Neutrality without pluralism

Neutrality without pluralism

Both defenders and critics of neutrality assume that neutrality presupposes pluralism. On this view, the state should be neutral among the many permissible conceptions of the individual good that citizens affirm insofar as none of them receives universal assent. Neutrality requires the state to treat all such permissible conceptions equally in the sense of not singling out any one of them for special favorable treatment or as being intrinsically superior.

In most versions, the relation between neutrality and pluralism appears to be grounded on empirical considerations. The view seems to be that in light of factual or historically given pluralism, neutrality presents itself as a plausible liberal response (Ackerman, 1980; Dworkin, 1978; Klosko, 2003; Kymlicka, 1989, 2002; Larmore, 1987; Patten, 2012; Waldron, 1993; Wall and Klosko, 2003: Introduction). This is the view that Jonathan Quong (2011: 138) refers to when he writes: “on one view, the fact of pluralism or disagreement is a fact about the world to which liberalism must accommodate itself if it is to be considered a sound political theory.” In other versions, the relation between liberal neutrality and pluralism is conceptual. This is Quong’s own view according to which “pluralism is understood to be a consequence of liberalism itself.” (Quong, 2011: 139) He writes: “Human rationality exercised in good faith under liberal conditions produces permanent disagreement about the good life” (Quong, 2011: 139). ⁸ While on the former view pluralism is a fact about the world to which liberal neutrality is a response, on the latter view pluralism is the outcome of liberal institutions themselves, ideally conceived. Insofar as neutrality is considered an integral part of liberalism, pluralism is conceptually linked to neutrality. ⁹ In either case, neutrality is tied, either factually or conceptually, to pluralism.

When considered as a fact that precedes liberal theory and to which the latter is a response, pluralism is conceived of as we find it in the world. It is a pluralism that includes conceptions of the good that are compatible with the requirements of liberal justice as well as those that are not. Factual pluralism includes both permissible and impermissible conceptions of the good. By contrast, when considered ideally, as part of liberal theory, pluralism is “reasonable”, which means that it includes permissible conceptions of the good only; that is, only those conceptions that are compatible with the requirements of liberal justice. ¹⁰ In either case, liberal authors maintain that neutrality holds only among those conceptions that are compatible with the requirements of liberal justice. Regardless of whether it is taken as the mere fact of pluralism or as “reasonable” pluralism, neutrality is always presented as a policy that extends only to permissible conceptions of the good. The important point here is that liberal neutrality either presupposes pluralism as we find it in the world or conceptually implies the normative notion of reasonable pluralism. ¹¹

In light of this strong connection between pluralism and neutrality, it is sometimes assumed that, in the absence of former, there would be no need for the latter. On this view, the state could appropriately favor the conception of the good that enjoys unanimous acceptance. ¹² The reasoning behind this position goes as follows: the reason why the state should not single out a particular conception of the good for special favorable treatment is its controversial character (in the sense of not being accepted by all); thus, when a conception of the good is not controversial because it enjoys unanimous acceptance, there is no reason why the state should refrain from favoring it. On this view, a state may justifiably promote a unanimously favored conception of the good. Since religion is usually taken to be a conception of the good, the implication of this reasoning is that religious neutrality is motivated by religious pluralism. ¹³ As the view goes, in the absence of pluralism, there is no need for religious neutrality. According to this, a proper political response to religious unanimity could be some form of religious establishment.

Those who hold the view according to which the absence of pluralism removes the need for neutrality clearly assume the perspective on pluralism as an empirical fact that is given independently of liberal institutions. Otherwise, they could not even entertain the possibility of the absence of pluralism. By contrast, when the relation between pluralism and liberalism is taken to be conceptual (i.e. pluralism as the outcome of liberal institutions), pluralism is seen as part of liberal theory itself, not as a fact about the world. On the latter view, the possibility of the absence of pluralism cannot even arise. Accordingly, the notion of “neutrality without pluralism” takes pluralism as a fact in the world. ¹⁴

