Contemporary Methodological Perspectives in Educational Research on ‘Teachers’ practice’: Assumptions and Shortcomings for ‘Effective Practices’

Introduction

Teachers’ practice, caught in the wind of improvement of the educational system, is being widely debated worldwide. There is a large consensus on one basic element: the role teachers play in the implementation of the educational system is essential; the strength of the system depends on the quality of the teachers (Darling-Hammond, 1999, 2017; McKinsey & Company, 2007, 2010; Penalva, 2003). A different story, however, is the query about the role teachers should play to obtain better outcomes. There is no clear-cut idea about what and how the sort of ‘practice’ needed is to achieve better results, particularly in this complex, uncertain, ambiguous and volatile time. This question is still in dispute. Therefore, on the one hand, educational policy is demanding evidence of effective practices, but on the other hand, the key issue of practice is still ‘alive and kicking’ and, subsequently, so is the problem of the implementation of an educational system.

Since the 1970s, there has been an ongoing agenda for research on teachers’ practice, namely that relevant knowledge for teachers’ practice is to be generated ‘from’ and ‘within’ practical contexts. On this basis, nowadays there is a major hunt for evidence for implementing research-based policy and research-informed practices. Nevertheless, for evidence to be consistent and effective, it is necessary to proceed with a scientific and methodological base, which is, eventually, what evidence is about. To this end, the first step would be to investigate not just teachers (teachers’ assumptions and beliefs when interacting, theories-in-use, etc.) but researchers’ practice when they are to investigate teachers’ practice. From a scientific and methodological point of view, this should be the first key step. Therefore, to properly address the question of the effectiveness of teachers’ practice, the first step should be to take into account the very conception of methodology underlying the contemporary dominant perspectives of educational research.

This paper tackles this issue. To this end, it starts by expounding a succinct historical account of the scientific and methodological turns on teachers’ practice from the 1970s up to the present. It shows that, despite the wide and vast literature on teachers’ practice, the current methodological trends are tied to three perspectives: (1) naturalistic methodology, (2) descriptive methodology, and (3) the nonmethodological solution. This paper analyses them and brings to light the main methodological assumptions and shortcomings when it comes to teachers’ practice. As a result, the paper concludes, first, in the methodology underlying the dominant trends of educational research when facing the problem of teachers’ practice, there is a neat and clear continuity with traditional methodological perspectives, which, in turn, were in decline long ago. Second, it also concludes that contemporary perspectives in educational research fail to provide a consistent methodological model for ‘effective practices’. The paper finally draws some conclusions and offers suggestions for further development on methodology for teachers’ practice and the relationship among research, practice and policy.

Scientific and methodological structure from contemporary perspectives

A general overview from the literature on teachers’ practice suggests a multitude of lines of research, aligned with a wide range of diverse traditions, sometimes incompatible and which bring together different conceptions of practice. However, from the point of view of scientific knowledge (i.e. the key elements that compound the structure of science) and with a focus on methodological aspects (i.e. principles, patterns and procedures to achieve knowledge), contemporary trends on teachers’ practice come down to the features described as follows.

From a historical point of view, the late 1960s brought to educational research a scientific crisis, perhaps as a side effect of a methodological and epistemological shift in social sciences and the social upheaval of that time. What is ‘good’ practice in teaching? Where is the ‘evidence’ of good practices? What appeared to be solid knowledge soon became liquid knowledge, ambiguous concepts and nonproductive views (Bell, 1973; Cole, 1994; Donmoyer, 1996; Lyotard, 1979).

From a prescriptive standpoint, i.e. the normative level, what ought to be done in teaching over, the generalised prescription encountered a huge blow. The realisation that prescribing what constitutes good practice had a poor impact on the day-to-day teachers’ practice led to dispute, and soon to the destruction of, – what was considered ‘traditional views’ of knowledge and research (Elbaz, 1983; Elliott, 1981, 1991/1992; Fullan, 2001; Jackson, 1968).

Axiologically speaking, i.e. with regard to driver values for knowledge and research, a new set of values came into force: to be involved and close to the day-to-day life in the classroom; to be committed and responsive to school context. Consequently, impractical, detached, uninvolved, unresponsive approaches were seen as traditional or old-fashioned values, because they belong to a sort of discourse produced and constructed in an academic context, based on theoretical and disciplinary trends and which were then applied to the field of teachers’ practice. Research then avoided, at least theoretically, that academic, theoretical, disciplinary knowledge. Research has thus steered away, at least theoretically, from an explanatory theoretical knowledge disconnected from activities and practices (Atkinson, 2000; Bassey, 1995; Judge, 1980; McIntyre, 1980).

From an epistemological point of view, i.e. related to the concept of knowledge, if, in the past, the prevalence of the application of discipline knowledge to practice and professional contexts was the norm, from that point onwards the relevance of practices, practical professional knowledge and contexts has increasingly gathered momentum (Anderson, 1994; Anderson and Her, 1999; Cochran-Smith and Lytle, 1993; Constas, 1998; Clough, 1999; Eisner, 1992; Gage, 1977, 1985; Howe, 1998). When it comes to methodological aspects, this new practically focused perspective can clearly be differentiated from theoretical approaches where knowledge emanates from an aprioristic disciplinary field (such as philosophy, sociology and psychology), which is subsequently applied to the teacher’s realm of practice, that remain disconnected from practice and the day-to-day practical knowledge.

