The function of myths about great leaders in human culture: A cultural evolutionary perspective

Leaders’ mythologization

Schwartz’s research of Abraham Lincoln’s mythologization (2000) is a prominent example of the main psychological principles involved in turning a leader into a symbol.

During his term in office Lincoln was highly controversial and was barely re-elected. He was perceived by many as hesitant—even softish. For example, in the then Zeitgeist (to borrow the Hegelian notion) his empathic behaviors were seen as weakness of character. Examples are his pardoning a soldier who had fallen asleep on guard and was sentenced to death; his habit of visiting wounded troops in hospitals—a rare gesture in those days (Washington in his eight years of leading the army never once visit wounded soldiers: Schwartz, 1987); his agonizing over decisions relating to human life (which nowadays seems very human and usually spark sympathy in the public’s eyes. Moreover, Lincoln, who is publically identified with the abolition of slavery, did not go to war to free the slaves. In fact, in his inaugural address in 1861 Lincoln promised not to intervene in the issue of slavery. Lincoln launched the civil war because the southern states were threatening to secede from the federation. Under those circumstances, he saw war as a legitimate move to preserve the Union. After the war and his death, Lincoln was forgotten for many years. His construction as a venerated leader gained momentum only in the twentieth century, reaching its peak in World War I when he became the ultimate symbol of moral leadership.

Schwartz (2000) demonstrates how the construction of Lincoln as a narrative, as a “leadership icon,” reflects the changes of values, norms, and desires in American society. In the new reality appropriate symbols were needed to represent it.

From the end of Lincoln’s presidency (1865) up to 1910 (the beginning of his mythologization processes, the US population more than tripled in size (from 27 million to over 92 million). The increase in urban population ranged from 20 percent to 50 percent. In other words, American society that in Lincoln’s time had been agrarian had become much more pluralistic and urban. In Shils’s (1975) terms, the “center” (the sociological term for entities, persons, groups representing central values of society) had changed dramatically. There had been mass immigration followed by sociological processes and the rise of various social movements supported by some of the most influential newspapers editors. As a result, the very same narratives that had made Lincoln so controversial during his tenure rendered him the most revered American leader in 50 years later. Lincoln embodied progressive and “advanced” human values. He became associated with willingness to go to war to liberate the slaves (which as mentioned, was not true historically) his biography as a “self-made man” as an orphan who grew up in a poor family in the Midwest, studied law and rose to prominence, was a fitting story for a society of immigrants seeking symbols of equal rights and meritocracy to identify with. Lincoln’s image could have provided the screen for projections and attributions that reflected public desires in the Zeitgeist of a newly formed urban society of immigrants dreaming about a “new world.”

Mythologization—turning leaders into “icons”—does not occur only in the context of political leadership. It can also be seen at the level of social and organizational leadership. A prominent example of this is presented by Spector (2014), who described and analyzed the mythologization of Lee Iacocca, the CEO of Chrysler cars in the 1980s.

During Iacocca’s term Chrysler was saved from bankruptcy and reached profitability. Some writers (e.g. Bennis and Nanus, 1985; Thorpe, 1988; Tichy and Ulrich, 1984) described Iacocca as an American hero, as a transformational leader, as a great figure who succeeded in saving a failing company.

Spector analyzes Iacocca’s mythologization, taking essentially a transformational leadership perspective (Bass, 1985; Burns, 1978) which has become a major form of leadership analysis (Bass and Riggio, 2006).

Indeed, in Iacocca’s mythologization, values and moral aspects that typify the notion of transformational leadership (Burns, 1978) were emphasized (like Lincoln’s). He was described as a visionary leader, able to harness employees’ hearts and causing them to go “beyond the call of duty” (Bass, 1985). He was described as an American model—a figure who could change reality through his optimism, beliefs, determination, and hard work. Spector’s analysis presents an entirely different reality. The improvement in Chrysler’s condition stemmed from factors beyond Iacocca’s control. By 1984, the US economy was far healthier than it had been when Iacocca assumed control of Chrysler. The American economy overall was expanding. Inflation had dropped to under 4% and corporate earnings were healthy. The entire US industry was experiencing recovery (Cacy and Miller, 1984).

