Abstract
Authenticity, a growing area of interest in leadership studies, is an important concept within existentialist thinking. Currently it is largely untheorized. Here the concept is examined using Sartre’s work. Current literature implies authenticity as relating to an ‘inner’ or ‘true’ self which existentialist thinking rejects, opening the way for a different approach to theorizing authenticity. There is a need to consider context, and subjective and inter-subjective experience to understand and to practice authentic existential leadership.
The word ‘authenticity’ appears with increasing frequency in the literature on leadership. ‘Authentic leadership’(Avolio et al., 2004) and ‘authentic transformational leadership’ (Bass and Steidlmeier, 1999) are not unusual. The purpose of this paper is to examine authenticity and leadership from an existentialist perspective. We do this by discussing themes in the developing literature on authentic leadership, noting the paucity of empirical data to support such themes. We highlight various assumptions made in the literature and the lack of a convincing ontological basis for the concept of authenticity as it is applied to leadership. We present an examination of authenticity using the works of Jean-Paul Sartre and conclude that this theoretical approach to authentic leadership has considerable application in the development of a leadership ethic.
Whilst the number of articles discussing authenticity in relation to leadership may be increasing, few overtly relate the concept to philosophical foundations or identify ways in which the interpretations of the concept might have altered over time. There are exceptions to this, for example Sparrowe (2005), drawing on the work of Krentz and Malloy (2005). Still the concept merits deeper examination, to consider what insights are available. Authenticity forms an important theme in the writings of Jean-Paul Sartre and here we adopt his approach to examine authenticity in relation to leadership and to consider what implications there might be for leadership research and leadership development.
Context
At times of economic and political difficulty attention turns to the desire for more effective leaders as an answer to problems, and increasingly the call is for more authentic leaders: ‘Upheavals in society have energised a tremendous demand for authentic leadership. The destruction on 9/11, corporate scandals at companies like WorldCom and Enron and massive failures in the banking industry have all created fear and uncertainty. People feel apprehensive and insecure … they long for bona fide leadership they can trust and for leaders who are honest and good. People’s demand for leadership makes the study of authentic leadership timely and worthwhile’. (Northouse, 2010: 205)
The rise in interest in ‘authentic leadership’ coincides with the growing attention being paid to corporate social responsibility (CSR). Public concern over the (generally, quite legal) business activities of blue-chip companies including Nike, McDonalds, Shell, Gap and Microsoft has given rise to the view that organizations have to be responsible and accountable beyond the normal rigours of the market (and even the law) and that such demands perhaps require business leaders to be in possession of a different mindset from their predecessors and particularly to be ‘authentic’ (Luthans and Avolio, 2003).
For many, the vision for the 21st century seems to be one where corporate leaders need technical expertise allied with boundless charisma and unquestionable morality. Some, such as Stewart D Friedman (2008), Professor of Management at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School, suggest that it is Barak Obama’s authenticity that won him the US presidency and that it offers a new dawn for global politics. Such hopes attached to national leadership illustrate the continuation of a romanticism of leadership in practice (Meindl et al., 1985).
We argue here that such a perspective, which we precis to emphasize our point, is somewhat naïve, which is not to say that ethical leadership is not of fundamental importance. Rather, we take issue with the current predilection for promoting authentic leadership as an individualized morality which is proposed as a means of providing solutions to contemporary problems. We return to this point later in the paper. Our concern is that morality in relation to leadership assumes a clear and identifiable distinction between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ and that leaders with strong values can make this distinction relatively easily. Firstly, this can over-simplify the complexity of behaviour and decisions in-the-world. Secondly, it ignores the challenge of leadership not in deciding between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ but in deciding between ‘right’ and ‘right’ (Ashman, 2011).We adopt a Sartrean view of authenticity and responsibility that, we believe, offers a more fundamental perspective through which to address issues of moral leadership and a more fruitful means of developing leadership theory. This approach challenges the assumption of fixed and absolute morality and recognizes that it is dynamic and relative as a result of its location ‘in-the-world’. As such leadership involves embracing the uncertainty of the world and leaders’ own inevitable anguish in dealing with that.
Leadership we view as process – it is inseparably ‘in the world’; it happens through action and interaction, through deeds and dialogue. We see leadership not as some combination of elements preordained by certain categories such as ‘leader’ and ‘followers’. If leadership is really concerned with personal issues of commitment, inspiration and making sense in uncertainty, it can only ever occur ‘in the world’. This is important in considering the first of the themes identified by Ladkin and Taylor (2010) in the developing authentic leadership literature: that there is the assumption of a ‘true self’; that self-awareness is a ‘key component’ (65) of authentic leadership; along with that of morality, as we have already noted. The existentialist position rejects the first point, the notion of a ‘true self’ (and the implication that this is separate from the world) from the outset. We summarize this notion of ‘being-in-the-world’ in the next section, together with another important aspect of existentialist thinking, that of existential choice. Both form a backdrop to current developments in relation to authentic leadership. Subsequent to discussing these developments, we consider the Sartrean perspective of authenticity and what the implications of this are for the development of leadership theory.