Therefore, from a methodological point of view, we can observe a ‘methodological turn’ in the field of educational research in terms of teachers’ practice from the 1970s up to the present. From the 1920s to the 1950s, teachers’ practice was understood in terms of ‘instrumental practice’. This view was supported by an empirical methodology and a positivistic epistemology. Educational research was just a field where disciplinary, theoretical knowledge was applied. From the 1970s onwards, it was followed by a change that saw teachers’ practice as being perceived as a practical realm with contextualised epistemology and interpretative methodologies. Hence, if practice was previously understood in terms of instrumental effectiveness, it was then regarded as ‘informed practice’ by means of which educational values, skills and knowledge are reached.

From a semantic point of view, i.e. related to the underlying conception of language and meaning, this new methodological paradigm leads to a ‘practical principle’ for research on teaching. The meaning of propositions on teachers’ practice emanates from ‘practice’, ‘professional knowledge’ and ‘contexts’. Thus, now the focus for researchers in making sense of teaching and teachers’ practice is ‘the process of teaching’ and ‘the process of learning’ (when it is the case of preservice teachers). The term ‘process’ (in the process of teaching) is understood using different categories for conceptualisation: interactive teaching (Jackson, 1968), theories-in-use (Argyris and Schön, 1974; Schön 1983, 1987), reflective teaching (Clark and Peterson, 1986; Shulman, 1986, 1987), practical knowledge (Elbaz, 1983; Elliott, 2001) and professional craft knowledge (Brown and McIntyre, 1993; Judge, 1980; McIntyre, 1980, 1988).

Despite the different concepts that research is using, there is a prevailing and governing category to conceptualise and understand the ‘process’ of teachers’ practice: research has dominantly focused on ‘teacher cognitions’, namely teachers’ knowledge and thinking when engaged in practise and in interactive teaching (Bennett, 2002, 2010; Berliner, 1987; Bransford, 1999; Briesch et al., 2008; De Jong, 2005; Hill, Beisiegel and Jacob, 2013; Jones, 1987; Leinhardt and Greeno, 1986; Simonsen et al., 2006). Thus, how does research understand this ‘cognition’ (teachers’ practice)? The answer is: it is a sort of knowledge and thinking that is embedded in teachers’ everyday lives in the classroom; this knowledge and thinking is tacit rather than theoretical, latent rather than explicit; it is intuitive, spontaneous (embedded in routine aspects of teaching); it is ‘theories-in-use’ rather than ‘exposed theories’. In a nutshell: this thinking teases out assumption versus theoretical knowledge.

This way, under this new paradigm on teachers’ practice from the 1970s, we find a ‘new agenda’ of research on teachers’ practice. For research, knowledge on teachers’ practice is now to be generated ‘from’ and ‘within’ a practical context (i.e. schools, classrooms, interactions). Epistemologically, research is looking for practical knowledge (of good, effective practices) and the methodological question being: how can research come across teachers’ knowledge and thought embedded in their action when they are engaged in interactive teaching? And how can research measure this knowledge? To answer these questions, the dominant trend on teachers’ practice traces the following methodological perspectives:

Put simply, contemporary educational research on teachers’ practice is under a new paradigm (for a description of paradigm in science, see Kuhn, 1962; Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970; Laudan, 1977), looking for teachers’ practical assumptions and teachers’ tacit knowledge. Ruled by this paradigm, we find three methodological perspectives.

The naturalistic methodological perspective

Nowadays, international comparison in science, maths/numeracy and literacy is leading the political agenda for an ‘evidence-based’ policy. No wonder so many research centres are worried about how to achieve expectations: to be accessible to policy demands, evidence is required to give a clear message. And what What seems to be the clearest message is ‘what works’ and ‘effectiveness’. These are the current buzzwords in educational research on teachers’ practice.

The tendency towards ‘what works’ is renewing and dramatically gaining momentum day after day (Bredo, 2006; Cain, 2015; Lenihan, 2013; Nelson, 2014; Oliver, 2014; Sharples, 2013; Thomas and Pring, 2004). In the UK (Avis, 2003; Bryk, 2015; Clifford, 1973; Hammersley, 2002, 2005; Hargreaves, 1996, 1999; Hargreaves et al., 1998; Haslam, 2011) it has influenced educational policy (Development for Education and Skills (DfES), 2001; Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE), 2011; Sylva, 2010), initial teacher education programmes (McIntyre, 1997) and teacher development (setting ‘what works centres’). In addition, in the USA (Slavin, 2002, 2004, 2008), this focus has influenced teachers’ practice (Cochran-Smith, 2001; Darling-Hammond et al., 2002; Darling-Hammond et al., 2010) and preservice teaching. Similar trends are seen in Europe (Gough, 2013; Gough et al., 2011; European Commission, 2012, Commission of the European Communities, 2013, 2015), Canada (Campbell, 2014) and Australia (Bartholomew, 2003; Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs (DETYA), 2000; Egeberg et al., 2016; Rickinson, 2016, 2017; Tseng, 2012; Tseng and Nutley, 2014), etc. ‘What works’ is a widespread tendency all over the world, which is often concealed under labels such as ‘effective classroom management’ (De Jong, 2005; Egeberg et al., 2016; Henley, 2010), ‘community schools as effective strategies’ (Adams, 2010; Coalition for Community Schools, 2010; Henderson and Mapp, 2002; ICF International, 2010; Warren, 2005), and ‘effective teaching’ (Hattie, 2003; Kyriakides et al., 2013; Lloyd et al., 2015; Mouza, 2009). In addition, the dissemination of ‘effective’ findings is becoming a priority, to mobilise ‘effective practices’ amongst teachers: driven by concepts such as ‘evidence-informed practice’ and ‘research-based practice’ (Hulme, 2013; Gough, 2013; Levin et al., 2013; McFarlane, 2015; Saunders, 2014). The tendency is growing, regardless of the criticism on the methodological shortcomings and problems in disseminating and applying this knowledge (Biesta, 2007, 2010; Durbin and Nelson, 2014; Edwards, 2000; Evers and Kneyber, 2015; Guskey, 2003; Nelson, 2014; Penalva, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d, 2010; Roberts, 2015).

