“Boots on the ground” state-building: Using Action Research to improve local governance in Afghanistan

Abstract

This paper explains how the authors applied Action Research during Operation Enduring Freedom in the course of U.S. Department of Defense operations intended to improve local governance in Afghanistan. Serving as civilian field researchers in 2011–2012, we were tasked, in part, with observing how informal custom and authority interacted with the functioning of local government. Assisted greatly by Action Research’s participatory nature, we were able to systematically develop a crucial relationship with an influential government official in a rural area. The partnership that resulted ultimately led to the implementation of planning procedures that were well suited to meet the needs of the district and more transparent to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and entities working with the U.S. Department of Defense. We argue that adopting and training for Action Research would increase the probability of success for current and future “non-lethal” U.S. Department of Defense activities.

Keywords

Afghanistan military operations political development state-building local governance

Introduction

Action Research (AR) is a participatory methodology well suited to helping researchers engage with stakeholders in the process of finding systematic solutions to immediate problems.¹ As such, AR has applicability in modern “counterinsurgency” (COIN) warfare, where military efforts are often geared toward “non-kinetic” activities designed to protect non-combatants and promote political development, in addition to “kinetic” activities designed to physically attack an enemy (see U.S. Department of the Army, 2006). Among other things, personnel operating day-to-day on COIN missions must “actively engage the ‘human terrain’ in their communities, with a special focus on ‘traditional authority’” (Murtazashvili, 2016). Broadly speaking, this was the task given to the authors while working in southern Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom from 2011 to 2012. Partnering with a District Governor (DG), we used AR to (1) help the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) understand how local government functioned in the context of customary authority, and (2) work with the DG to improve local governance.

In an environment where informal order is the norm, the authors worked closely with the DG for almost a full year, observing him implement the laws and policies of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) across multiple villages in his jurisdiction. Among other things, we learned that much of the DG’s authority came because he was a well-respected religious leader intimately aware of the preexisting informal order and how it functioned. Indeed, he was a part of the fabric of that order, familiar to most rural Afghans. Because he knew the intricacies of custom, he could leverage his informal religious role to govern according to GIRoA’s formal rules and structure. Actively helping him realize and strengthen his formal governing capacity, our partnership benefited the DoD. We also helped the DG more fully understand and perform in a formal political leadership role, thereby enhancing his capacity as an agent of the state and contributing to district stability.

This article builds on the first published evidence of AR used in a long-term military operation; Hardy and Rodman (2016) explain how Hardy used it to sustain relations between transitioning units and Afghan local security leadership. The next section describes the broader cultural and policy context in which we worked, at a time when the DoD was using a “good governance” approach to COIN that directs attention to improving the political, economic, and social conditions of locals.² We address the military doctrine and operations literature, explain AR’s applicability in COIN, and then we describe structural features of the government we were trying to develop. We then move to a series of narratives demonstrating our work and conclude with reflections on our work.

Culture and COIN, COIN, and AR

Since the Taliban were removed from power in late 2001, state-building efforts in Afghanistan led mostly by the DoD have been perilous, resource-intensive, and riddled with setbacks. Some setbacks resulted from policy-makers not adequately accounting for the significance of custom, culture, and local governance, which historically were the main sources of stability throughout much of the country. Known as “customary disregard,” this mistake has been made repeatedly since the middle of the 19th century, as those orchestrating state-building efforts “either attempted to eliminate customary organizations or simply disregarded them in their quest to consolidate political power” (Murtazashvili, 2016, p. 35). Without a strong centralized state, Afghanistan’s stability developed out of a localized version of “rule of law” drawing power from informal mechanisms and not a formal consolidated state as typically understood by Euro-American academics, military forces, and political leaders (Murtazashvili, 2016). At the village level, respected religious leaders known as mullahs represent their village and make decisions during community disputes. Shuras are village council meetings where tribal elders and designated representatives deliberate about a range of local issues.³

