Stories or Science? Facts,Frames,and Policy Attitudes

Abstract

How much do factual information and other kinds of frames affect policy attitudes? And whose attitudes are most malleable? I address these questions via two original survey experiments about the estate tax. I demonstrate that correct information about who is potentially subject to the estate tax increased support for the estate tax. Furthermore, this information did not appear any less persuasive than pro- or antitax arguments that emphasized values such as equality or fairness. Finally, the effects of this information were concentrated among lower income conservatives and Republicans. These findings contrast with previous research on estate tax attitudes and have broader implications for the study of political information, framing, and policy attitudes.

Keywords

public opinion framing estate tax political information

In their study of the politics of the estate tax, Michael Graetz and Ian Shapiro (2005) argue that opponents of the estate tax demonstrated a superior understanding of what moves public opinion on this issue. Opponents focused on “stories,” or rhetorical arguments designed to tap into people’s emotions. For example, opponents of the estate tax would often talk about people who lost a business or farm when they were forced to pay the estate tax. By contrast, supporters of the estate tax focused on “science,” or facts, figures, and data—such as how few people were actually affected by the estate tax. Graetz and Shapiro see this as a fundamental mistake. It was the stories, not the science, that Americans found more persuasive. This in turn helps explain the central puzzle of the estate tax: why so many Americans want to repeal a tax that so few of them will ever pay.

But is this correct? Do stories trump science when it comes to public opinion about the estate tax? I argue that this is not the case. Correct information about who pays the estate tax does reduce opposition to the tax. In fact, this correct information is as powerful as other rhetorical arguments for and against the estate tax. Moreover, correct information matters most among those arguably least predisposed to believe it: Republicans and conservatives. This is particularly true among Republicans and conservatives with lower incomes—groups that may tend to oppose the estate tax for partisan or ideological reasons but have little chance of paying the estate tax.

These findings constitute a significant departure from previous research on the estate tax. This research has often expressed skepticism that opposition to the estate tax depends on ignorance about who pays it. This research also suggests that if information about who pays the estate tax matters at all, it matters most for people already predisposed to agree with it—Democrats—which suggests that partisanship effectively filters new information about the estate tax. However, these conclusions are based on observational measures of knowledge about politics or the estate tax, which could be endogenous to opinion. By contrast, this study estimates the causal effect of factual information via randomized experiments embedded in surveys and reaches a very different conclusion.

These findings have implications for three important broader questions about factual information, framing, and policy attitudes. The first question is whether citizens are open to new facts and willing to change their minds accordingly. Much research suggests that this does not happen readily. Moreover, the estate tax constitutes a “least likely” case for the proposition that factual information can change attitudes. The estate tax has been unpopular since at least the 1930s and has been the subject of recent political controversy. This suggests that attitudes about the estate tax would be crystallized and resistant to factual information. For this reason, the conclusion of this study is all the more striking: Factual information can change minds on even hotly contested issues.

The second question is whether factual information can compete with other types of arguments. Relatively few studies have compared the effects of correct information with the effects of other appeals—a shortcoming that parallels the lack of attention to competing arguments or frames more generally. This study helps to fill that gap and demonstrates that facts can affect attitudes as much as other kinds of arguments do.

The third question is whose attitudes shift in response to correct factual information. I find that factual information can overcome partisan bias, even on a highly partisan issue. This study also points to an important condition that may mitigate bias: when people’s underlying interests and values conflict with each other.

I begin by reviewing literature about these debates to develop expectations to be tested empirically and to identify gaps in the literature that this study addresses. I then show that new observational data can replicate the finding of some previous literature: Knowledge of who pays the estate tax is associated with more support for the tax, but primarily among Democrats. I then present the results of two survey experiments that demonstrate that correct information about who pays the estate tax actually causes additional support for the tax, that it is as effective as rhetorical arguments about the tax, and that it is most effective among lower income Republicans and conservatives. I conclude by discussing the implications and limitations of this study.

Debating Factual Information, Frames, and Their Consequences

If factual knowledge is a “central resource for democratic participation” (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996, p. 5), then a substantial number of people appear to lack this resource. Although there is an ongoing scholarly debate about the extent of political knowledge (e.g., Gibson & Caldeira, 2009; Hochschild & Einstein, 2015; Luskin & Bullock, 2011; Mondak, 1999; Prior & Lupia, 2008), overall the extant research suggests that a large enough fraction does not know certain political facts that providing additional information could conceivably change opinions.

This is certainly true with regard to the public’s knowledge about tax policy and the estate tax in particular. Bartels (2005) argues that “most ordinary citizens are remarkably ignorant and uncertain about the workings of the tax system” (p. 21). In Delli Carpini and Keeter’s (1996) list of 112 survey questions about knowledge of domestic policy, an average of only 27% answered the 10 questions about tax policy correctly, compared with 42% for the other questions. The estate tax appears to be no exception. Slemrod (2006) finds that a majority of people either believe that the estate tax affects “most” families (49%) or do not know how many families it affects (20%). In response to a multiple-choice question about what fraction pays the estate tax, only 36% of respondents said “less than 5% of all Americans” when the other possible responses were 95%, 70%, 50%, and 25% (Krupnikov, Levine, Lupia, & Prior, 2006).

