regime, Han Fei (韩非, c280-233 BCE) argued that the only way to sustain proper order would be through laws and the application of punishment as necessary. Described variously as a ‘science of socio-political organisation’ (Schwartz, 1985: 335), a ‘theory of bureaucracy’ (Creel, 1974) and ‘an amoral science of statecraft’ (Graham, 1989: 267), Legalism, after Han Fei, integrated the themes of penal law (fa, 法), statecraft (shu, 术) and strategy, circumstantial advantage or power (shi, 势) in proposals for effective government (Lai, 2008: 174). The establishment of strong bureaucratic power and the imposition of strict codes over socio-economic life were axiomatic. Permitting ‘the people’ voice in state decisions would act to weaken the state through arbitrary, ad hoc decision-making on a case by case basis.

Han Fei may be regarded as a sort of Chinese Machiavelli. His system of statecraft espoused ‘government of the ruler, by the ruler, and for the ruler’ (Peerenboom, 1993: 153). It was a pragmatic, though frequently amoral, form of governance to maintain order in a world of perceived chaos. Han Fei ridiculed Confucian scholars and others as ‘vermin’ (Han Fei, S49, in Hutton, 2008) and the idea of li (礼) as unchanging ritual as delusional. However, the Legalist concept of law as a state system governing social conduct is, in effect, similar to Confucian li, though externally imposed. Legalists also derided the Daoist idea of natural law (see below), arguing that ultimate authority must lie with rulers and bureaucrats, not with nature: ‘law is codified in books, established in government offices’ (Liao, 1959: 188, in Peerenboom, 1993: 141). The purpose of law is to eliminate confusion, rather than to generate it, as Legalists suggested that Daoism does.

Absolutist versions of Legalism argued that harsh measures to control society were necessary because people are self-interested and fickle, to the detriment of the state. During the Qin Dynasty, Legalist rulers suppressed critical thinking and often dispensed brutal punishment to scholars, non-compliant officials and other ‘law-breakers’. The ultimate downfall of the Qin empire occurred through civil war inflamed by the draconian nature of its oppression. The emergent Western Han dynasty sought to distance itself from such a regime and turned to a philosophy of governance which constrained the power of rulers and offered a theoretical and moral foundation in the natural order for its rule of law. This was Huang-Lao, often regarded as a form of Daoism (Cao, 2017; Chen and Sung, 2014).

Daoism

Daoism is another polysemic compilation of ideas established in the pre-Qin period. Laozi (老子) and Zhuang Zhou (庄周), legendary compilers of the Daodejing (道德经) and Zhuangzi (庄子) respectively, influenced the development of Daoism from the late Warring States period. Early versions of the Daodejing were grounded in phenomenology, rather than in politics and ideology, whilst later versions, grounded in metaphysics, spoke directly to concerns of governance, identifying with Huang-Lao thought as demonstrated below.

Both philosophical and religious readings of the Daodejing exist. Our concern, in relation to planning theory, is with the philosophical readings. The opening line of the Daodejing may be translated in a range of ways, including, in chronological order:
‘Existence is beyond the power of words

To define’(Bynner, 1944: 25)

‘Way-making (dao) that can be put into words is not really way-making’ (Ames and Hall, 2010: 78).

‘The Dao that can be spoken of is not the constant Dao’ (Chen, 2020: 46).

This sentence, in its varying forms exemplified above, demonstrates the limited ability of language to express reality and its meaning. The range of interpretations reflects the time, context, writing style, ideological leanings and/or idiosyncrasies of its translators. Several interpretations stress the dynamic and transformative nature of dao. Ames and Hall’s (2010) ‘way-making’ or ways of acting are dynamic: ‘experience is processual, and is thus always provisional’ (p.78). Change is constant and we should flow with change rather than obstruct it. Reality stems from the interaction of factors which are ordered, not from a model or strict plan about how a thing is or should become, but from immanent processes which generate, develop or block potentiality; a pattern landscape of tendencies. Potential, or propensity is key. Humans should co-ordinate activities ‘with the workings of the natural environment, and the propensity of circumstances’ (Daodejing, Ch.9, Ames and Hall, 2010: 85). The term propensity designates both the particular circumstances characterising different stages of a process or trajectory and the potential energy or force relations produced.

