Why Jewish Refugees Were Imprisoned in a Spanish Detention Camp while Fleeing Europe (1940–1945)

In 1942, George Ross, a young Polish Jewish man, escaped from a detention camp in France and walked over the Pyrenees to Spain. He was arrested for having entered the country without having all the required travel documents, put in prison and then sent to a large detention camp called the ‘Concentration Camp of Miranda de Ebro.’ He remembers his arrival at the camp in this way:

George:

Arriving there, I’ll never forget one sight. There was a house – First of all, in prisons, there was no food. During the fortnight, I have lost 14 kg. And I couldn't walk. But arriving into the camp, the sight that I have seen, was, there was a fellow, very well-built fellow, standing on one leg, because he had one leg only. And over a small tin, with fire in it, keeping his wooden leg over the fire, burning bed bugs out of it. That was the introduction to the camp. Because that was a sight that I will never forget.

Interviewer:

And how did the other people look? [A: In the camp?] In the camp.

George:

Very weak too. ¹

The vermin, the limited means available for dealing with it, arriving at the camp already hungry and weak, and the continuation of inadequate food once in the camp are themes that emerge repeatedly in oral history interviews with Jewish refugees who were interned there.

The Miranda de Ebro concentration camp's barracks with their damaged roofs, small windows and bleak uniformity, built close together on a small rectangle of land. From Historia del Campo de Concentración de Miranda de Ebro (1937–1947), by José Ángel Fernández López.

The Miranda de Ebro detention camp, from Historia del Campo de Concentración de Miranda de Ebro (1937–1947), by José Ángel Fernández López. ²

The number of Jewish refugees who left continental Europe via Spain between the beginning of World War II and the autumn of 1944 is estimated to be 37 500 by one expert on the subject, ³ and a more modest 15 000 and 23 000 by others. ⁴ Most of the refugees arrived in Spain intending to transit through it as quickly as possible in order to reach Lisbon and take a ship to the Americas, Palestine, Britain or elsewhere beyond Europe. Some had arranged for boat passage from a Spanish port. A subgroup of Jews travelling through Spain during the war years were single men trying to join French or other Allied armies in North Africa or Britain. ⁵ Although the refugees had hoped to travel swiftly through Spain, significant numbers were held up there because the Spanish authorities put them in prison, before moving the men to the Miranda detention camp.

The sequence of events by which Jewish men ended up in the Miranda camp was normally as follows. Jewish refugees in France tried to acquire all the necessary travel documents in order to pass through Spain and Portugal, but thousands were unable to do so. They were afraid that if they left France on public transport, the French or Spanish border police would check their documents and turn them back, imprison them, or hand them over to the Gestapo. In an effort to avoid this, they crossed the Pyrenees Mountains on foot. Once inside Spain, they were arrested, usually in the mountains or when approaching their first town, but sometimes while in cities, on the train to Barcelona, Madrid or Bilbao, or near the Portuguese border. ⁶ Those arrested in the mountains tended to be kept in a prison cell in a village for a few days and then transferred to a prison in a larger town, where they remained for a few weeks. They were then sent either to the Miranda camp or to one, two or three more prisons before being transferred to the camp. ⁷ The women and children were released or sent to a women's prison for a few weeks and then permitted to live in supervised freedom, reporting regularly to a police station. In the region of Girona in 1943, children were separated from their mothers and sent to a children's home. ⁸ Also in 1943, some refugees were kept under surveillance in hotels in the Catalonian spa town of Caldas de Malavella; from there, the men were sent on to Miranda or released with the women. ⁹

Although the Spanish authorities and prisoners referred to the Miranda de Ebro camp as a ‘concentration camp’, it is best thought of as a detention camp; its aim was not extermination, starvation or forced labour. The camp was located in northern Spain, near the small town of Miranda de Ebro in the province of Burgos and the region of Castille. It was created in 1937 for prisoners of war captured by the Nationalists during the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). Between 1940 and 1944, Jewish refugees comprised a small fraction of all camp prisoners, most of whom were non-Jewish soldiers who had fought Germany, or men who wished to do so. Camp prisoners were mostly from German-occupied countries, Britain, Canada and the United States. The largest group was Polish. The camp also held anti-Nazi dissidents, members of the International Brigades and some Spaniards and Latin American residents of Spain. ¹⁰

Camp conditions were harsh. Camp food was insufficient and of limited nutritional value, and prisoners were constantly hungry. Showers and toilets were filthy, and prisoners were plagued by lice, bedbugs and rats. They suffered from dysentery and other illnesses, and medical care was inadequate. It was hot in summer and very cold in winter. The heating was insufficient. For much of the time, the camp was overcrowded. It contained 3005 prisoners on 16 July 1943, which was about double its capacity. ¹¹ Until early in 1943, there were not enough taps, and prisoners had to queue up in order to drink or wash. No changes of clothing were provided. Prisoners hated the early morning roll call before breakfast, during which they had to stand for a long time, give a fascist salute as the flag was raised, and sometimes sing Spanish Nationalist songs. ¹² Some Jewish prisoners endured anti-Semitic remarks from other prisoners and suffered at least one violent attack by Belgian prisoners. ¹³

The Miranda camp was one among many camps built to imprison Republicans. Paul Preston affirms, ‘With all of Spain in [Franco's] hands at the beginning of April 1939, the war against the Republic would continue by other means, not on the battle fronts but in military courts, in the prisons, in the concentration camps, in the labour battalions and even in pursuit of the exiles’. ¹⁴ During the Civil War and its aftermath, Franco developed the largest, most populated and longest-operating concentration camp network in southern Europe. Some 188 camps have been identified, and they held an estimated 527 000 prisoners ‘in deplorable conditions and subject to humiliating classification and re-education policies’. They were created to classify the prisoners, and they made possible their indoctrination, re-education and submission. ¹⁵ In historian Mirta Nuñez's view, the camps’ purpose was the submission and passivity of Republicans. The lack of food, water and cleaning facilities; the ubiquity of parasites; and roll call were forms of torture. ¹⁶

During World War II, Miranda became the main camp for foreigners. Some scholars view it as the government's practical solution to a problem, such as the need to house an avalanche of new arrivals seeking refuge and rest. ¹⁷ Others relate incarceration in Miranda to the outcomes of battles in the war and to the prisoners’ membership in a particular category. ¹⁸ Unfortunately, research on the camp contains almost no analysis of the sequence of policies that resulted in camp incarceration for foreigners between 1940 and 1944. Existing research on the Spanish government's attitude towards letting Jews into Spain is also relevant to the imprisonment of Jews in Miranda. ¹⁹ However, it, too, pays scant attention to Spanish policies on the incarceration of foreigners.

