The trouble with merit

The trouble with merit: Some preliminary considerations

Concepts and the ideas they are associated with have a life of their own. Much of their ‘fate’ in how they germinate, evolve, or otherwise develop is the result of a variety of factors, including their tradition and the non-ideal circumstances they are part of. To complicate things further, the last few decades have attested to the many important shifts in making sense of our ‘conceptual cartography’ in areas as diverse as political philosophy, educational theory and philosophy of education, migration studies, and so on. In particular, the pantheon of political ideas has become replete with a wide range of problems, challenges, and other conceptual ‘transformations’ that make the analysis of almost any of its ‘members’ far more devious than originally envisaged.

Two diametrically opposed cases can be identified in the scholarly literature. On one hand, neoliberalism started to include concepts that have traditionally been part of the emancipatory rhetoric of egalitarianism, including fairness, justice, well-being, and equality itself (Sardoč, 2021b). On the other hand, concepts traditionally identified as an integral part of the ‘right’ ‘traveled’ to the opposed side of the political spectrum. Choice and responsibility stand out as the most visible examples. As G. A. Cohen emphasized when discussing Dworkin’s responsibility-sensitive theory of distributive justice, Ronald Dworkin has ‘performed for egalitarianism the considerable service of incorporating within it the most powerful idea in the arsenal of the anti-egalitarian right: the idea of choice and responsibility’ (Cohen, 1989: 933).

If being an essentially contested concept has been a household challenge most of the concepts have been grappling with (Gallie, 1955), these and other ‘transformations’ identified above have been far less straightforward (Sardoč, 2020, 2021c). Alongside ambiguity and confusion, perhaps the most ‘stable’ companions of any conceptual analysis (and the associated disputes), some of the most well-known concepts from the pantheon of political ideas face very peculiar problems and challenges. For example, the ‘traveling’ of a particular idea and the associated phenomenon of conceptual stretching (Sartori, 1970), semantic confusion (Nathanson, 2010) or appropriation (Sardoč, 2021b) as well as conceptual inflation (Miles and Brown, 1989) are just some of the most pressing ‘transformations’ plaguing normative theorizing on a particular phenomenon and its gravitational orbit of concepts (Zapata Barrero et al., 2022).

Each of these ‘misadventures’ has been associated with concepts as diverse as political violence, toleration, patriotism, equality of opportunity, neoliberalism, diversity, and so on. To cite one example, any definition of political violence faces a range of tensions and dilemmas that make it almost impossible to come up with a clear-cut definition that would turn out to be both conceptually precise and practically useful. As has been emphasized by Arun Kundnani when discussing the sense of disorientation when trying to provide a definition of radicalization and violent extremism, ‘confusion is an outcome of the institutional uses to which the term has been put. In these settings, the function of the term is to conceal as much as to reveal; to obscure as much as to elucidate’ (Sardoč, 2022: 126).

However, there is a concept that does not fit the categories identified above. Its genealogy supposedly representing the best possible approximation to the idea of ‘careers open to talent’ makes the idea of merit a one of the most important ‘innovations’ associated with both the American and French Revolutions. As Rafe Blaufarb (2002) emphasizes in his book, The French Army, 1750-1820: Careers, Talent, Merit, ‘the idea of careers open to talent is one of the most enduring legacies of 1789’ (p. 2). Its promise of upward social mobility associated with the ‘meritocratic equation’ (IQ + effort = merit) has ultimately transformed the distribution of advantaged social positions and has had a lasting influence on the very idea of fairness itself. Despite its dystopian characterization emanating from Michael Young’s (1958) satirical novel The Rise of the Meritocracy, its reception has been almost diametrically opposed to the author’s original intention. Michael Young (2006) himself reflected on this misunderstanding: ‘[n]ot only has it come out as I feared it would, but it hasn’t been taken as a warning but been taken as a sort of blessing’ (p. 77).

This article aims to examine some of the distinguishing features of merit-based allocation of advantaged social positions as well as the disillusionment with the ‘age of meritocracy’ and meritocratic rationality as its chief character trait. The introductory section identifies the most distinctive characteristics of the merit-based allocation of advantaged social positions. The central section reconstructs some of the arguments advanced by Michael Sandel (2020) in his book The Tyranny of Merit. The concluding section presents the motivational impulse for the book symposium on The Tyranny of Merit and the main issues arising out of the discussion between the commentators and Prof. Sandel.

