A Preliminary Assessment of the Impact of Plea Bargaining Among a Sample of Waiver-Eligible Offenders

Abstract

This study examines the use of plea bargaining among a sample of waiver-eligible juveniles. Using focal concerns as our theoretical foundation, we examine whether concerns about public safety and blameworthiness help to shape plea bargain decision making. Data from a juvenile court in one South Carolina jurisdiction were analyzed using logistic regression (N = 241). This research finds that several factors influence the plea bargain decision including type of offense, number of victims, age, and race. Additionally, the analysis shows that there are several interactive effects between race, first-time offenders, and presence of an attorney. The theoretical and policy implications of these findings are discussed.

Keywords

plea bargaining waiver-eligible juveniles focal concerns

Introduction

Plea bargaining has been a fixture of the contemporary criminal justice system for over a half century, with some scholars tracing its use as far back as 1804 (Alschuler, 1979). The use of plea bargains received formal judicial recognition in Bordenkircher v. Hayes (1978). First noting that the guilty plea and plea bargain are integral components of the criminal justice system, the Supreme Court noted that during the give and take of plea negotiations, prosecutors will inevitably present difficult choices to defendants, including the right to a trial (Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 1978). Should a defendant forgo making a deal and go to trial, the tough choices that defendants must make are deemed legitimate tools so long as prosecutors do not deter them from exercising a protected right or base the plea on impermissible factors such as race (Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 1978).

While once rare, plea bargaining is now a common and accepted legal practice in both the criminal and juvenile justice systems notwithstanding a myriad of criticisms accompanying its usage (Alschuler, 1979, pp. 216–17). Plea bargains now account for as many as 84% of cases disposed of at the federal level (Teeter, 2005), and as many as 95% of disposed cases at the state level (Kyckelhahn & Cohen, 2008). A number of studies have focused on plea bargaining in criminal courts (Ball, 2005; Humphrey & Fogarty, 1987; Savitsky, 2009; Wynne & Hartnagel, 1975). Even more, there are a number of studies that have examined how juvenile adjudications impact sentencing decisions at the adult level (Goldstein-Breyer, 2010; Marrus, 2004; Redding, 2003; Roberts, 1997; Sanborn, 1998).

However, there remains a dearth of knowledge on how the plea bargaining process functions for juveniles, especially those who may be waiver-eligible or reverse-waived back to juvenile court. Even more, the degree to which waiver-eligible juvenile offenders may be burdened by their prior adjudications akin to what is seen in criminal courts is largely unknown. This study seeks to shed some light on this area of inquiry by examining the plea decisions of county solicitors involving juveniles eligible to be waived to adult court. Specifically, this research will examine the use of plea bargains in cases, where juvenile offenders commit offenses that make them eligible for transfer (discretionary) to adult court.

Juvenile Plea Bargaining

As a whole, little empirical research has focused exclusively on plea bargaining processes among juveniles (Mears, 2000). Though a number of older studies from the late 1970s examined the emerging plea bargaining trend in juvenile courts (Hayeslip, 1979; Sagatun & Edwards, 1979), they cannot necessarily provide us with any insights into how these processes operate in contemporary juvenile courts. Notwithstanding that fact, these older studies showed that plea bargaining had gained a foothold in juvenile courts in many areas of the country. Additionally, they found that prosecutors were increasingly using plea bargains in order to extract confessions (admissions of guilt) from juveniles. Many prosecutors themselves reported that they did not have a plea bargaining policy in place to aid in their decision making with regard to juveniles (Sagatun & Edwards, 1979, p. 20). Further, another study found that sentencing outcomes were negatively impacted for juveniles particularly when they entered not guilty pleas (Hayeslip, 1979).

Much of what we do know about the juvenile plea bargaining process has been derived from qualitative studies and legal/statutory analyses conducted during the 1990s (Sanborn, 1992, 1993). In an analysis of state statutes governing plea bargaining, Sanborn (1992) found that juveniles are at a major disadvantage because judicial inquiries into the voluntariness of pleas (Boykin inquiries) are not mandatory by juvenile courts in a majority of the states (p. 133). More importantly, he found that states provide more protection to adults who plead guilty versus juveniles especially in light of the fact that few courts truly investigate the voluntariness of pleas that involve juvenile offenders (Sanborn, 1992, p. 143).

The extant literature also suggests that courts, especially adult courts, may assess penalties for exercising one’s right to a trial (Johnson, 2005; Nardulli, Flemming, & Eisenstein, 1985; Spohn, 1992; Ulmer & Bradley, 2006). As Nardulli, Flemming, and Eisenstein (1985) point out, there is general agreement that a “trial penalty” exists, but there is less agreement regarding its actual form. Though less studied, there is also evidence that juvenile offenders also encounter a similar “trial penalty” in the juvenile court system. For example, Redlich (2010) notes that the incentives that promote avoidance of the “trial penalty” in adult courts may result “false plea bargaining” in juvenile courts because juveniles are less capable of defending their best interests. Notwithstanding this belief, there is no empirical research that has documented the degree to which this “penalty” promotes or encourages juveniles to bargain against their best interests in the hopes that they may secure a more favorable outcome.

