Investigating the Origins of the Gender Gap in Support for War

Abstract

Gender is an important source of influence on foreign policy attitudes but has received less research attention than it deserves. In the United States, gender differences on support for military interventions average around 8 percent, with women less likely than men to support the use of force. This gap has surfaced in many conflicts, including World War II, the Korean and Vietnam wars, through to the Gulf War and the conflict in Iraq. The existence of a modest though persistent gender difference in support of the use of military force thus arouses considerable interest among political researchers. This piece critically discusses four explanations, the empirical evidence to date, and future directions for studying and testing the origins of this gender gap. The four explanations are economic/political marginalization, feminist identity, Social Role Theory, and value differences.

Keywords

gender gap support for war public opinion

Gender is an important source of influence on foreign policy attitudes, but has received less research attention than it deserves. In the United States, gender differences on support for military interventions average around 8 percent, with women less likely than men to support the use of force (Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986). This gap has surfaced in many conflicts, including World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, and the conflict in Iraq (Bendyna et al., 1996; Burris, 2008; Conover and Sapiro, 1993; Eichenberg, 2016; Kam and Kinder, 2007; Sidman and Norpoth, 2012). The origins of this gap are unclear. This piece critically discusses four explanations, the empirical evidence to date, and future directions for studying the origins of this gender gap. The four explanations are economic/political marginalization, feminist identity, Social Role Theory, and value differences. Two of these explanations, marginalization and feminism, have been tested, while the other two are largely untested.

Public opinion on foreign policy matters and influences the decisions of policymakers (Holsti, 1992; Powlick, 1995; Zaller, 1994). The gender gap on the use of force also holds interest for political behavior researchers, because it could contribute to the gender gap in voting when force issues are salient. There is considerable evidence of gender differences in presidential vote choice, more generally (Center for American Women and Politics (CAWP), 2012; Chaney et al., 1998; Huddy et al., 2008a). Gender differences on salient issues influence the gender gap in voting (Chaney et al., 1998), and demographic characteristics do not appear to account for the gap in presidential vote choice, suggesting that it is the result of issue position differences (Huddy et al., 2008a). Gender differences in presidential approval also exist, particularly in economic evaluations (Clarke et al., 2005; Welch and Hibbing, 1992).

Hence, the gender gap in war support may add to the voting gap during wartime elections. Attitudes about ongoing interventions influence presidential approval (Gelpi et al., 2007; Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987; Krosnick and Brannon, 1993; Norpoth and Sidman, 2007; Voeten and Brewer, 2006) and vote choice (Aldrich et al., 1989). For example, research on the effect of war support on the 2004 presidential election found, but did not investigate why, men were significantly more likely to vote for George W Bush (Mockabee, 2007; Norpoth and Sidman, 2007). Finally, women’s lower levels of support for the use of force have important electoral implications because women turn out to vote at higher rates than men (CAWP, 2015).

Although most of the research reviewed here focuses on the gap in the United States, evidence is not limited to the US. In the USSR, research documented a gender gap on defense spending and differences in support for past military conflicts (Carnaghan and Bahry, 1990). Danish women are more favorable toward reducing the defense budget (Togeby, 1994). Canadian women compared to men are more sensitive to potential soldier casualties (Gidengil et al., 2002). The gap does not appear to extend to the Middle East, but it is unclear why (Tessler et al., 1999; Wilcox et al., 1996). The explanations discussed here may or may not apply to other countries.

Explanations for the Gender Gap

It is important to note that gender is socially constructed and has been used as a justification for unequal relationships and rights as well as the patriarchy more generally (Tickner, 1992). I use the term “gender gap” because that is the prevalent terminology when discussing differences in opinion, voting, and partisanship between men and women (Huddy et al., 2008b).

Moreover, the lived experiences of women, although varied, are inextricably influenced by society’s assigning of a particular gender and corresponding stereotypes (Kessler and McKenna, 1978). In this review, I do not conceptualize gender differences on support for military intervention as the result of fundamental, foundational, or essential differences between men and women. Instead, I take a non-essentialist approach discussing how differences between men and women in circumstances such as income, differences in feminist identity, social roles, and values may explain the gap. This gap is sizeable, but too small to suggest that all women oppose war, whereas all men support it. Therefore, a non-essentialist approach is consistent with past findings regarding the size of the gap.