Was the regime anti-Semitic between 1940 and 1944? Spain had no anti-Semitic legislation in these years. There was some police action and discrimination against Jews, but this was based on prejudice rather than on anti-Jewish regulations. Spain granted transit visas without discriminating between Jews and non-Jews, enabling thousands of Jews to pass through the country. ²⁰ Abroad, several Spanish diplomats helped Jews. ²¹ As well as helping, however, the government treated Jews poorly. It denied 3000 baptised Jews collective transit visas for Spain in the summer of 1940. ²² In different periods, the government opened and closed the border and sent back some Jewish as well as non-Jewish refugees, while imprisoning others. At the beginning of the war, it prevented the creation of an official welfare organization that could handle them. ²³ In the autumn of 1940, the Spanish Foreign Office told Spanish consuls not to put obstacles in the way of the application of anti-Jewish policies in France. Franco's advisor, Luis Carrero Blanco, wrote in 1941, ‘Spain, guardian of faith in Christ, is once again faced with the real enemy: Judaism’. ²⁴ That year, the Ministry of the Interior ordered that a ‘Judaic archive’ be produced in all provinces, to contain records for Jews. ²⁵ Senior officials obstructed both the entry of Jews from the Balkans, with Spanish nationality, and their remaining in Spain. ²⁶ German refugees in Mallorca were forced to choose between leaving Spain and being sent to a concentration camp. Similar incidents occurred in Madrid and other cities. A Barcelona government office cancelled the work permits of several dozen Jews in June 1943. Minister of the Interior Ramón Serrano Suñer encouraged Falangist, anti-Semitic propaganda in Spain. ²⁷ Franco included anti-Semitic pronouncements in some of his speeches and told the German ambassador in December 1943 that his government was hostile towards the Jewish community. ²⁸ Anti-Semitism was an integral part of the regime's rhetoric in the second half of the war. After Operation Torch, Jews were identified with the United States and Great Britain, which had crushed Spain's hope for an empire. They were also branded ‘conspirators’. ²⁹ For a part of 1940–1944, Jewish organizations, all non-Catholic worship, and non-Catholic marriage were forbidden in Spain. ³⁰

In sum, Spain's treatment of Jews was in some ways helpful but in other ways poor. In examining this treatment, scholars have neglected to analyse the policies that resulted in foreign Jewish men being incarcerated, and the question of whether there was anti-Semitism involved in this incarceration. As imprisonment in the Miranda camp was a defining feature of flight through Spain for a great many Jewish refugees, this is a serious omission, that this article seeks to remedy. A further reason for examining such policies is that being sent to Miranda was a matter of great concern to the refugees, to the relief organizations and escape lines that helped them in France and Spain, and to the Allied ambassadors in Madrid. Many of these parties took action to prevent or shorten men's internment in the camp. ³¹ This article analyses the succession of policies that led to Jewish men being sent to the Miranda camp, instances of non-application, and the role of provincial governors in determining Jews’ fate. The central finding is that Jewish refugees were sent to the Miranda camp because of government policy directed at incoming foreigners, rather than at Jews specifically. However, between September 1940 and January 1943, provincial governors decided where most incoming foreigners were to be sent. They were leaders in the Falange, Spain's only political party, and the Falange's Germanophilia may have influenced their decisions.

1. Spanish policies that sent men to Miranda (1940–1944)

Senior officials in the Foreign Office and Ministries of the Interior and Army developed policies about what to do with foreigners who entered Spain from France ‘clandestinamente’. To enter Spain clandestinely meant coming across the border without all the required and up-to-date documents. The Captain General of Cataluña explained ‘clandestinamente’ with the phrase, ‘sin la documentación en regla’ [without one's documents in order], when discussing ‘crossing the Pyrenees border in a clandestine fashion.’ ³² The policies were expressed as lists of directives, which stipulated what to do with various categories of foreigners, including whom to send to a campo de concentración. They were sent to senior officials and military higher-ups in Spain's provinces, and evidence suggests that these men and their subordinates followed them, but not always.

What were the directives that sent people to the Miranda camp? The first set from the 1940–1944 period was dated 20 June 1940, coinciding with the fall of France. To be sent to a concentration camp were persons with no Spanish visa as well as either no proof of a means of making a living in Spain or no proof that they had a family of their own asking for them or willing to receive them in Spain. Persons of any nationality who were undocumented and considered suspicious were also to be sent to a camp, as were Allied army deserters, whether documented or not. ³³

In September 1940, the Chief of the General Staff determined that refugees from belligerent countries who crossed the border in organized and armed detachments or remains of armed detachments were to be interned until their nation ceased to be a belligerent. He stated that there was no obligation to intern and keep in military custody persons who did not cross the border in this way; their condition in Spain was that of undocumented foreigner or foreigner without means. ‘In military custody’ would have meant ‘in camps’ because concentration camps were the responsibility of the armed forces. Individuals for whom diplomatic authorities were not willing to serve as guarantor or help repatriate were to be considered undocumented foreigners or foreigners without means, and could be expelled from Spain (“puede procederse a su expulsión”). It was the provincial governors who had to expel them. This September 1940 document begins with ‘Excmo. Señor’ but no recipient is mentioned, and this suggests that it was sent to a number of officials; the widely circulated Circulars 70 and 78, discussed below, use the same words. ³⁴

A 1940 set of directives on letterhead of the General Staff, Second Section, and titled, ‘Rules that must be followed with foreign refugees in concentration camps intended for them’ must be the outcome of the above-mentioned September 1940 document; it provides more detail. It states that individuals who crossed the border without constituting organized and armed military detachments were to be the responsibility of the governing authority. These were to include ‘all individuals, military or civil, from any country, be it neutral, belligerent, or having ceased to be belligerent’. Refugees in armed detachments of a country that was no longer a belligerent were also to be the responsibility of the governing authority. Refugees from belligerent countries who crossed the border into Spain in organized and armed military detachments were to remain interned in military camps until their country ceased to be a belligerent. The ‘governing authority’ would have meant the provincial governor. Provincial governors were under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior. Refugees not in armed units of a belligerent country were to be under the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior, and diplomatic representatives were to be notified of their presence. ³⁵

About two years later, on or shortly before 8 September 1942, a new list of directives was produced, entitled ‘Regulations regarding the Freedom of Foreign Nationals’. ³⁶ These directives indicated who was to be released from prison. They are relevant because men who were not released could end up in the Miranda camp. The following were to be kept in prison: (a) people without diplomatic representation (be they from occupied or unoccupied countries) and (b) people with diplomatic representation and from unoccupied countries, if (for people not of military age) they have civil or military responsibilities, or if (for those of military age) Germany objects.