Mears (2003) suggests that with the increasing tendency to blend the juvenile court with criminal court processes, there will also likely be an increase in the use of plea bargaining. Mears (2003) also equates juvenile plea bargaining with an “unofficial use of waiver.” That is, there will be more severe sanctions for juvenile offenders, more severe charges and longer sentences, as a result of threats from prosecutors if the offender does not accept a plea (Mears, 2000, 2003, pp. 162–163).

In the end, we still do not know the extent to which there are differences between juvenile offenders who plead guilty and those who do not. Is juvenile plea bargaining rare or is it as commonplace as its occurrence in the adult system? If it is true that as much as 95% of cases for adult defendants are disposed of through plea bargaining, would we see similar patterns in the juvenile courts? Against this backdrop, there is a need to ascertain whether plea bargaining among juvenile offenders is indeed the boon that many suspect. This research is a preliminary examination of use of plea bargains in one juvenile court.

Theoretical Considerations

There is accumulating evidence that concerns about public safety have taken center stage in decision making of juvenile courts (Feld, 1990, 1998; Kole, 2001). At the same time, prosecutors often confront the reality that they must make, at best, educated guesses about juvenile offenders and their likelihood of committing more serious crimes in the future. Balancing these concerns about public safety and juvenile criminality is not easily resolvable for either judges or prosecutors. However, the intersection of these two very important issues may be explained, in part, by the “focal concerns” perspective first proposed by Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer (1998) and Steffensmeier, Kramer, and Streifel (1993).

“Focal concerns” maintain that there are three primary considerations that court actors such as judges and prosecutors regularly make are as follows: blameworthiness and harm, protection of the community, and practical considerations. First, blameworthiness encompasses several factors that have legal significance. Among other things, the type of crime committed (offense severity), the amount of harm caused (injury to victim), and prior record are paramount considerations of judges (Steffensmeier, Ulmer, & Kramer, 1998). The literature on juvenile transfer has devoted significant attention to how various jurisdictions are responding to the perceived epidemic in violent crime among juvenile offenders (Barnes & Franz, 1989; Jordan & Myers, 2007; Lanza-Kaduce, Frazier, & Bishop, 1999; Podkopacz & Feld, 2001). Significantly, this literature confirms that the severity of the offense is a primary consideration for the transfer decision. Notwithstanding the importance of these findings, there is no discussion of how judges and prosecutors may negotiate charges to ensure that the punishment does truly fit the crime (Demuth & Steffensmeier, 2004a; Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2000). In other words, do these courtroom actors use plea bargaining in such a way that the perceived “blameworthiness” of offenders changes from the time of initial charge to final disposition? There is some evidence to suggest that such a shift in perceptions of “blameworthiness” does occur in the context of juvenile transfer (Burrow, 2008a, 2008b).

At the same time, prosecutors and judges may consider “first-time offender” status as an important consideration of blameworthiness. In examining the offenses that brought the juveniles to the attention of the court, it is possible that courtroom actors may perceive the actions of some offenders as the product of poor decision making as opposed to hardened criminal behavior. Moreover, it is possible that these offenders may not be seen as “leaders” who masterminded or orchestrated the crime, but rather, “kids” who got involved with the wrong group of people. As such, the use of pleas would be seen as a tool to responsibly apportion blame, and assess culpability, based on one’s level of involvement in the crime and “familiarity” with the justice system.

Second, “focal concerns” emphasize protection of the community. Here, judges and prosecutors devote attention to factors such as dangerousness and recidivism (Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2000). This theory holds that sentencing outcomes may be predicated upon both legal and extralegal factors based on select case information that includes history of recidivism and educational attainment (Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2000). However, these assumptions are not wholly borne out in literature on juvenile transfer (Myers, 2003; Podkopacz & Feld, 1995, 2001; Singer & McDowall, 1988; Steiner, Hemmens, & Bell, 2006). If “protection of the community” is truly of paramount concern to judges and prosecutors, then it is important to understand what role plea bargaining may play in shaping and assessing factors related to “dangerousness,” especially if perceptions of an offender’s “dangerousness” shift depending upon the content of his or her case file. For example, Steffensmeier and Demuth (2000) suggest that a number of important case considerations may ultimately influence the perception of “dangerousness” including employment history, first-time offender, and other criminal history characteristics.