But does providing correct factual information actually change the opinions of the uninformed or misinformed? Often, it does not. People tend to discount facts that are contrary to their existing attitudes or interpret facts in ways that support these attitudes (Gaines, Kuklinski, Quirk, Peyton, and Verkuilen, 2007; Liu & Ditto, 2013; Lodge & Taber, 2000; Taber, Cann, & Kucsova, 2009). The extent of this “motivating reasoning,” to use Lodge and Taber’s term, depends on both individual motivations and the information environment. Motivated reasoning is particularly prevalent when existing attitudes are strongly held (e.g., Lavine, Johnston, & Steenbergen, 2012; Leeper, 2014; Leeper & Slothuus, 2014) or undergirded by durable predispositions such as party identification. It is also more prevalent when issues are less salient (Ciuk & Yost, 2015) and when the information environment provides salient cues tied to predispositions (Bolsen, Druckman, & Cook, 2014; Jerit & Barabas, 2012; Leeper & Slothuus, 2014; Zaller, 1992) or provides other frames or arguments that are more persuasive than factual information (Druckman & Bolsen, 2011).

These findings may help explain why providing factual information specific to a policy area only sometimes changes opinions. In case studies of foreign aid and prison spending (Gilens, 2001), spending on education and teacher salaries (Howell, Peterson, & West, 2011), and spending on health care for the poor (Bullock, 2011), factual or policy-related information affected attitudes. But in case studies of issues that were especially salient and politically charged—the Iraq War (Berinsky, 2007) and welfare (Kuklinski, Quirk, Jerit, Schwieder, & Rich, 2000)—correct information had little impact on attitudes.

The politics of the estate tax, as well as the associated academic literature, suggest that attitudes about the estate tax would be resistant to factual information. Although Slemrod (2006) concludes on the basis of observational data that “better-informed voters would be much less likely to support these tax reforms,” most others are skeptical (p. 72).¹ Bartels (2005) finds that general knowledge of politics does not affect attitudes toward the estate tax. Speaking of the misperception that most people could have to pay the estate tax, he writes, “Would correcting this misperception produce widespread public support for the estate tax? That is much less clear. Americans have always found the juxtaposition of death and taxes peculiarly unsettling” (Bartels, 2006, p. 411). Krupnikov et al. (2006) agree:

Many supporters of progressive taxation and liberal intellectuals believe that if only citizens know more about the operation of the estate tax, the masses would come to support the same forms of taxation that they do . . . such beliefs constitute wishful thinking. (p. 435)

Graetz and Shapiro (2005) feel similarly: “. . . the opponents of estate tax repeal failed to grasp that in politics, science is never enough” (p. 226).

Indeed, the politics of the estate tax may facilitate motivated reasoning and mitigate the potential influence of factual information. Public suspicion of the estate tax dates back to the Great Depression (Bartels, 2008). Since the 1990s, the tax has been the subject of an intense partisan debate (Graetz & Shapiro, 2005), and, as a result, public attitudes about the tax are strongly tied to party identification (Bartels, 2006; Krupnikov et al., 2006; Slemrod, 2006). Similarly, the apparent impact of knowledge about who pays the estate tax is limited to those for whom that knowledge is most congenial: Democrats, who are supportive of taxation generally and the estate tax in particular (Krupnikov et al., 2006). Factual information about the estate tax must also compete with other rhetorical arguments, such as that it is unfair to tax an estate after a death and interfere with a family’s ability to pass on wealth to younger generations (Graetz & Shapiro, 2005). In sum, previous studies of factual information, framing, and policy attitudes have established conditions under which factual information is less likely to affect attitudes. Those conditions appear to be met in the case of the estate tax.

But several key gaps in the literature remain. One is that extant research about the estate tax has relied on observational measures of knowledge, and sometimes on measures of general political knowledge rather than policy-specific knowledge. There is good reason to think that policy-specific knowledge can affect attitudes over and above the effect of general political knowledge (Gilens, 2001) and that observational measures of policy-specific knowledge may be endogenous to political attitudes (Kuklinski et al., 2000). Here I draw on an experimental manipulation of information specific to the estate tax.

The second gap, which is not limited to the literature on the estate tax, is that there are very few tests of the persuasiveness of factual information as compared with rhetorical arguments or frames. Although scholars have begun to examine the impact of policy-specific information alongside partisan cues (e.g., Boudreau & MacKenzie, 2014; Bullock, 2011), these cues tend to be simple signals about which side each party supports, not more extensive arguments about particular dimensions of the issue (i.e., frames). Just as we know relatively little about the impact of multiple or competitive frames (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Sniderman & Theriault, 2004), we know little about how facts and frames compete, although Druckman and Bolsen (2011) is a notable exception. This study helps to address this gap by examining a policy area where there are already strongly stated, but untested, hypotheses about the impact of facts and frames, or “stories” and “science” (Graetz & Shapiro, 2005). In particular, this study tests Graetz and Shapiro’s contention that rhetorical arguments, and especially antitax arguments about the unfairness of the estate tax, are more persuasive than information about who pays the estate tax.

