Pragmatism and Human Resource Development

Why Advocate for Philosophy in HRD?

Philosophy is a cognitive endeavor. It is an activity of building a coherent framework of ideas, beliefs, values, and assumptions within which we can understand our experiences. This framework is built from various sources of information, such as concepts, theories, experiences, intuition, folk tales, and superstition (Rescher, 2010). A major interest of the classical Pragmatists was the importance of inquiry for building our belief systems and for resolving problems (Dewey, 1938b, James, 1907/1995; Levi, 2012; Misak, 2004; Peirce, 1877). The aim of philosophical inquiry is to develop a more adequate understanding of the world for the purpose of developing more adequate practices in the world. Philosophical inquiry helps us make better choices (Rescher, 2000). Philosophical inquiry can help clear up some of the confusion, contradictions, and defects in the knowledge base of a field and in our personal bases of knowledge. Winch (1990) described this role of philosophy as clearing out the underbrush so the important work (e.g., research, theory, and practice) can proceed.

Philosophy attempts to describe the nature of the world, how the world works, and how it works at levels beyond that which empirical science has explained. Despite the power of science to explain enormously complicated phenomena, there are things that science has not, or cannot adequately explain, such as human meaning, purpose, reality, and truth (Rescher, 2001). In the pursuit of understanding, philosophy strives for a rough approximation of reality, not defensible information about the truth (Rescher, 2010). Thus, in addition to our scientific knowledge, philosophy can provide a working framework and normative system to help us better understand, take action, and cope with the world.

In any substantial and serious endeavor to understand the world, philosophy is a key issue—it is not optional. Consciously or not, our philosophical framework guides our thoughts and actions (Rescher, 2010). There is no getting away from it. Important philosophical questions to address are as follows: Are we conscious of our philosophical assumptions? How good, bad, clear, or confused are these assumptions? Even the act of ignoring philosophy is a philosophical decision to address (Jaspers, 1951 as cited by Gosney & Hughes, 2016). Working toward a more systematic and practical understanding about how things work is important for grappling with the more intractable problems we face in the world.

The next section briefly reviews a selection of important ideas relevant to HRD informed by Pragmatism—including ideas from emerging practice theories. This brief and selective review is only a sampling of the ideas put forth by a range of philosophers and scholars of Pragmatism and practice. We propose that this brief sampling has important implications for the work of HRD scholars and practitioners.

Brief History of Selected Pragmatic Ideas

The words “Pragmatism,” “practice,” and “practical” derive from the Greek word for action (πραϒµα). Even though Charles Sanders Peirce, the founder of Pragmatism, did not initially use the word Pragmatism to describe his work, the word Pragmatism was introduced by William James to describe this distinctive new American view of the world (Bernstein, 2010). The early Pragmatists were concerned with developing actionable knowledge useful to people living their everyday lives. They rejected the universalist and foundationalist assumptions governing existing paradigms in favor of pluralist and emergent explanations of a contingent and evolving world experienced as the flux and flow of life (Dewey, 1938a; Elkjaer & Simpson, 2011; Margolis, 2010).

Major influences on the early Pragmatists were Darwin’s theory of evolution and the emerging power of science (Margolis, 2010), which inspired a growing interest in the natural world in many fields. The idea that human beings are part and parcel of the natural order of things drove the early Pragmatists away from the classical, idealistic, and theological perspectives of humanity and the world.

Peirce proposed a practically oriented philosophy in the late 1800s to counteract the dominant ideas of Descartes who claimed that through the power of introspection and intuition we can find truth independent of the external world (Rumens & Kelemen, 2013; Talisse & Aikin, 2008). To the early Pragmatists (Peirce, James, and Dewey), this idealist, abstract way of understanding the world was impractical for developing our understanding of how to get things done that were beneficial to people in their everyday lives. They rejected the extant philosophies based on idealism and realism that claimed we could accurately and with certainty represent the real world through rational, abstract reasoning. The concurrent rise of science at this time, along with a focus on practical outcomes fostered the development of the Pragmatists’ thinking.

Peirce (1878) developed what became known as The Pragmatic Maxim stating that the courses of action suggested by an idea compose the sole meaning of that idea. It was action and its consequences, not ideals, principles, or the supernatural that were the basis of the Pragmatist’s worldview. William James (1907/1995) projected this view beyond the meaning of ideas, to include the notion of truth. He defined truth as what is better for us to believe rather than the classic notion that truth is an accurate representation of reality or an ideal, universal principle (Bernstein, 2010; James, 1907/1995). This shift from abstract, ideal principles to practical consequences upended the traditional views of the world and of reality—traditional views, however, that still govern much of our thinking and action today.

Inquiry and Objectivity

The rise of science as a means to inquire about the world came to be called Naturalism and was an influential position within Pragmatism (Talisse & Aikin, 2008). Of the various ways of inquiring about the world (e.g., deference to authority or religious faith), Peirce argued that the scientific method was the best available method for inquiring about and developing our beliefs (Levi, 2012; Peirce, 1877). Dewey extended this argument beyond just developing beliefs, to the need to solve problems in society (Dewey, 1938b; Levi, 2012). Referring to the advancement of science, Kuhn (2000) argued that revolutionary change cannot rely on guidance from a worn out paradigm, and experimentation or inquiry is a way of figuring out the way forward (Fine, 2007).