Iacocca, according to Spector’s analysis, was a pragmatist, who did not hesitate to cut expenses and lay off workers. He took several technical and mainly financial decisions (e.g. taking a government loan) that allowed Chrysler to survive for a short while until, as described, economic conditions on a national scene improved significantly.

Iacocca, Spector maintains, ran Chrysler as a manager, impelled solely by cost–benefit considerations—certainly not as a transformational leader. His decisions, deeds, and style were far from the myth established around him as a transformational leader.

Although, the circumstances of Lincoln’s and Iacocca’s leaderships are different. The gap between reality and narrative, as propagated among the public, points (as in many cases of legendary leaders—see Popper, 2012) to both the centrality of the narratives of “great figures” and the desired elements that are included in such stories. Cooley (1964) described the psychological; function of the stories about great figures aptly: “The function of the great famous man is to be a symbol. The real question in mind is not so much ‘What are you?’ as ‘What do I believe you are?’ ‘How far can I use you as a symbol?’” (p. 341).

The stories about Lincoln and Iacocca exemplify the symbolic element that exists in reference to leaders in certain circumstances—an aspect that can be identified in many legends (Hamilton, 1999). In the context of leaders there is a bias (the term “bias” is used in the way Schelneker (1982: 205) defined it: “a bias in the interpretation and explanation of events is a subjective tendency to prefer one interpretation over another”); Meindl et al., (1985) and Meindl (1995) define it as the “romance of leadership”—the tendency to glorify leaders especially when they are far away (Shamir, 1995). The romantization of leadership is already intimated in the observations of a number of scholars (e.g. Burns, 1978; Staw and Ross, 1980; Weber, 1946). The argument is that the concept of leadership is a perception that plays a part in the way people attempt to make sense of relevant phenomena. In this sense-making process leadership has assumed a romanticized, larger than life role. Lincoln’s and Iacocca’s cases illuminate the romance of leadership and the major conditions for its origins and existence. The major prerequisites are these: (1) The romantic elements of the story are created at a distance from the leader (Popper, 2013). This distance is created by time (e.g. Lincoln) or by space (e.g. Iacocca). One way or another, the story is not based on actual interaction. Usually it originates and is carried out by various mediators (e.g. journalists) (Schwartz, 2000). Distance from the leader is an important component of the ability to construct a romantic leadership story. In many cases the story is not anchored to precise facts. It is constructed on the basis of psychological needs and cultural aspects that are beyond facts. Lincoln’s and Iacocca’s cases exemplify this aspect as well.

(2) Context is a central aspect in constructing a mythological leadership story. The principle of relevance (Sperber and Wilson, 1995) determines in the eyes of the beholders the information that will be accepted or rejected. Thus, Lincoln’s myth began 50 years after his death, at a time when strengthening national identity in a rapidly growing heterogeneous immigrant society had become more central than before (Schwartz, 2000). Similarly, Iacocca’s mythology was anchored to circumstances of economic crisis (Spector, 2014).

(3) The more ambiguous and threatening the circumstances, the stronger the inclination to romanticize the leader. That is, strengthening the larger than life element in the story about the leader (Meindl et al., 1985) serves (as will be elaborated) as a psychological mechanism for dealing with epistemic distress. So, with the help of biases inherent in us, certain elements of the story about the great figure are empowered and promoted to the level of being a myth (Allison and Goethals, 2014; Campbell, 1949; Popper, 2012; Price, 1978).

We turn now to discuss the origins of this psychological phenomenon.

The psychological foundation of leaders’ mythologization

The psychological explanation for the phenomenon of mythologizing leaders is anchored in the human desire to have responses to three essential adaptive needs (Popper, 2012, 2016): (1) The need for security. (2) The epistemic need. (3) The need for meaning. We shall now examine each of these explanations.

The evolutionary rationale underlying psychological yearning for leaders

To demonstrate the evolutionary logic underlying our claims, we start by highlighting processes occurring already in infancy. We have chosen to present studies in the domain of natural pedagogy (Csibra and Gergely, 2009, 2011) as these clearly demonstrate the primary nature of the tendency to be attracted to large figures, as well as the signals that activate manifestations deriving from this tendency. This review will provide the conceptual basis for analyzing the psychological and cultural functions and dynamics of narratives of venerated leaders.