An awareness of customary governance and culture became increasingly important, as the DoD invested heavily into the good governance approach.⁴ Acknowledging that kinetic activity alone would not bring stability in this type of conflict, the 2006 publication of U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3–24 directed land-force commanders to use “full-spectrum operations to disrupt or destroy insurgent military capabilities” (U.S. Department of the Army, 2006, p. 61). The FM departs from conventional warfighting doctrine because it puts “political action at the forefront of counterinsurgency and subordinates military operations—particularly offensive operations—to the establishment of functioning legitimate government” (Vizzard & Capron, 2010). Along with offensive and defensive operations, FM 3–24 identifies another category, “stability operations,” to “thwart insurgent efforts to control or disrupt people’s lives or routine activities” (U.S. Department of the Army, 2006, p. 61).⁵ Likewise, issued on September 16, DoD Instruction 3000.05 (2009), “Stability Operations,” explicitly gave U.S. forces the responsibility for “establishing civil security and civil control” and “strengthening governance and the rule of law.”

COIN is not conventional warfare. There is still much lethal violence, but COIN requires military units to perform many non-lethal tasks in addition to those designed to locate and kill enemy combatants. The modern fight is different, if only because commanders now must figure out ways to train for and conduct missions that help improve local government. Options are available to planners, but regardless of the approach, COIN success is “predicated upon an intimate understanding of human behavior as well as the social, economic, and political forces” at the root of the insurgency (Clemis, 2009). Social science research methods such as AR can help military units achieve such an understanding.

AR is a systematic way to solve problems, not just with “best practices” but by merging theory and practice (Lewin, 1946). It is “a participatory, democratic process concerned with developing practical knowledge” that “seeks to bring together action and reflection, theory and practice, in participation with others” (Reason & Bradbury, 2001). AR’s features may seem at odds with the traditional hierarchical and rigid chain-of-command, where participation and diversity of thought in decision-making processes are often discouraged, but recent conflicts have demonstrated “the need for rapid change in tactics, techniques, and procedures and our overall approach to campaigning” (Paparone & Reed, 2008). COIN campaigns are tricky for the United States in part because its military’s commanders are generally “trained to attack; they are raised to believe that doing something is always better than doing nothing” (Vizzard & Capron, 2010, p. 486). This is problematic, as COIN requires a slow and deliberate approach to warfighting. That is precisely why current doctrine has built-in flexibility encouraging commanders to “overcome their own training and assumptions in order to win” (McBride & Wibben, 2012). AR can help commanders exercise some of that flexibility while working at the pace required for stability operations.

AR in modern warfare

AR is referenced infrequently in military doctrine and operations literature.⁶ Apart from Hardy and Rodman’s article, no other citations describing AR’s use during military operations is known to the authors. However, in an explanation for how military professionals learn the craft and pass on knowledge to others, Paparone and Reed suggest AR as “an effective professional military methodology,” viewing the “full-spectrum” approach to COIN as “a corollary to solving complex social problems” (Paparone & Reed, 2008). They discuss AR as it relates to “accommodative knowledge” in Kolb’s (1984) theory of learning, emerging when professionals “begin to extend more intuitive kinds of knowledge into forms that entertain new assumptions and beliefs on a broader scale” (Paparone & Reed, 2008).

In their description of AR used in a long-term military operation, Hardy and Rodman describe a four-step repetitive cycle; once a problem has been identified, the cycle of planning, acting, observing, and reflecting can begin (Hardy & Rodman, 2016). AR is similar to Boyd’s OODA (observe, orient, decide, act) loop, a popular theory of fast-paced decision-making in combat familiar to the military community (Boyd, 1976). Instead of being used to make decisions quickly, AR deliberately focuses on social interactions over time, which is key for bringing about the desired effect because the very process of interacting “acts primarily as a problem-solving tool for informing a decision-making process” (Hardy & Rodman, 2016, p. 90). The cycle proceeds as follows: (1) Planning: Practitioners identify a problem and its scope, gather background data needed to formulate a proper course of action, and then a specified and desirable goal, or end-state, is developed. (2) Action: A preferred course of action is implemented. (3) Observation: A detailed account of reactions to or the consequences of the action are recorded. (4) Reflection: Practitioners reflect on observations and determine whether to continue with the original course of action if it is helping achieve the desired goal or make alterations if not (see Mertler, 2009). Depending on the complexity and scope of the problem, AR can involve one-on-one interactions between individuals or it can be used in larger scaled operations, and there is likely to be much variation in the length of time and number of iterations to be cycled through.

