Hatred versus tolerance: The effect of the media on the notion of citizenship in Kuwait and Oman

Abstract

The wars in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, the crisis in Bahrain and the confrontation with Iran have created an environment of sectarianism in the region. This hostility has challenged the media to deal with the issue of citizenship (Al-Muwatana) in a responsible manner. This study applies Social Responsibility Theory to shed light on the role of print media in shaping the concept of citizenship in the Arabian Gulf, with reference to states that enjoy full or partial freedom, especially Kuwait and Oman. The results of this study show that Omani newspapers deal with citizenship positively when reporting news from Syria, Bahrain, Iraq, Yemen and Iran despite press censorship, while Kuwaiti print media, with its greater freedom of the press, is more negative on the topic of citizenship.

Keywords

Citizenship Gulf states media effect print media Social Responsibility Theory

Overview

Citizenship (Al-Muwatana) is a vital and delicate issue in the Gulf states, posing a threat to the future of much of the Gulf region. Some governments in the Gulf are aware of this potential danger and have taken measures to prevent it having a negative impact on Gulf citizens. This is of particular importance, given that many citizens of the Gulf originate from elsewhere, but have chosen to cut themselves off from their places of origin and settle in a Gulf country, albeit sometimes maintaining a relationship with relatives in their home country.

When the Gulf states were being founded, each of them adopted a system that was deemed to be appropriate for the general population. For example, Kuwait is a constitutional emirate, sharing power with its citizens through the National Assembly. Qatar is also an emirate, while Oman is a sultanate monarchy, and Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are kingdoms. In contrast, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven emirates. Throughout the Gulf, therefore, the structures of modern sovereign states were formed to control migration and foster development (Beaugrand, 2006). In 1981, these six states formed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) with the aim of creating unity in the Gulf region.

In addition to the above, each member of the GCC has adopted different ways of dealing with the issue of citizenship: some states strictly limit the granting of citizenship to residents who have lived on their soil for a very long time, while others are quicker to naturalise incomers (Beaugrand, 2006). There are still many residents in the Gulf states who are considered ‘stateless’ (Bidoon) inhabitants who have lived for a long time, for example in Kuwait, but are denied citizenship or nationality, while others do not apply for citizenship, and some even have dual citizenship (Muzdawajeen). Moreover, non-natives often retain their mother tongue, such as Farsi (from Iran) or Urdu, without any objections from the rest of society. In fact, the general population often learn new languages to be able to communicate with non-Arabic speakers. Moreover, before the discovery of oil, citizenship was not a major issue in the Gulf and did not cause any instability in the region. Nevertheless, once these states grew wealthy and following the insurgence of political crisis in the zone, citizenship became a key factor of their stability (Kinninmont, 2013).

Islam is the official religion throughout the Gulf, but Islam itself has two main branches: Sunni and Shia.¹ In the GCC countries, the governments are Sunni, while Shiites (a minority in nearly all the states) have the right to practise their religion without any discrimination. In Kuwait, the majority (around 70 percent) of citizens are Sunni, with around 30 percent of the rest of the population consisting of Shiites. In Oman, however, the majority of citizens are Ibadi, followed by Sunnis and then Shiites (World Population Review, 2018).

In 1979, the Ayatollah Khomeini overthrew the Shah of Iran and created a Shiite form of Islamic government, which claimed it would export its revolution to the neighbouring Gulf states (Ramazani, 2004; Stephenson, 2011). Since then, Kuwait has been faced with numerous actions against its government, leading to extremism amongst its citizens and raising questions of loyalty and citizenship (Boghardt, 2006).

The 8 years of war between Iran and Iraq (1980–1988) inflamed the issue of loyalty and citizenship in the region, but each Gulf state adopted a different way of addressing the problem. Nevertheless, the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and establishment of a Shiite majority government in his place triggered sectarianism in the zone. The 2011 uprising in Bahrain and the start of the civil war in Syria, followed by the insurgence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS or Daesh), worsened the tensions surrounding citizenship and sectarianism. This came to a head in 2015, when a coalition led by Saudi Arabia started a war in Yemen. In the context of Kuwait, these tensions peaked during the 2016 National Assembly elections, with some candidates resorting to the language of sectarianism and tribalism to win seats, while others used religion to gain voter support. The outbreak of the Syrian civil war and conflict in Yemen, with the involvement of Iran and Hezbollah on one side and the majority of the Gulf states and Turkey on the other, further exacerbated these issues of sectarianism and citizenship (Siegel, 2015).

Against this backdrop, the media have played a vital role in appeasing or fuelling tensions over citizenship. During the Iran–Iraq war in the 1980s, the mainstream Western media favoured Baghdad (Kellner, 1992). Similarly, most of the media in the Gulf states supported Saddam Hussein. The media’s criticism of Iran began after the Iranian revolution in 1979, and continues to emerge whenever there is tension between Iran and the Gulf states.

In all the Gulf states, except Oman, the media have been unsuccessful in keeping tensions over citizenship under control and this raises questions over the media’s social responsibility in its treatment of the topic. How, in fact, do the media in the Gulf discharge their social responsibility? This study seeks answers to the above question in the specific context of Kuwait and Oman and their media’s treatment of the topic of citizenship. For instance, is it something that they play up or play down? In responding to this, the current paper looks at news coverage of conflicts involving citizenship in print media by applying Social Responsibility Theory. This is intended to shed light on the relationship between the freedom of the press and the coverage of news relating to citizenship issues in the print media, from the perspective of social responsibility.

