Beyond Diplomacy: The Demarcation of Montenegrin-Ottoman Borders (1879–1881)

[…] neither in the history of the past, nor in tradition, nor in custom were we able to find elements that shed light on the question or clarified the possibility of the intended separation […] ¹

In recent years, studies of the development of state borders have highlighted their central relevance for understanding the multiplicity of factors and dynamics that shaped the formation of modern nation-states. Many of these publications have focused on the importance of border-making processes for the evolution of relations between the Ottoman Empire and its neighbours. ² In particular, Sabri Ateş has described in detail the transformation of the Ottoman-Persian borderlands, characterised by semi-autonomous political entities, into modern Ottoman-Persian borderlines. ³ His work has brought to our attention documents produced by 19th-century border-commissions that reveal the international diplomatic negotiations which formed state boundaries that still exist today.

In addition to diplomacy, scientific disciplines such as cartography, topography and medicine also played a key role in defining the borders of the Balkan nation-states. This article emphasises the importance that both delegates to the Delimitation Commission and regional consuls had as ‘agents of knowledge’. ⁴ A comparison of Ottoman and Italian diplomatic documents offers us new insights into how these disciplines contributed to the development of European imperialism and modern state borders. At the same time, our analysis underscores the role played by a limited – if not downright superficial and fallacious – knowledge of the region held by the European negotiators who defined the borderlines from above, and the role of local actors who managed to influence border-drawing from below.

The first section of this article briefly describes the historical context of the western Balkans, a contested region between the Ottoman Empire and European states like Venice and Austria. It also provides an overview of the evolution of the ‘Eastern Question’ in the 19th century. The second section describes the role of sanitary measures in the Montenegrin border-building process. The third discusses the Congress of Berlin, in which diplomats hastily – and in ignorance of local landscapes, ethnic patterns and social conditions – sketched out maps of the new Montenegrin-Ottoman borders. The fourth and fifth sections highlight the composition of the Delimitation Commission, which was tasked with translating these cartographic visions into practice, and the fraught process of negotiations between the Great Powers, the Montenegrins and the Ottomans. Finally, the sixth section considers how local populations strove to resist and reshape the decisions taken by the delegates.

1. Between east and west

Starting in the 15th century, the western Balkan region had been disputed between states on the Italian Peninsula and Balkan despotates, kingdoms and empires. Their boundaries essentially corresponded to the definition of ‘fluctuating transient inter-state border’. ⁵ During this period, the structure of the Ottoman-Venetian border did not include two features that are typical of modern borders: (1) the respect for territorial separation and (2) ‘mobility control’ regimes. Although based on the effective military control of the territory, the principle of the inviolability of borders ‘was not constantly respected’ and local populations were free to move across the border lands in both directions. ⁶ The ‘movement to demarcate borders’ began only in the 18th century and continued throughout the 19th, ‘in order to form a compact territory’ and an inviolable borderline. ⁷

During the Ottoman expansion in the Balkans, Montenegro was incorporated by the Empire in 1496, after a period of ‘vassalage’. ⁸ Its administration was included in the İşkodra Sancağı, or Sanjak of İşkodra [nowadays Shkodër]. Transhumance and steady migration characterised the region until the second half of the 19th century. ⁹ During the 17th century, similar to what happened in many Ottoman provinces, the Ecclesiastical Province of Cetinje became the only autonomous political entity of Montenegro, recognised by both Venice and the Ottoman state. ¹⁰ Its boundaries were those between the spiritual and the temporal of an Orthodox ecclesiastical province, officially administered by the Patriarchate of Constantinople and linked primarily to the ‘spiritual jurisdiction’ of the primate of Cetinje. This ecclesiastic province became the nucleus of the future state, which, under the Petrović-Njegoš dynasty (1697–1918), gradually led to the independence of the Principality. ¹¹

