Abstract
Background:
Monkeypox (mpox) is a reemerging viral zoonosis caused by the mpox virus (MPXV) that has significant global public health implications following the 2022 and 2024 outbreaks. This review examines the evolving landscape of MPXV, focusing on its genomic organization, epidemiological shifts, phylogenetic relationship with variola virus, zoonotic transmission cycles, and the critical interventions for therapeutic targets and vaccine development.
Methods:
A comprehensive narrative review of literature from 2020 to 2026 was conducted. Key thematic insights were synthesized using Bibliometrix, Scopus Analytics, and VOSviewer to analyze global trends in transmission dynamics, clinical manifestations, and therapeutic interventions.
Results:
The review highlights the divergence of MPXV into Clades I and II, noting that while Clade IIb drove the 2022 global outbreak, the more virulent Clade Ib has dominated the 2024 reemergence. Zoonotic spillover remains a primary risk through contact with reservoirs such as rope squirrels and Gambian pouch rats, although human-to-human transmission has evolved to include rapid community spread among specific high-risk populations. Genomic analyses identify key mutations in proteins like H3L that facilitate host-specific adaptability and immune evasion. Current clinical management relies on supportive care, with targeted use of the JYNNEOS vaccine and antivirals like tecovirimat for severe cases.
Conclusions:
The continued reemergence of mpox underscores the necessity for an integrated “One Health” approach to surveillance and pandemic preparedness. Future research must prioritize environmental wildlife monitoring, genomic surveillance of emerging clades, and the development of multi-epitope vaccines to effectively mitigate both zoonotic spillover and human transmission.
Introduction
Monkeypox (mpox) is a reemerging zoonotic viral disease caused by the mpox virus (MPXV) with significant global public health implications. As a member of the Orthopoxvirus genus, mpox is closely related to the variola virus (VARV), the causative agent of smallpox. Since its first discovery in laboratory monkeys in 1958 and the identification of the first human case in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1970, mpox was historically considered a rare disease endemic primarily to the tropical rainforests of Central and West Africa. However, the epidemiological landscape has shifted dramatically over the last few decades.
The virus is classified into two distinct genetic clades: Clade I (formerly the Congo Basin clade) and Clade II (formerly the West African clade). While Clade I has been associated with higher virulence and fatality rates in endemic regions, Clade II gained global notoriety during the 2022 multicountry outbreak. This 2022 outbreak represented a critical turning point, as the virus spread rapidly across nonendemic countries, primarily through human-to-human transmission, including close contact and sexual networks, leading the World Health Organization (WHO) to declare it a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC).
More recently, the emergence of a new strain, Clade Ib, in late 2023 and 2024 has further complicated the global response. This strain has demonstrated increased transmissibility and severity, particularly affecting diverse populations in the DRC and neighboring African nations, prompting a second PHEIC declaration in August 2024. These evolving dynamics highlight the virus’s capacity for microevolution and human adaptation, driven by selection pressures rather than mutation pressure alone.
Given the shifting demographics of infection, transitioning from a childhood disease in endemic areas to one predominantly affecting adults in global networks, there is an urgent need for a comprehensive synthesis of current scientific knowledge. This review examines the evolving landscape of mpox, providing a narrative synthesis of its structural morphology, genomic organization, and changing epidemiological patterns. Furthermore, it explores the intricate interplay between the virus and the host immune system, clinical manifestations, and the latest advancements in diagnostic, therapeutic, and preventive strategies. By integrating evidence from recent outbreaks and ongoing research, this article aims to inform clinical management and strengthen public health preparedness for future pandemics.
Epidemiological Insights
mpox was first discovered in 1958 among laboratory monkeys in Denmark that were shipped from Singapore. It was in 1970 that the first human mpox case was reported in a 9-month-old boy in the DRC, who lacked a smallpox vaccination (Jezek et al., 1987). Within a decade, there were 59 human cases reported from Central and West African regions, which rapidly increased to over 500 by 1999. Historically, mpox has been endemic to African countries, namely, the DRC, Central African Republic, Nigeria, and others. In 2003, the DRC reported the first human mpox outbreak involving 11 confirmed cases, all under 18 years of age and presenting with serious illness; most of them were residing in the same hospital. It also documented the longest adequately recorded chain of uninterrupted transmission of mpox in humans, which is up to six consecutive human-to-human transmissions (Learned et al., 2005). The DRC turned out to be the worst-affected country from 1970 to 2010 and saw a jump from 38 cases in the 1970 to a staggering number of 18,788 by 2019. Nigeria stood as the second worst-affected country with 181 cases, followed by the Republic of Congo (97 cases) and the Central African Republic (67 cases) in 2019 (O’Shea et al., 2022). Children were more prone to MPX (median age 4 years) during the 1970; however, the pathogenicity of the virus has possibly increased, as it affected a broader age range and shifted the median age to 21 years by the 2010. From 1970 to the 1990, all the deaths were below 10 years. As of the 2010, children contributed only 37.5% of mortality due to MPX infections.