Being-in-the-world and existential choice
Each individual is situated in her/his own world, without a separate and ‘private’ or ‘true’ self – what existentialists refer to as Being-in-the-World. Polt (1999), for instance, points out that we can never transcend the world that we occupy. We exist in a context, variable over time and can never be separate from this. We must always interact with people, events, etc. and cannot be disinterested spectators of our own particular context. We are compelled to engage with it even if we would rather not.
There is thus some relationship between the abstract universal and the concrete particular in our world, in that there is no separate ‘inner authenticity’ versus the external ‘real world.’ We are integral to our world as it is to us and do not exist beyond or apart from it. According to Marcel (cited in Cooper, 1999) we are not ‘watching a show’ but are the performance, with no distinction between audience and players. Taking this view we have no inner world in which our true selves hide, rather following the strand of thinking from Kierkegaard and Nietzsche onwards, our self is something we ‘become’ but never reach.
The ‘human condition’ then, in this line of thinking, is individual freedom and choice with no predestination, either by the world we are in, our past selves, or some divine influence. Authenticity involves recognizing this as the basis for living in the world. We are accountable for our own moral choices and not subservient to an (abstract, universal) code of ethics or, in this case, appeals for righteousness. This requires ‘an unwavering recognition of the necessity one is under to be free’ (Olsen, 1962: 145). Sartre views this as fundamental to the human condition: The first effect of existentialism is that it puts every man [sic] in possession of himself as he is and places the entire responsibility for his existence squarely upon his own shoulders. (Sartre, 1973: 28)
Unlike other animate and inanimate objects that are constituted as ‘being in the midst of the world’ humans are ‘beings in the world’. The distinction is that humans have discretion regarding the ways in which they interact with the world and how they ‘become’ through these interactions. Humans are individuals and different from one another but we cannot withdraw from the world to some inner sanctum of introspection in the hope of ‘finding our own authentic self’. We ‘become’ through acknowledgement of our persisting freedom and through the choices we make: in effect we constantly choose whom to become. These issues of persisting freedom and choice are the factors which create an existential sense of anxiety and dread. If we accept that all individuals are free, we are all faced with considerable anxiety at the prospect of choice. Agarwal and Malloy (2000) suggest that every decision is like standing on the edge of an abyss, referring to Kierkegaard in that choice involves a ‘leap of faith’ as we cannot know the future.
What we make of our lives and whom we become are the consequences of choices we must make and we are responsible for those consequences. We are not, as it were, fully formed but have infinite potentialities. Our lives are not predetermined: ‘You are free, therefore choose – that is to say, invent’ (Sartre, 1973: 38). Our choice is open and is daunting. We can understand here Sartre’s (1996) expression of being ‘condemned to be free’ such is the anxiety over constant choice and the implications of choices made. Authenticity concerns the manner in which the individual recognizes and deals with the freedom–responsibility dilemma. From the outset it should be clear that our approach to authentic leadership stands in contrast to the developing literature on that topic, which we believe to be largely, objectivist, managerial and functionalist and which promotes a naïve and inaccurate representation both of ‘being in the world’ and of morality. In the next section we discuss current ideas relating to authentic leadership in the developing literature which, in the main, can be equated with personal qualities, moral values and behaviours and which stand in contrast with the notion of existentialist authenticity as summarized above. We then discuss the contribution of existentialist authenticity to leadership theory.
Leadership and authenticity: The developing orthodoxy
As noted, the literature on authentic leadership is increasing and, whilst a variety of interpretations of the concept is evident, there does appear to be an orthodoxy of approach developing. Recent special editions on authenticity in the Journal of Management Studies (2005), The Leadership Quarterly (Avolio and Gardner, 2005) and the European Management Journal (Grover and Moorman, 2007), where many of the sources referred to here are found, have included relevant contributions with a variety of perspectives. There are commentators that we might consider as taking a straightforward, ‘common sense’, applied approach – seeking to prescribe and promote a moral agenda for leaders based on personal rectitude and self-awareness (for example, Bass and Steidlmeier, 1999; Goffee and Jones, 2000; George, 2003; Avolio et al., 2004; Gardner et al., 2005). Similarly, some link self-awareness to the relational orientation of leadership (for example, Eagly, 2005; Ilies et al., 2005; Mitchie and Gooty, 2005; Shamir and Eilam, 2005). There are those that emphasize social constructivism as the appropriate framework by which to evaluate the cultural and historical relativity that accompany any debates on values and morality (for example, Delmestri et al., 2005; Glynn and Lounsbury, 2005; Jones and Smith, 2005; Peterson, 2005). Others consider the analysis of performativity, self-identity and aesthetics to represent a developing framework from which to understand authenticity (for example, Guthey and Jackson, 2005; Moeran, 2005; Svejonova, 2005; Ladkin and Taylor, 2010) and last, there are writers who seek to develop a more theoretical approach by drawing upon the works of established moral philosophical traditions (for example, Krentz and Malloy, 2005; Sparrowe, 2005; Novicevic et al., 2006).