After gaining protection and establishing stable relations with Russia, Montenegro continued to rise up periodically against the Ottomans in the 18th century, demanding domestic autonomy and clearly defined borderlines with the Empire. ¹² By the end of the 18th century, the efforts of several European powers to bring the Ottoman state under control, inaugurated the so-called Eastern Question (1774–1914). ¹³ As efficaciously synthetised by Caroline Finkel and Halil İnalcık, the ‘nub’ of this complex historical phenomenon was the competition between the main European powers to impose political and economic influence on the Ottoman government and its territories. ¹⁴ Despite the continuous efforts to reform the Empire, the interventions by the European powers in the imperial, domestic and foreign affairs to protect non-Muslims ended up causing the internal delegitimisation of the imperial government, and the consequent growth of national movements. ¹⁵

With the appearance of the Eastern Question, Montenegro, supported by Russia and Austria, played a role in the gradual erosion of Ottoman rule. ¹⁶ Having emerged from the status of an ecclesiastical province and begun moving toward the creation of an autonomous modern state, the Montenegro's new boundary lines had to be defined and stabilised by agreements between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans. Between 1837 and 1841, the Austrian government recognised Montenegro as an independent political entity and, within a few years, the Austro-Montenegrin border was negotiated and established. ¹⁷ The Montenegrin-Ottoman borders remained disputed until 1858 when the Principality obtained recognition of its political autonomy by the Sublime Porte and well-defined borders were established in an international conference held in Constantinople. ¹⁸

Nevertheless, during the 19th century, the Principality of Montenegro fought three different wars against the Ottomans to expand its borders on Ottoman territory. ¹⁹ After the first and second conflict in 1853 and 1862 respectively, the Convention of Shkodër (or İşkodra Barışı) in 1862 made Montenegro a ‘vassal state’ of the Porte for the second time. The Herzegovinian-Montenegrin border was put under Ottoman military control. ²⁰

2. Sanitary measures and borders

Another fundamental factor in the strengthening of the Montenegrin-Ottoman borders was the imposition of stable sanitary measures against pandemics. ²¹ In 1866, physicians and diplomats convened in the Third International Sanitary Conference of Constantinople and sanctioned the principle of international collaboration to prevent the spread of epidemics across the European continent. ²² Despite differences of opinion, states such as the Ottoman Empire considered quarantines and sanitary cordons as more effective remedies than simple ‘hygienism’. ²³

Officially, the Ottoman government supported the ‘neo-contagionist’ theory ²⁴ not only because of its efficacy, but also in order to reinforce the presence of the imperial administration at the borders. For the Porte, ‘[q]uarantine […] was an expedient tool for controlling trade movement, population migration, and borders’. ²⁵ However, simultaneously, the Ottomans were aware that quarantines and sanitary cordons could also strengthen borders between independent states. For this reason, the imperial authorities viewed the application of sanitary cordons internally, between Ottoman semi-autonomous entities and provinces, with suspicion such as in the case of the Hejaz or the Principality of Montenegro.

For example, the choleric wave between 1865 and 1867 forced Montenegrin, Ottoman and Austrian administrations to impose several sanitary cordons along their respective borders in order to prevent the spread of cholera. The uncoordinated imposition of such sanitary measures, in an area still characterised by borders permeable to the movement of local populations, often created tense situations between local administrations and populations. ²⁶ When the Austrian governorship in Dalmatia imposed a sanitary cordon, the Ottoman consul general in Dubrovnik, M. Persich Efendi, decried it as a measure that, in his opinion, was ‘completely out of place’ and one that represented a potential economic threat to imperial provinces, such as Bosnia. ²⁷ For this reason, following the guidelines of the Porte and his personal knowledge, Persich Efendi suggested to the authorities of Dubrovnik the creation of quarantine structures along the Austro-Ottoman border. This would have allowed the creation of an inter-imperial border that was pervious to commercial trade and able to detect illegal movements of population, smuggling and contagion.

At the same time, the Ottoman consul was conscious that the use of measures such as the sanitary cordon could strengthen uprisings and insurgent movements. When, in November 1866, cholera ‘had broken out in several districts of Montenegro’, Persich Efendi suspected that the unilateral imposition of a sanitary cordon by Montenegrin authorities represented an opportunity to ‘organise the country militarily’ and develop ‘a military border system towards Herzegovina’. ²⁸ In his opinion, the choleric wave of 1866 effectively offered the Prince of Montenegro, Nikola I Petrović-Njegoš, the opportunity to impose military conscription and justify military manoeuvres with the necessity of imposing sanitary measures.