In short, we see a global tendency towards evidence-based (with regard to educational policy), research-evidenced (relating educational research) and research-informed (when it comes to practice).

Scientifically and methodologically speaking, research, under this perspective, is looking for models to have access to effective outcomes of good practices (whatever a good practice is; the question is not a key point). In this perspective, research receives, beforehand, some aims and goals, which may include conceptual knowledge, skills and dispositions, professional craft knowledge and moral or cultural values. Then, the driver for research on ‘what works’ is grounded in empirical facts. In other words, the question about the truth of given goals is not relevant; those given goals are true as long as research finds effective achievements. Thus, the core for research now is not ‘what teachers’ practice is’ but ‘what effective teachers do’. Research now is not looking to provide an ‘understanding’ of teachers’ practice and effective practices, but to find the logic of ‘how an effective practice is done’. Thus, good practice now translates into ‘effective achievements’ and the question, methodologically speaking, is as follows: how do we measure ‘effective achievements’? How can research gain ‘access to’ effective practice and to teachers’ ‘practical knowledge’? What is the solution from a naturalistic methodological approach?

From a naturalistic methodological perspective, research is looking for empirical knowledge (positivistic epistemology), empirically grounded and tested (empirical methodology), according to the criteria that natural sciences use. Thus, this perspective appears, explicitly, with a scientific look: It assumes that there is progress of knowledge, because, it is said, there is a ‘scientific methodology’. it spells ‘Science’ with a capital S. From an epistemological point of view, a naturalistic perspective is searching for ‘evidence’ on ‘effective practices’; so effective practice is tantamount to evidence (EP = E). Methodologically speaking, evidence is the result of (quantitative and qualitative) methods with contrasted values (as per natural sciences), methods that are able to measure what repeatedly works. From a logical viewpoint, evidence rests on the logical structure of the predicative calculus, i.e. the logic of mathematics. So, Thus, what is an ‘effective practice’? In this view, effective practice is ‘what repeatedly works’. An effective practice is an ‘empirical’ fact of effective teaching, so EP = what works = empirical facts and evidence is presented in declarative propositions about what works.

In summary, the naturalistic methodological perspective on teachers’ practice is looking for methodological patterns to give a consistent measure of ‘empirical facts’. Underlying the naturalistic methodological perspective, there is a criterion of meaning: empirical facts, day-to-day practices in the that repeatedly work, which provide real significance to propositions on ‘good/effective educational practices’. Thus, empirical facts (what actually is) provide the grounding from which to make normative propositions (what should be and ought to be done in teachers’ practice, initial teacher education (ITL), teacher development, etc.). In other words: what actually is working appears to be the criterion for innovation in education.

In effect, the aim for this research approach is basically twofold: on the one hand, providing policymakers with evidence for education policy on teachers’ practice; whilst on the other, generating a databank of professional knowledge (name it, if you wish, ‘intellectual capital’ or ‘organisational capital’). A corpus of knowledge about what is to be an effective teacher. These findings are then to be disseminated to teachers, whose practice must be, it is said, ‘research-informed’.

That is the way to innovate under this perspective.

Next it must be said that this naturalistic methodological perspective reflects (effectively) a neo-positivistic outlook as sustained per the ‘Verification Programme’ of the 1920s. Already familiar in the real philosophy and methodology of science, the Verification Programme (neo-positivism) was, in turn, an offspring of the logical empiricism. It was developed in the Vienna Circle Manifesto in 1929 (Ayer, 1959; Hahn et al., 1929; Suppe, 1979) and counted on the Berlin School as an important advocate (Society for Empirical Philosophy, led by H. Reichenbach). The Verification Programme is founded on two basic methodological criteria.

Soon after its appearance, a clash of countervailing arguments were generated in the field of philosophy and methodology of science leading to a broad agreement that considered this programme as untenable (Kuhn, 1962; Lakatos, 1976; Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970; Laudan, 1977; Popper, 1935/1959, 1963). In addition, a dearth of arguments to support this scientific view led this methodological approach to an impasse. Nowadays, in philosophy and methodology of science, this methodological standpoint is widely considered as indefensible (I have developed this argument elsewhere; see Penalva, 2006b, 2006d). Over the last three decades, there has been unanimous agreement about the abandonment of ‘passive observations’ to generate scientific knowledge and the incapability of the ‘induction criterion’ to validate knowledge. In addition, it is agreed that, in methodology, there is no axiological neutrality (Laudan, 1984); in other words, methodology embraces substantive presuppositions (i.e. presuppositions about the world, about researchers’ worldviews, about the role of researchers, etc.).

Furthermore, there has been broad agreement on the following idea: there is an underlying rationality in the progress of scientific knowledge, but rationality must not be reduced to empirical facts. The question about ‘how’ the rational process of knowledge happens is still a controversial issue and remains an open question, but there is broad agreement about the failure of the methodology of the Verification Programme when explaining that process. In other words, positivism and empiricism do not work. Some research programmes may rely on the dominance of the ‘external elements’ of knowledge (i.e. social, political, economic context, etc.). Some other research programmes could highlight the significance of ‘internal features’ (coherence, structure, etc.). However, there is still broad agreement about the need of ‘historicity’ to properly conceive the progression of scientific knowledge.

Despite this fact, naturalistic methodological perspectives are rooted in a positivistic epistemology and an empirical methodology, as delimited in the 1920s by the Verification Programme. Thus, it assumes two basic methodological criteria.