The key to Daoist-inspired strategy is thus to study the forces present, or potentially present, in a range of possible situations in order to evaluate the conditions of possibility of various events taking place and to work out how to harness, exploit or block the powerful propensities at work. In this way, one should note the configuration of force relations as they develop and take shape, the potential implied by the configuration and which aspects can be made to play out favourably. ‘Returning to the propensity of things is common sense’ (Daodejing, Ch. 16, Ames and Hall, 2010: 90).

With regard to spatial planning, propensity is traced locally by examining often spontaneously changing circumstances rather than being attached to larger explanatory schemes (Law and Lin, 2018). Detection of patterns (li, 理) of propensities helps planning practitioners to understand what may resonate or be incompatible with what in specific circumstances and to work out how to act (Lin and Law, 2022). Strategies should, therefore, develop in relation to the elements involved and their implied potential, rather than as 'copy/pastes' of 'best practice'.

As Laozi was a contemporary of Confucius (Sima and Sima, 1993: 63), elements of influence and hybridity are to be anticipated between Confucianism and Daoism. Yet there are notable areas of difference, including interpretations of li (礼). As explained above, Confucianism regards li as knowing how to perform and performing correct ritual. Whilst Laozi and other Daoist scholars did not condemn ritual (Chen, 2018), Chapter 38 of the Daodejing suggests that:
‘Persons who are exemplars of ritual propriety do things coercively

And when no one pays them any heed,

They yank up their sleeves and drag others along with them.

…

As for ritual propriety, it is the thinnest veneer of doing one’s best and making good on one’s word,

And it is the first sign of trouble’

(Ames and Hall, 2010: 114).
Chapter 38 distinguishes between actions that are based in an external show of ‘proper conduct’ or ritual and those internally inspired by the dao; the difference between veneer and substance.

Daoist scholars develop the concept of li (理) as pattern, logic or intrinsic order (Roth, 2013), identifying the right action to take through studying patterns and systems. Finding the opportune moment and manner in which to act is important for reflective strategic transformation. Doctrines and rites are unnecessary. They appear only ‘when the simplicity needed to sense and act on the changing propensity of things is lost’ (Law and Lin, 2018: 9).

Instead of jingshi as statecraft, Daoists might engage shi (势), strategic utilisation of propensities or efficacy emanating from a particular pattern of force relations. Shi-type statecraft is strategy effective through adaptability and variation: the antithesis of mechanical practice of ritual. Good strategists adapt to circumstances which are often unforeseen. This is the art of acting ‘without action’ (wuwei, 无为). ‘Without action’, ‘effortless action’, or subtlety, does not imply doing nothing, however. It represents acting in balance or harmony with one’s inner disposition and one’s external, more-than-human, environment: action responsive to contextually shifting patterns of immanent necessity (Law and Lin, 2018: 12). As Daoism-oriented statecraft, actions are directed to the benefit of the people rather than the decision-makers. Decisions are made in the public interest. Sages ‘take the thoughts and feelings of the common people as their own’ (Daodejing, Ch. 49, Ames and Hall, 2010: 51).

Actions should weave the propensities of things together so that they are productively in balance. Human transformation of nature’s balance has resulted in global warming and other disasters, such as landslides, floods, dustbowls and so on. Daoists believe that humans are just a small part of nature. What is required, therefore, is increased attunement to the rhythms and cycles of nature and to the processes of change if we are to achieve a mutuality of humans and other-than-human nature.

