Abstract
This study is an attempt to investigate the cultural aspects of North Korea by examining the everyday lives of the people, a topic that has been a blind spot in the body of previous research on North Korea. Although there are ample studies on North Korea due to its significance for world peace, they are limited to military and political aspects. To look into the micro-aspects of the social practice of ordinary people in North Korea, the method of post-modern ethnography is adopted. In-depth interviews and participatory observation of North Korean refugees in a special high school for them were conducted by focusing on their experiences of viewing South Korean media, which is absolutely prohibited in North Korea. Watching South Korean media is a fad among young North Koreans these days, although it is seen as delinquent behaviour by the authorities and the young people have to take the risk of being caught and sent to jail. The viewing patterns of media in people’s daily lives may be one of the few indicators of social change in such closed societies as North Korea. Due to persistent poverty and pervasive corruption, social minorities exist without social care and control. Young people as a social minority are free to create their own resistant culture in the social underside. With little hope for the future, the visual fantasy of South Korean media allows youth to dream of an alternative way of life. Watching South Korean TV is not simply a means of entertainment or escaping from reality, but also a means of signifying social change. This audience study of young North Koreans is meaningful in the sense that a marginal activity like watching TV in a social minority group could signify major social changes in the most stagnant society in the world.
Keywords
Introduction
North Korea (NK) is one of the most isolated societies in the world. Scenes of strange mourning at the funeral of Kim Jong-il that were broadcast on television showed North Koreans hysterically crying and gesturing, which shocked both South Koreans and people across the world. The son of Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-un, is presently threatening the world by developing nuclear weapons and proclaiming hostility against the United States and South Korea (SK). World leaders around the peninsula are perplexed about to how to react; the behavioural pattern of NK and its young leader are entirely unpredictable due to the dearth of information regarding this closed society.
Media outlets are not able to access images of modern-day NK and, therefore, it is almost impossible to imagine what is really happening inside the nation. Our images of the country are largely limited to the same year-old clips: marching soldiers in Kim Il-sung Plaza, overblown voices of newscasters denouncing Western nations and SK, and loud threats to develop nuclear technology. Recently, the military threat of NK has grown, as demonstrated by the bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island, the sinking of the Cheonan, a South Korean naval corvette, and the present nuclear experiments. Thus, the world has focused its attention on NK, watching for any indication of impending war. Despite the lack of information, the media, particularly news agencies, speculate about the outbreak of war while calling NK a threat to world peace or part of the ‘axis of evil’.
Despite the political importance of NK, a country that is seen as both a threat to world peace and the last communist dictatorship of the 21st century, we do not have enough information about NK due to its closed-door policy. This study explores a new dimension of the study of NK in order to understand the deeper level of this society. In this article, I investigate the cultural aspects of NK by examining the everyday lives of its people, a topic that has been a blind spot in the body of previous research on NK. Almost all research and policy analyses of NK have focused on ideology and governmental actions without paying attention to ordinary life. However, it is difficult to draw a complete picture of North Korean society with a sole focus on politics, particularly in such a secluded society with limited information released to the outside world.
Because of restricted access and lack of information on North Korean cultural life, I adopt a special method for my study of North Korean society. Using the theories of Foucault and the post-structuralists, I look into the micro-aspects of the social practices of ordinary people in NK. This method of post-modern ethnography is helpful in my examination of North Korean people’s micro-behaviour with regard to social change in this closed nation. I attempt to examine North Koreans’ daily lives, particularly by looking at the experience of viewing South Korean media. Viewing outside media is absolutely prohibited in NK. This study focuses on the motivations and viewing patterns of North Koreans and how South Korean visual media relate to North Koreans’ everyday lives.
This research is particularly relevant to the social change brought about by youth culture in NK because adolescent culture can be an indicator of the society’s future. Rebellion among adolescents exists in NK, even though people are not free to express themselves and are politically repressed. Watching South Korean media, which is totally prohibited by the political powers, is a fad among young North Koreans. It is seen as delinquent behaviour by the authorities, as severe as violence or running away. Young North Koreans risk being caught and sent to jail in order to secretly watch South Korean TV shows and films. Despite the severity of punishment if they are caught, it is very common these days for North Koreans to view South Korean and Western media.
