Governing International Schools: Polarities,Networks and Actors in Governance Systems

Theorising international school governance

As a means of theorising international school governance, we drew on Actor Network Theory (ANT) to map the interactions between actors and polarities within governance networks. ANT is a theoretical and methodological approach that examines the interconnectedness of human and non-human actors within networks. Central to ANT is that human and non-human entities (people, objects, ideas, technologies) can be actors in a network and are treated with equal importance within analysis. This is achieved by ‘decentering’ the human to understand how networks are influenced by material, metaphysical and human actors (see Hay, 2024; Unsworth, 2023).

This focus on the material and the semiotic emphasises how networks are dynamic, with complex and interconnected relationships with and between actors. ANT provides a language to describe the often ‘precarious’ networks that require significant work, effort and resources to sustain as well as to describe the linkages between actors (see Fenwick and Edwards, 2012). ANT therefore highlights how networks are formed of assemblies or gatherings of ‘myriad things that order and govern educational practices’ (Fenwick and Edwards, 2012: iv), and can illuminate how networks may be disassembled as well as assembled, and how alternative networks can form and develop.

We argue that ANT can mediate exploration of contrasting macro and micro scale polarities and (often) competing actors within international school governance networks. We drew on Annelies Kamp’s 2017 work, which used ANT to explore systems leadership in education. Kamp (2017: 778) argues that the interplay between human and non-human actors reveals a ‘sociology of associations’ that has implications for school leadership and governance. We suggest that as much as these associations are between actors, they are also between competing and contrasting polarities (that are also actors). Kamp (2017: 780) contends that the strength of ANT is that:

‘[I]n the process of making clear how very heterogeneous actants [where actant is used interchangeably with actor] – furniture, human beings, policy texts, buildings, electoral cycles, a visit by Ofsted [the Office for Standards in Education, Children's Services and Skills, which inspects services providing education and skills for learners of all ages in England], electronic devices, memories, medical diagnoses, architecture, plants, intentions and so forth – are assembled, the potential for them to be assembled anew, with new effect, is also made clear.’

As Kamp (2017: 780) continues, a key point here is how actors can work as ‘intermediaries or mediators’ with significant influence upon a network. For example, power might be devolved from central government to the local level, but accountability processes imposed by the centre interfere with local level networks (see Kamp: 783). Fox (2000) explores the interrelationship between ANT and Foucault’s work on power relations.

Kamp’s work is particularly useful in framing the use of ANT in the international school governance space in two ways. First, it highlights how models for ‘good’ governance (we prefer the term ‘mature’; see Clapham, 2024), can often act as polarities themselves: on one hand, offering a framework upon which GBs can operate, and on the other, being ‘hopelessly oppressive’ (Kamp, 2017: 784). Second, it highlights how non-human actors – for example authority and advisory actors – can (potentially simultaneously) work towards the goals of strategic leadership or thwart them (see MacBeath, 2008).

As we discuss in the next sections, ANT has been useful in highlighting the polarities (and the push-pulls acting on them) in international school governance networks. Doing so enables us to develop a framework for supporting schools to balance these polarities and to understand the interaction between actors within these networks. In the following section, we discuss the methodology and analytical frameworks we employed, and the five governance networks polarities we thus identified.

Local-global

The local-global polarity reflected the nuances of ‘being’ an international school as well as the interactions between the actors in these networks. This polarity emerged from the participants’ understanding that international schools, and their actors and networks, are simultaneously global and local. They are local in that they are legally constituted in their host country. Sometimes, as Blake noted, this is because the host country establishes one or more formal categories for such organisations within its educational ecosystem, or sometimes because international schools are essentially a variant of a private school in that jurisdiction. Governance of such a school in the local context involves compliance with laws and regulations, which Dante recognised as the ‘first and foremost’ governance responsibility and a necessary precondition of a school’s continued licensure. As he put it, schools must ‘play nice’ with local government.

However, Blake also saw within this the possibility of peril, as actors such as national politics in some jurisdictions can provide a ‘minefield’ for governance networks; an example of how strategic leadership can be thwarted that MacBeath (2008) describes. The upshot of this is that local policy actors can create uncertainty and, in some cases, result in a dissonance of values. Such difficulties can threaten enrolment, meaning that, as Charu saw it, there was an imperative for international school governors to understand the local context. Blake used the metaphor of ‘navigating’ to articulate the role of school-level governance in interacting with the local political environment; Adam expressed similar sentiments in reflecting on the way in which schools must respond to the political philosophies of their locations (Lindle, 2018; Wilkins et al, 2019).

