Manufacturing resilience: An analysis of broadcast and Web-based news presentations of the 2014

Abstract

This study aims to better understand how various Russian news outlets present stories pertaining to Russia’s recent economic downturn and future economic outlook. This study analysed over 1500 Russian broadcast TV and online news stories. Among its major findings are the following: (1) calls for Russia to diversify its economy by accelerating trade agreements and cooperation with Eurasian Economic Union and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) nations, (2) presenting China as critical to Russia’s economic future, (3) presenting Russia’s economy as strong due to natural resources and (4) framing the United States negatively by calling for strategies to counter Western economic sanctions. Strategic and policy implications are discussed at length.

Keywords

Economic crisis narrative analysis news media narratives ruble Russian economy

In an increasingly globalized, political system, it is important to understand how authoritarian regimes maintain social order, manage crises in the digital era, and balance the allowance of certain public freedoms while restricting others (Hutchings and Szosteck, 2015; Koltsova, 2006; Schenk, 2012). The recent Arab Spring is evidence of various international challenges and power vacuums that can arise from the collapse of long-standing authoritarian regimes and the speed at which such revolutions can happen when citizens unite against their governments (Dabashi, 2012). While there are countless factors that play into the resilience of a given state or political system, this study argues that the state-owned news media narratives supporting Russia’s resilience is a major factor contributing to the maintenance of the Russian regime’s systemic power.

The primary theoretical gap filled by this study is through the adaptation of Fisher’s (1984, 1987) narrative paradigm and relating the paradigm to the various components of resilience (i.e. limiting crisis impact, creating recovery strategies, promoting change, and predicting risks or conflicts). Numerous studies (see Kirmayer et al., 2009; Sonn and Fisher, 1998) used resilience narratives at the micro- and macro-levels. However, there are few studies examining resilience narratives on national economic crises through broadcast television news or online news media (see Cawley, 2012; Harrison, 2013) and virtually, all of these studies are heavily focused on the West and Western news media (Pendall et al., 2009). While there are numerous studies which have extensively analysed Russian news media in various mediums (see Enikolopov et al., 2010; Mickiewicz, 2008), applications of the narrative paradigm and/or resilience narratives are virtually non-existent. This study adds to the literature by applying the resilience narratives to Russian broadcast television and online news media during times of economic hardships caused by international sanctions.

For this article, researchers analyse the way in which the ‘managed democracy’ of the Russian Federation is supported through public resilience narratives that are crafted by state-owned news media in order to project system resilience to the general public. Specifically, this study draws from Fisher’s (1984) narrative paradigm to examine the state news media’s public resilience narratives of the country during the 2014–2015 economic crisis. The narrative framework is held together by four dominant resilience narratives: the ability of the Russian government to (1) limit the impact of the current economic crisis, (2) recover quickly through survival and evolution, (3) grow in the face of rapid change and (4) anticipate risk. Through this narrative analysis, this study examines how the Russian state media attempt to project, and maintain, system resilience.

Literature review

Russia as an international authoritarian regime

Russia, following World War II, has been an important actor in international affairs and is a nation whose policies and actions still carry significant weight in global politics, even after the fall of the Soviet Union (Machalek, 2008; Oksan and Ekim, 2013; Öksüz, 2009). Russian President Vladimir Putin structured the new Russian Federation under the moniker of ‘managed democracy’, presenting a state-controlled alternative to versions of more liberal democracy seen in the West (Fournier, 2015; Krastev and Holmes, 2012). Russia is also a major military and nuclear power with political alliances and interests that often run counter to those of the United States and Europe (e.g. Iraq, Libya, Syria and the Ukraine). Furthermore, Putin’s administrations have overseen stability in wages for an emerging middle class and featured more exposure, exchange and cooperation with Western Europe (Machalek, 2008). Russia also globalized during this time, harbouring a younger generation of citizens accustomed to easy access to information from social media, the Internet and contact with European and democratic ideals (Fournier, 2015). However, such modernization and globalization of Russia and its citizens have not gone unnoticed by the Russian regime.

According to the Human Rights Watch (2015), Russia is increasingly a place of deteriorating human rights, with crackdowns on civil society and independent media. Russian Parliament and authorities have adopted laws and engaged in practices to increase anti-Western hysteria, arrest political activists, shut down independent online media, suppress free expression and encourage lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) sentiments (Persson, 2015). Human Rights Watch (2015) also claims ‘pro-government media have supported the government’s effort to control the narrative about developments in Ukraine, including Russia’s occupation of Crimea and its support to insurgents in eastern Ukraine’.