The next set of directives was Circular 70, published on 29 January 1943. ³⁷ While it was being drafted, Jews, anti-Nazi dissidents, would-be Allied soldiers and others were crossing the Pyrenees in large numbers because Germany had taken over the unoccupied zone of France on 11 November 1942, the Americans and British having just landed in northwest Africa. Circular 70 ordered that many categories of persons who ‘enter Spain in a clandestine or irregular fashion’ must be sent to a concentration camp, namely: (a) foreigners of military age (18–40) from belligerent nations, who had entered Spain clandestinely, with the exception of chiefs and other officers (Paragraph 1). (b) Foreigners not of military age and without proof of sufficient means to be able to live in Spain or a financial guarantee from a solvent resident of Spain; these could also be sent to a prison. Women went to prison, as there was no camp for them (Paragraph 4). (c) Czechs, Poles, Yugoslavs and stateless persons not of military age and without financial means or a financial guarantee; these were to be sent to a concentration camp or prison until the International Red Cross took over responsibility for them (Paragraph 6). (d) Members of the three branches of the armed forces who arrived in Spain as a result of the hazards of combat, damage or accident (Paragraph 9). Lastly, Frenchmen who did not wish to return to France were to be placed under the responsibility of the International Red Cross (Paragraph 5). This would have referred to Frenchmen going to join the Allied forces in North Africa. The introductory lines of Circular 70 state that the directives were based on an agreement between the Ministry of the Interior and the Foreign Office. A draft of the circular, which was typewritten and had almost identical wording, was produced on 10 December 1942. ³⁸

A new set of directives regarding persons who had entered Spain in a clandestine or irregular fashion was published three months later, on 30 April 1943. Entitled Circular 78, it was the result of an agreement between the Foreign Office and the Ministries of the Interior and Army. ³⁹ It was similar to Circular 70, with minor differences. ‘Military age’ was shortened by two years, becoming 20–40 (Paragraph 1). Professional soldiers would be sent to camps; Circular 70 had only implied this (Paragraph 2). Escaped prisoners of war were to be placed in a camp until it was proven that they were escaped prisoners of war, whereupon they were (regardless of nationality) to be freed and allowed to leave Spain, in conformity with Article 13 of the Hague Convention. Those of any age found not to be escaped prisoners of war would be kept in a camp (Paragraph 13). ⁴⁰ A new paragraph (5) explained that Frenchmen who had entered Spain since the Anglo-American occupation of North Africa for the most part intended to join the armed forces involved in that conflict, and consequently they should be considered belligerents. Those of military age who entered Spain in a clandestine fashion and did not wish to return to France would be sent to a camp, except for chiefs and other officers. Those who were leaving North Africa and heading for France, on the other hand, should be considered subjects of a non-belligerent country, put in supervised freedom and assisted with their return to France. Circular 78 was still the list of directives being used on 6 September 1944, by which time Paris had been liberated and very few Jews and persons with Allied sympathies were coming into Spain. ⁴¹ However, for a short time after the Normandy Landings of 6 June 1944, an ‘Instruction C-4 (Amended)’, produced by the Army's Central General Staff and marked ‘secret’, was put into effect by regional army commanders along the Franco-Spanish border. It concerned detachments of belligerent armies. ⁴² In sum, Spain had a series of policies that stipulated what was to be done with foreigners who entered the country without all the required travel documents. The category of foreigner in which a Jewish man belonged determined whether or not he would be sent to the camp. There was no category just for Jews, but the 1943 Circulars contained a category for the stateless, which we will explore below.

2. What shaped policy?

The policies that resulted in Jewish men being sent to Miranda were influenced by large population movements in France; by the pro-Axis and pro-Allies leanings of senior officials; and by the ambassadors of Britain, the United States and Germany in Madrid.

Large movements of people within and from France

Large population movements in France, towards and over the Spanish border, shaped Spanish policy and affected the likelihood of imprisonment for Jewish refugees entering Spain without their documents in order. If imprisoned, men had a higher chance of ending up in Miranda than if released. The first such population movement was comprised of thousands of people who fled from northern to southern France and Spain in June 1940, while the German army invaded France. L’exode, as it was called, is the likely reason for the stringent Spanish policy of June 1940. The mass of people at the Spanish border caused the Spanish government some alarm. The director of the General Directorate of Security, in the Ministry of the Interior, wrote to the provincial governor of Lérida, Catalonia, on 29 May 1940, asking him to take action based on information in an urgent telegram from the Minister of the Foreign Office. ⁴³ The telegram stated that the Spanish consul in Toulouse had reported that ‘thousands of Belgian and French refugees’ had arrived in his area, ‘many of them apparently intending to enter Spain. […] He [the Consul] has noticed that among [these] refugees, who must number over 100 000, there are spies and all kinds of undesirables. And that as he expects that the evacuation will continue to increase due to current events, he suggests that surveillance of our frontier be reinforced so as to prevent clandestine crossings via the mountains. Our Ambassador [in Paris] states that he considered this suggestion to be on the mark and well-founded.’

There were a great many non-French Jewish refugees in this exodus from northern France. They had come to France when Hitler became Chancellor of Germany and began persecuting Jews, when he annexed Austria and the Sudetenland in 1938, and when Germany invaded Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg in May 1940. When Germany invaded France, many of these refugees were among the thousands who fled the German army and travelled south towards and into Spain.

The next significant wave of people moving towards and across the Spanish border came when the Vichy government began rounding up Jews in the unoccupied zone and sending them to camps, on 26 August 1942. ⁴⁴ Many also tried to enter Spain two and a half months later, when Germany invaded the unoccupied zone, on 11 November 1942. Jews and anti-Nazi dissidents were fleeing France, and Frenchmen were trying to join de Gaulle's or the British army in England. Some 12 000 Frenchmen had entered Spain between 8 November and 7 December, the American ambassador reported. ⁴⁵ Circular 70 of January 1943 would have been a response to this surge. Its first paragraph states, ‘Given the frequency with which large numbers of foreigners enter Spain in a clandestine fashion, due to the special circumstances that exist in the neighbouring country of France, and with the goal of determining the situation in which each of these should be placed, in accordance with each case, the following directives will be kept in mind …’. There were so many people entering Spain without their documents in order that the ministries clearly felt the need to create even more specific categories for them than previously, as a basis for determining what to do with them.

