Philosophy’s rematch: A new conceptualization of the study of higher education

Abstract

In recent decades, philosophy has been identified as a general approach to enhance the maturity of higher education as a field of study by enriching theory and method. In this article, I offer a new set of philosophical recommendations to spur the disciplinary development of higher education, departing from previous work in several meaningful ways. Due to their deep and useful connections to higher education research, philosophy of measurement, virtue epistemology, and Bayesian epistemology are introduced and discussed in relation to their conceptual association and potential practical influence on the study of higher education. The culmination of these points signals a learnercentered lens focused on the development of students.

Keywords

Higher Education,philosophy,philosophy of measurement,virtue epistemology,Bayesian epistemology,higher education research

“ … philosophy may even be defined as the general theory of education.”

—John Dewey (2012 [1916])

Introduction

A half century ago at the U.S. national assembly of the Association of Professors of Higher Education, Mayhew (1974) presented his understanding of the most pressing issue facing the study and discipline of higher education:

… Perhaps the most pervasive weakness is the problem of identity … First, there is no clear agreement as to the parameters of the study of higher education. Second, there is no generally understood preparation for expertise which an acknowledged professor of higher education should possess (p. 37).

In recent years, Mayhew’s claims appear just as relevant. There remains perpetual confusion on why higher education degree programs exist (Melendez, 2002), what their scholarship concerns (Brennan and Teichler, 2008; Terenzini, 1996; Tight, 2019, 2020), and what it means to educate students in higher education (Bitzer and Wilkinson, 2009; Card et al., 2016; Miller and Nelson, 1994; Weidman et al., 1984). Moreover, the purpose and academic legitimacy of higher education research has been sharply criticized (Layzell, 1990; Terenzini, 1996), spurring attempts to define its unique contribution (Brennan and Teichler, 2008; Cheng, 2009; Dressel and Mayhew, 1974; Teichler, 2014; Tight, 2004, 2014).

Appealing to interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary labels do not salvage the situation, either. Most empirical studies on higher education research suggest that—while borrowing from other disciplines—the study of higher education does not have unique theories and methods of its own (Daenekindt and Huisman, 2020; Tight, 2004, 2013, 2014, 2019, 2020), failing to fit the typical requirements characteristic of interdisciplinary fields (Bitzer and Wilkinson, 2009). And even if rightly considered multidisciplinary (Jensen and Freeman, 2019), these areas have been shown to lack coherence, display opaque epistemic contribution, and jeopardize the development of expertise and the training of graduate students (Graham, 2005; Núñez et al., 2019). Thus, higher education is sometimes described as an atheoretical importer discipline (Tight, 2004) that “ … becomes even more scattered and disintegrated over time” (Daenekindt and Huisman, 2020, p. 584).

One general approach to assist the maturation of the study of higher education, addressing theoretical and methodological deficiency, has been to incorporate and consider philosophical perspectives with research. The present paper succinctly surveys this literature and offers an alternative way(s) of incorporating philosophy that sidesteps some of the shortcomings of previous work. Thus, the primary aim of this paper is to delineate the broad conceptual ties (a) Philosophy of Measurement, (b) Virtue Epistemology, and (c) Bayesian Epistemology share with the study of higher education that can be leveraged to promote interdisciplinary development. For each point, I provide concise descriptions of what it is, how it’s connected to higher education, and how it can be used to inform higher education research and disciplinary development. The intersection and implication of these three points are then discussed.

Philosophy and higher education: Previous recommendations

Philosophers and philosophically minded social scientists have for some time recognized the lack of a unified theoretical framework to situate the study of higher education. Renowned philosopher of higher education, Ronald Barnett (1990), noted over thirty years ago the inability to think “ … about higher education educationally” (p. 4). This recognition spurred new developments and comments on philosophy’s potential contribution to the maturation of the study of higher education, especially within the last two decades.

Macfarlane (2012), for instance, generated a graphic of the study of higher education in the form of a map to make sense of the field, outlining how philosophy fit among the larger divisions of teaching and learning and public policy research. Golding (2013) delineates the need for and utility of philosophical approaches to higher education research, suggesting their value in: analyzing teaching and learning roles, evaluating the applicability of research methods, and understanding evidence, among other uses. Additional contributions of this sort include highlighting the significance of philosophical clarity to avoid unwarranted interpretations from higher education research that tend to oversimplify critical issues (McArthur, 2012). Scutt and Hobson (2013) suggest the acquisition of a meta-perspective when incorporating philosophy into higher education research which, “ … allows us to extend the boundaries of sight beyond individuals, considering the possibility of examining the university itself as a character, a reflexive subject” (p. 17).