For the participants, however, to ‘navigate’ the local does not mean to accede to it in every respect. There was a sense that some level of regulatory freedom may be a specific boon of being an international school in some cases, and that such schools had the opportunity, as Charu noted, to transcend and exceed local requirements – especially if the school did not think of such requirements as representing a high standard of governance practice. On the other hand, a school distinguishing itself from its local environment is necessarily an exercise in political savvy: it requires that some things remain unwritten lest, as Charu saw it, it be seen otherwise to amount to a critique of local context, which it would be unwise to codify.

As a school’s positioning between global and local is a site of polarity, so too is representation among the participants of local-global governance. Dante noted that some international schools have written into their constitutional documents (such as articles of association) a requirement for representation by certain local groups, as an attempt to codify the ‘international’ component of the school’s identity in that school’s distinctive context. However, if these national groups are expatriate groups within the host country context, in privileging their representation on a governing body the school may be at risk of generating a disconnect between itself and the cultural composition of the host country. As Dante put it:

‘trying to offer a cellophane experience of schooling, where you’ve created a bubble and we are immune to what’s happening around us. You’re not’.

Similarly, Blake perceives the ‘danger’ of the international school becoming an ‘island’ if its board does not represent the local population (reflecting Allen’s (2002) description of international schools as ‘atolls’ in the ‘seas of culture’). Blake sees that local representation may help to ‘ground’ a board in its local environment and yield potential networks with actors who possess cultural capital in the host country. This was an opportunity also seen by Adam, who feels that such local representatives were the ones who were ‘engaged with what was going on’ in the host country. However, local representation (which may involve greater ethnic and cultural homogeneity than is evident in the wider school community) may in turn yield an ethnic disconnection between the board and other elements of the community. In these respects, ‘international’ school governing bodies, just like the schools they serve, are poised between the international and the local. This leads Dante to wonder whether international schools in some jurisdictions are ‘really now local schools’; especially since, as Adam points out, international schools are increasingly serving families who are host country nationals (see ISC Research, 2023).

Considering the different constituents, expatriate and local, that may be served by international schools, divergent perspectives exist with respect to what obligations an international school may owe to students’ future lives. Adam highlights the experience of some students who may feel dislocated from what they perceive to be their ‘home’ country if they have attended an international school elsewhere. As a result, international schools may be obligated to help students to prepare to return ‘home’ to the specific cultural and linguistic context in question. Contrastingly, Charu saw the obligations of schools as being more location-agnostic, aspiring to a more generic concept of ‘global citizenship’. In a sense, both perspectives may generate tensions in the context of governing an international school.

The local and global polarity also plays out in a school’s connection to broader policy networks. International schools are influenced by cross-national policy borrowing (Ball, 2012) as well as by local policy actors. All participants identify a repertoire of ‘good governance’ practice, such as agendas, minutes, a subcommittee structure, reports, annual budgeting, designated leads for certain risk management issues, as being shared across different schools and school systems. For example, Dante identifies accreditation bodies as playing a role in spreading and encouraging the repertoire across the sector internationally, especially by insisting that governance practices at each school are properly codified so that they can then be scrutinised. However, the positioning of the school is often a liminal one, as the repertoire of internationally shared practice encounters specific cultural backdrops in each host country. In Dante’s view, accrediting bodies recognise that they cannot change ‘deeply rooted civilizational cultural frames of reference’, but at the same time seek to ‘navigate’ the ‘micro politics’ of such situations to find practicable means of addressing the polarity.

The balance between local and global polarities and actors significantly impacts the governance of international schools. Governance networks must simultaneously navigate the demands of actors such as local cultural elements and compliance with local regulations, while maintaining globally recognised educational standards and practices. Decision-making processes often involve diverse stakeholders, including local families, international students, and regulatory bodies, which can both complicate governance and also enrich it. Additionally, these governance networks must address the challenges of cultural sensitivity and language. The demands of these multiple actors require governance networks that are adaptable and inclusive, leading to strategic leadership that reflects both local community needs and global educational goals.

