Abstract
Critical media literacy (CML) education is an approach to teaching about power, ideology, and hegemony through media. As a critical intervention in mainstream media literacy education, CML education integrates a cultural studies lens with a critical pedagogy orientation. In this article, we use critical auto-ethnography and personal reflective narratives or “anti-biography” to explore the dynamics and tensions of teaching CML in the posttruth era. We locate the shift to posttruth in the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign and election of Donald Trump, which produced a resurgence in far-right discourses promoting distrust of media and state institutions. We show how this shift created openings to criticality that made teaching CML easier in some ways; however, as we look deeper, what appears as an opening may in fact be an impasse. Through personal narratives, we illustrate what these openings and impasses looked like, how they felt and how they played out, to theorize about the possibilities and tensions of teaching CML in the current political moment. We argue the posttruth era necessitates a change in how we teach CML but not, as commonly argued, by teaching students how to fact-check or identify reliable sources. Instead, we must learn and teach about how the right uses media in transgressive ways to promote and normalize a racist, sexist, and authoritarian political agenda. We must also work to better understand students’ experiences of economic precarity and the limits of neoliberal multiculturalism.
Biden is going to take away your hamburgers, says Fox News. The left hates your babies, adds Tucker Carlson. The New York Times is anti-conservative claptrap. Trump and his followers go on about “the big lie” while believers in Q or anti-vaccine conspiracy “the great reset” encourage you to “do your own research” (“What Is the Great Reset- and How Did It Get Hijacked by Conspiracy Theories?” 2021). Right-wing discourses grow increasingly critical of media bias while deploying these assertions in the service of a reactionary politics (Harsin, 2020) that grows increasingly radical, racist, and sexist (Neiwert, 2016). In answer to the rise of far-right media and misinformation, scholars and educators call for a broad media literacy program in schools (e.g., Miller-Idriss, 2020). Yet, few have explored the challenges, the openings and the impasses, of teaching critical media literacy in the wake of Donald J Trump.
Critical media literacy (CML) education is an approach to teaching about power, ideology, and hegemony through media. As a critical intervention in mainstream media literacy education, CML education integrates a cultural studies lens (examining popular culture as a product and producer of power, oppression, ideology, and hegemony) with a critical pedagogy orientation (developing critical consciousness and liberation from oppression). As educators who have used CML in our courses for over a decade, we have engaged in ongoing dialogue about its possibilities and challenges. In this article, we explore the challenges of teaching CML in what has come to be known as the “post-truth” era. We locate the shift to posttruth in the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign and election of Donald Trump, which produced a resurgence in far-right discourses promoting distrust of media and state institutions.
Using critical auto-ethnography (Denzin, 2003) and personal reflective narratives from our teaching process or “anti-biography” (Reed-Danahay, 2009; Tebaldi, 2020), we show that teaching CML became, in some ways, easier in the posttruth era. Instead of naturalizing media narratives as self-evident neutral truths, students increasingly came into class with a hermeneutic of suspicion toward corporate media. This provided an initial opening for critical deconstruction of media narratives. However, as we look deeper, we see that what appears as an opening may in fact be an impasse. We draw from our auto-ethnographic narratives to illustrate what these openings and impasses looked like, how they felt, and how they played out. Our narratives also show how we use personal stories and aim to create space for vulnerability and deep listening in our classrooms, reflecting the affective and relational work of critical pedagogy. We aim to show that the posttruth era necessitates a change in how we teach CML but not, as commonly argued, by doubling down on teaching students how to fact-check or identify reliable sources. Instead, we must learn and teach about how the right uses media in transgressive ways to promote and normalize a racist, sexist, and authoritarian political agenda. We must also work to better understand students’ experiences of economic precarity and the limits of neoliberal multiculturalism.
In the following sections, we first situate our discussion within the current political context and literature on the digital far-right, media studies, and media literacy education. Then, we describe our teaching context, social positionality, and auto-ethnographic methods. Third, we share two personal reflective narratives about our teaching experience. Finally, we draw from these narratives to theorize the possibilities and limits of CML pedagogy in a posttruth, post-Trump era, and consider implications for practice.
Political Context: Posttruth, Social Media, and the Far Right
The 2016 U.S. presidential election is widely viewed to have ushered in a new political era, although we think it is more accurate to say it illuminated political shifts that were long in the making (Nygreen , 2017). The campaign leading up to the election was marked by more overt racist, sexist, and xenophobic language than had previously been permitted in mainstream political discourse. Far-right narratives, positions, and actors moved swiftly from the fringes to the center of national politics. The “post-truth” era arrived too, denoting a political context in which “facts” and “alternative facts” were presented as “both sides” of a political debate. As Harsin (2018) explains, “post-truth” does not imply a loss of truth, but a loss of social trust and legitimacy of the institutions and discourses previously seen as gatekeepers of truth. What is considered fact became politicized: climate change, COVID-19, the number of genders.