Citizenship

Most Gulf countries share a similar demographic mix, with populations that comprise a combination of different tribes, ethnicities and religious groups. These originate from within and outside the Arabian Peninsula, as far as Iraq, Iran, Syria and Yemen. In some cases, the citizens of Gulf countries have Indian or African heritage. However, the Arab populations of these countries are largely divided along religious lines between a Sunni majority and Shiite minority. Other Muslim minorities include Ibadis, Ismaelis and Zaidis, who are generally found in the south of the Peninsula and Oman.

In addition, the GCC states vary in their citizenship policies. Bahrain, for example, adopted a policy of large-scale naturalisation at the beginning of 21st century in order to rebalance the country’s demography against its Shiite majority. As a result, tens of thousands of Arab and non-Arab Sunni immigrants were granted Bahraini citizenship. Conversely, Qatar denaturalised thousands of members of the Al-Murrah tribe due to disputes with Saudi Arabia, whereby the Al-Murrah were accused of loyalty to the previous Amir, who was ousted by his son Hamad in 1995. In contrast, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have implemented a more conservative naturalisation policy, with a limited number of stateless residents (Bidoon) being granted citizenship in the last two decades. Only Oman and the UAE have maintained the same naturalisation policies since their independence.

In most of the GCC countries, the notion of citizenship is based on tribal traditions and is hierarchical in nature. Royal families not only support this model of hierarchy, but have also adopted it as their political system. In the tribal hierarchy, obeisance must be given to the head of the tribe and political allegiance is due to the ruler. However, the Gulf countries generally lack the modern concept of civil citizenship. In legal terms, citizenship is based on a bilateral relationship between an individual and the civil society in which they live, based on loyalty to the state on the one hand and the societal protection of the individual on the other. As such, states need to secure individuals’ civil rights on an equal basis, with the protection of personal freedoms, regardless of cultural, social, political or religious difference.

The development of contemporary notions of citizenship was originally intended to put an end to a long period of religious and tribal conflict in Europe. It established peace and introduced coexistence between rivals. Citizenship should therefore overrule all kinds of religious, ethnic and social categorization to include people of all kinds in a joint administration (Ghabra, 2011). However, the GCC states have failed to specify any advanced criteria for citizenship after a long history of political independence, even though they enjoy strong international recognition and global diplomatic relationships. Moreover, some of the Gulf countries are ranked among the world’s richest nations and most satisfy the standards of modern states in terms of their population, national entities, designated borders and military capability. Nevertheless, citizenship is still confounded between loyalty to the state and loyalty to the ruling families (Louër, 2008).

In studies on citizenship in the Gulf states, Sater (2014) identified certain particularities that they all share: for example, only a limited number of civil rights are enjoyed, with few political rights and a considerable number of social rights. Alsallal (2012: 9) defines citizenship in the Kuwaiti context as ‘the awareness of belonging to a geographical area [with] specific political and social goals and shar[ing] one common culture and political system’.

Social Responsibility Theory of the press

The unbalanced reporting of news, monopolistic tendencies, sensationalism and mass commercialism of the American press has led to the establishment of a non-governmental commission tasked with examining these accusations and making formal recommendations, according to the successes and failures of the American news media industry (McQuail, 2005). In 1947, the Commission on Freedom of the Press, known as the Hutchins Commission Report on Freedom of the Press in the USA, emphasised the need for ‘social responsibility’. The Commission stated that the American press must open up access to all groups within society and that it needed to be a ‘more diverse, objective, informative and independent press institution which would avoid causing offence or encouraging crime, violence or disorder’ (McQuail, 2005: 171). The Commission highlighted five responsibilities of the press: (1) the truthful, comprehensive reporting of events within a meaningful context; (2) the provision of a forum to exchange comments and criticism; (3) the representation of all groups; (4) a declaration of society’s goals and values; and (5) full access to its sources (Middleton, 2009).

Social Responsibility Theory claims that the press has the responsibility to provide fair, accurate and objective information to society. To justify the privileges of a free press, the media must in turn demonstrate responsibility to society through six essential functions: (1) serving the political system through information, discussion and debate; (2) enlightening the public; (3) safeguarding the rights of individuals (acting as a ‘watchdog’); (4) serving the economic system; (5) providing entertainment; and (6) remaining free from the pressure of special interests (Gunaratne and Hasim, 1996: 103–104). This theory stresses the importance of the media’s role as a source of information to help sustain democracy, while avoiding the publication of information that could lead to violence and social unrest (Yadav, 2011).

This notion of media responsibility rests on the current and future condition of society, where journalists refrain from isolating themselves from the social obligations of their citizenship (Yadav, 2011). This is of particular significance given that the mass media have the power to use identity reinforcement or nationalist rhetoric, thereby encouraging their audiences to think about their citizenship in nationalistic terms (Rosie et al., 2006). Rosie et al. state that:

. . .individuals whose worldview contains (among other dimensions) a sense of belonging to a national community might seek out media they regard as relevant to their citizenship: either to find news about ‘home’ or for comment that chimes in with their national consciousness. (2006: 328)

In other words, to be socially responsible to the wider community, a journalist should make the interests of that society their top priority (Middleton, 2009). Thus, the social responsibility of the media, as Bardoel and D’Haenens explain it:

. . .can be interpreted in terms of both ‘responsibility,’ referring to the media’s responsibility with regards to society, and ‘responsiveness,’ relating to the manner in which the media listen to and take the public into consideration. (2004: 6)

Gunaratne (2005: 124–125) expands on the Theory of Social Responsibility and concludes that ‘the West-centric norms of social responsibility may not necessarily reflect the norms of social responsibility in many nation-states outside so called “Europe”’. The notion of freedom of the press cannot be universalised because East and West do not have the same understanding of freedom. This factor then translates into the journalistic process (Gunaratne, 2005: 142) and may be applied to Kuwait and Oman, as they view social responsibility from an Eastern Islamic perspective. Here, religion, culture and tradition determine the media’s responsibilities to society. Therefore, freedom of the press can have both a positive and negative influence on the concept of citizenship.