Dewey’s method of inquiry is a robust process beginning when we experience an indeterminate situation that causes us to doubt our knowledge or ability to do something. From this doubt we formulate a concrete problem statement and question, create potential solutions, test them via experimentation, gather empirical evidence, and determine what are the practical consequences of enacting any particular conjecture or hypothesis (Dewey, 1938b; Hookway, 2016). This scientific approach to inquiry was the method of a democratic society to foster the well-being of all people (Dewey, 1938b). The major point for Dewey is that the situation is tangibly changed for the better, not just our beliefs about it. Dewey, as well as later proponents of Pragmatism, rejected the conceptual dichotomy between theory and practice. They described the work of shared inquiry as directed to the resolution of societal and community problems and for settling on truth (Bernstein, 2010).

Contemporary Pragmatists continue to work out the reasoning and process of inquiry proposed by Peirce and Dewey. For example, Levi (2012) claimed that inquiry is necessary to affirm and challenge our belief systems (our doxastic systems), and Misak (2004) similarly analyzed the idea and process of inquiry for settling on truth. She claimed that a true idea would withstand intense skepticism and rigorous inquiry to the best of our collective abilities.

Peirce’s commitment to truth, which followed from the use of the scientific method to pursue inquiry as far as it could go, allowed for intermediate projections along the way of what might be found true if inquiry was pursued to its end—not the end of a particular experiment, but the end of meaningful inquiry far into the future. The best available answer (truth) is an actionable one that has beneficial consequences at a particular time and place. The meaning of the Pragmatic Maxim developed by Peirce is that hypotheses only have the meaning of their practical consequences. If there are no practical consequences of a hypothesis or belief, it is meaningless (Hookway, 2012; Peirce, 1877; Rescher, 2000). The adequacy of our inquiry and theories is found in their efficacy for achieving practical outcomes.

Although the early Pragmatists embraced the scientific method as a means for inquiry, contemporary Pragmatists allow for other methods of inquiry, such as appeals to experts or external signs received through our senses (Levi, 2012). Pluralism is valued in Pragmatism, and an appropriate means of inquiry depends on the desired end, not on methods (Rumens & Kelemen, 2013). In other words, the efficacy of methods is measured by their outcomes, specifically in the form of action—not in the form of compliance to some privileged idea or methodology. Efficacy of our methods relies on the question of what can we do and what do we do with the outcomes of our inquiry? If there is nothing to be done, then the effort is useless. Thus, efficacy is not a priori or expected from prescriptive adherence to a privileged method, but rather an a posteriori, retrospective discovery or assessment of the outcomes of a method. If it worked, it is worthwhile to consider for future application, if it did not work, it is open to skepticism or rejection. This is the overarching sense of fallibility that is continuously present in all decisions and actions from a pragmatic perspective.

Among the many views of Pragmatism, some philosophers have moved away from the idea of pursuing the truth through inquiry instead favoring the idea of objectivity (Brandom, 1994; Stout, 2007). Objectivity in this view is a social norm of inquiry that is the responsibility of the inquirer to uphold. Importantly, objectivity is not equated with the traditional views of truth; it is the idea of being in accord with the facts of the situation under inquiry (Stout, 2007). Historically, the idea of objectivity has been conflated with the idea of truth. Pragmatists take great pains to disavow any strong connection between objectivity and truth—either by rejecting the whole notion of objectivity (Rorty, 1991) or by arguing that objectivity is merely inferring what is actually the case (Brandom, 1994).

Objectivity in the process of inquiry is answerable to not only the norms of inquiry held as standards by communities of inquirers (mere social conformity) but also to the facts of the situation under study (Brandom, 1994; Stout, 2007). The notion of objectivity is controversial—especially among Pragmatists with postmodern leanings, who prefer to reject objectivity as an idea that has outlived its usefulness (Rorty, 1991). Others strive to walk a fine line between adhering to the social norm of objectivity without straying into the delusion of avoiding subjectivity or of achieving a correspondence to reality (Stout, 2007).

Brandom (1994) proposed that the conceptual inference undertaken in inquiry must be preceded by sound practical inference from experience—pragmatics beget semantics. Brandom recalled Ryle’s (1949) concept of mind when he described objectivity as the knowing how (practice) that informs knowing that (theory). It is the knowing how something is in practice that affords the basis of inferring what might be the theory behind a phenomenon (knowing that). As the name implies, Pragmatism requires a good grasp of knowing how things are in practice as the basis for hoping to satisfy the norms of objectivity in inquiry.

Overall, the best that is said of maintaining the idea of objectivity in inquiry is as a social norm of inquiry that also requires faithfulness to the actual phenomenon under inquiry (Stout, 2007). The controversy with this is likely to be the result of the struggle between the growing realization at this point in our history that inquiry is a social practice, governed throughout by social norms, including the reframing of objectivity and truth from the traditional beliefs that inquiry could and should be conducted involving little to no human subjectivity to the realization that the idea of objectivity and inquiry is entirely socially constructed and socially conducted.

Epistemology, Truth, and Fallibilism

There are important standards and justifications for what we know, although it is not because of some ultimate or universal truth or conceptual exercise—the standards are based more on consensus, coherence, and practicality within groups of people. Some commonality appears in a general Pragmatist epistemology that proposes a reconstruction of the theory of knowledge to recognize the interests and limitations of knowers. This epistemology includes three views of knowledge: (a) antifoundationalism—knowledge does not require, nor does it need a set of foundational knowledge or principles; (b) fallibilism—all knowledge is open to revision or rejection; and (c) instrumentalism—all knowledge and reasoning depend on one’s interests or intentions (Talisse & Aikin, 2008).