As noted by the aforementioned account, the ownership of the media gives the Russian state the ability to influence the narratives on events and information entering the public consciousness (Oates, 2007; Schenk, 2012). Rather than denying that an event is taking place, the Russian state-owned media is able to pull from existing contextual and cultural narratives in order to control the way in which the event is discussed in Russia (Schenk, 2012; Simmons, 2005). State-owned Russian media during the Ukraine crisis featured anti-Western narratives attempting to present the United States as a historical enemy focused on world dominance and narratives of Russian nationhood and solidarity (Hutchings and Szosteck, 2015). Although one cannot confirm the Russian government creates these narratives, it is clear that the Russian state-owned news media is actively attempting to knit dominant narratives into an ideological fabric that provides a coherent world-view and sense of national identity to its citizens (Hutchings and Szosteck, 2015).

The importance of the Russian economy to the Russian regime

The recent Russian economic woes are largely products of the economic sanctions put in place by Western nations in response to developments in Crimea and Ukraine (US Department of State, 2015) and falling oil prices (Cunningham, 2015). Dramatic fluctuations in the Russian ruble limit the purchasing power of Russian citizens and sent shock waves across domestic industries such as construction and housing (Recknagel, 2014). While certain economic indicators can be assessed with great accuracy, larger socio-political consequences of the Russian economic downturn remain a challenge to understand. In early February 2015, the United States European Command (USEUCOM) issued a request for assessments, in part, on the consequences the Russian economic downturn was having on cultural narratives surrounding the economy, domestic politics, international alliances and national security (USEUCOM, 2015). The USEUCOM wanted to understand the public narratives surrounding the economy put forth by state-controlled media, and if any alternative narratives existed that might destabilize state management of economic conversations. It is imperative to understand how Russia controls narratives on its economy, as economic crises could potentially motivate Russians towards political demonstration against the government.

According to Sherlock (2015), Russians have historically leaned apathetic towards political participation except in times of heightened economic downturn. Some economic demonstrations in Russia eventually morphed into political demonstrations overturning the ruling governments (McFaul, 2015). Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it became increasingly important for the Russian government to keep track of Russian public opinion because the abundance of systemic changes could inspire political revolution (Hale, 2005). Three Russian presidents served in office since the fall of the Soviet Union: Yeltsin (1991–1999), Vladimir Putin (2000–2008), Dmitry Medvedev (2008–2012) and Vladimir Putin (2012–present). For Yeltsin and Putin (from 2000 to 2008), the public’s approval ratings of the Russian president correlated to perceptions of Russia’s economy, which led to Yeltsin’s waning popularity and Putin’s increase in popularity (Treisman, 2011). For the Medvedev administration, polls indicated roughly 66 per cent of Russians approved of his regime and, subsequently, Vladimir Putin was re-elected in 2012 (Jensen, 2015). Despite the appearance of strong public support for Putin’s administration, some are sceptical of the polls’ validity as other studies show low public trust of the government (Jensen, 2015).

Survey data collected from Russian citizens over the past several years show that over 80 per cent of respondents report never having taken part in any type of civic activity such as participation in human rights organizations or public demonstrations (Sherlock, 2015). However, the survey data also show that over 60 per cent of Russians surveyed would be unwilling to bear a substantial decline in family well-being due to continued sanction exchange between Russia and the West, and over 70 per cent claimed the state should be concerned with its citizens’ well-being over programmes of military expansion (Sherlock, 2015). In addition, a Pew Research Center (2012) poll found Russians were increasingly concerned about the economic outlook and were increasingly embracing core democratic principles. From 2011 to 2013, waves of protests against the Kremlin occurred across numerous Russian cities, but the protests gradually declined over time and the regime re-established control (Ross, 2015). Subsequently, support for Putin’s administration throughout the current economic crisis has remained uncontestably high (Simmons et al., 2015).

Despite the continued support for the ruling elite by Russian citizens, the notion of an increasingly democratic Russian society, in a time of economic crisis, concerns Russia’s ruling factions (McFaul, 2015). Concern over Western influences on Russian youth in creating generational gaps in Russian society and producing a more individualistic society oriented more towards foreign states than traditional Russian values has been a central focus of Putin since coming to power in 2000 (Fournier, 2015). To counter the perceived globalization of Russia and Russia’s youth, Putin’s regime implemented measures towards offering Russians a ‘vision of self and nation indivisibly linked, a vision of civil society coupled to state sovereignty’ (Hemment, 2012: 234). Part of this offering has been Putin’s introduction and strengthening of the aforementioned ‘managed democracy’, a principle allowing executive powers to make decisions on behalf of the citizenry when problems arise that are not suited for democratic solutions (Fournier, 2015; Krastev and Holmes, 2012). Fournier (2015) suggests the principles of managed democracy show then underlying uneasiness Russian ruling elites have towards democratic self-rule by a population rendered potentially politically unreliable by exposure to the West.