The third gap concerns the individual-level factors that condition motivated reasoning and thus the impact of factual information on political attitudes. Previous literature has focused on the strength or importance of relevant attitudes and predispositions (e.g., Klar, 2013; Lavine et al., 2012; Leeper, 2014). But less deeply explored are the tensions among existing attitudes and predispositions, also known as “cross-pressures” (e.g., Hillygus & Shields, 2008). In this study, I explore the potential tension between two core concepts in the study of public opinion and especially opinion about taxation: self-interest and political identities. The impact of factual information on attitudes about the estate tax depends on the intersection of the two.

Data

I draw on original data from the 2007 and 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Surveys (CCES). These were two-wave panel surveys of voting-age Americans conducted in the fall of each year (see the online appendix for further details [available at http://apr.sagepub.com/supplemental]). The first wave of the 2007 CCES (N = 1,000) and the second wave of the 2008 CCES (N = 829) included separate experiments that provided respondents with different information or arguments before ascertaining their attitudes toward the estate tax. In 2007, attitudes were measured using this American National Election Study item: “There has been a lot of talk recently about doing away with the tax on large inheritances, the so-called ‘estate tax.’ Do you favor or oppose doing away with the estate tax?”² Below I discuss the information in the experimental conditions that preceded this question.

In 2008, respondents were asked about their knowledge of the estate tax before being asked their opinion:

In the United States, there is a tax on large inheritances that is sometimes called the “estate tax.” What percent of Americans do you think have a large enough estate to be subject to this tax? If you don’t know, just give your best guess.

The prompt for a “best guess” mirrors the prompt in Prior and Lupia (2008). Respondents gave their estimate as a percentage from 0 to 100. This question is different from knowledge measures on previous surveys about the estate tax, which have employed less specific quantitative terminology—for example, whether “most” or “a few” families have to pay (Slemrod, 2006)—or have provided specific percentages in a multiple-choice framework (Krupnikov et al., 2006). The CCES item more precisely measures respondents’ knowledge. Respondents were then asked for their opinion of the tax: “There has been a lot of talk recently about doing away with the estate tax. Do you favor or oppose doing away with the estate tax?”³ Again, there was prefatory text provided in the experimental conditions, which are discussed below.

Knowledge About the Estate Tax and Its Consequences

To begin, I replicate findings from previous studies that relied on observational measures of knowledge about estate tax. These studies suggest that a majority of Americans do not know that few people have to pay the estate tax. Data from the 2008 CCES confirm this. Of the 829 respondents interviewed in the postelection wave, 813 (98%) provided an estimate of the fraction of Americans subject to the estate tax. Panel A of Figure 1 presents a histogram of these estimates; each bar captures a 5-percentage-point interval.

Figure 1.

The contours and consequences of knowledge about the estate tax.

Although the distribution of responses is appropriately skewed toward lower estimates (M = 21%; median = 10%), only a minority of respondents provided the correct answer. If “correct” is defined strictly, as 1% or 2%, then about 20% of respondents answered correctly. If a correct answer is defined as 1% to 5%—which corresponds to the “correct” answer in Krupnikov et al. (2006)—then 36% answered correctly (the same fraction as in Krupnikov et al.). But many other respondents were not accurate. For example, approximately one in five believed that 40% or more of Americans could be subject to the estate tax. These figures confirm that accurate knowledge about the estate tax is the exception rather than the rule.

Is knowledge associated with opinions? I regressed attitudes toward the estate tax—coded 1 for those who supported the tax (i.e., opposed repeal) and 0 for those who opposed the tax—on knowledge, controlling for personal income, and either party identification or self-reported ideology on the liberal-conservative scale.⁴ Panel B shows the relationship between knowledge of who pays the estate tax and the predicted probability of supporting it. (The full results are available in Table A1.) As Slemrod (2006) finds, there is a statistically and substantively significant relationship. A respondent who believes that 40% of Americans could be subject to the estate tax is 14 percentage points less likely to support the estate tax than a respondent who believes (correctly) that 1% of Americans could be subject to this tax. Party identification, though not income, is also associated with attitudes. Similar findings emerge if ideology is substituted for party identification (Table A1).

To test for the conditional effects of knowledge, I estimated additional models that interact knowledge with party identification or ideology (see again Table A1). The marginal effect of knowledge is statistically significant only among respondents who are Democrats, pure independents, or independents who lean Republican (Panel C) and only among liberal and moderate respondents (Panel D). These results confirm Krupnikov et al. (2006), who find that the apparent effect of knowledge is confined to the left and center of the political spectrum.