It is noteworthy that an offender’s race may also factor into how he or she is perceived by judges and prosecutors (Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2000; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, & Kramer, 1998). Given the perception that they pose a greater danger to the community, it is likely that Black and Hispanic offenders are given more severe sanctions than their White counterparts (Freiburger & Burke, 2010; Hartley, Maddan, & Spohn, 2007). As such, non-White offenders may be disadvantaged such that they are likely to receive fewer plea offers. Equally important to the “focal concerns” perspective are considerations about the household, particularly “disruption” within the home. “Disruption” may assume myriad forms including caregivers’ absence from the home and whether the offender is disruptive due to a parent’s inability to exert control.

Third, “focal concerns” theorize that the decision making of judges and prosecutors may be influenced by “organizational constraints and practical consequences” (Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2000). Though there is no exhaustive list of what constitutes “practical consequences,” it is conceivable that judges and prosecutors will focus on factors that aid the “perceptual shorthand” they regularly use in their day-to-day decision making (Demuth & Steffensmeier, 2004b; Hartley et al., 2007).

Though “practical consequences” remains a nebulous concept, one of the most important considerations that judges face relates to the individual offender and his or her “ability to do time” (Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2000). This “focal concern” may be manifested through the determination of whether a juvenile offender is a first-time offender or whether he or she is a recidivist. It is likely that a number of judges do not believe that first-time offenders merit punishment in the adult system, given their lack of prior offending (Burrow, 2008a). Also, it is possible that courtroom actors are cognizant of the offenders’ ability to “do time.” That is, “first-time” offenders are perhaps the worst candidates for extended or lengthy periods of incarceration and thus they may deserve some type of discounted punishment (O’Neill, 2001; Von Hirsch, 1985).

Another significant problem that prosecutors and judges must confront with regard to the plea decision is whether the offenders are the “worst of the worst” (Bishop, Frazier, Lanza-Kaduce, & Winner, 1996; Bishop, Lanza-Kaduce, & Frazier, 1998) and the overall efficacy of this policy goal in that the research suggests that waiver may actually exacerbate recidivism and it has only “marginal deterrent value” (Bishop, 2000). It is against this “organizational” backdrop that judges and prosecutors must decide how to best pursue the goals of justice.

Notwithstanding the theoretical implications of the “focal concerns” perspective, there remain some questions regarding the appropriate considerations for juvenile offenders who are waiver-eligible. On one hand, “focal concerns” is grounded in assumptions about “rationality,” wherein the decision making of prosecutors is characterized by “uncertainty avoidance,” such that they utilize all available information at their disposal to achieve successful decisional outcomes (Albonetti, 1986, 1991). As such, they utilize their discretion, and even perhaps stereotypes, in ways that benefit not only themselves but also other courtroom actors. On the other hand, the concerns that drive decisions for adults may not necessarily merit the same consideration for juvenile offenders. In fact, they may be supplanted by other considerations including extralegal factors oftentimes embedded in presentencing reports that are available to judges. While current offense and prior offense history may drive decisions for adults (Demuth & Steffensmeier, 2004a), it is possible that these factors may take on secondary importance in instances where judges must decide whether a juvenile offender should be offered a plea bargain. Thus, the “organizational constraints” that may be at play for adults may not materialize for all juvenile offenders.

Predictions

The decision-making process of courtroom actors is guided by factors that have both legal and extralegal significance. Plea bargains are likely to be reserved for juvenile offenders who not only pose the least risk to the public but also pose the least risk to the intended goals of the courtroom actors. Juveniles who are very young are likely to receive plea bargains because judges and prosecutors may see them as less dangerous, and thus, less of a threat of public safety. These juveniles may also be viewed as the least attractive candidates for punishment in adult court due to their youthful appearance, limited life experience, and their diminished levels of culpability. Furthermore, very young juvenile offenders may be seen as more salvageable than their older counterparts, many of whom may be viewed as committed to the criminal lifestyle. In light of the nascent nature of this research, the following hypotheses will be examined:

Hypothesis 1: Juvenile offenders who are 15 years old will receive more plea bargains than juvenile offenders who are 16 years old or older.

Hypothesis 2: Juvenile offenders who commit major property offenses will receive more plea bargains than offenders who commit criminal sexual conduct (CSC) offenses.

Hypothesis 3: First-time offenders are more likely to receive plea bargains.

Hypothesis 4: Non-White juvenile offenders will receive fewer plea bargains than White juvenile offenders.

Method

Sample and Procedures

This research was conducted in a single, large county in South Carolina. Data were retrieved from case files maintained by the county Solicitor’s Office for a 5-year period of time (2002–2006). These files contained case processing variables including both offense and offender-specific information. Information that would be considered confidential or sensitive such as social security numbers or medical information was not extracted and coded. Additionally, case-level information was obtained from police reports contained in the files.