Mission-money

Much like local-global actors, the mission-money polarity highlighted the unique nature of international school networks. Unlike state-funded (not-for-profit) schools, or indeed, for-profit local level schools, the mission-money polarity was a high-stakes actor within international school networks. The interactions between mission-money actors played out across the network, with accountability being a particularly high-profile example. The participants saw governance as a means of accountability as much as strategic leadership. Charu saw this as a matter of governors needing to ensure that the school is ‘delivering on what they’ve promised their customers: their parents and their students’; Adam expresses a similar sentiment in positioning the governors as verifying ‘whether it’s delivering in terms of . . . what the school is marketing itself as and promising to be’.

As needed, governors challenge the school – especially the leadership, whom, as Adam points out, they often are responsible for appointing. Dante holds that the governors are there to ensure that a school ‘performs’. They may even take this performance personally, especially in a proprietary model. Adam recounts how one school proprietor showed high levels of personal disappointment that no students in a particular graduating class received admission to the universities of Oxford or Cambridge.

What this means is that the indicators used to define and judge performance are not only high-stakes but also highly contentious. For the participants, accountability as an actor highlights how different philosophies and practices around mature governance interact. As all the participants point out, there is no agreed definition of an international school, therefore no consistent definition of international school governance, and therefore no single best model for it. What may allow for some commonality in the definition of performance is, as Adam articulates, that governors are working to ensure alignment with a school mission. Dante expresses similar sentiments in describing governors as the ‘custodians’ of those guiding statements:

‘I see [the role of governors] as being North Star setting. It’s the school board that sets the direction, and therefore those charged with executing on that – the educational leaders, the CEO, the teachers, the programming, the extracurriculars – however that’s accomplished, have to serve that cause.’

Similarly for Blake, the guiding statements are significant actors in that they ‘drive everything’, as well as reflecting ‘what . . . international education is about’, such as the ‘international’ ideas of peace and diversity.

However, participants also recognised that the way school performance should be judged needs to be set against corporate imperatives as well as moral and ethical considerations. In Dante’s view, the ‘tensions’ between the school’s educational and social mission and the question of what resources should be made available to serve it needs to be ‘talked out’ in governance discussions. Blake recognises that this tension creates a need for ‘balance’. As increasing competition and the commodification and ‘mass production’ of education – for instance through franchising (Bunnell, 2008) – place corporate pressures on governors, both Dante and Blake recognise that the sustainability of the entire international school sector is at stake. The tension between actors in this polarity reflects other work looking at school governance; for example, the push-pulls between governing bodies and regulatory actors such as Ofsted (see Clapham, 2024). In these examples, on the one hand governing bodies must be engaged in the school’s mission and educational outcomes, while at the same time remaining pragmatic to help manage the school’s performance against regulatory actors.

This polarity also relates to the increasing prevalence of for-profit international schools within the sector (Bunnell, Fertig and James, 2016; ISC Research, 2023). Adam points out that some schools that are ostensibly not-for-profit may be part of the for-profit phenomenon, based on ‘great ways of channelling the funds in and out’. Participants see ‘good governance’ in the for-profit context as being a corporate asset. Charu notes that investors in for-profit schools want good governance because it makes for ‘stable schooling’ and is the subject of much ‘due diligence’ prior to an investment being made. Equally, investors are themselves actors with influence on the governance process itself. Charu is clear that they have a ‘big voice’ around the boardroom table, on which they invariably sit, which adds ‘complexity’. They may bring professionalism, according to Blake, and they may (by choice) adopt the above-mentioned repertoire of good governance (per Charu’s experiences of governance in the for-profit context). Equally, where values dissonance occurs between the corporate and educational actors, this becomes the basis for obvious problematisation:

‘We used to notice when we were working with [networks of international schools], the most problematic schools to deal with and also the schools where there were the greatest challenges for teachers, and the biggest turnover of kids, often were the proprietary for-profit schools (Adam).’

In such schools, governance tends to involve an ‘internal’ approach whereby governing body members are close to the corporate entity, thus leading to these actors exerting a powerful sway on the entire network.

The mission-money polarity exemplifies how international school governance must balance the moral and ethical demands of its educational mission with financial sustainability. This means that a host of actors are in play, actors that are simultaneously push-pulling the school's mission with its financial goals. Of course, there is a vested interest between these actors as the educational excellence (real or otherwise) provided by international schools is imperative to maintain if financial viability is also to be maintained. The intersection between actors within the mission-money polarity therefore requires governors to have a particularly sophisticated set of capabilities; a clear understanding of what constitutes ‘good’ education, as well as what makes a viable business.