Based on genomic sequences and clinical presentations, the MPXV has been classified into two clades: Clade I, which was predominant in Central Africa and the Congo Basin, and Clade II, which primarily affected regions of West Africa. Between 1981 and 2017, there have been several outbreaks caused by Clade I in the DRC with a high fatality rate (1–12%). In 2017, Clade II caused a large outbreak in Nigeria, with 122 confirmed cases, after nearly 40 years of no cases in the country, but was less virulent, with a fatality rate <0.1% (Mitjà et al., 2023a; Yinka-Ogunleye et al., 2019). The outbreak in Nigeria was attributed to waning immunity due to the discontinuation of smallpox vaccination in 1980 and increased butchering of wildlife for subsistence. It is reported that smallpox vaccination provides protection against the other members of the Orthopoxvirus genus and is effective in preventing mpox, as 90% of reported mpox cases did not have any history of smallpox immunity (O’Shea et al., 2022).
Along with an increase in the cases in endemic regions, there were some sporadic outbreaks in nonendemic countries that were associated with travel to or animal importation from endemic countries (Mitjà et al., 2023). In 2003, 71 confirmed cases were reported in the United States, which led to the first international attention to the disease. These cases were related to prairie dogs that had been in contact with African rodents. Only 21% of them were vaccinated against the smallpox virus, and no deaths were recorded. There was no proof of human-to-human transmission either. Travel-related cases were reported in other nonendemic countries in the following two decades. Between 2018 and 2021, seven cases were confirmed in the United Kingdom, out of which four were travel-related. Additionally, one case in both Israel and Singapore was also reported (Gong et al., 2022; Yong et al., 2020). Travel-related cases emerged in the United States in July 2021 when two travelers returned from Nigeria to Texas and Maryland (Meo et al., 2023).
The 2022 mpox outbreak
A 2022 WHO report considered mpox endemic to several African countries, including the DRC, Central African Republic, Benin, Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, and Côte d’Ivoire (O’Shea et al., 2022). In May 2022, the WHO announced mpox as a global health emergency and declared a multicountry global mpox outbreak in humans (Jamil et al., 2022). Before May 6, 2022, a cumulative total of 27 cases were active in Africa until a case was reported from the United Kingdom in a traveler from Nigeria (Cohen, 2022). Since then, several cases started to appear across several nonendemic countries. Africa did not report the same increase in the number of cases. The number of cases increased exponentially in nonendemic regions with people with no travel history to endemic areas. On July 23, 2022, the WHO declared mpox as a PHEIC. The weekly trends (Fig. 1a) illustrate the temporal distribution of these cases, including the initial 2022 peak and the significant upsurge in 2024. Many early cases occurred in people who attended an international LGBT+ Pride event held on the Spanish island of Gran Canaria and were linked to transmission chains in European countries. Later reports and case studies showed that the infection was predominantly transmitted via sexual activities between males (men who have sex with men [MSM]) (Gong et al., 2022). These demonstrated the human-to-human spread of mpox outside of endemic regions. The 2022 outbreak lasted about 11 months, as the WHO declared an end to the acute global outbreak in May 2023 and the PHEIC concluded, citing steady control and decline in acute mpox global cases. In total, 111 countries reported cases of mpox infections, with cumulative cases over 87,500 and 141 deaths. The worst-affected countries in this outbreak until May 2023 were the United States (n = 30,194), Brazil (n = 10,941), Spain (n = 7,551), France (n = 4,146), Colombia (n = 4,090), Mexico (n = 4,017), Peru (n = 3,800), the United Kingdom (n = 3,742), Germany (n = 3,691), and Canada (n = 1,484), contributing to 84% of all global cases (Sun et al., 2024). mpox infections have shown a changing demographic pattern over time. From 1970 to 2015, mpox primarily affected children under 10 years (71–83%). However, during the 2017–2018 outbreaks in Nigeria, the median age shifted to 29 years, which further changed to 34 years in the 2022 global outbreak. Similarly, the proportion of male cases increased from 51–64% (1970–2015) to 64% in 2017–2018 Nigeria, reaching 96.8% in the 2022 outbreak. The MPXV was detected in human semen as well, suggesting the MSM subpopulation might be at higher risk of infection (Kipkorir et al., 2022). There is also a disparity based on regions. Africa witnessed more child (0–9 years, 23.08%) cases compared with the cases in regions of Europe and the Americas, where children accounted for <1% of cumulative cases (Ogunleye et al., 2023). The pooled case fatality rate (CFR) before the 2022 global outbreak was estimated to be 8.7%, which varied by clade. However, a WHO report estimated a pooled CFR of 0.08 in the 2022 outbreak, which is significantly lower. Very low CFR of the Clade II variant (<1%), active surveillance, and early diagnosis and treatment are plausible reasons (Tuttle et al., 2024).

Reemergence as 2024 mpox outbreak
A new strain of Clade I, Clade 1b, emerged during September 2023 in the South Kivu province of the DRC. This new strain appeared to be more severe than that of the 2022 Clade 2b, with higher transmissibility and significant clinical differences (Vakaniaki et al., 2024). By late 2023 and into 2024, it spread to several other African countries, including Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, the Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, and South Africa (Vakaniaki et al., 2024). On August 14, 2024, WHO declared the new outbreak a PHEIC, just 15 months after lifting the previous mpox PHEIC. Although a lot of cases could not be laboratory-confirmed due to ongoing conflicts in the affected region of the DRC, the infection was deemed more lethal with higher transmissibility (including sexual transmission). In 1 week of early August, the DRC reported about 2400 suspected cases and 56 deaths. African countries reported more confirmed and suspected mpox cases in 2024 than in all of 2023. Children were particularly more affected, with two-thirds of the cases being under 15 years of age (Parums, 2024). This outbreak was linked to Clade 1b, although the 2022 Clade 2b variant was also present; it was not predominant. Case reports show that sex workers constituted a large proportion of the cases from South Kivu, where Clade 1b predominates (Masirika et al., 2025).