Importantly, we were interested in the use of plea bargains by county solicitors who handled waiver-eligible cases in the juvenile court. In each case file, there was a designator that indicated whether the case was resolved through a plea. There was no other information regarding the “plea,” so it was impossible to disentangle whether the plea was the result of a charge bargain or a sentence bargain. Thus, we believed that this “plea” indicator, though imperfect, was the closest approximation of how the bargaining process unfolded in the juvenile court.

In South Carolina, a juvenile can reach criminal court in three different ways: (1) statutory exclusion, (2) mandatory waiver, or (3) discretionary waiver. Under the statutory exclusion law, juvenile offenders are tried in criminal court if they are 16 years old and if they are charged with a range of felony offenses (according to South Carolina Code of Law 1976 §20-7-7605, Class A, B, C, or D felonies or a felony punishable by a maximum of at least 15 years’ imprisonment if committed by an adult). With mandatory waiver and pursuant with the South Carolina Code of Law 1976 §20-7-7605, juvenile offenders of age 14 and older who are being charged with a crime carrying a minimum of 10 years in prison and have a prior conviction/adjudication of a similar offense on two or more prior occasions may be transferred to criminal court. Finally, discretionary waiver applies to juveniles of any age for murder or criminal sexual misconduct. In addition, discretionary waiver may be used when an offender is age 14 or younger and commits certain drug, weapon, aggravated assault, aggravated battery, or certain Class A, B, C, or D felonies punishable by 15 years of imprisonment if committed by an adult. Furthermore, discretionary waiver may be used when an offender is 16 years or older and commits a Class E or F felony or a serious misdemeanor (see South Carolina Code of Law 1976 §20-7-7605).

Our sample was restricted to only waiver-eligible offenders who were facing transfer to adult court through the state’s discretionary waiver mechanism. As defined here, “waiver-eligible” refers to juvenile offenders who committed offenses that, under the statute, permit the county solicitors to file criminal charges in the adult court. Initially, 287 files were coded. However, several issues reduced the final sample size to 241 cases. First, there were some cases where the outcome was still pending. Second, some of the files had a significant amount of missing data including the “instant offense” (or waiver eligible offense). Given that the decision to seek a waiver motion is generally driven by the nature of the offense, having complete and accurate information on this data element was important. Accordingly, files that were missing this information were excluded from the sample.

Independent Variables

The independent variables of interest were divided into two separate categories: primary and secondary legal factors and extralegal factors. This categorization was due in part to evidence indicating that sentencing decisions by judges seemingly are guided by an amalgamation of primary legal, secondary legal, and extralegal factors, as they relate to an offense and offender (Mears & Field, 2000).

The dependent variable of interest is the plea decision, a dichotomized measure of adjudication status (coded: 0 = no plea, 1 = plea). More specifically, this research was interested in the extent to which pleas are impacted by both the legal and extralegal considerations of judges and prosecutors. Although it would have been theoretically feasible to treat the plea decision as a trichotomous measure, we did not believe that any meaningful comparisons could be made, given the small number of cases in which the prosecutor agreed to nolle prosequi the charges (n = 11).

The independent variables consisted of a series of primary and secondary legal and extralegal factors considered by the court. The primary legal factors included the age of the defendant and offense category (CSC, assault, robbery/homicide, and major property crimes [Burglary I and II and Larceny I and II]). Age of the defendant was divided into three separate groups: 14 years old, 15 years old, and 16/17 years old (0 = no and 1 = yes). Additionally, it is worth noting that there was no redundancy between the offense variables in that the most serious charged offense was used to determine the placement of juveniles in each category.

Among the secondary/quasi-legal factors are first-time offender (0 = no, 1 = yes), weapon use during the crime, injury to victim, number of victims, and number of accomplices (three dummy categories all coded 0 = no and 1= yes). The inclusion of these quasi-legal variables has a basis in the extant research (Burrow, 2008b; Cauffman et al., 2007) and they all comprise elements of courtroom actors’ concern about community protection.

Given both the practical and organizational constraints that frame the decision making of prosecutors and judges, we included a number of extralegal factors: race of the offender; attorney present at adjudication (coded: 0 = no, 1 = yes); sex of the victim/victims; highest grade completed (three dummy groups—less than 9th, 9th–10th, 11th and higher—each coded 0 = no and 1 = yes); living situation of the offender (three dummy groups—other, single parent, and two parent—each coded 0 = no and 1 = yes); and history of physical or verbal abuse in their home (coded: 0 = no, 1 = yes). The living situation of the offender was also included, given the empirical evidence which suggests offenders with inadequate living situations are more likely to participate in crime (Shihadeh & Steffensmeier, 1994; Wong, 2011). Finally, presence of an attorney at adjudication was included as was physical/verbal abuse by a parent or legal guardian, given the literature which suggests that offenders who are abused by a parent or legal guardian may be more likely to participate in criminal deviance (Widom & White, 1997).