Anchor-agility

Unlike the previous two examples, the anchor-agility polarity was less obviously unique to the international school context. Mature governing bodies (in the private, public, third sector alike) must offer both safe and considered strategic leadership, whilst also being agile and risk-taking when necessary (Pennacchia et al, 2025). Nonetheless, participants described examples of the way governance as an anchor (actors such as articles of association; governance reviews; succession planning) and agile governance (being proactive to events; changing investment strategies; risk taking) played out in international schools.

Blake saw mature international school GBs as an anchor providing stability. They were ‘custodians’ and a ‘safe pair of hands’, tasked with maintaining the school amid external, and sometimes internal, pressures. Charu agreed by describing how external actors may create regulatory changes, meaning GBs must provide anchorage against these changes (thus ensuring the school is acting lawfully). For Blake, meanwhile, anchored governance was able to resist the vested interests of actors; he gave the example of parent stakeholders who want to ‘get into management’ and advocate something that is of specific benefit to their child. In such circumstances, governance can provide a ‘check and balance’, weighing the subjective interests of the individual stakeholder against the ‘objective’ interests of the school’s network.

However, participants also saw agility as an important characteristic of international school governance. Charu gave the example of the recruitment crises generated by global teacher shortages, and Blake described the growing prevalence and impact of digital technology (particularly AI). Evident in all the participants’ comments was the view that the ‘safe pair of hands’ of anchored governance could easily become myopic, staid and anything but agile.

What was clear from their comments was that it is highly problematic when governing bodies cannot offer future-focused and strategic leadership because they are too large (as Blake observed) or because they have become subject to stasis through a lack of new members (as cited by Adam). Adam also notes that some governing bodies may appear to have more breadth in capabilities and expertise than they have in practice. For Dante, it may be a point of tension that some forms of innovation – for instance, embracing the educational possibilities of artificial intelligence – generate challenges to compliance and regulation. Navigating this polarity is, for Dante, about governing bodies:

‘recognising that they might have a compliance responsibility but equally recognizing that they have a responsibility towards creativity and adaptability, and those two things not necessarily being straightforward and having to be held in suspension.’

A paradox is created in which governance must act both to ensure readiness for change while also ensuring that things stay broadly the same. In navigating this, governance is managing risk either way. Blake recognised that governing bodies are increasingly called upon to manage a growing number of crises (as also identified in Gross, 2024). In doing so GBs may be accountable for making institutional changes following review of a school’s practices, and simultaneously accountable for making sure that practices are strong in the first place, and therefore enduring and unchanging.

International school governance therefore must balance the need for strategic leadership with the ability to remain agile. Governing bodies must establish clear, long-term vision and strategic plans that guide the school's direction and priorities, while maintaining governance structures flexible enough to respond to changing circumstances. Failing to do so means that international schools become staid, rear-view, unresponsive and unadaptable to the dynamic educational landscape. As Charu maintained, whether it is because a governing body fails to anchor the school, or because it fails to shift values fast or far enough, when ‘governance goes wrong it goes wrong big’ (Charu).

Stakeholder-capability

The stakeholder-capability polarity, and tension between actors in it, is prevalent across governing bodies of international schools or other forms of school (see Ranson, 2012b; Wilkins, 2015, 2016; Wilkins et al, 2019). Community-based school governance involving a wide range of stakeholders can increase transparency and accountability in decision-making processes. Similarly, the inclusion of diverse perspectives leads to more comprehensive and inclusive decisions. The counter argument, however, is that the capacity and expertise of stakeholders involved in governance may be limited.

In the specific context of international schools, parent-governed schools are considered as following a traditional model (see Bunnell and Gardner-McTaggart, 2024) of communitarian governance (Ranson, 2012b). Here, stakeholders from the school community hold an authority over what happens at the school; usually via election to several specified board positions. Blake and Adam both judge this mechanism to be intended to ensure ‘equal representation’ of some sort. As the New Public Management paradigm has shifted state-sector schools in western countries to a more professionalised, capabilities-based model (see, for instance, Ranson, 2012b; Wilkins, 2015; Wilkins, 2016), so the international school sector has seen similar changes (as referred to by both Adam and Blake).

For Adam, in the international school context this trend is linked less to changes applicable at the level of individual schools, and more to the opening of brand new schools, which has shifted the centre of gravity across the sector. Corporate groups, venture capital, and proprietorships have driven enormous sector-wide growth. Opening in large numbers across the world and especially in Asia (Hayden, 2011; ISC Research, 2023), Adam viewed such schools as disproportionately likely to bring with them non-stakeholder governance models. Where stakeholder models exist, they require ‘investment’, as Charu terms it, to ensure that the boundaries between governance and management are observed; a new and expanding industry of board training providers having arisen to satisfy this need.

