Transnationalization of Turkish dramas: Exploring the convergence of local and global market imperatives

Abstract

Since the mid-2000s, an ever-increasing number of Turkish dramas have been exported to several markets and commanded high prices and ratings. To explain the transnationalization of Turkish dramas, this article explores the political economic imperatives as opposed to the commonly cited cultural proximity thesis. Based on in-depth interviews with television producers, distributors and executives, it analyses the burgeoning of the Turkish production sector, the search for additional revenue streams in foreign markets by Turkish producers, their integration into global networks of television trade, governmental support and the converging local and global dynamics that created favourable export conditions for Turkish dramas.

Keywords

Cultural proximity political economy television trade transnationalization Turkish dramas

Since the mid-2000s, there has been a conspicuous rise in the exports of Turkish television dramas, also referred to as soap operas or telenovelas. These weekly, big-budget productions have been sold to dozens of countries in the Middle East, Balkans and Central Asia and, more recently, in Latin America, Europe and Asia. According to available data, the first Turkish television drama to be exported was Deli Yurek (Crazy Heart) in 1997, which was sold to the Kazakhstan state television for only US$30 per episode. By 2001, the number of exported dramas had risen to 65, with buyers concentrated mostly in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In 2005, Yabanci Damat (The Foreign Groom) had made its way to a commercial Greek channel and become a ratings hit (Today’s Zaman, 2012). But the real breakthrough came in 2008 when the pan-Arab network, the MBC, began to air Gumus (Noor in Arabic), which became a huge hit with Arab audiences, its final episode drawing an estimated 85 million viewers (Rohde, 2012). Prompted by Noor’s unforeseen popularity, Turkish producers, broadcasters and distributors began to venture into global markets. In 2010, the distribution company, Global Agency, entered the Balkan markets with Binbir Gece (A Thousand Nights), and sold Muhtesem Yuzyil (Magnificent Century) to a number of Balkan and Middle Eastern countries the following year (Oxford Business Group, 2012). By 2013, Magnificent Century had become Turkey’s most significant cultural export with approximately 200 million audiences in 50 countries, from Italy to China. According to the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Turkey exported 36,000 hours of television to 76 countries between 2005 and 2011. At the time of writing, more than 100 Turkish dramas are being exported to 80 countries, bringing in US$100 million to the Turkish economy (Ozedincik, 2013). With this increasing popularity and demand, Turkish dramas now command amounts of between US$15,000 and US$150,000 per episode (Ozedincik, 2013). Turkish producers and broadcasters sell not only original programming but also their remake rights. For example, in 2011, the broadcast channel, ATV, sold Ezel and its remake rights to a number of markets, including Belgium (McDonald, 2012). In 2013, it sold Son (The End) to a Swedish broadcaster as well as to a US production company (Clarke, 2012; Whittock, 2013). The deal was celebrated by Sabah newspaper, ATV’s sister company, with the headline, ‘The End of Hollywood’ (Ulker, 2013).

With the Turkish drama sector now emerging as a key player in transnational television flows, so, too, would a celebratory discourse develop in the local and foreign press. Journalistic reports heralded the ‘heyday of Turkish content’, calling attention to the addictive nature and ‘unstoppable boom’ of Turkish dramas (Holdsworth, 2012; McDonald, 2012; Ros, 2012; Zalewski, 2013). Policy analysts and Turkish government officials embraced the country’s expanding ‘soap power’ in neighbouring regions, and explained how the popular appeal of Turkish dramas was getting a boost from the so-called cultural similarities, historical relationships and/or religious connections between Turkey and the Middle East, Balkans and Central Asia (Oxford Business Group, 2012; Oymen, 2012). A think-tank report declared Turkish dramas to be ‘an important part of Turkey’s soft power’ and having ‘the potential to have a lasting effect on Turkey’s image’ (Turkish Social and Economic Studies Foundation (TESEV), 2010). Egemen Bagis, the then Minister of European Union (EU) Affairs, praised Turkish television producers for assuming the important mission of projecting a positive image of the country (Temizkan, 2013).¹

While the cultural proximity argument (Straubhaar, 1991) has come to dominate the discourse on the transnational flow of Turkish dramas, it has left several questions unanswered. For example, it primarily attributes the popularity of Turkish content to ‘face value’ affinities between Turkey and the Middle East, yet ignores the appeal of Turkish modernity for Arab audiences (Kraidy and Al-Ghazzi, 2013).² Second, the cultural proximity thesis assumes that the reception of Turkish dramas is generally favourable and overlooks negative reactions from audiences and regulatory authorities in various countries.³ Last but not least, it fails to account for the outflow of Turkish dramas to markets such as Romania, Poland, Brazil, Japan and Vietnam, none of whom share with Turkey any linguistic, cultural or historical commonalities. The notion of ‘multiple proximities’⁴ might offer a more nuanced analysis as it considers the shared cross-cultural genre structures (melodramas) and narrative themes (family, romance, power, etc.) to be contributing factors to the transnational popularity of Turkish dramas. As a Turkish television executive interviewed for this study observed,

For years, we imported Brazilian telenovelas. And now our writers come up with similar storylines, but set in a Turkish context. Different country, different city, different names, but similar storylines: Love, money, romance, family relationships. So the Arabs watch it, the Russians watch it, and the Pakistanis watch it. (Executive 1, 3 July 2013, Istanbul, Turkey, personal communication)