There are numerous examples in the extant sentencing literature which show that race plays a part in sentencing decisions (Demuth & Steffensmeier, 2004a). As such, we include race/ethnicity among the predictors. Though the 2000 U.S. Census indicates that the three largest racial/ethnic groups in this large county are White (84%), African American (12.6%), and non-White Hispanic (1.9%), these numbers are not actually borne out in the juvenile court under observation. Both African Americans and non-White Hispanics have a much higher representation in this juvenile court (58% and 3.6%, respectively). Rather than dropping the Hispanic offenders from the analysis, we collapsed African American and non-White Hispanic into a single group (0 = White and 1 = African American/Hispanic).

It is imperative to note that because females made up such a small proportion of the waiver-eligible cases, they were excluded from the analysis. However, because the researchers were interested in how victimization is viewed by the court, the sex of the victim was included in the analysis to examine its impact on the plea decision. Finally, whether or not the victim was injured was included in the analysis in light of the evidence that victims with visible injuries may influence the court to sentence the offender more harshly (Ahola, Hellstrom, & Christianson, 2010).

Statistical Analysis

Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, logistic regression was utilized to analyze the data (Menard, 2002). Logistic regression is useful in predicting the probability that an observation will appear in one category of the dependent variable (no plea bargain) versus another (received a plea bargain) and for evaluating which measures are stronger or weaker predictors of a dependent variable (Menard, 2002). The resulting “log-odds” can then be exponentiated to produce easily interpretable odds ratios (odds of an outcome change; DeMaris, 1992).

In view that some of the independent variables tap certain dimensions of the same construct, we used the variance inflation factor (VIF) to test whether there would be problems with collinearity; none of the VIF values ranged higher than 2.0. Because the VIF values produced were so low, one can conclude that multicollinearity was not an issue with these data (Friendly & Kwan, 2009; Hoffmann, 2004; O’Brien, 2007).

Results

Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics. We observe that 74% of the offenders received a plea while 26% of the offenders did not receive a plea.

Table 1.

Descriptive Statistics for Waiver Eligible Cases in One Large County, South Carolina.

Variable	N	Frequency (%)
Dependent variable
Plea decision
No plea	62	25.7
Plea	179	74.3
Primary legal variables
Offender age
14 or 15	163	67.6
16 or 17	73	30.3
CSC offense
Yes	23	9.5
Homicide/robbery
Yes	20	8.3
Assault
Yes	73	30.3
Serious property (burglary, larceny, grand larceny, and arson)
Yes	83	34.4
Secondary legal variables
First-time offender
Yes	99	41.1
Number of accomplices
None	113	46.9
One	34	14.1
Two or more	66	27.4
Was the victim injured?
Yes	85	35.5
Nature of the injury
No injury	151	62.7
Sexual/digital penetration	47	19.5
Blunt force/beaten	28	11.6
Was a weapon used?
Yes	54	22.4
Extralegal variables
Attorney present?
Yes	173	71.8
Race of the offender
White	120	49.8
Black/Hispanic	111	46.1
Sex of the victim
Female	74	30.7
Male	89	36.9
Highest grade completed
Less than 9th	62	25.7
9th or 10th	139	57.7
11th or 12th	10	4.1
Family living arrangement
Two-parent household	83	34.4
Single-parent household	104	43.2
Grandparent	22	9.1
History of abuse, neglect or DSS intervention in the home
Yes	117	48.5

Note. CSC = criminal sexual conduct; DSS = Department of Social Services.

Table 2 presents the results from two logistic regression models—Model I (which reflects the South Carolina mandate, S.C.C.L.1976 §20-7-760, to focus on the offense and the age of the offender) and Model II which contains the extralegal predictors. Among the strongest predictors in Model I are the offense and age. First, those charged with assault offenses were 486% more likely to receive a plea concession compared to the reference category (the offense catchall category or “Other Offense”). Also, the odds of receiving a plea for those charged with a major property offense such as Burglary I or II increases by 513% compared to the reference category. Similarly, the odds of receiving a plea for those charged with a robbery/homicide offense increases by 417% compared to the reference category. Perhaps most importantly, the plea decision is impacted by an offender’s age especially among 15-year-old offenders. In fact, they are 58% more likely to receive a plea compared to offenders who are 16.

Table 2.

Logistic Regression—Legal/Secondary Legal and Extralegal Variables.