Against the extended view that liberal neutrality presupposes the empirical fact of pluralism, political history shows, however, that there have been good political reasons for neutrality in the absence of pluralism. In particular, specifically religious neutrality has been historically motivated by political problems that have nothing to do with those posed by religious pluralism. By “neutrality without pluralism” I mean a conception of specifically religious neutrality that is not motivated by an antecedently given empirical fact of religious pluralism. This conception historically developed as a response to what I call the fact of “religious hegemony.” By this I mean a social scenario in which a particular religion is unanimously recognized as dominant regardless of whether it enjoys state recognition as official or not. A religion is hegemonic when affirmed by the vast majority of the population and the values and beliefs that it affirms are pervasive in society’s social and political institutions. Although not all citizens affirm the hegemonic religion, all of them recognize it as such. Thus, religious hegemony is compatible with a minimum of pluralism. ¹⁵

The point I wish to emphasize is that the reasons that motivate neutrality as independence have nothing to do with the existence of this minimum of pluralism. Instead, such reasons originate in the political problems posed by the kind of power exercised by the hegemonic religion. As will become clear as we proceed, this kind of religious neutrality is addressed to the challenges that a hegemonic religious institution poses to the state as the former seeks to make use of the latter as an instrument for the carrying out of its own religious purposes. Since it is not motivated by the conflicts and problems posed by religious pluralism, this kind of neutrality does not hold among religions. Instead, it is a type of neutrality that holds with regard to religion as such and requires the state to be independent from religion. Thus, I call it “neutrality as independence from religion” or “neutrality as independence” for short. This requires the state to be devoid of all religious words and symbols that can be taken as an expression of endorsement or criticism of religion. A neutral state, on this conception, neither affirms nor criticizes religion. ¹⁶ In the following section, I briefly present the political problems that historically motivated this conception of neutrality.

Neutrality as independence

Historically, neutrality as independence from religion developed in places with a recent history of religious, specifically Catholic, establishment. This kind of neutrality was the historical product of the efforts to disentangle the state from religion, which efforts were in turn motivated by the adversarial relation that had evolved between the state and the hegemonic Church as the former attempted to introduce, among other political changes, the protection of some basic individual rights and liberties as well as a republican (i.e. non-monarchical) form of government (Sinkin, 1979). The Catholic Church, as is well known, was strongly opposed in the 19th and early 20th centuries to freedom of conscience and of the press, to the granting of equal citizenship (that cancelled out special legal privileges for the members of some corporations, such as the Catholic Church), and to republicanism and liberalism more generally (Catholic Church and Pius, 1864). Since most of the population was Catholic, the state had to contend with a wealthy adversary that had great power of political influence and was also the highest social moral authority.

In this particular kind of context, the aim of the regime of separation was not to protect the Church from the state’s interference, but to weaken the former and to free the state from its influence. Establishment had previously meant, on the one hand, the state’s material, symbolic, and legal privileging of Catholicism, intolerance of all other religions, and the state’s authority to participate in the Church’s internal organization. On the other hand, establishment had also meant the Church’s commitment to help the state in case of need and the former’s authority to perform administrative and judicial functions that were later to be assumed by the modern secular state. As political forces pushed for the recognition of basic individual rights and liberties, the Catholic Church clung to the defense of its centuries old political, economic, and legal privileges and immunities. In the end, the Church lost this war, and the regime of separation forced it to become a civil association, bereft of its former privileges. Thus began a process of transformation in which the Catholic Church gradually adapted itself to the demands of the modern secular state. ¹⁷ The latter, in turn, promoted the secularization of society at large.

The doctrine of neutrality emerged in the midst of this struggle as a way of conceiving of a state that aimed to become independent from religion. According to this doctrine, which was assumed to complement the regime of separation, state institutions, official speech, and formal politics at large were to be free from religion. A regime of separation establishes various limits between state and religion: on the one hand, the state must not establish a religion as official, offer its material or symbolic support to any religion, or interfere in the internal life of religious organizations; on the other hand, religious authorities and the members of religious congregations cannot hold public office and must also refrain from participating in formal politics. The doctrine of neutrality adds a particular stance that state institutions and officials are to maintain with regard to religion: they are neither to affirm nor to criticize it. In order to do this they are to avoid all religious words and symbols that could be taken as an expression of endorsement or criticism of religion. ¹⁸ The state is neutral in this sense when it is devoid of religious expressions and it offers a thoroughly secular face. ¹⁹

