Mainstream media’s coverage of the Gezi protests and protesters’ perception of mainstream media

Abstract

This article seeks to analyse how different sets of media covered the Gezi protests, whether the protest paradigm model varied according to the ideological leanings of newspapers, and whether social media created an alternative way for citizens to gather information while bypassing domestic news media. Furthermore, the study examines protesters’ perceptions of mainstream media coverage of the Gezi Park protests. It is important to understand how the exchange of information and idea flows in a polarized media environment and social media tools affected this process in Turkey.

Keywords

Content analysis framing Internet interviewing movements

Introduction

Millions of Turkish people turned to Twitter for information during the Gezi Park demonstration. The mainstream news media, on the other hand, had a hard time showing what was happening in Taksim Square and failed to shape public opinion by framing this event properly. The Gezi protests involved a diverse profile of demonstrators, including environmentalists, Kurds, secular nationalists, and even some Islamists (Letsch, 2013). Therefore, understanding the reasons for such a wide-scale mobilization from such a diverse range of backgrounds is important.

A free press is an important actor in any democracy. It provides accountability and encourages healthy public debate (Norris, 2008). According to a Freedom House report, a Washington-based non-governmental organization (NGO), the mainstream media in Turkey is not fully free. The report concluded that Turkey’s government is improperly using its leverage over media to limit public debate about government actions (Corke, 2013). This problem is very common among powerful governments all around the world, but it is a serious problem for the public. Government’s attempts to control the media damage the media’s role as a watchdog. Because of former Prime Minister and current President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s way of conducting politics and the government’s intervention in the media, the mainstream media have become more polarized in Turkey (Erkus, 2013). Anglo-Saxon-type media emphasizes pluralism and an ethics of the Fourth Estate (Foys, 2008). In that type of media environment, journalists act as watchdogs who must report rather than opine, but this has not been universal (Alexander, 2002) Turkey’s mainstream media have strong connections with politicians and other power groups. Turkish news media in particular are all fairly unambiguously identified with particular political tendencies (Cook, 2013).

From this point of view, it makes sense to distinguish Turkish news media outlets as pro- and anti-government. While pro-government news media are directly influenced by the government, anti-government media are influenced by the opposition political parties. In this polarized media environment, social media have become important media channels for citizens who are looking to express their opinions freely. Especially during the protests, social media were used by citizens to bypass the mainstream media and to present an alternative representation of the events.

This study examines the framing of Turkey’s Gezi demonstration. The purpose of this study is to understand how the mainstream news media framed the Gezi demonstration and how the protesters used Twitter to bypass the mainstream media and frame the demonstration themselves. Social media mobilized a diverse group of protestors, including environmentalists, soccer fans, Kurds, secular nationalists, and even some leftist Islamists, making the social media part of this study important in understanding how this diverse group of protesters framed the demonstration. What was their definition of the problem and their perceived cause of the protest? Also, during the protests, many people relied on Twitter to get more balanced and more accurate news because most of the mainstream news media ignored the demonstration initially. This reliance on Twitter shows how individuals used social media to bypass the mainstream media, using Twitter as an alternative information source. During the protest, because of the ignorance of the domestic news media, the international media was informed by citizen journalists through Twitter. Protesters also shared news and photographs produced by citizen journalists and the international media to show the public what was really happening in Taksim Square. This is important because it shows how social media users can bypass mainstream media to shape public opinion with social media tools. This study examines two pro-government newspapers and two anti-government newspapers. It also examines the protesters’ tweets collected during the 10 days of the protests to understand how the users framed the Gezi demonstration. Finally, some protesters were interviewed to understand their perception of mainstream media’s coverage of the event.

Background

Gezi Park is an urban park near Taksim Square. This area used to be the historical military building of the Ottoman Empire in 1940 (De Monchaux, 2013), which is why Erdogan attempted to rebuild the Ottoman Empire barracks in Gezi Park. Before the Gezi protests, nobody would have guessed that this small park would become the cause for a big conflict between the government and the people. The protest began after the municipality of Istanbul declared that it would transform this park into a barracks as it used to be earlier (De Monchaux, 2013). After Istanbul’s declaration, protesters occupied the park to protect the park’s trees. They pitched tents and began living in the park (Kirisci, 2013). When the police tried to suppress the demonstrations with tear gas and water cannons, the demonstration received public attention and the protests spread to other cities in Turkey. During the first days of the demonstration, the police used an excessive amount of tear gas and water cannons to disperse the protesters, and these police actions received a great deal of attention online (Ozisik, 2013). One might wonder why this kind of environmental protest became widespread. The answer is not easy, and we need to look at Turkey’s democratic journey and Erdogan’s way of doing politics to find it.

