How argumentative writing stifles open-mindedness

Abstract

A longstanding assumption within higher education is that there is a clear link between argumentative writing and critical thinking. In this paper, I challenge this assumption. I argue that argumentative writing genres of persuasion, inquiry, and consensus fail to target students’ open-mindedness, which is an important aspect of critical thinking. In particular, argumentative writing genres do not challenge students to confront key cognitive biases, namely confirmation bias and motivated reasoning, when engaging in moral, political, and/or social questions. The motivation to conduct a balanced selection of evidence as well as an unbiased interpretation of evidence is overshadowed by the motivation to preserve one’s prior beliefs. The structure of argumentative writing genres thereby stifles open-mindedness and can even nurture dogmatism. As a result, in our goal to develop students’ critical thinking skills through argumentative writing, we may be doing more harm than good.

Keywords

Cognitive bias argumentative writing motivated reasoning confirmation bias critical thinking open-mindedness

Scholars and public intellectuals have long emphasized the inextricable link between the functioning of a vibrant democracy and a citizenry with developed critical thinking skills (Baron, 2018; Dewey, 1916; Gutmann, 1987). For Martha Nussbaum (2010), a flourishing democratic society is one where moral and political issues are debated by a citizenry who can think critically and are able to sympathize with the perspectives of their fellows. Our current political climate, however, has become increasingly polarized, resulting in the demonization of opposing viewpoints and the strengthening of in-group bias (Iyengar and Krupenkin, 2018). These are hardly the conditions of a vibrant democracy. It would therefore seem that our current political and social climate demonstrates a failure of critical thinking, particularly open-mindedness. It is not that we have an inability to make arguments; it is that we lack the ability to listen to, thoughtfully engage with, and judiciously consider differing points of view.

Nussbaum (2010) has highlighted the importance of the arts and humanities disciplines in developing students’ critical thinking skills. But with continuing cutbacks to these disciplines, at all levels of education, the consequences could be dire. She contends that as the arts and humanities go, so goes critical thinking, and as critical thinking goes, so go our democracies. While I am sympathetic to Nussbaum’s overarching thesis, educators need to do more than promote the arts and humanities disciplines as beacons of critical thinking. We also need to reevaluate pedagogical practices to ensure their effectiveness. One longstanding assumption, particularly within the humanities, is that there is a clear link between critical thinking and argumentative writing (Carey, 2000; Cooper and Patton, 1997; Graff and Birkenstein, 2018). But, is this in fact the case?

There is something of an irony to this paper. I argue that argumentative writing genres of persuasion, inquiry, and consensus fail to sufficiently develop students’ critical thinking skills, specifically open-mindedness.¹ These argumentative genres do not challenge students to confront their cognitive biases when engaging in moral, political, and/or social questions.² In part one, after a brief discussion of critical thinking and open-mindedness, I argue that the persuasive essay encourages a biased selection and interpretation of evidence, thereby forestalling open-mindedness. To defend this claim, I consult the moral psychology and cognitive bias literatures to show that the motivation to conduct a balanced selection of evidence as well as a fair interpretation of evidence is overshadowed by the motivation to persuade. Rather than a measure of good critical thinking, I contend that the persuasive essay is a better measure of good rationalization. In part two, I consider the inquiry and consensus forms of argumentation. While these genres have some advantages over the persuasive essay, I argue that they nevertheless fail to confront students’ motivated reasoning and as a result fail to sufficiently target open-mindedness. My conclusion is therefore pessimistic. Rather than challenge students’ prior beliefs, argumentative writing genres reinforce and even strengthen them. They implicitly encourage students to succumb to a number of cognitive biases, which serves to stifle open-mindedness and nurture dogmatism.³

Critical thinking and open-mindedness

Conceptions of critical thinking can be grouped into two categories: narrow and broad. The narrow conception is understood largely in logical terms. Robert Ennis, who has been researching critical thinking for over 50 years, held a narrow view of critical thinking in his early work. For Ennis, a critical thinker was one who could recognize a number of logical relations between statements such as “a statement follows from the premises,” “something is an assumption,” and “an argument depends on an ambiguity” (Ennis, 1964: 599–600). This kind of narrow view is still maintained by some contemporary theorists. For Mulnix, “Critical thinking just is that mode of thinking that seeks to justify beliefs on the evidential relations that hold between statements” (Mulnix, 2012: 472).

Most contemporary researchers, however, adopt a broad conception of critical thinking. This includes Ennis’ more recent work, in which he regards critical thinking as “reasonable reflective thinking focused on deciding what to believe or do” (Ennis, 2018: 166). Ennis calls this expansive definition, which puts critical thinking at the core of belief and action, “the mainstream concept of critical thinking” (Ennis, 2018: 166). Although variations exist, there is a general consensus amongst researchers that this expansive definition captures the essence of critical thinking (Brookfield, 1987; Kuhn, 2015; Paul and Elder, 2008; Scriven and Paul, 1987).