The viewing patterns of media in people’s daily lives may be one of the few indicators of social change in NK. Even though some would argue that micro-changes in the daily lives of people, such as media-viewing patterns, have no significance until they become a structural transformation, NK has been closed and stagnant for so long that it is difficult to notice major changes by looking solely at political and structural dimensions. Although most studies have focused on governmental policies and political leaders in the nation, it is hard to predict the major signs of social change from this information. This audience study of young North Koreans is also meaningful in the sense that a marginal activity like watching TV in a social minority group could signify major social changes in the most stagnant society in the world. This study adopts the theories of Foucault and other theories of ‘postmodern ethnography’ (Clifford and Marcus, 1986; Marcus and Fisher, 1986). Some may argue against the validity of applying post-modern or post-structural theories to NK, where traditional oppression and military tension are intact. Nevertheless, post-modern ethnography can detect micro-changes in this closed society that conventional (modern/structural) theories tend to ignore, while focusing on macro-transformation of the political side of NK.
Reviewing the ideological aspect of North Korean studies
There have been ample studies on NK since it is an idiosyncratic case in a contemporary world. Two of the most published topics related to dictatorial communism are world peace and human-rights issues. Researchers and policymakers in SK are particularly interested in the governmental activities of NK because of military confrontations in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Recently, since military confrontations were extended into SK’s own territory, SK, as well as international powers surrounding the Korean Peninsula, including the United States, Japan, Russia and China, have been eager to discover any small bits of information about NK.
However, past studies on NK illustrate the limitations to exploring the reality of this country solely by examining military and political conditions. Although the North Korean case is of great interest among researchers in SK, they tend to have presumptions about NK because of the political conflict between the two countries. Additionally, lack of information about NK hinders the completion of studies for those outside the country. Because of these two factors, what could be a diverse group of research topics about NK becomes a single dimension: politics.
The cultural studies of NK are politicized as well, as North Korean cultural phenomena are interpreted only in terms of political motivations and functions. Most researchers view the culture of NK as a political tool exercised by a monopolist power (Jun, 2007; Kim, 2006; Lim, 2000; Oh, 2004). They find that art, popular culture and even religion are supported or undermined depending on political motivations. This view is consistent with the idea that in communist societies, any form of art or culture has existed for the purposes of revolution and political propaganda since the Leninist regime. Cultural research on NK has shown that while NK broke the Lenin communist dogma by prioritizing military power, a practice known as Songun 1 politics, it also uses art and popular culture in order to educate and mobilize people under the control of a monopolist leader, formerly Kim Jong-il, now Kim Jong-un (Ha, 2003; Jung, 2008). Studies of NK’s youth culture have been a continuation of these claims. Many adolescent studies define the identity and culture of North Korean youth in connection to ‘Juche philosophy’ 2 and loyalty to the Kim family (Kil, 2002; Lee, 2001).
However, a new phase of studies on NK has emerged as refugees have come into SK from NK since the turn of the century. Through the stories of North Korean refugees, a more realistic view of daily life in NK has emerged. Since the mid-2000s, empirical studies on NK have been proliferating in various areas. These studies have contributed to a more accurate picture of the reality of North Korean society (Cho, 2009; Lee etal., 2008). Nevertheless, the recent empirical works in North Korean studies have not provided a broader perspective on the society, but, instead, remain focused on potential insights into the current political situation. Most studies consider refugees as a sample in order to predict problems that would occur after a reunification of SK and NK. The main research interests that these empirical studies share are the challenges that face North Korean refugees in adjusting to the South Korean lifestyle. As for adolescent studies, many empirical studies indicate how young North Koreans have adjusted to both school and family problems in SK (Jun etal., 2004; Kim, 2008). Media studies have also focused on the function of media in the refugees’ adjustment to South Korean society (Lee, 2000; Lee and Woo, 2004; Lee, 2003; Sung, 2008).
The problem with most empirical studies on North Korean refugees is that they fail to show the cultural aspect of everyday life in North Korean society. No one can deny that brutal repression is carried out by the North Korean regime. Patrimonial tyranny has controlled the entire society for three generations and people are militarily mobilized in constant terror. Yet, human beings cannot be unilaterally controlled by a repressive power for a long time. Even with political dictatorship, there is always diversity in culture and lifestyles.