Turkey has been a democratic and secular country since 1924, but Turkey’s road to democracy has not been easy. Turkey’s democracy was interrupted three times by military coups (Karadjis, 1997). After the Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi (RP)) was banned in 1997 for Islamist activities, in 2002, the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), a party with an Islamist pedigree (the Justice and Development Party), received 34.2 per cent of the votes. This result showed that Turkish people supported democracy and were against anti-democratic interventions. AKP’s success was a reaction against the military coups and the Islamist Welfare Party’s ban. In 2007, the military published a memorandum against the AKP on its official website and became involved in Turkish politics again, but the memorandum received a negative reaction from the public. After this military involvement, the AKP received the majority of the Turkish electorate’s votes. The military’s anti-democratic involvement in politics was one of the main reasons for the AKP’s success because, after the 2011 election, the AKP became the most powerful government in the history of Turkish multi-party politics (Cakmak, 2007). Erdogan’s party has won three general elections and has achieved the greatest economic growth in Turkey’s history. This power and success have led to Erdogan meddling in people’s private lives, and his ambitions have caused a lot of conflict when they interfered with people’s private lives. Moreover, while Erdogan recalled for today’s Turks the glories of their warrior ancestors, the Ottomans, some secular and liberal Turks see this image as a threat to the secular state and fear that Erdogan is trying to reverse the legacy of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (Cakmak, 2007). This is why worried secular and liberal citizens joined the protests and why the protests became so widespread in Turkey.

The mainstream media did not adequately report on these protests until some protesters mocked the mainstream media on Twitter (Baykurt, 2014). Twitter is free and open to all, and because of its interactive structure, people are able to interact with other protesters and support them. Because Twitter provided the ability to instantaneously spread messages to the people, the Gezi protests quickly gained momentum on Twitter. Hundreds of thousands of people posted tweets about the protests. In Turkey, public trust towards the mainstream media has been eroding, and so Turkey has been witnessing an explosion in online social media networks recently. Turkey is ranked fourth in global usage of Facebook and eighth for Twitter usage (Bluff, 2012). These usage rankings reveal that social media are powerful rivals to Turkey’s mainstream media. The protesters’ usage of social media during the demonstration has been phenomenal. They relied mostly on Twitter during the protests. For example, the protesters posted about 2 million tweets mentioning hashtags related to the protests in a single day.

Method

To examine how Turkish mainstream media and social media users framed the Gezi protests, a content analysis was conducted. A sample of mainstream media coverage and social media posts between 1 and 10 June 2013 was examined. The content analysis involved examining four newspapers. Two of these newspapers are regarded as pro-government newspapers because of the government’s strong influence on their content: Sabah (N = 44) and Zaman (N = 46) (Reuters, 2008). For example, Sabah has been described as a ‘major pro-government newspaper’ in The New York Times (Pfanner, 2013). The other two newspapers are regarded as anti-government newspapers: Hurriyet (N = 75) and Posta (N = 68). These newspapers were strongly opposed to the government and under the influence of the opposition party. These newspapers were chosen because they were among the most circulated newspapers and they dominate the domestic news coverage in Turkey. In addition, 300 tweets were randomly collected from protesters’ Twitter accounts between 2 and 10 June 2013. To collect tweets, the direngezipark and occupygezi hashtags were examined. Furthermore, 38 protesters were interviewed to examine their perceptions of the mainstream media coverage. Protesters were found by searching Twitter accounts. First, we contacted the protesters and asked them for an interview. We contacted 55 protesters, but only 42 of them accepted our interview request. Because we wanted to interview real protesters, we asked several questions to determine whether they had joined the protests in person or whether they were just tweeting about the protest. They were asked whether they had been to Taksim Square at least once during the protests and whether they had actively joined the protest. After our pre-interview questions, we dropped six of them because they were ineligible. Finally, we interviewed 38 protesters. Interviews were conducted through Skype and Gmail Talk. Each interview was for 10 minutes. The framing categories were conceptualized by reviewing the literature. According to Entman, news can be framed in multiple ways (Entman, 1993). Scholars use several common themes to explain media coverage: emphasizing the conflict, emotional aspect of the news, and the economic consequences of the conflict (Entman, 1993). These themes are common because they can provide a definition of the problem and a diagnosis of the reason.

Variables and operationalization of frames

To answer research question 1, each media set (pro-government, anti-government, and Twitter) was examined to understand which dominant frames were used to frame the Gezi protests. The following frames were counted: 1 – injustice frames defined as injustice being done or as emphasizing moral outrage; 2 – legitimizing frames, defined as protests have legitimate reasons; 3 – de-legitimizing frames, defined as marginalizing or radicalizing protesters; 4 – sympathy frames, defined as showing sympathy to the protesters; 5 – spectacle frames, defined as focusing on violence, emotion or drama in the protests; and 6 – contextual frames, defined as focusing on the background of the protest or in-depth coverage of the protests (Harlow and Johnson, 2011).

To answer research questions 2 and 3, one of Gerhard and Rucht’s (1992) collective action frames, the diagnostic frame, was used. News articles and tweets were examined to understand how each defined the problem and diagnosed the reason.

Finally, in-depth interviews were used to answer research question 4. The protesters’ responses were examined to see their perceptions of mainstream media’s coverage of the Gezi protest and their perceptions of the mainstream media. Interviewees were asked about the mainstream media’s coverage of the Gezi Park protests. Did they think the coverage of the Gezi protest was fair or balanced? Moreover, we asked some questions about their perceptions of the Turkish mainstream media. What did they think of the mainstream media? Did they trust the mainstream media or not? After their responses were collected, we created some categories according to the interviewees’ responses.

A group of three students were trained to code the sample. After several codebook revisions, inter-coder reliability was achieved with seven variables at ‘substantial agreement’, where Kappa is between .64 and .79, and with 12 variables at ‘almost perfect agreement’, where Kappa is at or above .81 (Viera and Garrett, 2005).