The term fake news, first meant to describe intentionally false stories circulated as disinformation campaigns, was co-opted by Trump to dismiss unflattering media coverage. While the right has long described the media as having a liberal bias, from Fox to Sarah Palin’s critiques of “lamestream media” (Blake, 2014), Trump made media critique a central grievance and political rallying cry, describing the entire press corps as “the enemy of the people” (Samuels, 2019). One outcome was an increase in the polarization of media (Wilson et al., 2020), which has led to greater ideological and affective polarization, and a proliferation of far-right media sources from Breitbart to America One to conspiracies like QAnon, which weaponize the idea of truth to sell reaction. Some argue this is an “infodemic,” with radical implications for the health of democratic society (Harsin, 2020).
This “post-truth” era is what Stuart Hall (2021) calls a crisis in and of ideology; it reflects the failure of dominant ideologies to win consent of the governed during a period of economic decline and social fracture. The lack of trust in media and political leaders speaks to the failures of institutions to create livable futures for us and our students, and to the ruling class’s need for new villains, and virulent far-right discourses. As the social crisis deepens, moral panics grow in intensity until they become far-right conspiracies. These far-right discourses work within the fractures and contradictions of late capitalism, the failures of the liberal center, and mainstream right. Exposing the fractures and failures of the liberal center appropriates resistance and pushes the discourse further right. Hall’s framework helps us to articulate the ways in which right-wing discourses can be both an opening and an impasse. We look to his understanding of conspiracy or “fake news” as revealing deeper social facts, and to his understanding of the challenge as far-right discourses appropriate resistance and win consent to the mainstream. Using Hall and CML methods that draw on cultural studies, we ask not only how we can stop “alternative facts” but also the broader media “infodemic” and its appeal to our students.
The Far-Right “Infodemic”
While the “infodemic” may be a problem for democracy, it arose along with a democratization of media access. Social media, from the former President’s use of Twitter, to the widespread sharing of weird news by your aunt on Facebook, is essential in the “post-truth” era. Many researchers have explored how this mistrust of centrist media has led to “algorithmic enclaves” (Lim, 2020) where users consume increasingly partisan news sources (as does Tebaldi who thinks NPR is capitalist claptrap). On the right, the “crisis of truth” has been met with a call for individuals to mistrust the mainstream media and do their own research in ways that echo our own calls for greater media literacy. They even do critical media analysis. Jungian sexist Jordan Peterson (2019) calls Frozen anti-male sexism, whereas radix journal offers essays on Blade Runner and esoteric anti-Semitism (Adrian, 2020). Social media increased access and increased criticality, but this democratization also seems to have led to a great deal of fascism online.
While racism in politics is not new, the 2016 election saw a confluence of multiple groups from the alt-right to gamers and Christian traditionalists, and a greater role for social media. Online, messageboards like 4chan and r/The_Donald connected these groups, permitting the combination and circulation of new right-wing discourses. Within these spaces, conspiracies from pizzagate to QAnon, or “post-truth protest” (Tuters et al., 2018), were created that would circulate much more widely and with serious consequences for social trust. Some call this “disinformation assisted hate propaganda” (George, 2020) or misinformation in support of political reaction. Others characterize it as “affective propaganda” (Boler, 2020) that emphasizes the use of hate, but also play, transgression, and sex, in spreading far-right ideology.
Far-right digital media expertly deploys a transgressive style or “countercultural conservatism” (Nadler, 2020); in the words of NRA spokeswoman Dana Loesch (2017), “conservatism is the new punk rock.” Greene (2019) notes that this racism is also framed as ludic; through emotion and wordplay, it is made ironic, transgressive, and fun. In a study of Stormfront style guides, she notes how this is not only a form of deniability but an explicit recruiting strategy for young people. Others use a language of fighting and battle; from meme wars to the digital soldiers in the “Prager force,” to gamers’ transgressive racist or sexist insults, this is the language of a “geek masculinity” (Massanari, 2020). This transgressive style also uses sex and sexism to cast the right as the true critical thinkers. Tebaldi (2020) shows how the right characterizes itself as “speaking post-truth to power”; it casts itself as the minoritized voice. They call themselves “Gramscians of the right,” using the language of criticality to frame racism as transgressive, the language of academia to make it stigmatized truth; it’s not racism, it’s the truth of “human biodiversity” that the anti-White PC police don’t want you to know. Tebaldi (2020) shows how the intellectual dark web characterizes itself as radical intellectuals, using this idea of transgressing liberal politically correct (pc) norms to sell race science as critical thought.
The far right’s transgressive style has an increasingly visible element on college campuses, as well as online. Binder and Wood (2012) show how this transgressive and sexual style is deployed for campus recruitment. Campus conservatives get attention with shocking displays, such as dressing up in diapers, while painting themselves as truth-tellers in opposition to PC insanity. Binder and Wood add that an important element of campus recruitment is the consistent characterization of professors as liberals and graduate students as radical socialists (thanks) who hate conservatives, accusations of bias echoed by innumerable right-wing sites such as the online “university” PragerU (Prager, 2019).
Fact-Checking and Media Literacy
In light of the rising tide of right-wing media disinformation and hate, many propose education in CML. Yet, this very often relies on old models of media literacy as “fact checks” or “reliable sources” and has not yet been brought into dialogue with existing work on CML as an exploration of social power. Conversely, studies in CML are not well informed by knowledge of right-wing media and tend to repeat tropes of the right as simply ignorant, wrong, stupid, isolated in the corners of the internet, or the swamps of the south (Tebaldi, 2021).