An Experimental Test

These observational data suggest that knowledge about who pays the estate tax could affect opinions, at least within the political left and center. But apparent knowledge about the estate tax could be endogenous to preferences: Those who favor the tax may then decide that it affects few people, and those who oppose the tax may decide that it affects many people. Perceptions of facts are then rationalizations, not sources, of preferences. A better way to gauge the causal effect of information is via experimental manipulation that randomizes whether respondents receive correct information about who pays the tax as well as whether they receive arguments for and against the tax. Table 1 summarizes the experimental designs in the 2007 and 2008 CCES.⁵

Table 1.

Structure of Experiments in the 2007 and 2008 CCES.

Experimental condition	2007 N	2008 N	Pooled N
Control	211	98	309
“Who Pays”	185	114	299
“Aristocracy”	—	111	111
“Family rights”	—	89	89
Aristocracy + Family rights	—	98	98
Who pays + Aristocracy	211	113	324
Who pays + “Punishes success”	202	—	202
Who pays + Family rights	—	108	108
Who pays + Aristocracy + Punishes success	191	—	191
Who pays + Aristocracy + Family rights	—	98	98
Total N	1,000	829	1,829

Note. The wording of the experimental treatments (and the years in which each treatment appeared): “Who pays”: “This is a tax that affects those who inherit estates of more than US$2 million. The vast majority of Americans, about 99%, do not have an estate large enough to be taxed.” (2007, 2008). “Aristocracy”: “Supporters of the tax say that without it, we will have an aristocracy of wealth, where financial resources depend on heredity rather than merit.” (2007, 2008). “Punishes success”: “Opponents of the tax say that it punishes financial success and discourages people from saving and investing.” (2007). “Family rights”: “Opponents of the tax say that it infringes on the right of families to pass along inheritance to their children.” (2008). CCES = Cooperative Congressional Election Surveys.

In the 2007 CCES, respondents were randomized into five different groups. The control group was simply asked whether it supported or opposed repealing the estate tax. The second group was first given correct information about how many and who pay the tax, based on existing law when the CCES was conducted and on analysis by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities: “This is a tax that affects those who inherit estates of more than US$2 million. The vast majority of Americans, about 99%, do not have an estate large enough to be taxed.”⁶ I refer to this experimental condition with the shorthand “Who pays.”

To capture the effects of this information when combined with rhetorical arguments, the third group (“Who pays + Aristocracy”) was provided the same factual information about who pays the tax alongside an argument for the estate tax: “Supporters of the tax say that without it, we will have an aristocracy of wealth, where financial resources depend on heredity rather than merit.” This paraphrases a statement by Warren Buffet (quoted in Johnston, 2001), one of a number of wealthy Americans who publicly opposed estate tax repeal (see Graetz & Shapiro, 2005, Chapter 16). The fourth group (“Who pays + Punishes success”) was provided the factual information alongside an argument against the estate tax: “Opponents of the tax say that it punishes financial success and discourages people from saving and investing.” This is a frequent assertion of estate tax opponents (see Janjigian, 2008). The fifth group was provided the correct information and both the pro and con arguments.

The experiment in the 2008 CCES elaborates the 2007 design in two ways. First, the design is a 2 × 4 factorial. The eight experimental conditions randomize the provision of information about who pays the tax, as well as the provision of a protax argument, an antitax argument, neither argument, or both arguments. Unlike in the 2007 experiment, there are experimental conditions in which respondents did not receive the information about “who pays” but received only a protax argument, an antitax argument, or both arguments. Second, the 2008 experiment included a different antitax argument: “Opponents of the tax say that it infringes on the right of families to pass along inheritance to their children.” This argument (“Family rights”) portrays the estate tax not as penalizing prosperity but as violating a fairness norm: that parents can provide for their children via inherited wealth. This norm is invoked by some Americans who oppose the estate tax (Hochschild, 1980) and has been central to the repeal movement’s strategy (Graetz & Shapiro, 2005; Meagher, 2013). Otherwise, the 2008 experiment mimics the 2007 experiment in the inclusion and wording of the “Who pays” and “Aristocracy” arguments. Both experiments examine the effects of information alone and information combined with pro- and/or antitax arguments. Both experiments include a control group that received neither the correct information nor any of the arguments.

These experiments have several advantages. Most importantly, respondents are randomly assigned to receive correct information about who pays the estate tax. I can thus evaluate its effects without concerns about endogeneity.⁷ Of course, survey experiments have their well-known liabilities (see Gaines, Kuklinski, & Quirk, 2007). But the advantages of experimentation in this case outweigh the disadvantages, especially because prior literature on public opinion about the estate tax has relied on observational data.

