Depoliticising Gender Equality in Turbulent Times: The Case of the European Gender Action Plan for External Relations

Introduction

The European Union (EU) represents itself as strongly committed to promoting gender equality worldwide. Since 2010, the EU has adopted two gender action plans (GAPs) – the first Gender Action Plan (GAP I; 2010–2015) and the second Gender Action Plan (GAP II; 2016–2020) – in order to advance the principle of gender equality and to better implement the strategy of gender mainstreaming in EU development policy and external relations. Particularly in GAP II, titled ‘Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment: Transforming the Lives of Girls and Women through EU External Relations 2016-2020’, the EU clearly articulates its leadership role by stating that it is ‘at the forefront of the protection and fulfilment of girls’ and women’s rights and vigorously promotes them in its external relations’ (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2015: 2).

GAP II is currently in the process of being implemented until the end of 2020. In contrast to the GAP I, GAP II is far-reaching, indeed, as it sets out a holistic framework for coordinating and implementing gender equality activities ‘in all areas of EU external relations’ (Allwood, 2018: 3, own emphasis; Šimáková, 2017). That means, GAP II reaches out beyond development cooperation and encompasses a wide and diverse range of policy areas, such as Common Foreign and Security Policy, Common Commercial Policy, European Neighbourhood Policy or the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, which includes immigration, asylum and fundamental rights among others. Moreover, the GAP II sets out the elements for an institutional culture shift in Commission services and in the European External Action Service (EEAS; European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2015: 13–15; cf. Allwood, 2019). One of the key elements in this context is a results-oriented approach that defines a large set of measurable goals and indicators for monitoring and evaluating gender equality outcomes. Overall, GAP II is an ambitious document that aims at extending its political and institutional reach and demonstrating the EU’s global leadership role in gender equality.

However, since more than a decade, the EU is confronted with a number of crises that significantly changed the environment under which the EU operates in the field of gender equality. The global financial crisis of 2008, the subsequent Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and austerity policies imposed on highly indebted EU member states by the Troika ¹ have deepened the economic disparities between and within member states. The structural reforms were inherently gender biased and had, as many studies show, particularly negative effects on women’s livelihoods (Bruff and Wöhl, 2016; Emejulu and Bassel, 2017; Karamessini and Rubery, 2013; Walby, 2015). Besides the economic crisis, the EU is also confronted with a series of political challenges, such as United Kingdom’s decision to leave the EU (Brexit), the increasing Euroscepticism and the strengthening of right-wing forces within Europe (Virdee and McGeever, 2017). Moreover, the instability in the neighbouring regions increased the inflows of refugees. The EU member states plunged into bitter fights over quota to receive refugees and demonstrated their inability to share the responsibility for refugees and to protect basic human rights. All these crises and the difficulties in crisis resolution have profoundly challenged the EU’s sense of solidarity and damaged its image as a ‘normative power’ (Manners, 2013). The dissatisfaction with the way the EU has handled all these crises has – as the introduction to this special issue underlines – culminated in a deep political legitimacy and credibility crisis of the EU.

In this context, inevitably the question arises how the direction of gender equality policies in EU external relations can be assessed against the backdrop of all these crises. Many empirical studies show that economic crisis and austerity politics usually lead to a deprioritisation of gender equality goals (Jacquot, 2017; Karamessini and Rubery, 2013; Lombardo, 2017a). The GAP II, however, has even extended its gender equality goals in the midst of crisis. The changes in GAP II actually emerged as a result of critical evaluations of GAP I. These evaluations revealed a commitment-implementation gap which called the credibility of the EU as a global policy entrepreneur in the field of gender equality into question (European Commission (EC), 2015). GAP II is a policy document that aims at overcoming exactly this commitment-implementation gap of the GAP I and at demonstrating EU’s credibility in the field of gender equality.

This article investigates the ways in which post-crisis recommendations (i.e. EC, 2009; European Parliament (EP), 2013; Stiglitz et al., 2010) are utilised in GAP II in order to tackle the credibility crisis in EU’s gender equality policies. It does so by analysing, first, how the content and the conceptual orientation of gender equality policies in EU external relations have changed in the light of post-crisis recommendations. Second, the article scrutinises the monitoring and evaluation framework through which the EU tries to improve the success of its gender equality activities in external relations. We argue that the results-oriented measures and gender indicators in GAP II translate complex societal processes into a technocratic data-based framework and thereby depoliticise gender equality activities. By employing a Foucauldian approach and theorising GAP II as a governance technology, we will unveil the norms underlying the gender equality measures in EU’s external relations.