A few years later, in 1874, pro-quarantine and anti-quarantine powers found a compromise that permitted them to choose between the adoption of quarantine and sanitary inspections, thus sanctioning the end of the principle of inter-imperial and international sanitary collaboration. ²⁹ This modification led to a system characterised by the existence of multiple national sanitary systems put under the surveillance of the Great Powers. ³⁰

The preservation of Europe against pandemics coming from the ‘Orient’, became a pretext for the spread of political influence on other states, not only towards states like the Ottoman Empire, the Qajar Persia and the Khedivate of Egypt, ³¹ but also ‘minor’ European Christian states, such as the Principality of Montenegro. In this way, the logic of imperialism found a sanitary justification, which was confirmed at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 when the Montenegrin maritime-sanitary border was put under the surveillance of Austria-Hungary.

In fact, Article 29 of the Congress granted the district and the port of Bar to Montenegro, ³² although, in doing so, it attributed the right and responsibility to Austria-Hungary to maintain the neutrality of its waters and to exercise maritime activities, especially, sanitary police actions, such as the application of disinfection and quarantine procedures along its coast. ³³ Through its control over health and security institutions, Austria-Hungary exercised a de facto ‘sanitary and police protectorate’ on the new maritime border of Montenegro. ³⁴ With the Congress of Berlin, even medical knowledge that was produced by physicians and diplomats, who reunited at the international sanitary conferences, and the need to ensure the respect for the sanitary measures sanctioned, had become a tool of imperialism.

3. Hastily making a border

The third and last Montenegrin-Ottoman war lasted for nearly three years, from June 1876 until January 1878. ³⁵ The revolt of some Herzegovinian villages against the Ottoman tax collectors in 1875 ended up causing a rebellion in Bosnia openly supported by the Serbian, Montenegrin and Danuban principalities, and covertly by Austria-Hungary and Russia. ³⁶

The Porte declined Serbia and Montenegro's proposal of peace in exchange for the surrender of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and they declared war on the two allied principalities. Ottoman victories provoked a Russian ultimatum to cease the hostilities and sign an armistice. ³⁷ After that, negotiations failed, and in April 1877, Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire while supporting Serbia and Montenegro. ³⁸ Thanks to the support of the Russian army, ³⁹ the Danuban Principalities, Montenegro and Serbia won and obtained their official autonomy from the Porte. With the 1878 Congress of Berlin, it was time for Montenegro to settle its national borders.

The Congress of Berlin was an agreement between the Great Powers that revised the map of the Balkans to create a new equilibrium in the area. This map ‘reflected the prevailing logic’ of realpolitik, ⁴⁰ creating an international order ‘characterised by autonomous national states each pursuing their individual power politics, not letting their sovereignty be curtailed by multilateral commitments’. ⁴¹ The Congress was ‘particularly influential in imposing an epistemology of ethnic and religious difference’ in the Balkans, ⁴² thus transforming a multi-ethnic and multi-religious imperial space of free movement to an area of confrontation between new national entities. The Ottoman ‘administrative heritage’ was deliberately ignored and new circumscriptions and states were created according to European ethnographic ‘scientific’ criteria. ⁴³

The Treaty of Berlin gave specific descriptions concerning the new status quo of the western Balkans; these were based on ‘knowledge’ about the Balkan scenario acquired by European ‘experts’. ⁴⁴ In reality, their knowledge was not only the result of studies in history, medicine and geography by way of manuals such as those written by other Europeans, ⁴⁵ but above all, it was the result of experience ‘on the ground’, as written in the documents of the vice-consul in Sarajevo, Cesare Durando. In 1864, while he was preparing a report on trades in Bosnia, Durando admitted that he did not find ‘those works of general notions’ that existed for other Ottoman provinces. Bosnia was still a little-known territory in Europe. ⁴⁶ Therefore, he had to resort to unspecified ‘investigations’ and the ‘information of private individuals’. In the end, and in most cases, Durando had to resort to ‘information from one shopkeeper about another's trade’. ⁴⁷ Nevertheless, the vice-consul assured that he was able to ‘discern the truth’ concerning trades in Ottoman Bosnia.