In practice, religious neutrality so conceived requires official buildings, official political speech, formal politics, and state funded social services (such as public schooling and public health) to be devoid of religious expressions. This doctrine of neutrality developed mainly in the fashioning of official schooling as the emerging secular state struggled to exclude the Catholic Church from it. Publicly funded schools gradually became thoroughly secularized as religious organizations were not allowed to run them or to participate in their organization, religious personnel were not allowed to teach in them, the curriculum did not include the teaching of religious subjects (such as the history of religions), and religious symbols were forbidden in school buildings and even in the attire of school employees. As the doctrine of neutrality became the official state stance towards religion, all state buildings had to be devoid of religious symbols, ²⁰ and public officials on duty had to refrain from expressing themselves in a way that could be taken as endorsing or criticizing religion, and from wearing visible religious symbols. Since formal politics had to be devoid of religion, religious authorities and organizations were not allowed to participate in it, and all those involved in formal politics could not publicly employ an explicitly religious language—especially political parties and candidates running for public office.

I wish to notice that what I have called “neutrality as independence” is often assumed to be part and parcel of French republicanism. ²¹ However, in the Mexican case, this type of neutrality has always been identified with a liberal position. ²² It was the late 19th century liberals who carried out the separation between church and state in Mexico, and who introduced the doctrine of neutrality in religious matters. Both the regime of separation and the doctrine of neutrality were instrumental for the state’s emancipation from the power of the Catholic Church, for the protection of basic individual rights and liberties (such as freedom of worship and of the press), and for the establishment of a republican form of government, among other political ends. ²³ In a social context in which the state had to contain a hegemonic Church that opposed religious toleration as well as liberalism more generally, neutrality as independence allowed the state to expel from its domain the religious voices and symbols that implied or evoked the rejection of individual rights and liberties. This political strategy allowed the state to confine the expression of such a rejection to the “private” domain of civil associations and individual consciences.

To conclude this section, I will address a conceptual objection that threatens the coherence of neutrality as independence. According to this objection, neutrality as independence is not really a conception of “neutrality” since the latter presupposes some sort of conflict among at least two parties and in respect of which a third party claims to be neutral. ²⁴ When there is no plurality of competing religions, the objection continues, there is nothing for the state to be neutral about in religious matters. Perhaps, it could be added, proponents of neutrality as independence really mean the state’s independence from religion. As we have seen, a state that purports to be neutral in this sense of neutrality seeks to exclude all religious words and symbols from its institutions, from official speech, and from formal politics. According to this objection, neutrality talk is unnecessary, potentially confusing, and probably incoherent.

The objection is right in pointing out that proponents of neutrality as independence do, in fact, mean to defend the state’s independence from religion. A state that claims to be neutral in this sense seeks to become independent from religion by making it invisible in its domain. The objection is wrong, however, in assuming that claims to neutrality make sense only in relation to a conflict between at least two parties. A being or a thing can also be said to be neutral when it lacks some feature, as when we say that a facial expression is neutral, meaning that it lacks some emotion, or that a background for a photo is neutral, meaning that it is empty. Likewise, a state can be said to be neutral with regard to religion, meaning that it lacks, or is devoid of, religious content. This is the meaning of neutrality at play in neutrality as independence. If we keep in mind this second meaning of neutrality as lacking some feature, the absence of a conflict between religious views does not render incoherent, confusing, or unnecessary the conception of neutrality as independence.

The task of the following section is to present the various types of what I refer to as “traditional” liberal neutrality in order to set the stage for a comparison with neutrality as independence in the fourth section.

Traditional liberal neutrality

The purpose of this section is to present the existing conceptions of traditional liberal neutrality. By “traditional liberal neutrality” I mean all views on neutrality that present it as a response to pluralism, either factual or reasonable. Within this literature, it is universally assumed that neutrality presupposes pluralism. On this familiar view, the state should remain neutral in relation to the existing plurality of conceptions of the good, some of which may be religious, in the sense of not singling out any one of them for special favorable treatment or as being intrinsically superior.