A second advantage is that I can compare the effects of factual information with those of rhetorical arguments used by estate tax proponents and opponents to determine whether factual information matters less than other appeals. Conditions that combine both factual information and these arguments better approximate the broader discourse about the estate tax, which includes factual claims as well as other rhetoric. Of course, estate tax proponents and opponents make multiple arguments, not merely the few included in these experiments. But even if including two such arguments is a weak approximation of, say, congressional debate (see Mucciaroni & Quirk, 2006), it is better than ignoring these arguments and assuming that factual information is provided (or not) in a political vacuum.

The Effects of Stories and Science

To show the effects of these experimental treatments, I first present the level of support for the estate tax across the conditions within each experiment (Figure 2). In the control condition of the 2007 experiment, 40% of respondents said that they supported the tax. Among those given correct information about who pays the estate tax, 51% supported the tax—an 11-point increase. Pairing this information with the protax argument about a potential “aristocracy of wealth” increased support further, to 56%. The antitax argument—how the tax punishes financial success—had little impact when paired with the correct information. The level of support among respondents in this condition was virtually the same (53%) as when the correct information was presented alone. Finally, the combination of the correct information with both arguments produced the most lopsided distribution of opinion, with 62% favoring the tax. The antitax argument appeared to “backfire” once combined with other arguments (see Chong & Druckman, 2007), producing more support for the tax than did the combination of correct information and the protax argument.

Figure 2.

Support for the estate tax, by experimental condition.

In the 2008 sample, fewer respondents in the control group (28%) supported the estate tax (see the right-hand panel of Figure 2).⁸ The correct information again increased support for the tax (to 40%) and by about the same amount as in the 2007 experiment. The protax “aristocracy” argument had a similar effect, increasing support to 39%. By contrast, the antitax argument about family rights did not affect opinion relative to the control group. Neither did it neutralize the protax argument: Combining them produced essentially the same level of support for the estate tax (38%) as did the protax argument by itself (39%).

Other experimental conditions also suggest the power of correct information and the aristocracy argument, relative to the family rights argument. As in 2007, combining the correct information and the aristocracy argument increased support for the tax more than did the correct information alone (to 47%). Combining the family rights argument with the correct information had little effect relative to receiving only the correct information (37% vs. 40%). Combining the antitax argument with both the correct information and the aristocracy argument produced a lower level of support (38%) than combining only the information and the aristocracy argument (47%), but a higher level of support than in the control group (28%).

These descriptive results suggest that both this piece of correct information and the protax aristocracy argument affected opinion toward the estate tax. A multivariate model of support for the estate tax allows for formal tests of the treatment effects as well as tests comparing the magnitudes of these effects. I take advantage of the commonalities across the 2007 and 2008 CCES and pool the two experiments to maximize sample size. The dependent variable is coded 1 for supporting the tax (opposing repeal) and 0 for opposing it. The model includes dummy variables for the experimental conditions (the control group is the excluded category), party identification, income, and a dummy variable for the year of the survey.⁹ The coefficients are presented in the first column of Table 2. To convey the substantive meaning of the various treatments, I present their marginal effects and 95% confidence intervals in Figure 3.

Table 2.

Models of Attitudes Toward Estate Tax.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Who pays	0.65*	0.08	−0.36
	(0.22)	(0.30)	(0.41)
Who Pays × Party Identification		1.14*
		(0.44)
Who Pays × Conservatism			1.57*
		(0.65)
Aristocracy	0.56	0.54	0.47
	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.33)
Family rights	−0.07	−0.1	−0.38
	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.37)
Aristocracy + Family Rights	0.48	0.46	0.27
	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.33)
Who Pays + Aristocracy	0.85*	0.87*	0.76*
	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.21)
Who Pays + Punishes Success	0.56*	0.60*	0.56*
	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.24)
Who Pays + Family Rights	0.39	0.36	0.29
	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.32)
Who Pays + Aristocracy + Punishes Success	1.09*	1.15*	1.05*
	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.25)
Who Pays + Aristocracy + Family Rights	0.80*	0.81*	0.63
	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.35)
Party identification (high = Republican)	−2.56*	−2.78*
	(0.18)	(0.20)
Conservatism			−4.15*
			(0.31)
Income	−0.18	−0.17	−0.36
	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.24)
Year 2008	−0.65*	−0.63*	−0.48*
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Constant	0.95*	1.02*	2.07*
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.27)
N	1,324	1,324	1,349

Source. 2007-2008 CCES.

Note. Table entries are logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is coded 0 = oppose estate tax, and 1 = support estate tax. CCES = Cooperative Congressional Election Surveys.

p < .05.

Figure 3.

Marginal effects of the experimental treatments.

Correct information about who pays the tax increased support for the tax (a marginal effect of 0.16, SE = 0.05). This information was not less effective than values-based arguments against the estate tax. The effect of the “aristocracy” argument—which Graetz and Shapiro argue was ineffectual when wielded by Warren Buffet and other corporate titans—was 0.14 (SE = 0.05), which is not statistically distinguishable from that of the correct information. (A test of the difference in their respective logit coefficients generates a χ² statistic of 0.08, p = .77.) Moreover, the “family rights” argument—which Graetz and Shapiro consider the most potent weapon used by the antitax movement—did not have a statistically significant effect on opinion. Neither did this argument neutralize the effect of the correct information. The coefficient for the “who pays” treatment alone is not statistically different from the coefficient for the treatment combining the correct information and the family rights argument (χ² = 0.65, p = .42).