Largely based on such expertise, the situation in the western Balkans was deeply reshaped by the Congress. In particular, both Bulgaria and Montenegro were favoured by including ‘ethnically heterogeneous and non-Slavic’ territories. ⁴⁸ For example, despite the fact that the Austro-Hungarian military occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was legitimised through Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin, turning Austria-Hungary into a dangerous neighbour for Montenegro, Article 26 of the Congress still guaranteed its independence internationally, preserving its independence from both the Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary. Moreover, despite the Ottoman representatives’ disappointment, ⁴⁹ Article 28 established the new borders of the Balkan principality, doubling its territory. ⁵⁰ Even though in a superficial reading of Article 28 it may appear that Montenegro's new borders had been well-defined by the Congress, ⁵¹ the words of one of the protagonists involved in the process shed light on the real methods and rough criteria with which the Montenegrin-Ottoman border was prepared during the Congress.

The Austro-Hungarian consul general in Cetinje, Gustav Freiherr von Thömmel, was considered ‘the one who already had perfect knowledge’ of Montenegrin lands at the Congress of Berlin. In fact, he played an important role in the work of delimitation on the map’. ⁵² In particular, the map of the Austro-Hungarian high command, on which Thömmel had worked during the Congress of Berlin was the one on which the representatives of the assembled Great Powers worked out the new borders of Montenegro. ⁵³ Nevertheless, this map was the subject of numerous disputes, especially by Ottoman representatives, due to its alleged inadequacy and ambiguity. During a conversation with Durando, chargé d’affaires in Cetinje at the time, Thömmel did not deny, but rather explained the reasons for the inaccuracy of the Austro-Hungarian map. ⁵⁴ Due to the lack of knowledge concerning the geography and ethnography of the area and the consequent inability of the military commission of the Congress to precisely mark on the map the Montenegrin-Ottoman border, the French Colonel Sept-Maisons and Thömmel were appointed to create the map ‘in less than an hour’ on a table in the buffet room.

Although the Austro-Hungarian diplomat knew a great part of the territory, the French colonel did not. Moreover, Thömmel, despite his relative practical knowledge of the territory, had some difficulties with the spelling of the Slavic names. Therefore, he said that the map was ‘very inaccurate, especially for the territories surrounding Montenegro’. Thömmel admitted that many places marked ‘do not correspond to the true topographical point’: ‘a tribe is indicated as a village; the course of the waters and the backs of the mountains have different directions; and quite a few places that have the same names in the country’ were confused on the map. It clearly emerges from Durando and Thömmel's discussion how such knowledge and the consequent delimitation were actually the result of their limited knowledge.

As the story of the Delimitation Commission's work shows, pace and efficiency represent one of the main challenges that all border commissions face in their graphic representations of borderlines. In Thömmel's opinion, the drafting of Article 28 of the Treaty, which established the new borders of the Balkan principality, ‘would require not two hours but several days of long and quiet study’. He reported how ‘at every moment, many of the plenipotentiaries approached the two editors to receive the Article; they were impatient with the delay, said that the Congress had requested it, that the printer was on standby solely to print off [the Article]’. Simultaneously, ‘in the buffet room, the coming and going of the servants, […], everyone's voices, the deafening noise of the cups and glasses’ provided even further distraction. Thömmel said that it was ‘a miracle’ that the drafting of the Article did not become even worse than it already was.

In June 1879, the Italian government admitted that all the demarcation lines developed at the Congress of Berlin ‘[left] much to be desired’, and that, if they were to carry out a new rectification, they would never finish. ⁵⁵ They were not only aware of the incomplete geographic and ethnic knowledge of the European ‘experts’, but also of the pragmatism of the cartographers, military officials and diplomats. Even for the contemporaries, this delimitation process, which was not rooted ‘in the history of the past, nor in the tradition, nor custom’ of the western Balkans, was not without error and misunderstanding. ⁵⁶