In a classic experiment (Meltzoff, 1988), 14-month-old infants sat with their mothers facing the experimenter. The experimenter looked at an infant, then at a “magic box” set on the table in front of her, and then performed this surprising action: she bent forward toward the box and by pressing it with her forehead turned on a light attached to its top. A week later the infants returned to the lab and were allowed to play with the box. Most of them leaned toward the box spontaneously and turned on the light using their heads, although they could easily have used their hands. In a later version of the experiment (Gergely et al., 2002) the same conditions were applied, except one: the experimenter’s hands were hidden under a blanket, indicating that they were not accessible. In this case, most of the infants turned on the light with their hands, rather than their heads. And in a later version still (Király et al., 2004) no eye contact preceded the demonstration. Again, most of the infants turned the light on with their hands, emulating (but not imitating) the experimenter’s actions.

What can explain the surprising fidelity of the infants’ imitation (termed in the literature “overimitation” (Lyons et al., 2007; McGuigan, 2013) in Meltzoff’s original study, even though the behavior was actually quite inefficient compared with using their hands? What caused the difference in the replications?

Csibra and Gergely’s (2006, 2009, 2011) theoretical model—“natural pedagogy,” based on their empirical studies—suggests an answer. They claim that humans have a unique, specific mechanism for transmitting cultural knowledge and practices vertically. This learning mechanism is much more efficient than other learning mechanisms, such as trial and error. It enables a naïve learner (small figure) immediately to trust a figure perceived as competent and benevolent (large figure) demonstrating for him/her some relevant but opaque (for the learner) cultural knowledge. This ability of the naïve figure to learn and generalize the knowledge efficiently (her pedagogical stance) lies in the following evolutionary propensities (Csibra and Gergely, 2006, 2009):

Trust in “large figures”: Such trust, as will be elaborated, is connected to trusting in the ability and benevolence attributed to the transmitter (e.g., a baby’s trust in his parents (Gergely et al., 2007).

We argue that the biases described above are innate and are part of the foundation of the attraction to leaders. Meltzoff (1988) as well as Csibra and Gergely (2006, 2009), fully demonstrate the implications of such basic instincts. They show how and under what conditions the maximal effect of the large figure exists—an effect that results in accurate imitation that can be found only in humans. (Monkeys, for example, imitate a general course of action. They might imitate a man’s use of a stick to chop bananas from the plant. However, the motions will not necessarily be accurate. For example, the stick might not be raised on the same side as the man raised it. The imitation is of the general action that leads to end result: emulation).

It can be argued that the processes described are relevant only to infants as they tend to trust almost automatically large figures and because they are not yet influenced by socialization processes. However, studies in adults have shown that the pattern of accurate and faithful imitation (which as mentioned exists only in humans) is clearly evident in adults also. In fact, it is reported that adults tend to over-imitate more than children, with high selectivity in respect of the model’s age, expertise or prestige (Flynn and Smith, 2012; McGuigan et al., 2011). This line of experiments highlight the inner sensitivity of humans to certain signals (Kahneman, 2011). The intensity of signals triggering the biases inherent in us is clearly expressed in social psychological studies. For instance, Todorov et al., (2005) showed Princeton University students faces of men for short periods of up to a second, and asked them to rate the faces on various traits, one of which was competence. The faces were not a random sample but of politicians. Todorov and his colleagues compared the results of elections in different states with the Princeton students’ rating, based, as mentioned, on short exposure without a political context (the students did not know who the candidates were). In 70% of the ratings for the position of senator, congressman or governor, the winners in the elections were candidates whose faces the students rated higher in competence. Addressing the possibility that people relate to general likability rather than to competence, the researchers asked participants to judge various other trait dimensions such as intelligence and honesty. From a simple halo-effect perspective, competence emerged as the most important trait attribute on which people evaluated candidates for leadership positions. Such remarkable results have been confirmed in Finland, in regional council elections in England and in various election races in Australia, Germany, and Mexico (Bellew and Todorov, 2007; Olivola and Todorov, 2010). Antonakis and Dalgas (2009) conducted an election game with children and discovered that children and adults were influenced by similar cues in judging competence from facial appearance.