Prior research clearly indicates that men and women differ in their support for the use of force. The reason for these differences remains elusive. The focus of this review is to provide a comprehensive discussion of the extant theories that scholars have put forward and tested for the gap as well as to elaborate on promising, untested explanations that have been shown to partially explain other gender gaps in other policy areas. The following sections will discuss four explanations for gender differences on the use of force: economic and political marginalization, feminist identity, Social Role Theory, and value differences. These explanations are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, I expressly regard the values explanation as compatible with each of the three other theories. This is discussed in greater detail after the four explanations are reviewed.

Analyses of gender differences usually investigate mediational hypotheses. For mediation to exist, the effect of gender should considerably reduce with the inclusion of the mediational variable, such as measures of marginalization, feminist identity, social roles, and values. The best theories will indicate why women are less supportive than men of the use of force. I provide a critical evaluation of the empirical research in support of each theory, consider the weight of evidence in favor of each, and discuss possible deficiencies with each approach.

Economic and Political Marginalization

Economic and/or political marginalization may cause women to be more likely than men to oppose the use of force. Women’s economic and political marginalization is historically related. Patriarchal societies traditionally limit women’s access to both economic resources and political power. Moreover, economically marginalized women may also feel alienated from the political system. Therefore, I discuss these explanations together.

Women’s economic marginalization is theorized to lead to greater self-interest in minimizing the cost of war. The economic hardship of unmarried women with children is known as the “feminization of poverty”, and even exists in Western, industrialized societies where women make up a larger proportion of the poor (Kimenyi and Mbaku, 1995). Women’s economic marginalization may result in the view that military interventions will siphon disproportionate national economic resources away from domestic social programs that assist the poor. Indeed, increased military spending correlates with increased income inequality at the macro level (Abell, 1994).

Women may oppose war because of their historically limited power leading to political alienation. Women value less competition and are more egalitarian than men due to differences in access to power (Welch and Hibbing, 1992). From an international relations perspective, J Ann Tickner (1992) contends that women’s marginalization in terms of political power may lead to different perspectives on international disputes; she also points out that historically women have not taken part in the protection of national security through military service. Although women may contribute to a war effort in other ways, historically being unable to be a soldier has kept women at the bottom of the hierarchy (Elshtain, 1987; Tickner, 1992). Similarly, Cynthia Enloe (1989, 2007) argues that militarized societies embrace and rely upon notions of masculine authority and feminine dependents. Thus, women’s marginalization may be a factor leading to the gap.

Empirical work testing this explanation is mixed. As income level increases, support for Desert Storm increases, but political alienation and income do not fully explain the gap and gender remains significant with these factors in the model (Bendyna et al., 1996; Nincic and Nincic, 2002). Using cross-national data, Clyde Wilcox et al. (1996) conclude that economic self-interest does not fully mediate the gap. Rather, economic and political marginalization does appear to be predictive of war attitudes, but fails to remove the gender effect entirely. Perhaps, different measures of economic self-interest and political marginalization would yield more supportive results for this theory. Measuring economic dependence on the government, such as receipt of government aid, might better capture economic marginalization. This explanation may only be relevant during particularly costly interventions.

Feminist Identity

The feminist identity explanation contends that women possessing a feminist identity are less supportive of governmental use of force. There are different feminist ideologies, but a feminist identity likely includes all of the following: believing that men and women are equal, believing that women’s historically unequal position in society is the result of social construction meaning it is not natural nor is it ordained by a higher power, and finally, an understanding of the shared experience of women, which should promote an entreaty for change (Cott, 1987). Some supporters of this explanation have argued for a link between pacifist orientations and feminism. Traditionally, the women’s movement has supported principles of non-violence and opposed traditional forms of power relations (Beckwith, 2002; Brock-Utne, 1989; Costain, 2000). There are theorists who argue against this association between pacifism and feminism, because the absence of armed conflict should not be equated with justice and equality (Brock-Utne, 1989; Sjoberg, 2006). Moreover, there are feminists who at times have supported military interventions to promote justice, especially gender justice such as in Afghanistan after 9/11 (Butler, 2009; Tickner, 2002).

Others argue that feminist identity leads women to embrace certain values. Pamela Conover (1988) contends that women with a feminist identity will be more likely to endorse egalitarianism, less likely to endorse individualism, and more likely to report sympathy for the disadvantaged. There is support for this hypothesis; feminist women express a greater fear of war and a lower commitment to building a strong national defense, while men and non-feminist women do not differ in their attitudes toward most foreign policy issues (Conover, 1988). Tickner (2001) also argues for an association between egalitarianism and the promotion of peace through challenging patriarchal ideas that promote militarism, including men as protectors and women as needing protection.