Many of Putin’s previous economic policies focused on business regulations to restore principles of fairness in the everyday lives of Russian citizens (e.g. timely wages, pension payouts and punishing criminal business practices) (Machalek, 2008). The state provides its citizens with narratives that allow justification of limited political freedoms by narrowing the conversation on democracy to one of fairness, economic strength and a sense of national pride (Hutchings and Szosteck, 2015). However, the economic sanctions placed on Russia following its involvement in Crimea and Ukraine are purposely geared towards damaging Putin’s policies and, ultimately, aimed at displacing the Russian president (Rutland, 2014). The Russian regime, which has utilized the increased economic well-being of its citizens as a central platform to justify the restriction of public freedoms and political participation, now finds itself forced to craft narratives explaining the harsh economic reality in order to maintain its own legitimacy. Showing the state as resilient during economic crises and fitting that resilience into narratives that align with the expectations of Russian citizens is challenging, but the Russian regime has a vast media empire at its disposal in order to meet this challenge.

The Russian regime and the Russian media

The Russian state-owned news media has powerful tools and manipulative techniques at its disposal in order to craft narratives (Kiriya and Kachkaeva, 2011; Koltsova, 2006; Oates, 2007, 2008). As various studies (see Mickiewicz, 2008, 2014; Oates, 2007, 2008; Schenk, 2012; Zassoursky, 2004) note, the Russian state has long been heavy-handed with its distribution of media outlets, carefully crafting messages for public consumption as part of Putin’s ‘vertical of power’ project (Schenk, 2012: 787). Particularly important, and guarded by the state, are broadcast media, as most Russians get their news from television (Mickiewicz, 2008; Schenk, 2012). Simmons (2005) argues that the control of media by the Russian state, particularly television (Oates, 2007), is an aim by the Russian government to create a single, controlled information space for its citizens giving the regime the ability to reach virtually all of its citizenry with the narratives it creates. Although the media content remains largely influenced and monitored by the Russian government (Kiriya and Sherstoboeva, 2015; Oates, 2007, 2008; Schenk, 2012; Vartanova, 2012), the nature of power relations in current Russian news media, its media owners, the State and the Russian bureaucratic system is more complex (Koltsova, 2006; Schimpfossl and Yablokov, 2014). In modern Russia, there is an uneven distribution of power resources and many asymmetric practices of power (Koltsova, 2006).

Media gatekeeping, when news media organizations select ‘which information will enter society’s “gates,” through a process that includes exclusion, selection, and framing’ (Perloff, 2014: 400) plays a major role in Russian mainstream media (Erzikova and Lowrey, 2010; Koltsova, 2006; Oates, 2007; Vartanova, 2012). The Russian government’s information policies have resulted in concealing negative information and supplementing it with a professionally developed ‘positive information flow’ (Koltsova, 2006: 40). Furthermore, various studies (see Kiriya and Sherstoboeva, 2015; Koltsova, 2006; Richter, 2008; Schimpfossl and Yablokov, 2014) have also found that the production of Russian mainstream media content is less often regulated by media owners and/or the Russian government but is more often regulated by journalists’ self-censorship. As a result of this mainstream media gatekeeping and censorship, Russia’s public sphere and mass media in the 21st century is divided into parallel groups with different ideologies and motives (Degtereva and Kiriya, 2010; Etling et al., 2010, 2014; Kiriya, 2012). Most dissenting groups in the Russian public sphere operate and communicate on particular online, multimedia platforms, creating alternative dialogues to the Russian mainstream media (Alexanyan et al., 2012; Etling et al., 2010, 2014; Kiriya, 2012; Kiriya and Sherstoboeva, 2015; Richter, 2008).