The Pragmatists limited the need for justification of beliefs to what was practical—justification or epistemology need not be merely a conceptual exercise. Their focus was not to justify current beliefs that were useful, but to justify changes in our beliefs (Levi, 2012). Current beliefs (those without doubt) are accepted as truthful and only lose their truthfulness if and when doubt emerges. In the face of a doubtful situation, one undertakes inquiry to modify one’s beliefs or obtain new beliefs. This change of beliefs is what needs justification for its actionability and increased practicality. It is the consequences of our beliefs that are important, not the beliefs alone.

Regarding what we know and believe to be true, and how we justify the changes in what we know (epistemology), there are conflicting perspectives throughout the Pragmatist community (Bernstein, 2010). One perspective takes an antiepistemology stance claiming that the whole notion of epistemology is irrelevant because (a) one is not committed to a position because it is the truth, but rather because of reasons anchored in cultural, social, and historical contexts (i.e., anticognitivism); (b) all standards of knowledge are historically and socially constructed (i.e., historicism); and (c) there is no clear, universal standard of knowledge (i.e., relativism). There are also counter-arguments to the antiepistemological view. A counter-argument to anticognitivism claims that we can know things and we do value some ways of knowing over others. A counter-argument against historicism claims that even though individuals in different cultural, social, and historical contexts produce knowledge related to their context, this is not the same as saying that knowledge is inherently a social construction. Regarding relativism, a counter-argument claims that from an individual perspective, few individuals subscribe to relativist views of knowledge believing instead that their particular views are best (Rescher, 2001; Talisse & Aikin, 2008).

The early Pragmatists rejected the Cartesian idea of universal or absolute truths and instead argued for a deflated notion of truth as fallible, contextual, and dependent on inquiry and practical results (Misak, 2007). The Cartesian Correspondence Theory of Truth claimed that there was a reality independent of persons and that one could justify an assertion of truth based on how accurately it corresponded to reality. This works well for many simple assertions of the natural world, however, for complex assertions about science, mathematics, history, or other human and social phenomena, resorting to the Correspondence Theory for justification is indefensible (Bernstein, 2010). Justifications of correspondence to reality rely on language, reason, and representations of reality that are prone to arbitrary factors of circumstance, history, power, privilege, and individual biases (Bernstein, 2010).

An alternative theory of truth is the Coherence Theory of Truth, which argues for a consensual, rational, and coherent explanation as the measure of truth (Rescher, 2001, 2010). Yet, critics of the Coherence Theory of Truth argue that it is another form of an idealist or relativist perspective that rejects a mind-independent reality (Will, 1997; Young, 2013).

Between the extremes of the Correspondence and Coherence Theories of Truth, Haack (2011) proposed a blended theory drawing upon the best of the two in a more practical manner that recognizes the need for experiential evidence of empirical data (a Foundationalist or correspondence element) and for some degree of consistency in the belief system (a Coherentist element) that more or less support our beliefs. Rather than a view of beliefs as a relatively stable system, Haack argued that beliefs exist in a dynamic force field where various degrees of supporting and opposing forces strive for a dynamic equilibrium. Thus, within many belief systems, there is more or less doubt at different times in different situations continuing an ongoing struggle and evolution of our belief system.

Truth is what one pursues through collective inquiry. It emerges out of the careful, collective development of evidence or knowledge—it is not something “out there” waiting to be discovered (Talisse & Aikin, 2008). The idea that truth emerges from the practical work of inquiry is controversial from an idealist perspective; however, James (1907/1995) argued that the concept of ideal truths existing independently of people is impractical and unrealistic—all we know are the best available answers that emerge through our collective processes of inquiry. There is no practical need for believing in an ultimate, certain truth. Pragmatism views the idea of an ultimate truth as a myth a delusion that we are better off ignoring (James, 1907/1995).

In reconceptualizing the idea of truth, Peirce also rejected the Cartesian principle of skepticism or the method of doubt as untenable. Descartes’s aim was to foster the search for certainty by doubting all our beliefs and the reasons for our beliefs, whereas Peirce claimed that we do have beliefs and that for all practical purposes we may take them as certain—beyond doubt—because they work reasonably well most of the time. It is a fallible sense of certainty, however, and when the time comes to doubt a belief (as when something goes wrong or an anomaly appears), then we proceed to inquire about how to resolve the doubt. We remain aware that there is always the possibility of error in our beliefs, but until then, there is no practical reason for doubting some of the beliefs that help us live our everyday lives. What is important from a practical perspective need not be believed as objectively true in the traditional sense, but may be believed as practically true.

James (1907/1995) elaborated on Peirce’s view of truth when he said that we do not need reasons for our beliefs if there are no apparent challenges to our beliefs. There is a conservatism or inertia around our belief systems that provides stability until challenged by new experiences or other disruptive reasons. In Pragmatism, the view of knowledge that informs our beliefs emphasizes the power and fallibility of practical knowledge, in contrast to the narrow pursuit of ideal certainty as an assurance of risk-free knowledge (especially via rationalism).

In a similar manner, Will (1997) recognized the fallibility of truth and advocated a moderate view of correspondence theory linking our understanding of our experiences of the natural world with the truth without inflating the idea of truth to be a universal ideal. In Will’s pragmatic interpretation, truths were contextual, corrigible, and dependent on the quality of our experiences and practicality of our reasoning.

To some Pragmatists, a more useful view of truth is that truth obtains from the careful application of inquiry to reach a warrantable belief, which Peirce (1877) called a true belief. Therefore, one of the more indefeasible views of truth in Pragmatism is that it is the outcome of a systematic disciplined process of inquiry (Misak, 2007).