According to a report from WHO, as of May 2025, 30 countries have detected Clade 1b MPXV, with 10 African countries still reporting ongoing community transmission, including DRC, Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Burundi. This global expansion and the varying intensity of case counts across different regions are visualized in the choropleth maps (Fig. 1b). From January 2024 to May 2025, Africa reported 36,310 confirmed cases and 123 deaths due to mpox, with the DRC contributing the majority. Sierra Leone experienced a sharp surge in 2025, becoming the top affected country in recent weeks (Mukherjee et al., 2023). From January 2022 to April 2025, globally, 142,151 confirmed cases and 328 deaths were recorded, out of which 68,840 confirmed cases and 152 deaths were reported from the WHO Region of the Americas and 35,833 confirmed cases and 135 deaths in the African Region. It is important to note that this number could be a huge underestimation, as many cases and deaths could not be laboratory verified, especially in African regions due to social instability, ongoing conflicts, and lack of awareness and necessary infrastructure in the areas of outbreak. Over the past year, mpox case counts plateaued in the African Region, whereas the Eastern Mediterranean and Southeast Asia Regions have consistently reported the lowest case numbers, although an increase was noted in the Eastern Mediterranean earlier in 2025, primarily influenced by a rise in cases in Gulf nations. The European Region has shown a stable trend in recent months. Meanwhile, regions such as the Americas and the Western Pacific saw increased case numbers in early 2024, which later declined. The global average of confirmed mpox cases per month stood at approximately 3253. The African Region contributed the majority, with 28,973 cases, followed by 4891 cases in the Americas and 2355 in the Western Pacific. Among countries outside Africa, Spain recorded the highest monthly count in April 2025, with 93 confirmed cases (Hatmal et al., 2022; Mukherjee et al., 2023). There is a decline in mpox infections since the 2022 peak in the United States and Europe due to the development of targeted vaccination strategies and, more importantly, behavioral changes within high-risk communities, such as reduced sexual partners in the case of men who have sex with men and increased immunity following infection, as it reduced the population of susceptible individuals.
Structural Morphology/Genomic Organization
MPV is a member of the Orthopoxvirus family, including VARV, the main causative agent of smallpox. mpox mainly infects the remote parts of Central and West Africa (Hatmal et al., 2022). Genome analysis of mpox provides insights into its evolutionary trajectory, transmission, and the potential for future outbreaks. The mpox genome is 200 kilobases long and encodes more than 200 genes (Gong et al., 2022). The genome is well organized in a central coding region, flanked by two identical terminal regions. The central coding region contains genes involved in the primary processes like viral replication, transcription, and pathogenesis, whereas the terminal regions contain genes involved in host range and virulence; refer to Figure 2 (Monzón et al., 2024). Studies have reported that the comparative genomic analysis of different mpox strains revealed a genetic variation within the virus. The mpox strain responsible for the 2003 outbreak in the United States was found to be more closely related to West African strains than to Central African strains, suggesting that it was introduced to the United States from West Africa (Chen et al., 2005).

Additionally, the analysis of mpox strains from different outbreaks has identified mutations in genes involved in virulence and immune evasion, potentially contributing to the differences in disease severity and transmissibility. Phylogenetic analysis of mpox has also indicated the evolutionary trajectory of the virus. The virus originated in Africa and diverged from VARV, approximately 3000 years ago. The virus has subsequently evolved into multiple clades, which are associated with different geographic regions and outbreaks. The most recent common ancestor of all known mpox strains is estimated to have existed approximately 200 years ago (Isidro et al., 2022). Using genome-wide and protein-specific phylogenetic analysis of the mpox revealed that the 2022 outbreak sequences and the previously endemic virus sequences did not diverge from the endemic mpox (Luna et al., 2022). The analysis of two full draft genome sequences from Portugal and Belgium confirmed this against 100 endemic mpox as well as other members of the Orthopoxvirus group, such as CPV and VARV. It was found that mpox from the 2022 outbreak was derived from the West African clade due to the presence of a complete identity of protein A42R and H3L between the two sequences. Moreover, they had a 98% genome-wide sequence similarity among all the mpox sequences and 95% similarity with the members of the Orthopoxvirus group. Interestingly, a higher variability was observed between VARV and mpox due to the exposure of H3L, an immunologically important protein, to light. H3L is a 324-amino-acid-long protein with glycosyltransferase on the viral coat and the role of one of its epitopes in host immune system recognition. The protein plays an important role in attachment to the host target cells and facilitates the entry of the virus (Gong et al., 2022). This signifies the host-specific adaptability of the virus due to the high overall genome-wide sequence similarity among the Orthopoxvirus group members as well as higher variability, up to 6.5%, in the H3L protein sequence between VARV and mpox. Thus, H3L could serve as a potential target for vaccine development against mpox (Huang et al., 2025).