The Economic Crisis in Europe: Setback or Window of Opportunity for Gender Equality?

This section briefly reviews the literature, which discusses the impact of the economic crisis and subsequent austerity measures on gender equality policies. There are different perspectives over the question of whether the economic crisis is to be assessed as a setback or a window of opportunity for tackling gender inequalities.

Feminist scholars analyse the effects of austerity on gender equality policies at national and supranational levels (e.g. Jacquot, 2017; Lombardo, 2017a, 2017b; Weiner and MacRae, 2017). Kantola and Lombardo (2017) argue that the EU and its member states have enforced a new ‘economic governance regime’ in the course of the economic crisis, which marginalises topics of gender and social equality altogether. They critically point to a climate of austerity that leads not only to a deterioration of women’s economic well-being but also to a steady dismantling of gender equality policies. As Lombardo (2017a) exemplifies for the case of Spain, austerity politics has promoted a neoliberal-conservative agenda with public retrenchments in the areas of ‘care, social assistance, family policies, and health’ (Lombardo, 2017a: 219). Moreover, she shows that public cuts resulted in a ‘downgrading or elimination of equality institutions’ (Lombardo, 2017b: 27) and activities at regional and local level.

Scholars of feminist political economy explain these trends by emphasising the ‘political and economic trajectories’ (Wöhl, 2017: 140) of EU gender equality politics. Sauer (2010) points to fiscal conservatism, neoliberal hegemony and market conformity of EU gender equality regulations that make gender equality policies prone to crises and austerity measures (see also Wöhl, 2008; Van der Vleuten, 2017). Griffin (2015) shows how supranational bureaucracies, such as the EU, have trivialised feminist concerns by techniques of governance during the economic and financial crisis. She coined the term ‘crisis governance feminism’ in which feminist rhetoric is utilised to enforce austerity measures with adverse effects on gender equality (Griffin, 2015: 63). Jacquot (2017: 43) is likewise pessimistic when she evaluates the recent developments concerning the EU gender equality policy as ‘progressive extinction’.

Apart from these negative estimates of the crisis effects, other scholars have argued that the economic crisis creates a window of opportunity for social policies and investments (Deacon, 2011; Sarfati, 2013). The ‘window of opportunity’ perspective is supported by various studies of global economic institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund or the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Evoked by the crisis, the studies interestingly identify growing inequalities, including gender and racial inequalities, as a hindrance to economic growth (OECD and Cingano, 2014; Ostry et al., 2014).

The ‘window of opportunity’ argument is reflected in post-crisis policy recommendations, which are suggesting transformative action towards a more just and equitable society. One famous example and major reference point for policy developments after the financial and economic crisis in 2008 and its aftermath in Europe is the report by the ‘Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress’ (Stiglitz et al., 2010). The former French president Sarkozy initiated the commission as a direct reaction to the crisis and the failure of common economic measurement systems, such as the gross domestic product (GDP). The commission consisted of a wide range of political and economic scholars, including the feminist economist Bina Agarwal. The report argues that economic growth (and its measurement through the GDP) does not equal well-being. The Commission suggests that governance institutions should increasingly focus at the quality of life (instead of economic growth) and consider to measure various types of inequalities as these inequalities negatively affect the ‘non-monetary aspects of quality of life’ (Stiglitz et al., 2010: 141). The so-called ‘Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi-report’ is one of the most prominent examples, which considers the measurement of inequalities in an intersectional manner. Thus, the report goes beyond simply measuring socio-economic differences and argues for developing indicators that measure ‘equal access to and treatment for all: by ethnicity, religion, race and gender, and so on’. (Stiglitz et al., 2010: 180). Two aspects mentioned in the report are reflected in the GAP II for EU external relations, that is, first, the goal to address socio-economic inequalities and, second, to measure inequalities in a comprehensive way by including gender, migration, age and different socio-economic groups.

Interestingly, the ‘window of opportunity’ argument seems to have gained momentum at the supranational level: Both the EC and the EP demand a systematic integration of gender equality policies in aftermath of the economic and financial crisis in order to mitigate the negative effects (EC, 2009; EP, 2013). ² As a matter of fact, EU spending on gender equality activities in development cooperation has increased significantly after the economic and financial crisis: In 2015, EU institutions spent over six times more on projects where gender was a principal objective than in 2005 (208.284 million US dollar in 2015 vs. 33.411 million US dollar in 2005). ³ This increased spending at EU level lies in stark contrast to the developments at national level – as mentioned above – where gender equality policies are under pressure and drop off the agenda during times of crisis.