In fact, almost every treatment involving a potential argument for the estate tax—the correct information about who pays, the protax “aristocracy” argument, or combinations of these with each other or with the antitax arguments—increased support for the estate tax. The effects of the seven treatments including the correct information and/or the protax argument are not statistically distinguishable from each other (χ² = 7.24, p = .40). These findings suggest that, contra Graetz and Shapiro (2005), antitax arguments were not more and perhaps actually less effective than either protax rhetorical arguments or than factual information about who could pay the estate tax. Moreover, the effect of factual information by itself was not statistically distinguishable from the impact of other protax arguments. Thus, these findings do not suggest that “stories” trump “science” in this policy domain.

The Conditional Effects of Factual Information

If correct information about who pays the estate tax does affect opinion, then the next question is, “Who is affected?” Previous literature suggests that this information would have larger effects on liberals and Democrats. To test these hypotheses, I estimated models of estate tax preferences, similar in specification to the first model in Table 2, but including an interaction between the information treatment and either party identification or ideology. The results of these models are also presented in Table 2. Figure 4 depicts the interactions between the information treatment and these variables (using code from Brambor, Clark, & Golder, 2006). The graphs plot each variable’s effect on the probability of supporting the tax, with separate lines and confidence intervals for respondents who received the correct information (the solid line) and for respondents in the control group (the dashed line).¹⁰

Figure 4.

Effects of the factual information treatment, by party identification and ideology.

The conditioning effects of party identification and ideology are the opposite of the effects found in previous literature. Providing this factual information increased support for the estate tax among Republicans and conservatives, not Democrats and liberals. For example, among strong Republicans this information increased support for the estate tax by 21 points. Among strong conservatives, it increased support by 16 points. This finding contradicts those based on observational measures of information about the estate tax (Krupnikov et al., 2006). Correct information rendered opposing partisans in these samples more similar, not more polarized.

Why were conservative and Republican respondents more affected by this information? Perhaps Republicans and conservatives were less informed to begin with, and thus the correct information had “more to correct” in these groups. As it turns out, Republican and conservative respondents were less knowledgeable about the estate tax. Among Republicans interviewed in the 2008 CCES, the median estimate of the percentage that could be subject to the estate tax was 15%, compared with 10% among Democrats. Among conservatives, the median was 20%, compared with 5% among liberals.¹¹ The interactions between the information treatment and party identification and ideology could therefore be spurious. The truly important interaction could involve the information treatment and knowledge about the estate tax.

Drawing on the 2008 CCES, which included the knowledge measure, I estimated models identical to Models 2 and 3 in Table 2, and then those same models including knowledge about the estate tax as well as an interaction between knowledge and the information treatment (see Table A5 in the online appendix [available at http://apr.sagepub.com/supplemental]). Including an interaction between the information treatment and knowledge barely affected the interactions between the information treatment and either measure of political predispositions, which remained substantively and statistically significant.

Moreover, the interaction between the information treatment and knowledge, albeit in the expected direction, was not statistically significant (see Table A5 and Figure A1). This seems counterintuitive: Why did information about how few pay the estate tax not matter more for those who believed that a large fraction must pay this tax? One answer involves the information treatment’s mention of not only how many pay the estate tax (about 1%) but also who pays the tax (“those who inherit estates of more than US$2 million”). If the “who” was more consequential to respondents than the “how many,” then the information treatment’s effect would not necessarily depend on respondents’ estimates of how many.

A second reason that the “Who pays” information had a larger impact among Republicans and conservatives is that this information made salient the cross-pressures that some Republicans and conservatives feel, while having more muted effects on cross-pressured Democrats and liberals. Cross-pressures arise when a person’s political predispositions, interests, and identities conflict with each other and make him or her more susceptible to persuasive information (see, for example, Hillygus & Shields, 2008).

In the case of the estate tax, cross-pressures could derive from conflicts between economic interests and political values. The conflict is likely to be particularly acute for lower income Republicans and conservatives, once informed that only very large estates are subject to the estate tax. Lower income Republicans and conservatives have an ostensible economic interest in keeping the estate tax—or at least no economic interest in opposing it—but their political values push them toward opposing it. But interests may take precedence over values after being given this correct information, leading poorer Republicans and conservatives to support the tax. As in previous research, making the stakes of policy more visible may enable people to better connect policy attitudes to their economic self-interest (Citrin & Green, 1990). By contrast, wealthy Democrats, who would also appear cross-pressured, should not have the same reaction to this correct information. Because the treatment states that only a few, large estates could be subject to this tax, even most upper income Democrats would not be affected. Thus, the information treatment should serve mainly to increase support for the tax among lower income Republicans and conservatives.