As a practical form of government, Daoism has been advocated by some scholars (including Everest-Phillips, 2015; Feldt, 2010; Hillier and Cao, 2011), but it has been widely criticised as anarchistic, laissez-faire, nihilistic or simply impractical (Rapp, 1998; Wang, 2012). Whilst several critiques appear to hinge on a politicised misreading of key concepts, we do accept that some form of controlled actions are necessary for effective governance and spatial planning in periods of dynamism and change. We, therefore, turn to Huang-Lao thought as a possible theoretical foundation of value for dynamic planning practice.

Huang-Lao Thought

Originating in the Warring State period’s Jixia Academy (稷下学宫, Cao, 2017), Huang-Lao (黄老) was an influential school of thought flourishing in early 2^nd Century BCE Western Han dynasty China. It developed from a political philosophical movement which sought a means to overcome the perceived failure of Legalism and the decline of Confucianism, whilst incorporating concepts from both philosophies together with significant ideas from Daoism to the extent that it is sometimes referred to as Huang-Lao Daoism (Cao, 2017). The assemblage nature of Huang-Lao is reflected in its name: Huang referring to the Yellow Emperor and Lao to the Daoist master Laozi (老子). The term Huang-Lao appears from about 100 BCE in several texts, such as Sima Qian’s (司马迁) Shiji (史记) followed by Ban Gu’s (班固) Hanshu (汉书), composed about 54-92 CE (Ban, 2012; Sima and Sima, 1993). It fell into disuse when Emperor Wu adopted Confucianism as official State orthodoxy (Peerenboom, 1993), but its influence remained in areas such as local administration and philosophical discussion for about a thousand years, to the early Northern Song Dynasty (960-1127 CE) (Liu, 2020). Interest in Huang-Lao thought has rekindled recently since discoveries of a set of manuscripts at Mawangdui (in 1973) and a cache of bamboo slips at Guodian (in 1993) which are of great significance for the study of early Chinese intellectual history.

However, as Chen and Sung (2014) indicate, the term Huang-Lao tends to be used differently by different writers/compilers, highlighting the impossibility of regarding the school of thought as a consistent philosophy. The fragmented and often contradictory nature of ancient texts has elicited lack of agreement on a definition of Huang-Lao. There also exists some confusion about whether Huang-Lao should, or should not, be included in Daojia (道家) philosophy based on the texts of the Daodejing (道德经) and whether Huang-Lao Daoism is a misnomer. Cao (2017: 3), for instance, writes that the the Shiji ‘is generally accepted by the academic world as a plausible description of Huang-Lao Daoism in this early Han period’. Other authors, such as Roth (1997) and Barnwell (2011) contend that Sima implied Huang-Lao in the Daojia such that the original meaning of Chinese Daojia was Huang-Lao instead of its traditional understanding as ‘Lao-Zhuang’ (the Laozi and Zhuangzi texts) Daoism. In addition, for Chen and Sung (2014: 243),‘in the Shiji, “Huang-Lao” is apparently used interchangeably with Daojia 道家 (school of the Way) and Dao de jia 道德家 (school of the Way and Virtue)’.

We regard Huang-Lao not as a synthetic or hybrid composition with unified meaning, but rather as an inclusive disjunctive synthesis of Confucian, Legalist and Daoist philosophies. Such a synthesis affirms the disjointed concepts without excluding one from the other. Ideas thus achieve new, positive value through inclusive disjunction, in which they communicate while retaining their difference in a unique system of thought. Whilst the main influence on Huang-Lao is Daoist (reworking ideas of propensity or potential, flexibility, harmony with nature and so on), observance of duties is borrowed from Confucianism and laws and standards are drawn from Legalism. Huang-Lao seeks order based on the natural world. Through restrained application of procedures, regulations and standards, it offers a practical form of management appropriate to the circumstances.