	Model I			Model II
Variable	b	SE	Exp(B)	B	SE	Exp(B)
Primary legal
CSC offense	−.098	.582	0.906	−0.336	.625	0.714
Assault	1.581	.467	4.859**	1.583	.492	4.868**
Major property	1.636	.454	5.134***	1.608	.476	4.993**
Robbery/homicide	1.428	.718	4.171*	1.494	.767	4.453*
Offender age
14 years old	−.447	.193	0.639*	−0.418	.211	0.659*
15 years old	.459	.194	1.582*	0.440	.211	1.552*
Secondary legal
First-time offender	−.088	.323	0.915	−0.005	.348	0.995
Accomplices
One accomplice	.498	.263	1.646^†	0.447	.277	1.564
Two/more accomplice	−.490	.262	0.612^†	−0.438	.276	0.645
Presence of a weapon	.091	.440	1.095	0.111	.464	1.117
Number of victims
One victim	−.467	.247	0.627^†	−0.439	.257	0.645^†
Two/more victims	.485	.248	1.624^†	0.456	.258	1.578^†
Victim injury	−.007	.009	0.993	−0.005	.009	0.995
Extralegal
Race/ethnicity				−.032	.014	0.969*
Victim sex				.010	.006	1.010
Attorney present				−.004	.005	0.996
Highest grade
8th or less				.139	.208	1.149
9th or 10th				−.132	.207	0.876
Living situation
Single				.254	.189	1.290
Two parents				−.257	.189	0.774
History of abuse in home				.007	.012	1.007
Constant				.150	.272
Nagelkerke R ²				.170	.223
Cox and Snell R ²				.237	.312

Note. CSC = criminal sexual conduct.

^† p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Model II presents the analysis that includes the extralegal predictors. Much like the previous model, the type of the offense impact the plea decision with assaults, major property, and robbery/homicide all being significant (p = .001, .001; and .052, respectively). In this model, the odds of receiving a plea increases by 486% for offenders charged with assault offenses compared to the reference category. Similarly, the odds of receiving a plea increases by 499% and 445%, respectively, for major property and robbery/homicide offenses.

The impact of the number of victims was somewhat marginal in this model (p < .10). It is once again notable, however, that offenders who were 15 years old were more likely to receive a plea compared to other 16- or 17-year-olds. The odds of receiving a plea increases by 55% for 15-year-old offenders compared to the reference group (16- or 17-year-old offenders). Importantly, race/ethnicity was significant in this model (p = .025). In this model with race/ethnicity, Black/non-White Hispanic defendants are 96% less likely to receive a plea compared to their White counterparts (see DeMaris, 1992).

Thus far, the results show that the plea decision is largely influenced by legal factors such as the offense and age much in keeping with the South Carolina mandate, S.C.C.L.1976 §20-7-760. Importantly, race/ethnicity was also shown to exert an influence on the plea decision. However, we were interested in whether race/ethnicity acted in concert with other predictors to reduce the likelihood of some offenders to receive a plea. Thus, we constructed a final model that included several two-way interaction terms to explore this possibility.

Table 3 presents the results from Model III, the logistic regression with the interaction terms. As shown in the previous two models, the offenses including assaults, robbery/homicide, and major property remain among the strongest predictors of the plea decision (p = .003; p = .029; and p = .001, respectively). In this model, assault offenses increase the odds of a plea by 439% compared to the reference category. Similarly, the odds of receiving a plea increases by 546% and 563%, respectively, for major property and robbery/homicide offenses.

Table 3.

Logistic Regression Including Interaction Terms.

	Model III			Model IV
Variable	b	SE	Exp(B)	b	SE	Exp(B)
Primary legal
CSC Offense	−.570	.649	.566	—	—	—
Robbery/homicide	1.729	.791	5.634*	1.444	.609	4.239*
Assault	1.480	.502	4.392**	1.374	.390	3.950***
Major property	1.698	.490	5.464**	1.670	.394	5.311***
Offender age
14 years old	−.356	.217	.701	−.341	.192	.711^†
15 years old	.379	.218	1.460^†	.363	.192	1.438^†
Secondary legal
First-time Offender	−.029	.359	.972	—	—	—
White × First-Time	.842	.355	2.322**	.861	.304	2.365**
Black × Firs-Time	−.813	.358	.443*	−.825	.308	.438**
Accomplices
One accomplice	.385	.282	1.470
Two/more accomplice	−.377	.282	.686	—	—	—
Presence of a Weapon	−.063	.478	.939	—	—	—
Number of victims
One victim	−.323	.250	.724
Two/more victims	.342	.251	1.408	.019	.010	1.020*
Victim Injury	−.003	.010	.997	—	—	—
Extralegal
Race/ethnicity	−.038	.085	.962	−.043	.073	.958
Victim Sex	.008	.006	1.009	.011	.006	1.011^†
Attorney Present	.019	.031	1.020	—	—	—
Att × Black Offender	.499	.266	1.647^†	.519	.230	1.680*
Att × White Offender	−.523	.286	.593*	−.523	.230	.593*
Highest grade
8th or less	.090	.214	1.094
9th–10th	−.085	.213	.919	—	—	—
Living situation
Single parent	.302	.200	1.353
Two parent	−.305	.201	.737	—	—	—
History of abuse in home	.008	.011	1.006	—	—	—
Constant		.206			−.334
Nagelkerke R ²		.247			.156
Cox and Snell R ²		.345			.218

Note. CSC = criminal sexual conduct.