Meritocratic rationality and its problems

As a distributive principle for allocating positions of special advantage, the merit-based conception of equality of educational opportunity has been one of the fundamental principles of public schooling and one of the basic mechanisms to ensure a fair distribution of advantaged social positions. Any conception of equality of opportunity and the associated idea of ‘meritocratic rationality’ is based on three distinct requirements, that is, (1) that all individuals have equal access to adequate education or qualifications (the requirement of equal access); (2) that morally arbitrary factors, including ‘natural’ and ‘social’ contingencies such as talents, socioeconomic status, ethnicity, and race, should not affect the merit-based allocation of advantaged social positions (the requirement of non-discrimination); and (3) that any advantaged social position is assigned to the most meritorious person (the requirement of merit).

In fact, the legitimacy of existing distributive arrangements and the overall fairness of the institutional framework of contemporary societies have been built upon the commitment that each and every individual should have equal opportunities. This principled commitment came to dominate public policy, including education (Brighouse, 2010; Frankel, 1971), housing (Chetty, 2021), employment, health and healthcare (Daniels, 1985; Jusot and Tubeuf, 2019) as well as development-oriented mechanisms by leading intergovernmental organizations. Moreover, a commitment to a merit-based conception of distributive justice has played a central role in major public policy initiatives and educational reforms related to desegregation, antidiscrimination, and inclusion. Its historical legacy as one of the most important emancipatory ideas of the 20th century (e.g. the ‘Civil Rights Movement’), coupled with an appealing rhetoric, has led to an overall acceptance of the merit-based conception of distributive justice as a default mechanism for allocating advantaged social positions.

Championed by a panoply of otherwise incompatible political and theoretical positions, a merit-based conception of distributive justice has been one of the most important (albeit controversial) social ideals embraced unanimously throughout the political spectrum. The desegregation of education in the United States in the 1960s (Coleman et al., 1966) and other reform initiatives following it have made the merit-based conception of equality of opportunity one of the cornerstones of public education. Its deterministic assertion claiming that distributive inequality is a mere reflection of individuals’ effort and merit associated with the ‘meritocratic equation’ (IQ + effort = merit) (Young, 1958) has ultimately transformed the distribution and allocation of advantaged social positions and is supposedly representing the best possible approximation to the idea of ‘careers open to talent’. Interestingly enough, the last few years have witnessed a resurgence of interest among both scholars and public intellectuals over issues associated with distributive justice and its gravitational orbit of concepts, including the idea of merit and the adjacent vision of a meritocratic society (e.g. Appiah, 2018; Lemann, 2019; Littler, 2017; Wooldridge, 2021).

Despite its commitment to fairness, a merit-based allocation of advantaged social positions is neither unproblematic nor unquestionable. Its alleged inconsistency with a mutual advantage conception of distributive justice and a failure to live up to its alleged emancipatory potential has made this distributive mechanism prone to a range of criticisms. For example, the rising inequality and the associated phenomena such as decreased intergenerational mobility, disadvantage, and poverty coupled with the overall reduction of living standards have not only fuelled distrust in existing distributive arrangements and the lack of a meaningful participation in shared public life but have questioned the very foundations of meritocratic rationality and its conception of fairness. This has led to some of the most trenchant criticism of meritocracy, including the ‘opportunity gap’ (Putnam, 2015), the ‘meritocracy trap’ (Markovits, 2019), and ‘meritocratic hubris’ (Sandel, 2020).

These (and other) obstacles have severely undermined the overall legitimacy of existing distributive scenarios as any inequality-related outcome arising out of such an arrangement might claim to be unfair. The ‘conceptual negligence’ over the fairness of merit-based allocation of advantaged social positions and the alleged illegitimacy of inequalities arising out of these processes are a sufficient proof that existing conceptions of distributive justice are insufficiently articulated. These and related challenges call into question the fairness of the processes of competing for positions of special advantage and the legitimacy of resulting inequalities.

The language of merit

Contemporary research on equality of opportunity displays two contrasting trends. On one hand, empirical research has been expanded by the quantification of research on issues as diverse as intergenerational mobility, housing, employment, student performance, health-related issues, and so on (e.g. Ferreira and Peragine, 2015). This shift of emphasis in empirical research on equality of opportunity raises important governance-related challenges associated with ‘big data’ and the phenomenon of ‘governing by numbers’ (Frické, 2015; Grek, 2009; Porter, 1995). On the other hand, this area of scholarly research has been invigorated by normative and conceptual research on talents and distributive justice (e.g. Robb, 2021; Sardoč and Deželan, 2021), ‘natural’ and ‘social’ inequality (e.g. de los Santos, 2021), and the American Dream (Sardoč and Hauhart, 2021; Reeves, 2014), with some of the most important contemporary philosophers contributing reflections on particular aspects associated with merit-based allocation and distribution of advantaged social positions (e.g. Arneson, 2018; Scanlon, 2018; Segall, 2013).