Despite the variety of approach from this range of authors, there appears to be an orthodoxy developing from a positivistic epistemological orientation which is largely unchallenged and which we feel limits the scope for debate and development of the concept of authentic leadership. This presents no surprise given the positivistic stance or influence of much research on leadership more generally (Alvesson, 1996) with the objective, often implied rather than explicit, of being able to identify and define the core characteristics of a universal model of leadership (Lawler, 2005). Despite the resources committed to this search, such a model still proves elusive and perhaps will continue to be so, leaving leadership itself as a ‘contested concept’ (Grint, 2005). Yukl, writing some two decades ago, notes that despite definite progress in developing our understanding of leadership the ‘yield of knowledge is much less than would be expected from the immense literature on leadership’ (Yukl, 1989: 279). That point can still be made into the 21st century and in relation to authentic leadership.
Alvesson (1996: 455) argues that the positivist approach to leadership research is limited and that leadership research is dominated by positivistic or neo-positivistic methods which privilege certain aspects such as objectivity, quantification and generalization. Ultimately, he argues against any notion of a ‘grand theory of leadership’ (457) and yet much of the work on authentic leadership, we believe, follows a similar methodology, with the aim of defining the construct and developing a means of measuring this in practice (e.g. Walumbwa et al., 2008). Our argument here is that the pursuit of a grand theory of authentic leadership is unlikely to be successful and, more importantly, that its aim restricts our potential understanding of authenticity in relation to leadership.
Before we elaborate our argument in relation to authentic leadership, it is important to acknowledge how important, rightly or wrongly, authenticity has become, as a moral foundation – not just within the leadership literature but across the whole business and management field (see, for instance, the special edition of the Journal of Management Studies (Jones et al., 2005) on authenticity in cultural industries). Although commentaries that link leadership to questions of authenticity can be traced back many years, it has only been in the last decade or so that the notion of authentic leadership has come to such prominence (e.g. George, 2003; Luthans and Avolio, 2003; Avolio et al., 2004; Goffee and Jones, 2005; Ladkin and Taylor, 2010). Bearing in mind how contested the separate concepts of leadership and authenticity have been, it is perhaps surprising that there is a broad concurrence over its general development. It is acknowledged (Northouse, 2010) that authentic leadership might have an intrapersonal perspective (Shamir and Elam, 2005); a developmental perspective, (Avolio and Gardner, 2005; Walumbwa et al., 2008) and an interpersonal perspective (Eagly, 2005). Despite each having a slightly different focus, certain themes recur within these approaches which merit consideration. First, it is generally the case that authenticity is treated as synonymous with such ideas as trustworthiness, honesty and genuineness which, of course, connect with the wider concern of personal character. This comment may seem redundant since it reflects simply a commonly held view of authenticity but, as we shall see, it is a long way from the existentialist conceptualization of the word. The notion of self-awareness and particularly being ‘true to oneself’ is prominent (Ladkin and Taylor, 2010). George (2003: 12) has done a great deal to promote this notion with his widely cited book containing sections on ‘Being your own person’ as the essential quality of leadership and ‘Developing your unique leadership style’: ‘authentic in every regard’.
Second, there is a tendency, implicit if not always explicit, to view authentic leadership as a counter-trend to the prevailing ethos of narcissism that contemporary philosophers, such as Lionel Trilling (1972) and Charles Taylor (1991) have identified as a modern-day social evil. As we indicated earlier, at the heart of any discussion of authentic leadership there is a concern about the morality of organizational life and it is apparent that thinkers like Trilling and Taylor, among others, have played a part in shaping this.
Third, following from, for instance, the work of Bass and his colleagues (see, for example, Bass and Steidlmeier, 1999); authentic leadership has come to be understood to relate strongly to transformational leadership. Logic might suggest that this positioning is inevitable because, like the personal charisma that underpins the idea of transformational leadership, authenticity is viewed as depending on the values held by each individual and therefore has its roots in the structure of personal character recognized in our first point. Luthans and Avolio (2003) argue that authentic leadership represents a confluence of positive organizational behaviour, transformational leadership, and ethical and moral capacity and development. Their definition has a behavioural element (in terms of modelling behaviours) but reflects the long-established trait approach with a strong element of individualized heroic leadership: The authentic leader is confident, hopeful optimistic, resilient, transparent, moral/ethical, future oriented and gives priority to developing associates to be leaders. The authentic leader is true to him/herself and the exhibited behavior positively transforms or develops associates into leaders themselves. The authentic leader does not try to coerce or even rationally persuade associates but rather the leader’s authentic values, beliefs and behaviors serve to model the development of associates. (Luthans and Avolio, 2003: 243)
Others such as Avolio et al. (2004) similarly stress the importance of remaining true to one’s own values, preferences and emotions to develop authenticity. Shamir and Eilam (2005: 396–398) summarize authentic leadership under four broad principles that reflect well the general consensus.
Authentic leaders do not fake their leadership. Relatedly, authentic leaders do not take on a leadership role or engage in leadership activities for status, honour or other personal rewards. Authentic leaders are originals, not copies. Authentic leaders are leaders whose actions are based on their values and convictions.
In developing our critique of the contemporary debates surrounding the concept of authentic leadership we shall begin by considering each of the three broad conventions of definition set out above before moving on to examine some aspects of more nuanced approaches.