In a series of studies on ordinary North Koreans, researchers focussed on devastating situations that people have experienced in NK. These studies made attempts to examine the real-life experiences of North Korean refugees. Lee et al. (2008) illustrated changes in the everyday life of NK, as witnessed by refugees. Yet, their focus was solely on the economic difficulties and changes in political institutions that were happening in NK. The testimony of refugees only played a partial role in the studies, providing simple information about public areas in NK.
Compared to Lee, Cho (2009) went one step further in examining everyday life in NK. Referring to Edoardo Grendi, her research was designed to illustrate the ‘micro history’ of NK (p. 4). In addition to conducting interviews with 29 refugees, Cho mainly examined North Korean literature, including novels. She analyzed literature describing the ‘Arduous March’, 3 but only cited a few lines of refugees’ statements, as North Korean art and literature could be publicized only when it fits the political position of Kim Jong-il’s government.
Present research on NK continues to investigate the ample literature and political claims available to researchers, regardless of the focus of the studies. Academic work with regard to NK has not been diversified. Instead, next to world peace, the topics of famine and human-rights violations in NK have received the most scholarly attention. NK is sometimes called the ‘Rogue Regime’, even in academic papers (Becker, 2005). While North Korean studies omit diverse aspects of human life stories in NK, most studies simplify human-rights issues, famine and other cultural problems as being caused by a lunatic political leadership (Chon etal., 2009; Haggard and Noland, 2007; Park etal., 2010).
To detect the social changes happening inside this closed society, we need to change our perspective and look into everyday practice at the marginal level. It is useful to revisit the first chapter of Foucault’s (1977) book, Discipline and Punish, in order to explain the repressive nature of North Korean society. Foucault describes theatrical scenes of torture with a guillotine before modern criminology existed. For Foucault, physical torture and bloody violence, that is, repressive power, are more easily overturned by revolt than with scientific guidelines or power/knowledge. North Korean politics can be compared to the brutal scene in the first chapter of Foucault’s book, which shows pervasive control and terror. However, this repressive power will not continue to function at the micro-level. The brutal power of North Korean political authority will eventually be exposed by those who are under its control. Those who are marginalized will begin engaging in resistance to the blind oppression in their everyday lives.
This study is an attempt to bring a cultural aspect to studies on NK. Culture is not solely reflected in the ‘superstructure’ of political power, as shown in previous studies on North Korean culture, media and adolescence. These conventional studies assume a prototype of NK projected as a political and ideological power. Even when researchers examine cultural phenomena, they resort to describing them as auxiliaries or by-products of NK’s political dimension.
In contrast, this study will shift the focus from structural power at the top to micro-power at the bottom by looking at the daily lives of a minority of North Koreans in order to hear the voices of adolescents who have been ignored by mainstream society. Through an examination of this small group of North Koreans, we may gain insights into social changes occurring inside this repressive society.
To gain this insight, the television-viewing patterns of young North Koreans were chosen as the focus of this study. I anticipated that media-viewing patterns in NK might indicate signs of change more than any other grand-scale transformation in the politics or economy. Watching the media in NK must be more than just a means of entertainment or escape for North Koreans, as they are sent to jail, destroying their families, if caught. Therefore, I conducted an ethnographic study of the young audience in NK who watched South Korean media at the risk of severe punishment.
This study illustrates interesting theoretical points, such as how cultural resistance may lead to important social changes in countries like NK, even where modernization is delayed and globalization is marginalized. Adopting Foucauldian ethnography helps to examine the cultural resistance involved in young North Koreans’ media-watching patterns. Although NK is far from a post-modern society, examining the everyday practices of its people can provide insights into understanding the cultural practices and social changes led by marginalized people in an oppressive society. Such insights can be seen in Rabinow’s (1977) Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco, followed by diverse ethnographic studies in Thailand, sub-Saharan Africa and South America (Arac, 1991; Emerson 1995; Pels and Salemink, 2002). ‘Postmodern ethnography’ in these pre-modern or modernizing societies provides a revision of the theoretical stance of Foucault and later Foucauldian theories. Instead of focusing on ‘biopolitics’ designed in the most knowledge-advanced society that Foucault and other post-modernists presumed, ethnography in a less modernized society draws the perspective of micro-politics without adopting all of the post-modern arguments. The research strategies have a phenomenological emphasis, similar to Rabinow’s Moroccan study, and a changing perspective that can be applied to non-Western and less liberal societies. Rabinow emphasizes the importance of a full-scale description to follow the identity formation of ordinary people in Moroccan cultural environments. Even though description and cultural interpretation are the first step in ethnography, this study attempted to go one step further, turning its attention to Foucault’s concept of technologies of self while studying media-watching patterns in a repressive and traditional society.