While numerous studies have focused on the power of television and print news in increasing public awareness, impacting decision-making and crafting public rhetoric in Western societies (Oksan and Ekim, 2013; Wang and Gantz, 2007), less scholarship has focused on the types of narratives created in Russian media. Most of the scholarship acknowledges that the Russian state-controlled narratives serves to provide lenses for the public to process information, rather than attempts by the state to deny their occurrence (Levintova, 2010; Lilja, 2013; Persson, 2015). Although Persson’s (2015) study focused on narrative analysis of non-traditional sexuality, the argument that the state confronts issues in the public eye by crafting interpretations of that issue through the media, rather than attempting to deny it, can also be seen in the analysis of Russian state narratives justifying actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine (Hutchings and Szosteck, 2015). This shows the Russian government recognizes that global access to information prevents the regime from simply ignoring or denying an event to its citizens (Persson, 2015). Instead, the state must establish the dominant narrative on the event by utilizing the media.

Narrative analyses and public narratives of resilience

Walter Fisher (1984) claims that all meaningful communication is a type of storytelling in which human beings experience and understand life as a series of ongoing narratives. A narrative analysis is a distinctive strategy for organizing data about the world, for making sense and significance, and evaluating embedded components at various micro- and macro-levels (Branigan, 1992; Fisher, 1984, 1987) Narratives can be studied through rubrics of narrative probability and narrative fidelity (Fisher, 1987). Narrative probability details the coherency and salience of an argument, which evaluates how reliably a story’s elements fit together (Fisher, 1987; Hanan, 2008). Narrative fidelity evaluates how well a story resonates with its audience, how claims correspond with an ‘accurate assertion about social reality and thereby constitute good reasons for belief of action’ (Fisher, 1987: 105).

According to Somers and Gibson (1994) there are four types of narratives: (1) personal (ontological) narratives, (2) conceptual (disciplinary) narratives, (3) meta-narratives and (4) public narratives. Personal narratives are stories about our place in the world and personal history (Somers and Gibson, 1994). Conceptual narratives are stories and explanations that scholars in any field elaborate for themselves and others about an object of inquiry (Somers and Gibson, 1994). Meta-narratives are thought of as the epic dramas of a time, where individuals are embedded as contemporary actors in history (Somers and Gibson, 1994). Finally, and most relevant to this study, public narratives are stories that are created by media and governmental structures and are circulated among various social institutions (Somers and Gibson, 1994). As Somers and Gibson (1994) claim, an individual is not free to create a narrative at will but, instead, must choose from the stories and representations available to them. Public narratives include news media presentations that often rely on authoritarian sources as a key rhetorical component. These authoritarian sources are claim makers seeking to solidify support for their views on societal issues from various stakeholders (i.e. citizens) (Lilja, 2013).

Central to this study are the public narratives surrounding resilience. Amy Zalman (2013) notes that resilience narratives are a critical component to resilient systems. In the face of a crisis or rapid change, showing and achieving system resilience is often achieved using resilience narratives (Zalman, 2013). Resilience narratives are the means by which stakeholders (i.e. citizens) collectively understand their relationship and the collaborative work needed in order to anticipate risk, limit impact and adapt to change (Community and Regional Resilience Institute (CARRI), 2013; Torrens Resilience Institute, 2009; Zalman, 2013). For an authoritarian regime, resilience narratives can be used to project to citizens how the government is dealing with a crisis and to show citizens the government is working in their best interests (Zalman, 2013). While Zalman is concerned with using resilience narratives to bring forth an era of open communication and relationship-building between opposing nations, this study focuses on how authoritarian regimes use resilience narratives to create the illusion of system resilience to their citizens in an effort to prevent an uprising and potential collapse during a crisis. Thus, this study poses the following research question: What public resilience narratives are evident in the Russian state-owned news media coverage of the 2014–2015 economic crisis?

Method

This study employs the categorical-content approach of narrative analysis, which examines various aesthetic or linguistic components of the narrative units that are analysed (Lieblich et al., 1998). These components are collected from the analysed texts and are sorted into the appropriate categories and counted to measure frequencies (Lieblich et al., 1998). While this method resembles the text content analysis method in many ways, the categorical-content approach of narrative analysis primarily focuses on interpretations and qualitative forms (Lilja, 2013). As Lieblich et al. (1998) explain, there are four steps to the categorical-content approach of narrative analysis: (1) selecting the subtext, (2) defining the content categories, (3) organizing the content into the categories and (4) making conclusions from the findings.

Selecting the subtext

The analysis utilized various Russian media sources using the Broadcast Monitoring System (BMS) and the Web Monitoring System (WMS) at Texas A&M University (Media Monitoring System [MMS], 2015). These technologies enable the analysis of foreign-based language media, allowing researchers to evaluate full foreign language news coverage in the original context and provide validated English translations. While these systems provided accurate English translations of the Russian news media, one of the researchers involved in the study is a Russian speaker and is familiar with the cultural nuances of the language. Each system archives news stories up to a specific period (i.e. BMS = 1 year; WMS = 3 months) from selected news media channels and websites. Thus, these systems store and delete data continuously.

