Human dignity in historical perspective: The contemporary and traditional paradigms

For their helpful suggestions I would like to thank Jimmy Altham, Friedo Ricken, Kathryn Sensen, Franz Josef Wetz, Stephen White and two anonymous referees for this journal.

Throughout the article I shall use ‘pattern of thought’, ‘paradigm’ and ‘conception’ interchangeably.

Accordingly, the German dictionary Duden describes dignity (Würde) as a ‘worth inher ent in human beings that commands respect (Achtung gebietender Wert, der dem Menschen innewohnt)’ (my tr.), see G. Drosdowski (ed.) (1997) Duden: Etymologie, p. 821. Mannheim: Dudenverlag.

Cf. e.g. Allen Wood (1998) ‘Kant on Duties Regarding Nonrational Nature I’, Aristotelian Society Supplement 72: 189. Hardy E. Jones (1971) Kant’s Principle of Personality, p. 130. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. Herbert J. Paton ( 1947) The Categorical Imperative, p. 171. London: Hutchinson. David W. Ross (1954) Kant’s Ethical Theory, pp. 52-4. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Patrick Æ. Hutchings (1972) Kant on Absolute Value, pp. 287, 290. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press. . P.C. Lo (1987) Treating Persons as Ends., p. 165. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Guido Löhrer ( 1995) Menschliche Würde, pp. 124, 34-6. Freiburg: Alber.

Josef Seifert ( 1997) What is Life?, p. 97. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Cf. ibid. p. 98.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Cf. G. E. Moore (1903) Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Max Scheler (1913/16) Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik. Berne: Francke. Not all forms of value realism postulate an ontologically distinct property. More modest forms of realism might e.g. hold that value statements have a truth value, or that they refer to something independent of human beings, cf. Allan Gibbard (1999) ‘Morality as Consistency in Living: Korsgaard’s Kantian Lectures’, Ethics 110: 142, n. 3. For some disadvantages of the Moore-style realism cf. John Mackie (1977) Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, ch. 1. New York: Penguin. The ontological and epistemic nature of this value might seem ‘queer’ in comparison with natural objects. In addition, one who holds this view would be powerless to argue against relativism, and - from a Humean perspective - it fails to give an account of how this value could be motivating.

Seifert (n. 4), p. 98.

Seifert (ibid.) explicitly refers to Moore on p. 95.

The most prominent proponents are Christine Korsgaard (1996) Creating the Kingdom of Ends, ch. 4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Allen Wood (1999) Kant’s Ethical Thought, ch. 4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Paul Guyer (2000) Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness, ch. 4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cf. Mary Ann Glendon (1999) ‘Foundations of Human Rights: The Unfinished Business’, American Journal of Jurisprudence 44: 10. Knut Ibsen (1990) Völkerrecht, p. 642. Munich: Beck. Franz Josef Wetz (1998) Die Würde der Menschen ist antastbar, pp. 75-6. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta .

See Matthew Craven (1995) The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, pp. 16-17, 1. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

For further examples see James Griffin (2001) ‘Discrepancies between the Best Philosophical Account of Human Rights and the International Law of Human Rights’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101: 6 n. For a brief overview of human dignity in international law more generally, see Jochen A. Frohwein (2002) ‘Human Dignity in International Law’, in D. Kretzmer and E. Klein (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse, pp. 121-35. The Hague: Kluwer Law International.

See Wetz (n. 12), p. 51; Glendon (n. 12), p. 2.

(1946) Charter of the United Nations, p. 2. New York: United Nations Publications.

( 1949) Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ‘Preamble’ . New York: United Nations Publications .

For an account of the history of the drafting process see Mary Ann Glendon (2001) A World Made New. New York: Random House. Klaus Dicke (2002) ‘The Founding Function of Human Dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, in Kretzmer and Klein (n. 14), pp. 111-20.

The UN Charter lists dignity and worth together (see above), thereby associating dignity and worth or value.