Yet, the proximity theses, whether they centre on cultural, historical, genre or thematic affinities, still fail to address the flow of Turkish dramas in its full complexity. To remedy this gap, I offer a political economic analysis and explore the underpinning market imperatives. To this end, I situate the phenomenon within the context of the transformation of the Turkish television industry in the late 1990s and 2000s and explore the shifts in both the local and global markets that created the export opportunities for Turkish dramas. More specifically, I analyse the burgeoning of the production sector and the growth of the advertising market in Turkey, the search for additional revenue streams in foreign markets by Turkish producers, the integration of these actors into the global networks of television trade and the governmental support given to producers and distributors. I draw upon analyses of surveys, reports and news stories as well as interviews with television executives, producers and distributors. Among the reports I analyse are those published by the Turkish Ministry of Tourism and Culture, the Directorate General of Press and Information, the Istanbul Chamber of Certified Public Accountants (ISMMMO) and the TESEV. News stories and op-ed columns included in this analysis come from industry publications such as Variety, Variety Arabia, Hollywood Reporter, Television Business International and World Screen and from industry websites such as C21Media and TTVNews. In order to contextualize these documents, I draw upon a total of 28 unstructured interviews with Turkish producers, distributors and executives conducted during June–July 2013 as well as interviews with distributors and buyers at the Istanbul Television Forum and Fair (iTVF) on 20–21 June 2013.⁵

The significance of the transnationalization of Turkish dramas is evidently associated with the multidirectional media flows. As several scholars have shown (Bielby and Harrington, 2008; Iwabuchi, 2002; Kraidy, 2005; Sinclair et al., 1996; Straubhaar, 2007; Thussu, 2007), the rise of non-Western production centres, the emergence of regional broadcast and satellite enterprises and the increase in geo-cultural and geo-linguistic flows have challenged the cultural imperialism thesis and the associated process of homogenization. The shifts from dominant flows to contra-flows (Thussu, 2007) and from homogenization to hybridization have also been studied in detail, with the foci on the interaction between global standards and local diversities (Iwabuchi, 2008; Kraidy, 2005; Pieterse, 2009 [2003]; Straubhaar, 2007). Given the expansive literature in global media studies, my objective is not to review these theoretical issues, but to direct attention to the capitalist imperatives beneath the transnationalization of Turkish dramas and to tease out some implications for a political economic analysis. I argue that the transnational flow of Turkish dramas is not primarily an outcome of any cultural affinities between Turkey and other countries, but, rather, it is a by-product of those political economic factors in the mid–late 2000s that increased the drama output in Turkey and created a favourable environment for its distribution. By analysing these dynamics that remain hidden in the cultural proximity argument, this article makes a contribution to the study of transnational television flows.

Political economic forces

In this section, I offer a political economic analysis to account for the influx of Turkish content in world markets, and explore how it has been facilitated by the boom in local production, governmental support, the growth of the advertising sector, the integration of Turkish producers into global networks, the favourable export conditions and the historical conjuncture.

Growth of local production

To understand the rise of Turkish dramas in world markets, one must start by examining the historical background of local production in Turkey. Until the early 1990s, television broadcasting in Turkey was under the monopoly of the state broadcaster – the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT). However, with the proliferation of commercial channels, Turkish airwaves went through a transformation. In stark contrast to the TRT’s programming strategy, the commercial channels offered viewers lively talk shows, news programmes, game shows and foreign content that crossed the cultural and political boundaries set by the state broadcaster. The early years of commercial broadcasting were marked by heavy reliance on imports, a result of the newly established channels’ need for cheap content and their lack of programming resources and trained personnel. Daytime and primetime schedules were inundated with Brazilian and Mexican telenovelas and American series. But it must be remembered that the heavy presence of Latin American and US content did not necessarily mean a total absence of local material. The channels produced news and entertainment programmes in their studios and turned to local production companies for dramas and comedy series. Beginning in the late 1990s, an important shift took place from imports to local fare, which subsequently led to the ‘primetime supremacy of local series’ and the relocation of foreign content to thematic channels or non-primetime slots. In the late 1990s, there were about 40 local series on air; in the early 2000s, this number jumped to more than 100 (Executive 2, 5 July 2013, Istanbul, Turkey, personal communication).

The rise of local production was prompted by several dynamics in the Turkish media and cultural industries. The migration of film and theatre talent to television due to financial setbacks and the consequent exploitation of the labour, know-how and technical expertise of this talent by commercial broadcasters played a significant role in the development of the production sector.⁶ To get a share of the growing market and to meet the increasing demand from broadcasters, film production companies (TMC and Plato Film) entered the television business even as wholly new television production companies were established (Medyapim, Bocek Yapim, Mint–Made in Turkey Produksiyon, Pana Film, TIMS Production, Ay Yapim), which are among the leading players in the market today. The growth of local production was also facilitated by the presence of skilled writers, actors, producers and directors; the availability of programme formats and production models; and the increase in television and film school graduates.

In the early 2000s, the overall economic growth and specifically the expansion of the advertising market generated a favourable environment for local producers. After the recurring economic crises of the 1990s, the advertising market began to expand significantly. According to available data, advertising expenditures grew from US$953 million in 2002 to US$1.6 billion in 2010, marking a 30 per cent increase (Dogan Haber Ajansi, 2011). In 2011, they jumped to US$2.5 billion. The Advertisers Association of Turkey projects the market to grow up to US$5 billion by 2015 (Hurriyet, 2012). According to an executive at the state broadcaster, TRT, ‘as advertising revenues began reaching gigantic levels, the producers naturally headed towards productions with mega budgets, and that itself meant even higher quality productions’, which translated into an increase in exports for Turkish producers (Jay, 2013). Today, Turkish television is a creative hub. At the time of writing, there are a total of 63 series on the nine major broadcast channels. Given the fact that each programme runs approximately 90 minutes, Turkish television producers roll out close to 6000 hours of original programming every week (Table 1).

Table 1.