In this way, empirical facts provide the meaning for what is a ‘good/effective practice’. Empirical facts are the basis to propose what ought to be done (normative propositions on teachers’ practice). The source for ‘what ought to be’ (normative propositions, recommendation for practice and policy) is what repeatedly and efficiently works, as per empirical validation.

Then, the naturalistic methodology approach, when entering the normative sphere, falls into the standard logic of the predicative calculus (i.e. the logic of mathematics) and the following question should trouble this approach: amongst all the available alternatives of action, to obtain effective practices, which is the best option? From a naturalistic point of view, the answer to this question is based on the empirical facts emanating from observations. Thus, methodologically speaking, it confuses hypothesis (what would be) with norms-policy recommendations (what should be).

In other words, ‘what is already done’ appears to be the ground for ‘innovation’ (what should be done) in this complex, uncertain, ambiguous and volatile time.

At present, the naturalistic methodological perspective on ‘effective practices’ has produced relevant results, particularly when implementing professional activity in the field of business organisations, where some ‘instrumental skills’, such as flexibility, networking and creativity, are needed to implement certain ‘aims provided beforehand’. But However, next we must ask, is this the case for education? Are aims and means separate dimensions in teachers’ practice?

The descriptive methodological perspective

This perspective of educational research grew under the shadow of some sociological approaches that were analysing professional activities within the fields of business, medicine, law, engineering, etc. (Drucker, 1993, 1996; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; cf. Penalva, 2006b, 2006c). When it comes to methodology, the prominent author of this perspective is Schön (1983, 1987; see also Erupt, 1995; Lampert, 1985; Munby and Russell, 1989; Wilson, 1987). This perspective gained strength in the 1980s and today is one of the most dynamic methodologies connected with teachers’ practice, aligned with labels such as ‘reflective teacher’ (Brookfield, 1995; Calderhead, 1989; Towndrow, 2008; Zeichner and Gore, 1990), ‘reflection in action’ (Darling-Hammond et al., 2002, 2010; Elbaz, 1983; Eraut, 1995; Kemmis, 1993; Whitehead, 1993), ‘realistic teacher’ (Evelein and Korthagen, 2015; Korthagen, 2001, 2007) and ‘collaborative teaching’ (Cochran-Smith, 2001; Lillejord and Borte, 2016; Roth and Tobin, 2002, 2005). It is also influencing different ITL programmes around the world: Singapore (Towndrow, 2008), Stanford (Darling-Hammond et al., 2002, 2010), etc.

The key basic features of the descriptive methodology perspective, in terms of teachers’ practice are as follows.

First, it starts with a criticism of traditional models of research on professional practice, which are seen as lacking in productivity and effective results. Traditional views, it is said, rest on aprioristic theoretical knowledge and conceive professional practice as derived from disciplinary knowledge that is applied to professional activity. Thus, in the traditional view, practice is just an instrumental action, because the aims have already been provided beforehand (by theoretical knowledge that is supposed to embrace a scientific methodological standpoint). According to this, traditional views are seen as carrying an understanding of teachers’ practice from a technical rationality point of view: practice entails technical expertise, where teachers just have to apply the knowledge and procedures provided beforehand.

Second, it is said that such a traditional view on practice is ineffective for professional activity. In complex societies (characterised by complexity, uncertainty, instability, etc.), professionals and teachers experience a great deal of difficulty during the process of ‘adapting’ their practices to the contexts and to the specific situation. In real life, the context of practice is not just a problem-solving activity, but a problem-setting activity too, because each situation is unique. Thus, in complex contexts, the problem to be addressed is not given beforehand, but must be delimited and set. A problem-solving activity is a technical task (where theoretical knowledge is to be applied to the context), whereas a problem-setting activity is not. Thus, a different conception of professional practice is required.

Third, rather than knowledge emanating from a theoretical-academic source, knowledge about teachers’ practice must be produced ‘in’ action, ‘in’ the context. From this perspective, there is a shift in favour of ‘practical epistemology’: practice of what practitioners actually do when they are acting in the context, in specific situations.

Fourth, from a methodological point of view, how does research have access to the sort of knowledge that is relevant to conceive ‘teachers’ practice’? The answer being observing what practitioners actually do and describing their patterns of action. In this way, it is said, we get a ‘practical’ account of teachers’ practice, i.e. what teachers’ practice ‘is’ and what teachers’ practice ‘should be’ (in teacher education, teacher development, etc.).

Thus, here we are: a descriptive methodology. Thus, after examining the professional practices of architects, psychotherapists, engineers, planners and managers, Schön, a prominent author for this perspective, concludes that the day-to-day professional practice depends on tacit knowledge, a knowing-in-action, which permits professionals to diagnose a situation without having theoretical principles (i.e. principles, rules, procedures). Professionals think as they are acting and they embody a ‘know-how’ that depends on their own common sense. Schön summarises this way as the practitioners’ pattern of action (Schön, 1983).

Therefore, from a semantic point of view, meaning about practice is implicit and embodied in practitioners’ patterns of action and emanates from practitioners’ common sense, from their tacit knowledge, intuitions and knowledge-implicit-in-action.

Ontologically (i.e. the conception about what the reality of practice is), teachers’ practice, in this methodological perspective, is an intuitive activity of an effective and efficient character (know-how as problem-setting and problem-solving activity). Teachers’ practice is an interpretative activity, looking for an effective and efficient achievement.

As a result, under this perspective, teachers’ practice is not just a purely ‘technical’ activity, but a ‘reflective’ one too. Teachers’ ‘reflection’ meaning: ‘know-how’ as problem-setting and problem-solving activity, a sort of knowledge that flows from intuition. Thus, as opposed to a ‘technical rationality’, this perspective advocates for a ‘reflective rationality’ (of an intuitive character).