4. The delimitation commission between intervention and resilience

After the Congress ended in August 1878, the direct implementation of its provisions was entrusted to a joint commission of expert diplomatic and military representatives of the various powers to guarantee peaceful, territorial transfers between the Ottoman Empire and Montenegro. ⁵⁷ These delegates represented the governments of the Great Powers, holders of the international principle of legitimacy: Great Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia and Italy; and the states involved in the delimitation process, namely the Principality of Montenegro and the Ottoman Empire, were also represented. Members of the Commission included: Captain Testa of Germany; Captain Sauerwald and Consul General Lippich of Austria-Hungary; Consul General Count Colonna-Ceccaldi of France; Captain Sale of Great Britain; the Voivode Simo Popović of Montenegro; the Colonel Baron Nikolai von Kaulbars of Russia; the General Veli Riza Pasha, the Lieutenant-Colonel Bedri Bey, the Senior-Adjutant Sabri Bey and Pzenni Efendi of the Ottoman Empire; and, finally, Lieutenant-Colonel Giuseppe Ottolenghi of Italy. All these men were appointed based on their skills, their knowledge, and above all, to promote the political agenda of their respective state.

For example, the Italian government had had a special interest in the eastern coast of the Adriatic since 1862, and, in particular, in the Montenegrin question, for strategic reasons. ⁵⁸ Their interest increased during the Montenegrin-Ottoman War of 1876–1878. Therefore, at the beginning of April 1879, the Italian foreign minister ad interim, Agostino Depretis, appointed Cesare Durando as chargé d’affaires of Montenegro, ⁵⁹ due to his knowledge of the Balkan situation and his closeness to Nikola I. ⁶⁰ Simultaneously, the secretary of the foreign ministry, Giuseppe Tornielli, appointed Lieutenant-Colonel Giuseppe Ottolenghi as plenipotentiary minister for the Delimitation Commission. ⁶¹ An Italian patriot and military official, Ottolenghi was chosen for his military expertise, his service to the state and his renowned attention to detail. ⁶² The objectives of the Italian representatives were to strengthen Italy's international position as a Great Power, to support Montenegro in the negotiations as far as possible, and finally, to promote Italo-Montenegrin relations. ⁶³

The other commissioners mirrored the same subdivision between experts of international law and military strategy, highly motivated to put their knowledge at the service of their state, rather than the objectives of the Commission. If the Voivode Simo Popović had been sent to the Commission as representative of Prince Nikola I, who, with the support of the Russian delegate, favoured the enlargement of Montenegrin borders, ⁶⁴ for their part, the Ottomans chose five military officers as representatives based on their knowledge and expertise in the fields of strategy and cartography. They were led by Riza Pasha, and one delegate from the foreign ministry, Pzenni Efendi, who did not hold the rank of commissioner. Their objectives were essentially ‘to safeguard as far as possible the interests of the Empire’, ⁶⁵ and to adopt ‘delaying tactics’, ⁶⁶ aimed at gaining ‘some time’ to negotiate better conditions. ⁶⁷

Looking at the titles and ranks of the other delegates, they were experts in military issues and in diplomacy, rather than in the Balkan area as such. The appointment of these delegates was based on the similarity of their educational backgrounds, social positions, studies, knowledge of European international law and languages; the aim was to create a shared sense of belonging among them in order to facilitate the negotiations. ⁶⁸ Similar social status, education and mastery of certain languages, could have enabled the self-identification of the delegates as an epistemic community. In fact, as it emerges from Cesare Durando's documents, the delegates were supposed to create a committee of decision-makers involved in the creation of a new national entity, due to their proximity in rank and common education in disciplines such as military strategy, topography, medicine, international law and European languages. ⁶⁹

In reality, the result was a ‘year of violence and dilatory tactics’, which on the one hand saw the Ottoman delegates resist by using their expertise in international law and, on the other hand, the local populations; they were united in the Albanian League against the united front of the Great Powers and Montenegro, and were interested in imposing ‘new territorial realities’ and dynamics. ⁷⁰

