Cognitive engineering and decision support are applied fields that build on cognitive theory and empirical data but ultimately seek to design and build interactive artifacts that improve human decision-making, performance, and use-experiences. However, the path from theory to operational transition has often been very difficult, often ending in failure in a “valley of death” between successful research and successful practical application. This panel presents different perspectives on the trek through this valley – researcher, end-user/operator, program manager, and what-can-we-learn-from-past-failures– set in the issues of current research program making that trip.
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