The etymology of ‘authenticity’ and the fallacy of self awareness
If asked what is meant by the adjective ‘authentic’, it is likely that most respondents would provide synonyms such as, original; genuine; sincere; or truthful. Thus, when we consider something to be authentic we interpret that to mean that we are dealing with the genuine article and that can be important if set within the context of historical investigation. However, we might question whether it is meaningful to talk of something being ‘authentic’ when that thing is still in the process of becoming. In other words, can we talk of a living human as being ‘authentic’ when that person has the capacity to change and to redefine her/his self constantly? Is it possible to talk of an abstract concept that is subject to constant redefinition as being authentic? Clearly, those who write about authentic leadership believe it is meaningful to apply the notion of authenticity in both ways.
Such writers do this by adopting the common-sense notion of genuineness or honesty and then linking to that the idea of selfhood, to provide a fixed position against which the authenticity of an individual’s actions can be judged. Their assumption is that residing within every individual an essential ‘authentic self’ exists, to which that individual has privileged access, and which acts as a fixed bearing for some form of moral compass. Harter (2002), in a passage often cited in the literature on authentic leadership (for example, Luthans and Avolio, 2003: 242), links the origin of the authenticity concept directly to self-knowledge: ‘The history of the concept of personal authenticity can be traced back to ancient Greek philosophy as revealed in injunctions such as “Know thyself” and “To thine own self be true”.’
It is worthwhile to make a few observations regarding the use of Harter’s claim. First, the phrase ‘to thine own self be true’ is taken from a speech by Polonius in Shakespeare’s Hamlet and not from Greek philosophy. Second, although the phrase ‘know thyself’ is of Greek origin (it was an inscription on the Temple of Apollo at Delphi), it is not attributable to any Greek philosopher and, arguably, has little to do with contemporary notions of authenticity. Perhaps the Greeks understood very well that ‘self-knowledge’ is an impossible ideal and so the phrase ‘know thyself’ is an entreaty to individuals to examine their own conscience before judging others. A third point is that it is interesting to note that philosophical dictionaries (such as Honderich, 1995; Bullock and Trombley, 1999), when defining authenticity, refer only to the existentialist tradition and say nothing about Greek philosophy or self-knowledge.
The emphasis on self-knowledge, apparent in most of the authentic leadership literature, is not supported particularly by the etymology of the word authentic. The Greek word closest to ‘authentic’ is authentikos, the root of which is authentes, derived from autos meaning ‘self’ and hentes meaning ‘doer or being’, thus referring to ‘one acting on one’s own authority’ (Online Etymology Dictionary, 2001), which does not depend on self-knowledge. Aristotle’s notion of autarkeia has the same root and is generally translated into English as ‘self-sufficiency’. All of this suggests that the principle of ‘knowing thyself’ is erroneous and that what is more important is the principle of ‘self-determination’ a premise that is at the heart of Sartrean philosophy. Finally and perhaps most importantly in relation to our discussion here, in the orthodox approach to knowing our ‘own selves’, we are implied to have a pure, unsullied inner ‘self’ at the core of our being and separate or separable from the world in which we live as opposed to being-in-the-world, to reiterate our earlier concerns.
The moral underpinning of authentic leadership
Bearing in mind that ethics is the central theme in the literature on authentic leadership, it is legitimate to ask: what are the moral foundations of the concept? There are indeed texts which deal with moral foundations of leadership (for example, Ciulla, 1998). However, in reviewing discussions and analyses across academic books and articles, and more populist sources, no coherent reply is forthcoming. To put it another way, it would seem that in an attempt to present an appealing doctrine of leadership, those who promote the idea of authenticity avoid engaging with ethical theory and ignore the problem of moral dilemma. Authentic leadership appears to be a construct with no philosophical root and, despite its presupposition of a normative ethic, it does not provide one. If values are central to a theory of morality, then there is an obligation to set out what those values should be. The writing on authentic leadership prescribes without offering a prescription.
We might ask whether authentic leadership is absolutist or relativist in its outlook. It is a universally held view that authentic leadership promotes selflessness or what we might call altruism or philanthropy – it appears to be considered as an absolute good. But on what authority is that position adopted? It is an unresolved question at the heart of ethical naturalism: what is more natural – self-love or benevolence? We might note that the principle of psychological egoism claims that every act has to be motivated by self-interest because the actor cannot have privileged access to the interests of others as the other defines it for him or herself. Does authentic leadership allow for paternalism? Should a leader act against the wishes of followers because he or she believes that the followers are incapable or unaware of their own best interests? These questions are not asked and so no answers are forthcoming.
Is authentic leadership teleological (consequentialist) or deontological (non-consequentialist)? Bowie (2000) provides a conceptualization of ethical leadership from a Kantian perspective, although, perhaps wisely, he makes no reference to authenticity. He suggests that despite a Kantian theory of leadership sounding like an oxymoron it is possible, based on the premise that ‘the Kantian leader seeks to increase the autonomy and responsibility of followers so that they in turn become leaders in their own right’ (Bowie, 2000: 192).
This idea chimes true with a lot of what is argued in relation to authentic leadership (e.g. Luthans and Avolio, 2003), but can it really be the case in an organizational setting that the duty of a leader is to demolish their own raison d’être? Is there not too much at stake for the leader and the organization? Paradoxically, it might be argued that the actual intention of those promoting authentic leadership is to reinstate the leader as an exceptional individual (akin to Plato’s philosopher king, perhaps), which is the antithesis of Bowie’s Kantian thesis.