In light of the ‘window of opportunity’ argument, the remainder of this article aims to explore the ways in which the post-crisis recommendations are abided and operationalised in GAP II.

The EU Gender Equality Architecture for External Relations

Gender policies play an important role in the introduction, stabilisation and diffusion of certain gender norms in the EU and are therefore key to understanding the construction of gender and its implications (Elgström, 2000; Van der Vleuten, 2017). This is even truer when it comes to the GAP II. While GAP I only covered the area of development (EC, 2010), the new GAP includes all external relations.

External relations in the EU were reorganised after the Lisbon Treaty, which was signed in 2007 and entered into force in 2009. The post of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who represents the EU in these policy areas, was newly created (EU, 2007). The High Representative, currently Josep Borrell, is also Vice President of the EC and head of the EEAS, the EU’s diplomatic arm. ⁴ Furthermore, external policy areas include development and human rights covered by the EC services (Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development, Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments). The EC and the EEAS are both represented in the EU headquarter, as well as in 140 EU Delegations and offices in partner countries. ⁵ All Commission services and the EEAS including the EU Delegations have to report the progress on the GAP implementation annually to the European Council (Council of the EU, 2015: 6).

The GAP therefore aligns different gender equality institutions, such as gender focal points or offices in the EU and sets the agenda on what aspects of gender equality are addressed and what measures are to be taken. Standardising gender equality policies does not only apply to the EU offices themselves but partner countries and EU member states alike. The GAP is therefore a suitable unit of analysis in researching the ways in which gender and gender relations are conceptualised and operationalised in policy procedures.

The GAP I consists of 17 pages, which outline the EU agenda on gender policies in development cooperation, the objectives and the approach and a section on monitoring and evaluation. The implementation strategy is based on a ‘three-pronged approach’ (EU, 2010: 7) consisting of political and policy dialogue, gender mainstreaming, and specific actions targeting gender equality and women’s empowerment. The operational framework for the monitoring and evaluation consists of five pages with nine specific objectives, 30 proposed actions and 41 indicators. A timetable determines in which year the indicators will be measured and reported. Most objectives are more general points of action than specific goals. The first objective, for instance, aims to ‘strengthen the lead role of the EU in promoting gender equality’, which is specified in four actions and six indicators. From the nine specific objectives, only three are more content related and specific (EC, 2010: 6). They focus on the UN Millennium Development Goals 3 and 5 on education and maternal health (objective 7), gender-based violence (objective 8) and women, peace and security (objective 9).

The new operational framework of the GAP II is annexed to the Council Conclusions and is based on a joint Staff Working Document (Council of the EU, 2015; European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2015). It consists of two parts, both of which differ substantially from the GAP I. The first part of the Annex is named ‘Institutional Culture Shift in the European Union External Relations’ (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2015: 20), which is mandatory for all implementing partners, namely, the EEAS, the EC and European Member States. It encompasses six objectives, 23 activities and 45 indicators, which are supposed to measure the implementation progress. New thematic priorities and pillars form the second part: (1) physical and psychological integrity, (2) social and economic rights and (3) girls’ and women’s participation. The thematic priorities are very comprehensive in comparison to the GAP I. They include altogether 14 objectives, 83 indicators and 60 examples for activities. In total, the GAP II consists of 20 objectives, 128 indicators and 83 activities, and is therefore far more elaborate than its predecessor (see Table 1). Instead of implementing all priorities and goals, the EU Delegations at partner country level are supposed to conduct a gender analysis as a starting point for all new external actions and identify at least one objective from every thematic priority. In comparison to the GAP I, the new framework regulates more precisely who is responsible for its implementation, what to do, when and how to do it, and how to measure it. ⁶

OPEN IN VIEWER

Table 1.

GAP I and GAP II in Comparison.

	GAP I	GAP II
Range	Development	All external relations
Institutions	Commission Services (DG DEVCO), including EU Delegations, Member States	Commission Services (EC), EEAS, Member States
Overarching priorities (institutional and thematic)	To ‘accelerate the achievement of the MDGs, especially MDG 3 and MDG 5, as well as to attain the goals set out by CEDAW, the Beijing Platform of Action, and the Cairo Programme of Action’ *	(A) Institutional Culture Shift (systematic reporting) (B) Physical and Psychological Integrity (C) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (D) Political and Civil Rights
Objectives	9	20
Thematic objectives (non-institutional)	3	14
Activities	30	83
Indicators	41	128
Reporting	Commission services	Commission services and EEAS

GAP: Gender Action Plan; DG DEVCO: Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development; MDG: Millennium Development Goals; CEDAW: Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women; EU: European Union; EC: European Commission; EEAS: European External Action Service.