There is still debate among contemporary Pragmatists about a deflationary view of truth; however, by affording a lower status to the concept of truth, we can ignore controversy about “ideal” notions of truth. The deflated view of truth is an assertion and commitment that what we assert as true we can support with evidence that will stand up to challenges—or be abandoned (Brandom, 2011; Stout, 2007). The Pragmatist view of truth holds that truth is a fallible assertion less concerned with finding inviolable, universal truths and more concerned about learning what works through inquiry (Talisse & Aikin, 2008). Levi (2012) argued that rather than use the word fallible, which implies that we are forever unsure about our knowledge, we should use the word corrigible. Corrigibilism favors an antiskepticism in which we can be certain about the best available truths we know without doubt, and still be open to changing any of them in the future if and when new information warrants such a change.

Practice and Experience

As described above in the section on inquiry and objectivity, practical theory, as conceptual inference, is when derived from practical activity (Brandom, 1994)—not the other way around. The goal is not only to conceptualize practical activity that can resolve an indeterminate situation but also to be, first and foremost, deeply grounded in practice before trying to conceptualize or theorize what might work. It means to be intimately connected to and having expertise in the phenomenon (the practice)—without which it is impractical to theorize innovative and practical solutions.

The increasing gap between theory and practice has fostered greater attention to the characteristics of practice (Simpson, 2009). Pragmatism would argue that theory and practice are mutually constitutive and inseparable. Emerging practice theories align with and complement the focus of Pragmatism on the consequences of our ideas in the context of everyday life and work. Practice theories provide new perspectives of human activity focusing on the interrelatedness of knowledge, activity, science, language, social institutions, meaning, and human transformation within fields of practices (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011; Nicolini, 2013; Schatzki, 2001). Pragmatism explains the link between ideas and actions, practice theories further explain how and why activity unfolds as it does in the world. As with Pragmatism, pluralism is a defining characteristic of practice theories.

Within the scholarship of practice theories, three different views have evolved recently: (a) Practice as an activity, (b) Practice as multiple activities embedded in systems of values, discourse, and power structures, and (c) Practice as the reproduction and innovation of activities and their effects on society (Corradi, Gherardi, & Verzelloni, 2010). Each of these strongly projects Pragmatist principles.

Practice can be conceptualized and studied as an empirical object and an epistemological process of knowing. As an empirical object, studies focus on the activity systems, artifacts, and contexts in which practice occurs. As an epistemological process, studies focus on the creation and development of knowledge and beliefs situated in particular collective activities (Corradi et al., 2010). Common features of practice theories emphasize habitualized human activity and purposive human agency entangled within complex and multifaceted social environments (Sandberg & Dall’Alba, 2009).

In addition, Feldman and Orlikowski (2011) described three principles of practice theories: (a) a collection of activity that enacts (produces or reproduces) a social order or system, (b) the rejection of dualism in favor of the relations among things, and (c) the mutual constitution of elements with phenomena. Current views of organization and the workplace recognize the complex, dynamic, distributed, unpredictable, and emergent nature of practice. The analytical power of practice theories derives from a nonreductionist or holistic view of the workplace and work—one that owes much to Pragmatist philosophy.

The Practice view takes a process and relational orientation emphasizing the interdependence of activity and performance from the level of the collective or group, which also includes social processes of conflict, power, and politics. This interdependence is not only among the individuals in the group but also among the roles of materials, tools, rules, and communities in the work people do (Corradi et al., 2010; Engestrom, 2000; Nicolini, 2013). Practices organize human activities around a set of meanings, identities, and behaviors that emerge as a social arrangement (Schatzki, 2001). Schatzki described social arrangements as a more or less organized collection of activities in pursuit of some collective goal governed by a set of sanctioned rules, beliefs, and hopes. Rather than reducing practice to the tasks that people do, a more holistic perspective recognizes the real and powerful effects of the situation, the environment, artifacts, norms, beliefs, politics, institutional logics, and the experiences of the actors interacting within a system of practices.

Regarding the influence of experiences on practice, Pragmatism and current practice theories reject the traditional view of experience, professed by Hume and Descartes, as that of a passive agent receiving sensory data (atomistic, determinate, and singular). Traditionally, experiences did not include any content in the form of concepts, meanings, or other nonsensory data. One presumes that these raw, sensory data come from the external world, but we do not have any deep sense of this external world beyond these “thin” data (Dewey, 1920/1948; Hookway, 2016). Dewey (1938b) rejected the notion that experience is reducible to simple external data, as well as the notion that experience was largely a noncognitive process lacking in concepts, meaning, and any other nonsensory elements.

Pragmatism favors empiricism—especially the belief that all knowledge comes from our sensory experiences. However, Peirce, James, and Dewey challenged the traditional empiricist view of passive experiential data reception and proposed that experience was “thicker” and more interactive (Hookway, 2016). They claimed that experiential data could not be separated (reduced out) from other internal cognitive and affective elements. Furthermore, the sense we make of our experiences is an intricate part of those experiences. Dewey (1938a) proposed a biological view of experiences as the continuous organic engagement and interaction between an organism and the world, as well as how our expectations affect our present and future experiences. There is an inseparable symbiosis in experience between our internal cognitions, emotions, and external environmental factors. Experience is an important and pervasive phenomenon in the world from which we construct ideas and knowledge mediated by our senses (Margolis, 2002). The goal is that we can use our experiences as tools to improve our ideas and increase our knowledge to guide our practices.