The criticisms we have levelled with regard to philosophical underpinning may seem excessive; after all, moral philosophers have been grappling with these questions for millennia without making much headway. However, it is important that some grounding (side taking) is necessary for any theory to be coherent and, therefore, useful in practice. Some writers have attempted to present a moral foundation for authentic leadership but have not succeeded in providing a clear framework. For instance, Bass and Steidlmeier (1999: 198) talk of ‘the modern ethical agenda of individual liberty, utility and justice’ and invoke philosophers from wildly different eras and moral traditions; from Confucius and Plato to Nozick and Rand; from Locke and Stuart Mill to Sartre and Marcel; as well as Rawls, Macintyre and Whitehead, without any critical comment on these perspectives..
The aspiration of authentic leadership
With its concern over how the integrity of organizations and their leaders is perceived and what values are seen to underpin operations, there are elements of the authentic leadership literature that have an aspirational or rhetorical quality – harking back to notions of heroic leadership. Such approaches appear to be using the word ‘authentic’ to highlight two aspects of leadership. Firstly, as we have noted, that authentic leadership is intrinsically positive, is value-based, and as such has a strong moral component; and secondly, that leadership influence and aims go beyond the immediate team or organizational context and include a broader social intention. Avolio et al. (2004: 810) suggest that leaders’ influence can be very broad and extend beyond the workplace to include broader social and policy issues and problems. There are strong echoes of the contested notion of heroic leadership in this. Avolio et al. (2004) provide a definition of their understanding of authenticity ‘that the more people remain true to their core values, identities, preferences and emotions, the more authentic they become’ (2004: 802–3). Despite the implication, this does not necessarily mean authenticity is beneficent. Consider for instance Hitler – it is possible to conceive of a person being authentically evil. Avolio and his colleagues use the work of others, such as Kark and Shamir (2002), to argue that authentic leaders can motivate, engage, and develop commitment and satisfaction among their staff (so too could Hitler), but in itself this does not differentiate authentic leadership from some other models such as transformational leadership where the influence purports to be very similar. The common interpretations of authentic leadership follow a similar set of assumptions which underpin Bass and Steidlmeier’s (1999) arguments, namely that authenticity is an unproblematic term, it is altruistic and paternalist, is of itself virtuous, and is easily distinguished from other forms of leadership that they consider to be ‘pseudo-transformational’.
Thus we believe that there are internal difficulties and unresolved inconsistencies in the authentic leadership literature as it stands. Rather than gloss over such inconsistencies or try to resolve them by focusing more closely using the same epistemological lens, we feel theory on authenticity and leadership might more fruitfully develop using Sartre’s concepts. Thus, having built up our critique of the orthodox principles underpinning ‘authentic leadership’ we will now introduce specifically Sartre’s thinking on authenticity and ethics, without reference to leadership to facilitate clarity, and subsequently return to a discussion concerning how his philosophy redefines authenticity in relation to leadership alongside potential research and development implications.
A Sartrean perspective on authenticity
Authenticity is an important concept within the existentialist canon, and although Sartre rarely mentions it in his magnum opus Being and Nothingness (1996, first published 1943) it is a significant subtext within that work and most of his early philosophy. He deals more explicitly with the nature of authenticity in two other works written at around the same time – War Diaries (1999) and Anti-Semite and Jew (1995, first published 1948). The War Diaries: Notebooks from a Phoney War was written in 1939 and 1940 but published posthumously in 1983. In it Sartre develops his formative view of authenticity, but the ideas, and indeed most of the vocabulary, are drawn straight from Heidegger’s Being and Time (1962), a philosopher for whom authenticity was central to an understanding of Being. Across the immense and often complex oeuvre of Sartre it is inevitable that there are inconsistencies in the way he uses the idea of ‘authenticity’ (along with related concepts like good faith and bad faith (Santoni, 1995)), but that should not detain us here because it is quite practicable to delineate the Sartrean account of authenticity that differs quite markedly from that used in the leadership literature.
According to Heidegger, authenticity is the condition of those who, through experiencing Angst, understand the existential structure of their lives and therefore recognize that they are responsible for choosing their character given the constraints of their particular situation (family, culture and so on) (Honderich, 1995: 68). Sartre, with his emphasis on freedom claims a near identical position; ‘To be authentic is to realise fully one’s being-in-situation, whatever this situation may happen to be’ (Sartre, 1999: 54).
Nevertheless, whereas Heidegger sees the ‘unauthentic’ as simply unavoidable on occasions, Sartre sees it everywhere in a refusal to make choices and take responsibility that he calls bad faith. Golomb (1995: 149) argues that Sartre’s phrase ‘Man is not what he is’ implies that authenticity is a process of becoming. Our past lives do not determine our current selves, nor is our current self immutable. In other words, individuals can never claim to be authentic but can only aspire and work towards authenticity. But this very attitude of aspiration is itself an act of bad faith (i.e. unauthentic). Sartre declares the paradox in his posthumously published work Notebooks for an Ethics (1983: 4), that the search for authenticity for its own sake is not authentic. Sartre does not concur with the everyday notion of authenticity as being synonymous with genuineness, honesty and sincerity. These he sees as adherence to preordained standards rather than constant striving and engagement with the changes and challenges of being in the world.