Theory, literature, and research questions

Framing

Framing can affect both individuals and the society at large (D’Angelo, 2002). It is described by different phrases: framing building, frame setting, and individual and social consequences of framing (Scheufele, 2000). The mainstream media and political elites play an important role in building frames. News framing is an important concept to study because, usually, audiences have no other source of information, and so mainstream media coverage affects their decisions about events (Entman, 1991). In fact, a large body of literature examines how the news media frames events and how these frames affect public perception (Entman, 1991). According to Entman (1993), the mainstream media constructs a message with certain frames. He summarizes the frame concept as follows:

to frame is to select some aspect of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described. (p. 52)

As Entman suggested, the mainstream media highlighted or excluded some aspects of the Gezi protests. Moreover, it defined the problem and diagnosed the reasons for the event, but because Turkey has a fractured (polarized) media environment, we assumed that there would not be a homogenous coverage of the protests.

Polarized media environment

Polarization has been one of the dominant themes in discussions of Turkey’s politics in the last decades. According to the literature, there is strong evidence that polarization is associated with increased levels of gridlock in the political system (Binder and Forrest, 2002; Jones, 2001). Political polarization, not surprisingly, causes media polarization too. Some researchers state that the introduction of different media technologies has had substantial impact not only on political outcomes, but also on individual views and attitudes (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007; Gentzkow, 2006; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2004; Stromberg, 2004). So the media may help diffuse views and attitudes about any event. Moreover, according to the ‘echo chamber’ argument, new media technologies have tended to increase polarization (Bishop, 2008; Sunstein, 2009) because new media have allowed people to select media outlets that conform to their prior ideological views. In Turkey, the polarization problem was not just because of the polarized political environment, but also because of the problematic ownership structures. Many media companies have investments in other sectors, such as energy and construction. Due to these investments, some media companies have strong ties with the government (White, 2013).

Therefore, the ownership issue is the most important barrier to press freedom and quality journalism in Turkey. According to Arslan (2013), hate speech was strengthened in Turkey after the Gezi protests as a result of the polarized political and media environment.

Social movements and social media

Recent literature has shown that the media coverage of the protests influenced how the public perceived the protest and the protesters and whether the public supported the protesters (Detenber et al., 2007; McLeod, 1995). Mainstream media tends to use a set of routines to cover social movements. This tendency is referred to as the ‘protest paradigm’ (Chan and Lee, 1984). Other scholars have extended this idea that the mainstream media uses some elements such as framing and relies on official sources to marginalize, de-legitimize, or demonize the protesters (McLeod and Hertog, 1999). The protest paradigm focuses on certain aspects of the protests. For example, from the perspective of the protest paradigm, the mainstream media usually focuses on some sensational details, such as violence and drama, in its coverage of protests or protesters (Kielbowicz and Scherer, 1986). In this study, we asked whether the protest paradigm can be applied to social media and mainstream news media outlets and whether such application varies according to the ideological leanings of the newspapers.

On the other hand, frames are very important for social movements because they help determine whether a movement can mobilize or not and whether the movement is successful (Snow et al., 1986). For successful mobilization, frames must be credible, which means there must be consistency between a movement’s ideals and actions. To provide a credible frame, the protesters need a credible source to show people how their actions and ideals are consistent. The credibility of a frame is very essential to a social movement’s success (Benford and Snow, 2000). During the Gezi protests, protesters shared news sources other than the domestic news media because the mainstream media initially mostly ignored the protests in Taksim Park. For example, protesters shared links to foreign newspaper articles and to citizen journalists’ photos and news on their social media accounts to show what was happening in Turkey.

Social media provide new dynamics for political change and democratization. Some researchers have suggested that the Internet and social media have democratic potential to mobilize politically inactive populations (Boulianne, 2009). Social media can eliminate prejudice and other obstacles to equal participation and make civic engagement more inclusive. The rapid growth of the Internet user population and the impact of information dissemination affected Turkey’s political and social environment. The social and active personalities of Turkish Internet users includes shared mistrust of official information sources and shared mistrust of the mainstream media in general; therefore, many citizens now rely on social media sites to learn important news.

Most framing studies have focused on the mainstream media, but online media, including social media websites, are believed to serve as an alternative source for evaluation and interpretation about relevant issues that might be overlooked or omitted by the mainstream media (Papacharissi, 2011). Therefore, framing analysis of online media is becoming a very important area of research. When analysing how different media frame social events, comparative analysis is an effective method, and cross-media comparison is one of the most frequently used contexts (Hamdy and Gomaa, 2012).

This study has three purposes. First of all, we wanted to know how different sets of media covered the Gezi protests. Second, we wanted to learn whether the protest paradigm model varied according to the ideological leanings of the newspapers. Finally, we wanted to know whether social media created an alternative way for citizens to gather information while bypassing domestic news media. It is also important to understand how the exchange of information and ideas flow in a polarized media environment and how social media tools changed or affected this process in Turkey. Turkey is evolving to become a more democratic country. Therefore, it is essential to pay attention to Turkey’s media structure and its representations of political issues.

Research questions

RQ1: Which dominant frames are employed in pro-government and anti-government media (pro-government, anti-government, and Twitter)?

RQ2: How did each media set define the problem (pro-government, anti-government, and Twitter)?