Although disinformation is a growing issue, especially around health and vaccinations (Walter et al., 2020), initiatives to combat far-right ideology that focus on disinformation often suggest that “fact checking” or new facts is this answer (e.g., Farrer, 2017). This suggests the issue of disinformation can be resolved by teaching students to recognize a difference between real and fake news. Journell (2019) suggests educators need to distinguish between incorrect facts or fake news, which they fight, and bias which is less problematic. Yet, teaching students to simply check snopes.com or look for a reliable source may reinforce many of the same power structures we, as critical pedagogues, had hoped to challenge. As Harsin (2018) states, while media education and fact-checking are often proposed as one liberal academic solution to right-wing media, a real posttruth critical education would be a broader social transformation of consumer capitalism, education, and unequal media resources.
A second characterization of far-right media relies on metaphors of illness, protection, or contamination—the “infodemic.” These framings suggest far-right media is not merely propaganda but a communicative disease, and often rely on old models of media literacy which frame it as protecting our children from dangerous ideas. For example, Goering and Thomas (2018) call media literacy a lifesaver in a sea of disinformation, whereas Fine (2012) describes bad media as “mental contamination.” These echo how Kellner and Share (2007) characterized that early work in media literacy, which viewed digital media as something which students need to be protected from, in contrast to contemporary work in CML that sees it as an interrogation of culture and power in the media.
Both of these framings turn back from the field’s focus on criticality, offering a fact-check instead of looking at the full social fact. A few scholars suggest instead that we increase the work of critical pedagogy, offering more personal stories, building more connections, and engaging in open dialogue (Rodriguez & Huemmer, 2019). We follow this call for a doubling down on the personal, affective work of critical pedagogy and CML education. We note that CML sees popular culture as a site for the simultaneous reproduction (Giroux, 2011) and disruption of White, middle-class, or liberal educational norms (Morrell, 2002; Kellner and Share, 2007). CML understands media as public pedagogy (Giroux, 2011), which teaches us about culture and power; Giroux explains that film’s affect makes it a powerful tool for cultural politics and the production of identity.
CML is especially important for understanding right-wing media, which offers both an affective spectacle, a Trumpian public pedagogy of racism and cruelty (Kellner, 2016), and a pseudo-critique of mainstream media’s bias and “fake news.” Therefore, interestingly, both CML and the far right see themselves as disrupting mainstream, middle-class, establishment norms. CML also looks at popular culture, not merely news, but social media, advertisements, clothing, and material culture. These are key areas in the mainstreaming of the right and the maintenance of right-wing identities, as Miller-Idriss (2020) notes. Current work often focuses most closely on digital media; work in communication or critical digital media studies often looks at how right-wing media shapes “structures of feeling” (Sharma & Tygstrup, 2015) and the ways in which digital media produces and circulates intense affect to construct new relationships. Boler (2020) argues we need to understand the affective politics of digital media; we need to go beyond fact-checking to understand digital media’s “affective weaponization of facts” (Hong & Hermann, 2020).
Teaching students media literacy in the era of posttruth requires that we become critically literate about right-wing media. The far right sees themselves as cultural warriors, not just spreading misinformation but using transgression, affect, and play in a metapolitical battle. CML allows us to understand media not just as true or false but as a structure of feeling and a cultural politics—the way the right does too. We can’t just debunk, we need to better understand why and how these media are appealing, and what they teach.
Auto-Ethnographic Methods
In this article, we use critical auto-ethnography (Reed-Danahay, 2009) to look back on our teaching of CML before, during, and after the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election. Critical auto-ethnography involves using personal experiences and identities to illuminate social practices, power, and inequality, through the use of anti-biography (Reed-Danahay, 2009). We generated this article by producing individual auto-ethnographic accounts of our teaching experience, sharing, and reflecting on them together. Our narratives draw on qualitative research’s use of personal identity, emotion, and interpretation of key moments or events to connect personal experience to broader social structures and social critique (Behar, 2009; Ghodsee, 2011). They relate the challenges we faced in teaching media literacy, and possibilities, and the traps, as criticality becomes part of right-wing commonsense. They offer snapshots of our classrooms and engage our ongoing conversations about teaching after Trump.
Both authors are White women on the political left, but with long familiarity with right-wing ideas. Our collaboration began when we both taught versions of the same CML-based undergraduate course at a large public university. The course, Education and Film, fulfills an institutional “diversity” requirement and uses Hollywood representations of schooling to teach about educational inequality along lines of race, class, and gender. Nygreen, an Associate Professor, designed the course and taught it twice per year between 2011 and 2021—from the Obama era to Trump’s defeat. Tebaldi served as a graduate Teaching Assistant of Education and Film for 3 years, designed and taught her own independent versions of the course from 2015 to 2017, and developed other courses applying a CML framework such as “Harry Potter and the Myth of Meritocracy.” Tebaldi also pursued a line of scholarship in media studies, digital ethnography, and the resurgence of extreme right-wing politics and right-wing media. As a scholar of the far right and the daughter of a far-right woman, she has intimate familiarity with rightist media.