*

EC, 2010: 6.

The sample of our qualitative content analysis includes GAP I and GAP II, with a specific focus on the current plan (EC, 2010; European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2015). To widen the context of our analysis, we included the following accompanying documents: the annual implementation reports of 2016 and 2017 (European Commission and EEAS, 2017, 2018), the evaluation of the EU support to gender equality and women’s empowerment in partner countries (EC, 2015), ⁷ the European implementation assessment by the EP (EP, 2017) and the guidance note for the implementation of the second EU GAP 2016–2020 (EC, 2016).

The content analysis of the GAP I and GAP II and the accompanying material focusses first on the conceptualisation of gender and gender relations, in order to explore in how far post-crisis recommendations are addressed content-wise. The second part of the analysis focusses at techniques of governance, which we refer to as ‘governing by numbers’. The aim is to scrutinise how the goals of the GAP II are operationalised and quantified. The next section highlights our theoretical understanding of the GAP as technology of governance.

The EU GAP as a Technology of Governance

We conceptualise the GAP as a technology of governance to unveil the rationalities and power effects.

The governmentality approach, which Michel Foucault introduced in his genealogy of modern states (Foucault, 2007), helps to analyse the GAP as a technology of governance. Governmentality entails ‘institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power’ (Foucault, 1991: 102). The notion of ‘technology’ is key to the approach of governmentality, as it ‘addresses the range of practical mechanisms, procedures, instruments, and calculations through which authorities seek to guide and shape the conduct and decisions of individuals and collectives in order to achieve specific objectives’ (Lemke, 2016: 4). Even though the practices of international organisations such as the EU do not regulate populations directly, they apply governmentality to states by introducing mechanisms and rationalities of ‘good governance’ (Hout, 2010; Joseph, 2009; Phillips, 2005). By setting a normative framework and linking it to financing procedures, the GAP in EU’s external relations governs populations indirectly by prescribing certain rationalities to member states and partner countries as a technical process. In this regard, particularly the GAP II

operates as power as well as in the service of other powers, all the while presenting itself as extrinsic to or neutral with regard to power, [which] makes it especially potent in shaping the lives of female clients of the state (Brown, 1992: 202).

Consequently, by conceptualising the GAP II as a technology of governance, we show how indicators in the operational framework include underlying norms, rationalities and implications for gender and intersecting inequalities. Researching governmentality means asking how we govern ourselves and others by focussing on singularities and microphysics of power (Abélès, 2017: 29). Sending and Neumann (2006: 656–657) focus on techniques and practices, knowledge and political rationality behind global governing tactics. It is thereby possible to illuminate the process of power transformation in which populations become objects and subjects of governance.

Merlingen (2003) differentiates between the analysis of political rationalities and political technologies. The analysis of rationalities can be conducted by examining policy documents to analyse which policy problems are identified and what kind of strategies are deployed to solve those problems (Merlingen, 2003: 367). While rationalities concern discursive elements, technologies translate discourses into practice and are the measures through which power is wielded. Such technologies include policies, data collection or monitoring practices (cf. Dean, 1996; Foucault, 2007; Kipnis, 2008; Miller and Rose, 1990).

The growing global governmentality literature has contributed substantially to the understanding of ‘governing through numbers’, but it fails – apart from a few examples (e.g. Fukuda-Parr et al., 2014; Merry, 2016) – to recognise how indicators contribute to the construction of gendered and intersecting identities. Wöhl (2008) and Muehlenhoff (2017) have used the concept of governmentality from a feminist point of view to unveil neoliberal norms and the construction of gender in and through the employment strategy and security policy of the EU. Scholars who have linked the governmentality perspective to the intersectionality approach have mainly focussed on processes of subjectivation (Beckmann, 2013; Staunæs, 2003) or the entanglements of neoliberal governmentality and diversity or feminist knowledge (Bilge, 2013; Duggan, 2012; Prügl, 2011). Despite those rapprochements between intersectionality and governmentality, the assessment of governance technologies through an intersectional lens is still a blind spot. The intersectional approach can further enhance the understanding of the complex structure of power and discourse in state actions.