RQ3: How did each media set identify the causes of the movement?

RQ4: What were the protestors’ perceptions of Turkish mainstream media?

Results

This study intended to uncover how the Gezi Park protests were framed by Turkish newspapers and social media and what the differences were between the newspapers’ coverage and social media’s coverage. Furthermore, this study intended to understand the protesters’ perceptions of Turkish mainstream media. To answer RQ1, which frames were employed in each media set, two media sets were examined. According to the results, pro-government newspapers mostly employed (50%) the de-legitimizing frame (Table 1). The pro-government news media’s usage of the de-legitimizing frame is not surprising because the then Prime Minister Erdogan also used this frame during the protest to dehumanize the protesters. According to him, these protesters had connections with Israel and were trying to stop Turkey’s economic growth. Because of the government’s influence, the pro-government news media also described the protesters as violent and marginal people. For example, on 7 June, the pro-government newspaper Sabah ran a headline stating that the protesters had burnt down a bank in Istanbul (Ozturk, 2013). De-legitimizing frames also were useful for the ‘foreign influence scenario’ employed by the government during the protests: the pro-government newspapers usually pointed to Israel and the United States as the foreign actors involved in the protests. They especially blamed Cable News Network (CNN) and other foreign media outlets because of their international coverage of the protests.

Table 1.

Dominant frames.

Frames	Pro-government	Anti-government	p
Injustice	4 (4%)	20 (15%)	<.001
Sympathy	1 (1%)	32 (24%)	<.001
Legitimizing	0 (0%)	38 (27%)	<.001
De-legitimizing	45 (50%)	0 (0%)	<.001
Spectacle	32 (36%)	39 (28%)	ns*
Contextual	8 (9%)	8 (6%)	ns*
Total	90 (100%)	143 (100%)

nonsignificant.

Pro-government newspapers also used the spectacle frame: 36% of the articles used this frame. The newspapers primarily focused on how the protests were violent and how this violence could damage Turkey’s economic growth and affect foreign investment. For instance, the pro-government newspaper Zaman reported that the stock market might crash because of the negative effects of the violence (Isiklar, 2013). Pro-government newspapers blamed the protesters for the violence. For example, Sabah reported that protesters burnt down a police car (Kemal, 2013). Many pro-government articles used the spectacle frame to emphasize the economic implications of the violence. For example, a Sabah article reported that interest rates may go up because of the violence (Seref, 2013). On the other hand, the pro-government media failed to provide in-depth context for the protest. Only 9 per cent of the pro-government newspaper frames were contextual frames. On the other hand, the anti-government newspapers used the spectacle frame as a dominant frame. According to the results, 39 per cent of anti-government newspaper articles employed this frame. This frame type was also the most used frame by pro-government newspapers. The anti-government newspapers held government officials responsible for the violence. For example, the anti-government Hurriyet newspaper reported that the Internal Affairs Minister had commanded the police to use excessive tear gas to stop the protesters, causing some protesters to be hurt and spreading anger among the protesters (Korkmaz, 2013). The second most used frame by the anti-government newspapers was the legitimizing frame (27%) – to show the government putting pressure on freedom of expression and to show that the protesters had legitimate reasons to protest and the government was trying to obstruct the people’s right to protest.

The other frequently used frame by the anti-government newspapers was the sympathy frame – 24 per cent of the anti-government articles used this frame as a dominant frame. The pro-government newspapers rarely used this frame in comparison. For example, on 12 June, Posta’s main story was about the protesters’ cooperation. The newspaper reported that the protesters had built a library tent and created a lively, peaceful, and colourful space in Gezi Park (Dha, 2013). This was a move to show that the protestors were not seeking violence, and that it was a peaceful protest. Results have shown that both pro- and anti-government newspapers failed to provide in-depth coverage of the protest, but they relied on more sensational frames such as spectacle frames.

To answer RQ2, how each media set defined the problem, five definitions of the problem were identified. These included unrest, uprising, protests, conspiracy, and chaos (Table 2). Government officials used mainly chaos and conspiracy to define the protests. Meanwhile, the opposition parties and the government’s opponents usually used uprising and protests to define the Gezi protests. Not surprisingly, the pro-government newspapers relied on the government’s definition of the problem and mostly used the conspiracy (48%) and chaos (27%) frames. These frames were useful for making the connection between foreign actors and the protesters. The conspiracy frame especially emphasized that the protesters had connections with Israel. For instance, Sabah reported that the Israel lobby was supporting the Gezi protesters because they didn’t want Erdogan in power. Using Israel in conspiracy theories is common in Turkish politics. Especially after the 2009 Davos meeting (during which Erdogan walked off the stage after an angry exchange with the Israeli President), these kinds of Israel-related conspiracy theories have increased in Turkish politics (Arango, 2013).

Table 2.

Definitions of the problem.

	Pro	Anti	Twitter
Unrest	5 (6%)	12 (8%)	12 (4%)
Uprising	0	82 (58%)	96 (32%)
Protest	10 (11%)	47 (32%)	188 (63%)
Conspiracy	48 (53%)	1 (1%)	0
Chaos	27 (30%)	1 (1%)	4 (2%)
Total	90	143	300

X₂=75.11, df=4, p<.001.