Hardy’s field work

Hardy and Rodman (2016) demonstrate that AR provides a systematic way to address “the problem of social continuity” (p. 89). Serving on a Human Terrain Team (HTT) as a combat advisor to military units, including Navy SEAL (SEa-Air-Land team) platoons and Army Civil Affairs (CA) teams, Hardy provided social science research capabilities to units in a “district stability platform” (DSP).⁷ DSPs are small bases set up in local communities where the U.S. military was conducting stability operations in partnership with Afghan security elements. Hardy’s position required him to develop relationships with “key leaders.”⁸ In this case, Hardy became the primary point of contact between the DoD and an Afghan Uniform Policy (AUP) lieutenant responsible for “the flow of supplies to nearly all local security forces” (Hardy & Rodman, 2016, p. 91). He soon realized that incoming units were ill-informed about the AUP lieutenant’s personal attributes, despite previous units’ multiple interactions with him during their deployments. Among other things, aspects of his personality, history and relations with the men he commanded, leadership style, and management skills, all had to be learned by new units coming into the area.

On Hardy’s guidance, AR was deployed to record of the numerous social interactions occurring between DoD personnel and local leaders. After a planning process with relevant DoD entities, members of the DSP acted according to the AR model and began recording their own interactions with the lieutenant as well as his interactions with other Afghan citizens and leaders. They observed previously overlooked details about the lieutenant, such as his preferred time of day to meet with DoD entities and GIRoA officials, changes in body posture when he felt threatened, tactics used to maintain superiority over those under his command, and his penchant for displaying his prominence in front of other officers. After some time spent observing his behaviors, and based on thoughtful reflection throughout several iterations and unsuccessful actions of the cycle, members of the DSP were able to formulate a “sophisticated understanding of the lieutenant’s self-perception and motivation” (Hardy & Rodman, 2016, p. 93). One thing learned was that the lieutenant had a craving for argument as well as respect for and desire to bond with others who were willing to engage him in “lively” debate. In fact, members of the DSP concluded:

… that their relationship with the lieutenant needed some measure of friendly conflict to be productive. In contrast, if the DSP members engaging with him were overly deferential and anxious to please, he would become less cooperative and more prone to anger. Eventually the DSP members found a balance between what they considered the substance, as opposed to the social displays, of their interactions with the lieutenant. (Hardy & Rodman, 2016, p. 94)

This knowledge was acquired through the systematic process of AR, which DSP members would use to create a smoother “handover” with others who would replace them later. The DSP members used AR to learn how to partner with a key leader, putting themselves in a better position to teach those that came after them how to do the same thing. AR can help incoming units benefit from “lessons learned” by other units and improve social continuity, but it can be applied to a wider range of problems faced in modern warfare.

Features of government and three AR narratives

The government’s structure and the DG

GIRoA is a federal system characterized by a strong presidency, with a high degree of bureaucratic centralization through local governments. The country is divided into subnational units of government known as provinces, each headed by a Provincial Governor (PG) appointed by the President, and provinces are split into districts, each headed by a DG also appointed by the President. This type of appointment system means all subnational governors serve at the local level as representatives of the Executive Branch. With little formal governing authority or autonomy to create and oversee the implementation of local policies, both PGs and DGs take direction from Kabul, with DGs held accountable for their actions by PGs.