Media and citizenship in the case of Kuwait and Oman

In order to play a strong positive role in society, the media should address everyone without discrimination. Hasan (2013) states that the mass media play a major role in strengthening notions of citizenship, promoting education and defining a citizen’s rights and responsibilities. Nevertheless, he qualifies this by adding that, currently, the media do not meet all the requirements for promoting concepts of citizenship, reporting government views, or attempting to justify governments’ behaviour, when rights are removed from members of the public, in the absence of media that are free from political constraints and bureaucracy.

Kuwait has a diverse press, presenting different political views, content and reporting styles with relative freedom, compared to most Arab countries (Rugh, 2004). However, the technological advances of the 1990s and, more recently, the social media networks have helped broaden media consumers’ participation and changed the relationship between the government and the media. The government is no longer the sole owner of the media: private television and radio channels as well as online newspapers are emerging. These new media technologies have challenged the government’s influence and control over both the content and delivery of media and are starting to challenge many institutions in Kuwaiti society.

Elements of citizenship are mentioned in numerous Articles of the Kuwaiti Constitution. For example, Article 29 states that ‘All people are equal in human dignity, and in public rights and duties before the law, without distinction as to race, origin, language or religion’, and Article 35 guarantees the right to personal beliefs and to practise one’s religion. However, in light of the current political crises in the region, which directly affected Kuwait, the Articles of the Constitution are insufficient for preventing sectarianism, thus giving rise to a negative view of citizenship among Kuwaitis. In 2012, the new Legislative Decree No. 19, regarding the protection of national unity, was ratified to promote the concept of citizenship in the face of sectarianism in Kuwait. The new law prohibited the printing, broadcasting or publishing online of any content that might be considered offensive to religious sects, or which could elicit hatred towards any social class or group in the community, thereby inciting sectarianism, tribal strife or the dissemination of ideas to suggest the superiority of one race, group, ethnicity, religious doctrine or sex over another, or to incite members of the population to violence. The fines for this kind of incitement currently range from KD 10,000 ($35,500) to KD 200,000 ($709,000), and as long as 7 years in prison (U.S. Department of State, 2014).

The level of press freedom varies from one Gulf state to another, with the Kuwaiti press being considered as one of the freest, while Oman has frequently been criticised by international organizations for restricting free speech and the right to assembly (Table 1).

Table 1.

Comparison of freedom of the press between Kuwait and Oman.

Country	Political system	Freedom of the press		Newspapers
Country	Political system	Freedom House 2019	Reporters Without Borders 2020	Newspapers
Kuwait	Constitutional emirate	Partly free (36)	109	13
Oman	Monarchy	Not free (23)	135	4

According to Table 1, Kuwait exercises civic and political freedom, but is not fully democratic. When Kuwait gained its independence in 1961, the new Constitution contained two Articles that specifically sought to protect freedom of expression and freedom of the press (Articles 36 and 37). However, Kuwait’s press freedom ranking has been on the decline. For example, in 2008, the non-profit non-governmental organization (NGO), Reporters without Borders, ranked Kuwait 61 worldwide, but this ranking had dropped to 109 by 2020, due to restrictions on the freedom of expression contained in press law, government control over the internet, and the arrests and convictions of social media users (Reporters without Borders, 2018).

Oman’s media have accepted Social Responsibility Theory, but have adapted it to their religious, cultural and traditional standards. Irrespective of Articles 29, 30 and 31 of Oman’s 1996 Basic Law, which guarantees freedom of expression and freedom of the press, Oman has a restrictive media; the law forbids material that incites ‘public discord, violates the security of the state, or abuses a person’s dignity or rights’ (Freedom House, 2015). In fact, Oman’s Press and Publication Law of 1984 restricts the freedom of the press with a high degree of government censorship over print, broadcasting and online media. Individuals are legally prosecuted, if a message sent via any means of communication, whether online or offline, violates the public order or morals, or is considered offensive by the authorities. A licence to practice is required for every journalist in Oman and this can be revoked at any time if Oman’s press laws are violated. As a result, self-censorship is widely practised by journalists.

Article 130 Repeated (2001/72) of the Omani Penal Code stipulates that anyone who promotes, instigates or elicits a feeling of hatred among the people shall be punished by imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years (Omani Penal Code, 2001). These laws on unity were originally conditions for living in the Sultanate before they became written laws. They therefore represent a part of the historically tolerant nature of Omani culture, which coexists with the differences that arise from its diversity.

To study the issue of print media and citizenship in Kuwait and Oman, as well as the role of social responsibility, three hypotheses were to be tested in this study:

H1: The media play a vital role in establishing the notion of citizenship in Oman and the State of Kuwait.

H2: Social Responsibility Theory is applied positively in Oman and negatively in Kuwait when dealing with the issue of citizenship.

