Democratization in Political Communication

Abstract

Disintermediation allows citizens to directly access political communication. The greater diversity of interactions between political actors results in increased flow of information. This causes decreased effectiveness for gatekeepers and agenda-setters (old media), and makes way for the creation of a deregulated, non-hierarchical, and borderless space, resulting in the empowerment of citizens and the democratization of political communication. This is a modernizing time that affects the development of political process and the role of different political actors. However, this transformation is shaped by bias and structural factors that limit its universalization and, a priori, encourage the emergence of a citizen elite that is capable of managing and benefiting from change.

Keywords

political communication disintermediation democratization citizenship mediatization political actors

New Playground

In recent decades, developments in political communication have led to a high rate of change in politics. Disintermediation and deregulation have led to a modernization of political communication channels (Parisi and Rega, 2011; Tasente, 2014), which has resulted in clearing signs that the political market has overcome the “era of mediation” (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995; Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999; Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999; Meyer, 2002). Non-conventional channels (primarily information and communications technology (ICT) and social networks) have allowed citizens to directly influence the development of political communication, a space which is traditionally represented by the triangle made up of leaders, media, and the public (Brants and Voltmer, 2011; McNair, 2003; Perloff, 2013).

These new channels have created a new “playground,” that is, a more deregulated political market, which has increased production and exchange of information between different political actors (Chadwick, 2006). This has distorted the framework which traditionally regulated political communication. Citizens do not act as observers or receivers, but rather as other players (Habermas, 2006). Because of the participatory focus of this changed role, we can see this as part of a process of democratization. In making this observation, we can also link changes in political communication to a range of factors that underlie any phenomenon of this nature: the influence of economic development, organizational capacity, empowerment, access to political participation, and so on (Beetham, 1994; Coppedge, 2012; Dahl, 2006; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Rustow, 1999, inter alia).

The ability for a large number of citizens to enjoy direct access to the space in which political communication occurs is an important achievement for the new phase. However, this has not been the case from a qualitative point of view (Hindman, 2008; Van Deursen and Van Dijk, 2014). The influence of communication on new media and digital media is accompanied by a series of biases (Chadwick, 2006; Norris, 2001; Prior, 2007; Van Deursen and Van Dijk, 2014; Wei and Hindman, 2011), known by some authors as the OMA (Opportunity, Motivation, Ability) frameworks (see Dimitrova et al., 2011), which hinder the emancipation and empowerment of citizens. One bias stands out from the others: the dependence upon education for the politically correct use of these tools (Anduiza et al., 2010; Dimitrova et al., 2011). Sophistication is a requirement which coincides, at least in part, with one of the most determining factors of any political democratization process (Finkel et al., 2007). Dependence upon sophistication could lead to the creation of a citizen elite capable of organizing and managing this new space for participation.

Political Communication: A New Age

The space of political communication has been functionally connected to a triangle made up of politicians, press, and citizens (Brants and Voltmer, 2011; McNair, 2003; Perloff, 2013). The nodal actors remain the same in this space for exchanging information and messages, although their coverage has been progressively extended with the achievement of universal suffrage and the appearance and incorporation of all kinds of political actors. This is an inclusive process, which has resulted in the incorporation of practically all actors that take part in politics. As in the case of the political process, however, the role played in this space by different actors is determined by their capacities.

The trajectory through which these changes have occurred, with its easily identifiable milestones, has allowed different authors to identify a series of stages in the evolution of political communication. This is a dynamic process in which the centrality of information technology and social networks in communication is an important novelty, as well as a distorting factor, that facilitates the identification of a series of characteristics that differentiate this period from others. The new participatory role of citizens, the inclusive nature of these tools, the changes that occur in this space, and all the actors involved in the political process permit the identification of this stage as a democratizing one. This identification mainly responds to the transitions through which it has developed. Specifically, the transition from the stage of media coverage of political communication to a more participatory one, whose immutable characteristics cannot yet be clearly defined, but which is easily recognizable as a series of transformations through which it can be clearly identified and differentiated.