The mpox from the multicountry outbreak in 2022 derived from the similar mpox that previously caused the major outbreak in Nigeria in 2017–2018. This was transmitted from Nigeria to Israel, Singapore, and the United Kingdom in 2018–2019, which later evolved genetic mutations and gave rise to the 2022 outbreak, causing mpox (Adler et al., 2022; Ogunleye et al., 2023). Evolutionary studies have revealed that mpox can undergo microevolution involving amino acid point mutations for human adaptations for higher pathogenesis and infection. Phylogenetic and mutational studies have shown that mpox from 2017 to 2018 Nigeria acquired multiple point mutations in multiple proteins and evolved into the 2018–2019 mpox lineage, and 10 proteins showed common amino acid mutations (Ogunleye et al., 2023). This further formed the evolutionary ancestor of the B.1 mpox lineage that caused the 2022 outbreak, comprising the same specific mutations as the UK lineage. Analyzing the codon usage bias and host adaptation indices, studies revealed that the genes that demonstrated nucleotide mutations in lineage B.1 were favorable for human adaptation. Analyses such as the ENc-GC3s plot, the Neutrality plot, and Parity Rule 2 (PR2)-bias plot suggested that selection pressure, rather than mutation pressure, plays a major role in the evolution of genes with nucleotide mutations in the B.1 lineage of mpox (Desingu et al., 2022). It is all suggestive of the evolutionary capabilities of mpox with time and space by utilizing the selection pressure to attain human adaptabilities and may proceed to gain a vast range of host adaptability. In addition to providing insights into the evolution and transmission of mpox, genome analysis has also facilitated the development of diagnostics and therapeutics for the disease. Continued genomic surveillance of mpox strains also helps to identify emerging strains and inform public health interventions to control future outbreaks (Soheili et al., 2022).
Smallpox versus monkeypox: Direct ancestry or independent descent?
VARV is the causative agent of smallpox, and MPV is the causative agent of mpox. Both belong to the genus Orthopoxvirus and the family Poxviridae, which also consists of other viruses: CPV, vaccinia (VAC), and camelpox (CMLV). The MPV and VARV share approximately 90% of their genome. Still, despite their genetic similarity, phylogenetic and comparative studies show that both viruses have independently descended from Orthopoxvirus, and neither one has descended from the other (Shchelkunova and Shchelkunov, 2022).
Smallpox is a human pathogenic virus, whereas the other viruses in the family Poxviridae are zoonotic. Smallpox was the most dangerous infectious disease humankind has ever faced until its eradication. On the contrary, mpox cannot be compared with smallpox in severity, with the latter being more severe than the former (Shchelkunova and Shchelkunov, 2022). The ecological dynamics for both viruses also differ; smallpox has no known reservoir and only affects humans. In contrast, MPV has multiple animal reservoirs, the most common being monkeys, Gambian pouched rats, and squirrels, supporting the theory of independent zoonotic origin. VARV is strictly human-adapted, having lost several genes related to host range and immune evasion that are still present in mpox, which retains the ability to infect multiple mammalian species, as shown in Figure 3 (Tuttle et al., 2024).

Comparative analysis of restriction endonuclease site maps and short DNA sequences depicts the central genomic regions of MPV and VARV as nearly identical (96.3%), which encodes for essential enzymes and structural proteins. At the same time, the terminal genomic factors are distinct, which is attributed to virulence and host-range factors. Comparative analysis of the MPV and VARV genomes indicated that MPV is a distinct species that varies substantially from both major and minor strains of VARV in terms of the genes that cause virulence, suggesting that both MPV and VARV most likely evolved independently from an Orthopox ancestor that resembles CPV (Yong et al., 2020).
Life cycle of MPOX
The mpox life cycle starts with the entry of two different infectious particles into the host cells. First, the most abundant viral particles are known as intracellular mature virions (IMVs). They are single-membrane-bound structures released upon lysis of the cell that elicit a stronger immune response by the production of neutralizing antibodies (NAbs) as well as complement proteins and enter the host by endocytosis or direct contact (Gong et al., 2022). They are highly resistant to external damage and can enhance their survival outside the host. Second, the extracellular enveloped virions (EEVs) consist of a double-membrane structure that helps in facilitating intracellular dissemination and can enter the host cells by direct membrane fusion only. This leads to infection of neighboring cells, leading to the spread of the viral particles, illustrated in Figure 4. Once entered into the host cells, both the viral particles IMVs and EEVs attach to the receptors on the membranes and damage skin cells via glycosaminoglycans. Then upon entry, they transport the viral core to the perinuclear replication compartment with the help of cytoskeleton particles such as microtubules. Thereafter, the viral genome serves as the template for rapid DNA replication. Then IMVs are enveloped to form three-layered intracellular enveloped virions (IEVs) by the Golgi apparatus and move to the surface by actin and microtubules. IEV fuses with the host membrane and by exocytosis forms cell-associated enveloped viruses (Yahya et al., 2026).

Lifecycle of the mpox virus. This diagram illustrates the sequential stages of infection, starting from transmission, cell entry, and uncoating, through cytoplasmic replication and assembly to the final exocytosis of mature viral progeny. Images created using BioRender.
Clinical manifestations
mpox can be transmitted from animals to humans, as well as from humans to humans, whereas the zoonotic reservoirs range from monkeys, squirrels, dormice, rats, nonhuman primates, and other species as well. The transmission occurs through bites and scratches or by consuming improperly cooked meat from infected animals. The direct contact with infected skin surfaces such as lesions or mucosa, and breathing respiratory droplets leads to human-to-human transmission of MPX. Recent reports have indicated instances of sexual transmission of MPX, but they only occurred among MSM (Halder et al., 2025).