For both the BMS and WMS databases, two key search terms (i.e. ‘Economic Crisis’ and ‘Ruble Economy’) were used to narrow the scope of the news stories analysed. The terms were chosen because of their relevance to the goals of the project and the broad presence of those terms across the entirety of the archive. The search terms were chosen after also searching the terms: ‘Economy’ (n = 15,000), ‘Russian Economy’ (n = 1987), ‘Global Economy’ (n = 434), ‘Future Economy’ (n = 164) and ‘Economic Trade’ (n = 22).

A total of 1131 stories were analysed for this project using two key search terms: (1) ‘Economic Crisis’ (n = 656 stories) and (2) ‘Ruble Economy’ (n = 475 stories). The BMS data were pulled from 7 April 2014 to 15 April 2015, and the WMS data were pulled from 13 February 2015 to 22 May 2015. All of the BMS data (n = 867) contained stories from the Russian news channel, Rossiya 24, a popular broadcast TV news channel that is part of Russia’s largest state-owned media enterprise, the All-Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK, 2017). The WMS data (n = 264) contained stories from four pro-government, Russian news websites: Izvestia (n = 28), Komsomolskaya Pravda (n = 48), Moskovskij Komsomolets (n = 83) and Rossiyskaya Gazeta (n = 105). Although the data samples derive from the population of the MMS technology and are not generalizable, the researchers account for this technological limitation by pulling stories over time and by multiple search terms that allow for a maximum return of news stories within the search parameters. The data pulled from the archives for this study were uploaded to a cloud-based data-storage system known as MediaRes and can be made available for other researchers to utilize.

Defining the content categories

The researchers independently conducted a preliminary qualitative analysis on a random sample (n = 138) of news stories from the full data set and then cross-compared to identify emerging trends and themes within the data. This step was done in order to allow researchers to assess the content without preconceived coding categories associated with resilience. Coders initially identified 13 themes associated with the data (see Table 1). The stories were not coded exclusively in one thematic category, meaning that numerous stories contained multiple thematic categories.

Table 1.

Initial 13 themes from pilot code.

1. Other nations’ and the global economy’s economic failures

2. Economic implications of US–European sanctions and Russian economic downturn

3. Political implications of US–European sanctions and Russian economic downturn

4. Russian national strength and self-sufficiency

5. Implications of US–European sanctions and Russian economic downturn for Russian citizens

6. Assigning blame for the Russian economic downturn

7. Russia’s anti-crisis kick-start plan to combat the economic crisis and sanctions

8. Russia’s relationship to the United States and EU member-nations

9. Western involvement in former Soviet satellite areas

10. Russia’s economic plans for the future

11. The future of the global economy

12. Russia’s economic vitality

13. Russia leveraging resources to influence world politics and strengthen its economy

EU: European Union.

Organizing the content into the categories

These initial themes were refined into four narrative components based on the CARRI (2013) conceptualization of resilience, which is defined as the ability to (1) anticipate risk, (2) limit the impact of the crisis, (3) recover quickly through survival and evolution and (4) grow in the face of rapid change. Using these narrative components, the coders then analysed a second random sample (n = 100) of news stories from the data set independently and achieved a .92 overall inter-coder reliability score. After removing duplicate and/or irrelevant stories, the final data frequencies were refined to 951 stories (BMS = 754; WMS = 197).

Results

The dominant narratives associated with each component of resilience are discussed below by frequency (see Table 2) and example stories (see Table 3).

Table 2.

Occurrence of resilience narrative components.

	BMS (n)	WMS (n)
Ability to limit the impact of the crisis	206	60
Ability to recover quickly through survival and evolution	127	34
Ability to grow in the face of rapid change	245	46
Capability to anticipate risk	176	57

BMS: broadcast monitoring system; WMS: web monitoring system.

Table 3.

Resilience narrative component examples.