Media reception of young North Koreans
Although NK is an isolated and repressive society threatening peace and proliferating nuclear weapons, young people in NK still have room to create their own culture, however limited the resources. As a minority, young people have the privilege of developing their own culture while outside of society’s spotlight. Young people have this freedom because they are neglected by people in the mainstream who are busy surviving economic and political difficulties. Young North Koreans develop their own culture or sub-culture by playing around and ridiculing the dominant ideology, although it is true that they are not totally free from the control of top-down power.
The cultural study of young North Koreans did not inspire me until I visited Beijing for another research project and observed foreign students from NK who were as fond of South Korean media and celebrities as South Koreans. I immediately started this study on NK because it surprised me a great deal, especially considering the hostility that exists between SK and NK. There is no official cultural or media exchange between South and NK besides very restrictive relations of economic cooperation in the Gaesung free trade zone, governmental affairs including once-a-year family reunions, tourism (which has now stopped due to military conflict) and humanitarian aid. There has hardly been any contact among ordinary people in SK and NK for the last half century.
For the purpose of this research study, I initially solicited interviews from North Korean students at Peking University (PKU) through a Chinese professor, but the North Korean students declined to come to the interviews. I had to find an alternative way of pursuing this research and thus began interviewing refugees from NK who are presently living in SK (Table 1).
Interview subjects.
N: Northern Province; S: Southern Province; F: Father; M: Mother; h: hour; w: week.
I conducted an ethnographic study of young refugees who are presently attending a special high school for only North Korean refugees. It was difficult to get access to the subjects at first due to security problems. Because some refugees’ family members are still in NK or are in China waiting for a chance to come to SK, it would be detrimental for these refugees to identify themselves. After several attempts to request interviews, I was able to contact interview subjects with assistance from an official in a high position in the Defense Security Command (DSC). 4
Interview participants voluntarily took part in my research study, and once we had met, they were outspoken and frank. It did not take much time to create a rapport between the interviewer (myself) and interviewees, which allowed us to get to the main discussion without delay. I had both private and group meetings with interview subjects between April and June 2010, a period of 3 months. Each interviewee had between two and seven private meetings with me and one group meeting. Interviews lasted about an hour to an hour-and-a-half. In addition to in-depth interviews, I engaged in participatory observation of their classroom and extracurricular activities at the school. Participatory observation for this research project started with foreign students from NK in Beijing and extended to refugees who are in SK now.
I selected interview subjects from among those who came to SK no more than 3 years ago and had experience of viewing South Korean media when they were still in NK. Since my focus of study was adolescent life in NK, I explored their everyday experiences in NK through their own memories. Although this method is one of the limitations of this research study, it was the best method available to gather information on adolescent lifestyles in NK.
Adolescent culture in NK
In interviews, young refugees from NK remembered their adolescent experiences before coming to SK:
In NK, there’s no interest other than playing outside. We enjoyed playing all sorts of physical games since there’s no computer or any other means. There was no expectation for us to study hard or to accomplish anything because studying did not promise any success in NK. If there weren’t problems with necessities and enough food, NK would be a paradise for children and young people.
In NK, there’s a kind of caste system. Without money, one cannot achieve a high position. So normally, parents did not ask us to study.
In the interviews, memories of NK for the young refugees sounded more positive than I had expected. South Koreans presume that people in NK are miserable, have no leisure time and suffer from poverty, obstruction of their human rights and oppression all the time. The young people from NK recalled fun memories, although they did not forget to mention their experiences with lack of necessities and personal care, both from their families and from the society. Because of the exploitation of human resources and pervasive bribery in the society, the personal care and educational opportunities of youth are neglected.
However, Boy 2 recalled NK as a ‘paradise for children with its lack of necessities’. All the boys and girls who participated in the interviews shared their experiences of enjoying their leisure time in NK. They had parties, love affairs and athletic activities, similar to young people in any other country. Young North Koreans had a chance to create their own leisure culture because of the small amount of social pressure for future success, which was the result of social problems such as the quasi-caste system and political corruption that were mentioned by the interview participants.