To make up for delegates’ limited knowledge of the topography and ethnography, the Commission installed a sub-commission that was tasked with surveying the areas in question. This sub-commission, staffed with experts, provided the appearance of objectivity, but its members remained subservient to their respective state. Whereas Italy, perennially plagued by a lack of economic and human resources capable of promoting a great power policy in the Balkans, ⁷¹ Austria-Hungary and Russia could rely on large pools of interpreters, topographers and cartographers who were very familiar with the area. ⁷² Simultaneously, for the Ottomans, expert knowledge was instrumental in gaining time and mitigating the damages caused by European intervention to the legitimacy of the imperial state. This amalgamation of foreign policy interests and expert knowledge led to clashes during the first meetings. The issue of how to use the Austro-Hungarian high-command map provided the occasion. ⁷³

5. The failure of the negotiations

The map of the Austro-Hungarian high command that was used during the Congress was adopted as the ‘official’ reference point by the Commission in determining the new borders. It represented an expression of the European powers’ expert knowledge and willingness to separate populations in areas hitherto united culturally and administratively. Only the Ottoman delegates opposed this decision, claiming that the Treaty should be applied ‘to the letter by seeking on the ground’ the designations indicated in the text of the Treaty. ⁷⁴

However, despite Ottoman opposition, the majority of the representatives opportunistically dictated the use of the Austro-Hungarian map as the product of the knowledge of European experts. From the first meeting, the limitations of the map and the Ottoman delegates’ opposition to it had already clearly emerged. The Ottoman delegates opposed the concession of the districts with a Muslim population, as in the case of the districts of Gusinje and Plav, invoking identitarian and religious arguments. ⁷⁵ The plenipotentiary minister Riza Pasha refused to accept the principle that the erroneous names reported on the Austro-Hungarian map should be accepted by the Commission ‘without noting the identity of the names of the designated localities’ and requested more time to receive new instructions from Constantinople. ⁷⁶

While Riza Pasha tried to get more time, the Ottoman minister of foreign affairs, Alexander Karatheodori Pasha, was negotiating with the other powers ‘to vote for the pure and simple application on the ground of the mark indicated by the Treaty’, used ‘for all other delimitations in Asia and Europe’. ⁷⁷ However, despite Ottoman resistance, the majority of the Commission voted to continue using the Austro-Hungarian map. When Riza Pasha refused to follow up on this decision in an extreme attempt to block the activities of the Commission, ⁷⁸ other delegates temporarily suspended activities in protest of the Ottomans’ approach. ⁷⁹ In fact, the European delegates thought that the Ottomans’ delay-tactics were taking place in agreement with the imperial army and the governor of Albania, who was trying to impede the work of the topographic sub-commission. ⁸⁰

In an effort to ‘break the deadlock’ and re-size the Austro-Hungarian influence, the Italian delegate Ottolenghi proposed ‘making the delimitation both on the ground and on the map’ following the decisions of the majority of the Commission. ⁸¹ Moreover, he proposed postponing the definitive decision of the Great Powers, which also included the final document produced by the topographic sub-commission and the alternatives proposed by the Ottomans. In this way, it would be possible to implement the work of the Commission, marking ‘the points of the border’ on the ground with clearly visible signs ‘such that they can last until the final demarcation’. ⁸² By shifting the emphasis to the technical part of the delimitation and emphasising its transience, Ottolenghi avoided the clash of interest and knowledge concerning the identity of the areas involved and downgraded its actual purpose.

Despite Ottolenghi's efforts, surveying continued to be hampered by the tendency to divide areas and populations without religious, ethnic or historical justifications. ⁸³ The Italian delegate underlined the possible problems that might occur from the use of the Austro-Hungarian map, which, also in his opinion, ‘does not correspond at all either to the literal text or the spirit of the Treaty’, and risked causing future disputes. ⁸⁴ For Ottolenghi, the ethnic and political delimitation based on an incorrect map would be ‘contrary […] to military topographical and political-administrative requirements’. The case of the tribal area of Velje Selo (named ‘Mrkovič’ in the documents), which risked being divided by the new border because of the inaccuracy of the Austro-Hungarian map is illustrative of the paradoxical situations that were created. ⁸⁵ In fact, despite the delegates’ efforts to create new and functional administrative borders, the separation of areas occupied by tribal groups, based on realpolitik and an approximate knowledge of the geographic and ethnic components in the area, was interpreted by Ottolenghi as a harbinger of possible future clashes.