Whilst some amalgamation of views between Confucian and Huang-Lao thought on ritual propriety (li, 礼) may be apparent (Chen, 2018), Huang-Lao scholars were generally critical of ritual culture. Huang-Lao thought incorporates li (理) as pattern or principles in the Daoist sense (Cao, 2017; Roth, 2013). Whilst current use of the word ‘pattern’ may suggest regularity, with little room for variation, Huang-Lao li (理) is better understood as principles with degrees of flexibility. Huang-Lao li is, therefore, an ordering principle of other-than-human nature and, by extension, the worlds of human behaviour (Peerenboom, 1993: 47). As humans, we need to recognise our part in a holistic system and structure our societal practices accordingly.

Huang-Lao thought has been described as ‘a specific fusion of speculative cosmological thought, usually associated with Daoists, and pragmatic thought related to statecraft, rulership and human action in general, considered typical of Legalists’ (Gajdosova, 2021: 384). Huang-Lao statecraft is summarised by Chen and Sung (2014: 256) as a practice which ‘shifts with the times and changes in response to other things. Its techniques are based on emptiness and non-existence, its usage is based on following and compliance’. This passage suggests the importance for Huang-Lao thought of complying both with changing external circumstances (wuwei, 无为, from Daoism) and with laws and standards (fa, 法, from Legalism), epitomised in the Huang-Lao term daofa (道法), a conceptual space between Dao and law (Cao, 2017; Zheng, 2018).

Unlike Daoism, the concept of wuwei is more explicitly applied to acts of governance in Huang-Lao thought. Wuwei becomes politicised, pertaining to rulers, while the concept of youwei (有为, literally to have or possess action) is introduced for officials and bureaucrats. Youwei involves active involvement in government. It implies necessary action or purposeful action, taken to maintain functioning of the state in accordance with natural order. Actions are directed to benefit both the people and other-than-human nature.

Nature, in Huang-Lao thought, is mentioned in explicit terms, such that its cycles, processes, patterns, and standards become the guiding principle for the conduct and governance of human society (Chai, 2022). This is a significant advance in thinking. Pre-Huang-Lao philosophies in general engaged unidirectional, human-centred perspectives. For instance, in Daoism ‘nature is the anthropocentric materialization of Dao’s non-anthropocentric potentiality’ (Chai, 2016: 266). But Huang-Lao thought reminds us that Daoism is not about imitating nature because of what it is, does, or represents. Nature, rather, is just one of several realms in which Dao instantiates itself. Therefore, the closer we are in balance with nature, the more we will be able to harmonize with Dao (Chai, 2022).

The Daodejing (Ch. 14) refers to the positives of vagueness, indeterminacy and the indefinite. It is important not to ‘overplan’, setting overly rigid or too-detailed targets or goals. The qualities of vagueness have been advocated by spatial planning theorists for some time (see Buhler, 2021; Hillier, 2007, 2010). The generative qualities of xu (虚), emptiness or blandness, similarly afford flexibility. Blandness does not imply negative absence or non-action, but a vast field of potentiality, affording room for manoeuvre, spontaneity and creativity and allowing propensities (shi) to be explored and strategically engaged in response to changing circumstances. Blandness is thus a productive capacity: ‘The way to apprehend and understand [discover] is simply to be empty’, interpreted as ‘one must resist falling into the trap of viewing the world from an intransigent perspective, of clinging to old and biased ways of thought. Only then is one able to observe what is presented as it really is’ (Peerenboom, from Huang-Lao Boshu, 帛书, 43.3, 1993: 71).

Huang-Lao thought may have borrowed the concept of fa (法) from Legalism, but develops it very differently. While Legalist fa is concerned only with the imposition of law and rule by law, Huang-Lao fa is concerned with its moral foundation in Daoist natural law: rule of law (Peerenboom, 1993). The longest of the Mawangdui manuscripts, Jingfa (经法 The Constancy of Laws), opens with the section Daofa (道法 The Dao and the Law). It starts:
‘It is out of the Dao that the law comes into being.

These laws, prescribed according to calculus of gains and losses,

are yardsticks to measure and to distinguish what is correct from what is incorrect’ (translated Chang and Feng, 1998: 100).