It would seem that in his 1946 book, Anti-Semite and Jew, Sartre conceived authenticity in much the same way as he had in the War Diaries, where he viewed authenticity as constituting ‘a true and lucid consciousness of the situation, in assuming the responsibilities and risks that it involves’ (1995: 90).
Hopefully, it is apparent that the Sartrean conceptualization of what counts as authentic differs markedly from the orthodox notion. We argue here that Sartre’s conceptualization is superior because it is grounded in substantive principle of taking personal responsibility rather than the ephemeral ideas of self-awareness and integrity.
Sartrean ethics
In common with almost every writer on authentic leadership, Heidegger saw authenticity as necessarily morally desirable. However, Sartre did not and in Being and Nothingness he criticizes Heidegger for that very assertion (1996: 80 and 531). There are also indications in Being and Nothingness, such as the footnote on page 70, that he intended to write on authenticity in the book on ethics that he promises at the end of Being and Nothingness but in fact did not publish during his lifetime. Sartre argues that whilst authenticity does possess an inherent morality because it is predicated upon a commitment that prevents complacency, it is not in and of itself a guarantee of goodness or rightness. It is certainly the case that many characters in existentialist fiction who are portrayed as authentic are anti-heroes with no discernible moral case. The most obvious examples are Mathieu in Sartre’s The Age of Reason and Meursault in Camus’ The Outsider. For Sartre authenticity has a comprehensive aspect: that is, one cannot live authentically without choosing freedom for all. Furthermore, authenticity requires us to own the choices we make and take responsibility for our resulting selves (Flynn, 1999: 24).
This Sartrean conceptualization of authenticity shifts the moral axis of the assumptions linked to leadership and so the issue becomes less one of self-awareness and more one of self-determination (Simont, 1992). As Golomb (1995) makes clear, a leader cannot be true to him or herself because there is no inner essence to be ‘true’ to. That does not detract from the apparent fact, however, that individual leaders are self-determined – in other words, they are entirely responsible for their behaviours, all of which are a consequence of existential choice. It is the principle of undiluted responsibility that underpins Sartrean and more generally existentialist ethics.
Many commentators – even those sympathetic to existentialism, such as Mary Warnock (1970: 125) or Christina Howells (1988: 27) – recognize the potential meaninglessness in speaking of an ethics of existentialism, because a philosophy that is founded upon unconstrained free will conducted in a Godless universe precludes the possibility of an ethical doctrine. However, such a viewpoint, whilst understandable, seems to misrepresent existentialism and perhaps even misrepresents the foundations of moral philosophy, as Simone de Beauvoir suggests in one of the few existentialist tracts that is dedicated solely to the matter – The Ethics of Ambiguity. Here she argues that we as individuals make choices independently of any existing preordained code (de Beauvoir, 1997: 10).
Correctly stated, what critics of existentialism mean is that it is a philosophy that does not, and cannot, offer a moral doctrine. But that is not the same as saying that it cannot be the foundation for an ethic. Simone de Beauvior is telling us that humankind is not so flawed that it cannot make ethical choices without a reference manual. Morality lies at the heart of our existence and for the most part we know what is right or wrong; the real question for ethics is which we choose and why.
Thus, a Sartrean ethic offers little or no hope of changing society (an abstract ideal) it represents a coherent philosophy offering the concrete hope of people seeking a greater sense of control over their existence. Sartre’s existentialist ethic is perhaps best illustrated in a passage from his posthumously published Notebooks for an Ethics (1983: 7), where he states that ethics are individual and subjective. If ethical entreprize is directed at the ‘abstract universal’ it becomes meaningless and itself abstract. (Sartre, 1983: 7)
For many writers on ethics there is an implicit assumption that existentialism is a relativist philosophy and that, as relativism is no basis for an ethic, existentialism has nothing to contribute. Subsequently, the debate between consequentialist and non-consequentialist perspectives is continually re-rehearsed. This view of existentialism is very much mistaken. For the existentialist there is nothing relative about the immorality of exploitation or oppression (both of which are of central concern to the student of business); the issue, as we identified earlier, is the distinction between abstract universal and concrete particular.
Any moral code, whether a philosophical doctrine or an organization’s code of ethics, is necessarily abstract and intentionally universal – essentially divorced from the experience of Being-in-the-World, individual freedom and the existential angst that accompanies it. Sartre makes clear in Notebooks (1983: 9) that values which are chosen by an individual, whether through wisdom or ignorance, for good or evil, at the very least reveal and invoke freedom, whereas values imposed by others are necessarily alienating. Where an individual feels compelled to act by an ethical doctrine that is not chosen freely as his or her own then they are in bad faith because they are rejecting their own freedom and so abrogate responsibility for their act. As the discussion so far suggests, existentialist ethics represent a harsh reality whereby each and every individual is held accountable for their own moral choices.