Additional evidence suggests that feminist identity does not fully explain the gender gap in foreign policy attitudes. Feminists are less militaristic and less supportive of war, but feminist identity does not fully mediate the gap (Brooks and Valentino, 2011; Cook and Wilcox, 1991). Feminist attitudes only partially explained the gap in foreign policy positions in Denmark (Togeby, 1994). Data from the USSR actually found that feminists were less likely than non-feminist women to oppose increasing defense spending (Carnaghan and Bahry, 1990). There is also limited support for feminist identity as a predictor of Gulf War attitudes or as a mediator of the gap (Conover and Sapiro, 1993).

Feminist identity is a promising explanation. It does not always fully mediate the gap, but feminists are less supportive of the use of force. Measurement differences may be producing the mixed results for this explanation. Operationalizing feminist identity could include self-report, endorsement of gender equality, feelings toward the women’s movement, or feelings of closeness to feminists. These different measures may produce different results. Moreover, Conover (1988) argues that the relationship exists through the adoption of different value orientations, which is not the way that others have analyzed the relationship.

Social Role Theory and Motherhood

Motherhood and socialization to inhabit the role of motherhood are another possible explanation for the gap. In the feminist theory literature, Sara Ruddick (1980) argues that social roles strongly influence the ways in which individuals think and behave. Specifically, women’s social roles as wives and mothers lead to pacifist ways of thinking and behaving because maternal practices are characterized by non-violent conflict management such as compromise and reconciliation. Motherhood is associated with caring and nurturing perspectives, which would presumably lead to tolerant attitudes toward resolving conflicts including international disputes (Elshtain, 1987). This approach is criticized for reinforcing gender stereotypes (Zalewski, 1994). Feminist international theorists characterize such analysis as essentializing and argue that these notions about motherhood are used to justify the continued subordination of women and the devaluing of women’s perspectives in foreign policymaking (Enloe, 2000; Tickner, 1992, 2001, 2002).

Past research has found limited evidence for these ideas (Bendyna et al., 1996; Conover and Sapiro, 1993; Zalewski, 1994). In a Danish sample, women with non-traditional social roles were more likely to possess attitudes indicative of the gender gap with housewives being least critical of the use of force (Togeby, 1994). A mother gap on security issues failed to emerge in the 2004 election (Carroll, 2008; Elder and Greene, 2007). It is important to note that considerable evidence exists that mothers differ on a number of other policy preferences, including social welfare issues (Elder and Greene, 2007, 2012).

Relatedly, Social Role Theory purports that gender role socialization is behind gender differences in public opinion, including force issues (Diekman and Schneider, 2010; Eagly et al., 2004). Women, who are likely to inhabit the compassionate, non-violent, nurturing roles of wife and mother, are socialized to be anti-conflict (Diekman and Schneider, 2010; Eagly et al., 2004). Women do not need to inhabit the role of motherhood in order to be anti-conflict, because all women are presumably socialized for these communal, caring roles (Eagly et al., 2004). This theory remains untested, but suggestive evidence exists on domestic force issues such as capital punishment and gun control attitudes (Eagly et al., 2004).

Although research to date has not found that motherhood fully mediates the gap, Social Role Theory offers a related yet untested possibility. Similar to the feminism explanation, it is possible that the socialization into different social roles results in different value endorsements that then lead to the gap. The development of or use of an existing self-report measure of gender socialization would make this explanation easier to test directly. Or, self-report measures of compassion and nurturing would also provide a test of Social Role Theory.

Value Differences

Value differences offer an additional, untested theory. When evaluating whether or not to support the use of force, individuals may draw on relevant values. Values are evaluative, preferable end states or actions (Feldman, 2003). Values are fewer than attitudes and are more abstract so that they are applicable across different attitude objects (Feldman, 2003). Gender differences in value endorsement and value reliance may account for observed gender differences in support for interventions. Prior work in political science and psychology has shown a relationship between values and attitudes, values and political orientations, values and policy preferences, and values and voting (Feldman, 1988; Liberman, 2014; Piurko et al., 2011; Schwartz et al., 2010).

Two overarching categories of values may explain gender differences in support for war: Pro-Social Values and Militaristic Values. First, Pro-Social Values encompass values that measure support for pro-social behaviors, such as helping others, promoting human rights, ensuring equality for all people, and guaranteeing the welfare of others. Pro-Social Values include Stanley Feldman and Marco Steenbergen’s (2001) humanitarian values scale and Schwartz’s (1992) universalism and benevolence value types. Humanitarian values measure support for ensuring the well-being of others. The “universalism” value type indicates a preference for social justice and tolerance. Benevolence encompasses a desire to promote the welfare of close others.