Only the national government has official taxation power, as local governing officials “have essentially no formal authority to tax or make spending decisions. Those crucial decisions—the foundation of government activity—are made in Kabul” (Murtazashvili, 2016, p. 88). Any taxes generated locally are collected by appointed representatives called “line ministers” serving in various sectors of the government (agriculture, education, justice, water and energy, etc.) at the provincial and district level. In principle, once the line ministers have sent taxes to Kabul, and once the budget for the country has been created by GIRoA, revenues are to be sent back to provincial authorities to disperse funds to districts. Their powers vary, but by design line ministers and not DGs are ultimately responsible for implementing Kabul’s policies, as DGs generally have “almost no oversight authority over officials employed by other ministries working in their districts” (Murtazashvili, 2016, p. 91).⁹

Although GIRoA gives them formal roles, how does a DG provided with few financial resources, with little to no control over policy or staff, and whose duties are ambiguous to say the least, operate as an agent of the state? After all, they should be “the true face of the state in the countryside,” but in many rural areas, they are instead targets of insurgent activity and many “rarely visit their districts” (Murtazashvili, 2016, pp. 217–218). Understanding how the DG worked in his formal position requires recognizing how intricately religion is woven into the fabric of local custom and authority in Afghanistan. Political legitimacy necessitates religious legitimacy, and because the DG was a well-respected religious leader, he possessed an informal means of governing authority.

AR application 1: Given a mission to understand government and partner with the DG

Looking to improve governance in the district, Turner received a multi-faceted assignment to develop a relationship with the DG and assess local government. Part of the assignment involved inquiries into the inability of the national and local government to find qualified civilian and military personnel to fill what is known as the tashkil, or list of government workers, a widespread and well-known problem at that time. Identified as an ineffective leader, the DG did not appear to use his assigned district office, the residents of the district were not prone to accepting DoD assistance, and the DG seemed unable to fill civilian and security positions allotted to the district.¹⁰

Plan

Due to experiences in similar DoD-led operations, Turner knew the “worth” of key leaders is always assessed by coalition forces, and these assessments can be questionable in accuracy. Overly focused on a leader’s potential to be a threat and lacking consideration for the leader’s cultural responsibilities to constituents, internal assessments often create a myopia, with “good” people seeming like trustworthy allies and “bad” people seeming incompetent and antagonistic to the goal of coalition forces. With prior knowledge of the institutional constraints dogging DoD entities in these situations, Turner was skeptical of the profile he was given of the DG, which indicated a “less than average” political official with ties to the insurgent Taliban. Other DoD personnel corroborated this negative profile, some who had never even met the DG, which Turner had to consider as he prepared to meet with and begin his partnership. Knowing he was entering a situation where many others had failed, Turner also know that the others had mostly sought to either implicitly or explicitly wield influence over the DG.

Act

Turner attempted to get to know the DG tabula rasa over a period of many meetings, and in ways not previously attempted. He first met with the DG at the district center for personal interviews and rapport-building activities like afternoon tea and meals. The goal was to discover who he was, how he approached his governing responsibilities, and learn his vision for the district. Additionally, Turner needed to understand the needs of constituents in the rural agricultural district represented by the DG. Initially access to the DG was limited, despite the district center being located adjacent to a small combat outpost (COP). Coincidently, a change in command of the COP brought a commander open to the practice of full-spectrum operations and willing to provide more access to the DG because he appreciated Turner’s role as a combat advisor. Like Turner, the new commander preferred a “hands off” approach to working with the DG than his predecessors, giving him space to operate and implement his own vision of how the district should be governed.

During the action phase(s), Turner gradually began to understand the DG, minimizing DoD’s needs as an overt requirement for the interaction during attempts to build rapport, and not imposing DoD’s schedule and demands upon the DG. This approach helped him earn the DGs trust, and he was eventually granted permission to accompany the DG at multiple meetings with constituents. This was done with explicit assurance that Turner was not there to intrude but only to learn how the DG worked and interacted with villagers.

Observe

After several months of observing the DG in meetings with constituents and multiple DoD entities, it became evident that contrary to earlier assessments, the DG was indeed utilizing the district center. Turner witnessed his body language and demeanor in different crowds and settings, observing the “emergence” of the DG’s leadership over time. During one in-depth interview, the DG revealed his governing philosophy, which contradicted the DoD’s earlier assessment that he was “unwilling” to govern. There was a line of questioning that was geared at determining who or what was the governing authority in the district. Turner asked, “Who is the leader of the district?” After a thoughtful pause, the DG answered, “There is only room for one sword in the scabbard.” To the authors, this indicated that the DG saw himself as “boss,” and this was demonstration of his willingness to take responsibility of governing.