The median age susceptible to mpox has shifted upward over time; nevertheless, all ages are prone to infection. There are three routes to body infection, namely, oropharyngeal, nasopharyngeal, and intradermal routes. Once it enters the body, it undergoes rapid replication and subsequently infection of local lymph nodes. The incubation period lasts from 1 to 3 weeks, and the manifestation of clinical features occurs, such as fever, headache, malaise, chills, shortness of breath, and enlarged lymph nodes. This is often referred to as the prodromal phase, lasting usually from 0 to 5 days and being nonspecific in nature. The onset of fever is often characterized by lymphadenopathy, and it can be either unilateral or bilateral cervical, axillary, and inguinal (Prompetchara et al., 2024). Following the infection stage, the appearance of polymorphic painful skin rashes/lesions occurs on the face and then other parts of the body. Rashes could vary from one to 100 (Islam et al., 2023). The rash development occurs in certain stages, the small rashes (enanthema) starting first from the tongue and mouth, followed by macules on the face and spreading to arms, legs, palms, and soles in a centrifugal distribution fashion. This is distant from smallpox, where the pattern is centripetal. The development of rashes on palms and soles is the hallmark of MPX (Luo and Han, 2022). It undergoes the following phases, such as macular, papular, vesicular, and pustular. These different stages cannot appear at the same time on the body, unlike CPV. The various parts of the body have different lesion distribution frequencies such as 98% for face, 95% for soles, 70% for oral mucous membrane, 28% for genitalia, and 20% for conjunctiva (Islam et al., 2023). The lesions progress on the third day and transform into papules and further into vesicles on the fourth to fifth day. These vesicles are raised and filled with fluid. Following that, the lesions become pustules that are sharply raised and firm structures containing opaque fluid. These pustules begin to dry and form crusts toward the end of the second week. They often persist for 1 week before beginning to detach naturally, leading to skin with increased pigmentation and depressed appearance. Moreover, skin with decreased pigmentation and depressed appearance can occur; partial hair loss in certain areas is also reported, as is excessive scar tissue formation and deformity of facial muscles that can happen subsequent to the healing of facial ulcers. The disease generally lasts from 2 to 4 weeks in most of the cases, with an exception of immunocompromised individuals, chronic diseases, and those without vaccination. It can even lead to secondary infections, bronchopneumonia, loss of vision, sepsis, and encephalitis. The fatality rate ranges from 1% to 0% depending on other factors, such as specific clade, vaccination status, host factors, and availability of medical care. For instance, studies have reported no fatalities among individuals having smallpox vaccination compared with 11% of nonvaccinated individuals (Damon, 2011).
Innate immune responses
Like other disease-causing viruses, the Orthopoxvirus genus has evolved different ways to escape the immune attack imposed by the host and thereby cause infection (Yong et al., 2020). mpox affects the pattern recognition receptors such as TLRs by disturbing the recognition of pathogen-associated molecules (PAMs) and by inhibiting cellular apoptosis through the obstructive functions of various caspases (Prompetchara et al., 2024).
TLR plays an important role in recognizing PAM, followed by elimination of the agent via downstream signaling for an immune response. This is mediated by the binding of TLRs to ligands through the TIR domain, activating a cascade of reactions that activate inflammation-related transcription factors like NF-κB that are critical for nuclear genes involved in immune response (Gong et al., 2022). MyD88, MAL, and SARM are the various intracellular adaptor proteins involved in communication with the TIR domain, which is important for triggering an intracellular immune response (Saghazadeh and Rezaei, 2022). The disruption of these adapter proteins can often lead to the establishment of a viral infection. mpox affects the function of these adaptor proteins by producing a protein, A47R, that interacts with MyD88 and disrupts its physiological function, which inhibits the activity of NF-κB and causes failure of the innate immune system against mpox. Recent computational modeling and molecular dynamics simulations have shed light on a robust ligand for innate immune activation, which is the mpox F14 protein (Chakraborty et al., 2025). It acts as a primary candidate for mediating host–virus interactions through the TLR1/2 heterodimer. Since F14 has a higher binding affinity to the TLR1/2 dimer, this interaction leads to a proinflammatory signaling cascade in mpox patients, driving the production of cytokines through the NF-κB pathway. This makes it a high-priority target for future peptide-based vaccines and immunotherapeutics. Apart from TLRs, the cytosolic DNA-sensing cGAS-STING pathway uses cGAS as the enzymatic sensor that binds to dsDNA in the cytoplasm and triggers the production of interferon-β. Recent research has identified three specific mpox proteins, such as OPG147, OPG188, and OPG200, that inhibit this pathway. Moreover, OPG188 acts as a nuclease that destroys the signaling molecule cGAMP before it can reach the STING receptor. On the other hand, apoptosis is a crucial mechanism to control and prevent the spread of infection to other cells by killing the cells that are infected (Mukherjee et al., 2023). Absent in Melanoma 2 (AIM2) specifically senses viral DNA to trigger the inflammasome and maturation of IL-1β, which is responsible for the intense localized swelling and tissue necrosis seen in mpox lesions, as it triggers a form of programmed cell death called pyroptosis, which ruptures the cell to alert neighboring cells. The inhibition of NF-κB by mpox affects the apoptotic machinery by the production of B12R and C7L that inhibit the activity of caspases; refer to Table 1 (Zarenezhad et al., 2025). Moreover, mpox produces P1L, a protein that mimics the activity of BCL-2 (B cell lymphoma-2) that also inhibits NF-κB function and falls off the cellular apoptosis (Chakraborty et al., 2025). Therefore, mpox produces several proteins that disturb the complement system, chemokines, and cytokines, and targets the ubiquitin-proteasome pathway affecting the host’s inflammatory response.