Published three months later, Circular 78 of April 1943 would have been a response to new waves of young Frenchmen entering Spain in an effort to escape the Compulsory Labour Service and join General de Gaulle's army. ⁴⁶ The Compulsory Labour Service (Service du Travail Obligatoire, or STO) was a Franco-German programme, instituted on 16 February 1943. It coerced young Frenchmen into going to work in Germany. A similar programme called the ‘Relève’ had begun on 22 June 1942, encouraging Frenchmen to work in Germany in exchange for the release of French prisoners of war, but participation had been voluntary. ⁴⁷ Circular 78, as we saw, stipulated that military-aged Frenchmen going to north Africa should be sent to a camp. Spain's policies, then, were in part government reactions to large numbers of people travelling towards or across the Spanish border.

The pro-Axis and pro-Allied leanings of senior officials

The senior officials who drafted the policy were divided in their attitudes towards the belligerents, and these attitudes influenced the policies. Some hoped that the Allies would win the war, and others the Axis. Some admired Hitler and Nazi Germany, while others disliked both. There were also those who thought that Spain should steer a neutral course. From every iteration of the policy, it is clear that a salient issue for these officials was whether or not the incoming foreigners could contribute to the Allied forces. It is reasonable to assume that pro-Axis senior officials would have wanted potential Allied soldiers in the camp rather than free to leave Spain. Franco's powerful brother-in-law, Ramón Serrano Suñer, would have influenced policy while Minister of the Interior between 24 December 1938 and 16 October 1940 (continuing to administer the Ministry even after having left) and Minister of the Foreign Office from 16 October 1940 until 3 September 1942. ⁴⁸ He was certain of a German victory and eager for Spain to enter the war on the Axis side, in the British ambassador's view. He was believed to be a Germanophile and ‘hardly hid […] his native Spanish antipathy for the Anglo-Saxon block’, Vichy ambassador François Piétri recalls. ⁴⁹ Serrano was a leader in the Falange until September 1942, and in the Ministry of the Interior, he surrounded himself mostly with Falangists and appointed Falangist provincial governors. ⁵⁰ The Falange was the prime source of Naziphilia in Spain; Falangists were Germanophiles. ⁵¹ For most Falangists, full belligerency in the World War on the side of the Axis was the preferred option, from September 1939 onwards. ⁵² They were intent on gaining territory in Africa for a Spanish empire. ⁵³

Several other senior officials who would have influenced policy were pro-German or Falangist. Blas Pérez González was Minister of the Interior between 3 September 1942 and 1957, and a leader in the Falange. In the Ministry, he too surrounded himself with other Falangists and appointed Falangists to the posts of provincial governor, as was becoming customary. ⁵⁴ Pérez's Falangism may account for the 1943 circulars’ stipulations that men of military age and several categories of civilians should be sent to the camp. The Hague Convention (V) did not stipulate that civilians should be sent to camps, although ‘troops belonging to the belligerent armies’ should. The directive about persons of military age referred to men who were pro-Allies, as the refugees entering Spain tended to be pro-Allies. The prisoners from belligerent nations in Miranda were nearly all pro-Allies and from occupied countries, Britain, Canada or the United States, until the liberation of France began; there was a small group of pro-Hitler Belgians, however. ⁵⁵ However, Pérez's contributions to policy may have been affected not only by his Falangism, but also by the fact that German influence was ‘paramount’ in the Ministries of the Interior and of the Army. ⁵⁶

The Foreign Office was a partner in the creation of policy regarding incoming foreigners. Its Director of Foreign Policy, José María Doussinague, was particularly influential. He has been described as having ‘a visión of what foreign policy should be: a more equidistant position between belligerents, while retaining the ideological principles defended during the Civil War. [He and Minister Jordana] did not lean towards the Allies’. ⁵⁷ Yet his letter to the Minister of the Army shows the 1943 Circular 78 directive about Frenchmen in the making and suggests pro-German sympathies:

But as it is undeniable that since the Anglo-American occupation in North Africa and perhaps because of this occupation, most of the French refugees are trying to join the forces that are currently fighting in Tunis, we should consider the French in general as belligerents and consequently apply to them the rules that apply to belligerents. It is, however, appropriate to make a distinction favouring French nationals who support Marshal Pétain's Government, and who are travelling in the opposite direction in an attempt to leave North Africa and reach the French mainland via Spain, by granting them appropriate assistance.

The letter, written three weeks before Circular 78 came out, recommends helpfulness towards pro-Pétain Frenchmen and incarceration for pro-Allies Frenchmen. Doussinague would have been aware that Germany was arguing that French refugees should be regarded as belligerents and therefore interned or sent back to France. The letter also shows how important events of the war were in shaping Spanish policy regarding the incarceration of foreigners. ⁵⁸

Other important policy makers were pro-Allies. Francisco Gómez Jordana y Sousa was Minister of the Foreign Office between 3 September 1942 until 3 August 1944, and was understood by Hoare, Hayes and Piétri to be in favour of an Allied victory. ⁵⁹ He asked for policies regarding refugees to be altered in accordance with the wishes of the British Embassy, on several occasions. The 1942 directives about foreigners to be released from incarceration, for example, mention that at the request of ‘the Embassy’, the Foreign Office had asked the Ministry of the Army to release foreigners if they were from countries not occupied by Germany and with diplomatic representation in Spain. Jordana may have been motivated in part by the wish to maintain good relations with the Allies in order to protect Spain's economy. ⁶⁰

José Enrique Varela, Minister of the Army between August 1939 and 3 September 1942, was intensely anti-Falangist, and the leader of military opposition to the Germanophile tendency in 1941. The German ambassador Eberhard von Stohrer reported that Varela was considered to be Germany's enemy and that he leant strongly towards England. ⁶¹ While he was minister, the September 1940 directives were produced determining that only incoming armed detachments need be interned.

The absence of new, stringent policies in 1941 and most of 1942 may be due to Valera but also to the fact that Franco had appointed a monarchist colonel as Minister of the Interior on 2 May 1941, Valentín Galarza Morante. Galarza was opposed to the powerful Falangist, Ramón Serrano Suñer, and to the increase in Falange power. ⁶² Both Varela and Galarza were replaced by Falangists on 3 September 1942, Varela by Carlos Asensio Cabanillas, and Valentín Galarza Morante by Blas Pérez Gonzalez. Three months later, the 10th December draft of Circular 70 was produced, sending many categories of people to camp or prison.