To probe the way in which intersecting inequalities and gender relations are conceptualised and operationalised by the EU, we will employ a feminist and intersectional lens. Intersectionality enables us further to reflect on power relations in the context of the EU as a normative power in external and development policy making, encompassing global power relations and neo-colonial dependencies (Dossa, 2007; Manners, 2013). Intersectionality is a term introduced by Kimberlé Crenshaw to focus on interdependencies between different forms of discrimination, because one-dimensional analyses and foci bear the risk of reinforcing multiple inequalities (Crenshaw, 1991). Intersectionality research investigates ‘how categories of race, class and gender are intertwined and mutually constitutive’ (Davis, 2008: 71). While intersectionality as a travelling theory has been used by a number of scholars to focus on various categories of difference, many feminist scholars have stressed the importance of the interconnectedness of race, gender and class inequalities (Yuval-Davis, 2006). This understanding of intersectionality is not limited to identity categories but focuses on a more structural analysis of inequality relations or ‘axes of inequality’ (Klinger et al., 2007). Following Yuval-Davis (2006), we will focus on the structural relations of gender, race, class/economic inequalities. By assessing underlying structures, which (re)produce intersecting inequalities, we argue against the rhetorical use of ‘ornamental intersectionality’ (Bilge, 2013: 408). The next section analyses the rationalities of the GAP as a technology of governance using a feminist and intersectional perspective as described above.

Rationalities of Gender in the GAP

GAP II includes some of the post-crisis recommendations that can be found in the ‘Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi-report’ (Stiglitz et al., 2010), that is, first, the goal to address socio-economic inequalities and, second, to measure intersecting inequalities. However, they both remain unredeemed. In order to develop our argument, we will briefly analyse the first GAP, then turn to the changes in the GAP II and explore what these changes mean in terms of content and policy procedures.

As we described above, the thematic focus of the GAP I revolves mainly around three topics and is therefore relatively narrow. These topics are reproductive health and rights, education and gender-based violence (EC, 2010). The focus at these topics suggests a limited understanding of gender relations as power relations. Under these topics, women are mostly considered in their roles as mothers, victims and caregivers, which normalises and enshrines stereotyping (Çağlar, 2010). The understanding of gender itself is also not very comprehensive in the GAP I. While data should be disaggregated by gender, it is not specified what gender is supposed to mean and how data on gender can be generated. On the same page, it is stated that gender mainstreaming means to include the ‘needs of both sexes’ (EC, 2010: 10), which illustrates a very limited and binary understanding of gender. An intersectional perspective is lacking altogether.

Economic topics such as labour market participation, social reproduction and socio-economic gender inequalities are apart from two exceptions missing from the operational framework of the first GAP. The two activities propose ‘increased support to women’s economic empowerment’ (EC, 2010: 15) and the inclusion of ‘gender issues in the permanent dialogue on sector and macroeconomic policies’ (EC, 2010: 14). Other parts of the GAP mention and emphasise the importance of women’s economic empowerment without putting it into concrete terms or objectives (EC, 2010: 3). In summary, the GAP I has a very narrow understanding of gender and does not account for structural and intersectional gender inequalities. The crisis can thereby be seen as a chance to close the gaps by reshaping the focus of GAPs, including economic inequalities and a more intersectional and comprehensive understanding of gender. The comparison of the first with the GAP II can tell us whether this window of opportunity opened by the crisis has been seized and whether it led to a more comprehensive, intersectional understanding of gender.

On the first sight, the understanding of gender in GAP II is by far more comprehensive than that of its predecessor, including the introduction of intersecting inequalities, which are mentioned explicitly in various documents. The Staff Working Document on the GAP II states that ‘the gender gap is even larger when gender inequality intersects with other forms of exclusion such as disability, age, caste, ethnicity, sexual orientation, geographical remoteness or religion’ (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2015: 3). The accompanying guidance note for the GAP II implementation states that mandatory gender analysis needs to assess how gender intersects with other inequalities, though it is not specified what is meant by ‘other inequalities’ (EC, 2016: 39). The first implementation report of the GAP II in 2016 claims that ‘inequality based on race, ethnicity, caste, age, ability, religion, gender identity, and so on, need[s] to be challenged and changed in every sphere’ (European Commission and EEAS, 2017: 9). The second report even declares ‘diversity and intersectional inequalities’ as crucial (European Commission and EEAS, 2018: 159). The above examples show how gender as an intersectional category is introduced in the new GAP, which suggests a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of gender, and purports to tackle intersectional inequalities as a result of the post-crisis discourse. Furthermore, the thematic priorities give social and economic rights a prominent place in the GAP. The EC recommended in another document to focus on social safety in its support of developing countries in coping with the crisis: ‘The Commission will give specific attention, when feasible and needed, to social safety nets, labour intensive works and the reform of labour markets’ (EU, 2009: 8). The crisis thereby offered the opportunity to analyse and mitigate economic inequalities and support social infrastructure, which suggests a more structural understanding of gender relations.