One important difference between the narrow and broad conceptions of critical thinking concerns the concept of open-mindedness. On the narrow view, open-mindedness is not a part of critical thinking; on the broad view, it is a part. For example, in Ennis' (2018) later formulation of critical thinking, open-mindedness is regarded as a key disposition of critical thinkers. Given that most researchers adopt the broad view, there is now general agreement that open-mindedness is a core component of critical thinking (Ennis, 1987, 2018; Paul and Elder, 2008; Thayer-Bacon, 1998). Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a good critical thinker who is close-minded to other perspectives on issues.

Similarly to critical thinking, there are numerous conceptions of open-mindedness (Baron, 2008; Ennis, 1987, 2018; Hare, 1979). Clearly distinguishing open-mindedness within the broader concept of critical thinking is not an easy task. There is a tendency amongst theorists to define open-mindedness in an expansive way that encroaches upon other aspects of critical thinking. For example, according to Ennis, open-mindedness involves the ability to “seriously consider other points of view” and “withhold judgment when the evidence and reasons are insufficient” (Ennis, 2018: 167). The latter component of this definition seems to capture too much. Withholding judgment when evidence is lacking or insufficient is not a matter of being open to other views but of careful critical assessment.

The philosopher William Hare has spent many years investigating open-mindedness. According to him:

A person who is open-minded is disposed to revise or reject the position he holds if sound objections are brought against it, or, in the situation in which the person presently has no opinion on some issue, he is disposed to make up his mind in the light of available evidence and argument as objectively and impartially as possible. (Hare, 1979: 9)

Similarly to Ennis, Hare's definition of open-mindedness is too broad. The disposition to revise or reject one’s view if sound objections are brought against it also concerns one’s critical reasoning skills – that is, the ability to assess and evaluate evidence. This is not open-mindedness. In this way, Hare conflates open-mindedness with critical thinking at large. This becomes evident in a later work when he discusses a worry of open-mindedness. Hare writes:

Being receptive to the point of being duped is not a form open-mindedness at all and such gullibility undermines our claim to have a concern for truth and a genuine desire for knowledge. (Hare, 2011: 13)

According to Hare, an open-minded thinker is one who cannot be duped. But, this is incorrect. Open-minded individuals can easily be misled insofar as they are receptive to new ideas but have not developed the critical reasoning skills that are needed to assess them. Just as critical reasoning is necessary but not sufficient to be a good critical thinker, so too is open-mindedness necessary but not sufficient to be a good critical thinker. Since open-mindedness is a part of critical thinking, one can be open-minded and yet be an overall poor critical thinker.

A more moderate conception of open-mindedness is developed by Jonathan Baron (2008), which he calls actively open-minded thinking. The “actively” concerns seeking out evidence of different perspectives and the “open-minded” refers to an unbiased consideration of these perspectives (Baron, 2008: 200). For the purposes of this paper, I limit open-mindedness to these two aspects: a balanced search for evidence and an unbiased interpretation of that evidence. While the interpretation of evidence also requires critical reasoning in order to effectively assess it, this discriminatory component is beyond the scope of open-mindedness.

How the persuasive essay stifles open-mindedness

Persuasion and the nature of moral judgment

There are many skills that go into writing a persuasive essay, which can be categorized according to a two-step process. As Ramage et al. have noted:

The study of argumentation involves two components: truth seeking and persuasion. By truth seeking, we mean a diligent, open-minded, and responsible search for the best course of action or solution to a problem, taking into account all the available information and alternative points of view. By persuasion, we mean the art of making a claim on an issue and justifying it convincingly so that the audience’s initial resistance to your position is overcome and they are moved toward your position. (Ramage et al., 2006: 391)

This truth-seeking, or inquiry, is first undertaken to arrive at a position, and then the writer sets out to convince others of that position. Critical thinking skills at the inquiry stage include:

Conducting a balanced search of the literature.

Interpreting the work of others in an unbiased way.

Using critical reasoning to assess the work of others.

Proportioning one’s beliefs to the available evidence.

Critical thinking skills at the persuasion stage of the process include:

5. Providing good reasons in support of a claim.

6. Presenting one’s ideas in a clear and logical manner.

7. Anticipating and responding to counterarguments.

On paper at least, the persuasive essay targets many aspects of critical thinking including open-mindedness (1 and 2). After all, an effective inquiry process involves a balanced search for evidence and an unbiased interpretation of evidence.

The two main components of the persuasive essay highlight a tension that has been up for debate since the beginning of western thought: What is the proper relation between truth (i.e. inquiry) and rhetoric (i.e. persuasion)? One approach is to regard inquiry into the truth as so fundamental that persuasion simply falls out of it. We can call this the Platonic approach.⁴ On this view, the use of rhetorical devices—such as appealing to the reader’s emotions or anticipating counterarguments—is unnecessary. Indeed, Plato’s use of a dialogic structure in his works puts the emphasis on inquiry. It is through discussion on a topic that interlocutors are able to arrive at the truth of a matter. Since the truth is in itself persuasive, the relation collapses into one. The opposite view, which we can call the Sophistic approach, prioritizes rhetoric over truth. Here, the focus is on convincing an individual or group of individuals of one’s desired view, irrespective of the truth, much as a lawyer tries to persuade a jury. By regarding persuasion as primary, the Sophistic approach may be philosophically pernicious, but it is psychologically astute insofar as appealing to the emotions of an audience can sway opinion.

