Elected politicians can manage government agencies using administrative procedures that either enhance agencies' political responsiveness or their autonomy. Rational politicians will delegate autonomy when the benefits of agency decision-making are high, such as when the policy problem is technically complex. This article tests this hypothesis by investigating how state politicians design the institutional features of state clean air agencies and how these agencies perform under different administrative procedure regimes. I find that when a state's air pollution problem is complex, politicians eschew administrative procedures that enhance political control, and these agencies respond by choosing policies from a broader range of options.
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