When we deepen our analysis and turn to the operational framework, which is the basis for the reporting on the implementation of the GAP, another picture emerges. It shows how the intersectional approach remains very limited in its concretisation. The plan focuses on age by targeting girls and young women specifically, while other inequality categories are omitted or marginalised. Overall, the interconnection between age and sex is reflected in nine out of eighty-three indicators. The interlinkages between social class, economic income and gender are reflected in just five indicators (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2015). Race, ethnicity or geographic location are not mentioned in any of the indicators. This limited understanding of intersectionality also becomes apparent in staff training on the implementation of the GAP with the title ‘Leave No One Behind’. They include gender, age and disability as categories, but neglect race or ethnicity as well as their linkages to economic inequalities. ⁸ Sometimes, other categories are implied in the wording ‘such as’ or ‘and so on’. These additions demonstrate an additive understanding of intersectionality by adding just another category. It does not recognise the ‘differential positionings of power in which different identity groups can be located in specific historical contexts’ (Yuval-Davis, 2006: 204). The implementation reports of the GAP show how even age is rarely addressed and how reported measures and results only rely on sex disaggregation (European Commission and EEAS, 2017, 2018). The trajectories between gender, race and class, which build the structural dimensions of intersectional inequalities (Yuval-Davis, 2006), are therefore neglected, although they have contributed to the economic crisis in the first place (Fukuda-Parr et al., 2013). Translating intersectional equality claims into policies without recognising the primary causes and interlinkages between gender, race and class is thereby prone to further entrench inequalities instead of reducing them (Beier, 2018).

On top of the missing operationalisation of economic and racial inequalities, the use of gender is itself not consistent throughout the document. Some indicators demand sex disaggregation of the data, others use the word gender, whereas the difference is nowhere specified, implying that sex and gender are the same and that there are only women and men, omitting a more diverse and non-binary gender understanding. While the first GAP presented women mainly as victims, caretakers and peacemakers, these images which facilitate and reproduce gender norms are still very dominant in the new GAP. Women are, for example, determined as ‘key actors for improving nutrition for themselves and their families’ or as main drivers for peace (Council of the EU, 2015: 20). The alleged more comprehensive and intersectional understanding is therefore only to a certain extent realised in the new GAP.

The same can be observed for the focus on economic inequalities and the more structural understanding of gender relations. The third thematic priority proclaims ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – Economic and Social Empowerment’ (Council of the EU, 2015: 21). The four respective objectives in the results framework focus not so much on economic rights or social safety nets but on access to education, work, financial services and resources. Social reproduction which has a prominent place in feminist literature on the crisis (cf. Elson, 2012; Karamessini and Rubery, 2017) is not mentioned in any of the goals or objectives of the GAP, but only as one indicator referring to the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 5.4, measuring unpaid care work (Council of the EU, 2015: 23). The indicator suggests to measure the objective ‘access to decent work for women of all ages’ which frames social reproductive work as hindrance to paid work instead of recognising it as an important dimension of social and economic gender inequality. Various feminist scholars have debated and criticised the mere understanding of social and economic empowerment as women’s labour force participation and access to microcredits (Fraser, 2012; Kantola and Squires, 2012; Prügl, 2015).

The opportunity provided by the crises to tackle socio-economic inequalities in relation to gender has thereby only insufficiently been seized by the EU’s external gender policy. It instead focusses on a technocratic exercise through governing by numbers, as we will argue in the next section.

Governing by N#

The 128 indicators of the GAP suggest a step up in the credibility and accountability of the EU’s gender policy (see Table 1). We will argue that, by having a strong indicator framework, the GAP quantifies the objectives in a way, which depoliticises gender and makes power relations invisible and to a mere counting exercise as we argue in this section. The evaluation of the first GAP states a ‘mismatch between the EU’s strong policy commitments on GEWE ⁹ and the organisational capacity to deliver on them’ (EC, 2015: 91). The GAP II claims ‘to learn from past lessons’ (Council of the EU, 2015: 5). New features in the GAP II can therefore be put into the context of a crisis of credibility the EU is obliged to solve in turbulent times. The new measurement system can also be seen in the light of post-crisis recommendations from the Stiglitz-report and others that proclaim, that indicators should measure intersectional inequalities (Stiglitz et al., 2010: 180). The analysis of the GAP’s operational framework as a technology of governance shows the way gender relations are governed by indicators and whether these post-crisis recommendations have been seized as an opportunity to enhance progress on gender equality in external relations.