In the narratives that follow, we offer snapshots of our teaching and attempt to show the tensions and challenges we experienced. We recount events that occurred in our classrooms and give voice to our own internal dialogue as we negotiated the everyday tensions and dilemmas, impasses and openings, of teaching media literacy in the era of “fake news” as criticality becomes part of right-wing commonsense. Just as we use personal stories in our teaching to help students see beyond dominant ideologies, this article makes use of our own stories for the same purpose. We present our narratives in the next two sections.
Nygreen: On the Limits of Meeting Students Where They Are
In 2011, new to my institution as a pretenure assistant professor, I was assigned to teach a large undergraduate course called Education at the Movies. Since I had no experience with the topic, I tried to decline but was told it didn’t require expert knowledge because it was lower division, and moreover, it must be taught because it was a popular course that filled a lot of seats. The syllabus I inherited from a retired adjunct instructor provided minimal information about the course aims and substance. I asked around for advice and a colleague recommended a text about high school movies analyzed through a sociological lens (Bulman, 2005). It discussed how ideologies of meritocracy and individualism are infused into high school films, how these messages obscure structural inequality, and the impacts of such representation on public (mis)understanding of social issues. With a background in cultural studies and critical theory, this text made sense to me, so I adopted it and built the course from there.
In the first lecture, I introduced the premise to 120 students in a large auditorium. I said we would study inequality in schools, using analysis of films about education as an entry point. I explained that media is a socializing institution that, along with other socializing institutions (family, church, and school), shapes culture and identity. I discussed how mass media upholds ideological hegemony by manufacturing consent to unjust social structures and that media is powerful not because it tells us what to think but because it shows us what is (and isn’t) thinkable. And also, media always reflects particular perspectives and biases, which serve particular interests. I thought these were fairly straightforward points that would sufficiently frame the course before moving on to the substance of analyzing high school movies. It didn’t take long to learn that most students either didn’t understand or didn’t accept this framing. Their comments and writing revealed resistance to the idea that all media had a perspective. Viewing “bias” as inherently bad—synonymous with propaganda and disinformation—they rushed to defend the media. Not all media are biased; they would insist. Some news outlets are objective. Movies are just entertainment. No matter that their unrealistic happy endings are a middle-class fantasy that makes the system seem fair; it’s just a movie! Often, they mistook the moral of a movie as the lesson of the class. If we discussed how a movie promoted colorblind racism, they concluded we should all be colorblind because it’s wrong to judge a person by their race. Or, they interpreted movies as windows to truth: If a movie promoted the ideology of meritocracy, they concluded meritocracy was “real” because the film was “based on a true story.” When asked to reflect on their own media socialization, they denied having been influenced by media at all. I’m my own person, they would insist. I think for myself!
In subsequent semesters, I adjusted my approach. Instead of introducing the premise of the course in one preliminary lecture, I explicitly taught and retaught it throughout the semester. I made the framework of CML explicit, adding readings about CML to reinforce the importance of media literacy and illustrate the social role of media. While many students continued to deny that media shaped their own attitudes and beliefs, they seemed more receptive to the idea that it influenced young children’s attitudes and beliefs (many were aspiring teachers after all). So I incorporated readings and documentaries about the impacts of media on preschool and elementary age children. We looked at studies about cartoon characters that perpetuate gendered and racialized stereotypes, and how children as young as 3 years old had already internalized them. While original versions of the course had focused exclusively on racial and economic inequality, I gradually incorporated gender analysis and modified the syllabus so we opened with gender and sexuality. We looked at how gendered media messages, popular visual images, and unrealistic beauty standards shaped young girls’ aspirations, body image, and self-esteem, with impacts such as high rates of eating disorders and underrepresentation of girls in STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) fields. We also learned about harmful impacts of gendered scripts for boys, including toxic masculinity. We watched the high school movies that students requested, like Mean Girls, The Breakfast Club, and Ferris Bueller’s Day Off, while asking, “What do these movies teach? How do they do that? So what?”
Students were quickly able to see gendered scripts and heteronormativity in these movies and how they connected to the message of individualism (male characters expressing individuality through achievements; female characters through romantic attention from a man). The majority of students in the course were White and female. These topics resonated for many. They also resonated for me, a White woman, and I gradually began to weave some of my own personal experiences into lectures. This was a way to model personal self-reflection and make my own media socialization transparent. I told students that “unlearning” media messages is part of media literacy and that it’s a lifelong process rather than something to complete in one semester or even 4 years of college. Opening with these themes helped students grasp the idea that media could contain harmful ideological messages with real social impacts, but were naturalized and hence hard to see. This was the foundational understanding they needed to undertake the work of the course: critical analysis of high school films with attention to ideologies of race, class, and meritocracy. Instead of one lecture, it took us 4 or 5 weeks to get here. But I felt satisfied that, overall, most students were able to get here if they put in minimal effort and showed up to class.
One day, while lecturing about heteronormativity, I went off-script and told my own coming-out story. I was trying to convey how compulsory heterosexuality is naturalized in the air we breathe, so much so that overt homophobia is not necessary to enforce it. I had read about and lectured on this before, but this time I was in the midst of coming out as queer after being married to a man with two children, well into my late 30s. As I told students, in my entire life before that, I had never consciously questioned my sexuality (although with hindsight, there were signs). I always thought of myself as a self-aware, open-minded, and progressive person. I was never part of a religious or social group that was overtly homophobic. My family was liberal, as was the college town I grew up in and the women’s liberal arts college I attended. I couldn’t understand how I got so far in life without knowing this crucial aspect about myself. I told students that wrestling with this question helped me understand the power of internalized oppression, in my case internalized homophobia and internalized sexism. Even in the absence of overt homophobia, I said, I had internalized a view of homosexuality as deviant, perverted, and disgusting. And that, even with lean-in feminism and “having it all,” I had internalized a belief that my success as a woman was tied to my ability to attract a desirable man.