The persuasive essay has instituted a compromise between the Platonic and Sophistic approaches. Toulmin’s (1958) model of argumentation, for example, uses rhetorical structures such as counterclaims and rebuttals that are aimed to persuade the reader of a claim. However, these persuasive tools do not deviate the reader’s attention away from the topic under investigation through illegitimate tactics (e.g. ad hominem attacks). Rather than reducing truth to persuasion or persuasion to truth, the persuasive essay maintains both by emphasizing a two-stage process. Theoretically, at least, once we have arrived at our position through inquiry, we then move onto the writing stage where we seek to persuade the reader.

In practice, however, by collapsing the two-stage process of inquiry and persuasion into one persuasive paper, the critical thinking skills associated with inquiry may be undermined. Are students able to inquire into an issue in an open-minded manner, particularly when they are engaging in contentious moral, political, and/or social topics to which they may already hold strong opinions? When we reflect on how it is that we arrive at our moral beliefs, it might seem like an entirely rational process involving thinking, reflecting, and reasoning. This assumption has provided a thread through much of western thinking from Plato to Kant to Rawls. Based on this rational account of moral belief, the two stages of the persuasive essay is an ideal way to engage with divisive topics. However, recent findings across the interdisciplinary field of moral psychology—including neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy—have called this rationalistic model into question (Damasio, 1994; Greene, 2013; Haidt, 2012; Prinz, 2006). According to this alternative perspective, our moral reasoning does not follow the linear, straightforward process that the western tradition has generally presumed. Our moral judgments are instead quick intuitions and feelings, and the reasoning that follows seeks to rationalize these gut responses (Damasio, 1994; Greene, 2013; Haidt, 2012; Prinz, 2006).⁵ Empirical studies have shown—by devising rather extreme moral scenarios—that individuals first assert something is morally wrong and then begin the process of confabulating, that is searching for reasons (Haidt et al., 2000). Even if this search is unsuccessful, the reasoner will often stick with the conclusion without knowing why (Haidt et al., 2000).

According to Joshua Greene (2013: 300), who has conducted research into moral reasoning as a philosopher, psychologist, and neuroscientist, “The moral rationalizer feels a certain way about a moral issue and then makes up a rational-sounding justification for that feeling.” It is not that we reason our way to moral judgments; instead, we have an intuitive moral judgment about an issue and then we reason to make sense of it. The default setting of our moral reasoning is not to inquire into the truth of a matter but to rationalize a view to which we are already predisposed. It is important to note that this process is not consciously accessible to reasoners. Subjectively, it feels like we are providing substantial, objective reasons.

Jonathan Haidt has developed a social-intuitionist model of moral judgment, which is broadly in line with Greene’s account. Haidt concludes that

… each individual is really good at one thing: finding evidence to support the position he or she already holds, usually for intuitive reasons. We should not expect individuals to produce good, open-minded, truth-seeking reasoning, particularly when self-interest or reputational concerns are in play. (Haidt, 2012: 90)

Greene and Haidt agree that our default mode of moral reasoning is to justify our intuitive responses rather than engage in an open-minded inquiry into the topic.⁶ This feeling and intuition-based model of moral judgment presents a deep problem for the persuasive essay. When students are engaging with emotionally charged topics, a balanced inquiry will likely give way to a partial perspective that seeks to defend rather than discover.⁷

Festinger’s (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance provides a compelling explanation for understanding this seemingly perverse nature of moral reasoning. The questioning and overturning of one’s beliefs can result in a fundamental shift of one’s orientation to the world, which can be a psychologically difficult experience. By preserving one’s beliefs through rationalization, an individual’s way of being in the world can be maintained. Rationalization provides the path of least resistance. By prioritizing persuasion over inquiry, students may be able to write a convincing account, but this is not sufficient for good critical thinking. If they are rationalizing an initial intuition, then they are succumbing to a host of cognitive biases.

How cognitive biases impede the selection and interpretation of evidence

There has been a general lack of attention within higher education given to designing courses and assignments that specifically challenge cognitive bias.⁸ This is surprising given that university educators place such an important emphasis on critical thinking. In this section, I will make the case that the persuasive essay reinforces rather than challenges students’ cognitive biases and therefore undermines some of the critical thinking skills associated with inquiry.

There are two broad categories of cognitive biases that generally map onto the two stages of the persuasive paper:

Confirmation bias, which corresponds to the inquiry stage of selecting and interpreting evidence (Mercier and Sperber, 2011; Nickerson, 1998);

My-side bias, which corresponds to the persuasion stage of considering opposing arguments (Baron, 1995; Wolfe, 2012).