A difficulty for the comparison between the existing conceptions of liberal neutrality, on the one hand, and neutrality as independence, on the other, is that the latter is a conception of specifically religious neutrality while the former are addressed to the wider pluralism of conceptions of the good. ²⁵ Despite this difficulty, the comparison is appropriate insofar as existing conceptions of liberal neutrality treat religion as a conception of the good. Participants to the debate on neutrality as a response to pluralism usually take neutrality in the religious domain as paradigmatic and assume neutrality in the larger domain of the individual good to be an extension. They also often consider religious establishment as the paradigmatic case of a departure from neutrality (Arneson, 2003; Patten, 2012). Thus, the expression “conception of the good” includes religious conceptions. If we keep in mind that the relevant comparison among conceptions of neutrality is restricted to specifically religious conceptions of the good, the difficulty just mentioned should not represent a problem.

In the literature on neutrality as a response to pluralism, authors usually distinguish between the grounds for neutrality, on the one hand, and the various types of neutrality, on the other. There are also, in addition, various strategies for achieving neutrality. The grounds that are usually appealed to are citizens’ equality and the value of autonomy or self-determination. ²⁶ As regards equality, the basic idea is that since citizens hold a variety of conceptions of the good life that are compatible with justice, equality requires the state to be neutral among such conceptions in the sense of not singling out any one of them as intrinsically superior and deserving of special favorable treatment. If it were to fail to be neutral in this way, the state would not treat citizens equally. Thus follows a strong connection between liberal neutrality and anti-perfectionism (Dworkin, 1978).

The appeal to the value of autonomy or self-determination specifies the relevant respect in which the state ought to treat citizens equally. ²⁷ On this view, respect for the individual capacity for autonomy or self-determination requires the state to leave individuals free to choose, revise, and change their own conceptions of the good. Respect for this capacity requires the state to be neutral among the plurality of conceptions of the good that individuals affirm within the bounds of justice. ²⁸ Proponents of neutrality assume that self-determining individuals must be as free as possible from paternalistic state influence. If it were to promote a particular conception of the individual good as intrinsically superior, the state would paternalistically interfere with the exercise of the individual capacity for self-determination. Hence the conclusion that the state should treat all permissible conceptions of the good as having equal value and refrain from singling out any one of them as intrinsically superior and deserving of special favorable treatment.

Let us now turn to the types of liberal neutrality that have been offered in response to pluralism. Most participants in the debate draw a distinction between neutrality of effects (or consequences) and neutrality of intentions (of aim or justification) (Kymlicka, 2002: 217–219). A state is neutral in the former sense when its policies do not have the effect of favoring or harming a particular conception of the good. All authors in this debate agree that neutrality of effects is unworkable since most, if not all, state policies, may have favorable or harmful effects for some conceptions of the good. Even the protection of the most basic individual rights and liberties may make it easier for some conceptions of the good to flourish (to live by them and to gain adepts) and harder for others (Kymlicka, 1989: 884). Thus, most defenders of neutrality hold a version of neutrality of intentions, which, however, also has problems of its own.

Neutrality of intentions may be construed as neutrality of “aim” or of “justification.” On this view, a state is neutral when its policies do not aim at, or are not grounded on, singling out a particular conception of the good as intrinsically superior and deserving of special favorable treatment. According to its critics, whatever way it is construed, neutrality of intentions fails to rule out the most obvious cases of non-neutrality as long as the aim of, or justification for, the policy is a public good (Patten, 2012: 255). For example: the state recognizes the Catholic Church as official for the sake (or on the grounds) of social peace. So conceived, neutrality fails to rule out religious establishment as long as the aim of, or ground for, this policy is not the consideration of a particular religion as intrinsically superior and deserving of special favorable treatment. In light of difficulties such as this one, some have concluded that neutrality of intentions is as problematic as neutrality of effects (Patten, 2012).

There is a third type of neutrality that has recently been proposed and that allegedly avoids the problems that plague the two types just mentioned (of effects and of intentions). This is “neutrality of treatment”, which directly requires the state to be equally accommodating to all permissible conceptions of the good on the grounds that persons should have a fair opportunity to be self-determining (Patten, 2012). The state is “equally accommodating” when it extends equivalent levels of assistance or hindrance to rival conceptions of the good (Patten, 2012: 254). This conception does not focus on the actual effects of a policy or on the intentions behind it, but on its content: it focuses on what the policy says. On this view, a statute that recognizes a particular Church as official is non-neutral regardless of both its actual effects for rival conceptions of the good and the intentions on which it is grounded. Such a statute or policy would fail to be equally accommodating insofar as it does not extend an equivalent level of assistance to rival conceptions of the good.