Hence, the descriptive methodological perspective on teachers’ practice focuses on observing practitioners’ behaviour, and then, expressing practitioners’ pattern of action in propositions of a descriptive entity, i.e. it describes what they see as describing what it ‘is’. In addition, propositions about what actually ‘is’ are the basis to categorise what teachers’ practice ‘should be’. Thus, in this perspective, the logic and structure for teachers’ practice (in teacher education, teacher development, etc.) emanates from what is already done in particular situations and in contingent interventions. In a nutshell, what ‘should be’ is inferred from what actually ‘is’.

Therefore, from a normative point of view, i.e. what ought to be in teachers’ practice, practices that should be done are inferred from what has already been done. There is therefore a governing ‘inductive criterion’ to propose norms, policy, recommendation, structure of actions, etc.

What does ‘inductive criterion’ mean? It means that empirically perceived propositions are the basis to infer norms, policy, etc., on teachers’ practice. Thus, ‘empirical facts’, i.e. empirically contrasted propositions, are the ‘criterion of meaning’ for teachers’ practice. Subsequently, empirical propositions, empirically perceived and contrasted, reach a normative level.

Perhaps this perspective unconsciously assumes an underlying structural misunderstanding, that is, to consider descriptive propositions of practices to be ‘applied knowledge’ or, in a broader sense, considering descriptive methodology as an ‘applied methodology’.

In any case, the descriptive methodological perspective is sustained on the grounds of a ‘methodological jump’. Normative propositions are inferred from descriptive propositions that are, in turn, obtained through empirical observations. However, these two types of propositions, descriptions and norms, are of a different nature: descriptions refer to what things are; normative propositions look to what is possible and realisable. The underlying methodology is also different between these two types of propositions: descriptive propositions hold a hypothetic – deductive methodology; normative propositions entail an imperative–hypothetical methodology. In the descriptive methodological perspective, there is no connection between the methodologies. In the normative methodological perspective, the logical structure of what should be (normative dimension) emanates just from a detailed analysis of what practitioners actually ‘in fact’ do. There is, then, an underlying methodological jump. The question about how one type of proposition, descriptive, evolves into a different type of proposition, normative, is left aside.

From a normative point of view, the problem for this perspective is the following: it confuses what ‘is’ (what practitioners actually do) with what it ‘should be’. Hence, to this effect, we can raise the following question: are practitioners currently implementing the logic that should be (used)? Within the logic of the descriptive methodological perspective, there is no way to answer this question.

Therefore, the descriptive methodology lacks a rational criterion to discern the best line of educational action.

This shortcoming, which is significant to teachers’ practice, should lead this perspective to rethink its very conception of ‘practical epistemology’, its conception of ‘practical knowledge’; in other words, it should lead to a rethink of ‘practice’. In the descriptive methodological perspective, the concept of ‘practice’ appears to be constructed from an ‘aprioristic theory’ of practice, namely there reality, what teachers’ practice is and should be, is ‘constructed’ on the basis of practices related to contingent interventions in particular contexts. So, Thus, ‘practice’, in this perspective, produces ‘reality’. That is the ‘idea’ underlying the descriptive methodological perspective. Therefore, curiously, this ‘practical epistemology’ incurs a theoretical–idealistic conception of practice. Then this so-called ‘practical epistemology’ is loaded, oddly, with aprioristic knowledge (about the reality of practice and of education).

To sum up, the perspective of the descriptive methodology:

The perspective of a nonmethodological solution

This perspective flows from a criticism of the establishment that was shaping the time in the late 1960s, which soon raised nagging voices on the underlying ideology in educational discourse, policy and practices. Standards of teachers’ practice and measuring of effective practices were then seen as a mirror of an instrumental policy, which, in turn, were seen as part of a wider ‘political technology’ constructed by particular social–economic–cultural interests. Teachers’ practice was then seen as the key factor for the reproduction of a particular moral–political ideology. However, practice is neither morally nor politically neutral. Practice is a value–loaded activity (i.e. some particular tacit interests embraced in teachers’ practice), which is precisely what this perspective rejects and tries to replace. Since the 1970s, this perspective has grown and spread over a number of decades. (Incidentally, in Spain, this approach was the framework for a ‘witch hunt’ in the relation to teachers’ practice during the democratic period; Penalva, 2008a, 2008b, 2010, 2011.)

The source for the analysis and the degree of rejection of the given situation demarcates the methodology approach they are using. Thus, we can observe, depending on the source and the viewpoint for criticism, the following branches: historical (with history the viewpoint for analysis and criticism on teachers’ practice), social (sociology being the standpoint), moral (with moral values shaping the position) and philosophical (with post-modernity discourse the predominant angle). There are obviously some other branch lines, following some other particular disciplines of social sciences, but the idea behind mapping out still remains. The point here is to highlight that the nonmethodological perspective of teachers’ practice follows a particular disciplinary standpoint within the realm of social science and, at the same time, follows a particular leading author of that discipline of social science.

More specifically in regard to educational research, examples include the following.

This mapping is of an analytical character (both general and abstract) meaning that when studying some specific authors, lines of research or research programmes, we can see them attached to a particular branch. It is possible, however, to see them adhering to a few branches rather than remaining attached to just one. For instance, an advocator of the nonmethodological solution in teachers’ practice follows Dunne’s moral education account (Dunne, 1993), who, in turn, follows Gadamer’s methodological viewpoint (Gadamer, 1975), who, in turn, follows Aristotle’s ethics account. This trace provides a methodological proposal highlighting that teachers’ practice relies on a diversity of standpoints. Another example of this diversity might include some authors following Stenhouse’s account, who followed Bernstein’s ideas on education and, at the same time, follows, first, Gadamer’s methodological ideas and, later, Rorty’s methodological view (whose philosophy approach connects with Nietzsche’s philosophical ideas). We could go on giving examples, especially within the ‘critical pedagogy’ trend, but, in any case, the branches outlined above help us to map out an educational account of this nature.