After the lecture, several students approached to thank me for the story. Others sent emails or came to office hours. Some were young women who resonated with the part about gendered scripts and what it meant to be a successful woman. Some identified as LGBTQ+ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer or questioning) and wanted to come out to me. One shared that their parent came out as gay when they were in high school. It was a turning point in the class. It felt like the lecture had opened up space for deeper, more meaningful learning. Students’ writing became more self-reflective and personal, less resistant. I felt less self-conscious and more relaxed in class. So, in the next semester, when we arrived at that part of the syllabus, I told the story again. And again, the thank-you visits and emails came rolling in. After that, the story became a staple. A couple years later, a student said they had heard about the story before enrolling and looked forward to hearing it live.
In the same time period, I revised the course title from Education and the Movies to Education and Film, increased enrollment from 120 to 180 to support more graduate TAs, applied for and received the “diversity” designation from the university, and collaborated with TAs to continuously revise and improve the course. Each semester we updated readings and incorporated new forms of media, shifted our pedagogical approaches, modified prompt questions and assignments, restructured the format and meeting times. The gradual frontloading of gender and sexuality and the suburban high school films that students requested was an attempt to “meet students where they are.” These changes seemed to help students engage with and conceptually understand principles of critical media analysis. Over time, we saw more evidence that students understood how the media embodied particular perspectives, contributed to ideological hegemony, and legitimized oppressive power relations. They weren’t resisting these ideas with quite the same force. They were producing thoughtful, rigorous analyses of films. We had found our groove.
Just as I was feeling good about that, in fall of 2018 I received this comment from a student: I don’t appreciate how the class treats controversial subjects, such as gay relationships, as if they are not controversial at all. I think in a class of at least 70 people, it’s impossible to know everyone’s beliefs and morals, but gay relationships are different. A 2015 USA Today poll found that only 60% of Americans approve of gay marriage. Coming into class behaving like it’s no big deal, or as if it’s approved all across the board, is not helping anyone. Less than 5% of Americans identify as LGBT according to NBC News. This is why they are represented less in films. The other 95% of Americans want their film and TV characters to be people they can relate to in as many ways possible. This is why almost all characters in film are straight. It’s not homophobia, it’s relative representation of the consumer base. I feel that normalizing and advancing the LGBT agenda is unnecessary and we should instead be looking toward the actual consumers of these films rather than look to point fingers when a “diverse” film doesn’t perform well in the box office. I understand that this is a required diversity course but I am uncomfortable when everyone is taught to believe the same thing, without prior knowledge of anyone’s personal or religious beliefs. No one has spoken out because no one is brave enough to challenge the evident progressive agenda. I know there are lots of people who sit quietly and disagree with what is being taught. I have nothing against the professor for being gay and I wish no ill will onto her, but that doesn’t mean she can push her identity politics into everyone’s faces. And if you are going to push progressive politics into the class, include some conservative/Republican ideals too. After all, the Civil Rights movement (African-Americans) and the women’s suffragette movement (Women) were lead and[9] legitimized by Republicans. Just a thought[10].
My first reaction: “This is just the inevitable push-back when students are challenged to confront their own power and privilege. I’m used to this.” But something felt different. The student had used right-wing talking points coupled with homophobia. I spent the next lecture afraid. There was a White boy, or young man, sitting toward the front of the lecture hall near the center. His eyes were focused on me but he wasn’t taking notes. I hadn’t noticed him before. Was he new? Was he even in this class? I paced the lecture hall keeping him in my peripheral vision. I felt myself shaking, in a quiet panic. Could this young man be a mass shooter? I wavered between “I’m being paranoid” and “but no one would be surprised if it happened here.” Every White boy in the lecture hall that day looked like he could be the next nationally recognized school shooter. And why not? Would anyone really be surprised if it happened at [this university]?
Tebaldi: Openings, Impasses, and Incels
Part 1: Opening
Friday Morning discussion section, in the mid-semester slog, somehow both exhausted and motivated, over and underdressed. I scan the room as the students arrive, the eager redheaded boy, the fake rebel in the back who actually talks more than anyone, the sociology major in the corner, the girls in sweatpants and full makeup, the guys in shorts before march. I put up slides for our unit on expressive individualism, frustrated. “Be an individual just like everyone else.” Seriously, what am I teaching? What is the point of this? What will the kids actually learn about these paradoxes of individualism? Why does it matter? Are we just teaching people you don’t have to be Barbie? Is there more than just a discussion of representation in films? Why is the coffee here so watery? Why do none of the markers work? Why does everything smell like plasticine and teen angst?