Nevertheless, both aspects of research on equality of opportunity continue to struggle with very peculiar problems. On one hand, the quantification of research on equality of opportunity and the ‘big data’ revolution in the social sciences in general have failed to identify some of the key distinctions that lie at the basis of any research endeavor associated with fairness (Ben Shahar, 2017; Jacobs, 2004). On the other hand, normative theorizing on these issues has turned its attention to the nexus between moral arbitrariness and fairness. In particular, developments in this area of scholarly research – primarily having to do with luck egalitarianism (e.g. Arneson, 2015; Cohen, 1989; Lippert-Rasmussen, 2016) – have focused on the alleged unfairness of those (morally arbitrary) factors that individuals may have no influence over. The key distinction advanced as part of this commitment to fairness has been that of ‘legitimate’ (morally acceptable) and ‘illegitimate’ (morally unacceptable) sources of inequality.

These and other issues are a testament to the fact that several issues associated with the merit-based allocation of advantaged social positions and the concomitant idea of distributive justice remain ill-defined. In fact, several of the questions associated with equality of opportunity are to a large extent taken for granted, for example,

Each of these questions has been addressed differently by various conceptions of equality of opportunity. For example, the question, ‘what is a “fair starting position to compete for advantaged social positions?”’ differs considerably between a egalitarian and a libertarian conception. Yet, the radical conception has a completely different understanding of ‘background’ fairness. Despite the overall appraisal of equality of opportunity, the current social consensus over its value is ‘paper thin’ (Arneson, 2018: 152). In fact, the only solid assumption different merit-based conceptions of equality of opportunity share in common, as Richard Arneson (2015) emphasizes, is their rejection of fixed social relations, but not hierarchy per se.

If it took a literary work of fiction written as a satire to produce what the German playwright Bertolt Brecht labeled as the ‘distancing effect’, that is, estranging a particular object or idea from its everyday meaning and usage, a research monograph was needed to show that meritocratic triumphalism and its ‘ethics of success’ also have a ‘dark side’. Michael Sandel’s (2020) book The Tyranny of Merit: What’s Become of the Common Good? provides a nuanced examination of ‘the age of meritocracy’ and meritocratic hubris as its key characteristic. It dovetails an elaborated analysis of the technocratic conception of merit and the associated idea of meritocratic inequality with an in-depth elucidation of the collateral damage arising out of governing by merit, for example, the weaponization of college credentials, the practice of ‘incentivizing people’, populist discontent, helicopter parenting, and meritocratic hubris in particular.

The Tyranny of Merit makes a manifold advancement in the understanding of our commitment to the merit-based allocation and distribution of advantaged social positions. In contrast to the ‘data behind the words’ approach championed primarily by empirical research on equality of opportunity and associated phenomena, The Tyranny of Merit is a state-of-the-art example of the ‘concepts behind the data’ approach.

As with other books by Prof. Sandel (2009, 2010, 2013), there are manifold issues that distinguish The Tyranny of Merit apart from other scholarly endeavors. One of the most distinctive and straightforward qualities arising out of this book is the sensitivity toward phenomena associated with both merit and meritocracy. In particular, as he emphasizes, ‘the battlefield of merit’ is premised on a reductionist assumption arising out the faith in fairness emanating from meritocratic sorting. Despite its centrality for conceptions of equality of opportunity and social mobility in general, the merit-based distribution of advantaged social positions has been challenged over its inconsistency with egalitarian conceptions of distributive justice and a failure to live up to its alleged emancipatory potential. This is perhaps best depicted by Michael Sandel himself:

What if the rhetoric of rising no longer inspires, not simply because social mobility has stalled but, more fundamentally, because helping people scramble up the ladder of success in a competitive meritocracy is a hollow political project that reflects an impoverished conception of citizenship and freedom?

Another important quality arising out of The Tyranny of Merit has been Prof. Sandel’s perceptive analysis of political rhetoric and public discourse over the merit-based allocation of advantaged social positions. Time and again, he tackles some of the most visible slogans (e.g. ‘as far as their talents and hard work will take them’) and metaphors (‘the rhetoric of rising’) alongside various other thought-terminating clichés (e.g. ‘through no fault of their own’ or ‘what you earn depends on what you learn’) championed by meritocratic idealism and points to the many moral, political, and epistemic shortcomings stemming from a disfigured understanding of the idea of ‘careers open to talent’.

Interestingly enough, while central to egalitarian conceptions of distributive justice, the notion of talent remains to a large extent absent from the voluminous literature on these (and related) issues. In contrast to other concepts from the standard egalitarian vocabulary, for example, equality, opportunity, desert, social mobility, solidarity, fairness, and ultimately justice itself, there has been some sort of a conceptual negligence associated with the concept of ‘talent’ (e.g. Robb, 2021; Sardoč and Deželan, 2021; Trannoy, 2019). As I have previously argued, while the ‘standard’ understanding of the relationship between talents and effort views the two variables as distinct entities, there are scholars who point out that their relationship is far more complex and dynamic. A talent, as Alain Trannoy emphasizes, is a ‘cumulative variable’ comprising ‘past-effort, current effort and innate talent’ (Trannoy, 2019: 1).