^† p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Neither age nor the number of victims was significant in this model. While race/ethnicity alone was not significant in this model, there was a significant two-way interaction effect with several other predictors. First, there was a significant two-way interaction between race/ethnicity and first-time offender, such that first-time offenders who were White had odds of receiving a plea that were 232% higher than first-time offenders who were non-White. Second, there was a significant two-way interaction between attorney present and race/ethnicity such that White offenders who had an attorney present in court had odds of receiving a plea that were lower than offenders who were Black/Hispanic.

Following Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000), we constructed a final model (Model IV) that contained only the variables that were believed to have a minimum predictive relationship (p = .20) with the outcome variable. This model was constructed to reduce the number of “noise variables” or variables that were otherwise irrelevant. In evaluating the previous models, we decided to use only age, offense, number of victims, race, and the interaction terms. In this manner, we would be able to uncover the unique effect that each of these predictors contributed to the outcome.

In Model IV, we again observe that all assaults, major property, and robbery/homicide significantly impact the plea decision. In this model, assault offenses increase the odds of a plea by 395% compared to the reference category. Similarly, the odds of receiving a plea increases by 531% and 423%, respectively, for major property and robbery/homicide offenses compared to the reference category. The impact of age was marginally significant in this model (p < .10). The number of victims, however, increases the odds of a plea by 2%. Finally, the interaction terms again significantly increase the odds of receiving a plea such that first-time offenders who are White had odds that were 236% higher compared to first-time offenders who were non-White. Finally, non-White offenders who had an attorney present during adjudication were more likely to receive a plea. In fact, offenders who had an attorney present increase the odds of a plea by 168% compared to the White offenders who have an attorney present.

Discussion

This research sheds an important light on plea bargaining in a juvenile court. However, several findings require additional discussion. First, this research found that age was a significant predictor of the plea decision. More specifically, we found that 15-year-old offenders were more likely to receive a plea (Hypothesis #1). Two points can be made here. First, it is possible that solicitors are cognizant of the fact that few alternative sanctions are available to this age group short of waiver to adult court. Given that these offenders, 15-year-olds, have not yet reached a point where they have “aged out” of the juvenile court, a plea offer is perhaps the best method for ensuring that they receive the “care” that only the juvenile court can provide (see Courtney & Heuring, 2005). As a result, they use plea concessions to provide a “safe harbor,” so to speak, to this group of offenders. Second, and building on the former point, it is possible that the solicitors do not view this group of offenders as having reached the “end of the line” such that their age precludes them from receiving treatment in the juvenile justice system (Kupchik, Fagan, & Liberman, 2003; Lemmon, Austin, Verrecchia, & Fetzer, 2005; Podkopacz & Feld, 1996).

This research also shows that juvenile offenders who commit assaults, robbery/homicide, and major property offenses are different with respect to the plea concessions that they receive from solicitors. Waiver-eligible juveniles who commit assault offenses, for example, were more likely to receive plea concessions (Hypothesis #2) compared to offenders who committed CSC or “other” offenses. This finding was somewhat surprising, given the severe and sometimes grave injuries that can be inflicted on victims of violent assaults (Cook, 1987). This finding also seems contrary to the premise behind “blameworthiness” and “dangerousness” which posits that prosecutors and judges are especially sensitive to issues related to community safety. However, it is equally possible that neither solicitors nor judges believe that crimes committed by these offenders warrant harsh sanctions. Given that the alternative would have been to waive the offenders to adult court, it is possible that solicitors may not have believed that such a severe punishment was warranted. Additionally, juveniles who committed serious property offenses were also more likely to receive a plea concession. Again, it is possible that the solicitors were using plea concessions in an attempt to “blunt” the impact of the charges because they did not believe property offenses should result in waiver to adult court.

We also found that sexual-based assaults did not influence pleas. This finding was surprising, given the potential life-changing consequences that could accrue from a guilty verdict (lifetime registration for sex offenses). Depending on the state, juveniles, just like adults, must register as a sex offender for life (see Martin & Pruett, 1998). Additional research is needed to understand the decision-making process of the solicitors, as it relates to these sex-based offenses. Nevertheless, given the foregoing discussion, we believe that this finding is in line with our prediction.