What we experience is influenced by what happened before—either in our personal lives or more broadly in history. James described experience as an ongoing flow (the flux) in our lives (Bernstein, 2010). Dewey (1938a) called this flux of experience the experiential continuum comprised of identifiable situational interactions within an ongoing, dynamic continuity—the lateral and longitudinal aspects of experience. Within this experiential continuum, one can distinguish good from bad experiences. According to Dewey (1938a), good experiences are those that foster our growth and development, while bad experiences stifle growth and development.

In Pragmatism, ideas and knowledge are viewed as tools created by people through their experiences and practices. They are important tools we use to help us get things done in the world. Despite a wide array of ideas included under the umbrella of Pragmatism, there is a shared belief in the importance of practical knowledge, the social nature of practices, and the ability of people to improve their situations (Bernstein, 2010). All of which are grounded in our experiences.

The content of thought is intimately connected to our actions, what we do with it, which is entangled in our situations and environments. Our beliefs determine our habits and are the basis of the rules that guide our actions and influence our experiences (Brandom, 2011; Dewey, 1938a; Peirce, 1878). Theories and concepts are not more or less authentic representations of some real phenomenon, but rather approximations of situations used as tools, rules, or instruments (heuristics) to help guide our thoughts and actions. They are judged by how well they work and by what we can do with them.

Our judgments and actions are governed by normative assessments learned through experience. We apply our judgments and actions based on rules (ideas) that indicate what we are committed to. The responsibility related to applying an idea is a responsibility to do something. It is the responsibility related to integrating one’s judgments into a coherent whole by considering the consequences of one’s judgments, finding reasons for ones beliefs, and rejecting incompatibilities (Brandom, 2011). This is the process of growing and developing that Dewey (1938a) attributed to good experiences.

Summary of the Pragmatist Worldview

In the late 19th century, the increasing purchase of science and the industrial revolution in Western societies drove increasing challenges to and doubts about the Cartesian and Kantian philosophies that dominated the views of the Western world then, and in many respects still do (Margolis, 2002). The Pragmatists proposed an overall view of the world that recognized the plurality, contextuality, contingency, and social embeddedness of belief systems, and opted for a view of truth and knowledge as tools to help us better understand the world for the purposes of better living in the world (Rescher, 2001). Deflating our privileged notions of objectivity, truth, knowledge, and beliefs in the service of actionable, practical change for the better was meant to clear out the distortions of idealistic and unrealistic ideas that hindered the progress of growth and development for all.

The value of Pragmatism for HRD is as “a practical and anti-foundationalist philosophy that focuses on the future, concerned with improving the conditions that enable individuals to thrive in their everyday lives” (Rumens & Kelemen, 2013, p. 3). A key point in this description is that Pragmatism does not look backward to idealistic or foundational principles for guidance as much as it looks forward, informed by systematic inquiry and experience, open to the conditions that affect people’s everyday lives in the present and near future (Margolis, 2002). Pragmatism is focused on making sense of people’s lives and helping to solve the problems of individuals and communities.

For HRD scholars and practitioners, the tenets of Pragmatism provide for practical perspectives on our lives and work and in some cases profound changes in how we view the world in which we live and work. Some examples of the support that Pragmatism provides to HRD are the emphasis on inquiry for understanding, the devaluation of idealistic objectivity and truth, and the centrality of practice and experience. Underpinning all of this is the understanding of the fallibility (or corrigibility) of our research, theories, and practices. Another valuable contribution is the rejection of dualisms that foster separations between mind and body, subject and object, learning and performance, persons and context, and theory and practice (Margolis, 2002). These dualisms impede the utility and integration of knowledge with everyday life for the practical betterment of humanity.

Pragmatist views profess that knowledge is conditional and situational, and consequently there are many views (or vocabularies) of the world each being more or less fit for interacting with the world (Talisse & Aikin, 2008). Thus, the utility of a working vocabulary, or worldview, derives from its goodness of fit in a particular situation—and this measure can only be applied from within that particular worldview or vocabulary. Multiple vocabularies can easily clash with each other, and Pragmatists argue that critiquing one worldview by invoking the belief system of a rival worldview is useless, because it does not lead to effective action (Brandom, 2011). To evaluate a worldview compared with an alternative worldview requires moving to a higher level, more inclusive worldview (a third, higher level vocabulary) that encompasses the two lower level, rival worldviews, along with a new set of criteria and measures to evaluate the utility of either one (Talisse & Aikin, 2008). Essentially, this argument states that one needs to find an overarching “common ground” encompassing both rival views before useful action can be taken to work out the differences. Rigidly holding to a single worldview risks stifling progress by blocking inquiry. The Pragmatist’s allegiance to inquiry and practical results encourages us to continuously invent or develop new ways of seeing the world, along with new ideas that work better than our previous ones.

This brings us to a discussion of Pragmatism’s contribution to HRD—both in academic and nonacademic settings. Organizations in both settings operate within institutional frameworks that structure their practices (Scott, 2003). And while the logics within these institutional settings differ, the entanglement and mutual constitution of the elements composing their practice fields operate in similar ways.

Creative and Critical Philosophical Reflexivity

Pragmatically, in an applied field, it is critically important to continually examine our knowledge and beliefs about the ways in which we think and act. Some have argued that understanding a particular philosophy is less important than the act of philosophical inquiry or philosophizing (Rescher, 2001, 2010). The act of critically thinking about the reasons we might do one thing over another, or might not be aware of the forces and assumptions behind our thoughts and actions, or that there are valid, alternative perspectives to the most basic taken-for-granted beliefs and values in our field are very important intellectual and practical exercises necessary for enhancing and expanding our knowledge bases and cognitive abilities that drive our practices.