An important exposition of the nature, need, and status of theory was provided by Kezar (2004), who noted the lack of systematic and deep theoretical engagement in higher education. Along these lines, she also explicitly encouraged higher education scholars to engage with philosophy to root graduate study and research in ontological and epistemic discussions, claiming that “ … higher education scholarship suffers due to lack of engagement with philosophical texts” (Kezar, 2004, p. 44). “Wrestling with philosophy … ,” as Kezar (2004) put it, is therefore essential in helping students critically appraise their assumptions while adding theoretical depth and interpretive accuracy to the conclusions drawn from higher education research.

Recent years have seen an upsurge in both philosophy of higher education and social scientists’ recommendation for incorporating philosophical perspectives into various aspects of research projects. A newly published volume collects eleven essays from philosophers addressing a plethora of issues and dilemma’s facing the modern university (Stoller and Kramer, 2018). And an innovative international association (Philosophy and Theory of Higher Education Society) and associated journal, “Philosophy and Theory of Higher Education,” point towards the emerging value of treating contemporary university and college issues philosophically. Examples of such applications include frameworks for the use of data for equity purposes (Ziskin, 2020), exploring the imaginative possibilities for higher education scholarship (Gildersleeve and Kleinhesselink, 2019), and the moral purpose of future universities (McArthur, 2019).

And even more recently, Barnett and Fulford’s (2020) edited book organizes thoughtful analysis of students, culture, and the wider democratic function of the university. While there are many issues taken up in this text, most center on how historical educational theories and philosophies interface with the modern university. Some relevant examples here include applying critical theories to question contemporary notions of theory and practice in higher education (McArthur, 2020), and showing the value—yet absence of—philosophical perspectives on university thought and knowledge to the study of higher education (Barnett, 2020).

As mentioned, many social scientists have also acknowledged the advantage of applying and understanding philosophy in relation to various aspects of quantitative and qualitative research projects (e.g., Moon et al., 2019; Taguchi and St. Pierre, 2017). Longtime higher education researcher and premier journal editor, John C. Smart (2005), in his reflections on attributes of exemplary higher education research identified how different philosophies of knowledge accumulation help make sense of empirical work. From his perspective, theory development and measurement issues are “ … two of the major impediments to the maturation of higher education as a respected field of scholarly inquiry” (Smart, 2005, p. 475).

Limitations of previous work

All these prior recommendations for incorporating philosophy in higher education research are valuable and inform new possibilities, respectively. However, as they relate to sustained change, to theory development and higher education gaining its own epistemic contribution as a discipline, there are several shortcomings.

First, previous work is either too encompassing (e.g., fitting philosophy among the entirety of higher education research; Macfarlane, 2012) or too precise, emphasizing specific tools and classroom uses (e.g., introducing a particular method of inquiry; Golding, 2015). Second, previous proposals are either too administrative focused (e.g., Freeman et al., 2013; Weidman et al., 1984), or too metaphorical and removed from empirical study, making it difficult to translate such recommendations to the actual work and incentive structures facing higher education researchers (e.g., using the Anthropocene concept to inform possibilities for the study of higher education; Gildersleeve and Kleinhesselink, 2019). Third, while Kezar (2004) recommended clusters of philosophy reading material for scholars in higher education, there is none that suggest a principled integration of specific areas of philosophy into the curriculum of the study of higher education to form a part of its identity and spur interdisciplinary development.

The proceeding proposal attempts to obviate these issues with a balanced approach. The recommendations therefore aim for symmetry, where intellectual imagination is not stifled by strict adherence to particular methods, and where the ambiguity of future possibilities is not so vast and wide nearly any course of action is viable. To accomplish this task, I propose integrating specific strands of philosophy, each centered on the same core area of the study of higher education: students and their learning and development.

Philosophy and higher education: Three connections

Connection 1: Philosophy of measurement

What it is

Philosophy of measurement is the application of philosophical inquiry to all aspects of measurement. Tal (2013) explains that it “ … sets out to characterize and classify measurement procedures and to clarify the conceptual, ontological, epistemic, and technological conditions that make measurement possible and reliable” (p. 1,159). Classic issues in philosophy of measurement include how to link mathematical entities or parameters to empirical content and how to use numbers to represent empirical systems, though recent developments are turning focus towards the adequacy of aspects of modeling, usage, and interpretation of measurement procedures (Tal, 2013).