At the end of August 1879, Ottolenghi highlighted that it was impossible to continue the activities of the Commission because of the increasing hostility of the members of the Albanian League to the assignment of Gusinje and Plav to Montenegro, ⁸⁶ the lack of a detailed map, and, finally, the worsening of weather conditions. ⁸⁷ Therefore, the Commission's activities were postponed until May 1880. ⁸⁸

The Commission reopened in 1880; its activities were immediately complicated by the increasing tension between the Ottomans and Montenegrins around the question of the districts of Gusinje and Plav. ⁸⁹ During the negotiations, ‘the inhabitants of areas like Gusinje/Gusi and [Plav], initially slotted for transfer to Montenegro, would mobili[s]e their resources to the point where they, among others in the subsequent months, would violently resist their fate’. ⁹⁰ Even if the Austro-Hungarian delegates had undertaken the early surveys of the provisional border between Montenegro and Herzegovina, the absence of Montenegrin and Ottoman delegates, and the increasing instability of the Albanian northern districts, made it almost impossible for the Commission to function. ⁹¹

Therefore, the French commissioner proposed the creation of another topographic sub-commission ‘in which the technical element [was] predominant’ working with the support of local authorities to mark a ‘provisional border’, while the Commission would simply meet to sanction this activity. Ottolenghi and the other delegates agreed. But, in June 1880, having provisionally replaced Ottolenghi as Italian delegate, Durando wrote that, after the new suspension of the work of the Commission, the creation of the sub-commission became pointless. ⁹²

In his opinion, the Commission failed due to ‘the differences of rank’ and objectives between diplomatic and military delegates, which prevented the creation of a spirit of camaraderie, or fellowship, that ‘helps so much to soften the impact of opposing opinions’. ⁹³ In summary, instead of allowing the commonality of European education and knowledge to prevail over differences, the particular interest of the powers and the limited expert knowledge of the local situation prevailed over the esprit de corps they were supposed to create.

6. Popular voices against European knowledge

However, limited expert knowledge and colliding political interests were not the only factors behind the Delimitation Commission's failure. The resistance of the local populations played a key role as well. For example, when the Montenegrin commissioner guaranteed the security of the Commission members during the investigations, their Ottoman colleagues observed that, if the populations between Lake Shkodër and the Adriatic Sea perceived the activities of the delegates as a risk to their rights of residence, the imperial government would be forced to stop the Commission's work, as they would not be able to guarantee the members’ safety. ⁹⁴

As described in the documents, some groups intended to oppose the Commission's activities: the Ottoman delegates and the army, who were concerned about being deprived of strategic territories in favour of Montenegro and the Great Powers; the so-called ‘Albanian League’, an organisation composed of Ottoman subjects, who refused to be deprived of their property in favour of non-Ottomans; and, finally, the tribes in areas between Montenegro and the Sanjak of İşkodra, who had been accustomed to freedom of movement for centuries. These groups often reacted to the surveys of the members of the Commission, highlighting their opposition to the delimitation process. For their part, the delegates attributed such resistance to a generic ‘Islamic fanaticism’ against Christians, simply ignoring it or demanding the intervention of the Ottoman and Montenegrin governments to suppress local resistance. ⁹⁵

Regarding the Albanian League, it was an organisation initially composed of both Ottoman Christians and Muslims who opposed the concessions and the growing influence of Austria-Hungary and Russia in the area. Before the formation of this league, ‘Catholics and [Muslims] had already cooperated and signed a protest’ to the delegates of the Great Powers in Berlin against the cession of Ottoman territories such as the city-ports of Bar and Ulcinj, ⁹⁶ and actively opposed every attempt to ‘change the […] state of their territory’. As the territories ‘menaced’ by the delimitation were ‘inhabited preponderantly’ by Muslims, the League gradually ‘took the aspect of an Islamic league’, giving the impression to the Great Powers’ representatives that it was controlled by the Porte, and not a spontaneous protest of the populations involved in the demarcation process, as it actually was. ⁹⁷ The pacific or armed initiatives of the League against the delimitation ‘rendered the job’ of the Delimitation Commission particularly difficult. ⁹⁸

In April 1880, the Italian Ambassador in Constantinople, Count Luigi Corti, proposed a compromise. He proposed ceding to Montenegro a part of the district of Gusinje that was inhabited by Christians, along with Kučka Krajina, an area delimited by the River Zeta and Lake Shkodër. ⁹⁹ Unfortunately for the Italian government, which was aiming to reduce Austro-Hungarian influence in this area, this solution was abandoned due to the open opposition by the Albanian League.