The DG was not only an appointed political figure with formal education, but he was also well respected for his role as a military commander and member of the mujahaddin who fought in the resistance during the Soviet Union’s occupation of the country. Yet, it was not the titles of “governor,” “scholar,” or “commander” that constituents and government officials throughout the province used when speaking of him. Instead, he was known as “mullah” by nearly all who spoke about him. Throughout the province in fact, other religious figures, village leaders, and tribal elders all referenced the DG’s religious rather than political, secular, or military title.

Reflect

The authors returned to a larger Forward Operating Base (FOB) at regular intervals to report to authorities. Returning to the FOB was conducive to reflection. Discussions about written reports and observations were had with other analysts, and presentations given at staff meetings and briefings, as Turner ultimately decided to challenge the DoD’s original assessment of the DG. Some reflection time was spent with higher level staff members who eventually adjusted assessments and began to shift support toward the development of the DG. More importantly, time spent with staff strengthened the relationship between the author and the commander who originally suggested the mission, who understood the DG’s informal position as a respected religious leader could enable his emergence as a legitimate formal political official. Due to the commander’s experience, he knew the DG needed to be shielded from excessive DoD interference, which too often hindered and did not enhance the development of local governance.

AR application 2: Monitor the DG as he governed and promote political development

After developing a more accurate assessment of the DG, Turner was directed to continue monitoring his approach to governing and assessing his development as an appointed political official, in addition to observing the progress of various aid and development projects in the district.

Plan

Upon learning that the DG was indeed attempting to govern, Turner intended to continue to work with the DG to help the DoD learn more about the role of customary authority in local governance. One goal was to elicit from the DG a long-term strategy for the district that could be understood by others conducting development operations in the area. Turner wanted to identify things the DG was already doing that were effective and examine whether the DG was genuinely building influence with the most powerful tribal and family elements in the district. These actions would help the DG continue to gain support from GIRoA and DoD for his district and encourage the development of a more trusting relationship between GIRoA and DoD representatives in the region.

Act

The action phase primarily involved a continuation of meetings at the district center for constant engagement and additional rapport-building activities with the DG. In addition, on numerous occasions, the DG visited with the authors for tea and meals at the FOB to which they were stationed. Additional actions during this phase of the AR process involved observing the DG’s daily prayer schedule, engaging in numerous foot patrols into the district with DoD and Afghan security forces, continuing interviews with constituents and other key leaders in the district, and checking on the progress of development initiatives in the area.

Observe

During a lengthy observation phase, three significant events happened that help to demonstrate the ability of an informal authority figure to (1) solve disputes and foster the “rule of law,” (2) oversee the deliverance of public goods to the district, and (3) demonstrate a penchant for formal political development.

Land dispute resolution: The DG worked with local families to solve a land dispute that spanned over 50 years and originated with the death of an elder decades before. Different families clashed, as they attempted to satisfy the demands of the siblings, and over time, there were multiple other events and tragedies that contributed to the conflict. Another key point of significance in this case is that on several occasions when they were in power, the Taliban could not negotiate a settlement, as family elders always rejected the terms that they tried to impose.

The DG’s ability to understand the conflict, negotiate conditions satisfactory to all parties involved, and ultimately bring a conclusion to the feud brought him national attention. The resolution was a landmark event in the “emergence” of the DG, as it showed he could find and bring together the proper tribal and family leaders to resolve a conflict and enhance stability in the district. This “win” for the DG would not have been achieved with interference from DoD. The event represented a hallmark of uncommon success, brought about by the influence of a DG initially considered too weak, and disinterested in performing in a formal political position.