Young North Koreans were able to develop their own leisure culture under their limited means. Most activities that they enjoyed were prohibited by the mainstream, such as violence, forbidden parties and sometimes drugs and gambling. In private interviews, Boy 2 mentioned that he missed the fight competitions between groups and Boy 1 admitted to indulging in computer gambling while in NK. Youngsters managed to enjoy such delinquent behaviours due to the failure of social integration in NK.
In such circumstances, viewing South Korean media was one of the popular ways in which young North Koreans enjoyed their leisure time, even though it was as prohibited by society as other delinquent activities. Watching South Korean media provided North Korean youngsters with an outlet to dream of an alternative lifestyle to that of mainstream North Korean culture. Watching South Korean media was one of the rebellious cultural activities that young people engaged in at the risk of going to jail. 5 These young people took this risk for nothing more than the entertainment value of daily activities like watching TV in a society where persistent repression and terror prevailed.
Although NK is the most secluded society in the world, ordinary people in NK expose themselves to foreign culture and artefacts, part of an underground culture. Media is the leading force drawing people’s interests in foreign lifestyles. I conducted a survey regarding the experience of South Korean media while the students were living in NK. The survey was completed in the high school for refugees, which is the largest group of North Korean refugees gathered in SK (Table 2).
Survey of SK media consumption in NK.
N: Northern Province; S: Southern Province.
Among 140 respondents (from a total of 164 students), 79 (56%) said that they had viewed South Korean media while in NK. Among them, 40 said that they viewed South Korean media whenever they wanted. This figure is quite surprising because viewing South Korean media is absolutely prohibited in NK. 6
In the interviews, young refugees shared their experiences of how they were able to access South Korean media in NK:
I think two thirds of people around my neighbourhood were seeing South Korean media. We could rent or buy CDs and DVDs smuggled in from China.
When we watched Korean media through DVDs, more than 10 people gathered together, men and women, children and adults. In the market, there are stores that rent foreign programmes secretly. It was not expensive.
Even though NK officially closes its doors to any foreign influence, its people manage to get access to foreign media through the black market. Cultural geography affects the degree of exposure to foreign and South Korean media in NK, and the viewing of these media outlets prevails in all areas of NK. Despite the fact that the interview subjects were refugees who crossed the border, their statements illustrated the media reception of North Korean people, the majority of who watch South Korean and Western media. In the interviews, these young people knew the titles of South Korean TV dramas and the names of celebrities who were popular while they were living in NK. According to the interview statements, young North Korean people imitate the fashions, dances and songs of South Korean media. This imitation could also be observed in the North Korean students in Beijing.
In this way, ordinary people in NK contribute to getting access to foreign culture by creating an underground culture at the bottom. Among them, young people are the ones who predominantly engage in these underground activities. Interestingly, the dissemination of South Korean media to the general population is more pervasive where technological and economic means are less available in NK. Because NK has problems supplying electricity and producing media content, people seek alternative ways to enjoy their leisure time. The black market prospers because of the political isolation and economic hardship that the North Korean government maintains.
It is not only through media, but also through direct contact, that the people of NK get in touch with foreign cultures:
I kept coming to China by crossing the Duman River. 7 My parents smuggled me into China and I became an expert in crossing the border in order to deliver money to my grandparents living in North Korea. Yes, it was dangerous risking my life every time. I was scared to death at first, but I felt like coming home at last.
More and more people are crossing the national border of NK and China, although they have to put their lives at risk. In an interview, Boy 3 told me that although he was scared at first, the border crossing later became a routine. In interviews, all students shared their experiences of having access to foreign materials and culture when they remembered their everyday lives in NK. Research results revealed the fact that foreign contact in NK is much higher than we presumed. This rate of foreign influence is mainly due to the black market.
Despite its policy of isolation, the North Korean society as a whole cannot avoid opening its doors to the grand tide of globalization. While the government still retains tight policies, ordinary people contribute to the opening of this society by having direct and indirect contact with foreign cultures.
Media and social change
NK uses the media as the typical means of educating and persuading its people about a communist ideology inherited from Leninism. However, due to the decline of North Korean media, young people do not follow this educational principle. Even when they watched North Korean TV, the viewing pattern was close to ‘oppositional reading’, using Stuart Hall etal.’s (1980) terminology. They did not accept the ideological position of the power of the elite, but interpreted it differently with opposition to messages in the media:
I did not watch North Korean TV often because it did not seem real. It was on every day for over an hour and half, Kim Jong-il visiting here and there. I had no need to watch that … Young students were not interested in politics.