In sum, senior officials’ attitudes towards the belligerents of World War II influenced policy and the fate of foreigners who had entered Spain. These senior officials all had careers that depended on General Franco. Consequently, the policies that they produced would not have deviated greatly from Franco's ideas and wishes. Franco was pro-Axis for an extended period. Germany had helped him win the Civil War, and he thought that it would win the World War. He considered bringing Spain into the war on the Axis side, partly because he wished it to gain land in Africa if Germany were victorious. ⁶³ Mid-1941 was the peak of Spanish alignment with the Axis but six months later, a slow withdrawal from Germany began. ⁶⁴ Franco continued to help the Axis in many ways, but by December 1943 was making many concessions to the British and Americans, including allowing French refugees to leave Spain for North Africa. ⁶⁵ Spain's helping Germany was in contravention of the Hague Convention (V), which defined the rights and duties of neutral powers. In speeches, Franco admitted his disregard for strict neutrality. ⁶⁶

The influence of ambassadors in Madrid

The ambassadors of Britain, the United States and Germany in Madrid influenced the policies that resulted in Jewish refugees being sent to the camp, by making requests, complaints and threats to the Minister of the Foreign Office and to Franco. The remonstrations of the British ambassador might, ironically, have caused men to be sent to the camp in the first place. Samuel Hoare considered the conditions in Spanish prisons extremely bad and insisted that, in accordance with the Hague Convention, men in prisons should instead be interned in the camp, and officers in hotels. In his memoirs, he says,

In the early days of my mission, it was possible for a man to remain in prison for many days without my hearing anything about the case. Prisoners at that time were very badly treated. Their heads were shaved, they were moved about in gangs, tied together by ropes and thrown into cold and filthy cells with common criminals. It was no excuse for the Spanish Government to maintain that these were the ordinary conditions in a Spanish prison. I insisted upon the principles of the Hague Convention and, after many protracted arguments and vigorous threats, I at last obtained an arrangement under which officers were interned in certain hotels and the men sent to the camp at Miranda de Ebro. ⁶⁷

However, the Ambassador subsequently tried hard to prevent men from being sent to the camp and have those already there released. ⁶⁸ He knew that many would join the Allied armies. He says,

It was also satisfactory to hear that many of the men whom we passed through Spain were urgently needed for important war work. The hundreds of airmen, pilots and mechanics, for instance, meant a substantial reinforcement to Allied air power and particularly to the small air forces of our European allies. The exiled governments of Poland, Holland, Belgium, Czecho-Slovakia and Yugo-Slavia needed every man whom we could save for them. General de Gaulle, first in England, then in North Africa, no less welcomed the access of strength that the continuous flow of Frenchmen through Spain gave to the forces of Free France. The men whom we liberated were amongst the bravest and most resolute in the Allied service. In the face of incessant danger they had escaped from German prisons, trekked for days and weeks through enemy country, crossed the Pyrenees on foot and risked the rigours of a Spanish prison. These men were of great value to our war effort and of all others deserved any help that we could give them. ⁶⁹

Hoare was clearly interested in men being released from prisons and the camp so that they could join the Allied armies. The British Embassy's military attaché also made requests of the Spanish Foreign Office for the release and better treatment of the foreign prisoners in camps and prisons. ⁷⁰

Hoare influenced policies on the internment and release of persons from occupied countries by making repeated requests and threats to Jordana, Minister of the Foreign Office. Several letters by senior officials mention that what is being suggested is a response to demands coming from the British Embassy. ⁷¹ Hoare would back up his requests by referring to Article 13 of the 1907 Hague Convention (V), which reads as follows: ‘A neutral Power that receives escaped prisoners of war shall leave them at liberty. If it allows them to remain on its territory, it may assign them a place of residence.’ ⁷² This is perhaps why Circular 78, Article 7 states that escaped prisoners of war should be released in accordance with Article 13 of the Hague Convention. Samuel Hoare was able to influence policy because he applied pressure repeatedly. He spoke up firmly and vigorously when the government's behaviour was ‘un-neutral’. He made demands, and if they were ignored, he made them again, and again and again. He was determined, tough and not afraid to displease. ⁷³ The American ambassador, Carlton Hayes, also applied pressure. He says: ‘Both Sir Samuel [Hoare] and I would press the Spanish Foreign Office to ensure proper reception and handling of refugees in Spain and their eventual evacuation to North Africa’. ⁷⁴ German Ambassador Dieckhoff reported to his government in December 1943 that Franco had told him that French refugees ‘could not be turned over to the German authorities since this would provoke a frightful outcry on the part of the Anglo-Saxons.’ The term ‘outcry’ suggests that the British and American ambassadors were vociferous regarding the refugees, and the report suggests that this influenced Franco, who was mindful of the fact that Spain was dependent on the United States for gasoline and cotton, and on the British for navicerts. ⁷⁵

In contrast to Britain, Germany wanted Allied soldiers or would-be soldiers to go to the camp and stay there. Hayes says, ‘At various interviews with Count Jordana in January and the early part of February [1943] I countered claims the Germans were making that [French] refugees should be regarded by the Spanish Government as belligerents and therefore should be either interned in Spain or sent back to France.’ ⁷⁶ Germany's claims won out; Frenchmen of military age leaving France had to go to a camp. Germany must also have influenced the 1942 directives about the release of foreigners in prisons and the camp, because one directive stated that if the prisoner was of military age and from a country occupied by Germany and without diplomatic representation in Spain, the Foreign Office had to inform the Ministry of the Army if Germany had an objection to the prisoner being released. ⁷⁷ Like Britain, Germany used threats to influence the Foreign Office. In March 1943, Minister Jordana told Carton Hayes that refugees could not leave from a Spanish port because the Germans had told him that they would sink all refugee ships that might enter or leave such ports. Germany had torpedoed a Spanish ship on 24 February as a warning. ⁷⁸

When the Germans applied pressure, the British and Americans typically applied counter-pressure, with respect to the refugees, as well as trade. Hayes recalls,

neither we nor the British lost any time in seeking to counteract German pressure at the Spanish Foreign Office and to obtain from it the assurance and actions we wanted on behalf of the refugees. Count Jordana, I am sure, was favourably disposed from the outset. ⁷⁹

The German and the British and American ambassadors were involved in something of a tug-of-war in trying to influence the government.