Law and statecraft are pragmatic. The Daofa section continues:
‘In affairs there is that which harms,

called opposition,

called not balancing,

not knowing the practicable’ (translated Eno, 2010a: 24).

Dissent and confrontation are inevitable; they are part of the natural order. Laws create stability, especially if demonstrated to be impartial and publicly disseminated. But, as Peerenboom (1993: 81) points out, unlike for Confucianism and Daoism, Huang-Lao ‘sages’ are not ‘called upon to build a consensus out of dissension, to realise a harmony amenable to all concerned parties’. They make impartial, justified decisions in the public interest in the manner of a ‘well-intending parent who sincerely has the best interests of his (sic) offspring-subjects at heart’ (Peerenboom, 1993: 97).

In Huang-Lao thought Confucian rites and hierarchy are connected with Legalist law and statecraft and Daoist flexibility in an inclusive disjunctive synthesis. This synthesis offers practical advice for ways of thinking and acting holistically, bringing frames for political engagement, governance and society together within an integral role of nature.

Huang-Lao and Spatial Planning

Huang-Lao thought is concerned with achieving ‘systemic order, under the condition that the sociopolitical world and the lives of everyday people model their order upon that which comes from the natural world and its cycles’ (Cao, 2017: 6). Huang-Lao is a relational philosophy, recognising the intrinsic relations between humans and other-than-humans and their mutual entanglement. It is a worldview comprising non-coercive action (wuwei, 无为) and purposeful action (youwei, 有为), based on understanding patterns and principles and offering flexibility to cope with uncertainty, emergence and change. It implies taking action that makes sense in the environmental, social, political, cultural and economic context of the situation. Standards and regulations are enacted as appropriate, impartial responses to situations, whilst the disinterested blandness of xu (虚) offers scope for experimentation with new ideas and actions. There is an element of indeterminacy in Huang-Lao thought which suggests that the future remains open to potentiality.

Shi (势), propensity, strategic utilisation of potential or efficacy, is a driving-force of Huang-Lao statecraft. There is no definitive solution to perceived problems, but an emphasis on flexibility as situations change and unforeseen issues emerge. Planning theory and practice would be oriented towards experimental and ethical action which would reject the idea of an ultimate end-point in favour of continuous innovation and improvement of human and other-than-human environments. Planners would think in terms of becoming rather than completing, commencing rather than finishing. Forcing events often provokes resistance and has the opposite effect to that which is desired. Alternatively, nurturing the propensities and conditions of possibility for desired transformation may work effectively. Huang-Lao thinking advocates purposeful action (youwei) at the level of conditions of possibility in order to induce a situation in a desired direction, rather than having to intervene later.

The spatial planning system in China is undergoing comprehensive reform in response to a perceived lack of substantive progress with the post-2003 unification of local planning departments to implement multiple-plan integration (Zhao, 2019). Since reform events afford an opportunity for the introduction of a new theoretical frame for planning practice, we explore the fundamental elements⁶ of the reformed system from a Huang-Lao perspective. In 2019, the new Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) initiated an institutional reform plan which included two significant changes to the spatial planning system (Fan and Zhou, 2021).

First, the MNR integrated all related plans (function-oriented zone, land use, urban and rural, and environmental protection plans) into a unified statutory planning system of Territorial Spatial Planning (TSP). TSP is a trans-scalar, hierarchical planning system which systematically manages conflicting issues by using digital, satellite and field-sourced databases to control use of every parcel of land (Wang, 2021).

Second, as a unified planning system, TSP seeks to take human and other-than-human elements into account for the first time through its central, powerful regulation instrument or principle of ‘three zones and three lines’ (三区三线, sanqu sanxian). Red lines (‘three lines’) on plans depict areas of permanent basic farmland and of ecological conservation which are afforded priority over urban development (‘three zones’). Human activities should be constrained to within delineated urban development boundaries (Ministry of Natural Resources, 2022; Wang, 2021).