The democratization of political communication starts from the crystallization of “the Third Age” described by Blumler and Kavanagh (1999). The start of this period can be identified with the emergence of television in politics. However, in a broader sense, it revolves around the development of media as the most important source of political information (secondary source) for citizens, as an autonomous power capable of imposing its logic (“media logic”) on all politics (Blumler, 2015; Strömbäck, 2008, 2011), developing a “media hegemony” (Block, 2013) that has remained unchanged until the appearance of ICT and social networks. These have led to an exponential increase in the flow of information, the possibility of direct contact between different political actors, an increase in the intensity and content of the exchanges, and so on. This is a phenomenon that has gradually given way to the disintermediation of communication (Biancalana, 2016; Chadwick, 2007; Epstein, 2018; Parisi and Rega, 2011; Tasente, 2014).

This transformation occurs because direct communication between citizens and politicians allows them to bypass the media (Blumler and Gurevitch, 2001). Although this does not change the triangle that constitutes political communication, it gives way to the construction of a deregulated, flexible, agile, dynamic space (etc.) whose versatility is only comparable to the large volume of information produced and put into circulation. It is a space without limits, capable of favoring the creation of communities without physical boundaries or borders (Tonn et al., 2001), in which the role of intermediaries is changing, because there are no gatekeepers or agenda-setters regulating access or distribution of messages within this space. The media information monopoly is broken and new information circuits are created (Epstein, 2018; Skogerbø et al., 2016; Van Dijk and Hacker, 2003). For example, although levels of trust in new media vary by country (Reuters Institute Digital News Report, 2019),¹ citizens express a slightly higher preference for the Internet over television as their principal news provider (Reuters Institute Digital News Report, 2019). Through this and other (sometimes highly deregulated) channels such as telephone messaging applications that citizens use to consult, as well as produce and share information, they become information producers.

This new field of play has transformed the role of political actors, especially the role of citizens. As a consequence of the disintermediation and deregulation of the political market, citizens have become central to political communication. At least since the extension of basic rights of liberal democracy, such as universal suffrage, citizens have been part of the space in which political communication takes place. However, it has not been until the present moment that they have been able to access political communication without intermediaries. Thanks to new media, they can participate directly. Just as universal suffrage culminates the construction of political citizenship, disintermediation, the new model that ICTs have created, completes it communicatively.

Nevertheless, direct access to spaces where political communication takes place is not universal. Dependency upon ICT and social networks (RRSS) means that the way in which citizens participate is shaped by the characteristics of these tools. Despite this, the possibilities offered by this new framework, as well as the new flow of information, have managed to empower a large group of citizens, who have not only adapted to a new kind of political participation but have also reconfigured their relationship with other actors involved in the political process (Bennett, 2008; Bennett and Pfetsch, 2018; Bennett and Segerbeg, 2012; Cho et al., 2016; Coleman, 2008; Karlsen, 2015).

This ability to cooperate, which Putnam (2000) defines as “social capital” and which appears as a central element in the formation of democratic regimes (Schmitter and Karl, 1991: 79), will structure this new space. The creation and coordination of all types of networks overcome the classic type of political participation (Verba and Nie, 1987) and lead to a coexistence with less institutionalized forms. Combined with the lack of boundaries in this space (Tonn et al., 2001) and the paucity of regulation of political communication, this development calls for us to revisit the concept of the “public sphere” (Habermas, 1992). We find a space occupied by “players” who can be classified according to their “capital”: that is, the power to transform public and political space through these channels (Habermas, 2006: 419). New spaces for political action and engagement emerge (Vromen, 2017: 23) within a dynamic that we can identify as replacing traditional collective action by “individualized collective action” (Micheletti, 2010), or “connective action” (Bennett and Segerbeg, 2012). A set of “players,” who are mostly younger, find in participatory formats and less institutionalized spaces the form that is most adequate for practicing their citizenship (Bennett, 2008; Coleman, 2008).