Why could foreign powers influence Spanish policy on foreigners who lacked all the required documents? The British ambassador could influence policy because Franco proclaimed Spanish neutrality vis-à-vis the World War in September 1939, changing this to ‘non-belligerency’ on 12 June 1940. The equivocal status of ‘non-belligerency’ was not a status in international law, and it had previously been used by Mussolini prior to entering the war, but it was taken by Allied diplomats to approximate neutrality. It enabled Hoare to argue that as a neutral country, Spain should not commit un-neutral acts, and to back up his arguments by referring to the 1907 Hague Convention's stipulations regarding neutral countries. The British and American ambassadors could also influence policy because Spain became dependent on their governments for essential imports, particularly wheat, oil and rubber. They had successfully fostered this dependence in an effort to prevent Spain from entering the war on the Axis side. ⁸⁰ Spain needed these imports because of the weakness of its economy and, in 1940–1941, severe food shortages. Both resulted from Spain's Civil War and ‘the regime's poor decisions, economic ignorance, corruption and ideological dedication to inefficient systems’. ⁸¹ Samuel Hoare occasionally threatened that the good relations between Britain and Spain would be damaged if his requests on various matters were not met. ⁸² The United States also made threats. In order to continue to receive the imports, Franco had to maintain a working relationship with Britain and the United States. ⁸³ In 1942, as historian Stanley Payne observes, ‘the Spanish government could not be an entirely free actor, for it was heavily conditioned by Allied control of the seas and of vital imports’. ⁸⁴

The British ambassador's influence on policy also derived from his issuing of navicerts. ⁸⁵ Navicerts were like passes required for crossing the Atlantic, or safe conducts to grain and oil shipments bound for Spain. The British had set up an international maritime blockade of German trade. ⁸⁶ German Ambassador Hans Dieckhoff reported on 15 December 1943 that Franco said,

he therefore was hoping with all his heart for the victory of Germany and he had only one wish that this victory would come as soon as possible. In the meantime, however, he was in a difficult position. His country was only now recovering slowly from the effects of the Civil War, and it could only recover if it imported gasoline and cotton from abroad, products which he could receive only from the Americans and only with English navicerts. The Anglo-Saxons were ready to deliver these things to him and were delivering to a certain extent, they were demanding in return, however, that Spain assume not too outspoken a pro-Axis attitude and that matters which were indisputably unneutral should be discontinued. ⁸⁷

Franco thought that he had to make concessions to the British and Americans because Spain needed their imports and navicerts.

There were further reasons why the British and Americans could influence Spanish policy. They bought up Spanish raw materials that the Axis, and especially Germany, most wanted for their war effort, and offered very large sums for them. These included wool, which was essential for soldiers’ uniforms, and wolfram, which was used to produce ammunition that could penetrate steel. ⁸⁸ It suited Spain to have Britain and America pay high prices for its products. A further reason for Anglo-American influence is that Britain tempted Spain with slices of North Africa. ⁸⁹ Franco did take action favourable to the Allies in response to pressure from the British and American ambassadors, and increasingly so after it became apparent to him that the Allies might win the war. After a series of positive responses to Allied requests, he officially declared on 1 October 1943 that Spain's position was one of neutrality. ⁹⁰

The German ambassador in Madrid could influence Spanish policy because, in 1940 and 1941, Franco hoped to obtain military and other aid from Germany, and territories in Africa, if Spain joined the war on the Axis side. ⁹¹ Franco and Hitler discussed Spain's participation in the war, in these years. ⁹² Until it became clear that Germany might lose the war, Franco acquiesced to many German requests, helped Germany, as mentioned above, and tolerated German influence on the Spanish press, police and in other areas. ⁹³ Collaboration was substantially reduced by mid-1944 as a result of Allied pressure, but it did not cease completely until the end of the Third Reich. Another reason why the German Ambassador in Madrid could successfully put pressure on Spain was that Franco owed Germany gratitude for her help with winning the Civil War. ⁹⁴ Furthermore, Germany could influence policy because of its economic ties with Spain; Spain would have wanted to maintain these ties. Germany and Spain signed one commercial agreement on 22 December 1939 and another in the first half of 1940, guaranteeing the import of raw materials, mainly wolfram, by Germany, while Spain received aeroplane parts. Throughout the war years, approximately 40% of total Spanish exports, especially in iron ore, wolfram, lead, zinc, hides, olive oil, citrus fruits and textiles, went to the Third Reich. Germany provided manufactured goods, metal and chemical products, and eventually military weapons, but always in lesser volume.’ ⁹⁵ Lastly, many Spanish officials were being bribed by Germany and might have influenced policy. ⁹⁶ In sum, both the Allies and Germany were enmeshed in economic relationships with Spain, and for these and other reasons, they could apply pressure on the government and, with their requests and complaints, influence policy.

Was anti-Semitism an influence on the policies?

The Spanish policies regarding foreigners who had entered Spain clandestinely resulted in Jews being interned in Miranda not because they were Jewish, but because they were foreigners. The policies penalized Jews in the same way that they penalized other groups of foreigners. Many stateless persons were Jews, and when Circular 70 of January 1943 singled out statelessness as a category, it ordered that the stateless be treated identically to Czechs, Poles and Yugoslavs. In Circular 78 of April 1943, ‘stateless’ is defined as comprising three categories, all of which were to receive the same treatment. The category that included Jews was ‘those who for reasons related to race or other similar reasons have been stripped of their nationality of origin’ and persons entirely without documents. The other two categories were (a) persons from an occupied country without diplomatic representation in Spain, including Poles, Czechs and Estonians; and (b) persons who rejected their nationality and did not want to be placed under the responsibility of the diplomatic representatives for their country of origin (such as Austrians who did not recognize the Anschluss, Czechs and Slovaks who did not accept the protectorate of the Reich in Bohemia and Moravia, and Slovak fugitives). All three categories were to be treated in the same way, that is, persons not of military age were to be placed at the disposal of the International Red Cross, but before this occurred, if they did not have financial means or a financial guarantee from a solvent resident of Spain, they were to be sent to a concentration camp or prison. If they had financial means and a financial guarantor, they could live in supervised freedom until they had the documents needed for leaving Spain. Moreover, they were to be treated in the same way as all other foreign persons not of military age, and women and children. Hence, in Circulars 70 and 78, stateless Jewish refugees were treated like several other categories of persons for whom faith was not specified.

