A sociological approach to social problems Noel Timms

Abstract

Noel Timms, A sociological approach to social problems, Routledge and Keagan Paul, Students Library of Sociology: London, 1967; 109 pp. ISBN 978-0-415-72731-0, £65 (Hbk)

Reviewed by: Maria Appel Nissen, Aalborg University, Denmark

Achievement looks like the successful culmination of a climb we’ve made. I suppose I would hope that others after me would simply be content to ‘put one foot after the other’, without bothering about the goal ahead, which must be at least shrouded. I hope that language will preoccupy. Else I do not see any way in which we can attend to the materiality of our existence (Timms, 2014).

In an early book review of Noel Timms book, the reviewer conveys how his initial reaction was sceptical, since how is it possible to provide an adequate introduction to the sociology of ‘social issues’ in just 100 pages? ‘Nevertheless, having read it I admit to having swung the full pendulum. Timms’ book is excellent’ he states, before moving on to a brief summary of the book ending with an expression of confidence that if the Students Library of Sociology will ‘maintain the quality of this premiere, we can confidently anticipate the accession of a valuable teaching medium’ (Mitchell, 1969). For 15 shillings, students could acquire a high-quality introduction to the sociology of social problems – something, which by today’s standard and in a pecuniary sense would be considered a bargain! However, considering that Timms’ book was published more than 45 years ago, it is a question of what once made the river break into a flood plain is still present. The ‘meandering flow of the river’ might have changed, as Timms metaphorically reflects on the course of a life (Timms, 2014). The banks may have been cultivated, perhaps evened out, causing fundamental changes in the bed, in the underset and the possible fractions of the water. What once made the book materialize into something distinct might be impossible to revive, without leaving a sense of retrospectively enforcing a sense of the past. Whereas the reviewer of 1969 was sceptical of the possibility of providing an adequate introduction to ‘social issues’, I was initially slightly sceptical about the idea and value of reprinting an introduction to social problems written several decades ago, which – despite earlier valuations of its quality – would quite clearly not be able to include recent developments in sociological approaches to the study of social problems. Assuming that a reprint is not an attractive bargain to the collector, or that today’s students as well as teachers and researchers are more concerned with and are often struggling with just catching up with the current state, what could possibly be the value of a 2014 reprint of an introductory ‘teaching medium’ of 1967? Nevertheless, such a question immediately hits the person asking like a boomerang because: How does something become valuable? Without presupposing too much, we might suggest this has to do with quality and that searching for the qualitative aspects of something raises a question of how, if one recalls how the word quality derives from the Latin word qualis. It is also obvious how some things are not only valued as quality during a certain period of time, but can become (even more) valuable over time, and that time in itself is constitutive for this, not only because a thing gets ‘old’, but because it tells us something important about time in itself. In other words, how something becomes valuable is that it allows us to make sense of how we are present in time. So whether we are students, teachers or researchers interested in social problems, how can a text – a voice from the past – possibly work as a medium for making sense of our own presence in time?

The present is evanescent and tends to fleet as soon as we think of it. We can read a book, but the very act, the sense and feeling of reading is hard to preserve as it is. Therefore, we use language to think and make sense of the present, and often this becomes possible by making a distinction between the past and the future – not in a linear sense corresponding to actual time, but by constructing time linguistically on the basis of meaning. ‘Initially, the reaction was sceptical … Nevertheless, having read it I admit to having swung the full pendulum. Timms’ book is excellent’, the reviewer stated, thereby indicating a process of time where a book becomes present as something that is excellent – a process which at the same time makes the reviewer appear as a person, who has changed from one position to another. In other words, how something becomes valuable is through the shaping of a time-related process, which refers to social change. This understanding of time is in itself time-related. The construction of time has always been related to social change, although we might not always have perceived or spoken about time in that sense. Either because in the beginning, we did not have an explicit concept of time (not saying that time was not an element in a cosmic order), or because the shifting concepts of time have often been aimed at ordering specific social events for the purpose of synchronicity, rather than to a conceptual reflection of how time and social change are related (Moe, 2010). The same could be said about history. Some might speak of history as ‘accumulated record’, but if perceived as a time-related phenomenon, the making of history is rather a social and linguistic endeavour which in itself takes time (Timms, 2014). What makes history is not the accumulation of ‘documents’, but the retrospective identification of ‘monuments’, which has made a certain form of knowledge possible – not searching for a ‘linear accumulation of truths’ but for a ‘discursive practice’ (Foucault, 1972: 188). And so the making of history through explanation takes time. Recognizing this might explain why we are cautions about making absolute statements about what was, how it has led to what is and what we in that light expect to come. We might instead make use of metaphors, which makes it possible to convey how time is hard to capture adequately – a form of modesty, which allow a space for time in itself by implying how the future is always ‘shrouded’ and therefore not to foresee. To some, this might be too modest and too unsecure in terms of achievements. Instead we should aim at solving the ‘grand challenges’ of our time through knowledge of excellence (American Academy of Social Work and Social Welfare, 2014). However, the process of putting ‘one foot after the other’ engaging in a process of moving might also be an achievement in itself, if not the very preconditions to developing knowledge. What becomes a medium for making sense of our present might not be the idea of a future achievement, but a way of moving in time. This is what I think Noel Timms book can offer contemporary readers. As a text it can work as a medium for making sense of our own presence in time – not as a historical document, which should be purchased for the ‘record’, but as an example of reflecting and thus eventually changing our way of thinking in the here and now. Timms sociological discourse on social problems exemplifies a position in time, which in itself refers to time and thereby tells us something important about how we can engage in the discursive practice of developing sociological knowledge of social problems. In this sense, it provides valuable inspiration to how we might continue to ‘put one foot after the other’ in developing sociological knowledge about social problems. I will illustrate this point by three examples.