Number of series broadcast on major channels.^a

Channel	Number of dramas	Number of comedies
Kanal D	9	1
ATV	7	1
Star	5	1
Fox	10	2
ShowTV	5	1
Samanyolu	8	1
Kanal7	2	1
TRT1	5	1
KanalTurk	3	0

Data have been gathered from the channels’ websites at the time of writing in 2013.

Aside from primetime dramas, other local productions include news programmes, political talk shows and game and reality shows – most of which are format adaptations. Imported (read American) content is mostly relegated to thematic channels, both terrestrial and digital, and appeals to a niche market of young, urbanized, upper middle class audiences.

Conditions in the home market

The Turkish television market is extremely competitive and ratings-driven. Commercial broadcasters pour enormous sums of money into productions with the hopes of garnering high ratings and advertising revenues, and production companies strive to deliver big-budget series with star actors to secure those ratings. An outcome of this stiff competition is the high production quality, a commonly cited reason for the appeal of Turkish dramas in foreign markets. ‘The quality of the production, casts and scripts is very high. All [productions] are HD. These factors are usually highly recognized by the audiences around the world’, says a Turkish television executive (Jay, 2013). The rivalry among commercial channels is so intense that it has led to huge investments in sets and costumes. For example, Magnificent Century, popular in more than 40 countries, is the most expensive television programme in Turkish history. With its elaborate set – a 15-room re-creation of Topkapi Palace – and silk and velvet gowns, an episode costs approximately US$500,000. According to a television executive involved in Oyle Bir Gecer Zaman Ki (Time Goes By), another popular export item, ‘producers are spending incredible amounts of money when they launch a new [series]. We spent more than $1.3 million for just the first two episodes of our series’ (McDonald, 2012). Yet, while the ‘ratings war’ among broadcasters spawns big-budget series and a subsequent increase in production quality, there is another side to the story. The quest for ratings and advertising revenues is so aggressive that broadcasters immediately cancel a new programme if it ‘loses the ratings war’, no matter how high in quality or remarkably innovative it is (Distributor 1, 20 June 2013, Istanbul, Turkey, personal communication). Approximately 60 dramas are produced in a given year, with half of them cancelled after six episodes due to low ratings (Ros, 2012). As one television executive told me, ‘[T]he home market is not stable. Seventy percent of the series are cancelled within a year, and they never make it’ (Executive 1, 3 July 2013, Istanbul, Turkey, personal communication). Even the high-budget or artistically high-quality dramas are not immune from this cut-throat competition.⁷ An outcome of this volatile situation is the re-orienting of producers to start targeting foreign markets to recoup their costs:

If you fail in Turkey and your show is cancelled – which is very likely by the way – you can still break even with the money from international sales. Over the last 5-6 years, we have seen that we can sell to other countries and make money there. This is a new revenue source for us. (Producer 1, 23 June 2013, Istanbul, Turkey, personal communication)

Governmental support

To grasp the incorporation of Turkish dramas into world markets, one must also analyse how the role of governmental support, as seen in the financial and logistical aid provided by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to the television industry, fulfils the aim of generating economic revenue and soft power. Under the Ministry of Economy, for example, the Foreign Trade Department not only provides financial assistance to content producers and distributors to attend international trade shows, it also organizes trade tours to countries that might serve as potential markets for television content (ISMMMO, 2010: 411). Moreover, in an effort to promote Turkey as a strategic locale for the global content business, several government ministries and agencies provide logistical support to the organizers of trade shows based in Istanbul, such as Discop West Asia, Discop Istanbul and the iTVF, which annually bring thousands of television professionals to the country (Discop Istanbul, n.d., iTVF, n.d.). The Turkish government is also engaged in plans to develop a regional film-making hub in Istanbul, with talks already involving Entertainment Development Partners, a Los Angeles based entertainment consortium and a US$3-billion project (dubbed ‘Hollywood on the Bosphorus’) designed to attract producers to Istanbul with its planned Hollywood-style films studios and theme parks (Anadolu Agency, 2013). Meanwhile, offering producers, distributors and actors legal assistance with registering their ownership rights is the General Directorate for Copyright. And the Ministry of Tourism and Culture offers awards to producers and actors for their role in promoting Turkey (Hurriyet Daily News, 2013) – quite ironic, given the government’s oppressive attitude towards media in general.

It is difficult to trace the exact beginnings of governmental support or to ascertain its role in the transnational success of Turkish dramas. However, interviews conducted for this study point out that government officials’ awareness of drama exports increased in tandem with the increase in economic revenues. In other words, it was not the government that first initiated or encouraged commercial television exports; rather, it was government officials who saw a way to capitalize on the popular dramas and actors after the fact, given that distributors and producers had already been able to establish their presence in the global marketplace (Producer 2, 19 June 2013, Istanbul, Turkey, personal communication). When asked whether governmental support was a determining factor in the entry of Turkish content into global markets, a television executive said,

The remarkable increase [in exports], especially in 2008–2009, didn’t have much to do with the government. The turning point occurred when Kanal D sold Noor in 2008 and it became a huge hit. Then others decided to enter the game and exploit markets in the Middle East and Balkans. The government [support] came in later. (Executive 1, 3 July 2013, Istanbul, Turkey, personal communication)

A content distributor echoed,

When our programs and stars became popular in the Middle East and the Balkans, which was back in 2008 and 2009, this opened our eyes to the economic value of exports. I would say that’s when the government started paying attention and started supporting us. Don’t get me wrong; we are very appreciative [of their assistance]. But I think we can take some credit for laying the groundwork. (Distributor 1, 20 June 2013, Istanbul, Turkey, personal communication)