Wheat seed distribution: An Agricultural Development Team (ADT) working in the district was tasked with distributing a disease resistant wheat seed to farmers. Part of the mission was to utilize the Ministry of Agriculture, who would work in conjunction with the DG, to distribute the wheat. Previous endeavors were fraught with corruption, deception, and obvious incompetence by Afghan leaders. In this specific case, however, the DG was aware of DoD’s plan to distribute the wheat seed, but he did not have a positive working relationship with the Minister of Agriculture at the provincial level. Furthermore, despite a tashkil allotted for an agricultural representative in the district, none was present.¹¹

Given DoD’s perceived inadequacy of local governance, primarily due to the inaccurate perception of the competency of several appointed political officials, the distribution of the wheat seed was planned for rather than by local leaders. In fact, the distribution was essentially “ordered” by DoD to proceed before planting season, even without local government’s support. Complicating the process further was that the ADT had an extremely troubled relationship with, and general negative assessment of, the provincial agricultural representative.¹² Rather than developing a relationship with Afghan leadership, the authors observed that this ADT tended to “force” its plans upon formal government officials to accomplish a mission swiftly.

Engagements with the DG about the seed distribution revealed issues that the DG was facing in his relations with the provincial government, but also that he had a good line of communication with his constituents, knew of their problems, and was working to address the delivery of public goods from the government to his district. For starters, the DG notified Turner that the provincial agriculture representative refused to bring the seed from the provincial center to the district center, citing security concerns and his own (unfounded) fears that the DG was “corrupt” and would sell the seed for profit. The DG also made it known that he had little money to run the district’s affairs to begin with, and even though the seed was given to the district from the province at no cost, there was no money to cover the costs of transporting the seed to the district center and then to the farmers throughout the district.¹³

To mitigate these problems, and successfully distribute the seeds, the DG used handwritten and radio messages to convene a shura to openly discuss the distribution with local stakeholders. The solution that came out of this informal organization, led by the DG acting in his role as a formal political official while simultaneously leveraging his informal position as a mullah, was that the farmers agreed to collectively contribute to the cost of delivery from the provincial to the district center and throughout the district. Displaying the type of community solidarity commonly found throughout rural Afghanistan, the farmers agreed to subsidize the seed delivery for the less affluent among them who could not afford to pay a nominal fee.

The DG’s long-term strategy: After several meetings spent discussing his long-term vision for the district, Turner elicited from the DG a prioritized list of initiatives, complete with a loose timeline and reasonable expectations for DoD’s contributions to those initiatives. This set of proposals was translated into a single PowerPoint slide for presentation, which provided evidence that the DG indeed understood the district’s needs and had knowledge of what could reasonably be accomplished. This slide was also intended to be used for planning purposes by others supporting COIN efforts, such as U.S. Department of State and non-profit assistance organizations in control of resources to support local initiatives.

To ensure the veracity of the slide and the DG’s comprehension of his own initiatives, Turner purposefully altered some of the initiatives between a few meetings before submitting the slide back to the DG for review.¹⁴ Each time this was done, the DG corrected the “mistakes,” which was taken as validation that the strategy was indeed the DG’s and not overly influenced by Turner. Furthermore, the slide was on a preferred medium easily understood by DoD, and it also provided a more transparent way for provincial government officials to visualize the long-term needs of the district and measure the effectiveness of the DG assigned by the federal government to represent that district.

Reflect

What we saw in these three observations was processed as evidence of a DG who was willing and able to govern, and that he was a key leader who could merge his informal role as mullah with his formal role as an appointed political official. Religious authority proved beneficial as he worked to resolve conflicts and provide public goods to the district. Moreover, the DG was keenly aware of how to use other informal organizations, the jirga, and build networks of other key leaders in the district for assisting with dispute resolution. Furthermore, his demonstrated aptitude for long-term district planning showed a proactive approach to dealing with the district’s problems, rather than being reactive and waiting for problems to arise. This was determined to be an example of political development because it signified the type of administrative or bureaucratic growth which contributes to state-building.