Though some level of crossover between governance and management may be inevitable in some areas (for instance, Dante noted that the management of financial resources may stem from the fiduciary responsibilities governing bodies may hold), in most other areas a credo of separation exists to guard against board members straying into operational matters (Gerrard and Savage, 2022). Adam sees a danger that GB members with individual agendas may crowd out the wider needs of the organisation. Though structure and policy may aid in preserving the relevant role distinctions, Charu avers that it may be group culture and the enforcement of behavioural expectations on the individual level that ultimately ensures the separation of management from governance. Where vested interests exist, there are risks that such behaviours will become problematic, for instance in relation to confidentiality (as cited by Dante) or administrative overstepping (per Adam).

Some new developments or reforms are a ‘nightmare’ to ‘get past’ stakeholders, according to Blake. A long-standing concern about governing bodies that lack maturity is that, when members are also beneficiaries of the school’s practices in the present, they have little or no incentive to plan or contemplate the school undergoing (potentially difficult) transitions from which they might not benefit in the future. Blake’s reflections included an experience of working with a group of schools to advance a particular innovation:

‘Trying to get [it] all through their individual [governing bodies], because you had all the stakeholders, it was a nightmare . . . that word, “tension”, I think it happens a lot more when you’ve got that stakeholder model’

Despite the challenges, Adam saw stakeholder representation as ‘critical’ in governance networks (see also Ranson, 2012a, 2012b; Gerrard and Savage, 2022). In contrast, Blake felt that where stakeholders are absent from the boardroom, there can be greater independence, consistency, and diversity, helping a board to rise to increasing expectations – especially those expectations that ramp up corporate liability. Simultaneously, Charu argued that capabilities-based appointments should be subject to some level of deference to educational voices around the table. Not to do so fails to recognise that schools must be strategically led differently from organisations in other industries. School leaders can, according to Blake, ‘convince’ appointed members of their perspective and, with the political cover that comes from having board backing, can enact changes that would otherwise not pass muster with stakeholders. As a result, a segregation of expertise arises in which educational matters can readily be left to the executive, being the professional educators who, Blake reported, will often be the actual authors of the school’s educational strategy. In contrast, corporate and organisational governance is the preserve of a group of skilled and ‘dispassionate’ (again Blake’s description) expert governors.

The stakeholder-capability polarity therefore highlights this segregation between actors. This phenomenon is illustrated by Adam’s experience of a proprietary international school in which the board was designed to appear to represent the community’s needs. However, in practice it was operating in a network with a high level of centralised control:

‘When you look at the people on that board, they are appointed. There’s really only three people pulling the strings. The rest of them are nominally on the board, but they’re all people with big financial interests and so on . . . the board ostensibly has about twelve people on it, but there’s really three of them running the show.’

Having a wide range of stakeholders on international school GBs offers several advantages. Diverse perspectives can lead to more comprehensive and inclusive decision-making, enhanced transparency and accountability, and stronger community ties. However, this community-based model can also present challenges. There is the possibility of resource disparities, representation issues, difficulties in establishing clear accountability, and limited expertise and capabilities of stakeholders in managing school operations.

Authority-advisory

The last of our five polarities is concerned with governance as an authority-advisory actor. When acting as an authority actor, GBs must enforce rules, make binding decisions, hold the executive to account and set the strategic direction of the school without micromanaging day-to-day operations. In contrast when acting in an advisory capacity, GBs might provide input into the creation and revision of policies, give guidance on budget planning and school performance, and facilitate communications between the school and community. Once again, the way these actors interact is very much reliant on the type of school that is being governed.

In some ‘traditional’ stakeholder models of governing bodies, the members take on specific legal liabilities, for instance by becoming Directors of a limited liability company (Chuck, 2015). By virtue of them holding this level of legal responsibility, such governing bodies have – as Blake commented – been the holders of the final decision on key issues. For example, such governing bodies have been required to entertain escalations of issues beyond the head of school where s/he has not been able to resolve them. Charu was clear that with increasing levels of risk, and concomitant increased expectations placed on governors, international school governors who hold this level of responsibility bear a weighty burden. Similarly, Adam noted that GBs might well be responsible for the oversight of considerable level of financial resourcing, such as where the school is engaging in significant capital expenditure on campus development.