Regardless of the chronology, it is clear that the AKP government supports the drama sector in order to translate the documented success of Turkish television into concrete economic gain for the country. To promote Turkey and Turkish brands, government agencies, in collaboration with business associations, both support and capitalize on its popular actors. A fitting example of this relationship can be found in efforts to promote Turkey as a medical tourism destination and to attract foreign investment to the booming private health-care sector. In 2012, the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Economy announced that the government was ready to support television and film projects that featured storylines about medical services and suggested, ‘Why not have Kivanc Tatlitug [the hugely popular actor of Noor] play a doctor? Or maybe he could play someone who has an accident and then has plastic surgery at a hospital in Turkey?’ (Aktif Haber, 2012a). In the past, Tatlitug did indeed serve to promote Turkish brands, if not medical services. Government agencies and trade associations appointed Tatlitug, as well as Songul Oden, Tatlitug’s partner in Noor, as brand ambassadors. One trip in 2012 sent them to Dubai, Baku and Belgrade to attract an additional set of tourists to Turkey through their promotion of the Istanbul Shopping Fest (Hurriyet Daily News, 2012b). In tandem with the government’s promotional agenda, businesses, too, have tapped into the popularity of Turkish actors. For example, Vestel, a major electronics manufacturer, launched an advertising campaign with Tatlitug, who is referred to as the ‘Halal Brad Pitt’, to reach out to consumers in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Kaleseramik, Turkey’s largest manufacturer and exporter of ceramic tiles, used Magnificent Century and the Ottoman palace as inspiration for its new tile collection and saw its sales explode in Azerbaijan and Saudi Arabia (Benmayor, 2013). Obviously, Turkish businesses are seeking to profit from the surge in Turkey’s global visibility. As the chair of the Turkish Exporters Association notes,

Wherever audiences watch [our] television series, they also see our products, and the demand [for our products] increases. Our exports to the Middle East, the Balkans and Central Asia are on the rise. The television dramas help to increase the brand awareness of our products and improve our sales. (Aktif Haber, 2012b)

In addition to economic factors, the government is attentive to the transnationalization of Turkish dramas because of what it sees as their soft power potential. ‘[W]ith [these] television series [Turkey] can enter every house and spread the influence of Turkish culture’, observes a government official, noting that ‘two or three television series accomplish a publicity campaign [worth of] millions of dollars’ (Bahadir and Kutlay, 2012, p. 31). Indeed, the AKP government has paid special attention to expanding Turkish media in regions where Turkey has strategic interests, such as in the Balkans, the Middle East and Eurasia.⁸ The government has enabled the state broadcaster, TRT, to broadcast in languages other than Turkish and to reach audiences in its ‘near abroad’. To this end, the TRT launched the TRT Avaz television service in 2009 with the aim of ‘forming a unity of language and opinion between Turkey and the Turkish-speaking communities’ in Central Asia (Tokyay, 2012). The government also expanded the services of Voice of Turkey, a radio channel, under the auspices of the TRT, which now broadcasts in 35 languages and is the world’s fourth largest radio station in terms of the number of foreign languages broadcast (Tokyay, 2012). Thanks to the AKP’s public communication efforts, the state-run Anatolia News Agency (AA), which until recently only published in Turkish and English, is now available in Bosnian, Serbian and Croatian through a bureau in Sarajevo. The agency also launched its Arabic service and a new bureau in Cairo in 2012. By 2020, it plans to begin services in Azeri, Russian, Kurdish, Chinese, French, Spanish and German (Tokyay, 2012).

Historical conjuncture

In connection with governmental support, one must also consider the historical conjuncture during which Turkey’s economic growth and activist foreign policy were able to create favourable conditions for Turkish businesses. Following a series of economic crises in the previous decade, the Turkish economy began to improve in the mid-to-late 2000s. The economic growth rate increased from 3 per cent in 2003 to 9 per cent in 2010 (World Bank, 2013a). Gross national income rose from US$3810 in 2003 to US$10,830 in 2012 (World Bank, 2013b). Similarly, exports of goods and services increased from US$63 billion in 2004 to US$134 billion in 2011, and foreign direct investment grew from US$94 million in 2006 to US$2.5 billion in 2011 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2013). Although, by 2012, the growth rate had slowed to 2 per cent, Turkey continues to be a key economic player in its region and around the globe. At the same time, on the political and diplomatic fronts, Turkey has been following an activist foreign policy and asserting itself as a ‘vocal actor in an increasingly multi-polar global order’ (Onis, 2012: 144). In an attempt to diversify its external relations beyond the Western world, Turkey follows a new foreign policy that is based on the recognition of its ‘strategic depth’ (historical, cultural, political links with the MENA and Central Asia) and the intensification of diplomatic relations with countries in these regiosn. Whether or not this policy has been successful is open to debate, but the Turkish government continues its efforts to position Turkey as a global player and regional leader. Despite its chronic problems such as the Kurdish issue, ethnic minority rights, human rights and democratization, Turkey has enjoyed a rising international profile in the 2000s, its economic growth and activist foreign policy boosting the confidence of its citizens in engaging with the world (Quilliam Foundation, 2013). As a matter of fact, in several interviews, Turkish television executives, producers and distributors made references to the ‘new Turkey’ and noted how the ‘globalization of Turkish content’ happened at this historical conjuncture of economic growth, ‘independent’ foreign policy and a new sense of achievement and aspiration. A distributor noted,

Turkey has come a long way in the 2000s. Our economy, our foreign policy have improved. There are Turkish embassies all around the world now. Turkish Airlines flies to hundreds of cities every day. Turkish retailers, manufacturers are successful in global markets. Turkish television is in global markets, too. (Distributor 2, 20 June 2013, Istanbul, Turkey, personal communication)