Soft systems—human and social systems—concern psychological, behavioral, and mental attributes—also known as latent variables or constructs (Finkelstein, 2005). These latent constructs (e.g., math ability, grit) are not directly observable (e.g., height, weight), and instruments (e.g., tests, performance assessments, questionnaires, surveys, and rubrics) intending to measure them must establish some form(s) of validity. Validity is perhaps the single most salient concept in educational measurement (Mislevy, 2016) and is defined as “ … the degree to which evidence and theory support the interpretations of test scores for proposed uses of tests” (American Educational Research Association et al., p. 11). The philosophy of social science measurement thereby has a set of particularly salient issues to address related to validity, such as: the existence and structure of latent traits, the development of scales, fairness and equity in testing, test score interpretation, unit of measurement equivalency, and the lack of theory motivating measurement operations (Markus and Borsboom, 2013; Mislevy, 2016).

How it is connected

The ubiquity of measurement doesn’t inhibit there being several noteworthy connections between it and the study of higher education. These noteworthy connections include the embedded practice and use of assessment, and the emphasis on latent measures of learning and skill development, such as critical thinking, curiosity, and many other mainstay outcomes associated with most conceptions of liberal education (Newman, 1982 [1852]).

Assessment results are intended to supply measurement claims for individuals, and education and assessment have always been paired. Knowing a student’s standing on a particular trait or skill, and ascertaining their growth over time is, undoubtably, a fundamental higher education pursuit and essential for understanding the effectiveness of instructional practices (Morris, 2007). This pairing has been reflected in the routine use of both classroom and large-scale standardized applications (Kickert et al., 2019; Volante et al., 2020).

Philosophical perspectives on the meaning and appropriateness of the procedures used to measure complex, multi-faceted latent variables can aid assessment. Because higher education has many desired student growth outcomes, assessment aims to cover a range of constructs (e.g., college readiness, critical thinking, sense of belonging) for a range of purposes (e.g., college placement exams, student learning outcomes, program evaluation). It also admits to a host of practical issues with measuring innovative teaching practices (e.g., Orona, 2021) and their anticipated outcomes, such as open-mindedness (Southworth, 2020), collaborative problem-solving (Gaunt and Treacy, 2020), self-regulation, and other noncognitive, psychosocial, soft skills and abilities (Schmidt, 2020; Succi and Canovi, 2020).

How it can be used in higher education research

The connection with assessment and the construction of measures of latent traits illuminate several important uses philosophy of measurement has for higher education research. Two primary uses include coherence in the argumentation used to justify test use and evaluations of equity and fairness in test design and assessment practice.

A widely accepted approach to validating instruments in education is the argument-based approach (Kane, 1990, 1992; Lavery et al., 2020). Here, validity claims are evaluated against the warrants and backing supporting them, which encourages assessment designers to think through the conditionals and alternative explanations that may interfere with such claims (Mislevy, 2016). Philosophy of measurement can be used to evaluate the soundness of such validity-argument claims (Maul et al., 2016).

For instance, a primary approach to accomplishing this is evaluating the coherence between the syntactical (statistical/mathematical), semantic (meaning in test scores and inferences based from them), and pragmatic (potential use of the test scores) information associated with instruments (Mislevy, 2016). Currently, higher education researchers¹ are not trained for such tasks (Maul et al., 2016). Typically focusing exclusively on the statistical modeling of test data to examine “cut-offs,” they often ascribe validity based on this information alone (Maul, 2017). This has led to an undesirable situation in research, greatly hindering the progress of the study of higher education, as noted by Smart (2005).

Finally, philosophy of measurement could bolster fairness in testing. A critical lens is needed to address the assumptions undergirding the standardization of performance assessments, and the potential consequences of use as they relate to public goods, like access to institutions. Such assessments should avoid negatively impacting historically marginalized minority students in any capacity. Thus, important questions to be asked alongside instrument development and administration include: Is the targeted construct relevant and appropriate for all cultural backgrounds? Is this test fair for English-language learners? Is the test merely tracking socioeconomic status?

For a study committed to assessing ethical, personal, and intellectual development in students, measurement issues must be adequately addressed to provide high-quality information on a slew of latent traits, skills, and abilities. Philosophy of measurement is connected and useful to higher education research because of the apparent and long-standing and routine practice of assessing latent traits. Incorporating it can enhance the validity and fairness of measurement instruments and the uses based on their interpretations. With this integration, assessment issues of this variety reflect an area that the study of higher education is uniquely positioned to address, and one where it can potentially lend its developments to other disciplines.