H3: The media are more socially responsible in a less free society (Oman) than they are in a freer society (Kuwait), with regard to the topic of citizenship

Methodology

To investigate these hypotheses, we used a content analysis method conducted on news reports (over a period of 3 days) and op-eds (for 2 months) on five major crises surrounding the Gulf region. The selected crises were in Syria, the liberation of the city of al-Qusayr; in Yemen, the coalition war led by Saudi Arabia; in Iraq, the liberation of the city of Mosul against ISIS; in Iran, the Nuclear Agreement; and in Bahrain, the Shiite uprising of 2011. A pretested content analysis of the selected news reports revealed that most of the news stopped after day three which the authors found relevant to only select 3 days from the start of the crisis. However, for the op-eds, the relevant issues were mainly scattered from the beginning of the crisis to a two-month period. These were the selected days for the news reports:

Bahrain: 18–20 February 2011

Syria: 20–22 May 2013

Yemen: 27–29 March 2015

Iran: 15–17 July 2015

Iraq: 18–20 October 2016

Six of the most frequently read newspapers in Kuwait and four in Oman were selected for this study. The articles were collected either from the newspaper’s webpage archive, or from the newspapers’ head offices. The six Kuwaiti newspapers selected were: Alrai, Alseyassah, Alqabas, Alanba, Aljarida and Annahar, and the four Omani newspapers were Alwatan, Oman, Alshabiba and Alroya.

The events and articles chosen for this study were screened by two political science professors, one from Kuwait University (public) and the other from the Gulf University for Science and Technology (private), and two journalists of local media in Kuwait and Oman. The criteria applied to select the articles consisted of the legibility and presence of language relating to the issue of citizenship, and the repetition of certain language (Table 2). Words and phrases were coded according to both their general and specific meanings or connotations and their usage in the context of Gulf culture and traditions. The content of these newspapers was analysed according to the codes presented in Table 2.

Table 2.

Language used to promote or attack citizenship.

Sunni sectarian language	Shiite sectarian language	Tolerant language
Nasibi	Nasiriyoon	Tolerance
Takfiri	Rawafith	Amity
Amawi	Magi/Zardasht	Dialogue
Wahabi	Sufis	Coexistence
Daeshi/Daeshi terrorist	Hizb Allat	Muslims
Qaedi	Devil’s Party	Motherland
Salafists	Religious alliance	Citizens
Reactionaries	Fifth Column	Omanis/Kuwaitis
Conspiracy against the country	Alawites	National unity, Islamic unity
Aggression against Yemen and Syria	Conspiracy against the country	Working for the country
Men of Imam Husain AlKarbala	Iran is the greatest threat	Friendly relations with Iran
Adrikna Ya Sahib Al-Zaman	Criminal militias and terrorists	Brothers
Yasid and Yasidiyoon	Malali regime	National dialogue
	Sedition	Weft the homeland
	Iran’s tails	Peaceful methods
	Persian threat
	Persian empire
	Iranian expansion
	Shiite expansion

The three first days of reporting of each event were selected and analysed. We also analysed the selected news stories in their entirety, where these appeared on the front page and were continued on other pages. The newspapers’ op-eds were also selected from the first 2 months of each crisis. Most of the newspapers studied reported on the selected events, but few included any op-eds on them.

Results and discussion

Citizenship, or belonging to a nation, is broadly speaking the right of everyone in order to benefit from the privileges provided by a state without distinction or exclusion. Implicitly, good citizenship allows diversity within a state and acceptance of different identities such as race, gender and social affiliations. Intolerance weakens the bonds of citizenship because it disrespects some social groups, especially those in cultural or religious minorities. In the Gulf region, this tension between citizenship and tolerance causes some minorities to place group affiliation ahead of national identity, such that a person may say they are Sunni belonging to Saudi Arabia or Shiite belonging to Iran even though they are not a citizen of either country. This intolerance has seeped into news media using language that treats minority groups differently in terms of the characteristics used in this study. Further, the tension between citizenship and tolerance is not uniform for it has affected Kuwait more than it has Oman.

Social Responsibility Theory values social cohesion fostered through government and private sectors, and in particular holds that media should not create or exaggerate differences among social groups based on cultural, religious or political affiliations. When media violate this principle by using the language of intolerance, or favour one branch of Islam over another, social responsibility lessens. Thus, media coverage of minority groups that differs between Oman and Kuwait reflects a national difference in acceptance of social responsibility as a core, shared value.

Content analysis of news coverage in Kuwaiti and Omani newspapers

Content analysis of Kuwaiti newspapers was conducted on 89 articles and these were found to contain 40 occurrences of tolerant wording, 30 occurrences of offensive wording against Shiites and ten occurrences of offensive wording against Sunnis. Content analysis of Omani newspapers included 55 articles, containing 130 instances of tolerant wording, 20 instances of offensive wording against Shiites, and 15 instances of offensive wording against Sunnis (Table 3).

Table 3.

Language used in the Kuwaiti and Omani press (tolerant, anti-Sunni and anti-Shiite).