( 1967) International Covenants on Human Rights, ‘Preamble’ . New York: United Nations Office of Public Information.

Cf. Craven (n. 13), p. 7.

Parties of both covenants regularly write reports to the UN about measures of implementation and their progress in these measures, and the relevant committees can then make recommendations. However, it is up to the individual states whether they heed these recommendations. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has two further control mechanisms (see Ibsen (n. 12), pp. 647-9). Member States of the Covenant can complain about the progress of other members in front of the Human Rights Committee, which can ask for clarification and ultimately seek to mediate between the two states. However, state parties first have to declare in general that they recognize the competence of the Committee (see articles 41-2, 28). In 1989 24 member states out of 87 which had signed the Covenant had also recognized the Human Rights Committee (see Ibsen (n. 12), pp. 648, 641). Additionally, in signing an Optional Protocol members to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights can further authorize the Human Rights Committee to accept complaints from individual citizens about their state. The Committee will then give its views on the matter (see article 5 of the Optional Protocol). By 30 June 1995 83 states had signed the Optional Protocol out of 113 parties to the Covenant (see (1996) Encyclopedia of Human Rights, pp. 1672-3. Washington: Taylor & Francis). The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights does not have these additional control mechanisms. For detailed information about the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights see Craven (n. 13). For a thorough analysis of different aspects of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights see the essay collection edited by Louis Henkin (1981) The International Bill of Rights. New York: Columbia University Press.

See Viktor Pöschl (1969) ‘Der Begriff der Würde im antiken Rom und später’, Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Klasse 3: 55-6. Heidelberg: Carl Winter. Wetz (n. 12), ch. 3; and Dicke (n. 18), p. 111. One exception might be G. W. F. Schiller’s (1787) Don Carlos, Act III, Scene 3, although he does not characterize dignity as value. Whitman and Appiah even argue that the prominence of dignity in contemporary political documents results from what I call the traditional paradigm, cf. James Whitman (2003) ‘From Fascist ‘‘Honour’’ to European ‘‘Dignity’’ ’, in C. Joerges and N. Ghaleigh (eds) The Darker Legacy of European Law, pp. 243-66. Cambridge: Hart. Anthony Appiah (2001) ‘Grounding Human Rights’, in A. Gutman (ed.) Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, p. 107. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Several scholars have attempted to trace the history of the idea of human dignity; cf. e.g. Herschel Baker (1947) The Dignity of Man: Studies in the Persistence of an Idea. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. W. Dürig (1957) ‘Dignitas’, in T. Klauser (ed.) Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum, vol. 3, pp. 1024-35. Stuttgart: Hiersemann. Pöschl (n. 23). Rolf-Peter Horstmann (1980) ‘Menschenwürde’ in J. Ritter and K. Gründer (eds) Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 5, pp. 1124-7. Basel: Schwabe & Co. Kurt Bayertz (ed.) (1996) Sanctity of Life and Human Dignity. Dordrecht and Boston: Kluwer. Maximilian Forschner (1998) ‘Marktpreis und Würde oder vom Adel der menschlichen Natur’, in H. Kössler (ed.) Die Würde des Menschen, pp. 33-59. Nürnberg: Universitätsverbund Erlangen-Nürnberg e.V. Wetz (n. 12), ch. 2.

However, I do not mean to suggest that all of the thinkers who follow the traditional paradigm of dignity conceived of these as two separate stages.