My-side bias is the tendency to only include arguments in support of one’s view and to avoid considering opposing arguments. This bias stems from a lack of knowledge about what a convincing argument consists of, and it has been shown that with explicit instruction the problem can be corrected (Wolfe and Britt, 2008; Wolfe et al., 2009). Confirmation bias, on the other hand, is a deeper problem, as it is a largely unconscious-process that is not responsive to instruction. Given the greater challenge that confirmation bias poses, which occurs at the inquiry as opposed to persuasion stage of the process, I will focus my attention on it.

Confirmation bias can be viewed through a broad or narrow lens. Broadly, it is the tendency to seek out and interpret evidence that aligns with one’s beliefs while selectively ignoring, dismissing, and misinterpreting evidence that opposes one’s beliefs (Lilienfeld et al., 2009; Nickerson, 1998). This broad view involves both the seeking and interpreting of evidence. Alternatively, confirmation bias can be viewed in a more fine-grained way referring specifically to the seeking of evidence (Ditto and Lopez, 1992; Taber and Lodge, 2006). On this narrower perspective, the biased interpretation of evidence is seen as a more specified bias, sometimes referred to as disconfirmation bias (Edwards and Smith, 1996; Taber and Lodge, 2006) or motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990). For the purposes of this paper, I will use the term “confirmation bias” in the narrow sense to refer to the selective seeking of evidence and the term “motivated reasoning” to apply to the interpretation of evidence.⁹

Confirmation bias is a considerable problem for the persuasive essay as it disrupts a balanced and fair-minded search of the literature. Research over the past number of decades has confirmed this (Ditto and Lopez, 1992; Taber and Lodge, 2006). Rather than try to falsify our beliefs as the philosopher of science Karl Popper advocated, we are predisposed to seek confirmation of our beliefs. This can occur both consciously and unconsciously. It is not uncommon for students to first develop a thesis and then consciously seek out evidence to “prove” the thesis. Although this inverted process can be easily corrected with instruction, a more pervasive and troubling occurrence is the unconscious effect of confirmation bias, which can impede one’s ability to seek out disconfirming evidence despite the best of intentions.

Confirmation bias is strengthened when an individual holds a prior belief on a topic. The stronger the belief, the stronger the bias is to avoid seeking out disconfirming evidence (Edwards and Smith, 1996; Lord et al., 1979; Taber and Lodge, 2006). In a study by Taber and Lodge (2006), undergraduate students in an introductory political science course viewed pro and con information about affirmative action or gun control. The students were advised to view the information impartially in order to describe the issue to others. Despite this instruction, the researchers found that the students actively sought out evidence that aligned with their prior views on the topic. Moreover, they found that this selection of evidence was more pronounced with individuals who had stronger prior beliefs on gun control or affirmative action. This “prior belief effect” has been well-established (Edwards and Smith, 1996; Lord et al., 1979; Taber and Lodge, 2006) and poses a serious problem to academic writing. After all, students often choose to write about essay topics that they are interested in and interest often correlates with strength of belief.

In addition, Taber and Lodge (2006) found that confirmation bias was most pronounced for who they call “sophisticates,” those students who possessed more knowledge on the topic. They found that “sophisticated opponents of stricter gun control sought out six arguments of the NRA or the Republican Party and only two arguments from the opposition” (Taber and Lodge, 2006: 764). Similarly to the prior belief effect, this relationship between the selection of evidence and expertise is particularly worrying within an academic context. Based on this study, expertise correlates with a more restrictive search and thus less open-mindedness.

Even if one is able to overcome the challenges of confirmation bias by seeking out evidence that contradicts one’s beliefs, this does not entail a fair interpretation of that evidence. Similar to confirmation bias, motivated reasoning—interpreting evidence in a way to support one’s prior beliefs—has been well documented (Edwards and Smith, 1996; Kunda, 1990; Lord et al., 1979; Taber and Lodge, 2006).¹⁰ While all reasoning is in some respect motivated, what matters is whether it is motivated toward accuracy or preserving one’s beliefs (Kunda, 1990). It is the latter that is of concern, and it has been shown to occur with evidence that both supports and contradicts one’s beliefs. With respect to supporting evidence, individuals tend to readily accept the conclusions with little questioning of the reasoning. As for disconfirming evidence, individuals tend to spend a significant amount of time finding problems with the study or argument, which makes sense given that they are motivated to preserve their beliefs and thereby avoid the discomfort of cognitive dissonance.

Both aspects of motivated reasoning, which serve to maintain beliefs, were evident in Taber and Lodge’s (2006) study. Not only did they find that students spent more time assessing arguments to which they disagreed, but also once again, this was more pronounced for the students who had stronger beliefs. While this connection between motivated reasoning and strength of prior belief was also found in Edward and Smith’s (1996) research, one of the novel aspects of Taber and Lodge’s (2006) study was the correlation they found between motivated reasoning and the sophisticates. Those students who possessed more knowledge on the topic spent more time trying to find problems in the arguments that they opposed. In addition to being less likely to seek out opposing evidence, the sophisticates spent more time interpreting opposing evidence. That is to say, those with expertise on the topic were more prone to both confirmation bias and motivated reasoning.