Tolerant	Freq	Anti-Shiite	Freq	Anti-Sunni	Freq
Kuwait
Dialogue	15	Iran is the greatest threat	7	Takfiri	3
National unity/Islamic unity	6	Conspiracy against the country	4	Men of Imam Husain AlKarbala	2
Working for the country	5	Criminal militias	4	Daeshi/Daeshi terrorist	2
National dialogue	3	Malali/Malali regime	4	Conspiracy against the country	1
Friendly relations with Iran	2	Persian empire	3	Aggression against Yemen and Syria	1
Citizens	2	Iranian expansion	3	Adrikna Ya Sahib Al-Zaman	1
Peaceful methods	2	Religious alliance	2
Tolerance	1	Shiite expansion	1
Motherland	1	Magi/Zardasht	1
Coexistence	1	Sufis	1
Brothers	1
Weft the homeland	1
Totals	40		30		10
Oman
Dialogue	34	Iran is the greatest threat	11	Daeshi/Daeshi terrorist	8
Working for the country	22	Criminal militias	6	Aggression against Yemen and Syria	6
National unity/Islamic unity	21	Hizb Allat	2	Qaedi	1
Coexistence	13	Malali/Malali regime	1
Amity	12
Friendly relations with Iran	10
Citizens	5
Motherland	4
Brothers	4
Muslims	4
Tolerance	1
Totals	130		20		15

It should be noted that many Shiites in Kuwait look to Iran as a country that represents them on religious issues, but not politically. Various Kuwaiti citizens originally came from Iran to settle in Kuwait, and they are still in touch with their relatives there. They may therefore sympathise with Iran as their loyalty will remain with that country. Therefore, some of the language used by journalists and politicians in reference to Iran could be offensive to Shiites – for example, Malali (Mullahs) is strongly associated with political manipulation and ideology and, therefore, describing Shiite clerics in this way can be offensive to Shiites. The traditional Kuwaiti word for ‘cleric’ should be used instead: Mutawa’e, meaning ‘religious man’. That said, most sectarian language is not uttered or written directly by journalists or government officials, but by columnists, or else it appears in op-eds and is quoted by political experts if the newspaper gives them space to do so. For example, Alseyassah published a Twitter message by Dhahi Khalfan, deputy chief of the Dubai Police, who is known for his aberrant and sectarian statements to buttress the ideology he represents and who uses strongly sectarian statements against Shiites such as:

Muath Bin Jabal was sent by the Prophet (peace be upon him) to Yemen to be a judge and a teacher of the religion of God which he was a Sunni [. . .] he did not insult the companions or the believers or kneel on the dust of Karbala. (2015: 21)

It is evident that Khalfan’s statement is likely to provoke a sectarian reaction from many Kuwaiti citizens. Similarly, the Aljarida newspaper published a statement from Mohammed Al-Saqr, head of the Council of Arab and International Relations, describing ‘the restoration of Yemen from the hands of Iranian ambitions and the Iranian empire and Iranian hegemony’ (2015: 1). Likewise, the Alanba newspaper quoted a Saudi religious scholar, referring to ‘the Safavid tide of the Magi and the formation of a Persian crescent’ (2011: 76). Meanwhile, the Alseyassah newspaper cited this sectarian statement from the Turkish president, Tayyip Erdogan: ‘We do not want our Sunni Arab brothers and Turkmen to fall prey to anyone’ (2016: 19). In addition, regarding the situation in Iraq, Alrai reported the Saudi foreign minister, Adel Al-Jubeir, as saying: ‘The entry of Alhashed Alshaebi [the Shiites] into the city of Mosul in northern Iraq will cause a bloodbath’, thereby expressing Wahabi anti-Shiite ideology. As such, he uses a retaliatory statement like this to mobilise public opinion against Al Alhashed Alshaebi (Alrai, 2016: 38). Even though these statements may be directed toward Iran, their political, religious and cultural implications are potentially offensive to Shiites everywhere.

The content analysis also found that when all parties (or countries) are unified on a specific crisis, as in the case of ISIS (Daesh) where all the involved countries agreed that ISIS was a terrorist group and must be stopped, the news coverage appeared to be reporting only point views the danger of it ISIS with more tolerant language. However, some reports from news agencies appeared to contain a degree of sectarian or offensive language, and the newspapers that published these failed to delete or modify them.

In terms of the content analysis of Omani newspapers, the method differed slightly from that which was applied to the Kuwaiti press. First, Oman’s newspapers did not appear to report in the same depth on the events selected for this study as compared to the Kuwaiti press. In many cases, they did not provide any coverage at all of the events, thus reflecting Oman’s neutral position on sensitive issues in the region. Second, most of the selected Omani newspapers offered minimal reporting on the selected events and did not treat them as worthy of major headlines. Third, not all the selected newspapers had archived data available – only a limited amount of such data was accessible online. Fourth, due to the limited freedom of the press in Oman, the reports on the selected issues all reflected the same position, unlike the Kuwaiti newspapers which presented different perspectives. Fifth, Oman’s newspapers contained few op-eds relating to the selected events. Sixth, Oman’s newspapers were not found to be classified according to social class, sectarian views or political leanings, and were not owned by an elite group of families, unlike Kuwaiti newspapers.

A tendency was found in the Omani press to report on the selected issues according to the government’s position, which is to act in a socially responsible manner to protect the notion of citizenship. It is therefore highly likely that the government’s neutral policy affects the way in which news is reported in this context. Tolerant language characterized most of the reports on the various crises. Even where some offensive language was used in reference to Sunnis and Shiites, this was generally in reports from foreign news agencies or journalists, or in statements made by foreign officials, serving purely to illustrate other positions relating to these issues. Due to its culture of enforcement against personal discrimination, together with its legislation such as Article 130 Repeated of the Omani Penal Code, the tone of the news was neutral and posed no threat to the concept of Omani citizenship. The five news events selected did not incite any hatred or threaten the ethos of citizenship in Oman.