The Functional Roles of Key Monkeypox Viral Proteins in the Viral Life Cycle, Highlighting Their Mechanisms of Immune Evasion and Potential as Targets for Therapeutic Intervention
Role of B cells and defenses against antibodies
Adaptive immunity acts as a second line of defense, followed by the innate immune response, to control the spread of viral replication in the host. B cells are the site of antibody generation, representing a promising foundation for vaccines like smallpox. Thereby, the vaccinated individuals can potentially be used for immunoglobulin preparations for the treatment of mpox. Monkey models have shown smallpox-specific B cell responses to protect against lethal mpox infections by increasing the production of memory B cells and NAbs. B cells have the tendency to recognize and bind to many mpox proteins involved in immune function and regulation; for instance, the vaccinia (VACV) vaccine provides protection against 14 mpox due to cross-reactive immunity. Moreover, immunoglobulins such as IgM, IgG, and IgA are crucial for the infection process. IgM plays an important role in the primary immune response, and IgG and IgA are responsible for secondary immunity that is long-lasting. MPX patients demonstrate IgM and IgG levels in vaccinated and unvaccinated individuals, whereas IgM levels were prominent after the second day of infection on the onset of rashes that persist until Day 77 in vaccinated and Day 126 in unvaccinated patients. IgG levels appear on Day 1 in vaccinated and Day 2 in unvaccinated patients, persisting until Days 147 and 139, respectively, as illustrated in Figure 5 (Ganesan et al., 2025).

Sequential immunological response and pathogenesis timeline of mpox infection. This schematic delineates the host’s immune activation stages across the typical 2- to 4-week course of infection. The innate phase (Days 1–3) involves PRR-mediated detection of MPXV, which triggers type 1 IFN production and NK cell activation. The adaptive phase (Days 7–9), coinciding with the typical incubation period, is marked by antigen presentation in lymph nodes, triggering T cell activation (CD4+/CD8+), cytokine release, and IgG production. By Day 14, the establishment of memory B and T cells provides long-term immunity, facilitated in some cases by cross-reactive protection from prior orthopoxvirus exposure. IFN, interferon; MPXV, mpox virus; NK, natural killer; PRR, pattern recognition receptor. Images created using BioRender.
B cells also play an important role as specialized antigen-presenting cells by the upregulation of CD28 and inducible costimulatory molecules that activate and proliferate poxvirus-specific CD4+ and CD8+ T cells. This represents the interplay between T and B cell responses. B cells use their membrane-bound B cell receptor, which is a form of antibody, to bind specifically to mpox viral antigens (such as A35R or H3L). The B cell internalizes the virus, breaks it down, and presents these processed peptide fragments on its surface using major histocompatibility complex (MHC) class II molecules. B cells then present the antigen to CD4+ helper T cells. Then, the activated T cells provide signals (cytokines and CD40L binding) that cause the B cells to proliferate, undergo affinity maturation, and differentiate into plasma cells, which then secrete high amounts of soluble, NAbs (IgG, IgM, IgA). These findings represent strong evidence of the role of immunoglobulins in broad protection against mpox infections (Saghazadeh and Rezaei, 2022).
B cells contribute significantly to humoral immunity against mpox by generating NAbs that target two unique viral forms: IMVs and EEVs. The most prevalent viral type, IMVs, is the main target of NAbs, although EEVs, which are covered in an extra lipid membrane formed by the host, provide a bigger immunological obstacle. EEVs show strong resistance to complement-mediated neutralization, which lowers the overall effectiveness of NAb responses and makes it easier for the virus to avoid host defenses. Therefore, it is essential to comprehend the structural and antigenic distinctions between these two viral types, especially the surface-exposed membrane proteins of EEVs, to rationally design vaccines that are broadly protective. Immunoinformatic techniques provide a promising way to discover and predict important components of the EEV membrane that may be useful targets for vaccines. The creation of multi-epitope vaccines that can concurrently target both IMV and EEV forms can be directly influenced by these discoveries, potentially increasing the vaccine’s efficacy and breadth against mpox (Ganesan et al., 2025).