Impulse to globalize

In light of the volatility of the home market and the prospect of new revenue sources in foreign markets, Turkish producers have focused on developing the kinds of universally appealing themes and genre elements that I mentioned earlier. In general, these producers pointedly avoid associating their characters with any particular Turkish national, ethnic or cultural referents, but, instead, emphasize markers such as physical beauty, modern lifestyles and consumption.⁹ Globally successful series such as Forbidden Love and A Thousand Nights are lavish productions set in affluent locations narrating the trials and tribulations of the young, rich and beautiful. Magnificent Century, needless to mention, bears upon the opulent Ottoman palace and beautiful concubines. In terms of narrative themes, these series are primarily about love, passion and intrigue, not merely the Turkish national character. Forbidden Love follows an evil mother, a vengeful daughter and their intersecting stories of betrayal and adultery, whereas A Thousand Nights is the story of a beautiful architect who sleeps with her boss to find money for her son’s cancer treatment, then falls in love and marries him. Magnificent Century, which has been likened to The Tudors, is a historical costume drama, but its emphasis is on the romantic relationships, rivalries and intrigue in the Ottoman harem (Matthews, 2012). The de-emphasis on national identity and the focus on universal markers and themes are borne out of the needs of Turkish producers to increase the marketability of their products. As one producer interviewed for this study put it, ‘too much focus’ on Turkish national identity may be a liability:

Since 2008 – the year when Noor became a huge success in the Arab world – we have been very conscious of the international markets. We are not only thinking about the domestic audience. We want to make sure that we develop characters and stories that appeal to both Turks at home and to foreigners around the world. If the characters are too Turkish, then we cannot sell it to Arabs, Bulgarians or Brazilians. And we want to be able to sell to all these audiences. That’s why we want stories and characters that can attract anyone and everyone. (Producer 3, 2 July 2013, Istanbul, Turkey, personal communication)

A content distributor echoed this perspective:

[Producers] have the domestic market in mind. But lately they also started thinking globally. Because they have to. The home market is full of uncertainties. Imagine, you are a producer and you make an expensive drama with star actors, but it does not get enough ratings. The channel cancels it. What are you going to do? Kiss all that investment goodbye? So now [producers] are naturally thinking about the foreign markets. They are paying more attention to human stories, global stories, and not just Turkish stories. Because they want to be able sell abroad. (Distributor 3, 21 June 2013, Istanbul, Turkey, personal communication)

The presence of melodramatic storylines and universal themes, and the de-emphasis on national identity along with the market reorientation are all aligned with the concept of delocalization – that is, the ‘minimization of certain kinds of cultural specificities in a cultural product to lower the possibility of a cultural discount by the foreign audience’ (Straubhaar, 2007: 170). If characters are ‘too Turkish’, they might ‘turn off’ global viewers and ‘decrease the show’s marketability’ (Producer 3, 2 July 2013, Istanbul, Turkey, personal communication). This is why storylines and characters are made ‘odorless’ and intended to avoid ‘the smell’ of any Turkish national identity, to borrow Iwabuchi’s (2002) term.¹⁰

Conditions in importing countries

Another important factor to consider is the market conditions in countries which import Turkish dramas. Due to space limitations, I cannot make a full-fledged market analysis of importing countries, but, based on interview findings and available data, I note that the transnational flow of Turkish dramas is partly an outcome of global and regional shifts, both economic and political. For example, in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, many Balkan and Eastern European markets witnessed a decline in local production and an increase in demand for foreign programmes to fill the newly available airtime, presenting an invaluable business opportunity for Turkish producers and distributors to show their wares. As a television buyer from the Balkans said, the sovereign debt crisis in Greece and the budget cuts and closing of local production companies in small countries such as Croatia led to an increase in demand for Turkish dramas, which the buyers in these countries found to be of high quality and affordable, especially as compared to US productions (Buyer 1, 21 June 2013, Istanbul, Turkey, personal communication). Elsewhere in the Middle East, the Arab Spring and the subsequent political turmoil led to a decline in traditional production centres such as those in Cairo and Damascus and created new opportunities for Turkish producers and distributors. And, yet, while the Arab Spring negatively affected local production, it ironically led the way to the emergence of new channels, which translated into potential customers for Turkish exporters. As dozens of new local and satellite channels got launched, and television viewership and ad spending increased, Turkish dramas were able to provide ‘high-budget attractions’ that helped Arab television executives to fill airtime (Buyer 2, 20 June 2013, Istanbul, Turkey, personal communication).

Integration into the global television trade

As mentioned earlier, the increase in production output and quality, the need to globalize on the part of producers and the favourable market conditions in importing countries have all played a role in the transnationalization of Turkish dramas. However, one must also acknowledge that this would not have been possible without the integration of Turkish distributors into the global networks of television trade. As Havens (2006), Bielby and Harrington (2008) and Kuipers (2012) note, buyers and sellers are the main actors in the ‘diffusion of programs and practices into national television industries and, from there, to people’s living rooms’ (p. 554).

Although it would be ideal to explore the role of both the buyers and the sellers of Turkish content, for reasons of accessibility and logistics, I focus primarily on sellers in this article. Given that the three leading distribution companies in Turkey – that is, the Global Agency, ITV Inter Medya and Calinos Entertainment – comprise the major players in the outflow of Turkish content, it might be useful to take a closer look at their global networking.¹¹ Global Agency started in 2006 by selling reality TV formats and made its big break in 2008 when it sold A Thousand Nights to a number of Balkan countries in 2008. In 2011, it sold Magnificent Century to the Middle East and, within two years, expanded its roster of buyers to more than 50 (Marka, Lisans ve Medya Dergi, 2013). In 2012, it acquired the Australian company, World Wide Entertainment, to distribute English-language content worldwide (TTVNews, 2013). That same year, it sold the rights for Forbidden Love to Telemundo, which adopted the series as Pasión Prohibida and is now broadcasting it in the United States and Latin America (Mezzera, 2013). The company also has deals with Venevision International, a Venezuelan production house; with Mega, a leading Greek channel; and with Miditech, an Indian production company.