Often the kids get stuck thinking that the moral of the movie is the lesson of the class, that school ties teach you to overcome prejudice and succeed, missing that this is the meritocracy we came here to discuss. Here, I’m stuck, struggling to see outside of this film’s framing of individual expression fighting bland conformity. My gender analysis sounds plastic, a pseudo-sophisticated varnish on Katy’s speech at the end of Mean Girls—“Don’t worry about love, beauty and popularity but just be yourself.” As usual when I don’t know what to do, I began with some self-deprecating jokes: “Movies might say I’m worthless because I’m not married but don’t forget I’m also broke.” We talk about gender roles and beauty norms. A boy responds, yeah, it’s ok if women don’t flat iron their hair they are still pretty. My first thought is mocking, “oh, feminism achieved”—but it’s quickly replaced by a tenderness toward this boy whose daily niceness to everyone is a lesson on feminism better than I’m teaching now. And my hair is full Miss Frizzle. One student asks what’s wrong with a love story, and why we are saying love or being yourself is bad. I can’t answer her.
Eventually I start thinking about capitalism, as you do. I explain that these movies were invented in the 1980s and get ready to talk about the rise of American consumer culture. I rummage around in the back of my mind, pulling out an old lecture about women and sex under socialism, that talked about how American media used badly and similarly dressed women to paint socialism as asexual and not romantic. I think about how libertarian activists used teen rebellion to sell adult anticommunism. I think about the tax revolt, Gloria Steinem working for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), liberal feminism, and girl bosses. In a swirl it all comes together, and I open my mouth to explain, when a student in the back notices we are past time.
At this moment, I wanted to teach students about the way films narrate the idea of discovering yourself and becoming an individual in ways that if anything further naturalize middle-class gender roles. That they present as challenging suburban norms and conformity, but they teach those same values. As a class, we did get to a discussion of how these films teach women to be themselves but present this as achieved through men. Yet, as I explained this during discussion sections, this often fizzled into a discussion of how beauty isn’t very important or beauty standards are not good—less critical than a dove commercial. We would tell students our culture puts too much emphasis on marriage and love for women, and they would nod like this was old news. Over 12, 23, 14, and 15 discussion sections over and over again I saw they were familiar with media literacy classes on body image, expected to have jobs and boyfriends—what I was teaching seemed if anything the dominant narrative, and it wasn’t leading our discussion into a questioning of the ideology of liberal individualism but, if anything, deeper into a repetition of its central theme—“just be yourself.” Until one student, late in 2017 remarked, “but actually, I do just want to get married.”
Right-wing media also positions liberal feminism of the 1980s and onward as linked to neoliberalization and deindustrialization and its disruption of the previous generation’s gender roles—men working in less “masculine” industries, women working at all—as a disruption of the family. This view of feminism saw women working as linked to selfishness and consumerism instead of love and devotion. Their problem with the idea of the #girlboss was a woman who was a boss, but they also questioned the individualism of lean in feminism and the constant media discourses selling one variety of womanhood. They shared my facts, but with a very different set of values framing their interpretation.
At first, it was shocking to hear anyone question the value of feminism or tell me openly in a class that their aim in life was to get married, to present this dated view of women as objects for men as a new transgressive truth. It was like hearing my father’s voice come out of an 18-year-old girl; I flash back to him saying, “your brother’s hobby is soccer, yours is looking pretty.” And I mean I like men and being attractive to them. Imagine thinking it was cool to reduce yourself to that, and sexy to say it out loud. Much like the girls in 1980s’ movie, this student framed marriage as the real rebellion against the feminist schoolteacher’s PC culture. And that’s when I saw; the far-right media is essentially doing the same thing as a bad high school movie—teaching you that the real rebellion is White suburbs. Reactionary politics become sexy transgression. Conservatism is the new punk rock. The next time I teach the class, I will say Breitbart took his cues from John Hughes.
At the same time, the girl was right about lean-in feminism and a vision of the revolution as the right to a credit card and a McJob. Where was my teaching missing? Opposing career and love, did I make right-wing opposition between capitalism and traditionalism more plausible? Taking aim against beauty standards and love, rather than service jobs, did I make right-wing womanhood sexier? Right-wing discourses invoked by students could provide new understandings of media and why it matters, opportunities to think more critically, understand the urgency and import of our work, and recognize and develop my own beliefs; their anti-feminism was uncomfortable but a useful challenge—not an impasse but an opening in the smooth totalizing of late capitalist ideals.
Part 2: Impasse
A few weeks later. Summer school. I’m nervous and excited to be teaching the class on my own, wading into the deep end of frigid air conditioning (AC) and precarious employment. Twelve students look up at me, one question on their faces: When are we watching Mean Girls? If anyone drops out, I won’t be able to pay rent. This makes for very student-centered pedagogy. I ask them, “What movies about school and gender would you like to watch?” To my surprise, one boy asks, “Can we watch the red-pill?” I knew this anti-feminist mockumentary from my research on the far-right, a sexist spinal tap, but I had never expected to see it in the classroom. In it, a self-identified feminist woman discovers that despite pro-female media lies, men are society’s true oppressed because of divorce, the draft, suicide, and sex. The abuse of information and sexual resentment politics makes my face itch and I just tell him he can’t use it because it’s not in a school. Compensating for my irritation, and mindful of my job, I tell them each Friday they can choose their own movie clips. They remind me I don’t teach on Fridays. So Thursday. The boy selects a movie called LaPolytechnique, where a man murders 14 women in a classroom. He asks the class, “Why did feminism make this man want to murder people?” Well, it was in a school. All of a sudden, I’m not nervous but truly afraid.