Motivated reasoning extends beyond one’s prior beliefs. It also implicates behavior. In Kunda’s (1987) study, undergraduate students in an introductory psychology course read an article claiming that caffeine was dangerous for women. It turned out that female students who consumed large amounts of caffeine were less convinced by the article than those female students who consumed lower amounts of caffeine. No such distinction was found for male students. As a result, it was only the high caffeine consuming female students who found ways to question the truth of the study. They were motivated to disbelieve the study because only they would be worse off if the study were true. While this result concerns behavior in addition to belief, a comprehensive explanation can be provided through Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance. There is little incentive to exert cognitive effort when a conclusion aligns with one’s beliefs and/or behavior. But, when a conclusion does not align with one’s beliefs and/or behavior, there is an incentive to expend extra cognitive resources in order to find problems. These incentives are not concerned with an accurate assessment in which beliefs are proportioned to the evidence; they are concerned with maintaining one’s way of being in the world. The truth hurts and since we are motivated to avoid hurt, we often lose the truth.

In addition to confirmation bias and motivated reasoning, research has shown that individuals interpret both confirming and disconfirming evidence in a way that actually strengthens their beliefs. This bias, which is called attitude polarization, has also been well established (Edwards and Smith, 1996; Lord et al., 1979; Nisbett and Ross, 1980; Taber and Lodge, 2006). In Lord et al.'s (1979) foundational study on cognitive bias, one group of undergraduate students was in favor of capital punishment and the other was against it. Both groups read two studies—one supporting the death penalty as a deterrent to crime and one rejecting this link. Regardless of the group, motivated reasoning occurred. Those in favor of the death penalty found the pro capital punishment study to be more convincing while those against found the study that was critical to be more convincing. What was particularly surprising about this research was that the beliefs of the students were not only maintained, but they strengthened as a result of reading and assessing these studies. Simply being exposed to evidence on both sides served to strengthen each side’s view (Lord et al., 1979).

This polarization effect has been found in more recent work, including Taber and Lodge’s (2006) study measuring beliefs on gun control and affirmative action. Nevertheless, their findings were more fine-grained as they found this polarization to be more evident in the sophisticates. That is, the more of an expert one is on the topic, the more their belief strengthened after being presented with evidence that both supported and contradicted their view. This cognitive bias is called the sophistication effect (Yudkowsky, 2008). The more knowledgeable one is on a subject, the more counterarguments they can utilize to rebut or explain away disconfirming evidence. Since an expert on a topic can easily fall victim to confirmation bias and motivated reasoning, making a convincing argument in support of a contentious claim is not sufficient for a good critical thinker. One can make a reasoned and sophisticated argument but lack the ability to be open-minded to alternative perspectives.

It might be argued that the persuasive writing genre provides a check against cognitive bias, most notably through the rhetorical strategy of anticipating and responding to counterarguments. Considering and rebutting counterclaims are part of the Toulmin model, for example. Anticipating counterclaims, it could be argued, demonstrates a balanced and fair-minded inquiry, as the writer is able to present compelling reasons on the other side. The presentation of counterarguments, however, is not provided in a spirit of open-mindedness but rather as a persuasive strategy to further convince a reader. This is evident in how academic writing textbooks discuss this rhetorical strategy. Here is a selection:

By demonstrating that you have anticipated the concerns of people who would critique your views, you can avoid giving the reader the sense that you are smugly self-assured and thoroughly unappreciative of other perspectives on the issue. (Seech, 2004: 18)

When you entertain a counterargument, you make a kind of preemptive strike, identifying problems with your argument before others can point them out for you. (Graff and Birkenstein, 2018: 78)

By anticipating your opponent’s reasoning, you can often disarm the opposition … By addressing counterarguments to your position, you also appear more reasonable, more fair. You are seen not as narrow-minded, dogmatic, or unheedful of others’ views, but as broad-minded and aware of complexity and so ultimately as more intelligent, reliable, and thus credible. (Cooper and Patton, 1997: 69)

As these descriptions suggest, using counterarguments is a strategy to “appear more reasonable” when defending a claim. This appearance is ultimately a persuasive strategy to defend one’s case, which is made clear by the war-like language of “preemptive strike” and “disarm.” Anticipating and responding to counterarguments are certainly effective strategies to convince a reader, but they are not evidence of a balanced inquiry. Whereas confirmation bias, broadly construed, concerns the inquiry stage of the process, my-side bias “concerns how we use arguments and evidence to present our beliefs to others” (Felton et al., 2015a: 318). The consideration of counterarguments certainly helps to overcome my-side bias, but it does not sufficiently challenge the deeper issues of confirmation bias and motivated reasoning.