Yemen: The coalition war led by Saudi Arabia, 2015

Indirect sectarianism has been blatant amongst Shiite members of the Kuwaiti Parliament with regard to the war in Yemen. In the coverage of these events, Sunni members of Parliament have openly praised the coalition led by Saudi Arabia, while Shiite members of Parliament have spoken against the war, claiming that the Kuwaiti government has violated the Constitution by joining the offensive against Yemen. In this war, the coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia supports the central government, while Iran supports the Houthi movement. The war has consequently increased the amount of sectarian language appearing in the Kuwaiti press, whereby Sunnis support the coalition (Saudi Arabia) and many Shiites support the Houthis (Iran). Most of the reporting is in fact biased against Iran, but much of the language is also indirectly sectarian, like the word Safavid, referring to the place from where the Shiites originated in Iran. These reports have helped galvanise the sense that the war in Yemen is intended to stop Iran from supporting the expansion of the Shiite Houthis in the south of the Arabian Peninsula. In other words, the references to Iran indirectly target all Shiites.

Meanwhile, Omani reports on the crisis in Yemen were mainly neutral and characterized by tolerant language to protect citizenship and promote unity in Yemen, as well as the right of its population to resolve the crisis without interference from other countries. Since Oman is a member of the GCC and the Arab League, its allegiance is to the Saudi coalition in Yemen. These are some examples of the tolerant language used to report the Yemeni conflict:

‘We hope that the two will reach an agreement’. (conciliatory language; Alroya, 2015).

‘We will deal with Yemen on an equal scale’ (Alroya, 2015).

‘We hope the Yemenis will agree among themselves’ (Alroya, 2015).

‘The Sultanate will support any initiative for the stability of Yemen’ (Alroya, 2015).

However, on a few occasions, the reports contained references to ‘criminal militias’ even though, most of the time, the wording, ‘Houthi militias’ is used. This neutral language helped promote the concept of citizenship in the written word, as emphasised in the following examples:

‘The Sultanate emphasizes the importance of solidarity and constructive dialogue among Arab brothers’ (Alomaniya, 2015).

‘We hope that the Summit will lead to positive results in the area of joint Arab action to achieve security, stability and prosperity for the Arab peoples’ (Alomaniya, 2015).

‘We must deal wisely with these troubled situations’ (Alomaniya, 2015).

Omanis appear to view the crisis in Yemen as an internal affair, which the Yemenis need to resolve without any outside intervention. Thus, the overall tone in the Omani press has mainly been neutral, protecting the notion of citizenship through language that affirms Yemeni legitimacy, but does not harm the Houthis.

Syria: The liberation of the city of Al-Qusayr, 2013

The war in Syria, with the involvement of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states (Sunnis) in the opposition, and Hezbollah and Iran (Shiites) joining forces with the Syrian government, has moved the political conflict towards a more religious sectarian war. This has been reported by numerous Kuwaiti newspapers using language such as the ‘Invasion of Hezbollah and Iran’ (Reuters, 2013); ‘A fanatical terrorist group such as Hezbollah and Iranian forces’ (Agencies, 2013); and ‘Besieging a group of young Lebanese Sunnis in al-Qusayr’ (Alrai, 2013).

However, newspaper reports on the liberation of Al-Qusayr in Syria were not available online for any Omani newspaper except Alshabiba. Nevertheless, coverage of the liberation of Mosul from ISIS (Daesh) in Iraq included some mention of the Syrian crisis. Daesh was formed in Syria and then moved to Iraq to establish ISIS in both countries. Due to the balanced relationship between many countries involved in Syria, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, the USA, France, Turkey and Russia, Omani newspaper reports were neutral, presenting the views of both sides, without displaying any preference.

For example, the Alshabiba newspaper published an article entitled, ‘The fall of Assad will weaken Iran and Hezbollah’ (Khalil, 2013), which presented a neutral picture, taking into account the views of the Israeli prime minister and academics, with no negative statements against Iran, except for the occasional use of destructive language, such as ‘Axis of Evil’ in reference to Iran and Hezbollah (Khalil, 2013).

Bahrain: The Shiite uprising, 2011

Since Bahrain is a neighbour of Kuwait and a fellow member of the GCC, with a Shiite majority, when its Shiite population rose up against the Bahraini government in 2011, many Shiites in Kuwait sympathised with the uprising, while the Kuwaiti government supported the GCC’s position and backed the Bahraini government. The Kuwaiti press nevertheless remained neutral in its coverage of the uprising in order to protect the country from internal sectarian hostilities; for example, the Aljarida newspaper published on its front page news of the uprising on the first day, with a big headline, but then reduced this coverage to a small item on the front page on day two, and by day three, the story had been shifted to page 25. Moreover, tolerant language dominated most of these reports.

During the crisis in Bahrain, the Omani press represented the positions of all parties involved using neutral language such as ‘protesters’, rather than the ‘Shiite Rioters’ and stating that ‘the citizens of the country must calm, unite and cooperate with all political forces’, thereby calling Bahraini citizens to join with the government to calm the situation. Moreover, Iran was referred to as an ‘external party’, which is not explicit. Most of the reports did not implicate Iran as being behind the uprising, neither did they accuse Iran of interfering in Bahrain’s affairs. Three words were used to refer to the Shiite uprising: ‘Shiites’, ‘protesters’ and ‘demonstrators’. The tone of these reports promoted the notion of citizenship.