Connection 2: Virtue epistemology

What it is

Epistemology—as a distinct branch of philosophy—involves such fundamental questions as what is knowledge and when one can be credited with it (Pritchard, 2018). Perhaps an argument can be made that epistemology and education are intrinsically tied owing to the fact that both primarily involve general questions of who knows what (e.g., significant material as manifested on an exam) and when (e.g., after demonstrating some level of proficiency on it); however, a more precise connection between the two is illuminated in virtue epistemology, which situates the emphasis towards intellectual agents and communities (Greco, 1993; Macallister, 2012; Pritchard, 2013). Virtue epistemology is an approach to epistemology that, among other things, contemplates individual characteristics and traits in the process of belief formation (Ortwein, 2016). As Pritchard (2015) describes, it “ … puts the cognitive character of the subject center-stage, this means the interconnected web of the subject's integrated cognitive faculties, cognitive abilities, and intellectual virtues” (p. 3)

How it is connected

Notwithstanding the varying degree of salience placed on teaching as opposed to research across post-secondary institutions, colleges and universities are spaces concerned with, in no small measure, the dissemination and diffusion of knowledge. And whatever the putative aims of higher education, most postsecondary institutions place value on measuring the quantity and quality of knowledge students have acquired, and what characteristics were needed for them to do so. Thus, it follows that the study of higher education—like virtue epistemology—largely has at the forefront of its concern intellectual agents (e.g., students and professors) and intellectual communities (e.g., classes, majors, academic communities, institutions of higher education, etc.).

How it can be used in higher education research

But what might virtue epistemology lend the study of higher education? There may be much more to discuss than room, and I point the interested reader to Baehr (2013) and Pritchard (2013) for a start. However, a couple of suggestions here include enhancing the study of higher education by clarifying assessment interpretability (e.g., when does a student know?), as well as contemplating the role of intellectual traits—constructs like open-mindedness, intellectual humility, and intellectual curiosity (Battaly, 2008), to name a few—in the educational process.

Using a virtue epistemic framework, higher education researchers can begin to conceptualize situations that would indicate possession of the traits of interest (e.g., Jayawickreme et al., 2014; Pritchard, 2013). Starting with fundamental questions of whether such traits are measurable (e.g., Curren and Kotzee, 2014), virtue epistemology could help with analyzing concepts and stipulating theories for how intellectual virtues are developed (e.g., Aristotle, 1999; Zagzebski, 1996), what educational processes draw them out, and what they might correlate with and predict. This information would undoubtedly be valuable in the construction of assessment practices and test validation research (Markus and Borsboom, 2013), the evaluation of programs and policies intending to affect character formation (Curren and Kotzee, 2014), as well as research into the characteristics of effective learners (e.g., Kuhn, 2016).

The literature concerning the role of nonacademic variables in higher education could be bolstered by generating exact theories for how intellectual virtues manifest themselves in the context of help-seeking behaviors, course-taking trajectories, as well as testing situations (e.g., Fagioli et al., 2020). A question for the last example could be, what latent traits precede a student selecting a correct choice, enabling them to be credited with knowledge (Pritchard, 2013)? How can assessments be designed to isolate items capturing the relevant domains of interest? Alternatively, it can be contemplated what intellectual traits should be a result of a higher education experience (Baehr, 2013; Barnett, 2009; Newman, 1982 [1852]). In this way, the theories put forth by virtue epistemologists have the potential to broaden the scope of measurement outcomes and direct attention towards the analysis of epistemic aims.

Furthermore, the general virtue epistemological perspectives on reliable and responsible belief-formation carry implications for teaching and learning, as well. And the integration of virtue epistemology could illuminate theories on how teaching practices affect belief-forming habits in students. Thus, the connection persists between a branch of philosophy fixated on characteristics and traits of reliable and responsible intellectual knowers and a field of study allegedly committed to cultivating them.

Connection 3: Bayesian epistemology

What it is

Another area where philosophy may aid the study of higher education is Bayesian epistemology. Bayesian epistemology provides a principled means of updating our beliefs in light of new evidence. Beliefs are measured in gradations (more or less) as opposed to categories (yes/no); specifically, Bayesians use probability to quantify subjective degrees of belief (also called personal probability; Jeffrey, 2004; Joyce, 2004; Kruschke and Liddell, 2018).