If before, the anti-feminism in my class was a challenge to liberal capitalist visions of equality before the mall, this moment was something else. I don’t feel challenged to question my own media indoctrination, to co-construct new kinds of feminism with my class, or new ways of being equal and kind. My chest hurts. I smell the bile and hormones, salty sweat of violent misogyny. I guess we did have to teach that women are in fact, people. We sat there in what felt like the deepest most awkward silence I’d ever experienced. Was I already dead? I’m checking if the girls, especially the science majors, are ok. My mouth is somehow saying “Polytechnique is an elite science and engineering school in Quebec. What does this say about this shooter’s beliefs on gender and education?” My brain is saying “This student hates feminism. This student hates me.” How am I gonna fact check that away?
Discussion: Opening or Impasse?
In the time that elapsed between Nygreen’s first coming-out lecture and the first homophobic student comment or the first LaPolytechnique fan in Tebaldi’s class, the political and media landscape of the United States changed dramatically. The 2016 U.S. presidential election had occurred, emboldening and materially empowering a far-right movement based on racist, sexist, and homophobic identity politics. The era of posttruth and fake news decisively arrived. In some ways, teaching CML grew easier in that time. By 2018, our students widely understood that media is powerful, contains embedded ideologies and points of view, can shape politics, and influence culture. These claims had become un-controversial, almost self-evident. We used to struggle for the better part of the semester to achieve this level of understanding. Now, our students came in with it. This seemed to provide an opening for CML pedagogy. But was this opening actually an impasse?
We saw students who identified as right-wing become fluent in media criticism. They argued the media, and our course, had a liberal bias, to paint their own views as stigmatized. They wrote “representation matters” to show how White men, especially conservatives, Christians, southerners, the rich, and fraternity brothers are represented negatively in media, caricatured or portrayed as “backward” and stupid. They cited readings about intersectionality and institutionalized oppression to argue that political correctness was the new ideological hegemony—the new compulsory heterosexuality, as it were. This painted them, of course, as free speech warriors. At first, it seemed like an impasse. A co-optation of critique. Students across our courses showed an increased facility with the language of critique—yet this language was associated with ideas, beliefs, ideologies we found to be anathema to our vision of critical pedagogy. It was used not to question power, but to maintain status. In our students’ comments as well, leftist language was used to make the right seem like the real free thinkers, the real critical thinkers—and to paint White men as the new true oppressed.
Were they critical thinkers? They were, by most measures, more “media literate” than our students had ever been. Yet, more reactionary. Was this an opening for more critical thought? A beginning from which to teach a power analysis? Or an impasse, leaving us to watch as the students used the critical vocabulary we taught them to defend Trumpism? What solutions could be found? Were we limited to fact-checks, stuck between defending Jeff Bezos’s Washington Post and endorsing Steve Bannon’s Breitbart? What seemed at first like an opening began to seem like an impasse. “Fake news” was not students becoming critically literate, but the co-opting of criticality for authority. It was a faux-rebellion just like something out of The Breakfast Club or Ferris Bueller. Conservatives were the new punk rock, free thinkers, the new oppressed, and now, the new critical media scholars.
Our students weren’t saying these things in a vacuum; they were voicing ideas that are widely circulated in rightist media. As CML educators, we need to become critically aware of what right-wing media is doing, and how. It might look like disinformation to us, but to consumers of it, right-wing media gives the feeling of being the real critical thinkers engaged in battle against the PC authorities. We see this most clearly in The Red Pill, a pseudo-documentary about a feminist who discovers the “truth” of male oppression—a mirror image of the kind of discovery, critical awareness, and intersectional understanding of social power we aim to teach. The film relies centrally on a series of facts that are superficially true: the greater number of male suicides, the smaller number of male shelters. Yet, they elide important factual and social context, the far greater number of suicide attempts by women, that more women need shelters as we have less economic power and are more often victims of partner violence. They are correct facts, recontextualized within a vision of male grievance, loss and loneliness, and illegitimate female power. These correct yet decontextualized facts are used to reframe the right as both the true oppressed and the true critical thinkers. As Bates (2021) describes, The Red Pill, a prominent Men’s right community, promoted a video of Trump disparaging a female reporter that opens with their definition of “misogynist”: “a person who tells a woman the truth.” Like many Trump supporters, Men’s Rights Activists deify and enact the idea of speaking your mind and countering “political correctness.”
Bates shows how the members of this misogynist group note say they are in fact the truth-tellers and fact-checkers, fighting against feminist political correctness. The whole idea of the red pill is a fact that allows people to see beyond the dominant narrative, facts that allow you to access the truth and the correct values. They see themselves not as the indoctrinated, but as the ones with the facts, the “redpills” that fight against the false consciousness of PC ideology. As the name “Men’s rights” suggests, these simply take up the language of the oppressed for the rights of the oppressor. While these groups present themselves as stigmatized by feminism and social “gynocentrism,” researchers note that Men’s Rights and Incel groups share an ideology with mainstream America (Mattheis & Waltman, 2020). There is a broad belief in male entitlement, gender difference, and roles—indeed these are the cultural norms we aim to explore in films in our courses on CML. The Red Pill reframes these dominant cultural ideologies as transgressive critique; it makes 1950’s gender roles edgy.