Discussion
Sartre, following the line of thinking of Heidegger relating to the conformity of the ‘they’, argues that following external prescriptions and expectations is an inauthentic way of living. In our context this implies that following ‘recipes’ for leadership behaviours (even recipes for ‘authentic’ leaders) necessitates inauthenticity. Developing our potential acknowledges our individuality and uniqueness, which is a means of becoming authentic. Authenticity here does not present a claim for legitimacy – perhaps the reverse – and can only be attributed, not claimed, in the case of leadership. It is not something leaders can claim for themselves in an effort to increase their influence or justify their actions. Actions and not intentions determine attributions of authenticity. Sartre is at pains to point out that what we will is what we become. This is not the same as what we intend, but what we choose to do, and we can rely on no inherent qualities that will encompass what we are. We cannot define people by their aspirations or by the limitations of their facticity (their factual circumstances) but by what they do. Man is nothing else but what he purposes, he exists only in so far as he realises himself, he is nothing else but the sum of his actions … ‘You are nothing but what you live,’ it does not imply that an artist is to be judged solely by his works of art, for a thousand other things contribute no less to this definition of a man. What we mean to say is that man is no other than a series of undertakings, that he is the sum, the organisation, the set of relations that constitute these undertakings. (Sartre, 1973: 41–42)
To return to the distinction between the concrete particular (that is, personal, individual) and abstract universal (the social): at the individual level Sartre notes the unreflective ‘being-in-itself’ and the reflective ‘being-for-itself’ and at the social level, ‘being-for-others’ (Sartre, 1996). The third of these states is particularly relevant here, in relation to authenticity. If we are to view ourselves as ‘being in the world’ what do we regard as authentic being? The tensions between the social/communal and the individual are highlighted also by other writers in the existentialist tradition, such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Simone de Beauvoir. They highlight the possible alienation of the individual who lives her life with too great a focus on the beliefs, norms, codes and behaviours of others, and the struggle for authenticity in that context. The influence of the commonality, if it is passively accepted, submerges the individual. The disabling of individual values, beliefs and interpretations creates a levelling down, a narrow range of opportunities to be, and thus any aspiration to unique and individual expression is prevented.
This may be at the core of authenticity both in terms of leadership research and in terms of existentialist thinking. What is our purpose and the purpose of others? If we view others in a purely instrumental way – as means to ends rather than as ends in themselves – we are inauthentic, in that we do not accept the reality of others but attempt to impose our reality on them. Thus things (and people in the leadership context) are regarded as being ‘for’ a purpose: in leadership, perhaps to fulfil the aims of the organization/leader.
Implications for research and leadership development
It is important that we do not get carried away by the rhetoric of authentic leadership. We need to be clear that leadership occurs within a moral and ethical framework and that this framework is not immutable; that those involved in the leadership process themselves have their own, possibly differing value bases, and that both value bases and moral and ethical frameworks are not permanent and involve actors engaging themselves in choices as to their moral frameworks and the morality of their actions. Thus it is an important consideration for leadership research to recognize the influence of contextual ethics or values to a greater extent than appears currently to be the case.
Developments in leadership practice and theory have a bearing here, particularly in relation to the engagement of different actors in the leadership process, their own value frameworks and how they share and develop these. We noted above the relational element of leadership when discussing existentialist thinking and leadership practice, particularly the notion of being-for-others. Whilst much of the leadership writing focuses on the individual leader, from the heroic leader onwards, there are other developments which relate more closely to some of the themes of this paper. Ancona, Malone, Orlikowski and Senge (2007) note the unattainability of individuals possessing all the attributes or qualities deemed to be necessary for effective leadership. The capabilities for leadership, they argue, can be found through people operating together. The four capabilities they argue for are relating, inventing, visioning and sense-making, all of which occur in and through interaction with others. Leadership founded on interaction implies that it is a continuous process, as we indicated earlier. This dynamic process of leadership focusing on interaction rather than on individual qualities is also highlighted by Cammock (2003), who argues that not only is leadership a process but it needs to be viewed as holistic. He argues that effective leadership transcends divisions such as those between rational thinking and emotion, between economic and wider moral values, between the organizational and the societal, and that the leader cannot be divorced from the contemporary context in the way implied in a search for a universal leadership model. Thus Cammock’s approach reinforces the notion that leadership must always be ‘in-the-world’, in the term we use here.
In addition, writers such as Weick (1995) note the role of sense-making in leadership. If leadership is to be authentic, in acknowledging our condition of freedom and choice, we need to be able to make sense of that with others in the leadership process – not relying on leaders to impose sense or to make sense for others but to engage in narrative or dialogue, to make sense with others, as indicated in approaches such as that advocated by Ford and Lawler (2007). This acknowledges the different interpretations and experiences of others concerning leader relations and acknowledges also the individual freedom of all parties to ‘choose’. Thus dialogue is crucial to promote any notion of ‘authenticity’ in leadership. Similarly, Fairhurst (2007) examines the role of discourse in leadership and the possibilities this opens up for our understanding of leadership. Her approach echoes the above themes: a need to view leadership holistically and the co-creation of meaning through dialogue.