ITV Inter Medya, founded in 1992 as a film distribution company serving the Turkish domestic market, began selling television content to Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, Central Asia and the Baltic states in 2001 (ITV Inter Medya, 2013). More recently, the company has been focusing on the Latin American market and sold Derin Sular (Deep Waters) to a Latin American distribution company in 2013 (Gazeteciler, 2013). Taking a slightly different path is Calinos Entertainment, which was founded in 1997 in Los Angeles to sell American and Latin American content to Central Asian republics. In 2001, it opened an office in Istanbul and began selling Turkish content to Central Asia, the Middle East and the Balkans, thus exploiting the fact that ‘Turkey serves as a bridge between European and Asian cultures’ (Calinos Entertainment, 2013). The company was the first distributor to export a Turkish drama, Deli Yurek (Crazy Heart), to Kazakhstan in 2001. Since then, Calinos Entertainment has sold close to 26,000 hours of programming to 61 countries ranging from Russia to Malaysia, Austria to Brunei (Calinos Entertainment, 2013).

Aside from these three major distributors, leading broadcast channels and production companies have also entered the export business. Since the late 2000s, channels such as ATV, Kanal D and Star TV have launched their own sales units and major production companies have struck exclusive deals with global distributors. For example, the sale of broadcasting and remake rights of Son (The End) is the result of the partnership between Turkish producer Ay Yapim and the global distributor, Sparks Network/Eccho Rights.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that Turkey has recently emerged as a key player in transnational television flows. Since the mid-2000s, an ever-increasing number of Turkish dramas have been exported to several markets and commanded high prices and ratings. To explain the global popularity of Turkish television, media analysts have generally relied on the notion of cultural proximity and assumed that Turkish dramas are being received positively in any given culture/society, thanks to shared cultural values, vastly underestimating the potential negative responses arising out of the particular historical contexts and/or internal differences within that society.¹² Some of the issues that get overlooked in the cultural proximity discourse include the lingering feelings of resentment towards Ottoman rule in the Balkans and the Middle East; the misgivings about Turkish dramas’ Westernized, secular and liberal vision (Yusuf, 2013); and the concerns about both the so-called damage these dramas pose to moral and religious values (Jafar, 2012) and/or the negative economic impact they have on the local television industry. More importantly, the unduly narrow focus on the notion of cultural proximity has led to the omission of the economic imperatives behind the transnationalization of Turkish content, most prominently those having to do with the development of the Turkish television industry and its global integration in the late 1990s and 2000s. To understand the ascendancy of Turkish dramas in the transnational field, I explored this broader context which facilitated the circulation of Turkish dramas, and focused on the changes in the Turkish television industry; the convergence of global standards, formats and genres with local elements in Turkish dramas; the governmental support and the historical conjuncture; and the global networking and market orientation of Turkish producers and distributors.

While this article has attempted a preliminary look at the transnationalization of Turkish dramas, obviously, there is more research to be done. In-depth analyses of the media markets in countries which import Turkish dramas as well as qualitative field research on global viewership can provide a more nuanced discussion of the appeal of Turkish dramas. In addition, the soft power argument that associates Turkish television exports with Turkey’s so-called increasing cultural, political, economic influence in the MENA region merits further research. At the same time, it is likely that the global popularity of Turkish dramas has not yet run its full course. Despite some over-confident statements by Turkish producers and distributors, there are those who warn against the likelihood of Turkish dramas losing ground because of rising prices, for example. At a panel discussion I attended at the 2013 iTVF, panellists noted that Turkish dramas have become economically ‘unsustainable’ and will likely lose market shares in coming years. Moreover, geopolitical shifts in the Middle East might also impact Turkey’s drama exports. In August 2013, several Egyptian channels launched a boycott against Turkish dramas to protest the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s criticism of the Egyptian military (Erdogan had urged the United Nations (UN) to intervene in Egypt after the military removed Mohammed Mursi from office). Egyptian television executives said they were upset with Erdogan’s intervention in Egypt’s domestic affairs and wanted to send Turkey a message by halting the broadcasts of Turkish programmes (Alreedy, 2013). In light of the changing economic dynamics of global television trade and the shifting power alignments in global affairs, then, there is no doubt that scholars will need to revisit the transnational flow of Turkish dramas.

Footnotes

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.

Notes

Author biography

Bilge Yesil is Associate Professor of Media Culture at City University of New York, College of Staten Island. She is the author of Video Surveillance: Power and Privacy in Everyday Life (2009) and The Turkish Model? Media, Democracy and the Neoliberal Islamist State (forthcoming). Her research interests include media policy, censorship, Internet regulation, surveillance and mediated activism.

References

Aktif Haber (2012a) Dizi yildizlari ‘hizmet ihracati elcisi’ olacak [Drama stars will be ‘ambassadors of service exports’], 28 August. Available at: http://www.aktifhaber.com/dizi-yildizlari-ihracat-elcisi-olacak-653164h.htm (accessed May 2013).

Aktif Haber (2012b) Turkiye Brezilya’ya da dizi ihrac edecek [Turkey will export television series to Brazil, too], 10 March. Available at: http://www.aktifhaber.com/turkiye-brezilyaya-da-dizi-ihrac-edecek-569657h.htm (accessed May 2013).