Cf. Helmut Wegehaupt (1932) Die Bedeutung und Anwendung von dignitas in den Schriften der republikanischen Zeit. Ohlau: Eschenhagen. Hans Drexler (1944) ‘Dignitas’, in R. Klein (ed.) Das Staatsdenken der Römer, pp. 231-55. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftlicher Buchgesellschaft. Pöschl (n. 23). Hans-Georg Gadamer (1988) ‘Die Menschenwürde auf ihrem Weg von der Antike bis heute’, Humanistische Bildung 12: 95-107. For a sociological description of Roman society cf. G. Alföldy (1986) Die römische Gesellschaft. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner. The archaic conception has a lot in common with Aristotle’s conception of ‘magnanimity’ (cf. his Nicomachean Ethics, bk 4, 1123b-1125a). The Roman dignitas has many facets. Apart from (1) being excellent or worthy, dignitas could also refer to (2) the appearance of excellence, (3) standing or esteem by others, (4) a particular rank or office, cf. P. G. W. Glare (ed.) (1996) Oxford Latin Dictionary. Oxford: Clarendon Press. For an etymology of the Latin dignitas cf. Wegehaupt (n. 26), pp. 5, 9, and Drexler (n. 26), p. 233.

Again, cf. the Oxford Latin Dictionary (n. 26).

Pöschl (n. 23), p. 36.

Scholars believe that this is the earliest passage in which the Latin term dignitas is used to refer to all human beings, see Pöschl (n. 23), pp. 37-41; Wetz (n. 12), p. 20; and Hubert Cancik (2002) ‘ ‘‘Dignity of Man’’ and ‘‘Persona’’ in Stoic Anthropology: Some Remarks on Cicero, De Officiis I, 105-107’, in Kretzmer and Klein (n. 14), pp. 19-40. While a similar pattern of thought was common in Greek philosophy, there was no direct equivalent for the Latin dignitas in the Greek language, cf. Pöschl (n. 23), pp. 9-10. For a thorough commentary on De officiis cf. Andrew Dyck (1996) A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Cicero, De Officiis , tr. W. Miller (1913). Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press.

Cf. also 1. 100: ‘If we take nature as our guide, we shall never go astray’; or 1. 103: ‘Nature has not fashioned us to behave as if we have been created for fun and games. Rather, we are moulded for self-discipline and for more sober and important pursuits.’

See Pöschl (n. 23), pp. 48-9.

(1996) Sermons, tr. J. P. Freeland and A. J. Conway, 21, ch. 3, p. 79. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press. To the following cf. Pöschl (n. 23), pp. 42-50; Dürig (n. 24); and Richard Bruch (1981 ) ‘Die Würde des Menschen in der partistischen und scholastischen Tradition’, in W. Gruber (ed.) Wissen - Glaube - Politik, pp. 139-54. Graz : Styria.

Cf. (1999) Catechism of the Catholic Church, §1691 . London: Geoffrey Chapman.

Sermons, 27, ch. 6 (p. 114). Cf. Sermons, 94, ch. 2 (p. 392): ‘People should acknowledge their own dignity, and see themselves as ‘‘made in the image and likeness of ’’ their Creator.’ The idea that human beings are created in the image of God is likely meant to be a reference to the Bible; cf. Genesis 1: 26, cf. 1: 27-8, and Psalms 8: 5-10.

Some scholars have claimed that this is a general feature of Christian views on dignity; cf. Pöschl (n. 23), p. 42; and Bruch (n. 33), p. 140.

Sermons, 42, ch. 2 (p. 180).

Sermons, 39, ch. 2 (p. 167-8).

Cf. Pöschl (n. 23), pp. 44, 46; Bruch (n. 33), p. 141. The Catechism of the Catholic Church (n. 34) indicates that this is still the view of the Catholic Church today: ‘By virtue of his soul and his spiritual powers of intellect and will, man is endowed with freedom, an ‘‘outstanding manifestation of the divine image’’ ’ (§1705, cf. 1934, 1730, 306). In addition, Leo holds the view that human beings are an image of God in being able to do justice and be merciful, see Sermons, 95, ch. 7 (pp. 398-9).

Sermons, 12, ch. 1 (p. 49).

Some scholars argue that the twofold structure is a general feature of Christian thinkers; cf. Bruch (n. 33), pp. 148-9; and Glendon (n. 12), pp. 13-14.