Ability to limit the impact of the crisis	Yes people are losing their jobs and there is an economic crisis. But if you lost your job, now is a perfect time to find your inner self. (Rossiya 24, 11 April 2015)
Ability to limit the impact of the crisis	Russia will overcome the economic crisis with an anti-crisis plan that lays out how and where to cut expenditures very clearly. Leaders have prepared a plan that will save money over the next three years and reduce costs for the government. Optimizing the budget, not cutting any social, education, or medical expenditures. The three-year plan predicts that in 2017 oil will be up to 70 dollars a barrel and Russia will be on track and have no deficits. (Rossiya 24, 27 January 2015)
Ability to recover quickly through survival and evolution	There is no hope for a speedy lifting of sanctions. Sanctions are a new reality, the new normal for a long period of time. But for us in Russia, it is in fact a chance for us to increase our own production and help our economy through this difficult situation. The prospects for new jobs are many, in many industries for our citizens. (Rossiya 24, 28 September 2014)
Ability to recover quickly through survival and evolution	Russia is the absolute leader on natural gas reserves, no other country has as much, stores as much, or has as much capacity for it. Russian companies are developing new technologies to better process its natural resources. Russia also consumes a lot of gas as well, as much as German and Japan combined. (Rossiya 24, 22 January 2015)
Ability to grow in the face of rapid change	All the sanctions, which the Duma speaker claims are immoral, are not only hurting Russia, they are also hurting Europe. Russia will continue to keep diplomatic relations with sensible leaders and countries […] To combat the sanctions we need to further our cooperation with the Eurasian economic Union, Shanghai Organization of Cooperation, and with BRICS. (Rossiya 24, 20 January 2015)
Ability to grow in the face of rapid change	Russia is pursuing policies of global interest and mutual cooperation between states. If that relationship cannot exist with the EU, it will consolidate its interests and opportunities as one of the centers of a new multi-polar system. (Rossiya 24, 23 November 2014)
Capability to anticipate risk	The sanctions, which Europe has put on Russia, are seriously affecting Europe […] Tourism, of course, is suffering as well as European business. But it is important to understand European politicians do not seem to have calculated all the consequences of the sanctions that are now manifested in the economy of the euro zone economy […] Therefore, more and more voices in the voice of Europe that Russia needed to renew relationships in the economy and in particular, and I recall now the EU is trying to get out of the policy of sanctions against Russia. (Rossiya 24, 15 January 2015)

Ability to limit the impact of the crisis

The news stories within this resilience component reassure the general public of steps being taken to protect them from the sanctions, actions citizens can take to help the economic situation, and potential opportunities in the down economy. The origins of Russia’s economic crisis are presented as emerging from the failures of the West during the Great Recession of 2008–2009 and due to the sanctions Western nations placed on Russia. The stories show the United States as a clear enemy, relying on historical Cold War tensions as a basis for United States actions against Russia, and the desperation of the United States to recover its own struggling economy at the expense of others as a result of the Great Recession. The sanctions are presented as a United States strategy to prevent Russia from gaining influence and to exert control in areas such as the Ukraine. Although Europe is presented as culturally intertwined with Russia, it is also presented as a co-conspirator with the United States and economically desperate to follow US plans.

These stories show the Russian government as an international protagonist, doing everything in its power to make sure that its citizens are not burdened by the economic downturn, while also suggesting actions citizens can take to help themselves. The stories show the Russian government reforming policies of taxes, government officials’ pay, business incentives, subsidizing products (e.g. local sports teams and imports) and ensuring publicly accessible traditional holiday festivals. Russians themselves are encouraged to find opportunities in new investment sectors and to try to benefit from the protected markets resulting from the sanctions. The stories are positive and hopeful, one story even goes so far as to note that if a citizen loses their job, they will have time for introspection to find their true passion.

This resilience component is best exemplified by stories of the Russian regime’s anti-crisis kick-start plan, which details what the government is doing to combat the crisis and what role citizens can play in that plan. These stories show the Russian government as making huge infrastructural investments to ensure Russia overcomes the economic downturn. The stories frequently mention the monetary volume Russia is committing to move the country forward (e.g. reducing government costs, subsidizing import costs, protecting various industries through government subsidies, altering pension programme payouts, providing affordable credit lines to businesses and potential start-ups, and expanding industries into new markets). While no indications of an end timeline is given, there is a clear effort to show that the origins of the crisis is not based on Russian government actions, but that the Russian government will handle it in a way that protects its citizens.

Ability to recover quickly through survival and evolution

The notions that hardship brings out the best qualities of Russian citizens and promotes innovative development are central to this resilience component. These stories highlight Russian national strength and self-sufficiency. Russia is presented as a country of strong-willed people, who will remain strong, united and relevant. Russians are reminded that the country has a vast array of natural resources that will always have global economic value. The current crisis is presented as one of commodity and luxury, not necessity, and Russians are reminded that they are not a people who require luxury.