Our reading of the reformed TSP is that of a top-down, hierarchical system, which emphasises the importance of law and performance of tasks (rituals) correctly (Confucian li, 礼). Consideration of the natural world and the mutual entanglement of humans and other-than-humans is evident through enactment of standards and regulations of red lines around zones of urban development and the preservation of farmland and areas of ecological conservation. The red lining of areas reflects both a Legalist approach, invoking law and potential punishment for its breaking, and the Confucian ‘Rectification of Names’ (正名) that ‘things in actual fact should be made to accord with the implications attached to them by names, … the prerequisite for correct living and even efficient government’ (Steinkraus, 1980: 262). Naming thus produces a standard which everyone should comprehend.

Huang-Lao thought incorporates both Legalist and Confucian interpretations. Dao, names and legality are interrelated (Cao, 2017: 163). ‘Even a small thing must have its form and name. The form and name of things are established, then the “distinction between black and white” as well as the natural characteristic of the things, their certain position, and the criterion of right and wrong is also established. … One only needs to establish forms and names and edicts, then there is no one who can escape from one’s control and governance’ (Cao, 2017: 168, from the Mawangdui Jingfa document, Daofa S1.1).

Huang-Lao thought thus proposes that the individuation of a thing is dependent on its delimitation; the establishment of a boundary between what it is and what it is not. However, since boundaries are subject to change, names (such as ‘permanent basic farmland’ and ‘ecological conservation’) only stabilise boundaries temporarily. Nevertheless, names serve as important, provisional guidelines for processes of governance. The, albeit provisional, certainty of the red lines sets aside ecological spaces for respectful non-coercive action (wuwei, 无为), with purposeful action (youwei, 有为) to be undertaken in urban development spaces. There appears little scope, however, for immanence and continuous innovation, reading patterns (Daoist li, 理), engaging propensities (shi, 势) and nudging situations in desired directions.

There are always problems in connecting philosophical ideas to critical analyses of their applications to empirical processes. Empirical specification of Huang-Lao-inspired planning would inevitably imply departure, to an extent, from some Huang-Lao concepts more suited to the pre-Qin period than the present day. Methodological application in 21^st Century China requires an interpretation sensitive to significant temporal differences and contextual circumstances. We suggest that any future planning methodologies developed take the historical and cultural contexts of Huang-Lao thinkers and their texts seriously, whilst articulating the relevance of their ideas to contemporary experience (Tan, 2016: 14).

Texts may contain insights and instructions for living a better life or constructing a better world. Thinkers were often interested in ex tempore issues of governance and pre-Qin texts may be read as philosophically grounded ‘guides for living’ (Tan, 2016: 17). However, an emphasis on practice in such ‘guides’, how they are made and justified, cautions us not to impose any simplistic dichotomy of theory and practice. The key issue thus becomes not trying to distinguish between theory and practice, but rather ‘what practical results … [the] views will lead to’ (Ni, 2016: 131).

Might it be possible to develop spatial planning methodologies grounded in a Huang-Lao-inspired theoretical framework: methodologies rooted in principles of flexibility to deal with uncertainty, propensity or potential, restrained application of law and systematic order based in the natural world? Methodologies in which purposeful action is taken in balance with nature, recognising relationships of multispecies symbiosis? These would be methodologies in which plans and designs would be sensible to understanding past, present and emerging patterns and principles relating to economic, social, cultural, environmental and political issues. As Law and Lin (2018: 10) suggest, it becomes important to see how propensities in the different ‘fields’ may fit together and what form of response may be beneficial to the local area. It may be decided that weiwuwei (the ‘doing of not doing’) may be a good response, or that youwei (purposeful action) may be productive in encouraging or even blocking certain propensities.⁷