The productive role of these players, the multiplication of both sources of production and increased flow of information, can contribute to closing the “media gap” (Bimber et al., 2005: 375). This entails an increase in citizen exposure to information that could, by itself, exercise a decisive and positive influence on the realization of the virtuous cycle, proposed by Norris (2000), or the extension of the monitorial citizen, proposed by Zaller (2003)—a new media circuit that, at the least, can provide citizens with the minimum information necessary to act in the political system. Nevertheless, such an increase does not necessarily imply higher levels of civic commitment or political participation (Dimitrova et al., 2011; Hindman, 2008; Kocks, 2016). This is solely not due to the small space occupied by politics in the “social conversation” (Pew Research Center, 2016) but also because it is not possible to establish a direct relationship between these channels of communication and increased political participation (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2013), which maintains a closer relationship with traditional factors of high levels of political education, interest, and discussion (Pattie et al., 2004).

The Democratization of Political Communication

The disintermediation of political communication completes citizenship from a communication perspective. As already noted, direct access has not modified the structure or the space in which political communication occurs. However, the empowerment of this agent has allowed the democratization of this space. The new role of citizens as producers of information allows them to participate in the exchange of messages and information with the remaining actors who form part of the political process. Nevertheless, the participatory character of this new role depends upon skills and abilities in handling ICT and RRSS.

The mediatization of political communication placed media and politicians as the primary producers of information (Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999) in an oligarchic or semi-competitive regime regulated by horizontal competition between these actors (Brants and Voltmer, 2011; Voltmer, 2008). The democratization of political communication does not only incorporate the citizenry as a new actor but also increases competition over control of this space. As such, we define this new period as a phase resulting from the disintermediation of political communication, which has transformed the role carried out by citizens, empowering them and allowing their direct participation in the space within which it is produced. It is a period that is characterized by direct interactions between different actors, the lack of efficacy of traditional gatekeepers and agenda-setters, and the creation of a deregulated space with a high level of competition over agenda control (Cacciatore et al., 2016; Vargo et al., 2014; Vonbun et al., 2015).

The communicative empowerment of citizens gives rise to a similar transformation in a process of political democratization. It is important to note that this transformation does not refer to changes within the political system (the transition from a dictatorship to a democratic system), but to the evolution of the space in which political communication is produced. It refers to the participatory nature of citizens which “traditionally has been considered an important indicator of democratic citizenship: think voting or being knowledgeable about relevant issues” (Ward, 2011: 167).

The new role of the citizenry, and by extension the role of the rest of political actors, is combined with a decrease in mediated relations (Robles-Morales and Córdoba-Hernández, 2019; Tasente, 2014). The decline in mediated relations has given way to a period of transition from a semi-competitive to a more participatory regime. The intensity of the changes produced and the symbiosis established between communication and the political system build a new scenario which demonstrates the first signs of its consolidation. The association of this period with a process of democratization offers an obvious advantage of a transitory character which describes the intensity of the changes that are taking place. It defines the objective of the transformation, but not the regime that will result because, as in any political process, the intervention of different variables will determine the outcome.

The change in the role of political actors characterizes the transformation to which political communication is being submitted and is part of this transitionary period. Authors such as O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) or Rustow (1999) point to three key phases: (1) preparatory liberalization, (2) decision democratization, and (3) habituation consolidation.² Although the democratization of political communication cannot be fully identified with a transaction, “reform” in Linz’s (2000) words or “transformation” in Huntington’s (2001) words, neither can we achieve it with a replacement, “rupture” (Linz, 2000, or Share 1987). Similarly, it cannot really be a “reform” because there has been no negotiation between the hegemonic forces and the reforming actors, mainly because the changes that have taken place in the framework that regulates political communication are made of exogenous factors. Therefore, the most accurate approach would identify the disintermediation of communication (which occurred at a stage prior to the democratization of political communication) as the (1) preparatory phase. The incorporation and use of all types of unconventional media and channels in the private sphere of citizens have created patterns of behavior which have transferred to the public sphere, giving way to the (2) decision phase: democratization. The culmination of this transition, (3) the consolidation of a new frame of reference, will be the result of this metamorphosis.