At the same time, several egalitarian scholars started to perceive talents as a form of unfair advantage as holding a particular talent is arbitrary from a moral perspective. On this basis, some proponents of egalitarianism have derived the conclusion that individuals may not deserve the results of the ‘lottery of birth’ and have equated talents (as a form of ‘natural’ inequality) with ‘social’ inequality (e.g. Segall, 2013). Talents’ moral arbitrariness coupled with a ‘deterministic’ and ‘reductionist’ characterization depicting them as individual, innate, natural, and fixed make talents equivalent to ‘standard’ social factors, including individuals’ socioeconomic background, ethnicity, and gender. Most importantly perhaps, morally arbitrary factors severely undermine the overall legitimacy of existing distributive scenarios as any inequality that may arise out of the process of competing for advantaged social positions and would include talents might claimed to be unfair and therefore illegitimate. In particular, the non-voluntaristic view of talents as natural, individual, innate, fixed leads to a deterministic understanding of the ‘meritocratic equation’ with Social Darwinist implications of merit-based allocation of advantaged social positions.

As Prof. Sandel accentuates eloquently throughout the book, talents’ anatomy is considerably more complex. It is not only their moral arbitrariness that has led some of the egalitarian scholars to view them as an unfair advantage. For example, what a society prizes at a particular moment as a talent is also dependent on a wide range of factors and is ultimately a sociohistorical contingency. That individuals may benefit from their talents is therefore dependent on a society’s recognition of their talent and is therefore not primarily or even exclusively part of individuals’ own attribution. This ‘illusion of fairness’ associated with the meritocratic equation has ultimately questioned not only the emancipatory nature of the ‘rhetoric of rising’ but the overall fairness of merit-based allocation and distribution of advantaged social positions in general.

Furthermore, as Prof. Sandel makes clear, meritocratic hubris is taking its tool not only in the form of meritocratic despair among ‘those it leaves behind’ but is equally uncompromising toward those ‘who land on top’. The negative side effects of the tyranny of merit have had equally devastating consequences for both losers and those who claim to be winners of meritocratic sorting. The meritocratic promise of either failure or success as being ‘one’s own doing’ makes clear that meritocratic anxiety and meritocratic despair are ultimately two sides of the same coin. This assertion is in stark contrast to both those criticizing meritocracy and those advocating it.

In contrast to those objecting meritocracy (e.g. Howlett, 2021; Littler, 2017; Markovits, 2019), Sandel’s critique goes well beyond the ‘standard’ criticism of meritocracy’s myth as he points to its equally devastating consequences for both ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. In contrast to those advocating meritocracy (e.g. Wooldridge, 2021), The Tyranny of Merit questions some of the foundational elements of the meritocratic equation. In particular, his emphasis on the unfairness of non-merit factors that are part of this equation, for example, talents, calls for a rearticulation of the merit-based allocation of positions of special advantage.

The triangulation of merit

This book symposium brings together a set of contributions that discuss the main arguments advanced by Michael Sandel’s book The Tyranny of Merit on both merit and meritocracy, social mobility, fairness, higher education (and education in general), the dignity of work, the American Dream, equality of opportunity, contributive justice, and so on. At the same time, it points to various shortcomings that hamper the possibility of making progress in this area of scholarly research, including the lack of clarity about key concepts from the gravitational orbit of the merit-based conception of distributive justice. Its central contribution perhaps has been to provide an innovative conceptual framework for making sense of the allocation of advantaged social positions based on merit that is consistent with a mutual advantage conception of fairness. As Prof. Sandel accentuates, meritocratic rationality is not only corrosive of the common good but advances a deeply dysfunctional conception of civic equality.

Papers written by Mitja Sardoč, Harry Brighouse, J. B. Mijs, Victor Chen and Timothy Bland, Slavko Gaber, and Veronika Tašner deal with both conceptual and practical issues arising out of the arguments elaborated in Michael Sandel’s book. Each of the papers collected in this book symposium engages with a different aspect of Prof. Sandel’s arguments advanced in The Tyranny of Merit. His generous reply rounds up this book symposium by providing a way out of the impasse arising out of meritocratic triumphalism and its ‘ethics of success’. Like his other writings (many of them having the status of a ‘modern classic’ as well as ‘academic bestseller’), Prof. Sandel’s elucidation of a mutual advantage conception of the common good is ultimately destined to reinvigorate the idea of the social contract itself.