The act of philosophizing is the means to rejuvenating and evolving our philosophy of HRD. Ruona and Lynham (2004) offered that the benefits of HRD engaging in such an interrogation of our philosophical assumptions include

. . . (1) practical ways of thinking about certain types of questions (questions of the nature of reality, truth and ethics) and (2) the use of logical argument, disciplined reflection and theoretical reasoning through the invoking of this process of continual questioning. (p. 158)

Philosophical inquiry then includes the important acts of increasing awareness, challenging assumptions, and creating and testing ideas. It is a motivation to engage in the process of inquiry and the creation of improved ways of thinking and doing in our lives and work (Dewey, 1938b). Pragmatism embraces inquiry and experience to creatively grow and develop beyond our current knowledge, values, and beliefs. Pragmatic reasoning is an ever-evolving process in which critical deliberations within and across communities result in more practical solutions that tangibly advance our human condition (Dewey, 1938b; Margolis, 2010; Rorty, 1999). The fostering of such deliberations within a maturing field of HRD is beneficial and necessary.

Such philosophical reflexivity and critical deliberation within HRD will also serve to unveil privileged, taken-for-granted philosophical assumptions that have governed both the production and evaluation of HRD research and theorizing and the overreliance on traditional and privileged beliefs about research, theory, and practice (Gosney & Hughes, 2016; Jayanti, 2011; Margolis, 2002; Misak, 2004).

A pragmatic approach to critically analyzing dominant philosophical assumptions will likely challenge historical boundaries, improve future alternative pathways, and further clarify our ideas and actions for practical results that matter to broader and more diverse groups of people. As Gosney and Hughes (2016) stated, such an exercise can be at the forefront of the critical issues confronting HRD.

Just as there were recent calls for developing the theoretical base of HRD (Sambrook, 2004; Swanson, 1995; Torraco, 2004), it is important to develop the philosophical basis of HRD. Three major examples of critical and creative philosophical contributions of Pragmatism to HRD include (a) bridging the gap between research and theoretical paradigms, (b) between theory and practice, and (c) grounding science in practical concerns. First, Pragmatism looks forward into the practical outcomes of research and theory, not backward to ontological, epistemological, or methodological ideals. Margolis (2010) called these merely privileged cognitive ideals. Thus, the assumed incompatibilities between postpositivism and constructivism, or other paradigmatically driven communities become merely alternative philosophical perspectives of different research-oriented social communities that could better collaborate, expand, and enrich the research and theory building enterprises of HRD.

Second, the assumed gap between theory and practice is also rooted in the different perspectives of different practice-oriented social communities with their idiosyncratic, privileged cognitive ideals. The word practitioner not only applies to those practicing in the field outside of the academy but also applies to those practicing within the academy. Pragmatism and practice theories help us understand the academy as a field of practice, in which academic practitioners practice their craft according to the norms, beliefs, values, assumptions, and ideals of the academy. Those outside of the academy also practice their craft according to the norms, beliefs, values, assumptions, and ideals of their practices, whether they practice in government, business and industry, education, health care, and so on. Pragmatism helps us understand that the ideals of one social community of practice (e.g., the academy) will likely not be perceived as practical to another social community of practice (e.g., nonacademic institutions). Each has its own philosophical perspectives and vocabularies (Stout, 2007). Kuhn’s (2000) notion of paradigms is helpful to understand the difference between these practice communities. Kuhn also argued that even though different paradigms might be incommensurable, they are still comparable, and thus could find ways to collaborate by offering alternative perspectives, challenging each other’s assumptions, and potentially achieving a higher level understanding of our human condition. Pragmatism could provide the means to achieve higher level understanding and more fruitful activity between academic and nonacademic practitioners, thus providing a conduit of collaborative and creative problem solving between our different communities of practice.

Third, although the early Pragmatists argued for the scientific method as the best way to conduct inquiry (Dewey, 1938b; Peirce, 1877), their view of science was pluralistic, broader, contingent, and more grounded in practice and inquiry than much of the current research in science. For Dewey, research was merely a more systematic form of inquiry (Morgan, 2014). James (1907/1995) noted that in our age of enlightenment, the human preference for conceptual, theoretical knowledge has marginalized much of the experiential knowledge gained through our practices.

Furthermore, Putnam (2002) claimed that not all of our theoretical knowledge was created equal. Among the rich variety of perspectives and theories, particular theories and perspectives become privileged largely based on highly subjective, community preferences. Such selective privileging has confounded the self-correcting nature of science that Peirce (1877) praised as a virtue of Pragmatism. This privileging has also created a narrowly selective normative system in science that led to our presently biased division between those whose research is deemed appropriate science and those whose inquiry is not appropriate science (e.g., academic vs. practitioner research)—a problem that constrains the development and growth of knowledge for applied, practice-based fields.

The influence of science on HRD has given rise to the field’s dominant philosophies of inquiry: empiricism, humanism, and structuralism (Gosney & Hughes, 2016). These dominant philosophies are characterized by their assumptions of determinism, reductionism, biologization, as well as traditional beliefs in linear and final causality and the often-unaddressed tensions between behaviorism, constructivism, and critical theory (Gosney & Hughes, 2016; Slife & Williams, 1995).