Second, Militaristic Values include Schwartz’s (1992) power value type as well as Ole Holsti’s (1992) measure of Militant Values and Militarism (Williams et al., 2006). Power includes a desire for dominance over others (Schwartz and Rubel, 2005). Other Militaristic Values include measures of support for a strong army, for using the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to undermine hostile governments, a preference for military intervention over diplomacy, and a desire for respect and security for one’s nation. Cynthia Enloe (2007) contends that public endorsement of Militaristic Values is at the core of citizen support for the use of force over a reliance on diplomacy.

Regarding different value orientations, men and women likely differ in their degree of support for each value, rather than endorsing very different types of values (Feldman and Steenbergen, 2001; Howell and Day, 2000; Piurko et al., 2011; Schwartz and Rubel, 2005; Sidanius et al., 2000). Indeed, large gender differences in support of a specific value are not necessary in order to account for the gender gap in foreign policy attitudes. The gap is significant and sizeable, but by no means large enough to indicate that men and women’s value orientations do not overlap. Moreover, women are not homogeneous in their value orientations, and neither are men. Rather, it is likely that men and women sort slightly differently but their distributions substantially overlap. Because the gap in support for war is also moderate in size, this is one reason why value differences are a promising explanation.

Research on values offers evidence of modest gender differences in value orientations. Researchers have found gender differences in egalitarianism, humanitarianism, and social dominance (Feldman and Steenbergen, 2001; Howell and Day, 2000; Lizotte, 2016; Sidanius et al., 2000). Gender correlates with Schwartz’s values (Prince-Gibson and Schwartz, 1998) including universalism, benevolence, and power (Lyons et al., 2005; Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz and Rubel, 2005). Female adolescents are more likely to endorse Pro-Social Values, defined as a concern for the interests of others (Beutel and Johnson, 2004). Much of this research on values may extend to other countries. Schwartz’s value types have been shown to exist cross-culturally (Piurko et al., 2011; Schwartz and Rubel, 2005), but the other values research has mainly utilized American samples. This explanation deserves investigation.

Investigating Multiple Explanations

Further research is necessary to parse out the explanatory power of each of these explanations. It is also possible that these explanations are not mutually exclusive. It may be that marginalization, feminist identity, or social role socialization lead to gender differences in values that then lead to the gender gap in support for the use of force. For example, social role socialization should lead to gender differences in Pro-Social Values that would then predict differences in support for war. A series of experiments or structural equation modeling (SEM) would allow for further investigation of these explanations.

Several studies utilize experimental methods that investigate support for war or presidential approval of wartime presidents (Boettcher, 2004; Boettcher and Cobb, 2006, 2009; Brooks and Valentino, 2011; Horowitz and Levendusky, 2011; Thomson, 2016). Experiments would make it possible to test how different frames of an ongoing or fictional conflict give rise to the reliance on different explanations for the gap. An experiment varying the projected monetary cost of war would provide insight into how the economically marginalized, in particular low-income women, respond to more and less costly interventions. Another example might be to vary whether the decision to go to war is a publicly backed one or not, therefore allowing for the investigation of how politically marginalized individuals, particularly women, react. Experiments could also vary whether the intervention would promote gender equality or not to better understand how feminist identity is related to force attitudes.

SEM is another option. SEM is a promising approach to understanding the complexity and structure of public opinion (Petrič and Pinter, 2002). SEM could provide a test of whether marginalization, feminist identity, and social roles lead to gender differences in values, which then lead to differences in support for force. SEM allows for the investigation of latent variables, which are unobservable constructs such as economic and political marginalization, through the use of structural regression models (Raykov and Marcoulides, 2000). For economic marginalization, an income proxy could be used, and for political marginalization, a political efficacy measure might be used as a proxy. A path analysis, which presumes that the explanatory variables do not have measurement error, could also be used rather than SEM (Raykov and Marcoulides, 2000).

SEM would allow for testing a model of force attitudes that focuses on value differences as the proximate cause of the gender gap, but also investigates how marginalization, feminist identity, and particular social roles, such as motherhood, lead to observed gender differences in value endorsements. For example, feminists are more egalitarian than non-feminists (Conover, 1988); SEM would make it possible to test whether feminist identity leads to a greater likelihood of endorsing Pro-Social Values, such as Schwartz’s universalism value type, which then leads to anti-force attitudes. Similarly, a SEM model could simultaneously test whether motherhood leads to a greater endorsement of Pro-Social and a lower endorsement of Militaristic Values, because according to Social Role Theory women are socialized to be compassionate and anti-conflict (Eagly et al., 2004). This type of modeling would allow for a comprehensive, simultaneous test of these various explanations as well as how they fit together sequentially. Figure 1 depicts a possible model for future investigation. This model proposes testing whether marginalization, feminist identity, and motherhood predict value endorsements that then predict force attitudes while allowing for each of these explanations to have a direct effect on force attitudes. Figure 1 does not depict how SEM could account for measurement error. Finally, it is important to test these explanations side by side in order to understand their individual explanatory contribution to the gap.