There are several stories within this component of resilience that showcase Russians and businesses that develop import substitutions and work to strengthen the Russian domestic market through innovative exploitation of the resources around them. This is exemplified through stories of a town in the eastern Magadan Oblast region. The citizens of the town, which has vast stores of gold from mining operations, simply converts their payment structure from the devalued ruble to a gold and barter system to avoid negative economic impacts.

This component of resilience uses histories of Russian independence and innovation to remind its citizens of their strength. Russia is shown as a place where businesses can grow and thrive through utilizing its vast resources. The regime explains that Russia has too many resources to fail, has an intelligent and tested population, and can adjust to new industries. These stories also outline enemies in the United States and Europe, who sanctions damage more than Russia itself, and show Russians as able to survive together.

Ability to grow in the face of rapid change

This component of the resilience framework put forth by Russian state-controlled media features stories with two separate but related themes. The first outlines the type of change being brought forth and, again, provides the origins of the change as related to the West. These stories portray the United States and Europe as responsible for a global economic crisis. The global economic mismanagement by the West is repeated, detailed by coverage of any economic turmoil in the United States and Europe. Spanish youth riots, working-class poverty in US cities, Greek economic austerity measures and US bank-bailouts are frequently covered to show the failures of the Western economic model.

The second story line builds from the first – the failures of Western economies have led to the need for a new world economic order for which Russia is seeking new alliances. Russia is shown advancing relations and trade with BRICS (China and the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and Eurasian Economic Union nations. Russia is shown as energetically engaging with, and shaping, a new world economic power and political partnerships with emerging nations, particularly China, while the West falters. These new partnerships are presented as important because these emerging economies will form a new world economic order. These stories justify change and the measures the Russian government is taking to grow and develop.

Capability to anticipate risk

This component of the resilience framework leans again on stories of historical US antagonism to Russia, and on Europe as a diffracted continent. The United States is shown as arrogant victors of the Cold War and as a nation aiming to suppress Russia and its people. The stories reinforce the message that a central goal of the United States is to prevent Russia from being powerful and uses Cold War imagery of the United States as a nation sacrificing morality in the name of capitalism. Europe is presented by historical tensions within Europe, past economic failures and the deference of Europe to the hegemonic United States in global matters since the Cold War. The United States is shown as manipulating Saudi Arabian oil prices, manoeuvring in the Ukraine to force Russian involvement and encouraging other nations to adopt the illegal sanctions against Russia. These stories present the risks to Russia and its people due to the West’s inability to understand the consequences of its own actions. This is best exemplified by stories presenting US-led sanctions against Russia as triggering a boomerang effect on the entire global system.

The central features to these stories are Western miscalculations and Russia’s ability to understand, and adapt to, the risks posed by Western governments. While Russia is a nation too strong to fail, the immediate effects of Russia’s economic downturn are shown as devastating to European economies. Europe is presented as misunderstanding the importance of Russia to its own economies and overestimating its ability to harm Russia. A Russian economic downturn is shown as harmful to other nations because European industries need Russian customers, trade and investment. The media presents Russian leaders as cool-headed and, while hoping for reasoned decisions from the West, making plans to account for Western mismanagement.

Discussion

The results of the analysis show that Russian state-controlled media constructed narratives during the 2014–2015 economic crisis that helped to weave an ideological framework of resilience to its citizens, showing the causes for the downturn and its future trajectory. The resilience framework, through the dominant narratives, shows citizens the adaptations of the Russian regime in the face of economic crisis and also allows Russian citizens to see paths of personal economic growth despite difficult external conditions. The Russian state makes a case for system resilience to its population by the manufacturing of resilience narratives that go uncontested due to lack of oppositional media.

Altogether, these narratives present a larger framework of a resilient Russian economic system to Russian citizens. A global economic crisis exists because of Western economic failures and the US intentional policies to keep Russia marginalized. However, Russia is strong, resourceful and proactive enough to overcome these economic obstacles and can help create a new global economic order. The state-controlled media relies on resilience narratives to make this framework work so that citizens understand the state’s economic actions in a way that will prevent political mobilization. The framework leans on Russia’s historical strength as a superpower, the lingering impacts of the Great Recession of 2008–2009, historical animosity with the United States and a fractured, ineffective Europe. It also relies on the East as a place of emerging economic dominance.