In addition to the grounds for, and types of, neutrality, there are at least two strategies for achieving neutrality. According to a first strategy, the best way to achieve neutrality is through abstention: the state should not get involved in providing special assistance in the form of material goods or symbolic recognition to any conception of the good. By leaving the pursuit of the good to individuals themselves, the state remains neutral among the many conceptions that they might affirm. According to a second strategy, the best way to achieve neutrality is through active support: the state must provide special assistance in the way of material goods and symbolic recognition to all conceptions of the good, but it must do so equally or fairly (Patten, 2012).

These two strategies have radically different practical implications. According to the abstention strategy, the state should refrain from supporting, materially and symbolically, activities that are specific to some conceptions of the good, such as school prayers, certain kinds of artistic performances, particular sports, religious pilgrimages, or hunting excursions. According to the active support strategy, by contrast, the state may support or encourage activities such as these as long as support is distributed equally or fairly among different conceptions of the good: school prayer may be allowed provided that all individuals are offered a fair chance to engage in it according to their own religion, and atheists are somehow accommodated; the state may financially support artistic performances as long as all artistic tendencies are offered their fair share of material or symbolic support, and so on.

Most proponents of neutrality of intentions favor the abstention strategy. They conceive of the domain of the good as a sort of marketplace in which individual choices and resources determine which conceptions flourish and which die out. The view is that the state must leave it in the hands of individuals themselves to provide the necessary means for realizing their particular conceptions of the good. The abstention strategy also works well for neutrality of treatment insofar as abstention allows the state to be equally accommodating of all conceptions of the good.

The appeal of the active support strategy for achieving neutrality proceeds from the shortcomings of the abstention strategy. As critics have often pointed out, it is both impossible and undesirable for a liberal state to fully abstain from aiming at the promotion of certain conceptions of the individual good. On the one hand, the liberal state cannot fail to aim at supporting some conceptions of the individual good through some of its institutions. Take, for example, the promotion, in state funded schooling, of individual autonomy, which is reasonably considered specific to some conceptions of the good. On the other hand, some argue that it would be highly undesirable for the liberal state to fail to aim at actively supporting elements of some conceptions of the good. Why should the state not fund sports facilities or artistic performances that would be welcomed by most members of a given community? If the complaint is that those who don’t care about such activities could reasonably object, the right answer might be that state support should benefit all conceptions of the good in an equal or fair manner. If the abstention strategy is neither possible nor desirable as a way of achieving neutrality, the door is open for the active support strategy. ²⁹

Religious neutrality as independence from religion

The purpose of this final section is to argue that neutrality as independence constitutes a distinctive conception in two ways. First, there are specific features that distinguish neutrality as independence from the three types of neutrality considered in the previous section (of consequences, of intentions, and of treatment). As we will see, neutrality as independence also has its own distinctive ground. ³⁰ Second, neutrality as independence differs from any other possible type of traditional liberal neutrality since the former rejects some conceptual assumptions that are central to the latter. Specifically, neutrality as independence presupposes a different meaning of neutrality, does not treat religion as a conception of the individual good, and need not presuppose pluralism—although it can work under conditions of growing religious pluralism. Thus, neutrality as independence not only differs from neutrality of effects, of intentions, and of treatment, but from of any other possible type of traditional liberal neutrality.

Let us first consider how religious neutrality as independence differs from the existing types of, and grounds for, liberal neutrality. Neutrality as independence says that the state should be neutral with respect to religion in the sense of being devoid of all religious content (words and symbols) that could be taken as a form of endorsement or criticism of religion. This is a type of neutrality that differs from neutrality in the effects or intentions of state policies, but also from neutrality in the treatment of religious views. ³¹ First, neutrality as independence differs from neutrality of effects since the exclusion of all religious content from state institutions and from formal politics clearly disfavors those religions that seek the state’s material support or symbolic recognition and favors those that reject such support or recognition for themselves or for religion as such. Neutrality as independence makes its demands regardless of whether they have the effect of favoring or disfavoring some religious views.

Second, neutrality as independence differs from neutrality of intentions. As we saw, the latter does not require or presuppose a regime of separation between the state and religion. By contrast, neutrality as independence, as we saw, presupposes such a regime and is thus incompatible with policies that explicitly favor or disfavor a particular religion (or religion as such) regardless of their justification.