This stance is carefully manipulated by right-wing media (as the term edgelord implies). In this way, it echoes the John Hughes and other suburban high school films. Like Ferris in the shower with his soap mohawk talking about how he doesn’t care about European socialism, contemporary far-right media takes suburban ideologies about gender roles and consumer capitalism and makes them seem fun, rebellious, and nonconformist. This rebellious truth is constructed in opposition to the dull, censorious, boring progressive agenda of teachers (like us), just like Ferris’s rebellion is characterized in opposition to his parents’ authority, boring teachers, or idiot principals. This is the same kind of fun affective charge that animates much of right-wing transgressive, critical stance. The red-pilled truth speaker gets to “own the libs” with the same glee the breakfast club got to defeat the dull principal. In short, The Red Pill (like other rightist media) is not just “alternative fact” but a faux-critical stance undergirded by a fun, sexy, transgressive, or smarter-than-you affect. This blend of sex and smarts, rebellion and superiority, is an appealing stance for some college students, who are maturing and testing authority. This is familiar to those who have had the student who enjoys “playing devil’s advocate.” The Red Pill is affective, about identity, not merely something to be disproven—as anyone who has tried to fight with that kid in class can attest.
Yet, we did find some openings toward real critical thought. We must be very aware of the ways in which right-wing discourse is manipulative and propagandistic, not taking their claims to criticality on face value. Still, not everything right-wing media says is an alternative fact; some must correspond to people’s own interpretation of the social crisis as Hall (2021) points out about previous iterations of right-wing propaganda. Perhaps once we see the limits, it is possible to begin with this language and push for more egalitarian values. For example, rightist media constructs the Right as edgy, transgressive truth-tellers in opposition to a PC liberal elite with a “progressive agenda,” as Nygreen’s student evaluation put it. While this PC elite is as fictive as Joe Biden’s socialism, the construction is emboldened by neoliberal education practices and policies. When we have only a semester of “diversity requirements,” the language of critique is easily learned without its deeper lessons, enabling it to be co-opted by the right. When the neoliberal university superficially engages with diversity while charging thousands per course, it gives a grain of truth to the right’s claims about a PC elite. When liberal politics deal with representation and not redistribution, from rainbow capitalism to new nontoxic masculinity sponsored by Gillette, the right’s critiques of woke capitalism aren’t all wrong. If only we could get them to be mad at the capitalism part instead of the woke part.
Rightist discussions of the PC elite reframe economic critiques of the elite in terms of social identities and the “liberal” “cultural elites” are constructed as the power elite. This could be a jumping off point to talk about class, how we understand social power and inequality, and how the media we consume help us to do this. Perhaps a critical media approach to right-wing propaganda could look like attacking these discourses and showing how they are manipulative, but also engaging with the grains of truth or feeling that make them effective—instead of merely fact-checking and falling into the role of the dull PC police the right assigned for us, and also looking more deeply into both the experiences our students are having of the social crisis, and the media that is shaping this interpretation.
We are far from resolving this problem. But with patience and reflexive examination of our own struggles as educators, we have found small openings for critical pedagogy. Two areas in which we have been effective as educators in doing this is through a greater discussion of “deep stories” (Hochschild, 2018), especially those informed by class politics, and the use of affect. We worked as educators to go beyond a media literacy class to a CML class, one that went beyond representation and stereotypes, to one that used films to explore dominant narratives or deep stories, stories which are culturally, emotionally, and intellectually important. These in particular invoked ideas of meritocracy, individualism, self-expression, and rebellion, which are deeply connected to right-wing narratives. Tebaldi in particular struggled to do this with gender, moving from critiquing beauty standards to engaging with individualism. Nygreen’s course design also connected these to class and a deeper political economy. By discussing economic inequality and middle-class normativity, we were also better able to address some of the ways class was used against claims of White privilege and how the “white working class” was used to create this false criticality or fairy tales of White oppression.
Finally, affect and personal relationships had long been central to our research and understanding of critical pedagogy, but as we began teaching “post-trump” or “post-truth,” we saw that building connection and sharing who we were became even more important. Tebaldi found that being disingenuous about love and feminism made it harder to teach, whereas Nygreen found that honesty and personal narrative brought deep meaning to the same content. By being more honest with our own experiences and feelings, we can ask our students to do the same and counter the faux-criticality of the right.
Conclusion: Impasses and Openings
We have found that our students’ uptake of critical language about media seems like an opening but is often an impasse, like one of those old cartoons where they paint a doorway on a brick wall. We felt stuck between teaching fact-checking or accepting right-wing criticality at face value, both of these ignoring the social facts of student experiences. We needed to better understand our students and the ways in which their use, or misuse, of the language of criticality reflected at once the populist discourses of Trump and their own beliefs and needs. We also needed to examine the limits of neoliberal multiculturalism, of courses in “diversity” that do not address students’ ideologies or help them articulate their own needs.
Footnotes
Author Note
Kysa Nygreen, is now affiliated to University College London.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