Sometimes we do not see the woods for the trees, and when speaking about knowledge of social problems, the question of how we can perceive something as ‘social’ is easy to overlook in favour of a focus on the ‘problem’. Dwelling on this conceptual question is, in Timms words, not for the sake of ‘the delineation of the features of sociology with a loving and time-consuming attention to the precise form and place of each distinguishing mark, in order to distinguish rigidly between, for instance, history and sociology’ but for the purpose of constituting ‘a distinctive approach to the study of social problems’ (Timms, 1967: 3). The search for a distinct sociology of social problems goes back in time. However, in the outset, it was conveyed as a search for A Natural History of Social Problems (Fuller and Meyers, 1941). This early discourse of social problems as something which emerges through ‘natural’ processes and stages in time was based on the notion that ‘objective’ social conditions will not in themselves constitute a social problem unless they are defined as such. ‘Social problems are what people think they are’ (Fuller and Meyers, 1941: 320), it was claimed, and the main argument was that similar objective conditions in different locations would not necessarily be perceived as a social problem in each case due to different cultural values. This reference to both naturalism and subjectivism might appear as a logical contradiction to the contemporary observer. However, it might also be viewed as a reflection in a certain time of the past, where sociological explanation was still referring to connotations of ‘social pathology’ (Rubington and Weinberg, 2011). The reference to naturalism was therefore rather a way of moving in time involving a change in position. As Fuller and Meyers stated, the purpose of a sociological theory of social problems was to ensure that the students do not take problem conditions for granted as objective ‘evils’ caused by ‘evils’: ‘He seeks to explain social problems as emergent of the cultural organization of the community, as complements of the approved values of the society, not as pathological and abnormal departures from what is assumed to be proper and normal’ (Fuller and Meyers, 1941:328). In Noel Timms later approach to the ‘social’, the reference to naturalism has disappeared. Twenty-five years later and, one should note, in another context, reflections on social problems have moved on. It has become possible to speak more independently of social conditions as ‘social relations’ in a Weberian sense and of ‘social structures’ without struggling with the questions whether ‘social facts’ are or are not external to the individual (Timms, 1967: 3–10). Timms’ use of the definition of Merton and Nisbet from 1961 makes it possible to speak of a social problem as something that emerges when there is a ‘significant discrepancy between social standards and social actuality’, and to include how these standards and actualities are genuinely of a social kind thereby speaking of kinds of social problems in plural (Timms, 1967: 12). He reflects on this by emphasizing how ‘the way any society defines a “particular unpleasantness” and changes ones anxiety for another is of considerable importance’ (Timms, 1967: 11–12), as if he already is missing the future definition by Merton and Nisbet: ‘A social problem exists when there is a sizable discrepancy between what is and what people think ought to be’ (1976: 7). Thereby it is indicated how ‘social relations’ relates to shifting experiences of anxiety and various definitions of what is undesirable (Becker, 1973) if not yet the ‘social constructions’ of social problems (Spector and Kitsuse, 1987). Timms approach to social problems is thus anchored in definitions from the past available in the present, but is also anticipating a search for a more adequate language for understanding and explaining social problems. Today we might speak of this as a way of reconciling functionalism and constructivism. We could also say that Timms approach is a discursive practice - a way of moving in time – which makes sociological positions more open to change. What makes this movement possible? What enables this discursive practice? I propose reflection as a way of observing and discursively making visible the preconditions to various approaches, including the limitations inherent in these preconditions. Such a discursive practice requires that we are willing to and are actually welcoming the act of dwelling on both the obstacles and potentials of different approaches, gradually asking ourselves if this provides us with inspiration for new forms of languages of social problems (Nissen, 2014). In this way we are recognizing both interdependencies and differences, while gradually modifying how we perceive social problems. It is needless to say that this way of moving takes time, not the least because it involves a reflection of one’s own position in time. How is this possible? Let us move on to the second example:

Why should such groups have an interest in defining a social condition? If we define a condition as a social problem, we argue that its source is to be found in social relations, in society, and that its remedy is to be sought in some kind of social action. A stress on the second part of the term, social problem, involves us psychologically if not logically, in a world in which ‘problem’ goes with ‘solution’. It is not really worth defining a condition as a problem if the only possible response is that of endurance. However, it is very likely that a workable and effective solution of a ‘social problem’ will not be found at the outset, and it is important to note that the social definition of social problems changes. (Timms, 1967: 13)

This statement is also concerned with the possibility of engaging in a discursive practice of developing sociological knowledge of social problems but addresses ‘interest’ as an issue. The first interest, emphasizing how problems are social, is described as the practice of defining conditions with a reference to social relations, society and the need for social action. The second interest, emphasizing problems, is described as a practice of responding to social problems by seeking to solve them. In relation to this Timms notes how it is ‘not really worth defining a condition as a problem if the only possible response is that of endurance’, while at the same time he reminds the reader that a ‘workable’ and ‘effective’ solution is not easy to find. Today we might say that through this discursive reflection, Timms is touching upon a delicate institutionalized difference between sociology and social work. In a more explicit way, this was reflected in a contemporary notion saying ‘If social work has so far been guilty of acting without conceptualizing, sociology has been guilty of conceptualizing without acting’ (Kallen et al., 1968: 239). However, Timms reflection rather resembles earlier conceptions of the relation between sociology and social work as shaped by a common interest in knowledge of social problems deriving from the Chicago school (Klein, 1931), as well as future reflections on the ambivalence and the scientific embarrassment deriving from common historical roots in the reformist nonacademic ameliorative actors of the 18th century (Lee, 1986). In this way he exemplifies a discursive practice which seeks to acknowledge and maybe even reconcile different positions through reflection – something which is today still considered and taken up as a challenge – for example by the International Conferences of Sociology and Social Work since 2011. This gives us a sense of how solving ‘grand challenges’ takes time and involves a social change in positions.

Why do we engage in a discursive practice of developing sociological knowledge of social problems, when achievement is hard to foresee and the process of moving is so slow? The search for knowledge and the possibility to claim for ‘social action’ is one thing, but, as indicated above, we might also be involved ‘psychologically if not logically’ in social problems. There is an emotional side to ‘interest’. What lies behind the term ‘psychologically’, Timms does not unfold, but seen from the present, it could be said to indicate a consideration for the empathetic aspect of studying social problems, driven by a will to knowledge as a certain form of understanding. This is the third example:

A sociological approach does not consist in the collection of facts about discrete aspects of the environment, even though, as we shall see, statistical investigation may well be a necessary preliminary for sociological study. It is rather the attempt to discover those social relations that ‘make sense’ of facts about income, occupational status and so on. Nor is a sociological approach confined exclusively to external factors. It is concerned also with those aspects of social relations which become part of the individual’s inner world. (Timms, 1967: 16)

Although not refusing the value of collecting (statistical) facts about ‘discrete’ aspects of the environment, he encourages us to engage in what we might term in depth analysis, seeking to discover the social relations that make sense of facts. It is a way of understanding how external factors, e.g. income and status, become meaningful within social relations, and consequently how some aspects of these social relations become a part of the individuals ‘inner world’. The latter requires, if not a psychological, then an empathetic approach to the study of social problems. We might speak of a qualitative approach, where we ask how people make sense of facts, not only due to social relations but also due to how they come to view and think upon themselves. We might even speak of how social problems are related to ‘social suffering’ (Bourdieu, 2002). No matter what, we are encouraged to imagine, not only how social problems are public issues, but also how they relate to personal troubles and problems in the individual’s life in a certain time of history. Although Timms did not refer to sociological imagination as an approach (which was not only concerned with studying but also improving the quality of human life) (Mills, 1959), in present he speaks of the practice of criticism as something which requires an ‘imaginative development’ similar to what is required in social work (Timms, 1967). Having read his book, I dare to propose that this imaginative development refers to a form of sociological imagination, which allows us to make sense of how we are present in time – not as ‘the successful achievement of a climb we have made’, but as a way of moving and being moved by social issues.

References

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