The indicators in the GAP are based on present resources and other existing indicator frames instead of appropriate ways to measure the proclaimed objectives. The proposed indicators are mostly existing indicators by the SDGs and the EU Results Framework (Council of the EU, 2015: 2, 5, 9). Indicators are thereby not designed to meet the objectives in the GAP but are pragmatically based on existing data sources. This explains that the objectives are not necessarily linked to their indicators. The objective 20, for instance, aims at ‘Equal rights enjoyed by women to participate in and influence decision-making processes on climate and environmental issues’ (Council of the EU, 2015: 28). The respective indicator 20.1 measures the ‘Number of deaths per 100,000 from climate-related and natural disasters – average over last ten years (disaggregated by sex)’ (Council of the EU, 2015: 28). This means, the accomplishment of the objective “equal participation” in the field of climate and environmental policies is measured by counting the number of deaths. This causal link is seriously questionable for two reasons. Firstly, it constructs an unequivocal relation between gender equality and the number of climate change victims and, thus, does not account for many other factors that influence the course of natural disasters. Secondly, the underlying assumption here is that women by nature are ‘environmental caretaker’ (Resurrección, 2017: 73) and make more environmental-friendly decisions. This example drastically shows how the comprehensive objective of equal rights becomes problematic when translated into a quantifiable and preexisting measurement system. It also reinforces and reproduces stereotypes of women as being specifically close to nature and as such responsible for environmental topics. All indicators in the thematic sections are quantitative, counting, for instance, the number of women, the number of countries or the number of communities taking part in EU-funded projects. This sex-counting suggests that gender relations change substantially through the number of women funded or participating in projects.

The ‘horizontal goal’ and the respective activities of the recent GAP follow the general trend of the spread of indicators and benchmarking instruments ¹⁰ (Broome and Quirk, 2015; Merry, 2016; Van der Vleuten and Verloo, 2012). It is striking that 7 out of 23 activities in the category Institutional Culture in the GAP II establish benchmarking instruments. The collection of further data by stipulating sex and age disaggregation becomes a key instrument for achieving gender equality in the GAP II (Council of the EU, 2015: 9). The GAP thereby indicates that counting itself, generating more data and meeting quantifiable objectives, becomes an exercise to increase the credibility of EU’s gender support in external relations.

Following Hacking (1982), we argue that indicators function as control mechanisms. Even if the aspect of social control is not intended, they take effect by constructing a distorted reality, which serves as a reference point for the evaluation and creation of further policies. In quantifying social, political and economic phenomena and thereby implying that numbers indicate complex social realities, indicators play a major role in generating knowledge and creating political truth (Fioramonti, 2014; Lepenies, 2014; Merry, 2016; for a historical perspective see Speich Chassé, 2016). They construct social realities, such as a dual gender system, by using sex-disaggregated data, and focus on technical solutions instead of complex power structures. Sex disaggregation does not only naturalise and normalise the dualism of men and women but also contributes to the construction of very stereotypical and heteronormative gender roles when the numbers are depicted and interpreted in an essentialist manner (Derickson, 2009; Tolhurst et al., 2012). This notion of gender stems from a neglect to consider gender relations as power relations but instead frames women as mothers, victims and caregivers (Çağlar, 2010). The overall problem of translating social phenomenon into countable data frameworks is therefore exacerbated in the case of gender and other categories of difference. The reduction of complexity leads in this case to stereotyping, naturalisation and essentialisation. The alleged more comprehensive, intersectional and complex understanding of gender equality reflected in the GAP is translated into a technocratic exercise of setting targets and measuring indicators with their own problematic implications.

The operationalisation is creating the semblance of evidence-based policy making in a neutral development process (and progress), which can be scientifically measured and monitored (Lepenies, 2014; Merry, 2016). The framework can be interpreted as a direct reaction to the credibility crisis, because of its function in increasing the effectiveness of implementation and accountability. The thematic priorities in the GAP set a strong normative framework for all implementing actors and collaborating partners, and thereby normalise a specific view on gender policy problems and how to resolve them. This technocratic understanding of achieving gender equality and women’s empowerment stands in stark contrast to democratic, participatory and political understandings of gender equity and equality. The Committee on Development and the Committee on Women‘s Rights and Gender Equality of the EP have a similar concern, when they argue that the GAP should be ‘a genuine prioritising and policy implementation mechanism, as opposed to a mere in-house reporting tool’ (EP, 2018: 69).