While avoiding technical details, the prior, posterior, and likelihood (evidence/data) are the core elements of Bayes’ theorem (or Bayes’ rule). A prior belief (prior probability) is a degree of uncertainty about a proposition prior to encountering evidence about that proposition. After encountering evidence (likelihood), a new belief emerges; this is called the posterior belief (posterior probability). Evidence can shift one’s belief upward (stronger belief in a proposition) or downward (weaker belief in a proposition)—how much shifting occurs is determined by Bayes’ rule (Jeffrey, 2004; Joyce, 2004; Kruschke and Liddell, 2018; Levy, 2016)

How it is connected

Often cited goals in higher education include recognizing diverse perspectives and engaging differing opinions, critically evaluating one’s assumptions and beliefs, and being on a trajectory of continual learning. Bayesian epistemology connects to these long-standing educational aims, single-handedly characterizing many of the virtues that the study of higher education aims to understand or affect. It does so by helping to construct a context whereby openness to ideas and transparency are readily secured.

For instance, being committed to Bayesian ideas means that students will: (a) specify their own prior beliefs, (b) place positive probability on (not think impossible) other people’s hypotheses and ideas, (c) have a common framework for understanding how different individuals interact with new ideas, and (d) be able to track convergence in discussion. Diverse perspectives can be reflected by individuals’ prior belief on a topic. Making beliefs explicit and striving towards updating encourages students to not only engage different thoughts and starting points, but also directs them to critically evaluate their own beliefs and assumptions.

Bayesian epistemology also directly connects to the study of higher education through its explicit and unequivocal emphasis on learning. In fact, Bayesian learning models have been applied in a range of fields such as social behavior (Gale and Kariv, 2003), management (Andersen and Nielsen, 2020) and cognitive psychology (Smid et al., 2020). Smid et al. (2020) remarks that Bayes’ rule, “ … provides the most logically consistent way to model an individual’s current assessment of conditions in the external environment … ” (p. 534), where beliefs are “ … updated as individuals are exposed to a series of potentially informative cues over the course of their lives … ”(p. 534). With learning being deemed the most essential skill for the 21st century (Kuhn, 2016), Bayesian learning models can help the study of higher education innovate their theoretical and methodological repertoire to track the learning progress of students more effectively.

How it can be used in higher education research

Some current areas of higher education research are ripe for the integration of Bayesian epistemology. The Bayesian points connecting to diversity, widening of one’s perspectives, and self-reflection readily applies to Perry’s (1999) scheme of ethical and intellectual development in college students, arguably the most widely cited developmental model in higher education². Specifically, in Perry’s scheme, students transition from a dualistic belief system to one where uncertainty is adequately recognized and managed through understanding the manifold possibilities that might explain phenomena. Thus, as students begin with strict yes/no frameworks, they eventually account for contingencies and conditionals which helps them broaden their perspective, relate knowledge structures to one another, and apprehend the complexities associated with universal statements.

This developmental trajectory mirrors a Bayesian learning progression. The student moves from “I believe in x, and not in y and z” to “I place non-negligible credence across x, y, and z, though I think the evidence supports x the most.” Assessing learning can be bolstered by inquiries into student belief networks: how do students conceptualize and construct epistemic beliefs, and what evidence can they imagine—if encountered—might alter their beliefs? Interventions can be designed to identify students at different developmental positions, and tailor the instruction of Bayesian epistemology according to their learning needs.

Bayesian thinking is indeed already being applied in college classrooms. Warren (2020) showed that students assigned to the study condition trained to apply Bayes’ Theorem revealed greater knowledge gains and more revised epistemological beliefs than the control conditions. A related quasi-experimental study found similar results, with Bayesian updating activities having a positive impact on students’ quantitative critical thinking (Warren, 2018).

By recognizing the above connections with the study of higher education, Bayesian epistemology can be incorporated in a variety of ways, such as tracing undergraduate intellectual development, measuring learning in classes, and intervening on beliefs and knowledge. In short, Bayesian epistemology can be used not only to study learning, but also to help students learn. Together, these possibilities represent a unified expansion of college student development research, undoubtably a core aspect of the study of higher education.

Connecting the connections: The emergence of higher education as interdisciplinary

How do we make sense of these connections? How might the three strands interact with other disciplines? What would be the emphasis of a study of higher education that took this integration seriously? The answers cannot, and perhaps should not, be fully addressed here and now. They should become apparent—over time—through the intentional integration of the above recommendations alongside the shared collaboration of all those studying higher education. Still, it seems that connecting these points is suggestive of a future focus and direction for the study of higher education. I discuss that here.