However, in De Legibus 1. 24 Cicero too holds that the soul was created by God, and that humans have a likeness with God in being virtuous. Cf. Pöschl (n. 23), p. 42. A clear difference is that Leo holds that the dignity of humans was forfeited in Adam’s fall and restored in Jesus’ death: ‘This nature, although it had been corrupted in Adam, has nevertheless been re-fashioned in Christ.’ Sermons, 27, ch. 6 (p. 114), cf. 25, ch. 5 (pp. 102-3), 72, ch. 2 (p. 316). Pöschl (n. 23), p. 48 holds that this view was a general feature among Christian thinkers.

Sermons, 45, ch. 2 (p. 194).

Apart from Pico’s discourse De Dignitate Hominis, cf. also Bartolommeo Fazio (1450) De Excellentia et Praestantia Hominis, and Giannozzo Manetti (1452) De Dignitate et Excellentia Hominis.

Cf. e.g. Bernard Murchland (1966) Two Views of Man, p. vi. New York: Frederick Ungar. The prominence is probably a reaction to a similar emphasis in the Christian Middle Ages more generally, cf. Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, 2. 2. 9.

For a brief biography see Paul O. Kristeller (1964) Eight Philosophers of the Italian Renaissance, ch. 4. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Cf. Discourse, §3.6. Pico refers to the place of man ‘in universi serie’. Translations of Pico are taken from the joint research project by Brown and Bologna Universities on the Discourse on the Dignity of Man, see: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/ Italian_Studies/pico/index.html. For the idea of the chain of being more generally cf. Arthur Lovejoy (1961) The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea. New York: Harper & Row.

Discourse, §4.20 and 23.

Ibid., §6.28-30. For similar themes in Leo cf. his Sermons, 24, ch. 2, 71, ch. 2, and 73, ch. 4.

Ibid., §10.48-50.

While the claim that one should strive for a higher level of being can be expressed in terms of ‘being better’ or ‘having more worth’, this does not imply a separate value property in the sense of G. E. Moore or Max Scheler (n. 8). Ontologically, a higher level only has more being, cf. Friedo Ricken (1998) ‘Aristotelische Interpretationen zum Traktat De passionibus animae (Summa theologiae I II 22-48) des Thomas von Aquin’, in M. Thurner (ed.) Die Einheit der Person, pp. 137-40. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. Pöschl traces this view back to Plotinus’ Enneads, cf. Pöschl (n. 23), p. 51.

Cf. e.g. Paton (n. 3), pp. 171, 189; Ross (n. 3), pp. 52-4; Löhrer (n. 3), pp. 124, 34-44; and Wood (n. 3), p. 189; Wood (n. 11), p. 115; Dieter Schönecker and Allen Wood (2003) Immanuel Kant 'Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten’: Ein einführender Kommentar, p. 142. Paderborn: Schöningh.

See, for instance, Alan Gewirth (1982) Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Applications, p. 28. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Bayertz (n. 25); Seifert (n. 4), p. 98; Kretzmer and Klein (n. 14).

I have argued for this extensively in my (2009) ‘Kant’s Conception of Human Dignity’, Kant-Studien 100, pp. 309-331. (Scholars who read Kant as adhering to the contemporary paradigm of human dignity often rely on a few passages. A different picture emerges if one takes all occurrences of ‘dignity’ in Kant’s writings into account.)

Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals (G in the following), 4: 438. Page numbers refer to the Prussian Academy edition of Kant’s collected works: Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften (formerly Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften) (ed). (1902ff.) Kants gesammelte Schriften. Berlin: De Gruyter. References are to ‘volume no.: page no.’. All translations are - unless otherwise stated - by Mary Gregor from Immanuel Kant (1999) Practical Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