The motivation to seek out and interpret evidence so as to preserve and strengthen one’s beliefs are significant problems for standard practices within higher education, including the persuasive essay. This writing genre unwittingly encourages cognitive biases to flourish. Its focus on persuasion, which comes at the detriment to inquiry, serves to maintain and strengthen one’s prior beliefs on a topic. As we have seen, this effect is stronger when the expertise is greater and when the prior belief is stronger. Of course, there is nothing wrong with either strong beliefs or beliefs that strengthen over time, but if these beliefs are the result of unchecked cognitive biases, then there is a problem. While providing a convincing argument requires critical thinking skills, this is not sufficient for a good critical thinker. It does not develop the critical thinking skills associated with conducting a balanced search of evidence or those associated with a fair interpretation of that evidence. In short, it neglects open-mindedness.

How inquiry and consensus arguments fail to target open-mindedness

Inquiry-based argumentation

Although the persuasive essay is intended to develop a range of critical thinking skills, its structure encourages rather than challenges some key cognitive biases. While the skills of persuasion are targeted, such as the ability to support a claim by considering and responding to counterarguments, the skills of inquiry are not. Most notably, conducting a balanced search of evidence and interpreting evidence in a fair manner are neglected. A natural solution to this problem is to break up the process so that students write two papers, one dedicated to inquiring into a topic and the other dedicated to persuasion. The most notable genre of inquiry is the exploratory essay. A number of writing scholars advocate this scaffolded method in which an exploratory essay precedes a persuasive essay (Bean, 2011; Ramage et al., 2006).

Unlike a persuasive essay, an exploratory essay does not begin with a thesis that is subsequently defended by way of reasons and evidence. As the name suggests, an exploratory essay is intended to help students inquire into an issue by exploring different viewpoints. Through a critical analysis of the material, the student ultimately arrives at a position. As Ramage et al. note, “During exploration, writers may radically redefine the problem and then later alter or even reverse their initial beliefs” (Ramage et al., 2006: 191). Rather than trying to persuade a reader, this argumentative approach details the evolution of one’s thinking on a topic. While a persuasive essay aims to persuade a reader, inquiry-based argumentation “has truth as its single goal” (Crusius and Channell, 1995: 43). Since open-minded thinkers are motivated by the truth rather than what is psychologically expedient, it would seem that inquiry-based argumentation such as the exploratory essay would be the ideal genre for developing the two aspects of open-mindedness. After all, as we saw in the previous section, the skills of conducting a balanced search of the literature and interpreting the work of others in an unbiased way are intended to be developed at the inquiry stage.

With respect to combatting confirmation bias, that is conducting a balanced search of the literature, an exploratory essay could encourage the development of this skill. In order to satisfy the expectations of the assignment, students will be motivated to consult evidence from a range of perspectives. An exploratory paper that provides evidence from only one side would indicate partisanship. Its limited scope necessarily fails to be an exploration. In this way, the motivational structure of an exploratory essay does help to confront the challenge of confirmation bias.

However, an exploration of a moral, political, and/or social issue rarely begins from a neutral starting ground. Whether the topic is abortion, immigration, or tax policy, students tend to bring prior beliefs to these kinds of emotionally charged topics, and they will be motivated to preserve their prior beliefs whether they are informed or not. After all, we are predisposed to avoid the psychological discomfort of overturning our beliefs and reorienting our relation to the world. As such, when interpreting evidence in support of an opposing perspective, students will be motivated to disconfirm it. Ultimately, it makes no difference whether the essay is thesis-seeking or thesis-supporting because motivated reasoning will still occur. All of the empirical studies on motivated reasoning that were discussed in the previous section are just as applicable to the inquiry genre. Since students will be motivated to preserve their prior beliefs, the exploratory essay does not sufficiently confront motivated reasoning. As such, it does not sufficiently target the development of open-mindedness.

What then, are we to make of Crusius and Channell’s claim that inquiry-based argumentation “has truth as its single goal” (Crusius and Channell, 1995: 43)? This might be true in those limited cases where students have no prior beliefs on a topic. Then the exploration would begin from a neutral starting ground. However, in cases where prior beliefs do exist, the destination is more or less known before the exploration begins. As such, the structure of an exploratory paper does not challenge students to truly confront disconfirming evidence. Instead, it motivates students to preserve their beliefs in order to avoid the psychological discomfort of cognitive dissonance. Crusius and Channell recognize that psychological discomfort comes with an authentic inquiry:

Questioning received truths takes effort and may make us uncomfortable but we must do it if we are to earn our convictions and responsibly exercise our right to free speech. (Crusius and Channell, 1995: 43)

Nevertheless, inquiry-based argumentation such as the exploratory essay has no mechanism to bring about this discomfort. It does not encourage students to feel the weight of opposing perspectives. Instead, students will be implicitly motivated to maintain their prior views and to find problems with opposing arguments. That is to say, students can write an effective exploratory essay without igniting the moral intuitions that underpin opposing beliefs. As such, the force of opposing views will go unrecognized and will not be grappled with. Ultimately, the problem with inquiry forms of argumentation is that they require students to provide a thesis, which encourages the perpetuation of prior beliefs. It is this injunction to provide a thesis that distorts the aim of truth.