Alreedy

(2013) Egypt TV channels boycott Turkish dramas in Erdogan protest. Al Arabiya, 18 August. Available at: http://english.alarabiya.net/en/media/2013/08/18/Egypt-TV-channels-boycott-Turkish-drama-in-Erdogan-protest.html (accessed September 2013).

Anadolu Agency (2013) Hollywood on Bosphorus on the way, 5 April. Available at: http://www.aa.com.tr/en/rss/154787–hollywood-on-bosphorus-on-the-way (accessed May 2013).

Bahadir

Kutlay

(2012) Turkey’s Power Capacity in the Middle East. Ankara: USAK Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies.

Benmayor

(2013) The effect of ‘Muhtesem Yuzyil’ on ceramic sector. Hurriyet Daily News, 15 January. Available at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/the-effect-of-muhtesem-yuzyil-on-ceramic-sector-.aspx?pageID=449&nID=39062&NewsCatID=402 (accessed May 2013).

Bielby

Harrington

(2008) Global TV: Exporting Television and Culture in the World Market. New York: New York University Press.

Calinos Entertainment (2013) Available at: http://www.calinosentertainment.com (accessed June 2013).

Clarke

(2012) Sweden’s SVT buys hot Turkish drama. Television Business International, 27 September. Available at: http://tbivision.com/news/2012/09/swedens-svt-buys-hit-turkish-drama/16804/ (accessed May 2013).

10.

Discop Istanbul (n.d.) #1 Content and Adaptation Rights Market for Turkey, CEE, MENA and CIS Countries. Available at: http://discopistanbul.com/eurasia-premier-tv-and-online-content-industry-gathering/ (accessed June 2013).

11.

Dogan Haber Ajansi (2011) Reklamcilar Dernegi 2010 reklam yatirimlarini acikladi, 7 March. Available at: http://www.dha.com.tr/reklamcilar-dernegi-2010-reklam-yatirimlarini-acikladi_146714.html (accessed May 2013).

12.

Gazeteciler (2013) Latin Amerika’da yayinlanacak ilk Turk dizisi, 24 April. Available at: http://www.gazeteciler.com/diziler/latin-amerikada-yayinlanacak-ilk-turk-dizisi-65439h.html (accessed May 2013).

13.

Havens

(2006) Global Television Marketplace. London: British Film Institute.

14.

Holdsworth

(2012) International TV execs talk Turkey. Variety. Available at: http://variety.com/2012/tv/news/international-tv-execs-talk-turkey-1118051288/ Accessed September, 2013.

15.

Hurriyet (2012) Reklamverenler Dernegi 12. olagan genel kurulu yapildi. Available at: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/20083537.asp (accessed May 2013).

16.

Hurriyet Daily News (2012a) Macedonia bans Turkish soap operas, 14 November. Available at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/macedonia-bans-turkish-soap-operas.aspx?pageID=238&nid=34636 (accessed May 2013).

17.

Hurriyet Daily News (2012b) Turkish stars Tatlitug and Oden visit Dubai. Available at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-stars-tatlitug-and-oden-visit-dubai-.aspx (accessed September 2013).

18.

Hurriyet Daily News (2013) Turkish dramas receive tourism awards, 18 January. Available at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-dramas-receive-tourism-awards-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=39320&NewsCatID=381 (accessed September 2013).

19.

Istanbul Chamber of Certified Public Accountants (ISMMMO) (2010) Dizi ekonomisi [Economics of television series], 11 July. Available at: http://archive.ismmmo.org.tr/docs/yayinlar/kitaplar/2010/10_10%20dizi%20arastirmasi.pdf (accessed May 2013).

20.

iTVF(n.d.) Istanbul Television Forum and Fair. Available at: http://www.istanbultvforumfair.com/en_US/# (accessed May 2013).

21.

ITV Inter Medya (2013) About us. Available at: http://www.itv-intermedya.com/site/aboutus

22.

Iwabuchi

(2002) Recentering Globalization: Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism. Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press.

23.

Iwabuchi

(2008) Cultures of empire: Transnational media flows and cultural (dis) connections in East Asia. In: Chakravartty

Zhao

(eds) Global Communications: Towards a Transcultural Political Economy. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp.143–162.

24.

Jafar

(2012) Turkish soaps: Threat to Pakistan’s culture or entertainment market? Al Arabiya, 21 December. Available at: http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2012/12/21/256353.html(accessed June 2013).

25.

Jay

(2013) Special report: Turkish tales. World Screen, 26 February. Available at: http://www.worldscreen.com/articles/display/38026 (accessed May 2013).

26.

Jones

(2013) Iran pins rise in divorce on steamy Turkish TV. The Sunday Times, 31 March. Available at: http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/world_news/Middle_East/article1238230.ece (accessed June 2013).

27.

Kraidy

(2005) Hybridity or the Cultural Logic of Globalization. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

28.

Kraidy

Al-Ghazzi

(2013) Neo-Ottoman cool: Turkish popular culture in the Arab public sphere. Popular Communication: The International Journal of Media and Culture 11(1): 17–29.

29.

Kuipers

(2012) The cosmopolitan tribe of television buyers: Professional ethos, personal taste and cosmopolitan capital in transnational cultural mediation. European Journal of Cultural Studies 15(5): 581–603.

30.

McDonald

(2012) Turkey takes off. C21 Media, 28 February. Available at: http://www.c21media.net/turkey-takes-off/ (accessed May 2013).

31.

Marka, Lisans ve Medya Dergi (2013) Turk yapimi dizi ve filmlerin dunyadaki basarisi [Success of made-in-Turkey television series and films around the world]. Spring, pp.56–57.

32.

Matthews

(2012) The Arab world’s Dallas. Newsweek, 5 September. Available at: http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/09/04/turkish-soap-operas-are-sweeping-the-middle-east.html (accessed September 2013).