However, being perceived as competent is not enough. To feel trust, humans (as well as other species) must feel that the attributed competence can be addressed for their benefit (Batson, 1998). Reviewing the literature on hunter–gatherer societies, Boehm (1999) concluded that strong figures gain respect by being generous. Those who are stingy are sometimes disobeyed, replaced or even killed by the group. Indeed, manifestations of benevolence are central antecedent to gaining trust (Gambetta, 1988).

The studies described above display its theoretical proximity to the rationale of psychological theories such as Bowlby’s attachment theory (1973) that are based on primary biological processes. The main argument is that on the basis of innate foundations and certain types of interaction with significant large figures in early life (e.g. the caregiver in attachment theory), some essential psychological capacities relevant to human life as an adult are formed (e.g. the ability to maintain stable romantic relations: e.g. Hazan and Shaver, 1987). Similarly, natural pedagogy studies point to the innate foundations (e.g. the bias to ostensive cues, which possibly signals care and benevolence and other primary signals) that create trust in large figures in general and charismatic leaders in particular (Castelnovo et al., 2017). In the early stages, trust is granted to large figures almost automatically. Later, a degree of suspicion regarding large figures develops (Sperber et al., 2010). However, this fades when a meeting takes place with signals that are substantially of the same type as those observed in the early formative period of infancy.

The overt expressions of these signals might be different for adults as they might be expressed through language and abstract symbols that infants do not yet possess. But the essence is similar. These signals include (a) a reference to the recipient (e.g. President Kennedy’s address to the German audience in Berlin in 1962: “Ich bin ein Berliner”)—a rhetorical gesture, an act of ostensive communication (Castelnovo et al., 2017); (b) joint attention (e.g. Martin Luther King’s address in the “I have a dream” speech, with the vision of all children playing together regardless of color, and of course the constant repetition of the “dream” phrase (Castelnovo et al., 2017); (c) relevance—elimination of signals that are more important to the recipient (Sperber and Wilson, 1995). This selective process is effected in adults (as will be elaborated) by socialization factors. Moreover, natural pedagogy studies clearly indicate imitation as a central learning channel, particularly cultural learning. As Blackmore argues: “fashions, inventions, recipes, songs, ways of plowing a field or throwing a baseball or making a sculpture—all these cultural phenomena are learned through imitation” (1999: 66).

All the components described above are relevant to the analysis of this question: why and how do narratives of great leaders serve as a means for vertically transferring cultural knowledge and practices?

We turn now to examine this claim from a cultural–evolutionary perspective.

The great leader at the collective level: A cultural evolutionary perspective

The point of departure for the discussion regarding the significance of great leaders at the collective level is anchored in cultural evolutionary perspective (Richerson and Boyd, 2005; Tomasello, 1999, 2014. According to Tomasello, humans differ from other species in the following respects:

Humans are much more skillful than other species at discerning what others perceive, intend, desire, know, and believe. Human beings have a foundational skill of understanding intentions. The pinnacle of this ability is understanding beliefs that are indisputably mental and normative.

This argument is consistent with the claim that the ability to read each other's intentions and mental states is an important adaptive contribution (Tomasello, 1999). So presumably, individuals sharing the same cultural background, namely sharing the same norms and being familiar with the same symbols (including linguistic symbols), are better equipped, in Bruner’s (2002) terms, to communicate effectively with each other. In Tomasello’s terms, they have a better ability to understand each other's intentions, hence to collaborate at a higher level than that attainable with individuals of different cultures.

Indeed, some social psychologists have formulated notions and measurements of individuals’ “social or collective self.” Such measurements indicate differences in feeling and thinking among members of various collectives (e.g., Hogg, 2001; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). These works support the claim that it is easier, faster, and more accurate for individuals to communicate with their collective’s members than with individuals from different collectives (Heine and Bechtel, 2009; ; Markus and Kitayama, 1991). Leaders are one of the most powerful symbolic anchor of collective identity. We shall turn now to discuss the function of the great leader in this context.