Although plurality (Gosney & Hughes, 2016) seems to be an espoused feature of contemporary HRD to respond to a more complex world, Jayanti (2011) argued that the mechanisms of inquiry and acceptance of HRD research remain dominated by the dichotomy of deductive or inductive reasoning through the enduring grasp of postpositivist or constructivist research paradigms. Often knowledge produced by methods of inquiry that do not conform to what Jayanti called the “boilerplates” of inductive or deductive criteria are derided as practitioner or atheoretical knowledge (Holton, 2004; Ruona, 1999; Short, 2006; Swanson, 2001). In a practice-based field, such conventions limit and constrain practical inquiry, as well as provoking disconnections among our research, theories, and practices.

These standards of acceptable inquiry are grounded in dominant philosophical assumptions of research and objectivity. The field of HRD, like many other fields, has evolved with the view that science equals status and that objectively verified knowledge is the best means to defining a mature field (Evarts, 1998; Swanson & Holton, 1997). This is not a surprise. Over the last 400 years, science has achieved great acclaim for its ability to provide valuable answers and understanding of our world. Along with that acclaim comes political power: power that helps garner attention and allegiance. The problem is that in the race to produce knowledge for academics’ sake, science may be losing its inherent value to improve the world outside of the academy (Sarewitz, 2016). Research and inquiry that is firmly rooted in practice is essential for the Pragmatist, and we argue this should also be true for HRD.

To act rationally does not mean adherence to some foundational, universal standards, but rather to be able to intelligently rationalize our choices (Fine, 2007). From a pragmatic perspective, “the only test for scientific concepts is whether they can be organized in a logically simple system that finds fruitful empirical applications” (Fine, 2007; Kindle Location 812). Fine (2007) goes on to explain that how we move forward is based on judgments (not whims) and judgments

depend on reasons, ideas, experience, and skills; on interests and values; on goals and directions; on material, conceptual, and economic resources and rewards. They depend on the cooperation of the natural world. They also depend on our allies and on our adversaries. Everything that pertains to complex human action enters into judgments about how to practice science. Almost all the items that underwrite our judgments are underspecified in some or other respects. Very often even our goals are not so clear and firm as we might like to imagine. Much less so are the ideas, interests, resources, and so on that enter into what we decide to do. (Kindle Locations 820-824)

Pragmatism professes that there are many views (or vocabularies) of the world each being more or less fit for interacting in particular situations (Stout, 2007; Talisse & Aikin, 2008). The following sections discuss a few key contributions that Pragmatism makes to the work of HRD practitioners (both academic and nonacademic) in the realms of research, theory, and practice.

Research: Pragmatism’s Notions of Inquiry and Objectivity for HRD

Pragmatism assumes that the aims of inquiry for HRD researchers should depend on the practical results of allaying doubts and solving problems. Means of inquiry from a pragmatic lens are not contorted to fit into privileged methodologies and research paradigms (Rumens & Kelemen, 2013). Rather, pragmatic inquiry is systematically responsive to the context and practical needs of specific people and their organizational situations (Misak, 2004). The ends of inquiry cannot be separated from the means. Such a practical framing of inquiry in HRD challenges the human preference for traditional objectivity and abstract conceptual knowledge (i.e., theory). The preference for the “objective” can be observed in HRD research, in which conceptual determination (theory building, theory testing, and theoretical lenses) dominates. The ongoing lament that practitioners do not use theory is one indication that this research is not useful.

In a field that has been said to be dominated by (nonacademic) practitioners (Chalofsky, 2004; Gosney & Hughes, 2016) and whose theories and research are said to be judged by their practical utility (Swanson, 1995; Torraco, 2004), a philosophy of inquiry that pursues practicality and plurality seems appropriate. Pragmatism offers an alternative to the dominant and linear inductive and deductive reasoning underlying inquiry, truth, and knowledge creation in HRD and favors a more human, pragmatic, interconnected, pluralistic, participatory, and dynamic approach to inquiry and problem solving.

Pragmatism encourages the interdependence of scholars and practitioners to make sense of a messy world. Objectivity in Pragmatist inquiry means remaining faithful to the reality of the situation in question (Brandom, 1994; Levi, 2012; Misak, 2004). With no dictated compliance to a specific methodology, inquiry is more fluid and emergent as the real-world situation is fluid and emergent. The adequacy of inquiry to the Pragmatist is found in its consequences.

From a pragmatic lens, objectivity is not a quest for absolute truth. Rather, objectivity pulls the inquirer closer to the actual problem and grounds inquirers to the situation and practices in question. This is counter to the prevailing notion of objectivity as distance between the researcher and the subject. Pragmatism reframes the dominant meaning of objectivity from being impartial and a requirement of verifiable truth to meaning that the inquiry merely infers what is actually happening in situ (Brandom, 1994). Therefore, pragmatism also has important implications for how HRD defines truth. A pragmatic HRD scholar conjures multiple truths; the best of which is the actionable one that improves a situation rather than adhering to a methodological prescription.

Theory: Deflating “Truth” and Embracing Fallibilism in HRD

The traditional notions of truth as a conceptual, universal certainty are deflated in Pragmatism to become that which holds up to scrutiny in practice beyond a reasonable doubt. This is observed in how HRD scholars and practitioners judge and use theory. Traditionally, theory in HRD and many fields has favored the conceptual over the practical; due in large part to the previously discussed influence of science. The prevailing aims of accepted HRD inquiry and theorizing, therefore, have been to arrive at some verifiable truth that can then be disseminated to practitioners and applied to practice. The problem with this inflated notion of truth is that it infers that there is both a solution and a best solution to complex problems—and this solution is found through rational, objective research. This creates an inevitable gap between the theoretical truth and the multiple truths that exist in the practice and experience of HRD outside of the academy. The privileged belief about truth in HRD may contribute to the difficulties of using theories outside of academic practice (Garavan & Morley, 2006; Short, 2006; Van de Ven, 2007).