The mixing between disciplines necessary for interdisciplinary development may occur both between the philosophical strands introduced and across other disciplines. This is reflected in Figure 1 which, starting at the bottom, displays the potential influences each strand has on both higher education theory and method. The strands differ in their potential influence, with virtue epistemology and philosophy of measurement being more relevant to theory and method, respectively. Bayesian epistemology may influence both with equal force, as suggested in the section above introducing this strand. The connections between the strands indicate a unified front in shaping a student-centered developmental focus for the study of higher education that covers the individual ethical and intellectual attributes of students (virtue epistemology), their learning growth and network of beliefs (Bayesian epistemology), and the measurement and assessment issues associated with them (philosophy of measurement).

Figure 1.

The potential mixing of the three proposed strands of philosophy with other disciplines to promote interdisciplinary development for the study of higher education, i.e., generate unique theories and methods.

Also shown in Figure 1 is the potential influence of other disciplines. Examples of major disciplinary influences are listed in no order and with no intention of being exhaustive.³ It should be noted that other strands of philosophy may also be included here (e.g., metaphysics, ethics, etc.), as well as the kind of philosophical perspectives reviewed earlier in this paper.

However, there are three general points that the graphic intends to relay. First, it aims to show that, just as other disciplines have had a heavy influence over higher education research, the three philosophical strands should also be a core component constituting the study of higher education. Second, it suggests that incorporating the three strands will mix with each other and other disciplines to shape theory and method development. And third, with these core areas adequately incorporated and recognized, such mixing hints at a student-centered approach to the study of higher education that emphasizes the purpose, process, and product of developing student capabilities in context.

It’s important to note that disciplinary blending is not a myth, either. A prime example is epidemiology. Epidemiology synthesized knowledge and methods from microbiology, statistics, sociology, medicine, and geography. This synthesis led to an expansion of contemporary uses of case-control studies, quarantines, specificity and sensitivity, and attack rates—epidemiology’s unique set of methods (Aschengrau and Seage, 2013). All these methods are employed to explore, solve, or understand the nature of health epidemics—epidemiology’s unique domain (Aschengrau and Seage, 2013). Moreover, the epidemiologist thinks a certain way, distinct from a medical doctor and distinct from a biostatistician; this, in conjunction with their skillset, is their special contribution to knowledge.

If higher education is to ever develop in this way then reconstructing the curriculum for the thoughtful integration of philosophy (courses in philosophy of measurement, virtue epistemology, Bayesian epistemology, specifically) may be the best first step. Logistics in place, higher education could begin to gain its theoretical and methodological ground from philosophy’s influence. Such an influence would only be appropriate, too, given that higher education (distinct from other forms of education) intends to promote and instill an array of outcomes qualitatively conveyed from the logical next step of schooling and tied to a rich philosophical commentary (Barnett, 1990; Erden, 2019; McArthur, 2011; Newman, 1982 [1852]). This includes work outlining the unique function of a university in developing the intellect, inculcating curiosity and critical thinking, as well as impressing upon the student an open disposition consonant with the tradition of liberal education (Erden, 2019; Newman, 1982 [1852]).

Conclusion

In recent decades, philosophy has been identified as a general approach to enhance the maturity of higher education as a field of study by enriching theory and method. In this article, I offered a new set of philosophical recommendations to spur the disciplinary development of higher education, departing from previous work in several meaningful ways. Due to their deep and useful connections to higher education research, philosophy of measurement, virtue epistemology, and Bayesian epistemology were introduced and discussed in relation to their conceptual association and potential practical influence on the study of higher education. The culmination of these points signals a learner-centered lens focused on the development of students.

It’s the hope here that in the next half century something different might be said about the study of higher education, rendering Mayhew’s (1974) comments about the problem of identity no longer relevant. If, after all, a unique contribution cannot be found, then we must critically consider the notion of issuing academic degrees in a discipline that isn’t one. And recognizing this possibility is, well, the task of the “doctor of philosophy”—in higher education.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the reviewers and editor of this journal for strengthening this paper with their thoughtful recommendations. I would also like to thank Daniel Herrmann, Aydin Mohseni, and Gerard Rothfus for their insights and wisdom regarding Bayesian epistemology. I have greatly benefitted from discussions with each of them.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Gabe Avakian Orona

Notes

Author biography

Gabe A Orona is a PhD student in Education at the University of California, Irvine. His research focuses on measurement and assessment in higher education. Broadly, his interest is in designing and analyzing assessments consonant with the aims of higher education and using these to evaluate student learning outcomes.

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