In the passage from hegemony, or competitive oligarchy, to polyarchy, Dahl (1989, 2000) establishes the relationship between the increase of participation and (authentic) debate. This causal relation cannot take place in political communication without disintermediation. This phenomenon not only allows the establishment of direct contact between the different actors involved, but also involves the passage from a restricted space to the appearance of a liberalized one. This is a characteristic of democratization processes, since authors such as Dahl (1989, 2000), Schmitter (1995), Tilly (2007), Tilly and Wood (2013), and O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), among others, define democratization as the abandonment of an authoritarian regime (with different denominations) and the transition toward a competitive one.

It is not possible to classify the model of political communication resulting from mediatization as an authoritarian, or even hegemonic, regime. However, if we take elections (political competition) as the central element of democratic regimes, thereby allowing us to link the idea of political participation as a transformative factor, we can speak of a semi-competitive regime (Nohlen, 1996), a competitive oligarchy, or a competitive hegemony (Dahl, 1989). This is a competition for control of the frames of reference that during mediation establishes itself within the horizontal dimension, resulting in a relationship of dependency between media and politicians (Brants and Voltmer, 2011; Voltmer, 2008). Citizens are a secondary actor playing in a scenario in which they cannot compete with the “media logic” imposed by the media (Blumler, 2015; Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995; Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999; Strömbäck, 2008).

Access to competition itself becomes one of the central axes of any democratization process. As Dahl (2000) points out, this is a competition that must meet a series of requirements: (1) effective participation, (2) voting equality, (3) enlightened understanding, (4) control of the agenda, and (5) inclusion of adults. These are conditions that inevitably link democracy with electoral processes (Schmitter and Karl, 1991: 77) and which, as we have already seen, Dahl (2000: 86) equates with having a voice in a system of political debate—a participation that is restricted to political communication which emerges as the space in which this debate takes place. It is a dialogue between political actors that is intensified after disintermediation because it facilitates interaction between them, as well as the articulation of new discourses. Such versatility exceeds the limits of the horizontal dimension of political communication (Tasente, 2014; Van Dijk and Hacker, 2003; Voltmer et al., 2019).

The emergence of the vertical dimension (Brants and Voltmer, 2011), disintermediation, or decentralization allows us to overcome the secondary role that citizens have played up to this moment (Bennett and Pfetsch, 2018; Biancalana, 2016; Robles-Morales and Córdoba-Hernández, 2019). For example, from its early age, the media, as gatekeeper and agenda-setter, became the main interpreter of public opinion. Compounded by their ability to spread messages, these competences offered the logic of the media a dominant position in the development of public debate. In this typical mediation scenario, citizens have limited resources to intervene in the construction of political discourse. This regulatory framework is transformed through the progressive democratization of political communication, mainly because it develops not only the role of citizens but also that of all other political actors.

In Eastonian terms, in political systems the relationship established by different actors with each other and with the system produces a complex balance. For example, this dependence leads to different models of democracy having different regulations for media and journalists, which implies unequal development (Strömbäck, 2008), as can be seen in the famous study by Hallin and Mancini (2004). The interactions are systemic, meaning that any distortion or change in one component has an impact upon the whole.