North Korean media was too boring. Kim’s family looked so unreal and hypocritical. South Korean media demonstrated real life stories that were all so interesting.
Young people who participated in interviews expressed antagonism towards North Korean media. They did not have any interest in or didn’t pay attention to the patrimonial power represented in North Korean media. The media did not achieve its ideological role, but, instead, stimulated resentment against the political regime. Most people preferred to watch South Korean media because of its depiction of the ‘reality of ordinary lives’, as indicated by Girl 2. North Koreans appreciated a genuine life story more than the advanced technology or fantastic narratives depicted in South Korean media.
Although young North Koreans have found alternative ways of opposing the ideology of the communist regime, it might be an overgeneralization to expect that the media plays a role in promoting political opposition and social change, particularly when it is limited to the secret use of forbidden media. Interviewees said that they did not make any direct attempt to oppose the government or plan for any revolutionary changes, even though they eventually fled from the political repression of NK. What the interviewees actually got out of South Korean media was an emotional reaction to the uninteresting North Korean media and a favourable reaction to South Korean media. Even though they enjoyed South Korean and foreign media, which were totally prohibited by the law, media did not play a guiding role in social transformation on a grand scale. The voices of these people tell, not a grand narrative, but, rather, a small story on a micro scale of cultural tastes.
This finding echoes post-modern ethnographic studies of Western society using a combination of Foucault’s theory and cultural studies. Combining British cultural studies and French post-structuralism, post-modern ethnography tested the applicability of the critical view to the social problems in the West. This approach is one way to detect social criticism at the deepest level in a society where overt means of repression and power no longer come to the surface. Cultural resistance opens up a new way of disclosing who holds the power in post-modern societies. Significant meaning can be found in daily activities, such as music-making in Liverpool (Cohen, 1993) and dreaming of ‘another boring day in paradise’ among rock and roll fans in America (Grossberg, 1984). These cultural tastes and leisure activities represent power and resistance in contemporary society, instead of social change on a grand scale.
The applicability of post-modern ethnography to North Korean youth culture is limited due to social differences. Obviously, NK is far from a post-modern society. Yet, the young people’s pattern of viewing South Korean media shares certain aspects of cultural meaning with those found in a post-modern society. As Grossberg observed in American pop culture, young people in NK exercise their emotional means of forming their own youth culture by enjoying South Korean media at high risk to themselves. These emotional but rebellious activities function as ‘affective alliances’ and ‘affective differences’, which are opposed to the mainstream ideology in NK (Grossberg, 1984). The difference is, however, that these cultural activities of everyday life in NK illustrate social changes on the grand scale as well. This is a society where little change may occur at the structural level, but a tremendous transformation takes place in the daily lives of its people.
It is arguable that the daily practices of minority groups in NK lead to social change through cultural resistance. One thing is clear: the youth culture of NK illustrates a significant sign of social change in spite of the political pressure that tries to undermine this social change. Young North Koreans exercise cultural resistance in emotional and mundane ways. They do not design any big plan for ideological opposition or revolution, but they do make attempts to create alternatives to political pressure. Watching South Korean media and imitating Western popular culture are illustrations of cultural resistance conducted by ordinary North Koreans:
In North Korea, it was demanded that students work out in the field. Who would like to work? Absolutely nobody. We idly gathered in groups and tried to play together while avoiding any labor.
Boy 2 pointed out an interesting aspect of the young North Koreans’ resistance. When students were largely mobilized to do public labour, they had no interest in working and, instead, organized resistant activities to the political demands by playing around in groups. Young people demonstrated their disagreement indirectly by idling, joking and playing around, instead of working. In this case, the resistance of young people is not simply a way of expressing political opposition, but is also a major sign of social change in NK. Small leakages in governmental power, shown in the attitudes of young people and the government’s failure to control ordinary activities in workplaces and schools, will inevitably lead to social change.
In other cases, North Korean youngsters take themselves out of the system by withdrawing from school. They attempt to avoid ideological education and political mobilization by rejecting the system itself:
I did not go to school after elementary school. My mother was a teacher and was homeschooling me … I hate to work at school.
I had not gone to school since the fourth grade in NK because I was in and out of China often.