Hypothesis #3 was both confirmed and rejected in part. The findings reveal that the “first-time” offender label alone did not influence the plea decision. While the juvenile literature has discussed the significance of prior criminal offending (Fagan & Deschenes, 1990; Kupchik, 2006 Mears & Field, 2000; Podkopacz & Feld, 2001), there was no indication in this research that “first-timers” impacted how plea concessions were structured or offered. The failure to find a link between “first-time” offenders and pleas is important because, as noted by Osbun and Rode (1984), there is an inherent danger in misidentifying first-time offenders among the numerous offenders who may have had multiple contacts with the court system. In light of the fact that there is often an inverse relationship between prior record and severity of offense, it is easy to overlook the very real differences indefendants’ records when judicial or prosecutorial focus is solely on the “numbers” (Osbun & Rode, 1984, p. 191).

Given this fear, along with the observation of Mears and Field (2000), who suggested that research on juvenile offending would benefit tremendously from an examination of the interactive effects of plea bargaining and offense record, we examined the interactive effect between race and “first-time” offenders. Importantly, we found that Black, “first-time” offenders are at a disadvantage when it comes to plea bargains. This finding seems to support the belief that a “crime control” or punitive orientation seems to be taken toward certain offenders (Fader, Harris, Jones, & Poulin, 2001).

Importantly, our findings support the prediction that non-White defendants (Black and non-White Hispanic) are disadvantaged in the plea bargaining process (Hypothesis #4). The extant research on serious and violent juvenile offending has variously discussed the impact of race on juvenile outcomes (Kupchik, 2006; Mears & Field, 2000; Rodriguez, 2003) and juvenile crime more generally (Armstrong & Rodriguez, 2005; Engen, Steen, & Bridges, 2002; Feld, 2003). While these findings may not be wholly conclusive that race plays a role in plea outcomes, they do raise the specter that this extralegal does in fact find its way into the decision-making process. When minority youth are disadvantaged in the plea bargaining process, it has consequences that reach far beyond the immediate adjudication (Brown, 2007; Burgess-Proctor, Holtrop, & Villarruel, 2008). For example, because they less often receive pleas, these youth are increasingly exposed to secure confinement and transfer to adult court (Chessman, Waters, & Hurst, 2010; Feld, 1999). Interestingly, the analysis showed that the interactive effect between race and attorney present may have a “buffering effect” for minority youth (Armstrong & Kim, 2011). Future research should more closely explore this nexus.

This preliminary examination of serious and violent juvenile offenders provides insight into how a number of legal, secondary legal, and extralegal predictors impact plea decisions; however, a few limitations are noteworthy. First, this study was based on data obtained from one county in South Carolina. Given this fact, future research should endeavor to make multicounty or statewide comparisons in order to obtain a clearer picture of the extent to which plea bargaining is truly being used. Nonetheless, we believe this research offers compelling insights into this one court that have not yet been brought to light in other research.

A second potential weakness in the study is that we were unable to compared waiver-eligible and waived juveniles. In view that only a total of seven juvenile offenders were waived to adult court from this country during the time frame under investigation, we could not examine whether there were any substantive differences in the plea bargaining process for these two groups of offenders. Recent waiver research has emphasized the importance of examining outcomes across multiple offender groups in order to gauge the true import of policies and practices (Kupchik & Harvey, 2007; Kurlychek & Johnson, 2010). According to these studies, there must be a systematic examination of court outcomes in order to avoid a “winnowing” process that would reduce sample to only the “worst of the worst” (Lanza-Kaduce et al., 1999). Perhaps using statewide data, or even multistate, would permit researchers to make such comparisons.

Finally, another potential limitation of this research concerns the complexity of operationalizing plea bargaining. Is the definition of a plea really as simple as saying that some kind of concession was granted? What range of concessions and outcomes must be encompassed within the definition of a plea bargain? What makes operationalizing plea bargaining so difficult is that there is no agreed upon or consistent definition of what it truly means (Di Luca, 2005; Sanborn, 1986; Wynne & Hartnagel, 1975). As such, the range of “pleas” can be circumscribed to charge and count reductions or it may be much broader in scale to include behaviors ranging from sentence recommendations, to treatment/placement recommendations, to outright charge dismissal (Smith, 1986; McCoy, 2005). Future research should attempt to account for several manifestations of the plea bargaining process that may not be captured in this research.

Plea bargains are commonplace, and this research shows that solicitors regularly use this practice in order to differentiate between juvenile offenders who require harsher sanctions. In the end, we believe this research sheds some much-needed light on the plea bargaining process. Future research should build on these findings by examining multiple counties across multiple states. Additionally, future research should include additional predictors that would take into account whether the attorney was appointed or privately retained (Walsh, 1990).

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

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