AR application 3: Social continuity and accepting the agricultural representative

The final AR application explained here involved using the methodology to establish some degree of social continuity between transitioning military units and key Afghan leaders, just as it was used during Hardy’s fieldwork described above (Hardy & Rodman, 2016). After Turner’s tour of duty was complete, Ledet was asked to continue the mission and keep working with the DG. It is important to note that transitioning the partnership with the DG from Turner to Ledet was relatively seamless, as Ledet had already been given the chance to develop his own working relationship with the DG while accompanying Turner for several months. Ledet continued with the mission, but as his tour of duty was coming to an end, he was asked to help a CA team and an ADT who was assigned to continue operations in the district understand both the broader operating environment and what they would need to know to have a successful working relationship with the DG.¹⁵ These DoD entities were essentially taking over after much progress had already been made and were essentially being asked to monitor and work to maintain the development that was underway. However, filling the tashkil position for the agricultural representative, considering the importance of farming in the district, remained a priority.

Plan

The planning phase for the “hand-off” between Ledet and the incoming CA and ADT personnel accounted for several things learned after the extended period working with the DG. First, through Turner’s work, it was evident that the DG was well established in his district and had made great strides governing by leveraging his informal position as a mullah, which helped him command a great deal of respect in the shura. It would be important for the incoming units to not only respect the DG’s growth and position but also to be aware that much of the progress made could be easily erased if DoD entities were perceived by the DG, and his constituents, as “meddling” and attempting to “dominate” instead of just assisting. Second, the subject of accepting the provincial agricultural representative, which involved allowing him to have space to work out of district center, continued to be a contentious issue for the DG for the reasons noted above. Still, the DoD insisted that topic be addressed.¹⁶ Furthermore, the incoming ADT was interested in making progress on the agricultural representative issue and was made aware of the DG’s many previous objections to filling this tashkil position.

Complicating matters further, the ADT was led by a female captain. The DG had always demonstrated a great deal of respect and admiration for female DoD personnel, which was not unheard of but uncommon of males in an extremely conservative rural district (see Pottinger, Jilani, & Russo, 2010). It remained unclear how he would react when she would attempt to develop a working relationship with him while working to improve the district’s agricultural capacity.¹⁷ To be sure, the DG himself had young daughters. On multiple occasions, including dinners at his home, he lamented about the lack of opportunity for Afghan women and expressed what we felt was an uncharacteristically strong desire for greater gender equality. Regardless, filling the agricultural representative tashkil position was part of the captain’s assignment, so it was decided that she approach the issue with the DG at an appropriate time.

With those factors to consider, and with the DG made aware of the transition of personnel weeks in advance, Ledet returned to the COP adjacent from the district center and proceeded to meet with the DG over the course of several weeks. Over the course of many casual meetings, the plan was for Ledet to make as many introductions of the new personnel as possible so that the DG could gradually meet the incoming leadership. The subject of the agriculture tashkil position would eventually need to be brought up, but all personnel were advised beforehand not to “push” the subject.

Act

Many hours were spent briefing the new teams before leaving for their extended mission at the small COP near the district center. In addition to broad-topic briefings about the operating environment, the incoming personnel were provided with all knowledge about the DG that had been accumulated since the start of Turner’s mission. As planned, once joining the CA team and ADT at the COP, meetings at the district center began with Ledet taking the lead. Although the new leaders were introduced, they were instructed to only start making their own observations and not speak much initially. After numerous meetings, the leaders slowly began engaging the DG with small talk and questions about the district. Ledet minimized his contributions in conversations once it was obvious the DG was comfortable, which allowed the new leadership to engage to the point they could initiate meetings on their own.

Observe

Members of the CA team skillfully engaged in rapport-building activities with the DG during the transition process, and he was amenable to the prospect of developing a new partnership with them, but he was most receptive to the ADT captain. This was not only because of the “novelty” of having a female in a military leadership position, clearly treated as equal by her male colleagues. In fact, she possessed much knowledge about the subject and proved to be quite dexterous when conversing with the DG about agricultural production in the region. In one of the last meetings with the new personnel and the DG attended by Ledet, who was merely observing by this point, the ADT captain began to speak with the DG. After making inquiry into why there was an empty storage room in the district center, she casually suggested it might be a suitable office for an agriculture representative. Without hesitation, enthusiastically, as if this had never been a contentious issue, and as if he had been saving the spot for such an occasion when someone would just ask, the DG shrugged his shoulders and said something to the effect of, “Certainly! We need an agricultural representative here, and he can use that room as an office.”