Since neutrality as independence is not neutrality in the effects of state policies or in their justification alone, but directly focuses on the content of such policies, it may appear that this type of neutrality comes closer to neutrality of treatment. However, neutrality as independence also differs from this third type of neutrality. Neutrality of treatment, as we saw, demands the “equal accommodation” of all religious views through the extension of equal levels of assistance or hindrance. Thus, this type of neutrality does not require or presuppose a regime of separation between the state and religion. Neutrality of treatment is compatible with state support of religious conceptions provided that such support secures equal accommodation. By contrast, neutrality as independence, as I have emphasized, presupposes a strict separation between the state and religion.

Let us now turn to the ground for neutrality as independence. Although the exclusion of all religious content from state’s institutions and from formal politics may have the effect of promoting the exercise of an individual’s capacity for self-determination with regard to religion, such promotion is not the motivating ground for neutrality as independence. My own view is that “neutrality as independence” is grounded on a particular conception of religion and the political problems that religion thus conceived might pose. ³² While traditional liberal neutrality treats religion as an individual conception of the good, neutrality as independence conceives of religion primarily as a social institution capable of commanding various sorts of power in society (of political influence, moral/ideological, and financial). ³³ On this view, powerful religious institutions pose various kinds of challenge to the state as they seek to make use of the latter as an instrument for the carrying out of their own religious purposes—such as proselytizing (through compulsory schooling or official discourse, for example), enforcing religious prohibitions (such as those against abortion, sodomy, homosexuality, and polygamy), or both. Such a challenge is especially acute when a religion is both hegemonic and opposed to the political values that the state affirms. As I explained in the second section, neutrality as independence historically developed in response to the political problems posed by a hegemonic religion ideologically opposed to a state that affirmed liberal and republican values. This conception of religion as a social power that challenges the state is the motivating ground for neutrality as independence.

Since neutrality as independence purports to limit the power of a hegemonic religion, it might be objected that there is no reason why the demand for state’s neutrality with regard to religion should hold with regard to all religions, regardless of whether they are hegemonic or not. According to this objection, there is no reason for the state to avoid words and symbols that could be taken as a form of endorsement or criticism of minority religions that are not challenging (i.e. religions that do not oppose the official political values or do not seek to use the state as an instrument for the carrying out of their own religious purposes, or both). This objection maintains that neutrality as independence with regard to the hegemonic religion could coexist with non-neutrality with regard to minority non-challenging religions.

The answer to this line of objection is that there are both moral and stability related reasons for claiming that neutrality as independence must hold with regard to religion as such. On the one hand, if it were to be neutral with regard to the hegemonic religion and non-neutral with regard to non-challenging minority religions, the state would fail to treat its citizens equally by failing to treat all (permissible) religions equally. Though religious institutions are not equal in their power of social and political influence or in the relation that they maintain towards formal politics and official values, the state must treat them on an equal footing. On the other hand, as a matter of historical fact, neutrality as independence has actually been favorable to non-challenging minority religions. The latter have stood to benefit from the limitations established by neutrality as independence to a hegemonic religion even when such restrictions hold for all religions. The alternative of selective avoidance of religious content would not only be inconsistent with the value of equality but could also foster social confrontation.

Finally, the strategy for neutrality as independence is a version of the abstention strategy that focuses on religion only. This narrow focus avoids the problems that arise for the abstention strategy in the wider domain of the individual good. While it may be both impossible and undesirable for the state to abstain from policies that aim at favoring activities that are specific to certain conceptions of the good but not others, it is not impossible or (according to the arguments offered here) undesirable for the state to avoid all religious content that can be taken as a form of endorsement or criticism of a particular religion or of religion as such. This strategy obviously presupposes that it is possible to identify what counts as a religious organization or institution, which identification may be socially contested but not unfeasible.

So far we have seen how the conception of neutrality as independence differs from the various types of neutrality that are discussed in the literature as well as from the grounds for neutrality that scholars usually appeal to. This discussion, however, has implicitly shown that neutrality as independence also differs from any other possible type of traditional liberal neutrality—and not only from the three existing types considered here. I will now turn to this final point.