Figure 1.

Proposed SEM for the Gender Gap in Force Attitudes.

Conclusion and Future Directions

Common wisdom is that women are anti-war because of gender stereotypes that all women are compassionate, nurturing, and anything but forceful. Although this common wisdom dictates that all women hold anti-war sentiments, the gender gap on support for the use force is moderately sized. The four explanations discussed here could explain why women are more likely to oppose the use of force. Future work should simultaneously test these four explanations including with respect to recent conflicts and international crises such as Darfur, Syria, and Iran.

More attention should go to the electoral consequences of interventions that produce gender gaps. As we have seen recently, presidential approval ratings can dip very low when the public perceives an intervention as unsuccessful (Weisberg and Christenson, 2007). Overall, public support for ongoing conflicts decreases over time, and pre-war support does not correlate with support for sustaining a conflict (Sullivan, 2008). On the other hand, a successful and popular intervention can have the opposite impact on approval ratings (Gelpi et al., 2007; Norpoth and Sidman, 2007; Voeten and Brewer, 2006). For example, believing that invading Iraq was the right thing, and that there was a high chance of success, predicted a greater likelihood of voting for George W Bush in 2004 (Gelpi et al., 2007). Women were significantly less likely than men to vote for Bush in 2004 in models of vote choice that included various demographic controls as well as retrospective and current evaluations of the war in Iraq (Mockabee, 2007; Norpoth and Sidman, 2007). Perhaps one of the explanations above would provide insight into the gender gap in vote choice during the 2004 wartime election.

Future work should investigate whether the explanations discussed here elucidate gender differences in casualty tolerance. Casualties influence perceptions of military success and vice versa (Boettcher and Cobb, 2006, 2009; Gelpi et al., 2005; Voeten and Brewer, 2006). Recent casualties and casualty trends appear to have more of an effect on war approval than past or cumulative casualties (Gartner, 2008; Gartner and Segura, 1998). The public report higher casualty tolerance for ongoing conflicts than hypothetical interventions (Sullivan, 2008). Casualties may not directly influence public approval, but rather indirectly influence the public via elite cues (Berinsky, 2007). Women are more sensitive to and concerned about casualties (Bendyna et al., 1996; Burris, 2008; Eichenberg, 2003, 2016; Gelpi et al., 2005, 2007). The explanations discussed here may also account for these observed gender differences.

Finally, more work is needed to understand how context influences the gender gap in support for war. Non-gender focused work provides evidence that context matters. The context, such as the location of the intervention, influences casualty tolerance (Boettcher, 2004). The public are supportive of military interventions when there is a threat to national security and only support economic sanctions when there is no security threat (Thomson, 2016). Some work investigating the context of interventions has found gender differences. In a survey experiment, conscription reduces support for war, and women are less likely to support war across all conditions (Horowitz and Levendusky, 2011).Women are actually more likely to support humanitarian interventions than men (Brooks and Valentino, 2011; Eichenberg, 2016). Future research should examine why this reversal in the gender gap occurs including an investigation of the four explanations offered here. Work is also needed to understand when gender is salient regarding force attitudes. A gender gap virtually always emerges (Burris 2008; Eichenberg, 2003, 2016), but it is still unclear whether different contexts make gender more or less salient, particularly with respect to other identities such as race and ethnicity.

This piece provides an overview and critical discussion of the origins of the gender gap in support for war. A gender gap in support for war is well-established. The reason for this recurring gap is still unknown. A test of existing and new theories for the gap is an important step to better understand why women are more likely to oppose military interventions.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Leonie Huddy, Stanley Feldman, Howard Lavine, and Kira Sanbonmatsu for providing extremely valuable feedback on an earlier version of this work. I am also grateful to the Birmingham-Southern College Interdisciplinary Summer Writing Group for their encouragement to pursue this piece.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Author Biography

Mary-Kate Lizotte is an Associate Professor at Augusta University in the Department of Political Science. She earned her PhD in Political Science from Stony Brook University. Her research focuses on American political behavior with a particular interest in gender. Much of her work is concerned with the origins and implications of gender differences in public opinion. In addition to her work on public opinion, she has also published research on the gender gap in voting, political knowledge, and party identification.

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