In a similar vein is the development of the notion of narrative leadership (Fleming, 2001; Muldoon, 2004) where people develop shared understandings and articulate values through dialogue, again seeing leadership activities as emergent, that is considering the potentialities of relationships and of leadership. This echoes the point made earlier about the consideration of authenticity as a process of becoming rather than one of stability. A similar approach is taken within the context of organizational change by Tsoukas and Chia (2002). Whilst their context and foundations are different, the assumptions taken resonate with our approach, particularly how interaction generates new experiences which are interwoven with beliefs and which inform new practice. The point to make in relation to these related but separate developments is that, whilst they grow from different ontological and epistemological bases, their implications for leadership theory and practice are similar. In particular they all imply the value of a non-essentialist and emergent view of interrelationships and in our case, leadership.
Despite their different foundations, a key element in such approaches is the process of dialogue and the recognition of the importance of subjectivity and inter-subjectivity. In his discussions on individual subjectivity in the context of operating in the world with others, Sartre notes that we need to recognize our own subjectivity but also the subjectivity of those around us whom we see in an objective light (Sartre, 1973: 45).
At one level this might be interpreted as the other being a threat to ourselves, to our own freedom. However, in a subsequent text, Sartre (1983: 499) clarifies the potential of mutually acknowledged, inter-subjective freedom, where individuals present the opportunity for developing reciprocal meaning in the ways they relate (subject and object) to one another.
The implications of this are considerable. To recognize others as having their own subjective and objective freedom would involve organizational leaders relying less on traditional modes of control exercised by management and developing a true ‘empowerment’ where all those involved in the leadership process are involved in an inter-subjective, sense-making dialogue. This requires an inter-personal engagement, not ignoring but acknowledging and negotiating power asymmetries. Over-reliance of the ‘vision’ created and handed down by leaders is in these terms inauthentic and is itself limited and limiting as it prevents the enrichments described by Sartre above.
Our intention has been to stimulate thinking about authenticity in relation to leadership. We have questioned the developing orthodoxy of authentic leadership but to what end? At one level, we are provoking those involved in the leadership process to consider Sartre’s approach to authenticity in relation to their own contexts, actions and moral foundations. To that extent we believe this constitutes a contribution to continuing ‘leadership development’ at the level of the individual. In relation to leadership theorizing more generally, we believe that existential authenticity provides a further and fruitful perspective from which to view the experience, practice and research of leadership. Lawler and Bilson (2010) develop a matrix which forms a framework within which they locate different approaches to leadership. One axis of the matrix is rational-objectivist approaches at one end and reflective-pluralist at the other. The second axis ranges from an individual focus at one end to organizational focus at the other. Unsurprisingly, they locate much leadership research and theorizing in the individual, rational-objectivist category. Our argument here is that developing an existential authenticity perspective adds to the relatively unrepresented theorizing in the reflective-pluralist category, according to that classification. Thus it adds a further dimension: to reflexive approaches advocated by, for example, Alvesson (1996); to discursive approaches as noted by, for example, Wood (2005) and Fairhurst (2007); and to the notion of ‘becoming’ as noted by, for example, Ladkin and Wood (2008).
We are wary of the unchallenged development of an objectivist approach to authentic leadership, which we see as potentially self-serving and misleading and of no especial value in assisting leadership in practice, as well-intentioned people (and others) seek to find a way through the maze of organizational and ethical challenges. In conclusion, perhaps we need to be aware of the warning issued by Bellow: ‘In every community there is a class of people profoundly dangerous to the rest. I don’t mean the criminals. For them we have punitive sanctions. I mean the leaders. Invariably the most dangerous people seek power’ (1992: 51).
Perhaps we need doubly to beware authentic leaders. Further examination of authenticity in leadership might focus on the values which underpin leadership relationships and acknowledge the plurality of these, which often appear to be overlooked in the leadership literature. We have not reviewed the increasing literature on ethics and morality in management more generally here which is clearly apposite in current times. However, it is useful here to highlight that the values which underpin the leadership relationship, or within which leadership is negotiated, are not immutable and often not declared. Indeed they might not be consciously considered at all. The utility of the interest in authenticity in leadership is not that it provides us with a list of behaviours we can try to develop or adopt in order to view ourselves or be seen as being ‘authentic’, nor that it provides us with general codes of ethics but that it opens up potential discussions of the value systems within which we operate – the philosophy of leadership as it were, in a much more dynamic setting than the traditional transformational-transactional leadership debate currently allows. The search for one embracing definition of authenticity, as with that for leadership is fruitless. This is emphasized by Nietzsche’s ‘high priest of authenticity’ (Golomb, 1995: 176) Zarathustra: By many a trail and manner I came to my truth … and I never liked asking the way – that always offended my taste! I preferred to question and tried the ways myself. All my coming and going was a trying and questioning – and truly one must learn to answer such questioning! …’ This – it turns out – is my way – where is yours?’ That is how I answered those who asked me ‘the way’. The way after all – it does not exist. Thus spoke Zarathustra. (Nietzsche, 2006: 156)
From this perspective, the authentic leadership process needs to move away from prescriptions of how leaders behave and from imposed ethical frameworks, to an approach which enables the way to emerge, through dialogue specifically relating to it, for all those involved in the leadership relationship – their way.