Iraq: The liberation of the city of Mosul against ISIS, 2016

In contrast, Iraq differs from the other contexts addressed here, as the war against ISIS through the liberation of Mosul began when sectarianism was at its peak in the region in general, and in Kuwait in particular, due to the conflict in Syria, Bahrain and Yemen. However, the atrocities committed by ISIS against all religious Muslims (both Sunni and Shiite), Christians and Yazidis united every other country against them, rendering the news coverage uniform and unilateral. However, because Iran was part of the so-called ‘Popular Crowd’ (Alhashed Alshaebi), the reports showed concern over Iraq possibly moving towards Shiism in the region, creating what was referred to as a ‘Shiite crescent’, extending from Iran to Syria (Barzegar, 2008).

Similar to the Omani coverage in Yemen, reports on the Iraqi liberation of Mosul were neutral since all outside parties were in opposition to ISIS (Daesh). The reports therefore protected the notion of citizenship by using positive language to emphasize that Iraq’s sovereignty was being threatened by ISIS (Daesh). For the first time, a certain type of statement appeared in the Omani press (most likely missed by the editors): ‘The fall of Mosul will lead to the defeat of Sunni militants in Iraq’ (Reuters, 2016). However, unlike their first appearance, the mere use of the term ‘Daesh’ by Shiites cannot be considered as an offensive against the Sunnis since all parties involved shared the same negative feelings about ISIS.

Iran: The nuclear agreement, 2015

The coverage of Iran’s nuclear agreement in the Kuwaiti newspapers has demonstrated a mixture of tolerance and intolerance. Most countries in the world have supported the agreement, except for Israel and Saudi Arabia, and so the media coverage has been positive. However, there have been a few anti-Shiite slogans and comments such as ‘Mullah’s regime’ (Alseyassah, 2015); ‘Iran’s influence is expanding under sectarian slogans to its widest range since the establishment of the Islamic Revolution’ (Aljarida, 2015); and ‘Iran has the chance to expand its sectarianism to the widest extent’ (Aljarida, 2015). This kind of reporting shows support for Saudi Arabia’s position against the treaty.

When reporting on the Iranian nuclear agreement, the language used in the Omani press was mainly tolerant due to a global consensus and Oman’s constructive role in the agreement, which is clear from Oman’s coverage of the issue. In this regard, whenever intolerant language appeared, it was generally in quotes or reports from foreign sources or countries that were opposed to the nuclear agreement, such as Israel. For example, the Alwatan newspaper reported that ‘Iran is dangerous’, indicating the Israeli position. The ‘Great Satan’ discourse here highlights the positive position of Iran, its concessions and its flexibility in attempting to reach an agreement while avoiding war and sanctions, and thereby strengthening and improving the economic situation for its citizens. The report promotes the idea of citizenship by avoiding any verbal attack against Tehran and does not contain any inflammatory language.

Kuwaiti op-edd

To learn more about the role of the press in reinforcing or weakening the perception of citizenship in both countries, op-eds were collected over a two-month period, starting from the first day of each event. In Kuwait, 13 op-eds were published in relation to the selected events. Most of the newspapers produced op-eds that had been written in a fair and balanced manner, using the language of tolerance, except for the Alseyassah newspaper, which used common Sunni sectarian terms against Shiites: ‘Athnab Iran (Iran’s tails)’, ‘Malali (Mullahs)’ and ‘Al-Embaratoria Al-Farisia (the Persian Empire)’.

The analysis of op-ed content revealed that whenever the crisis got closer to Kuwait, the press would lean towards intolerance in their reports, thereby causing problems for the perception of citizenship. With regard to this local crisis, the newspapers did not care much about their social responsibility to protect the perception of citizenship, but rather used language that weakened the concept in the name of freedom. However, whenever the newspapers covered events in closely neighbouring countries, such as Bahrain, Yemen, Iraq and Iran, they applied government policy in their reporting of the crisis.

On 19 February 2011, Ahmad Aljarallah, owner of the Alseyassah newspaper, wrote an op-ed in support of the Bahraini government’s actions against Iranian (Shiite) activists in Bahrain, using typical Sunni sectarian language, such as the Malali regime and ‘Iran’s tails’. Then, on 22 March 2011, he wrote a further op-ed containing Sunni sectarian terms such as ‘the Persian threat’, ‘the Persian invasion’, ‘sectarian sedition’, and referring to Iran’s ‘subversive cells’ in all Gulf states.

On 24 March 2011, Jassim Boodai, owner of the Alrai newspaper, published a front-page op-ed on the Bahraini crisis, entitled ‘If you are sectarian please don’t add me’, as part of a youth campaign on social media, calling for transparency in criticism of the crisis. He exhorted the youth to reject sectarianism in the country and openly used the words ‘Sunni’ and ‘Shiite’ in the article. Then, on 14 June 2013, Boodai published an op-ed entitled ‘War on Kuwait land’, which openly discussed and criticised the crisis in Syria and its outcomes affecting Kuwait:

The arena is back with sectarian words, returning to a black hatred scene accompanied by expressions of vengeance, murder and revenge for similar phrases and similar actions. . . . We heard words from idiots, the arrogant, the backward and extremists to lure sedition to our country. . . . If you want to bring sedition to Kuwait, you should leave it. . . . (2013: 1)

On 31 March 2015, again with reference to the war in Yemen, the Alqabas newspaper published an op-ed entitled ‘Decisive Kuwait to untie the work of Arabs and human interference’, which addressed the topic of the Syrian Donors’ Conference held in Kuwait, criticising terrorism in Syria and Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen and the role played by Kuwait in bringing peace to the region. On 23 April 2015, in relation to the Yemeni crisis, Alqabas published further op-eds entitled ‘Decisive’ and ‘Hope’. These praised Saudi Arabia’s positive progress in Yemen and the restoration of a legitimate government. The newspaper stated that the success of the coalition had not only empowered Saudi Arabia and Arabs in general, but also brought hope of peace to the region. These articles sided with the Saudi coalition, but used language that respected the other side, thereby expressing opinions without attempting to dishonour the other parties involved, such as Iran.