Universal relevance, local relevance, and the great leader influence

The creation of collective identity means creation of cultural filters through ontogenetic and socialization processes. That is, beyond the phylogenetic attraction to great figures perceived as competent and benevolent, humans will refer to great figures through filters of cultural cognition. In other words, due to socialization processes, adults have more filters when referring to leaders. They will refer to them through filters that will determine the “relevance threshold” of the messages related to leaders. Sperber and Wilson (1995) and Wilson and Sperber (2012) in their theory of relevance, demonstrate such a selectivity process, arguing that the hearer/reader will search for meaning in any given communication, and having found meaning that matches their expectations of relevance, will cease processing. If the messages (i.e., contents) are perceived as existing within the boundaries of the “we” feeling (“group mindedness”) in Tomasello’s (1999) terms they will be perceived as relevant. Then (given that all other conditions demonstrated in Meltzoff’s experiment are maintained) the leader will be most influential. That is, his/her impact will be fast and powerful, as if the individual was primed to be influenced. In other words, for infants each message transmitted by the epistemic authority (the leader) in the manner described by Csibra and Gergely (2009) it will become relevant, that is, substantive and normative. With the development of ontogenetic and socialization processes more filters are accumulated. These filters calibrate the relevance threshold needed for specific cultural ecologies, a process actually supported neurologically. For instance, Schjoedt et al., (2010) reported that a devout Christian audience listening to a priest exhibited significant deactivation in the activity of the social executive functions (in the medial and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex)—evidence of “devotion”—giving up control during the sermon, much like the effect of hypnosis. By contrast, when the subjects believed they were listening to a sermon delivered by a non-Christian preacher the opposite reaction appeared: an increase in activation of these parts of the brain. Consistent with these findings, when asked later to assess the two preachers’ charisma, the devout Christians perceived the Christian preacher as more charismatic than the non-Christian. Such differences in the brain’s activity were not found in a parallel group of secular people exposed to the same conditions. This experiment highlights on the neurological level two major points previously discussed: (a) that attribution of “greatness” affects “devotion”—yielding control, as demonstrated in the brain activities; (b) that there clearly is an effect of filter or relevance threshold, as evinced by the differential reactions described in the experiments of Schjoedt and colleagues.

Local cultural relevance

It is argued that infants have a phylogenetacially “embedded software”. That is, they are preset with a universal platform for messages transmitted by a large figure perceived as competent and benevolent. The specific contents are carried on this platform. That is, this platform has a cursor that determines the relevance threshold of specific contents. This can be likened to canonization of literary personalities. Attraction to great leaders is universal (Allison and Goethals, 2014). However, a cultural hero in a certain collective will not necessarily be accepted as such in others: this depends on a given culture’s filter-like features that determine whom it will accept as a great figure in a given collective. As such, his/her acceptance carries a double meaning: (a) it attests to some major characteristics that typify the given collective; (b) he/she serves as a catalyst for identity processes that foster the collective’s ability to maintain its distinctiveness as a group. For example, Mahatma Gandhi, the most charismatic leader mythologized in Indian society as its greatest figure, profoundly influenced that society. On the other hand, it is assumed that his influence, which was based on core philosophies such as Brahamchara (spirituality), was reflected in Gandhi’s ascetic behaviors and decisions (e.g., to maintain a non-violent struggle); this attitude could be accepted in Hindu culture but would most likely be suspected or even rejected in Western cultures (Chadha, 1997; Popper, 2012).

In conclusion, it seems that individuals are drawn from birth to large figures. This has been clearly demonstrated in infants by developmental researchers (Ainsworth et al., 1978; Csibra and Gergely, 2006, 2009; Meltzoff, 1988). We can assume that this attraction is innate and phylogenetic since the environmental impact on infants is still minimal. It can also be seen that there is continuation of this tendency among adults (strongly reflected in studies on over-imitation (Flynn and Smith, 2012; McGuigan et al., 2011). However, while infants tend to trust great figures without using meticulous filters on the messages they transmit (Heyes, 2017) adults have a lesser degree of “automatic trust” and more epistemic vigilance (Sperber et al., 2010). Thus, in addition to inherent readiness to be influenced by leaders, adults also relate to cultural aspects accumulated in socialization processes which are related to “group mindedness” (Tomasello and Rakoczy, 2003).