This has forced all political actors to rapidly update their structures, communication channels, etc. All this leads to a progressive adaptation of the political elites to the new space (Brants and Voltmer, 2011, Chadwick, 2007, Ward, 2011). For example, despite the constant fall of party identification and affiliation (Biezen, Mair and Poguntke, 2012), there is a recapitalization of the old role of the affiliates of mass parties (although with a lower ideological and political burden and greater pragmatism). Political parties do not only explore new forms of online propaganda (Woolley and Howard, 2018), or direct contact with the electorate (Aldrich et al., 2016; Biancalana, 2016), they also try to make the most of new citizen capacities by implementing more flexible participatory formulas, such as establishing collaboration with external publics (Heaney and Rojas, 2015), or collaboration with citizen campaigners (Vaccari and Valeriani, 2016). This is an increase in the porosity of organizational boundaries that permits the externalization of all kinds of tasks. It Is the creation of hybrid repositories (Chadwick, 2007) which allow political parties to increase their competitiveness, thanks to the increased resources available for the formation of electoral strategy.

However, in the dispute between equalization theory and normalization theory (Vaccari and Nielsen, 2013; Yang and Mie, 2017) it seems that, once the new system is consolidated, given the advantages it offers, the same preexisting power relations tend to be reproduced (Gibson and McAllister, 2015). For example, traditional media has joined political parties in modifying their role. If we were to identify one actor who enjoys something approximating hegemonic power in the construction of political discourse during processes of mediatization, it would be the media (Block, 2013: 264-6). The media constitutes an actor which has lost a great degree of power due to its loss of informational monopoly and bridge between citizens and politicians. During this transition towards a new era or mediatization, it is pertinent that the main agent, who acts as a link between politicians and citizens, has suffered a disadvantage. Nevertheless, in the same process occurring with economic disintermediation, the production model can change, but the distribution of products continues to be important. In this way, a large part of the media’s capacity to diffuse messages remains intact (Bakker and Paterson, 2011), conferring upon them a pre-eminent position in the new hybridized model of political communication (Skogerbø et al, 2016).

Despite this tendency to adapt, there is no uniformity in the development of democratization, as in almost any other political and social phenomenon. In addition, the cost of this process coincides with a series of factors that determine the initiation and intensity of the process. Structural factors, such as economic development, and democracy’s relation to access digital media, or education and the political use of these tools, determine its uneven development and its most visible effect: the empowerment of citizens.

Finally, it is necessary to consider that the coincidence of this transitionary process with other political and social phenomena is not helpful in developing an adequate definition of the concept. The persistent economic, political, social, institutional (etc.) crises of the last decade have coincided with the consolidation of disintermediation. Establishing a dependent relationship between the modernization of communication and the empowerment and citizen emancipation movements of a broader nature would limit the scope of both processes. Although phenomena such as the Arab Spring have established the use of RRSS and ICT as a strategic factor for circumventing institutionalized political and informational circuits and promoting political participation, the objective of these movements is not to democratize communication but rather the broader political system. Moreover, in this respect, some authors note the greater dependence of these processes upon structural factors, rather than upon the use of unconventional means (Campante and Chor, 2012) or ‘‘crowdsourced’’ form of leadership (Papacharissi and Oliveira, 2012). However, these channels have become a learning ground for citizens to empower themselves (Comunello and Anzera, 2012; Nisbet et al., 2012) and to use them as an effective mobilization tool in combination with offline media (Tufekci and Wilson, 2012).

In any case, we should not limit the scope of the democratization of political communication to this type of phenomena regarding transition from authoritarian regimes to democratic systems. Establishing this causal relationship with these or other emancipatory movements would reduce its transformative capacity. For example, were this to be the case, countries with a higher level of development in the indicators that measure the quality of democracy, such as the countries of Northern Europe, would be excluded from these processes of modernization of political communication. We would, therefore, not be able to observe or analyze the changes that occur in the role of political actors during this period.

Democracy of the Few

More participation does not imply more democracy. This simple premise summarizes the Iron Law of the oligarchy (Michels, 1962) and shows its effectiveness at the time of describing this new phase. Although the majority of citizens can access the new political communication, they do not. The different capacity they have to create nodes, produce and share information, and so on determines their use. An asymmetric distribution of these capacities is closer to the Pareto principle than to an effective democratization of this space.