The chaos frame was also employed by the pro-government newspapers. The chaos frame is culturally congruent in the Turkish people’s minds, so Prime Minister Erdogan also used this frame to define the Gezi protests. According to Entman (1993), ‘the more congruent the frame is with schemas that dominate the political culture, the more success it will enjoy’ (p. 43). During the 1980s, before the military coup, because of the political conflict, a number of protests occurred in Turkey between politically opposite groups. These conflicts ended with a military coup, and because of the conflicts, 50 people were executed, 500,000 were arrested, and hundreds died in prison (Ogur, 2008). Turkish democracy suffered for years from the military coup. Because of the congruency of this frame, the pro-government media also relied on this frame to define the protests. On the other hand, the anti-government newspapers mostly used the uprising frame (58%). Uprising is a powerful frame because it is close to revolution. The anti-government newspapers used this frame to show how bad the situation was. Another frame used by the anti-government newspapers to define the problem was the protests frame. In contrast, Twitter users defined the problem predominantly as protests (63%). Their definition of the problem was different from that of the pro- and anti-government newspapers, but the second most used definition was uprising (32%). Twitter users, however, did not use the conspiracy and chaos frames.

In this study, the causes of the protest (RQ3) were also examined (Table 3). Anti-government and Twitter users used the frame of suppressing freedom of expression as the cause of the protest. For example, in one tweet, a protester says, ‘The attack on the protesters is an attack on freedom of expression and democracy. We will fight for our freedom of expression’. The protesters felt that the government threatened their freedom of expression. Another protester wrote, ‘Istanbul Police will launch an investigation on Gezi tweets. Can you believe it’? The anti-government newspapers also shared this concern with the protestors. For example, on 9 June, Posta reported that the government was suing some protesters for their tweets. This concern was reasonable. During the Gezi protest, Erdogan criticized Twitter and Twitter users several times. According to him, foreign powers used Twitter to provoke the protests. Similar to the government’s frames, the pro-government newspapers mostly used the foreign influence frame (75%) to show the cause of the movement. Their second most frequently used frame to define the cause of the problem was environmental consideration. According to Sabah, some protesters had sincere aspirations to protect the environment and the Gezi Park trees. However, some marginal groups had different agendas, according to the pro-government newspapers. These marginal groups were supported by foreign powers (Karagoz, 2013). There is an important difference between the anti-government newspapers and Twitter users in terms of diagnosing the reason for the protests. While Twitter users employed environmental consideration and interference in private lives, the anti-government newspapers chose instead the human rights frame. This different frame choice may be explained by the political value of each frame. Perhaps, the anti-government newspaper editors thought that the human interest frame was politically more worthwhile than the frames of environmental consideration and interference in private lives.

Table 3.

How each media identified the causes of the movement.

	Environmental considerations	Suppressing freedom of expression	Human rights	Foreign influence	Government interference in private lives	Total
Type of media	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)
Pro-government	12 (13%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	68 (75%)	10 (12%)	90 (100%)
Anti-government	10 (7%)	72 (51%)	39 (27%)	0	21 (15%)	143 (100%)
Twitter	64 (21%)	123 (41%)	38 (13%)	0	75 (25%)	300 (100%)

X₂=84.13, df=6, p<.001.

Finally, to answer RQ4, in-depth interviews were conducted. Several questions were asked to understand the protestors’ perceptions of the mainstream media in Turkey. After we completed the interviews, all the responses were analysed. Three important categories emerged from the protesters’ responses: media freedom, biased media coverage, and trust in media. The interview results showed that the protesters’ overall trust in the mainstream media was very low in Turkey. All our interviewees said that they do not trust any of the media outlets. For example, we asked them whether they trust any mainstream media outlets; most of them said they do not trust the mainstream media. This result was not surprising. The Turkish people’s trust in mainstream media has been eroding over the years (Baydar, 2013). This low trust can be explained by the mainstream media’s problematic ownership structure in Turkey. For example, a 26-year-old male protestor said,

media ownership structure is problematic in Turkey. Many large media companies own businesses in fields like energy, banking and mining[,] therefore these media outlets have strong relations with politicians and other power groups. So it is hard for me to trust them.

In fact, the protesters’ claims are not completely inaccurate. For example, the pro-government newspaper Sabah is owned by Calik, a group whose chief executive, Berat Albayrak, is President Erdogan’s son-in-law (Corke, 2013).

Another important category is media freedom. Most of our interviewers think that there is no media freedom in Turkey. One protester, a 23-year-old female, said ‘Turkish government has sought to control the media by heavy tax fines’. Another protester, a 27-year-old male, said ‘In Turkey if you are journalist and if you are controversial then you are asked to leave. President Erdogan often sued cartoonists and journalists who criticized him’. Protesters hold the government responsible for lack of media freedom. In Turkey, for years, media owners censor reporters while kowtowing governments to protect their other business interests (Baydar, 2013).

Finally, the protesters were asked about their perceptions of the coverage of the Gezi Park protest. All our interviewees said that they were not satisfied with the mainstream media’s coverage of the event. A 25-year-old female interviewee said,

there was no coverage of the protests during the first days of the protest. For example, during the protest one channel (Haberturk TV), only two hundred yards from Gezi Park[,] had three medical experts discussing schizophrenia. See how unbalanced mainstream media’s coverage is.