Based on this perspective, the nonmethodological solution, as a whole, this approach takes into account the following key basic characteristics of ‘teachers’ practice’ (cf. Penalva, 2014).

First, it starts by criticising the very concept of methodology underlying educational research and action research. In this view, those researchers who claim for ‘rationality’ and ‘methodology’ hold an academic viewpoint, lack a connection with day-to-day teachers’ practice, are based in theoretical and aprioristic knowledge and assume a positivistic methodology. In other words, researchers working in this space hold a particular set of beliefs, namely:

Second, after a flood of (sometimes hostile) criticism of these beliefs (which are normally considered as a threat), it categorises the former view of educational research as ‘traditional’. In keeping with nonmethodological solution, the traditional view, i.e. educational research and action research based on rationality and methodology, is just a particular socio-cultural construction, namely the conception of social science emanates from modern philosophy. Thus, the constructed discourse of modernity is the bedrock to support (1) principles about the nature of action (i.e. philosophical theories on human action), (2) the epistemological question about the justification of the nature of knowledge and, finally, (3) the need for methodology in the realm of education. Rationality and methodology are, in a nutshell, a social–cultural product of modernity.

Third, for the nonmethodological solution, ‘rationality’ and ‘methodology’ constrain ‘practice’.

Fourth, the traditional approach is considered to be a historical construction, which means it is neither essential nor necessary. So, Thus, with the traditional approach connected with a particular socio-cultural construction, why, it is said, must educational research and action research adhere to that sort of account and methodological principles?

Fifth, as a result, this perspective proposes that there is no need for methodology in teachers’ practice. Practice is basically and fundamentally an intuitive art of a moral character. Teachers’ Teachers’ practice is an interpretative activity and a moral concern.

Thus, here we are: a nonmethodological solution for teachers’ practice. The argument may be appealing. The sympathies usually lie in the feeling of overcoming the exceedingly dominant positivistic methodology, which has ruled educational research for decades. However, despite the statement that there is no need for a methodological standpoint in teachers’ practice, the perspective of the nonmethodological solution, when constructing its own account on teachers’ practice, takes the view of a particular methodological approach, namely the unveil methodology, demythologisation methodology, deconstruction methodology, as per post-modern philosophical account.

As I have argued elsewhere, the method for deconstruction, as per post-modern philosophy, basically consists of highlighting the hidden interests of a dominant ideology; in this instance, policy in education, educational research and action research (Penalva, 2008a, 2014). Such a method has an underlying hypothesis, which consists of the wish or desire to change the establishment. Qualifying a conception, for example, teachers’ practice, as a social–historical construction implies that such a conception is avoidable and replaceable. The grade of rejection, or the wish to replace the concept, demarcates the methodological nature of the analysis. Thus, those less involved with the change of reality will only make a historical analysis. However, those more engaged with the change, will make a revolutionary proposal. A revolutionary step in methodology describes a turning point in methodology. It is what we encounter in the nonmethodological solution. Such a revolutionary methodology flows from ‘a desire’, a ‘moral desire’ (if you like), i.e.: (1) the reality appears as this; and (2) such reality is avoidable and replaceable and should be another way. Nevertheless, we might ask is ‘desire’ (or moral desire) the sole basis for methodology in educational research? Is there no ‘rational’ stance, or even rational values, applicable to methodology? Does methodology necessarily depend only on socio-cultural contexts?

As a consequence, in the nonmethodological solution, the logic of ‘what should be’ (the normative stand in teachers’ practice: what should be done in teacher education and teacher professional development) depends on an interpretative assessment of an intuitive epistemological character. Although this logic allows us to make comparisons between better and worse practices, it cannot furnish logical grounds for supporting the ‘best’ possible alternative. Given that practice is based on the practitioner’s personal disposition (the line of action depends on subjective judgements related to a particular situation), this type of logic explicitly excludes pre-established methodological concepts for assessment. Hence, such a solution remains limited by a logic that involves ‘preferences’, and which, moreover, could even be influenced by moral dispositions, but which essentially rejects the key question of what is the most preferable or best option. Therefore, this logic lacks an evaluative rationality, with reference to what the preference should be on the basis of rational criteria.

Furthermore, if we dig a bit deeper, we see that this perspective of educational research, the nonmethodological solution, conceives the concepts of theory and practice as a dichotomy, thereby altogether avoiding the true significance of the theory–practice relationship. Both terms, theory and practice, are considered to be exclusionary, as either practice is subordinated to theory (academic–theoretical methodological orientation), or theory is subordinated to practice (practical epistemology). In the former case, the theoretical discourse appears to be disconnected from the practical context; the latter reflects random practices that lack rational grounds (i.e. ruling out rational criterion of action).

From a theoretical viewpoint, i.e. the concept of theory which, consciously or not, this perspective is using, it can easily be perceived that this perspective is based on a reconceptualisation of meaning (about teacher’s ‘practice’). From this perspective, the meaning of practice is based on the social–historical context. In this way, it starts by developing a narrative about the conceptualisation of teachers’ practice (i.e. genealogical methodology) and it next states that there is no objective criterion to validate knowledge and conceptions; there is no methodology that guarantees an accumulative progress of knowledge; there are only changes of meaning. Thus, it gives rise to an incommensurability of paradigms about the concept of practice. Therefore, the new paradigm, the nonmethodological solution, rests, theoretically speaking, on a ‘linguistic turn’. However, the ‘linguistic turn’, instead of being a ‘new’ perspective, is a rather old-fashioned idea, which incidentally has been broadly criticised, also in the realm of philosophy and methodology of science, as I have argued elsewhere (Penalva, 2014).