The September 1942 directives about which incarcerated persons to release did not target Jews either. They alluded to stateless persons when dictating that persons without diplomatic representation had to be kept in prison. ⁹⁷ Many German Jews were without diplomatic representation after Germany's 11^th Decree of November 24, 1941, which stripped of their nationality all German Jews who had left the German Reich. However, many non-Jews did not have diplomatic representation either, for example, because they were anti-Nazi dissidents whom Germany had stripped of their citizenship, or because their country had not sent diplomats to Spain. Samuel Hoare described the stateless as ‘almost entirely anti-Nazi Germans and Austrians’. ⁹⁸

Moreover, the policy focus on not having diplomatic assistance pre-dated the denaturalization decree. As early as September 1940, policy directives stated that persons for whom diplomatic authorities were not willing to act as guarantor or help repatriate could be expelled. For the creators of the policy, not having diplomatic representatives mattered because they saw diplomatic representatives as having the duty to support the refugees and help them leave Spain. A Foreign Office letter of 7 April 1943 states the following about stateless persons: ‘All these cases have been placed under the responsibility of the Spanish Red Cross, as representative of the International Red Cross in Spain, so that it takes on the role of diplomatic representatives or consulates in assuming responsibility for their protection and repatriation to their destination’. ⁹⁹ Diplomatic representatives did indeed give refugees stipends and help them acquire travel documents. ¹⁰⁰ The April 1943 circular's categories of stateless persons could not or would not approach diplomatic representatives of their country, in Spain.

A close reading of both 1943 circulars shows that not having financial means or a financial guarantor was more prejudicial than faith, as far as incarceration was concerned. Stateless persons were to be incarcerated if they did not have financial means or a financial guarantee from a Spanish resident, as were persons not of military age from any country, irrespective of faith. The emphasis on financial means rather than faith did not much help Jewish refugees, however, because Jewish refugees had in many cases been dispossessed of their businesses and homes, lost money in the effort to leave their country of origin, or been in flight or in hiding for months and thus usually lacked an income. If not impoverished, the refugees tended to keep their valuables hidden so as to avoid confiscation when arrested in Spain, and this would have made it difficult to prove financial means.

Although there is no clear evidence that Spanish anti-Semitism shaped the policies, anti-Semitism abroad made it more likely that Jews would be sent to the camp. It was particularly difficult for Jews to enter Spain with all the required documents, the lack of which was the overt reason for imprisonment. Their persecution in France by the Nazi and Vichy governments made it dangerous for them to present themselves at French police and government offices to request the French exit visa required for leaving France, and the safe conduct pass required for travel. Furthermore, because countries around the world were closing their doors to Jewish refugees, it was difficult for the refugees to acquire the final destination visas and boat passage that were prerequisites for Spanish and Portuguese transit visas. ¹⁰¹ When, because they lacked these travel documents, they chose to walk over the Pyrenees so as to avoid border guards, they were at risk of being arrested because a Spanish police force [the Guardia Civil] patrolled the mountains and nearby rural areas.

3. Not applying the policy

Whether or not the policy was applied partly determined whether Jewish men would end up in Miranda. Evidence suggests that the policy directives were followed, but not always. For example, in a number of letters written in 1943, senior army officers asked the Foreign Office to send or clarify the rules regarding what to do with foreigners who entered Spain without all their travel documents, so that they could implement them. ¹⁰² A letter from 1944 by the Chief of the Central General Staff states that as soon as he had learnt about Circular 78, he ordered the Captains-General to apply it; the Captains-General had been unaware of it previously. ¹⁰³ This suggests that there was a wish to apply the rules, but not having the rules, not being clear about them, or not knowing about them might result in non-application, for a while.

Some senior government and military officials were knowingly non-compliant. In early 1943, when the Miranda camp was overcrowded, a senior official in the Under-Secretariat of the Army decided not to have men sent there. ¹⁰⁴ There were also short periods during which, rather than official policy, ad hoc requests made by the Foreign Office of the other ministries were implemented. For example, a senior official in the Foreign Office asked the Ministry of the Interior to stop the police from arresting foreigners who could subsequently be sent to the Miranda camp because the camp was full; because the internment in Miranda of men who had not committed crimes had resulted in a scandal in some countries; and because of extremely forceful insistence from diplomats, and the need for these ‘campaigns and protests’ to stop because they were damaging to Spain. Another ad-hoc deviation from policy originated with Franco, who, in late 1943, allowed Frenchmen to be transported to north Africa because, as he told the German ambassador, ‘the retention of these people [in Spain] meant not only a great financial burden but also a certain internal political danger since it was a matter predominantly of Communistic riff-raff’. ¹⁰⁵

The Guardia Civil was the police corps for rural areas, and it patrolled the border, mountains and nearby areas. It sometimes arrested or let Jewish refugees go free arbitrarily. Dutch refugee Joseph Colen mentioned that a Guardia Civil member approached his group as they were walking away from the Pyrenees, and he was friendly, so one of the group, a barber, gave him a shave in the street. The Guardia Civil officer responded by saying that he regretted that he had already called his colleagues to come and arrest them. ¹⁰⁶ Refugees found it easy to bribe border guards with money and cigarettes. In some cases, guards’ anti-fascist or Falangist sympathies determined whether they treated the refugees kindly or unpleasantly. ¹⁰⁷ The policy was not always applied.

4. Provincial governors’ decisions

Provincial governors (gobernadores civiles) were powerful regional authorities who sent many foreigners, including Jews, to Miranda from prison. They had considerable power over the refugees’ fate because the September 1940 policy made them responsible for foreigners who were not in organized and armed military detachments when they crossed the border, be they from neutral, belligerent, or previously belligerent countries. The governors were also responsible for refugees in armed detachments of a country that was no longer a belligerent. The 1943 circulars lessened the governors’ power to decide the fate of incoming foreigners by providing clear instructions about what to do with each category of foreigner.

When the Guardia Civil or police brought foreigners who had entered Spain clandestinely to the local prison, they asked the provincial governor what to do with them. ¹⁰⁸ Governors ordered that the foreigners be sent to the Miranda camp, to a different prison, to their freedom, or back across the border. The case of the Hungarian Jews Edmond Vermes and his wife Madeleine Propper shows this process at work. The couple crossed the Pyrenees on foot via Andorra, walked down the mountains, arrived in the Spanish town of La Seu d’Urgell and went to the police station in a state of exhaustion. They described themselves as political refugees. So that they might recover, the police allowed them to stay in a hotel in La Seu d’Urgell under police surveillance, and meanwhile, the police chief wrote to the provincial governor of Lérida about them, on 5 November 1942. ¹⁰⁹ The governor ordered that Edmond be sent to Miranda and Madeleine to the women's prison in Madrid. ¹¹⁰ Sometimes governors ordered that refugees be released from prison, and this made it less likely that they would end up in the camp. This occurred, for example, when the Belgian, British, Dutch, French or American consulates or embassies wrote to the governor of Girona, asking that a specific individual be released. Requests were also made successfully by the International Red Cross delegate, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and refugee Victor Berenholz's mother, newly freed from prison herself. ¹¹¹ These forms of contestation limited the power of the state over the refugees.