For years, the Turkish mainstream media’ coverage of important issues has been problematic. For example, in 2011, Prime Minister Erdogan and media owners met to decide how mainstream media covered ‘news on terror’. After this meeting, the mainstream media outlets began to exercise excessive editorial caution (Baydar, 2013). Protesters think that the main problem is the media ownership structure in Turkey. Private ownership in the media sector in Turkey does not allow the existence of a credible, independent, vibrant, and high-quality Fourth Estate (Baydar, 2013).

Discussion

This study intended to uncover how the Gezi Park protests were framed by Turkish newspapers and social media. Furthermore, this study intended to understand the Gezi protesters’ perceptions of media coverage. Content analysis and interviews were conducted to understand social media and mainstream media coverage of the Gezi protests. During the last decade, the government’s growing influence on the mainstream media has raised questions about media freedom in Turkey. Moreover, the mainstream media in Turkey is highly polarized and has strong connections with politicians and other power groups (Kaynak, 2014). For these reasons, it was important to examine how the mainstream media covered the Gezi protests. Another aspect of this study involved Twitter users’ coverage of the protests. Twitter provides the ability to instantaneously spread messages to people, so the Gezi protests quickly gained momentum on Twitter. The results have shown that the Turkish people’s trust in the mainstream media has been eroding. The protesters said that they do not trust the Turkish media and they don’t think that there is media freedom in Turkey. Besides the low trust in the mainstream media in Turkey, Turkey has been witnessing as well an explosion in online social media networks recently. In summary, we can say that social media have become an alternative way for Turkish citizens to share and receive information.

The results of the study have shown that pro-government newspapers usually relied on government officials’ frames. For example, they used the de-legitimizing frame to define the protests. This frame was useful for accommodating the foreign influence and conspiracy frames. During the protests, pro-government media portrayed protesters as marginal youth who were influenced by foreign powers. Using these frames was an attempt to dehumanize and marginalize the protesters and favour the government frames. Moreover, the pro-government definition of the problem adhered to the protest paradigm. According to McLeod and Hertog, traditional media tend to follow the protest paradigm when it comes to coverage of protest events. They marginalize and dehumanize protesters and usually rely on official frames (McLeod and Hertog, 1999). Pro-government media also used the spectacle frame. They mainly focused on the violence in Taksim Square and held the protesters responsible for it. In 1999, Turkey suffered a big economic crisis (Cakmak, 2007). So officials and pro-government news media used this frame to remind citizens of the economic collapse, characterizing the protestors as vandals. Officials also used the contextual frame because they knew that after the big economic crisis in 1999, people would still have fears of another economic collapse in their minds. Anti-government newspapers also relied on contextual frames. They mainly focused on drama and violence, but they held the government responsible for the violence. This result shows that both anti- and pro-government newspapers followed the protest paradigm. A tendency to follow the protest paradigm could damage mainstream media’s credibility because they focus too much on official perspectives, drama, and violence, rather than on the reasons driving the protesters.

In this study, we also examined definitions of the problem and causes of the movement. The results show that there are sharp differences between pro- and anti-government news media’s causes and definitions. Moreover, Twitter users’ definition of the problem differed from that of both pro- and anti-government news media. First of all, the differences between pro- and anti-government media’s differences can be explained by the polarized media environment. While pro-government media defined the problem as conspiracy (53%) and chaos (30%) and relied on official frames, anti-government news media employed the uprising frame (58%) to define the problem. Uprising is a strong word to use because it refers to an uprising against the government. Anti-government newspapers’ use of this frame is not surprising because they also used the responsibility frame to hold the government responsible for the protests. Also, as mentioned before, the uprising frame was politically more worthwhile than protest or other definitions. We can also explain these results by the biased coverage of the protests. In this kind of polarized media environment, it is possible to see partisan tendencies. It is clear that pro-government newspapers used official frames and that anti-government newspapers used counter-frames to respond to the pro-government and official frames. In this kind of polarized media environment, social media users’ definition of the problem became important. Twitter users used protests as a definition of the problem. So we can say that Twitter users provided more balanced coverage of the issue. During the Gezi protests, some foreign media outlets referred to the Arab Spring and wrote that these protests could be another revolution (Turkish Spring) (Rubin, 2013). Therefore, social media’s definition of the problem was important because these protests started in order to protect the trees in Gezi Park, yet, because of the partisan tendencies in the mainstream media, pro- and anti-government news media ignored the environmental causes and relied on more sensational frames. When we look at the causes of the protest frames, not surprisingly, pro-government media (75%) used foreign influence as a cause of the protests. Using the foreign influence frame was questionable because it was an unverified assertion. This situation raises questions about pro-government news media’s journalistic practices.

Furthermore, the results have shown that the protesters were not satisfied with mainstream media’s coverage of the event. This result can be explained by mainstream media’s unbalanced coverage of the issue. This result also shows how social media became an alternative source of information. During the first days of the protests, while the news media ignored the protests, the protesters sent photos and videos to some international media outlets, and the international media outlets used these photos and videos to show the world what was happening in Turkey. In this way, the protesters bypassed the Turkish mainstream media by using social media tools effectively. However, the citizens’ rejection of the mainstream media’s coverage in favour of Twitter raises credibility questions because Twitter does not constitute journalism and rumours and disinformation can be quickly spread on Twitter.