Especially when viewed from a cyber-optimistic perspective, the citizen seems to have become the center of political communication (Hindman, 2008). However, democratization does not offer an anthropocentric view. The competition that takes place between the different actors, who participate in the political process, is central to the new period. A direct consequence of the creation of this deregulated space in which the absence of hierarchies and a clear hegemony give way to an intensification of the conflict with which the different actors construct political discourse (Howarth, 2010).

The new model, consequence of a more direct and individualistic form of participation, has not found a collective actor who is able to manage it. The democratic character of this space does not mean a participatory management of the same or that all citizens will act as a monolithic block. It does not find a collective actor who can handle the new situation. Among citizens, there is also a high degree of competition between intermediate agendas and issues. Depending on the degree of interest or notoriety they are able to achieve, these end up merging and becoming part of the public debate (Cacciatore et al., 2016; McCombs and Funk, 2011; Vargo et al., 2014; Vonbun et al., 2015). For this reason, the abilities and skills of citizens will be decisive in optimizing their new role and obtaining the necessary advantages to influence the preparation of the agenda and control of the political debate.

In the same way that processes of democratization start with preconditions or factors that determine their progress, the disintermediation of communication does not ensure the democratization of political communication or a homogeneous behavior on the part of citizens. Technology is not a democratizing force per se (Dahl, 1989: 339). It depends on the use that is given and the conditions that surround it.

The dependency the democratization of communication has upon ICT and RRSS makes the digital divide a determinant factor in the access and use that citizens make of this space of political participation. Socio-economic conditions, age, educational formation, and even gender (Gray et al., 2017) condition the access that citizens have, as well as the role they play online (Chadwick, 2006; Dimitrova et al., 2011; Prior, 2007).

A scenario similar to the processes of political democratization. A process that is favored by some factors. Structural factors such as levels of development, industrialization, urbanization, and education (Lipset, 1959) are usually the most recurrent. This is also the case for authors such as Moore (1966), who agrees with a more economic approach to the concept and establishes industrialization as the main element. This is a factor that is relativized by authors such as Rustow (1999), who are more focused on the role of elites (“no bourgeois, no democracy”) with sufficient capacity to transform systems (Teorell, 2012).

Although some authors highlight the normative biases in the identification of the effects of the digital divide (Lutz and Hoffmann, 2017), there is much research that demonstrates the influence of socioeconomic differences, beyond access to the Internet but also in the use of these channels (Mossberger et al., 2003; Norris, 2001; Van Dijk, 2005; Van Dijk and Hacker, 2003).³ These preexisting inequalities are reproduced in the online works, conditioning the use that is made of this space (Van Dijk, 2005; Van Deursen and Van Dijk, 2014; Zillien and Hargittai, 2009), leading to the development of an elite with greater capacity to take advantage of the opportunities offered (Calderaro, 2014; Van Deursen and Van Dijk, 2014; Van Dijk, 2005; Zillien and Hargittai, 2009).

The difference in the use of these tools is determined by users’ interests and abilities (Büchi and Vogler, 2017). Even when research, such as that of Blank (2017), finds different levels of education among users of Twitter in the UK and the USA, these still form part of the elite of their respective countries. Nevertheless, multiple studies differentiate between the effects that the digital divide produces upon access to the Internet and the uses that are made of the Internet once access is gained. Thus, for example, in these studies, once the users have accessed online space, there is not a great deal of difference produced in the political uses of these tools (Boulianne, 2016; Valeriani and Vaccari, 2016). This is especially the case in less demanding new forms of online participation, such as the “passive and negative participation” proposed by Lutz and Hoffmann (2017) or online petitioning (Elliott and Earl, 2018), but it is also capable of incrementing offline political participation through a contagion effect (Bond et al., 2012).