T cell responses
CD4+ and CD8+ T lymphocytes are essential for managing mpox infections. Studies showing that VACV immunization can maintain memory B cell responses for up to 50 years postvaccination through the release of important cytokines like IFN-γ and TNF demonstrate that CD4+ T cells give long-term immunological memory. Through cytotoxic methods, CD8+ T cells—rather than CD4+ T cells—are principally in charge of directly destroying virus-infected cells, such as infected macrophages and monocytes, therefore lowering the viral load. By coordinating the inflammatory response through the production of pro-inflammatory and regulatory cytokines, including IL-1β, IL-1RA, IL-2R, IL-4, IL-5, IL-6, IL-8, IL-13, IL-15, and IL-17, CD4+ T cells, on the contrary, indirectly aid in virus control. By attracting and activating innate immune cells, promoting antigen presentation, and maintaining effector T cell responses, these cytokines work together to enhance antiviral immunity and prevent viral multiplication and dissemination. In the end, this coordinated reaction makes it easier for subsets of helper and regulatory T cells to become activated in the inflammatory milieu. MHC molecules are the primary regulators of T cell-mediated immunity, which includes the activation and development of CD4+ and CD8+ T cells as elements of the adaptive immune system (Mukherjee et al., 2023). Surprisingly, mpox has no direct target for MHC molecules, whereas it employs a secondary route to escape T cell responses. The mpox B22 protein disrupts the viral dissemination mediated by T cells, whereas the M2 protein suppresses the CD28-mediated activity of CTLA4. This dual suppression decreases the activity of CD4+ and CD8+ T cells by disturbing the germinal center and B cell maturation that led to an adaptive immune response against mpox infection. Recent studies have reported that patients with compromised CD4+ cell counts are directly correlated with a higher risk of MPX infection, whereas patients with higher CD4+ cell counts are less likely to develop severe disease, thereby reflecting the implications of T cell responses in controlling mpox infections and ultimately contributing to vaccine design (Saghazadeh and Rezaei, 2022).
Transmission
mpox is a zoonotic viral disease caused by the mpox virus that belongs to the same family as the smallpox virus, poxviridae. It can be transmitted from animals to animals, animals to humans, and humans to humans. African rodents such as rope squirrels, tree squirrels, Gambian rats, and primates present as natural hosts for the mpox virus. A recent wildlife surveillance study strongly suggests fire-footed rope squirrels to be an animal reservoir of the MPXV that caused an outbreak in sooty mangabeys in Côte d’Ivoire (Kupferschmidt, 2025). This is the first direct evidence of cross-species viral mpox transmission. The zoonotic transmission can take place via invasive routes (bites, scratches by infected animals) or noninvasive routes (touching or hunting the infected animal, cleaning its living space, processing, and consumption of its meat). Human-to-human transmission was rare before the 2022 outbreak (O’Shea et al., 2022). Historically, human cases were mainly related to direct contact with infected animals or a visit to epidemic regions. In 2018, a case of a traveler from Nigeria demonstrated a secondary transmission as health care staff got infected with the virus. Humans can contract the virus from other humans via blood transfusion and close contact that involves respiratory droplet infection through food exchange and sexual activity, as well as via fomites in the surroundings of the infected person (Ogunleye et al., 2023). Vertical transmission has also been recorded (Jamil et al., 2022). During 2007 and 2011, four pregnant women had mpox infections; one had a healthy infant, two had miscarriages, and the other died in infancy with manifestations of diffuse maculopapular lesions. However, in the 2022 outbreak, no pregnant women were shown to transmit the disease to their infants (Hatmal et al., 2022). The pattern of transmission shifted in the 2022 outbreak, as sexual transmission appeared to be the predominant mode of transmission. Despite the detection of the virus in the seminal fluid of the infected person, it is not certain if the transmission happens sexually. Instead, it is thought to be spread by direct contact with the skin lesions and infections via microabrasion on skin caused by sexual activities. Reports from the 2022 outbreak showed a differential abundance and lifetime of the virus in different parts of the human body. It is mostly always found in the skin samples of the infected individual. The virus is detected in 60–70% of samples collected from the anus and throat, 50% in semen, and only 20% of blood samples. The viral load was also found to be much higher in the skin samples of the patients. Replication-competent viruses, which can cause secondary infections, are also more abundant in the skin compared with that of other body parts. In immunocompetent patients, the virus is detected by quantitative PCR for a median time of 25 days in skin samples, 13 days in semen, and 1 day in the blood. The virus goes undetectable in the skin post 41 days of infection (Ganesan et al., 2025). The tropism of the virus may account for undetectable cases as well as asymptomatic infections; however, the evidence of the latter is still debated. The virus enters the human body via two entry gates, the respiratory epithelium and skin epidermis, and by infecting first dendritic cells and fibroblasts, respectively, it eventually infects the lymphatic system, where it replicates and causes secondary viremia and spreads to the whole body (Prompetchara et al., 2024). Reported cases from the 2022 outbreak are majorly associated with community spread. There are also reports of environmental contamination and accidental transmission with used needle injuries; therefore, a systemic approach to assess the risk of transmission and proper safety measurements for health care workers is required. However, indirect cases via fomites have still been lower than in previous outbreaks. Asymptomatic cases have been rare in the outbreak but were reported among sexual health care workers in France and Belgium. Modeling has implied that presymptomatic transmission may have occurred (De Baetselier et al., 2022).
Elaborate prevention and therapeutics
The urgent need for effective prophylactic measures is highlighted by the MPXV’s reappearance in both endemic and nonendemic areas. A multifaceted strategy is required for successful prevention because mpox is spread via zoonotic overflow and human-to-human contact through bodily fluids, skin lesions, respiratory droplets, and contaminated items.