For example, in the recently proposed mission statement of HRD in the academy, Russ-Eft, Watkins, Marsick, Jacobs, and McLean (2014) wrote that HRD scholars’ mission should be, “Encouraging the systematic study of HRD theories, processes, and practices; disseminating information about HRD, encouraging the application of HRD findings, and providing opportunities for social interaction for scholars and practitioners” (p. 68). The premise that knowledge is to be “disseminated” and “applied” infers a one-way relationship from the scholarship of HRD to the practice of HRD. When applied to HRD scholarship, such a definition does just as James (1907/1995) professed: It marginalizes experiential knowledge that makes up much of the field.

Pragmatism’s answer to this problem is to be completely grounded in the practice of interest, whether this be in academic or nonacademic settings. Dewey (1938b) cautioned that facts could be assembled about a phenomenon without ever understanding the phenomenon. Instead of asking, “How can HRD scholarship be applied to practice?” the pragmatic HRD scholar asks questions, such as, “How can we solve this particular problem?” “What outcomes will improve this situation?” “What is the practical utility of this work?”

In a refusal to define HRD, Lee (2001) called the belief in the academy as a source of knowledge an “academic mindset”—a worldview upheld by the assumption that reductive and rationalist thinking is the one true path to producing appropriate knowledge. A problem with such a worldview in an applied field like HRD is that those who produce appropriate forms of knowledge then are the only ones who define what is appropriate creating a perpetual and exclusive cycle. Lee stated, “This approach pervades academic theorizing and shapes and influences all forms of knowledge considered acceptable by the academic community, and this becomes self-fulfilling” (p. 3). The result is a conflicted and privileged boundary between the scholar and the practitioner—one that the prevailing academic worldview of HRD has created.

Enacting a Pragmatist philosophy includes accepting the fallibilism of truth. In practice, this may mean cultivating beliefs and practices that deflate theories, ideas, and truths as contingent upon the situation (Misak, 2007). All knowledge then is open to constant revision and rejection from among a community of inquirers, both scholars and practitioners, who are seeking to solve real-world problems.

As Brandom (1994) proposed, Pragmatists favor that practical inference from experience should precede conceptual inference. Therefore, Pragmatism favors an intimate connection to the experiences and activities of HRD in nonacademic settings and is skeptical about idealized notions of research and theory. Theory, then, derives from the practices of HRD.

Practice: Experience and Activities of HRD

Pragmatism and practice theories have important implications for the practice and experience of HRD. Practice is conceptualized as multiple interrelated actors, activities, and habits that occur embedded within a dynamic field of values, discourse and power structures (Corradi et al., 2010; Engestrom, 2000; Foot, 2014). The work of HRD practitioners (academic and nonacademic) is a complex system comprised of the ongoing interplay among people, tools, goals, rules, actions, and conflicts.

However, an ongoing limitation to understanding the experience and practice of HRD is the reliance from both practitioners and scholars on assumptions of both dualism and linear causality (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011). Linear, causal thinking is insufficient when seeking to understand a nonlinear world. The rise of emphasis on “root cause” analysis through tools like Total Quality Management (TQM; Wilson, 1993) is one outcome of this type of thinking and is tied to enduring reductionist and determinist philosophical assumptions of work. Given the complex nature of organizational work, an approach to work that seeks to embrace and understand the complex and interdependent nature of practice is beneficial to solving, resolving, or managing organizational problems. Namely, a pragmatic philosophy on the practice of HRD challenges causal thinking and values practitioner reflexivity (Sarasvathy, 2001; Schön, 1987).

A potential contribution of Pragmatism to the practice and experience of HRD is a shift in emphasis from causal thinking to what Sarasvathy (2001) called “effectual reasoning” to challenge explicit or implicit assumptions that HRD interventions have more or less simple direct causal relationships among elements of a system (Lincoln, 2005). Effectual reasoning “ . . . begins with a given set of means and allows goals to emerge contingently over time from the varied imagination and diverse aspirations . . .” (Sarasvathy, 2001, p. 2). Effectual reasoning relies on opportunistic decisions and adjusting contingent goals through experimentation and trial-and-error.

A second implication of a Pragmatist philosophy is the valuing of practitioner reflexivity (Schön, 1987) as a method of developing new knowledge in HRD. Schön (1987) argued that most professional practice occurs within a “swamp” of messy, confusing problems of great concern to people and society. This swamp of professional activity defies traditional and dominant notions of technical rationality, causality, and prevailing human preference for objectivity and conceptual truths as previously discussed. Schön argued that practitioners’ expertise appears as “artistry,” which is the artful practices of problem formation, implementation, and improvisation. Cultivating such artistry may be a quintessential practice for HRD professionals. As HRD seeks to mature as a discipline that exists to solve practical and messy organizational problems, we argue it should also seek to enact a philosophy of practice that includes both academic and nonacademic practices informed by abductive artistry—creatively going beyond the present data. In addition, these practices can embrace critical philosophical reflexivity, participative and community-based notions of inquiry, multiple truths, and stay grounded in the messy practical world.