Taking the analysis further, the nonmethodological solution relies on a criticism of aprioristic discourses and presents itself, normally with a morally loaded concern, as engaged with ‘practice’. However, when offering a new account on teachers’ practice, this perspective, the nonmethodological solution, exposes an understanding of why the conception of modern action research is a social–historical construction; moreover, not only does it describe ‘why’, but it also wants action research to be viewed in a different way; then, based on that ‘why’ (and the underlying desire), it proposes an alternative for understanding practice (why practice is this other way). Nonetheless, it must be said that ‘practice’ not only refers to the question of ‘why things are’, but, overall, also concerns itself with the issue of ‘how things should be’. Hence, in the sphere of teachers’ practice, we are confronted with two aspects, which raise different questions.

Bearing these questions in mind, the nonmethodological solution perspective does not meet the requirements of ‘practice’, insofar as the question about ‘what should be’ is set aside, along with the question of practical propositions about what is possible and realisable, and the procedural methodological (of how) to reach results. In other words, this perspective does not consider the nature of practical propositions, procedural methodology and lines of action about what is possible and realisable. All in all, and strictly speaking, this perspective is not about ‘praxis’ but indeed about ‘lexis’. Thus, this perspective does not overcome the ‘aprioristic’ point of view.

To sum up, the perspective of the nonmethodological solution is as follows.

Discussion

In the face of the analysis developed in the previous sections, we can conclude, first, that in contemporary perspectives in educational research on teachers’ practice, there is a neat and clear-cut continuity with traditional methodological perspectives, which, in turn, were in decline long ago, and long ago overruled in the realm of philosophy and methodology of science.

Second, that contemporary perspectives in educational research fail to provide a consistent methodological model for effective practices. The perspective of a nonmethodological solution allows us to make some sort of comparison between better and worse practices, depending on our preferences (which are very much in dispute, according to different moral and political stands). So, from this perspective, we are unable to find a consistent ground for supporting the best possible alternative in teachers’ practice. It then fails to provide an evaluative rationality (even rationality, in this view, is not a very welcome word). In any case, this perspective is not about ‘practice’ but about ‘lexis’, so it also fails to provide a procedural rationality (or practical rationality), and then it is not of much use when it comes to ‘practice’. The descriptive methodological perspective also lacks a rational criterion to discern the best line for teachers’ practice (i.e. it lacks of an evaluative rationality). It therefore fails to provide a consistent methodology to propose what should be done in teachers’ practice, ITL, teacher development, etc. The naturalistic methodological perspective fails to provide a rationality of aims and goals. It confuses hypothesis (what would be) with norms-policy-recommendations (what should be done). So what is already done, in contingent interventions and particular contexts, is considered as a base for innovation (i.e. what should be done in new contingent interventions in different particular contexts).

As far as I am concerned, I agree with the premise of ‘effective practice’. We indeed need effectiveness to receive better outcomes in child development, school change and implementing educational systems. However, this is my key point, a more useful methodological perspective is required.

The methodological restrictions underlying the contemporary perspectives we have just analysed flow from an ontological base. In those research approaches, the reality of education (in this case, the reality of teachers’ practice) is basically regarded either as a natural thing (in line with natural sciences, e.g. naturalistic methodology) or as a social realm (within the sphere of social sciences, e.g. descriptive methodology and nonmethodology solution). Accordingly, the former looks for laws and regularities, to make generalisations. The latter seeks to give interpretations. All in all, both of them look for ‘explanations’, both of them lack an adequate model to bridge the gap between explanations (i.e. analysis about how things already are) and prescriptions (i.e. proposals of alternative lines of action). A is already familiar in the realm of philosophy and methodology of science, natural and social sciences are concerned with ‘explanations’. They are involved with causal and teleological (or interpretative) explanations, respectively. Thus, they properly give reasons as to ‘why’ things are. Nonetheless, applied sciences are also, and fundamentally, concerned with how things ‘ought to be’ and consequently with ‘prescriptions’. Then, it seems as if contemporary perspectives, consciously or not, assume an underlying structural misunderstanding: considering ‘descriptive, declarative, interpretative propositions’ to be ‘applied knowledge’ (to teachers’ practice); assuming ‘explanations’ to be ‘applied prescriptions’; or, in a broader sense, considering natural and social sciences as ‘applied sciences’ (to the field of teachers’ practice).

Hence, to overcome this methodological shortcoming, we need a different ontological base, which, in turn, implies a different methodological view, which, in turn, takes us to a new approach to applied science (to the field of teachers’ practice). My point is that applied science, and, specifically, the case of educational research will better be conceived from the perspective of the science of the design and the rationality of action (Penalva, 2011). In this view, the reality of education will be basically referred to as ‘human-made’, being complementary, although distinct, from the natural and social base. This ontological basis offers, then, a different perspective to the realm of education. The reality (of education) is to be synthesised, so it offers an innovative factor. This new ontological foundation puts forward a distinct scientific structure. Axiologically speaking, the research design will be focused on a synthesis of ‘what ought to be’ (rather than focused on analysis, descriptions and interpretations about how thing already are). From an epistemological point of view, explanations will be considered alongside the proposal for alternative lines of action (i.e. prescriptions). From a methodological point of view, the research design will simultaneously provide (1) new (synthesised) meaning and (2) practical alternatives (including the viability) to achieve its aims. From a semantic point of view, it will pursue the contribution of both new meaning as well as the process of its development.