A test of this hypothesis elaborates the models presented in Table 2 by including three-way interactions between the “Who pays” treatment, income, and party identification or ideology, as well as the constituent variables and two-way interactions.¹² The results are presented in Table A6 and illustrated graphically in Figure 5. Panel A shows that, among Democratic and independent respondents, income had almost no effect on attitudes in either the control group or the group provided the correct information. By contrast, among Republican respondents in the “Who pays” group, support for the estate tax increased among those in the lower and middle income groups, thereby strengthening the relationship between income and attitudes. Panel B shows that the “Who pays” treatment increased support for the estate tax among lower income respondents who are moderate or conservative, but had negligible effects among liberals.¹³ Correct information appeared to intensify cross-pressures among Republicans and conservatives whose economic interests and political values may have been at odds.

Figure 5.

Effects of the factual information treatment, by income within levels of (A) party identification and (B) ideology.

Conclusion

These experiments produced three novel findings about attitudes toward the estate tax and about the effects of facts and frames on political attitudes. First, information about who pays the estate tax does affect attitudes: telling respondents that only a few wealthy Americans are subject to the estate tax increased support for it. Second, information about who pays the estate tax was as effective as rhetorical arguments for and against the estate tax. In fact, nearly every treatment or combination of treatments was associated with greater support for the tax. Simply providing more considerations tended to make people more favorable to the estate tax.¹⁴ Third, Republicans, and in particular those with lower incomes, were most affected by exposure to correct information about who pays the estate tax.

These findings contrast with previous studies of the estate tax. The impact of correct information about who pays the estate tax contrasts with some scholars’ skepticism that this information would affect attitudes (Bartels, 2006; Graetz & Shapiro, 2005; Krupnikov et al., 2006; but see Slemrod, 2006). To be sure, this fact alone did not persuade the vast majority of opponents to support the tax, but nevertheless its effect is comparable to or larger than the impact of correct information in other experimental studies (Berinsky, 2007; Bullock, 2011; Gilens, 2001; Howell et al., 2011; Kuklinski et al., 2000). Furthermore, these findings contrast with Graetz and Shapiro’s (2005) claim that “stories,” or rhetorical arguments against the estate tax, were more effective than “science,” or correct factual information about who pays the estate tax. Finally, these findings contrast with the argument that any impact of knowledge about who pays the estate tax is larger among Democrats than Republicans (Krupnikov et al., 2006). Given that I also confirmed this finding using an observational measure of knowledge, one reason why my results differ is that I randomly assigned the provision of correct information, both by itself and alongside other arguments about the tax.

These findings contribute to the broader literatures on factual information, framing, and policy attitudes. To date, there have been relatively few studies that investigate the impact of policy-specific factual information, especially via randomized experiments. This study not only confirms that factual information can affect attitudes—as some, but far from all, previous studies have concluded—but also shows that factual information can matter even in an unlikely case: when the policy in question has long been unpopular and has recently been the subject of a lengthy partisan debate.¹⁵

These findings also speak to a nascent literature on competitive framing (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Sniderman & Theriault, 2004)—and especially to the effects of factual information relative to frames that involve other kinds of cues or arguments (Druckman & Bolsen, 2011). In contrast to some previous studies (Druckman, 2004), my findings do not suggest that exposure to competing frames mitigates the impact of the individual frames. In this case, competing frames did not “cancel out,” but generally pushed respondents toward greater support for the estate tax. Thus, my findings are more consistent with the idea that the “strength,” or persuasiveness, of frames can vary (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Jerit, 2009). I did not attempt to measure the strength of different arguments a priori. But my experiments do speak to scholarly accounts like Graetz and Shapiro’s (2005), which offer hypotheses about the persuasiveness of estate tax frames that are not born out here.

There is also the more specific question of what happens when factual information competes with rhetorical arguments or other frames. Here, my findings, if not my interpretation, largely square with those of Druckman and Bolsen (2011). They find that factual information can affect attitudes when presented alone, but it does not produce additional shifts in attitudes when accompanied by a rhetorical frame. That describes my findings as well, but the opposite interpretation is also valid: I find that rhetorical frames about the estate tax do not affect attitudes much more than giving respondents information about who may be subject to the tax.