Even in the context of this more ‘traditional’ type of board, however, authority is sometimes opaque – particularly insofar as the roles of the board are or are not delineated from those of the Head of School. In this case, the Head can ‘work out how to navigate the board’ (Blake), with the effect that a strong relationship with the board allows him/her to ‘get things done’. Particularly in national settings, certain practices that are part of mature governance can, as Blake observed, help to mute disagreement and allow the passage of ideas to the point of ratification. For Blake, Heads acting with sufficient stratagem can ‘plant’ strategic ideas that emerge in discussion with the board selectively into the school’s strategic work in service of his/her intentions. Similarly, Charu noted an emerging trend in which more junior leaders (for instance, Heads of Department) being groomed for senior roles are exposed to governance contexts as part of their professional development, presumably to learn early how one can ‘navigate the board’ as part of such a role.

Notably, this polarity is also found in the ‘complexity’ of the ‘dual governance’ setting created by the corporate group (Charu notes this), which may often designate advisory bodies at the school level as an alternative to a school-specific board possessing legal trusteeship. Charu also reports that, in for-profit groups in particular, it is common for members to be ‘appointed’ rather than elected. The role of an advisory board is in keeping with the conceptualisation of governance as a source of accountability. As such, advisory board members therefore ‘have a say’ (again as noted by Charu) through receiving presentations on various forms of data (for instance, academic attainment) and helping to question in the spirit of ‘high challenge, high support’. However, in a for-profit context members of an advisory board may well not make decisions about financial matters. In fact, in Charu’s experience members of such a board do not view the organisation’s financial information at all. These GBs are not there to govern the corporate aspects of the organisation but rather are an extension of a central (corporate) authority’s interests in increasing the educational attainment outcomes (and thereby, the customer satisfaction and likelihood of future profitability) in each of its sites.

The dual role of governing bodies as both an authoritative and advisory actor presents several challenges. Firstly, maintaining objectivity can be difficult. Governing bodies must hold the Head accountable for school performance, while also providing supportive advice which can lead to conflicts of interest (especially if governing body members have personal ties to the school). Secondly, balancing power dynamics is crucial. Governing bodies need to assert their authority without undermining the Head’s leadership. Thirdly, ensuring effective collaboration can be challenging, as GBs must foster a cooperative environment while making potentially unpopular decisions. Linked to this is that successfully navigating policy and compliance actors requires governors to stay informed and up-to-date with educational regulations, which can be time-consuming and complex. Lastly, recruiting and training governors with the right capabilities and knowledge to undertake these activities is essential but often difficult.

Towards a model of governance network polarities

The five polarities we have identified are of course broad categories. For example, the authority-advisory polarity is a highly complex governance network with many actors at play (for example statutory regulations and non-statutory guidance; relationships between the Head, chair of governors and the clerk or governance professional). What our work also suggests is that, whilst some aspects of these polarities may be unique to international school governance networks, others are applicable to both international and non-international schools. Again, using the authority-advisory polarity as an example, there is work that similarly examines how governors of state-funded schools in England are simultaneously advisory and authoritative actors (see Wilkins, 2015; 2016).

Findings like this are in many ways what we set out to explore. Put simply, school governance – of international schools or otherwise – is a comparatively under-researched phenomenon. If we put aside the importance of governance as offering strategic leadership of organisations that have a fundamental effect on young people’s lives, there is also the money factor. The schools’ budget in England for 2024-2025 was around £64,000,000,000 – that is just for England (not the United Kingdom), and just for schools. The strategic leadership and accountability frameworks for this significant amount of public funding is undertaken by volunteer governors often with little or no experience of governance. However, the United Kingdom’s Department for Education is not even sure how many governors there actually are in these schools.

As we have already highlighted, there is a similar lack of research exploring international school governance networks. If we again focus in on money (and conservatively estimate, based on our experience, an average international school tuition fee of £10,000 per annum, for 7 million students, thus giving a sector with income of £70,000,000,000), the lack of understanding around the governance of how these fees are spent is problematic. It is hardly surprising that this lack of research also means a lack of consensus as to the most mature models of governance for these schools. The five polarities we have discussed here go some way to offering some ‘guardrails’ within which research exploring school governance networks can take place. In doing so, the highly complex actions, interactions and reactions of the wide array of actors within these networks can become less opaque than they presently appear to be.