This perspective, which is completely new and distinctive in the field of educational research, connects with the very heart of teachers’ practice and educational systems, as far as practice and implementation do not primarily and essentially stem from ‘what it is’ (i.e. the given situation), but from ‘what might be’, in a different way (so as to improve and overtake a given state). The kind of knowledge that we need to overtake a given situation is not given beforehand, but must be reached, synthesised and designed, for us to offer new alternatives. Furthermore, to overtake this situation, we need a kind of knowledge of a particular nature: a cognitive knowledge as much as a practical one. It involves a sort of knowledge that would entail an expansion of the world, breaking through to discover new alternatives, which implies two meanings: (1) a cognitive dimension (addressing what is new) and (2) a practical meaning (offering feasible answers to complex problems). Then, the research design is embracing these two aims: an epistemic utility along with the practical applications. Consequently, the research design involves a concept of ‘rationality of action’ and ‘rationality of agents’.

An effective practice and, generally speaking, the effective improvement of an educational system is a matter of ‘action’. The nature of this kind of action is compounded by three dimensions: (1) What is the best alternative? (Epistemological level); (2) What is the best line of action? (Procedural level); and (3) What do the results show? (Evaluative level). Bearing this in mind, when it comes to considering the concept of rationality of action and rationality of agents, the distinction made by Rescher (1988, 1999) is fruitful. Following Kantian tradition, Rescher points out three main contexts of choice: (1) the choice related with beliefs, which addresses the acceptance, or not, of a particular thesis; (2) the choice regarding action, which has to be connected with actions to be done; and (3) the choice concerning evaluation, which leads to values and preferences. Accordingly, these different contexts for choice mirror the following domains of rationality: (1) epistemological or cognitive rationality, which addresses knowledge that is to be considered; (2) practical rationality, which refers to the sort of action to be performed; and (3) evaluative rationality, which assesses preferences. In this way, involving the three domains of the rationality of action, there would be no division between theory and practice, insofar as the three dimensions of action are taken into consideration with a rational character: there is a rational discussion about criteria for ends and aims in education; there is a rational discussion about criteria for the best means to achieve the aims; and there is a rational evaluation (according to rational criteria) of aims, means and results. Then, these three rational levels would allow the design to commit with the three dimensions of action, namely: (1) the best alternative (to achieve innovation); (2) the best means to achieve the aims (looking for efficiency and effectiveness); and (3) the best results (evaluation with educational, effective and innovation criteria). Within this scope, in the decision-making process, or what is essentially the same, in the process of design, we incorporate three rational domains: (1) the rationality of the aims, i.e. rational discussion about ends and aims; (2) the procedural rationality, i.e. rational discussion about the best means to achieve the aims; and (3) the evaluative rationality, i.e. rational evaluation of aims, means and results.

If, from this perspective, we turn again to the contemporary methodological perspective, which we have already analysed in the previous sections, we see that, when it comes to research, they embrace either an instrumental/technical rationality (i.e. it looks for the effects of aims given beforehand), or a substantive rationality (the line of action emanates from given contexts) or an intuitive rationality (leading to a war of interpretations). Therefore, those methodological approaches lack an adequate model to bring together the three dimensions required for ‘action’, namely: (1) the best educational alternative, (2) the best line of action and (3) evaluation of results according to the best alternative.

When it comes to the ‘teacher’, we can see that, consciously or not, ‘action’ (as per teacher’s action) is tantamount to ‘practice’. In those methodological perspectives, the realm for teachers is a ‘practical activity’, where ‘practice’ is understood as a situational, concrete and individual intervention in a given context. As long as ‘action’ equals ‘practice’, teachers (generally speaking, practitioners) are not able to ‘think’ (based on rational criteria) about ‘action’, namely: (1) What is the best alternative? (2) What is the best line of action? (3) What do the results show? Properly speaking, teachers do not ‘think’ on ‘action’ but on ‘practice’ (i.e. situational–contextual, concrete and individual intervention).

When it comes to ‘collaborations’ and ‘partnerships’, we clearly see that teacher’s cognitive dimension is exclusively focused on a ‘practical–procedural’ level. Only research involves rationality (a particular concept of rationality); only researchers are able to ‘think’ on action (on a particular concept of action). Therefore, both practice and practitioners play a restrictive role in the educational system. Accordingly, research and researchers play a governing role. The leading role is still on the side of researchers. Thus, collaboration is not balanced. Partnership seems to be conceived in an instrumental way. That is an important shortcoming when it comes to teachers’ practice and effectiveness and, generally speaking, to the implementation of the educational system.

We must keep in mind clear-cut evidence: there is a worldwide consensus on one basic element, which is the role that teachers play in the implementation of an educational system is essential; the strength of the system relies on the quality of the teachers. Therefore, reinforcing the quality and the role that the teacher plays in the educational system is essential. As we have shown, contemporary methodological perspectives offer restrictive grounds to teachers’ practice. Accordingly, the perspective of the science of the design along with the rationality of action proposes a more adequate methodological framework to reinforce the quality and the role teachers plays in educational systems. In my view, this new perspective consequently leads to think and shape collaborations and partnerships in a different, more useful way.

Conclusion

This paper aimed to investigate prevalent researchers’ practice, from a scientific and methodological point of view, when they are to investigate teachers’ practice. The paper has shown, first, that in contemporary perspectives in educational research on teachers’ practice, there is a neat and clear-cut continuity with traditional methodological perspectives, which, in turn, were in decline long ago, and long ago overruled in the realm of philosophy and methodology of science. Second, that contemporary methodological perspectives in educational research fail to provide a consistent methodological model for ‘effective practices’ and, in a broader sense, for teachers’ practice. Finally, this paper proposes that the perspective of the science of the design along with the rationality of action offers a more adequate methodological framework to reinforce the role teachers play in educational systems.