It might be argued that since inquiry-based argumentation can help overcome confirmation bias that it will in turn help overcome motivated reasoning. Perhaps exposure to arguments on the other side will help students to be less biased in their interpretation of evidence. But, as we saw in the previous section, this is not the case. Rather than playing a mitigating role, exposure to arguments from the opposing side has been shown to further polarize prior beliefs particularly for sophisticates (Lord et al., 1979; Taber and Lodge, 2006). Indeed, overcoming confirmation bias can actually intensify one’s motivated reasoning, which the sophistication effect demonstrates.

Although inquiry-based argumentation such as the exploratory essay seems like an ideal way to develop open-mindedness, it is not the case. By requiring students to provide a thesis, this genre implicitly encourages students to engage in motivated reasoning to preserve their beliefs.

Consensus-seeking argumentation

In addition to persuasion and inquiry, the final argumentative approach is to negotiate differences on an issue in order to reach a consensus. This kind of argumentation is sometimes called negotiation (Crusius and Channell, 1995) and sometimes called deliberative argumentation (Felton et al., 2015a, 2015b; Villarroel et al., 2016). Rogerian argumentation is an example of a consensus-seeking writing model. In a Rogerian argument, the writer presents a problem or debate using impartial language before describing the opposing viewpoint as charitably as possible (Hairston, 1976). To do this effectively, the writer must understand the nuance of the opposing position, which in turn requires an understanding of why one would hold this view. That is, it requires having awoken the moral intuitions that underpin the opposing belief. In short, it requires empathy. At the next stage, the writer provides an account of his/her own perspective on the issue, once again using impartial language. These preparatory stages set up the main purpose of a Rogerian essay, which is to reach common ground with the reader on a solution to the problem that is under investigation (Hairston, 1976). One of the benefits of Rogerian argument is that it is less adversarial than persuasive argumentation. It is also more respectful of difference and encourages a more collaborative and conciliatory approach. Consensus-seeking argumentation, such as the Rogerian model, certainly has its benefits, but does it target the development of open-mindedness?

One of the central limitations of consensus-seeking argumentation is that students are imagining a dialogue with an opponent. In so doing, they are framing the opponent’s perspective from their own lens. Writers will therefore be motivated to reach a common ground that does not challenge their prior beliefs. Once again, there is no mechanism within the structure of a Rogerian argument to prevent motivated reasoning.

One could argue that a Rogerian argument is successful in reaching a consensus because the writer has taken the time to fully understand the other perspective. This is no doubt true. However, it is important to note that this ability to understand and empathize with the other perspective is not developed as a result of the negotiation writing exercise. It is rather a prerequisite. This is clear when we consider the placement of a consensus-seeking essay within a writing scaffolded model. As Crusius and Channell note:

Negotiation has a chance only among people who have reasoned through their own position, through inquiry and who have attempted to defend it, not through force, but through convincing and persuasive argumentation. (Crusius and Channell, 1995: 154)

Negotiation is intended to build upon the skills developed within the inquiry and persuasion processes. In this way, it is thought to work best when students have already written an inquiry essay and a persuasive essay. The skills of inquiry and persuasion are then built upon in a consensus-seeking paper to develop the skills of respect, diplomacy, and negotiation. It is assumed that at the consensus-seeking stage that writers will have already developed open-mindedness on the topic, which will allow them to describe the opposing perspective in a rich and nuanced way. Indeed, Crusius and Channell noted that “the opposing parties must be open-minded” (Crusius and Channell, 1995: 175) before writing a consensus-seeking essay. Thus, consensus-seeking genres of argumentation do not target open-mindedness, but rather open-mindedness is a prerequisite in order to achieve an effective negotiation. The problem, as we have seen, is that the inquiry and persuasion forms of argumentation are not targeting open-mindedness. By the time students get to the consensus stage, they will continue to fall victim to motivated reasoning, and as a result, the common ground that they propose is unlikely to be assented to by the opposing side.

One way around the limitation of having students imagine the opposing perspective within a consensus-seeking essay is to have them engage in a consensus-seeking dialogue with a student who takes an opposing view. It is important to note that this suggestion takes us beyond writing, but research that has been conducted on consensus-seeking argumentative dialogue (also called deliberative dialogue) can shed light on the relation between this form of argumentation and open-mindedness. Studies have compared the effects of students engaging in persuasive argumentative dialogue versus consensus-seeking argumentative dialogue prior to writing a persuasive essay (Felton et al., 2015a; Villarroel et al., 2016). These studies show that students in persuasive groups, who were tasked to persuade their partner on an issue, were more likely to misinterpret and neglect evidence that opposed their beliefs in their subsequent essay compared to students in the deliberative groups, who were tasked to reach a consensus on an issue (Felton et al., 2015a; Villarroel et al., 2016). Villarroel et al. surmise that “persuasion goals seem to trigger a defense motivation that is antithetical to the task of evaluating data with care and impartiality” (Villarroel et al., 2016: 172). They conclude that the students were more likely to evaluate contradictory evidence fairly when altering the motivational structure from persuasion to consensus.