These students did not appreciate institutional education. Schools in NK ceased to function as an ideological apparatus, not to mention a proper educational system. Young people rejected the social values that had been demolished already among ordinary people while being away from this ideological apparatus. They considered schools a means of political oppression.
The viewing of South Korean media is not only an outlet from the repressive power imposed on young North Koreans, but also a sign of rejection of the social structure. All the students who participated in interviews preferred South Korean media because it described real-life stories, while North Korean media, which showed only politics and education, was boring to them. Although it was forbidden to watch any South Korean or Western media, it was almost an open secret that North Koreans watched these media in their everyday lives. All the students told me that they did not talk about media for fear of being arrested while watching South Korean media at home, together with their families:
We were caught once at home while watching South Korean media. Someone in my neighborhood must have made a report. Intelligence Agency personnel came and had a discussion with my parents and then went away after a short while. I did not know what was going on, but can assume that my parents gave them some money.
It was surprising how many people got away with being caught in the entirely politicized society of NK. According to the experiences of the interviewees, NK was not as tightly controlled as was thought due to political corruption and management inefficiency. Even when people were caught, they could escape being punished by bribing public servants, as Girl 1 stated. NK officially considers SK and Western societies as enemies, but most people enjoyed viewing South Korean media and Hollywood films. In the interviews, the students frequently mentioned the movie, Titanic, and Hollywood action movies as well as South Korean films and TV dramas. In the leakage of social control, young people enjoyed a forbidden culture as a means of resistance against the oppressive political authority.
Visual fantasy and social adjustment
In the interviews, the students spoke about fantasies that they had while watching South Korean media while living under the pressures of NK. South Korean media was a source of entertainment and retreat from the futureless frustration they anticipated if they continued to live in NK. The students revealed their fantasies regarding South Korean society that they experienced as a result of access to media. Under the social pressures and repression of NK, they found alternative lifestyles and human relations demonstrated in SK’s media.
In a group interview, the participants explained the fantasy that they had while watching South Korean visual media:
I thought that all people in South Korea were living in big houses. Since TV showed rich people, there’s a gap between fantasy and reality that I discovered after I came to South Korea.
Me too. By watching South Korean TV, I dreamed of how to decorate a big second story house with a handsome guy (laughs).
In North Korea, we could also buy good apartments as long as we could afford to pay. There’s no difference in that aspect (between North and South Korea).
I thought there were no problems with necessities in South Korea, but there are 100 times more worries here than in North Korea. Everybody makes an effort to find a job here.
Since the motivations of the South Korean media audience in NK were high because of the risk of being arrested, their expectations were so high that they believed what they saw on TV was all real. The interviewees were disappointed with the reality that they had experienced once they were established in SK.
Presently, media frequently report that there was a problem with the social adjustment of refugees from NK. Many of them failed to adjust to SK and experienced problems, such as becoming involved with drugs, gambling addictions and crime or credit problems. Some refugees even flew back to NK because they could not adjust to the new social system. This proves that there is a large social gap between SK and NK. People have started to suspect that it would not be easy to achieve social integration, even after a reunification of Korea takes place. Cultural exchange and media exchange between SK and NK are the most frequently cited solutions to these problems among policymakers and researchers preparing for reunification.
The effort to aid social integration through the media is a complex process, particularly when the cultural gap between the two societies is so large. Media also carry their own cultural bias, which makes the process even more complicated. The ideology transmitted by South Korean media distorts an adolescent culture that is already biased because of the social problems in NK. Among many other ideological problems, the gender issue was the most frequently addressed in group interviews:
I like a man who is good at fighting.
Yes. Someone who could save me.
A man who could protect me in the troubled world.
In North Korea, most girls like strong, tough men. They do not appreciate gentlemen. Because North Korea has no contact with foreign culture, old traditions are retained.
In North Korea, boys are often involved in group fighting. Every girl likes good fighters. Who would like wimpy boys?
In a group interview, the students addressed gender differences in their preferences of TV genres and ideal types of partnerships. They demonstrated that traditional gender ideals are still engrained in the minds of North Korean youth. The interview process was also awkward in the group setting as compared to the active participation I got in individual interviews. The participants knew each other well from living in the same dormitory, but it was hard to get them involved in a deeper conversation.