Finally, my findings also speak to the question of who is likely to be affected by factual information. For example, Gilens (2001) finds that policy-specific information matters more for those with higher levels of general political knowledge. My findings suggest something different: The effects of information about the estate tax were strongest among a group, those with lower incomes, who tend not to manifest high levels of political knowledge

My findings are also something of a counterpoint to studies showing how political predispositions create biases that lead people to ignore or downplay inconvenient information (e.g., Gaines et al., 2007; Lodge & Taber, 2000; Taber et al., 2009). I find that policy-related information mattered most among those whose predispositions—for example, identification as Republican—should engender resistance to this information (although obviously this finding does not mean that no respondents engaged in biased information processing).¹⁶

Moreover, that lower income Republicans were most affected suggests how a different factor can condition biases in information processing: the tensions among relevant political identities and predispositions. This finding was not anticipated by the estate tax literature and is less explored in the broader literature, which focuses more on the biases created by single predispositions or identity categories (but see Hillygus & Shields, 2008; Klar, 2013). My results suggest the value of examining the tension between a partisan or ideological identity and an identity related to material self-interest, such as income. The resulting cross-pressures may complicate people’s efforts to maintain preexisting opinions once new information pushes them in a different direction. Thus, my findings speak to a growing literature that examines the factors that exacerbate or mitigate biases in information processing (Bolsen et al., 2014; Leeper & Slothuus, 2014; Parker-Stephen, 2013).

It is important to note too this study’s limitations. It is limited first in its coverage of estate tax policy and politics. I do not consider, for example, how estate tax attitudes may change when tradeoffs (e.g., taxes vs. government spending or budget deficits) are made clear (Birney, Graetz, & Shapiro, 2006; Hacker & Pierson, 2005) or when the option of reforming but not repealing the tax is presented (Birney et al., 2006). Moreover, the study focuses only on the federal estate tax, not state estate taxes, and provides information based on federal rates and exemptions only as of 2007 to 2008. As of 2015, the exemption was larger than when these experiments were conducted (US$5.4 million vs. US$2 million) and the top tax rate was lower (40% vs. 45%). Of course, those potentially subject to the tax are still few in number and relatively wealthy, leaving the central message of the “Who pays” treatment unchanged. But with regard to the other treatments, a valid objection is that they did not capture some arguments made by estate tax supporters and opponents, such as the argument that estate taxes may hurt family businesses.

This study, like all survey experiments, may also be limited in its external validity. The broader information environment that citizens confront can powerfully shape whether citizens learn and use factual information (Jerit & Barabas, 2012; Kuklinski, Quirk, Jerit, & Rich, 2001), but these survey experiments represent that environment fairly crudely. The treatments are likely stronger than their real-world analogues (Barabas & Jerit, 2010)—hitting respondents, as Kuklinski et al. (2000) put it, “right between the eyes” (p. 792). These treatments thus afford little opportunity to study whether and how citizens are motivated to attend to and incorporate new information that is not presented to them so directly (Bolsen et al., 2014; Kuklinski et al., 2001). Moreover, real-world arguments about the estate tax would likely be conveyed by partisan elites or otherwise contain more explicit partisan cues than those provided here, which could attenuate the impact of factual information (see Druckman, Hennessy, St. Charles, & Webber, 2010; Druckman, Peterson, & Slothuus, 2013). Citizens may also be situated within networks of like-minded peers and media outlets that expose them only to certain information or frames—those preferred by elites from their party—rather than the competitive frames that are simulated here. In short, there may be no political actor who would provide “science” to citizens in a manner as simple as the typical survey experiment. And in the absence of science, stories could win out.

A final limitation involves generalizability. Like nearly all related studies, this study focuses on a single policy area. Would similar findings obtain in other policy domains? That is not a question that this study can answer, nor is it a question that the broader literature has been able to answer. Different studies have come to different conclusions about the persuasiveness of factual information, both in and of itself and in relation to other kinds of messages. The findings in this study may have limited generalizability if the estate tax actually does not evoke the same partisanship evident, for example, in the debate about the Iraq War, where factual information about American casualty levels did not affect opinion about the war (Berinsky, 2007). These findings may also not generalize to issues that are strongly connected to other potent predispositions, as is welfare to racial attitudes (Gilens, 1999; Kuklinski et al., 2000).

But these findings could generalize to certain other policy areas. Bullock (2011) hypothesizes that policy information could matter more for more complex issues. This hypothesis could help explain why some studies, including this one, have found that factual information can influence attitudes toward complicated policies such as taxation and certain government programs (Bullock, 2011; Gilens, 2001; Howell et al., 2011). For this reason, it would be fruitful to examine the impact of factual information on attitudes toward tax policy more generally, which is the subject of a similar debate about the role of ignorance (Bartels, 2005, 2007; Hacker & Pierson, 2005; Lupia, Levine, Menning, & Sin, 2007). Further research on the nature of policy issues could produce a more systematic account of how much “the facts” shape public opinion about these issues.

Despite the inevitable limitations of a single study, the findings here suggest that policy-specific factual information can affect attitudes, that it can do so even when that information must compete with other types of arguments, and that it can do so even among those with predispositions that should make them resist this information.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

I thank the editor, anonymous reviewers, Larry Bartels, Dennis Chong, Jennifer Jerit, Steven Kelts, Skip Lupia, and seminar participants at the University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill and University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign for many helpful comments and suggestions on previous versions of this article.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Author Biography

John Sides is associate professor of Political Science at George Washington University. His current research focuses on campaigns and elections, fiscal politics and policy, and political information and public opinion.

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