Individuals exposed to the mpox virus should be isolated in separate bathrooms and monitored for 21 days after their last exposure. All movements should be restricted only to medically essential purposes. No exposure to the skin lesions and oral secretions of the infected individuals. PPE used by health care individuals must include eye protection and an N95 or FFP2 respirator because the virus spreads primarily through direct contact with infectious lesions or fluids, respiratory secretions, and contaminated materials. The gear protects against both large respiratory droplets and smaller, potentially airborne particles, which can infect the eyes, nose, or mouth. Proper measures for handling waste management and soiled laundry are to be ensured. Individuals with smallpox vaccines were more protected or developed a less serious infection than those with no history of the vaccine (Christodoulidou and Mabbott, 2023). Hence, smallpox vaccines and their modern modifications are recommended by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices for pre- and postexposure prophylaxis. Pre-exposure for within 4 days to a maximum of 4 weeks of exposure and postexposure in severe cases with high risk, including health care professionals (Cohn et al., 2023; Garcia-Atutxa et al., 2024). The various therapeutics and vaccines available for the prevention of mpox are mentioned in Tables 2 and 3, respectively.
Monkeypox Preventive Therapeutics, Mechanism, Lifecycle Stages, Administrative Strategies, and Key Insights
FDA, Food and Drug Administration; WHO, World Health Organization.
Monkeypox Preventive Vaccines, Mechanism, Lifecycle Stages, Administrative Strategies, and Key Insights
PPI, protein–protein interaction.
The integrated molecular interactome highlights the sophisticated strategies employed by the MPXV to manipulate host cellular machinery through specific protein–protein interactions, as detailed in Table 4. Most mpox cases resolve completely within 2–4 weeks, but complications can arise in some instances. Severe complications reported include encephalopathy and a retropharyngeal abscess. Additional complications such as secondary skin infections, sepsis, bronchopneumonia, encephalitis, corneal infection, and deep abscesses have also been documented (Manoharan et al., 2022). Pitted scarring is the most frequently observed sequela, with vision loss due to orbital infections reported in some cases. Notably, severe complications and long-term effects were more common in unvaccinated individuals compared with those who had been vaccinated.
Molecular Landscape of mpox–Host Protein–Protein Interactions and Potential Therapeutic Intervention Points
IFN, interferon; GAGs, glycosaminoglycans; NK, natural killer.
Recent advances, clinical trials, and research gaps
Significant progress has been made in diversifying the medical countermeasures against mpox, particularly with the deployment of third-generation vaccines such as JYNNEOS (MVA-BN) and LC16m8. Recent clinical trials, including large-scale efficacy studies of LC16m8 in Colombia, have been pivotal in assessing cross-clade protection and safety in high-risk populations. On the diagnostic front, the integration of CRISPR-Cas12a with Recombinase Polymerase Amplification (RPA) has emerged as a promising avenue for rapid, point-of-care detection in resource-limited settings, potentially bypassing the need for sophisticated thermal cyclers (Matthews et al., 2025; Yang et al., 2023). Furthermore, genomic surveillance has become more robust, allowing for the real-time tracking of Clade Ib as it expands across Central Africa and beyond.
Despite these advances, critical loopholes remain that jeopardize global containment efforts. A primary concern is the over-reliance on tecovirimat (TPOXX); as the dominant antiviral in clinical trials, its potential for inducing viral resistance and its lack of definitive efficacy data for Clade I present a significant therapeutic risk. Moreover, a profound evidence gap exists for vulnerable groups, including children, pregnant women, and individuals with advanced HIV, who are frequently excluded from clinical trials despite suffering the highest morbidity and mortality. These challenges are compounded by systemic inequities in vaccine and diagnostic access; currently, testing rates in endemic regions like the DRC hover far below the 80% threshold required for outbreak control, highlighting a disconnect between global scientific innovation and local public health implementation.
Conclusion
The evolution of mpox from a geographically confined zoonotic infection to a global public health priority represents a significant paradigm shift in infectious disease dynamics. The recent emergence and rapid spread of Clade Ib, alongside the persistent challenges of Clade IIb, underscore the virus’s remarkable ability to adapt to human-to-human transmission networks. This review has highlighted that while our understanding of mpox morphology and genomics has advanced considerably, the clinical and epidemiological landscape remains in a state of flux, demanding a move away from reactive outbreak response toward a model of sustained global vigilance.
The path forward requires a dual-track strategy: closing the scientific evidence gaps and dismantling systemic barriers to health care. Future research must prioritize clinical trials for high-risk, understudied cohorts, specifically children and immunocompromised individuals, while diversifying the antiviral pipeline to mitigate the risk of resistance against tecovirimat. However, scientific innovation alone is insufficient if it remains inaccessible to the regions burdened most by the disease. Achieving long-term control of mpox necessitates a One Health approach that integrates environmental surveillance with equitable distribution of vaccines and rapid diagnostics. Only through such a unified, global commitment can we transition from managing recurring emergencies to establishing a robust framework for pandemic prevention and biosecurity.
Authors’ Contributions
A.P. and T.B.: Conceptualization and methodology. T.B., M.A., M.Y., T.G., and A.P.: Writing—original draft and writing—review and editing. All authors have read and approved the final version of the article.
Footnotes
Acknowledgments
The authors acknowledge the WHO for providing publicly available epidemiological data and regional classifications used in this analysis.
Consent for Publication
The authors consent to publishing the data and images included in this article.
Author Disclosure Statement
No competing financial interests exist.
Funding Information
No funding was received for this article.