There are two reasons presented to give Russian citizens justifications for the economic decline. The first, the Great Recession, is useful because it shows citizens the economic decline is widespread and not the state’s fault. The second, the antagonistic United States, gives citizens a known self-serving enemy that is dedicated to suppressing Russia. Vast amounts of news coverage show the continued ripples of the Great Recession and paint the United States as culpable in the recession. Another key to the ideological framework concerns Europe. By presenting Europe as broken, economically downtrodden and subservient to the United States, Russian state media explains to its citizens why Europe is going along with the sanctions. Since the Cold War, Russian citizens have long desired to be viewed as part of the European continent and have built close economic and cultural relations to Europe. The media emphasize the sanctions cause harm to European nations, those nations want the sanctions to end, and the conundrum Europe finds itself in being tied to the United States and Russia.

The final components to the framework offer hope and give direction for the future. Crucial to showing Russia’s future economic trajectory and adaptability to change are the emerging economies of a new world economic order with which Russia is seeking alliance and trade. These alliances show the Russian state’s commitment to bringing back economic prosperity to the country and even displacing the United States in an economic revolution. Citizens are shown that the Russian state is flexible, and it can link itself, and even lead, in the case of the Eurasian Economic Union, with rising economic partnerships like BRICS as Europe and the United States fade. The final component to the framework shows Russia’s strong history and ability to survive. This component of resilience is the one that links state resilience to citizen resilience and ultimately gives faith in system resilience. Russian citizens, with their government, will overcome the economic decline because they have done it before. This piece of the framework allows citizens to place their faith in the government and its plans moving forward. Citizens are reminded that Russia always will be a world power, and that its people know how to overcome crisis.

The ideological framework created through these resilience narratives serves to create an image of system resilience, and served to secure public opinion around Vladimir Putin and his regime, even during times of severe economic contraction. The media present clear story lines of a Russian government attempting to overcome the crisis along with its people, a clear enemy in the United States, and also offer hope both in the historic power of Russian solidarity and in new actors with which Russia can partner. A dying model of power is shown as being replaced with a new one, one that Russia will actively help to structure and lead towards a prosperous future.

These resilience narratives, having seemingly constructed a public dialogue around why the crisis is happening, which actors are involved, what the Russian government is doing to overcome the crisis and how the crisis will impact citizens, offer a clear trajectory going forward. Irrespective of these narratives’ truthfulness, the state allows for little competition from other sources and manufactures to its citizens narratives of a resilient system.

However, it remains to be seen if this ideological framework, constructed from these narratives, can be maintained through a prolonged period of economic downturn. If the economic crisis wears on indefinitely, it is critical to monitor whether the state ceases to control these economic narratives and where alternative narratives might arise showing the state as anything other than resilient. The increased crackdowns on oppositional media and political activists give a sense that such control may be on a knife’s edge for the state. As history has shown, when authoritative regimes lose control of the narrative, collapse can occur quickly.

Limitations and future research

There are several limitations within this study. First, the data samples derive from the population of the MMS technology and, subsequently, are not generalizable to the actual population. Second, many of the Russian translations were not flawless, making some of the content difficult to comprehend. Third, the time frame of the analyses from both the BMS and WMS data collection is somewhat limited. Fourth, this study excludes neutral and oppositional Russian news media websites. Finally, while the WMS data provide an extensive coverage of Russian news media sites, the BMS data only account for broadcast news from Rossiya 24. Therefore, future studies should consider (1) using additional search terms, (2) using improved translation technologies, (3) using a broader scope of the study, (4) using content from pro-government, neutral and oppositional news media sites and (5) pulling stories from other prominent Russian broadcast television news outlets.

Footnotes

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Author biographies

Skye C Cooley is an assistant professor of strategic communications at Oklahoma State University. His research interests include crisis communication, international relations, political public relations and political communication.

Ethan C Stokes is an assistant professor of public relations at The University of Alabama. His research interests include political public relations, political communication, public diplomacy and international relations.

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Manufacturing resilience: An analysis of broadcast and Web-based news presentations of the 2014–2015 Russian economic downturn

Abstract

Keywords

Literature review

Russia as an international authoritarian regime

The importance of the Russian economy to the Russian regime

The Russian regime and the Russian media

Narrative analyses and public narratives of resilience

Method

Selecting the subtext

Defining the content categories

Organizing the content into the categories

Results

Ability to limit the impact of the crisis

Ability to recover quickly through survival and evolution

Ability to grow in the face of rapid change

Capability to anticipate risk

Discussion

Limitations and future research

Footnotes

Funding

Author biographies

References