During the summer of 1880, a new project was developed by the British consul general in Shkodër, William Kirby Mackenzie Green, and his Austro-Hungarian counterpart, Friedrich Lippich von Lindburg. It ceded the city-port of Ulcinj and its district, up to the mouth of the River Bojana, to Montenegro. Although the Ulcinj Arrangements were accepted by the Great Powers, the Ottomans rejected them, preferring Corti's Compromise. Therefore, the Great Powers orchestrated a naval demonstration to ‘persuade’ the Ottomans to surrender the territories. ¹⁰⁰

Despite the Albano-Ottoman resistance, after this display of military strength in September 1880 and the threat to occupy İzmir, the Ottomans evacuated the Ulcinj district and ceded it to Montenegro in exchange for Gusinje and Plav. ¹⁰¹ Due to European and Ottoman pressure, the supporters of the Albanian League had to bow out and leave the areas now demarcated by the new Montenegrin-Ottoman border. Simultaneously, the ‘organi[s]ation, resilience and diplomatic verve’ of the communities of Gusi, Plav and Gruda ‘secured’ their victory. In fact, these communities ‘were returned to Ottoman sovereignty’ and secured an important victory for the Porte.

Therefore, it is possible to say that the Montenegrin-Ottoman border was not only the result of the pressure of the Great Powers, but also of the resilience and ‘geographic imagination’ of the local populations, which ‘modified and recalibrated […] an imperial imagination full of pathologies of racial difference and crude orientalist ideas’. ¹⁰² Moreover, the legacy of this spontaneous popular movement would provide important nourishment for growing Albanian nationalism. ¹⁰³

7. Conclusion

At the end of November 1880, Ottolenghi described the successful handover of Ulcinj. ¹⁰⁴ With this act, the issue of the border demarcation between Montenegro and the Ottoman Empire was deemed settled by the Great Powers. ¹⁰⁵ After the events that led to Ulcinj's cession to Montenegro, the work of the Delimitation Commission lost its relevance for them. They were now interested in other international upheavals, such as the French occupation of Tunis. In February 1881, although the demarcation had not been definitively concluded, the Ottoman delegate Bedri Bey informed the foreign minister, Nurizade Asım Mehmed Pasha, about the suspension of the Commission's work, which then mainly concerned the border between the Adriatic Sea and Lake Shkodër. ¹⁰⁶ Accompanied by both minor border skirmishes and diplomatic negotiations, the delimitation of the other Montenegrin borders continued until 1914.

The 19th-century delimitation of the Montenegrin-Ottoman border was the result of complex and difficult negotiations in the general context of imperial rivalry, limited expert knowledge and opportunistic applications of scientific disciplines such as medicine, topography and ethnography. ¹⁰⁷ Last but not least, the border was also the result of the interaction between the Great Powers’ representatives, on the one hand, who were interested in imposing an ‘epistemology of ethnic and religious difference’ in order to justify the spread of their influence, and on the other hand, the locals, who were resisting external interventions and interference. The struggle between them concerned who ‘would be the primary agents dictating the contours of what would later be construed as an inescapable [m]odernity overwhelming the Ottoman world’. ¹⁰⁸

The creation of the Montenegrin-Ottoman border was a Pyrrhic victory for the European Great Powers. They succeeded in imposing a temporary status quo, imposing themselves on local governments, quelled the growing dissent of populations opposed to partition, and suppressed centuries-old concepts of multi-ethnic imperial identity. In this way, the Great Powers imposed their perceptions of public health, topography and ethnic difference and separation. But this fuelled local resistance, which contributed to the formation of nationalist movements. In this case study, the Albanian League served as the prominent example. Such widespread local dissatisfaction with the status quo would further contribute to the destabilisation of the region and trigger World War I.