Therefore, we state that the operationalisation of gender equality in the GAP depoliticises and degrades the implementation process to a technical exercise. Furthermore, its rationalities include a very limited and stereotypical understanding of gender. The process of depoliticisation and limiting the understanding of gender equality is highly political but obscured as such. Instead of debating over strategies to tackle gender inequality, the GAP transforms gender into a mere counting exercise, which is legitimised by an increased accountability. CONCORD, the European confederation of Relief and Development NGOs (non-governmental organisations), states in a similar manner about the new GAP that ‘[t]here should be a shift from reporting to action’ (CONCORD, 2018: 24).

As we have shown, governing by numbers distorts social realities and gender relations. The qualitative aspects of gender inequality get thereby extruded in its translation into quantitative measurement systems as governing technology. The enhanced accountability framework as a strategy to reduce the credibility crisis of the EU can therefore be seen as a strategy to depoliticise gender equality altogether.

Conclusion

In our article, we asked how gender equality policies in EU external relations have changed in the light of post-crisis recommendations and how these changes were operationalised in the policy procedures. Our content analysis of the GAP and the accompanying material revealed that there is indeed a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of gender, which is very limited in its operationalisation. While economic rights are, for instance, thematised, the respective measures focus on individual economic empowerment and omit broader societal changes through social infrastructure and the recognition of social reproduction. The second part of the analysis focussed on the ways in which the EU tried to tackle the credibility crisis through data-driven and indicator-based procedures. We have demonstrated how governing by numbers limits and distorts the understanding of gender equality to a mere counting exercise which is prone to stereotypical, essentialist and problematic depictions of gender.

The economic crisis has enabled democratic spaces to reflect on global inequalities and discuss alternatives (Saith, 2011). In regard to the European gender policy for external relations, this space has only been seized in a rhetorical manner and has not been translated into the implementation measures. The opposite is the case: The quantification of social realities through the operationalisation in the GAP oversimplifies and depoliticises gender equality and at the same time obscures its political rationalities. The operationalisation of a more intersectional approach is in itself a welcome development, but it contains the risk of limiting intersectionality to questions of identity and thus neglects the entanglement of gender, race and class relations with the global economic system. The monitoring and benchmarking system in the GAP serves the purpose of translating the meaning of intersecting inequalities by fixating complex societal processes in a technical and data-based framework.

On the contrary, governing technologies, such as indicator systems and frameworks, can themselves be used to track down outcomes of policy processes and elucidate the structural causes for their failure and inefficiency. They give feminist researchers and activists a rich data body for analysis and the chance to enhance their understanding of certain global policy fields, develop counterstrategies and contest the implicative meaning of gender policies. Thus, they can exert pressure on policy makers to deliver on their claims and promises to reduce inequalities. Data gathering and accountability comes at a prize: The overwhelming effects of policies in constructing inequalities and shaping gender relations seem not only to contradict but also to marginalise intersectional scholarship and feminist academic and political critique.

Feminist scholars and gender experts play their own role in this process: They contest existing gender policies for their lack of accountability, methods of tracing or conceptual clarity and call for data generation and disaggregation (e.g. Esquivel, 2016; Hafner-Burton and Pollack, 2009; Stuart and Woodroffe, 2016). As Larner and Le Heron (2004) remark, the discussion about the inadequacy or inefficiency of benchmarking naturalises it by giving it some materiality. Taking this argument seriously means being careful that a critique of the operationalisation and measurement of inequalities does not legitimise the quantification of policy making. Sally Engle Merry points to this ambivalence: ‘Quantification has a great deal to contribute to global knowledge and governance, but it is important to resist its seductive claim to truth and to recognize it as only one form of knowledge with its own distinctive limitations’ (Merry, 2016: 222). This is also true for other policy areas but in the case of gender, quantification additionally distorts gender in a stereotypical and essentialist manner as we have shown above.

In terms of post-crisis policy making, it is therefore important to critically assess the new focus on intersectional inequalities and its quantification for its underlying rationalities. The emergence of intersectionality and inequality rhetoric can accordingly be understood as a form of governance technology, which depoliticises inequalities altogether. Since increasing inequalities and the growth paradigm have contributed to the economic crisis in the first place (Fukuda-Parr et al., 2013), addressing structural and intersectional inequalities through redistributive measures is not only important for a comprehensive and transformative approach to gender equality but has far-reaching implications for global inequalities and the likeliness of future economic crises. Addressing intersectional inequalities in policies must go beyond adding other identity categories but recognise different positions and structures of power structures (Yuval-Davis, 2006: 204). Intersectional approaches in the EU should also reflect on how much the EU and national states themselves are involved in creating and reproducing inequalities (Verloo, 2006: 223). By limiting intersectionality to pure sex- and age-counting instead, it seems highly doubtful that the EU will manage to reduce intersectional inequalities substantially.