To conclude this section: The attraction to leaders is universal as well as culture-bound. It is universal at the process level, that is, the “phylogenetic instinct.” It is culture-bound in the sense that the content (e.g., messages) determine, especially in adults, who is trustworthy and therefore can be followed or even imitated. The common result of this influence is manifested in the transition from an instrumental motivation system (i.e., fulfillment of self-interest) to a collective–normative one.

The arguments and studies presented above shed light on the origins and magnitude of leaders’ narratives in a given collective, particularly their impact on the transfer and preservation of culture. In this context we can formulate claims that canonical leadership narratives are characterized by the following factors.

They responded to prominent needs at a given time (e.g. Ataturk during World War I) and have become canonical (i.e., survive beyond that given time) because the protagonist—the large figure—has remained relevant in preserving the group’s identity and cohesiveness. In the terms discussed above, the story contributes to sustaining “joint attention.”

Theoretical and research implications

Most theories and studies on leadership focus on leaders’ impact on followers’ attitudes and behaviors (Bass, 1988, 2008; Burns, 1978; Goethals et al., 2004). Our discussion expands the perspective beyond this paradigm, granting the leader a more “generic” status. That is, the charismatic leader can be seen as an entity with a cultural evolutionary role in a given culture. Hence, the proposed framework allows new theoretical and research directions that can illumine the vertical transfer of cultural norms and knowledge. Initial expressions of such directions are indeed found in the literature, for example, inter-cultural comparative studies on leadership images (Den Hartog et al., 1999; Gerstner and Day, 1994). However, these studies usually rely on a general model that serves as a yardstick for comparative analyses (e.g., Den Hartog et al., 1999). In this respect, such studies can be regarded as specific descriptions at a certain point in time. They do not sufficiently indicate origins and processes of followership in specific collectives, or distinguish universal from local processes (Popper, 2012; Reicher and Hopkins, 2003). The outlook suggested here promotes development of research designs that can include such dynamic processual aspects.

We argue that the large-figure frame of reference in general and leaders in particular provides a powerful explanation for imitation processes, which as mentioned are a cornerstone in cultural learning. The leader is both a carrier of cultural symbols and a role model to be imitated. The developmental studies noted (Gergely et al., 2002; Meltzoff, 1988) detail the imitative learning processes as well as the preconditions under which this learning is performed most effectively. The present discussion contributes by breaking down the learning process into its structural, procedural, and consequential elements. This view does not contradict the classic psychological approaches described at the beginning of the article, but adds elements that expand and supplement these perspectives, indicating a cultural evolutionary function that these psychological processes serve. Tomasello’s (1999, 2014) concepts regarding cultural cognition and its function as a cultural filter, clarify how universal principles applied to vertical learning are used in transferring a variety of cultural knowledge in different collectives.

Furthermore, the argument that stories of iconic leaders reflect collective values (Popper, 2012) carries great potential for comparative cultural studies. This argument implies that some differences between great figures reflect in fact different collectives’ values and norms. Therefore, through this conceptualization research designs may be developed that will better illuminate the following aspects:

Identification of collective canonic narratives through great leaders that are considered salient “identification centers.”

In conclusion

The arguments presented throughout the article illuminates the adaptive cultural evolutionary role of the leader. The longing for leaders plays a significant role with regard to the most unique aspect of humans, their culture. The article discusses a matter that has not been sufficiently elaborated in the literature, namely the place and role of leaders as mechanisms for transferring cultural norms and practices (that is, “how” culture is transferred). By this perspective, the great figure and the stories told about him/her are a cultural evolutionary vehicle that enables humans to acquire and transfer cultural knowledge quickly and efficiently. The great figure also has an essential role in preserving the distinctiveness of the collective. Such processes, in Tomasello terms, safeguard the “we” feeling, which is central to the collective’s adaptive purposes. Future research (especially comparative studies) based on the perspectives suggested in this article can serve as a platform to better understand universal as well as particularistic processes of transfer, preservation, and change of cultural knowledge and norms.