What accounts for provincial governors’ decisions? All provincial governors had to follow policies created by the Ministry of the Interior. ¹¹² They also received ministerial instructions regarding foreigners who had entered Spain clandestinamente. ¹¹³ They had been chosen in order to carry out the ministry's orders and were not expected to act on their own initiative. ¹¹⁴ However, they appear to have occasionally taken decisions without following directives. The provincial governor of Girona, for example, ordered that some Jewish men in a prison in Figueres be sent to Miranda, others to the men's prison in Girona, and still others be released, all in the autumn and winter of 1942–1943, before Circular 70 appeared. ¹¹⁵

Provincial governors’ decisions are likely to have been influenced by the Falange's pro-Axis stance. Beginning in 1942, nearly all the provincial governors were members of the Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista (FET-JONS), as the Falange was called after Franco merged it with other groups in 1937. ¹¹⁶ Between 1940 and 1944, the governors were also, increasingly, regional Falange party chiefs (jefes provincials de FET-JONS); by 1944, this was true of all of them. ¹¹⁷ As such, they received instructions from the General Secretariat of the Falange. ¹¹⁸ Moreover, for much of the 1940–1944 period, their bosses, the Ministers of the Interior, were Falange leaders. It is highly likely, therefore, that the governors would have been influenced by Falange ideas. The core Falangist values were ‘anticommunism, antiliberalism, economic interventionism, militarism, Catholicism, and imperialism’. Falangist propaganda between 1940 and 1942 praised National Socialism and Hitler, sometimes employing anti-Semitic tones. ¹¹⁹ Falangists believed that the forces to be combatted within and outside Spain were communism, free masonry, Judeo-capitalism and socialism. ¹²⁰ If a provincial governor had absorbed Falangist ideas, it follows logically that he would have been hostile towards potential or actual Allied soldiers entering Spain, and possibly Jews. Hostility to the Allies would have been particularly acute in 1941 and 1942 when the Falange's ‘Blue Division’ of mostly Falangist volunteers went to Russia to fight alongside the Germans, and many volunteers were killed by Russians. ¹²¹ Many governors were also military men, whose decisions about incoming foreigners would have been influenced by the Ministry of the Army. Military governors were concentrated in the border regions. ¹²² In sum, until 1943, provincial governors had considerable freedom to decide what to do with incoming foreigners who were not in military units. Because they were Falange members, Falangist anti-Semitism may have factored into their decisions, but they were also subject to other influences.

5. Conclusions

Jews transiting through Spain were arrested on the grounds that they did not have all the travel documents required for entry and transit. When Jewish men were sent from prison to the detention camp of Miranda de Ebro, it was because they belonged to a broader category of foreigner about which Spain had policies dictating internment in the camp. The policies did not target Jews. They were expressed as lists of directives, and the directives in which the stateless (many of whom were Jews) were mentioned were the same as directives for several nationalities with no mention of faith. The policies were influenced by large population movements in France; by the pro-Axis or pro-Allied leanings of senior officials in the Foreign Office and Ministries of the Interior and Army; and by pressure on senior officials by the British, American and German ambassadors in Madrid. The policies were not always applied. The September 1940 policy determined that provincial governors would decide what to do with foreigners who had entered Spain without their documents in order. Governors appear to have been able to decide as they liked, until Circular 70 of 29 January 1943. As Falange members or leaders, they were influenced by Falangist ideas. Because there was Germanophilia and anti-Semitism in the Falange, anti-Semitism might have factored into their decisions.

The war had a significant influence on whether or not Jewish refugees ended up and stayed in the Miranda camp. The British Ambassador was energetic in his efforts to keep men out of the camp so that they might join the Allied armies in World War II. The war also enabled him to apply pressure on the Foreign Office by saying that Spain was ‘non-belligerent’ and so should conform to the Hague Convention (V) on the behaviour of neutrals in wartime. The war impacted the requests of German ambassadors as well. Hitler’s three ambassadors in these years put pressure on Spain to send young, foreign men to the camp and keep them there because they did not want these men joining Allied armies. They could apply pressure partly because Franco believed that Germany would win the war. The war also impacted the refugees in that Spanish senior officials’ attitudes towards the belligerents influenced the policies. Hence, the war influenced the fate of Jewish refugees, even in non-belligerent and then neutral Spain.

Jewish refugees were incarcerated in Spain in part because of the anti-Semitic policies of other countries. The Spanish requirement that foreigners have financial means or someone to support them, in order to avoid prison, might not have been intended to cause hardship for Jews, but it did make it more likely that they would be interned. This was because most Jewish refugees were impoverished due to the anti-Semitic policies of their host countries and of France, including the boycotting of businesses, the Aryanization of property, and the banning from many professions. Anti-Semitic persecution that resulted in Jews being in flight for several months and living in hiding also led to impoverishment. Similarly, anti-Semitic laws abroad made many Jewish refugees stateless, and therefore unable to meet the policy requirement that foreigners have a diplomatic representative in Spain in order to be released from prison. Being in prison increased the refugees’ chances of being sent to the camp.

The fact that camps already existed in Spain and France made it more likely that Jews would be sent to Miranda. Spain started building and using campos de concentración during the Spanish Civil War, for prisoners of war. With the infrastructure and practice of internment of ‘others’ already in place, it was less strange than it might otherwise have been to intern foreigners in the Miranda camp. Factors that led to the use of camps include the Nationalist uprising in 1936, the Spanish Civil War, the polarization of society, the othering of those with different ideas, and the policy of exercising repression against Republicans. There were other precedents. France used camps for the internment of Spanish Republicans during the Spanish Civil War. Two decades earlier, during World War I, military personnel and civilians had been sent to concentration camps and separated from their territory so as to prevent reincorporation into their armies. As Javier Rodrigo suggests, ‘this engendered an acceptance of the concentration camp as a vehicle for confinement and an appreciation of its economic value within the framework of total war.’ ¹²³ These precedents arguably made it more likely that Jews and other foreigners would be interned in Miranda, rather than left free to leave.

Being imprisoned in the Miranda camp had serious consequences for the refugees. Some saw their visas and boat tickets out of continental Europe expire. This reduced their chances of leaving Europe, as it became increasingly difficult to acquire such documents. The threat of a German invasion of the Iberian Peninsula hung over them. While in the camp, for weeks or months they endured malnutrition, hunger, illness, vermin, poor sanitation and separation from their family. Hence, although not the result of a policy targeting Jews, camp internment resulted in particularly negative outcomes for them. Spain was not a safe haven for Jews fleeing Nazi and Vichy persecution.