There are three features that set neutrality as independence apart from traditional liberal neutrality. The first feature, which I mentioned at the end of the first section, is the employment of a different meaning of neutrality. Liberal authors always conceive of state’s neutrality as the independence or impartiality of a party facing a conflict between at least two other parties. A neutral state on religious matters, according to this definition, is one that does not favor or disfavor any religious confession. By contrast, neutrality as independence employs the meaning of neutrality as the lack or absence of a certain feature. According to this second meaning of neutrality, a state is neutral in religious matters when it is devoid of all religious content. This is not neutrality among a plurality of religious confessions but neutrality in self-presentation. Neutrality as independence complements the regime of separation between the state and religion by adding a symbolic dimension to the demand for the state’s independence from religion. The neutral appearance of the state in religious matters is a symbolic dimension of the regime of separation.

The second feature of neutrality as independence that sets it apart from traditional liberal neutrality is the view of religion as a social institution capable of commanding various sorts of power in society (of political influence, moral/ideological, and financial). This conception of religion as a social institution is profoundly different from the individualistic liberal conception of religion as a conception of the good. While the former places the emphasis on the power that religious institutions command, the latter focuses on the individual endorsement of a religious conception. On this latter view, a religion is primarily a doctrine or body of beliefs and values that, in pluralistic societies, is controversial in the sense of not being shared by all citizens. ³⁴ The important point here is not to assess which view of religion is more defensible for political purposes. The point is only to capture the differences between the two in order to bring out how neutrality as independence differs from traditional liberal neutrality.

The third feature that distinguishes neutrality as independence from any possible conception of traditional liberal neutrality is a different take on pluralism. As I have argued, neutrality as independence need not presuppose pluralism. This conception is addressed to the challenges that religious institutions pose to the state as they seek to make use of the latter as an instrument for the carrying out of their own religious purposes. As I have emphasized, such challenges are especially acute when a religion is both hegemonic and opposed to the official political values. Though a hegemonic religion may coexist with a minimum of religious pluralism, the conflicts that motivate neutrality as independence in a context of religious hegemony have nothing to do with such pluralism.

To conclude this article, I wish to suggest that neutrality as independence can also work as a response to the problems posed by religious pluralism. When there is a plurality of religious institutions, none of which can be considered hegemonic, but some of which compete against each other for the state’s favor in carrying out their own religious purposes, neutrality as independence offers a way of treating all religious institutions equally. By avoiding all religious content from its institutions and from formal politics, the state may manage not to privilege any particular religion.

In fact, neutrality as independence continues to be attractive in the societies in which it originally developed despite growing pluralism. The end of religious hegemony has not rendered this type of neutrality pointless. Far from it, in contemporary debates both in France and in Mexico, friends of neutrality defend it in response to religious pluralism. It is important to notice, however, that the pluralism at play here is not only, and not even primarily, of the religious views that individuals affirm, but of the existing religious organizations that command various sorts of power in society (of political influence, moral/ideological, financial).

There are two kinds of reasons why neutrality as independence continues to be attractive in such places. The first kind of reason has to do with political history and practice. The institutional role of neutrality as independence, which presupposes a regime of separation, has shaped the local traditions of political thought and practice: there is a tradition of understanding religious neutrality as the absence of religious content from state institutions, formal politics, and official discourse; the conception of religion as a social institution capable of commanding various sorts of power in society is also deeply entrenched in political debate and practice. The second kind of reason is more straightforwardly normative. The conception of religion implicit in neutrality as independence is arguably better suited than the alternative view of religion as an individual conception of the good to address the challenges that religious organizations pose in society as they seek to make use of the state as an instrument for the carrying out of their own religious purposes. This particular kind of problem has been of the utmost importance to many of those concerned with the political problems posed by religion in these societies. Insofar as neutrality as independence, which is already incorporated in local traditions of political thought and practice, appears better suited than existing conceptions of liberal neutrality to address this particular kind of political problems posed by religion, it is hardly surprising that the former continues to be attractive as a response to the problems posed by the growth of religious pluralism. However, much more work needs to be done in order to establish that neutrality as independence is indeed normatively attractive. My aim in this article has been only to articulate conceptually this type of neutrality and to show that it differs from the existing types, as well from any possible type, of traditional liberal neutrality.