My claim that the requirement to respect others is already implied by the requirement to universalize one’s maxim will be controversial, but is expressively stated by Kant himself: ‘For, to say that in the use of means to any end I am to limit my maxim to the condition of its universal validity . . . is tantamount to saying that . . . the rational being itself, must be made the basis of all maxims of actions, never merely as a means but . . . always at the same time as an end’ (G, 4: 437-8; my emphasis). If one universalizes one’s maxim, one thereby respects those over whom one universalizes; cf. Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, 5: 87- 8; and Julius Ebbinghaus (1998) ‘Die Formeln des Kategorischen Imperativs und die Ableitung inhaltlich bestimmter Pflichten’, in his Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 2, p. 216. Bonn: Bouvier. Roger Sullivan (1989) Immanuel Kant’s Moral Theory, pp. 193-5. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Onora O’Neill (1989) Constructions of Reason, ch. 7. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; and my (2010) pp. 102-118 ‘Dignity and the Formula of Humanity’, in J. Timmermann (ed.) Kant’s Groundwork: A Critical Guide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cf. ‘Oberservations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime’, 2: 212, 215, 241; G, 4: 425, 440; Critique of Practical Reason, 5: 71; Doctrine of Virtue, 6: 435; Lectures on Logic, 9: 30. Sometimes Kant expresses this as something being below someone’s dignity, e.g. in Critique of Pure Reason, 3: 419; Critique of Practical Reason, 5: 327; Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, 6: 113; Doctrine of Virtue, 6: 327; Lectures on Pedagogy, 9: 489. For a clarification of ‘sublimity’, cf. Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5: 248.

‘Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch’ , 8: 344.

‘The Conflict of the Faculties’, 7: 073; my tr.

Reflection note, 6856, 19: 181; my tr.; cf. Lectures on Pedagogy, 9: 488. Kant hardly ever brings the two levels of dignity together. More commonly, he merely talks about one aspect, e.g. when he talks about how ‘reason, in the consciousness of its dignity, despises the latter [inclinations] and can gradually become their master’ (G, 4: 411), or about the esteem one has for ‘morality and its dignity’ (G, 4: 442-3).

Lectures on Pedagogy, 9: 488, tr. A. Churton in Immanuel Kant ( 1899) Kant on Education. London: Kegan Paul.

Cf. his Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, 6: 57 note: ‘These philosophers [Stoics and others] derived their universal moral principle from the dignity of human nature, from its freedom (as an independence from the power of the inclinations), and they could not have laid down a better or nobler principle for foundation. They then drew the moral laws directly from reason, the sole legislator, commanding absolutely through its laws. And so was everything quite correctly apportioned.’ (Tr. A. Wood and G. di Giovanni in Immanuel Kant (1996) Religion and Rational Theology. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.)

See Klaus Reich (1939) ‘Kant and Greek Ethics II’, Mind, 48: 446-63.

This way of putting the differences is my own. I have, however, been greatly helped by the works in the history of the idea of dignity mentioned earlier, cf. esp. Pöschl (n. 23).

For instance, plants are capable of nutrition and growth; animals possess those capacities and also the capacity for perception and motion, and human beings possess not only these, but also the capacity for reason and choice; cf. Aristotle, On the Soul, 414a29-415a13; Plotinus, Enneads, 5. 2. 1-2; Ricken (n. 51), pp. 137-40.

‘On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, But It Is of No Use in Practice’, 8: 292-3; cf. Doctrine of Right, 6: 230.

Richard Tuck has argued that the concept of a right in the sense of entitlement originated in 12th-century property law, and that it had its breakthrough only in the 17th century, cf. his (1979) Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development, pp. 9, 11. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cf. Jerome B. Schneewind (1998) The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy, p. 93. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Glendon (n. 12), p. 6.

Similarly Pöschl (n. 23), pp. 55-6.

For a fuller discussion of this claim see my ‘Dignity and the Formula of Humanity’ (n. 56).

The earliest passage I have found in which rights are based on dignity is in G. W. F. Schiller’s Don Carlos, Act III, Scene 3 (n. 23). However, Schiller understands dignity as a nobility in nature, a conception akin to the traditional paradigm of dignity. I have not found a passage in which ‘dignity’ is said to be an inherent non-relational value property before the 20th century - although I realize that Kant is currently often read this way.