In order to understand what is taking, and may take, place, it is useful to ask ‘how did we get to this situation? What were the conditions of possibility or propensities that led to this situation?’ Spatial planners need to remember that conditions of possibility are relational: economic, social, cultural, environmental and political issues should not be examined in isolation from each other. A situation, therefore, may have been influenced by: historical decisions taken for economic and/or political reasons; by economic and social transformation; by urban planning, urban design or architectural fashion; environmental factors and so on, and by responses to such events. Exploration of current economic, social, cultural, environmental and political propensities and the conditions of possibility for their actualisation may stimulate spatial planners to ask relational questions of ‘what might happen if …?’ various actions or non-actions were to take place. Planners should consider legal issues (such as the current legislative context, what might change, with what implications); political issues (what are the views of key political figures with regard to the future); economic issues (economic markets, availability of finance for projects); environmental issues (impacts of climate change); social issues (social demands regarding climate action, migration, social needs) and how the issues are interrelated. There would be no ‘overplanning’ in methodologies embracing inherent provisionality (see Pløger, 2018).

We consider what Ni (2016) calls a gongfu (功夫) method of applying Huang-Lao thought, referring to skills learned through practice. According to Ni (2016: 130), Daoists, Ming dynasty Confucians and Buddhists regarded their learning as gongfu. Such a method would not propose systems of rigid rules, but instructions for cultivation of skills, sensitising them to certain elements of Huang-Lao thinking (including relations with nature, the role of propensities, wuwei and youwei and so on) and prompting practitioners to develop the capacity to respond to situations flexibly. Because planning issues are not spatial or temporal copies of each other, but specific situations, instructions for planning cannot be uniform or systematic. In a gongfu method, elements of Huang-Lao thought would be brought into inclusive disjunctive synthesis with elements of spatial planning through their practical implications. It would not be dogma, nor a system which must be obeyed, but situational, context-relative protocols for developing and applying spatial plans.

We suggest that spatial planning methodologies might be constructed, engaging central and Provincial government frames as guidelines, whilst being appropriate to what the particular plan is trying to accomplish. In articulating Huang-Lao ideas into practice methodologies, planners would assess the significance of various ideas for addressing issues in accordance with local conditions. There would not be one set methodology, rather a set of locally adaptable ideas, perhaps similar to recent Chinese pilot schemes (shidian, 试点) for delegating discretionary authority in ‘experimental innovation’ initiative-taking (Guo and Liu, 2022; Zhu and Zhao, 2018).

Huang-Lao-inspired methodologies could align with Chinese ecological civilisation policy (MEE, 2022) through gongfu method. We are not aware of any empirical examples of Huang-Lao-inspired practice to date. There are, however, several documented projects which have attempted to apply Daoist ideas in their conceptualisation. For instance, Schőnfeld and Chen (2019) discuss the Lake Poyang, Jiangxi, eco-economic planning zone whose design is based on Daoist ideas of human-nature coexistence, and the Changsha, Hunan, green residential zone based on the ‘Daoist idea of living naturally, or being close to nature, by combining ecosanctuaries with high-density urban living’ (2019: 13). Whilst Lake Poyang is currently under threat from sand mining and proposed construction of a dam, Changsha has been hailed as a success (Wang et al, 2021). Another ecological civilisation project, the eco-city at Dongtan, near Shanghai, promoted an ecological discourse of ‘natural capital’, relating to an ‘essential “Taoist” philosophy’ (Sze, 2015: 148). Sze (2015) indicated that the project failed, however, due to corruption, a reliance on authoritarian displacement of local people and technocratic faith in the engineering solutions of a UK-based global company. Dongtan may thus represent a case of discursive hype rather than application of theory/philosophy in practice. Perhaps, if these various projects had also incorporated elements of Confucianism (such as observance of duties) and Legalism (laws and standards) in a Huang-Lao-oriented disposition, as explained above, outcomes may have been otherwise.