Reflect

After many months of partnering, the authors determined that the DG was capable but likely did not fully understand or appreciate his role as an agent of the state from the onset. Nevertheless, he leveraged his informal religious authority to perform in a formal political office. Other key leaders recognized his legitimacy, and he was never observed abusing his authority for personal gain. He effectively governed the small rural province largely because he possessed the ability to explain to others rather than resort to the use of force. This was aided by his widely respected religious authority. Yet, the eventual acceptance of the agricultural representative is still evidence of political development and indicative of state-building because of the implementation and eventual utilization of a formal bureaucratic mechanism, not just an informal means, to achieve the goals of GIRoA.

Reflection

In terms of the DG’s leadership, the authors left the country cautiously optimistic about the prospect of long-term stability in the district and left with a unique appreciation for an old argument. In Afghanistan, stability is not likely to come from top-down processes originating from a centralized national government. Instead, an effective local governance system merging informal authority with the formalities of constitutional government is the best way to encourage the “rule of law” in Afghanistan. We corroborate this claim.

We worked with several commanders who knew that local custom and culture was the bedrock of stability in the region; they provided us with resources to complete the task. Unnecessary risks were never taken, but there was always risk to personal and unit safety, for which those commanders had to take responsibility as we engaged in the process of conducting a long-term mission.¹⁸ Furthermore, both authors were military enlistees prior to their assignment, so they internalized military operations, tactics, and culture, a factor that enabled a smooth integration into the “battle-rhythm” of various units that assisted the research. Of course, there were commanders who made the “customary disregard” mistake. Determined to impose their will on local Afghan leaders, rather than partnering with them to try to understand the preexisting order, they missed an opportunity to promote stability in Afghanistan, from the ground-up.

Another thing to consider involves recognizing the need for linguists with local familiarity, as the work described here was conducted with the help of a trusted team member who grew up in the region and could read, speak, and write fluently in Pashto. In addition to his language skills and understanding of local customs, we had the advantage of working with him for nearly every interaction described here. He was part of our process, helping us navigate local culture, and become more knowledgeable of Islam and its significance in the region, and we are forever grateful to him.

AR is an effective tool that was used to help stabilize a region in Afghanistan during COIN operations. It helped build cooperation between U.S. military personnel and local leaders, but more importantly, AR assisted in empowering effective governance systems grounded in local culture and institutions. Some may lament the “weaponization” of AR by military super powers, but we envisioned our work as an effort to help preserve the sanctity of local culture in the face of violent and radical change accompanying the process of state-building (Hazelton, 2017). Adaptable for widespread use as a systematic approach to acquiring knowledge, AR is a framework that can be used to help military personnel learn more about the socio-cultural operating environment.¹⁹ This means implementing it into military doctrine and training, which would at least allow its effectiveness to be evaluated at the tactical and operational levels. If the DoD is indeed interested in promoting governance from the ground-up, it should consider AR to increase the probability of success in stability operations.

Footnotes

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Sharon Emeigh for editorial assistance as well as several of our peers who would prefer to remain anonymous for their assistance in this document’s preparation. The authors also thank our Afghan partners, a few practitioners, the editors of this journal, and anonymous reviewers. We welcome and invite your comments and reactions at our action research community’s interactive ARJ blog housed at AR+ .

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Author biographies

Richard Ledet is an assistant professor of political science at Troy University. He is a former Infantryman (U.S. Army) and Infantry Squad Leader (Louisiana National Guard), and he earned a PhD from the University of Notre Dame in 2011 and served as a DoD civilian in Afghanistan in 2012.

Pete Turner is a former Counterintelligence Agent with the U.S. Army who has over 70 months of deployment experience in combat zones as a service member, DoD civilian, and contractor in Bosnia, Egypt, Iraq, and Afghanistan, with the bulk of his day-to-day activities conducted “outside the wire” interacting with locals.

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