In the perspective of the economic and political hardships in NK, the gender issue seemed particularly distorted:
In North Korea, women usually earned the money. Men had a duty to keep their jobs with no pay.
In our neighborhood, all women worked and earned money.
Women had to earn money because men could not.
Despite that, men claimed their superiority.
According to the interview subjects, most North Korean women work for the black market in order to provide necessities, whereas men were required to work for the government without pay. Households rely on female labour to survive. However, the positive correlation between economic activity and the social position of women cannot be generalized in the North Korean society. In socialist countries, since men and women both work, the social position of women is considered higher compared to that in conventional capitalism. On the contrary, NK’s seclusion from the developed world allows the concept of patriarchy to stay intact there. Additionally, with the political corruption and economic problems, people cannot live on the money that they are given by the government and women have to work in the black market and manufacture goods at home. In spite of the economic contribution of women to the household, women are still discriminated against due to traditional gender roles that are upheld in North Korean society. Viewing patterns of media between boys and girls reflect the ongoing patriarchal power in North Korean society.
South Korean media, on the one hand, presents a fantasy to young people who are living in a repressive society without sufficient necessities. These disadvantaged youths use media as a compensation for the misery of their everyday lives. Economically advanced and sophisticated life stories in South Korean media provide a niche for them to breathe and create ideas of meaning and value on their own. On the other hand, although South Korean TV shows and films include a depiction of a modern, advanced lifestyle, they also tend to reinforce the old tradition of patriarchy that North Koreans learn in real-life history. Young people resist the social values and political repression that are imposed on them in NK. Watching South Korean media is an indirect way of demonstrating their resistance against patrimonial tyranny. Young people absorb the ‘Cinderella dream’ and materialism that South Korean media continue to emphasize throughout their programmes. Young people became vulnerable to a new type of ideological power contained in the patriarchal media of SK. These ideological mechanisms bind the audience’s feeling of lack and distress while reinforcing the pre-existing patriarchal power over them.
In private meetings, the interviewees shared their traumatic experiences that derived from patriarchal power in NK:
I was not worried about anything but the relationship between my mom and dad. Dad drank a lot and was violent. Now he has passed away. He beat me and my sister. He beat my mom when they had quarrels. He had not been like that until he changed his job from policeman to construction worker.
Girl 2’s statement illustrates how patriarchal power turned into violence and child abuse in her young life history. Women and children become victimized easily in North Korean society. Girl 3 also mentioned that she had been quiet and made no demands since a very young age because her father died and her sister was given to another family due to poverty during the period of the ‘Arduous March’. 8 Her mother was eager to earn money afterwards. In her situation, South Korean media gave her the only joy she experienced in NK.
It is ironic that these youngsters who suffered from pervasive patriarchal power, which manifested itself in repressive and sometimes physically violent forms, still believe in gender discrimination. Girls dream of macho saviours who offer material goods and protection while watching South Korean media. South Korean media reinforce traditional gender roles by mixing them with commercialism and magnificent visual technology.
Conclusion
There have been many studies on NK due to its threat to world peace and other practical interests. However, there has been little research on the cultural aspects of this society, as if it were a cultureless organ of war machinery. This research paper attempts to bring cultural elements of North Korean society to light by examining the everyday lives of ordinary people. Although NK is ideologically dogmatic and politically dictatorial, it is still a society where people create their own meaning in their everyday lives. On a level deeper than political tyranny, ordinary North Koreans practice resistance in diverse ways at the micro-level. Young people in NK create their own sub-culture, despite the fact that the society blocks any freedom and social mobility. The government exercises tight control from the top, but this control can never reach to the very bottom because of social disintegration. Due to persistent poverty and pervasive corruption, social minority exists in a blind spot of social care and control. Young people as a social minority are free to create their own resistant culture in the social underside.
Visual media is one of the strongest means of expressing the identity of youth culture in NK. Young people enjoy foreign visual media, particularly those South Korean TV shows and films that are banned in NK for political reasons. People manage to watch South Korean media by renting through the black market. With little hope for the future, the visual fantasy of South Korean media allows youth to dream of an alternative way of life. Watching South Korean TV is not simply a means of escaping from reality, but also a means of signifying social change. Watching South Korean media at the risk of going to jail is an expression of the resistant culture against pervasive terror in NK. NK is a prominent case of a country where cultural aspects lead to social change in spite of continuous political rigidity.
Footnotes
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.