Despite the proliferation of new and less determining forms of online participation, there are many studies that establish a direct relationship between the political use of these channels and the formation of users (Anduiza et al., 2010; Bang, 2005; Dimitrova et al., 2011; Norris, 2001; Van Dijk, 2005). Similar findings were discovered previously in the processes of political democratization because, as pointed out by Finkel et al. (2007: 410), there is a correlation between education and the empowerment of citizens, support of political parties, trade unions, women advocacy networks, and so on. The dependent relationship between education and socioeconomic status is well established, giving way to the finding that the “well-educated middle class” (Marien et al., 2010) or the “expert citizen” described by Bang (2005) with capacity for cooperative, professional communication that could actualize the Athenian ideal of “citizen self-government” (Kneuer, 2016) has a greater ability to take advantage of this new situation.

This description is similar to a republican elite in which individuals use their knowledge and skills to capture public influence. Using these abilities, they build networks of negotiation and cooperation with politicians, public administrators, interest groups, media, and so on, demonstrating a “network consciousness” that is fundamental for the successful management of this political space (Li and Marsh, 2008). “Ordinary citizens” seem to be excluded from a space in which it is a new citizen elite that can make the most efficient use of these communication resources (Bang, 2005; Hindman, 2008).

Due to technological developments, McLuhan and Nevitt (1972) had anticipated the possibility that the consumer could be transformed into a producer, who would later be called “prosumer” (Kotler, 1986; Ritzer et al., 2012; Toffler, 1984). This type of consumer adds value to the products that he consumes, especially due to his experience and the information he is able to provide. He becomes a producer by using his knowledge to personalize his relationship with the supplier and the product. In political terms, this is a behavior which seems to overcome the patterns of the political consumer described by Scammell (1995, 2000) or Bennett and Entman (2000). The scope of these is not limited to incorporating standards from the private sphere into public space or to personalizing the political choices they make to protest objectionable institutional practices (Micheletti and Stolle, 2008). The greater degree of autonomy these political prosumers, who are better able to take advantage of this new environment, have increases their capacity to intervene in the production of these policies, not only in their evaluation.

Although standards of behaviour and models of online political participation vary in their inclusiveness and homogeneity (Boulianne, 2016; Elliott & Earl, 2018; Lutz and Hoffmann, 2017; Valeriani and Vaccari, 2016) ITCs and RRSS do not seem to have failed to create complex and dynamic information circuits. This is, not only due to the relative scarcity of political information circulating online (Pew Research Centre, 2016), nor to the limited resources in the digital environment (Humprecht and Esser, 2018), but also due to the transposition of two offline phenonema: previous position confirmation or reinforcement bias, and the importance of secondary sources as well as opinion leaders.

A wide body of research demonstrates that these channels fail in the creation and exchange of political opinions (Barbera et al., 2015; Cho et al., 2016; Dubois and Blank, 2018), although they do succeed when transferring offline political positions and debates online (Ceron et al. 2013; Kalsnes et al., 2014). This lack of information flow and opening of debates is seen in the creation of small communities characterised by high segmentation and homogeneity (Chadwick, 2006, 2007; Hindman, 2008): echo chambers which increase fragmentation, the appearance of multiple public spheres in a ‘balkanization’ (Susntein, 2001), a ‘backchannel’ (Kalsnes et al., 2014), or disruptive spheres (Bennett and Pfetsch, 2018), which contribute significantly to the reinforcement of our political positions and mobilization (Song and Eveland, 2015; Bae, 2016) albeit with a reduced capacity for conversion (Cho et al., 2016).