If new or unconventional theories are to avoid being ‘domesticated’ and managed by practitioners seeking rigid structures and systems similar to those with which they are accustomed, there is a need for Chinese planning theorists and practitioners to explore such tensions and discuss the practicalities of putting new theoretical ideas to work. We would like to think it possible that spatial planners, such as those working at the urban fringe where red lines have been drawn under the TSP system, might engage the core principles of Huang-Lao youwei and wuwei, law, principles and patterns and conditions of possibility for propensities to actualise in planning methods constructed in gongfu manner, appropriate to their circumstances.

Conclusions

At a time of increasing calls for indigenisation of planning theories and practices, the aim of this paper has been to propose a culturally and contextually appropriate theoretical framework with potential for development as a basis for spatial planning methodologies in China. In this regard, we briefly explored the capacity of selected tenets of Confucianism, Legalism and Daoism, three pre-Qin schools of thought, identifying, in particular, the concepts of statecraft (jingshi, 经世), propensity (shi, 势), ritual or right action (li, 礼) and pattern or coherence (li, 理).

Discussion indicated that, whilst all three schools of thought possess elements of relevance to planning, some concepts may be less appropriate to 21^st Century issues, such as climate change, resource extraction and consumption and injustices relating to diversity, equality and inclusion of humans and other-than-humans. We pointed to anthropocentric, hierarchical and patriarchal elements of Confucianism, to rigid authoritarianism of Legalism and impracticalities of Daoism. We thus turned to the lesser-known Huang-Lao school of thought; a disjunctive synthesis of elements of Confucianism and Legalism in a Daoist framework which, nevertheless, remains independent. Huang-Lao thought recognises humans as part of a holistic more-than-human system which needs to be kept in balance. The concepts of wuwei (无为, non-coercive action) and youwei (有为, necessary action) imply decisions taken to maintain societal functioning in accord with natural order. Huang-Lao affords the development of pragmatic law and statecraft which accepts dissent as part of the natural order and offers flexibility to cope with uncertainty.

Fundamentals of the new Chinese statutory planning system, TSP, were appraised through a Huang-Lao-inspired perspective. Whilst essentially a top-down, hierarchical system, we found the TSP to contain increased consideration of the natural world and of relations between humans and other-than-humans. We then asked whether it might be possible to develop spatial planning methodologies grounded in Huang-Lao thought and outlined several elements of what they might consider. Acknowledging that connecting philosophical ideas to empirical processes is never simple, we referenced Ni’s (2016) gongfu (功夫) method, to advocate development of situational, context-appropriate protocols which might be essayed, perhaps, in pilot initiatives (shidian, 试点), a feature of Chinese recent policy development, affording local discretion and innovation.

Our contention is that, for China at least, Huang-Lao thought may offer a new approach to spatial planning theory and practice. With its emphasis on a natural order of relations between humans and other-than-humans, we suggest that Huang-Lao is in alignment with policies of ecological civilisation. It offers laws and standards which reflect the moral concerns of the people in just regulations which ground legal and sociopolitical order within a natural order.

Inspired by Huang-Lao thought, spatial planning might become, as the Daodejing (Ch. 73) describes, ‘it excels at prevailing though it does not contend; it excels at responding, though it does not speak; things come of themselves though it does not summon; it excels at planning though it is flexible’ (Eno, 2010b: 32-33).

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

We thank Gert de Roo and especially those reviewers of this paper who generously shared their insights into pre-Qin philosophy.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Jean Hillier

Notes

Author biographies

Jean Hillier is Emeritus Professor with the Centre for Urban Research, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia. Her research interests include poststructural planning theory and methodology for strategic practice in conditions of uncertainty, planning with non-human animals, and problematisation of cultural heritage practices in spatial planning, particularly in China.

Kang Cao is Associate Professor in the Department of Regional and Urban Planning, Zhejiang University, China. Her research mainly focuses on the culture exchange and knowledge flow based global planning history and contemporary planning theory. She is particularly interested in the issue of planning conflict, the transnational and transregional flow of planning and urban knowledge, and the traditional Chinese philosophy inspired Chinese planning theories.

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