The frames used by social media and anti-government media were also different. While anti-government newspapers relied on politically worthwhile frames, social media users chose more practical frames for the protesters, such as the human interest frame. These results also show how social media is important in this kind of polarized media environment. Because of the mainstream media’s partisan tendencies, social media’s coverage became an alternative way for citizens and for international media outlets to gain information.

Overall, this study examined how mainstream and social media covered the Gezi protests. This study adds to an understanding of social media use during social movements. During the protest, mainstream pro-government media relied on the protest paradigm. They marginalized and dehumanized protesters and usually used official frames (McLeod and Hertog, 1999). Under these circumstances, pro-government media did not act like independent newspapers, but as propaganda tools. This may explain why protesters do not trust in mainstream media and why they think there is no media freedom in Turkey.

This study is limited because it only examined four newspapers and one social media website. Therefore, the results cannot be generalized to all mainstream media. Future studies can examine different types of media outlets, such as TV coverage and other social media websites, to obtain a broader view. Nevertheless, this study is important in light of its timeliness. Future studies should also add interviews to understand why the mainstream media chose some frames and excluded others.

Footnotes

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Author biography

Mustafa Oz is a PhD student at the University of Texas at Austin School of Journalism. He earned his undergraduate degree from Ege (Aegean) University at İzmir, Turkey, in the field of Radio, TV, and Cinema in 2008. After receiving his Bachelor’s degree, he started to work at Haber Express newspaper. He worked there for a year. In 2009, he won an academic scholarship from the Minister of Education of Turkey. In 2010, he started his MA program at the University of Texas at Austin. After receiving his MA degree at 2012 from the University of Texas at Austin, he has started a PhD at the same university.He is currently doing his PhD at the University of Texas at Austin.

References

Alexander

(2002) Looking out for the watchdogs: A legislative proposal limiting the newsgathering privilege to journalists in the greatest need of protection for sources and information. Yale Law & Policy Review 20(1): 97–136.

Arango

(2013) Turkish premier blames foreign envoys for turmoil. The New York Times, 21 December. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/22/world/middleeast/16-more-arrested-as-corruption-inquiry-in-turkey-widens.html

Arslan

(n.d.) Media freedom in Turkey: Just how bad is it? 9 June 2015. Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/aslan-amani/media-freedom-in-turkey-just-how-bad-is-it

Baydar

(2013, July 19) In Turkey, media bosses are undermining democracy, 9 June 2015. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/opinion/sunday/in-turkey-media-bosses-are-undermining-democracy.html

Baykurt

(2014) We are turkeys generation y: Not a robot lobby. The Guardian, 19 March. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/19/turkey-generation-y-robot-lobby

Benford

Snow

(2000) Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment. Annual Review of Sociology 26(1): 611–639.

Binder

Forrest

(2002) Senatorial delay in confirming federal judges, 1947–1998. American Journal of Political Science 46(1): 190–199.

Bishop

(2008) The Big Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-Minded America Is Tearing Us Apart. New York: Houghton Miin Harcourt.

Bluff

(2012) Web log message, 7 November. Available at: http://blog.site-seeker.com/who-uses-twitter-demographic/

10.

Boulianne

(2009) Does Internet use affect engagement? A meta-analysis of research. Political Communication 26(2): 193–211.

11.

Cakmak

(2007) History of Turkish political life. Available at: http://www.aina.org/news/20070524131254.htm

12.

Chan

Lee

(1984) The journalistic paradigm on civil protests: A case study of Hong Kong. In: Arno

Dissanayake

(eds) The News Media in National and International Conflict. Boulder, CO: Westview, pp. 183–202.

13.

Cook

(2013) How democratic is turkey? Foreign Policy, 2 June. Available at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/03/how-democratic-is-turkey/

14.

Corke

(2013) Freedom in the world 2013. Freedom House, Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Turkey%20Report%20-%202-3-14.pdf

15.

D’Angelo

(2002) News framing as a multi-paradigmatic research program: A response to Entman. Journal of Communication 52: 870–888.

16.

DellaVigna

Kaplan

(2007) The Fox news effect: Media bias and voting. Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(3): 1187–1234.

17.

De Monchaux

(2013) The mixed-up files of taksim square architecture. New Republic, 10 June. Available at: http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113410/taksim-square-protests-over-new-building

18.

Detenber

Gotlieb

McLeod

. (2007) Frame intensity effects of television news stories about a high-visibility protest issue. Communication & Society 10(4): 439–460.

19.

Dha (2013) Gençlere ihtiyaçlarını karşılamaları için para verdim. Posta, 10 June. Available at: http://www.posta.com.tr/siyaset/HaberDetay/-Genclere-ihtiyaclari-icin-para-verdim-.htm?ArticleID=181136

20.

Entman

(1991) Framing US coverage of international news: Contrasts in narratives of the KAL and Iran air incidents. Journal of Communication 41(4): 6–27.

21.

Entman

(1993) Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. Journal of Communication 43(4): 51–58.

22.

Erkus

(2013) Freedom house calls on us administration to engage more over Turkish press. Hurriyet, Available at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/freedom-house-calls-on-us-administration-to-engage-more-over-turkish-press.aspx?pageID=517&nID=61967&NewsCatID=339

23.