33.

Mezzera

(2013) Upwards spiral. TTVNews, 26 February. Available at: http://www.todotvnews.com/scripts/templates/estilo_nota.asp?nota=eng%2FEjecutivos%2FEntrevistas%2F2013%2F02%5Ffebrero%2F26%5Fizzet%5Fpinto Accessed June, 2013.

34.

Moore

(2013) Soap opera diplomacy: Turkish television in Greece. The International, 12 February. Available at: http://www.theinternational.org/articles/339-soap-opera-diplomacy-turkish-tv-in-greece (accessed September 2013).

35.

OECD (2013) Country statistical profile: TurkeyOnis Z (2012) Triumph of conservative globalism: The political economy of the AKP era. Turkish Studies 13(2): 135–152.

36.

Oxford Business Group (2012) Soap Power: The Sweeping Success of Turkish Television Series. Available at: http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/news/soap-power-sweeping-success-turkish-television-series (accessed June 2013).

37.

Oymen

(2012) Turkish ‘TV series spring’ continues. Hurriyet Daily News, 17 October. Available at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-tv-series-spring-continues.aspx?pageID=238&nid=32562 (accessed June 2013).

38.

Ozedincik

(2013) 100 milyon dolarlik dizi ihracati [100 million dollars worth of drama exports]. Sabah, 24 March. Available at: http://www.sabah.com.tr/Ekonomi/2013/03/24/100-milyon-dolarlik-dizi-ihracati (accessed June 2013).

39.

Pieterse

(2009 [2003]) Globalization and Culture: Global Mélange. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

40.

Quilliam Foundation (2013) Turkey’s role as a regional power: Its scope, challenges and future, 22 July. Available at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/turkeys-role-as-a-regional-power.pdf (accessed September 2013).

41.

Reuters (2008) Saudi cleric slams Turkish shows as ‘wicked’, 27 July. Available at: http://in.reuters.com/article/2008/07/27/idINIndia-34699320080727 (accessed May 2013).

42.

Rohde

(2012) Inside Islam’s culture war. Reuters, 8 March. Available at: http://blogs.reuters.com/david-rohde/2012/03/08/inside-islams-culture-war/ (accessed May 2013).

43.

Ros

(2012) The heyday of Turkish content. TTVNews, 10 October. Available at: http://www.todotvnews.com/scripts/templates/estilo_nota.asp?nota=eng%2FDistribuci%F3n%2FMercados%2F2012%2F10_Octubre%2F15_turquia_mipcom (accessed June 2013).

44.

Salamandra

(2012) The Muhannad effect: Media panic, melodrama and the Arab female gaze. Anthropological Quarterly 85(1): 45–77.

45.

Sinclair

Jacka

Cunningham

(1996) New Patterns in Global Television: Peripheral Vision. London: Oxford University Press.

46.

Straubhaar

(1991) Beyond media imperialism: Asymmetrical interdependence and cultural proximity. Critical Studies in Mass Communication 8: 39–59.

47.

Straubhaar

(2007) World Television: From Global to Local. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

48.

Temizkan

(2013) Diziler politikada yumusak gucumuz [Dramas soft power in politics]. Hurriyet, 19 January. Available at: www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/22393285.asp (accessed September 2013).

49.

TESEV (2010) The perception of Turkey in the Middle East. Available at: http://www.tesev.org.tr/Upload/Publication/0cce6971-8749-4f19-b346-cd415e4aca3c/The%20Perception%20of%20Turkey%20in%20Middle%20East%202010_02.2011.pdf (accessed September 2013).

50.

Thussu

(ed.) (2007) Media on the Move: Global Flow and Contra-Flow. London and New York: Routledge.

51.

Today’s Zaman (2012) Turkish soap operas popular in Greece because of cultural similarities, 2 December. Available at: http://www.todayszaman.com/news-299930-turkish-soap-operas-popular-in-greece-because-of-cultural-similarities.html (accessed June 2013).

52.

Tokyay

(2012) Turkish media expands global presence. SES Turkiye, 29 May. Available at: http://turkey.setimes.com/en_GB/articles/ses/articles/reportage/2012/05/29/reportage-01 (accessed September 2013).

53.

TTVNews (2013) Global agency names new head of development, 24 January. Available at: http://www.todotvnews.com/scripts/templates/estilo_nota.asp?nota=eng%2FEjecutivos%2FNombramientos%2F2013%2F01%5Fenero%2F24%5Fglobal%5Fagency (accessed September 2013).

54.

Ulker

(2013) Hollywood’un Son’u [The end of Hollywood]. Sabah, 5 May. Available at: http://www.sabah.com.tr/ekonomi/2013/04/05/hollywoodun-sonu/ (accessed June 2013).

55.

Whittock

(2013) Exclusive: Turkish drama ‘The End’ to get U.S. remake. Television Business International, 4 April. Available at: http://tbivision.com/news/2013/04/exclusive-turkish-drama-the-end-to-get-us-remake/58492/ (accessed June 2013).

56.

World Bank (2013a) Country profile: Turkey. Available at: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx (accessed September 2013).

57.

World Bank (2013b) Turkey: GNI Per Capita. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD/countries/TR-7E-XT?display=graph Accessed September, 2013.

58.

Yusuf

(2013) The geopolitics of soap operas. The New York Times, 10 January. Available at: http://latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/10/the-geopolitics-of-soap-operas/?_r=0 (accessed June 2013).

59.

Zalewski

(2013) As Turkey turns. Slate, 16 August. Available at: http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/roads/2013/08/turkish_soap_operas_go_global_turkey_s_homemade_melodramas_are_popular_across.html (accessed September 2013).