Do these results indicate that consensus-seeking argumentation develops open-mindedness? The data from these studies suggest that they do not. This improvement in the understanding of the opposing position in the deliberative condition seems to target the more superficial problem of myside bias as opposed to the deeper problem of motivated reasoning. Two interesting findings of the Villarroel et al. (2016) study indicate this. First, they note that none of the participants in the deliberative condition changed their perspectives on the issue. One possible reason for this is that individuals who are seeking consensus are still in an argumentative frame of mind and are thereby motivated to arrive at a view that is most in accordance with their original perspective. As such, there will be resistance toward amending their view and certainly toward changing it. Second, the researchers expected to find greater polarization of beliefs in the persuasion group than the deliberative group. However, they found little difference between the groups. While most participants across the two groups showed no opinion change, the researchers noted that the change in opinion that did occur, including in the consensus-seeking groups, was toward more polarizing beliefs (Villarroel et al., 2016). This aligns with the research considered earlier on attitude polarization (Edwards and Smith, 1996; Lord et al., 1979; Nisbett and Ross, 1980; Taber and Lodge, 2006), in which the presentation of mixed evidence results in stronger beliefs. As such, it seems that the benefits of consensus-seeking argumentation stem from students overcoming their myside bias by consciously considering opposing perspectives. However, this does not address the deeper problem of motivated reasoning.

The findings from Felton et al. (2015a) also support this interpretation. In fact, they explicitly note that consensus-seeking dialogue helps to improve my-side bias, namely the inclusion and integration of opposing arguments within students’ subsequent written argument. Moreover, similarly to Villarroel et al. (2016), some of their findings support that motivated reasoning was occurring within consensus-seeking argumentation. Comparing students in the persuasion groups to those in the deliberative groups, they note that there was

… a lack of between-group differences in position change or strength of opinion after dialogue, in the length of dialogues or in the relative contributions of each partner in the dialogues. In fact, both groups showed a slight polarization effect, suggesting that participants in the consensus-dialogue condition generally did not change position or certainty, but instead tempered their arguments using integrative strategies. (Felton et al., 2015a: 327)

Within this study as well, the beliefs of students in the consensus-seeking groups became slightly more polarized. This attitude polarization, which is difficult to explain unless motivated reasoning was occurring, is antithetical to open-mindedness. Even for those students in the consensus groups who did not experience more polarized beliefs, there was no statistical difference compared to the persuasion groups with respect to changes to belief strength or belief change. As a result, the more fully formed arguments that the students in the deliberative groups made in comparison to the persuasion groups indicate the overcoming of myside bias.¹¹

Consensus-seeking argumentation certainly helps students to develop a number of critical thinking skills, but open-mindedness is not one of them. This is primarily because students are still motivated to preserve the essence of their prior beliefs. Indeed, similarly to persuasion and inquiry forms of argumentation, consensus-seeking argumentation does not challenge students’ motivated reasoning.

Conclusion

The skills of critical thinking are many and complex. Although the various forms of argumentation, namely persuasion, inquiry, and consensus, cumulatively target a number of them, we should be suspicious of their overall efficacy. Argumentative writing genres implicitly encourage students to preserve their prior beliefs and in so doing do not challenge important cognitive biases. Most notably, they all fail to confront students’ motivated reasoning. Since these argumentative structures motivate students to preserve their beliefs by defending or reaching a position, open-mindedness is ultimately stifled. Thus, in our goal to develop students’ critical thinking skills through argumentative writing, we may be doing more harm than good.

I am not suggesting that we dispense with the argumentative writing genres completely, but that we supplement them with other practices that target open-mindedness. We can do this in one of three ways. First, we can develop students’ open-mindedness through a writing genre that specifically targets this foundational skill prior to assigning an argumentative paper. Unfortunately, it is by no means evident that such a writing genre exists as developing open-mindedness was supposed to be one of the main functions of the argumentative writing genres. Second, we can supplement argumentative writing tasks with non-writing pedagogical practices that develop open-mindedness, such as active learning exercises. However, as we have seen through some of the research on deliberative dialogue and consensus-seeking dialogue, practices that purport to target open-mindedness may not in fact do so. Third, we can look outside of the curriculum to develop students’ open-mindedness. For example, research suggests that peer-to-peer interactions within a diverse student body can help in this regard (Pascarella and Ternzini, 2005). As educators, we need to be focusing our efforts on developing novel and evidence-based methods in all three of these areas. In a time when moral, political, and social issues have become increasingly polarized, developing students’ open-mindedness should be a priority.

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

James Southworth

Notes

Author biography

James Southworth, PhD, is a writing consultant in the Department of Teaching and Learning at Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada. He holds a PhD in philosophy from Western University, Canada. His research interests include writing studies and critical thinking.

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