Foys

(2008) The reality of media in anglo-saxon studies. The Heroic Age 11(2). Available at: http://www.heroicage.org/issues/11/forumc.php

24.

Gentzkow

(2006) Television and voter turnout. Quarterly Journal of Economics 121(3): 931–972.

25.

Gentzkow

Shapiro

(2004) Media, education and anti-Americanism in the Muslim world. Journal of Economic Perspectives 18(3): 117–133.

26.

Gerhard

Rucht

(1992) Mesomobilization: Organizing and framing in two protest campaigns in West Germany. The American Journal of Sociology 98(3): 555–596.

27.

Hamdy

Gomaa

(2012) Framing the Egyptian uprising in Arabic language newspapers and social media. Journal of Communication 62(2): 195–211.

28.

Harlow

Johnson

(2011) The arab spring| overthrowing the protest paradigm? How The New York Times, Global Voices and Twitter covered the Egyptian revolution. International Journal Of Communication 5(16). Available at: http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/1239

29.

Isiklar

(2013) Borsa’daki düşüşün gezi ile ilgisi yok denilebilir mi? Zaman, 9 June. Available at: http://hazelton.rssing.com/chan-1524574/all_p152.html

30.

Karadjis

(1997) Behind the Turkish military’s soft coup. Green Left Weekly, October. https://www.greenleft.org.au/node/13557

31.

Jones

(2001) Party polarization and legislative gridlock. Political Research Quarterly 54(1): 125–141. Chicago

32.

Karagoz

(2013) Gezi protestosu Wall Street’e benzemez. Sabah, Available at: http://www.sabah.com.tr/ekonomi/2013/06/05/gezi-protestosu-wall-streete-benzemez

33.

Kaynak

(2014) Media in polarized societies. The winter 2014 media and change discussion series, March.

34.

Kemal

(2013) Muammer güler bilançoyu açıkladı. Sabah, 2 June, Available at: http://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2013/06/02/muammer-guler-bilancoyu-acikladi

35.

Kielbowicz

Scherer

(1986) The role of the press in the dynamics of social movements. Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change 9: 71–96.

36.

Kirisci

(2013) Turkey protests: Are the youth at Gezi park a new actor in turkish democracy? 13 June. Available at: http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/06/13-turkey-protests-gezi-park-democracy-kirisci

37.

Korkmaz

(2013) Artik yasadisi gosterilere izin yok. Hurriyet, 06 June, Available at: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/muammer-gulerden-gezi-parki-protestolari-hakkinda-aciklama-23448798

38.

Letsch

(2013) Turkey protests spread after violence in Istanbul over park demolition. The Guardian, 31 May. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/31/istanbul-protesters-violent-clashes-police

39.

McLeod

(1995) Communicating deviance: The effects of television news coverage of social protest. Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media 39(1): 4–19.

40.

McLeod

Hertog

(1999) Social control, social change and the mass media’s role in the regulation of protest groups. In: Demers

Viswanath

(eds) Mass Media, Social Control and Social Change: A Macrosocial Perspective. Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press, pp.305–330.

41.

Norris

(2008) Driving Democracy. 1st edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

42.

Ogur

(2008) 12 eylul’un darbeci solcusu. Taraf. Available at: http://arsiv.taraf.com.tr/yazilar/yildiray-ogur/12-eylulun-darbeci-solcusu-ali-haydar-saltik/1942/

43.

Ozisik

(2013) Polis gezicilere yanlış yapıyor! Internethaber, 13 June. Available at: http://www.internethaber.com/polis-gezicilere-yanlis-yapiyor-1225785y.htm

44.

Ozturk

(2013) Meydan’a müdahale. Sabah, 12 June. Available at: http://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2013/06/12/meydana-mudahale

45.

Papacharissi

(ed.) (2011) A Networked Self: Identity, Community, and Culture of Social Network Sites. London: Routledge.

46.

Pfanner

(2013) Turks angry over dearth of protest coverage by established media. The New York Times, 6 June. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/world/middleeast/turks-angry-over-dearth-of-protest-coverage-by-established-media.html?pagewanted=all

47.

Reuters (2008) Turkey eyes reform of media ownership law-paper.

48.

Rubin

(2013) The U.S. should stand with the turkish people. The New York Times, 6 June. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/06/05/when-an-ally-treats-protests-harshly/the-us-should-stand-with-the-turkish-people

49.

Scheufele

(2000) Agenda-setting, priming, and framing revisited: Another look at cognitive effects of political communication. Mass Communication & Society 3: 297–316.

50.

Seref

(2013) Gezi parkı ve faiz lobisi. Sabah, 7 June. Available at: http://www.sabah.com.tr/ekonomi/2013/06/07/gezi-parki-ve-faiz-lobisi

51.

Snow

Rochford

Worden

. (1986) Frame alignment processes, micromobilzation, and movement participation. American Sociological Review 51: 464–481.

52.

Stromberg

(2004) Mass media competition, political competition, and public policy. Review of Economic Studies 71(1): 265–284.

53.

Sunstein Cass

(2009) Going to Extremes: How like Minds Unite and Divide. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

54.

Viera

Garrett

(2005) Understanding interobserver agreement: The kappa statistic. Family Medicine 37(5): 360–363.

55.

White

(2014) Web log message, 1 January. Available at: http://roarmag.org/2014/01/crackdown-press-freedom-turkey/