If during mediatization the strong influence exerted by the media over politics made citizens trust in secondary sources to a greater extent than in news protagonists when selecting information (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995; Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999), currently this trust is shared among the citizens themselves. In their role as bloggers, influencers (etc.) who frequently stand outside the traditional journalistic circles act as news producers and opinion leaders. This signifies a commitment to interpersonal communication (Choi, 2015) and the return to the opinion leader model or two-step flow model (Aldrich et al., 2016). These more prepared players, who are also more adapted to the new digital environment, as well as other political actors, are capable of exercising a notable degree of influence over this space (Bae, 2016).

In virtue of their privileged situation, prosumers succeed in their attempts to influence social networks (Weeks et al., 2017). For example, according to studies such as that of Nisbet and Kotcher (2009), these pro users demonstrate their efficacy in the propagation and incrementation of knowledge of phenomena, such as climate change. Nevertheless, other studies such as that of Park (2019) about the behavior of opinion leaders on Twitter demonstrate that while they have more influence on those who consume news, they do not curate news. It is probable that for this reason it is important to have previously set information circuits or our re-enforcement strategies through our echo chambers.

The democratization of the space in which political communication occurs has created unequal development. This is not only due to the biases that ICT and RRSS create in terms of access, but principally because of the different capacities that citizens have to manage such. The size of this new space and the dependency of these abilities upon the handling of these tools have led to the proliferation of these prosumers, of these new intermediaries. This forces us to reconsider the versatility of the vertical dimension and decentralization (Biancalana, 2016; Brants and Voltmer, 2011; Tasente, 2014; Voltmer, 2008). It seems likely that it is more appropriate to talk of a scenario characterized by versatility and dynamism of relationships which are established between these new managers or intermediaries, and other political actors, as well as with “ordinary citizens.” A space in which they can co-habit simultaneously, and depend upon each user’s demand, different models of intermediation, such as one-step flow, two-step flow, and three- or multistep flow (Hilbert et al., 2017; Ognyanova, 2017).

Future Directions

This transitionary period toward the democratization of political communication has transformed the way in which the political process unfolds. The ongoing emancipation and empowerment of citizens has modified the frame of reference that regulated a space characterized by horizontal relationships between media and politicians, giving way to a more multidimensional, more dynamic, versatile space. Despite the advantages that this scenario offers, at least a priori, for the elaboration of a more inclusive political discourse, the construction of broader deliberative spaces, and so on, the bias of the tools by which it is constituted and the sophistication it requires from citizens limit the scope of the changes produced.

The democratization of political communication has lived a similar process to that witnessed during processes of political democratization, where intermediaries appear to act as a link between citizens and the political sphere. Contrary to the initial postulates of those that are most cyber-optimist, we can observe the first signs of the emergence of a citizen elite, political prosumers, capable of capitalizing upon the advantages that the new deregulated space offers to citizens. The presence of these intermediaries, these new managers, who dispute the control of this new space over other political actors has been capable of transforming the Public Sphere. However, it becomes necessary to carry out a more detailed analysis of their nature and the capacities that they possess to intervene in the political process.

We should take into account that, unlike other political agents who act as intermediaries in the political sphere, these political prosumers are not representative. Citizens might place trust in them, but the position that they occupy is not derived from any democratic process, but from their abilities to use new information channels. Despite not having the same dissemination capacity as the media, they do share many of its functions, such as the production and distribution of information, dispute over agenda control, or monitoring politicians. Nevertheless, we cannot say that these prosumers are the new communication media. Not only because they can be displaced from their role, but also because they play political role, such as the effects they have upon mobilization, which are more akin to other kinds of political actors, such as political parties. This is a complex nature that could define new intermediaries as hybrid actors, whose impact upon the political system and the quality of democracy is important to analyze.

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Rubén Sánchez Medero

Notes

Author Biography

Rubén Sánchez Medero is an assistant professor of political communication at the Social Sciences Department at Carlos III of Madrid University (Spain). PhD in political science, he specializes in political communication and political psychology. He has developed his research in the applied field of political communication with studies related to political parties, candidates, partisan biases or effects of non-conscious perception.

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