On 29 March 2011, with reference to the uprising in Bahrain, the Aljarida newspaper published an op-ed entitled ‘There is a country for you sectarians’ on its front page, using strong language against anyone attempting to cultivate sectarianism in Kuwait. On 27 March 2015, concerning the Yemeni crisis, Aljarida published an op-ed entitled ‘We are all for Kuwait’, standing with the government’s decision to join the war in Yemen and justifying this decision as an action in favour of security in the Gulf:

There is no room for gray positions, for random objections, for internal differences, for confusions or distractions. We are all one hand, not only for Yemen, but for our Gulf and Kuwait and the unity of our people.

Omani op-eds

Six op-eds were collected from Omani newspapers, indicating that the stance in these was no different from that in news reports, whereby similar language was found in each case. In fact, the op-eds confirmed the results of the content analysis of the news reports, in which the nature of the issues, the parties involved, the sites of conflict and the government’s position were all reflected in the op-eds. However, very few op-eds were published on these selected events: one or two at most, but it is worth noting that the Alwatan newspaper’s op-eds were completely straightforward and indicated the newspaper’s position very clearly, with wording such as ‘Daesh Terrorist’, ‘America arranges Daesh’s escape’ and ‘. . .welcomes Russian interference in Syria’.

Meanwhile, the Alroya newspaper published an op-ed on 18 October 2016 entitled ‘Iraq is approaching salvation’, which supported the Iraqi government’s action against ISIS (Daesh) in Mosul. It openly referred to Sunnis:

The Iraqi forces are facing a real challenge in this battle. They are joined by the Kurdish Peshmerga and the tribes belonging to the Sunni sects. If these forces succeed in cohesion, they will continue to advance the heart of one man without sectarian or ethnic discrimination [. . .] the most dangerous terrorist organization [. . .] this Daesh cancer. (2016: 9)

Alwatan was the most outspoken in its coverage of the liberation of Mosul. On 19 October 2016, the op-ed, ‘Battle of the Mosul and the safe passages of “Daesh”’, carried straightforward statements that reflected the newspaper’s stance without posing any threat to the notion of citizenship. The above-mentioned op-ed mainly accused the Americans and their allies of supporting ISIS (Daesh) as a means of dividing Syria and Iraq and thereby safeguarding Israel.

Similarly, in the op-ed dated 23 October 2016, there is a clear position adopted against ISIS (Daesh) and its alleged allies, such as the USA, the UK, France and Turkey, using strong language against them:

‘. . .despite the importance of the battle of liberating Mosul to rid its people from the terrorist organization, called Daesh, and its malicious ideas – which contradict humanity and the doctrine of the Islamic religion, its values, its principles and its laws’.

‘The situation Iraq has reached is, in fact, the completion of the American project called “‘Greater Middle East”’.

‘The position of Western colonial countries that spill and spread hypocrisy to all parts of the world is to move toward supporting and encouraging terrorism, and to create more wars, turbulences, strife, and chaos’.

On 26 October 2016, Alwatan published a further op-ed along the lines of ‘European and American ambivalence’, which outlined the contradictory policies of the USA and Europe in Iraq and Syria, and concluded that:

The Americans and their European followers know precisely that there is no moderate terrorism and another extreme, they invented it, but with the deformation of Islam on one side, and employing this terrorism to serve their colonial plans and projects in the area and the world [on the other], which requires ambivalence and hypocrisy, and the use of other methods of deceit and immoral tools.

The style of the op-eds in the Alwatan newspaper remained consistent when covering Iran’s nuclear issue. On 15 July 2015, it published ‘Historic agreement for the region and the world’, which included a high proportion of positive tolerant language, calling for peace and promising a better future.

Conclusion

Social Responsibility Theory was applied in this study to examine the way in which local Kuwaiti and Omani newspapers reported conflict news in the region, especially with regard to the notion of citizenship. The study specifically looked at how local newspapers in a partially free press (in Kuwait) and a press that is not free (in the Sultanate of Oman) addressed the topic of citizenship in news coverage of sectarian conflict.

In recent years, the Arab region has witnessed various bloody internal conflicts, which reflect weak citizenship solidarity. Using the content analysis method, the results supported the study’s hypotheses. The way in which the conflicts across the five countries have been reported in the press of Kuwait and Oman revealed how newspapers can affect notions of citizenship, using language that either unites or divides the people by arousing hatred and anger instead of tolerance and respect. The null hypothesis (H1), namely that ‘The media play a vital role in affecting the concept of citizenship in the Oman and the State of Kuwait’, was consequently supported in this study. The results showed that newspapers can play a vital and socially responsible role in safeguarding notions of citizenship from any sectarian news that might divide the people and introduce anger and hate.

Regardless of the fact that it is considered to be a nation without a free press, Oman’s local newspapers demonstrate social responsibility in protecting citizenship. Most of their reports on the conflicts in the region were found to contain tolerant language, which coincides with the government’s stance on protecting citizenship. In contrast, Kuwait’s press had failed to report in a socially responsible manner, often using highly offensive language and thus inciting hatred amongst some readers. In contrast, the tone of the reports in the Omani press was very positive in its protection of the notion of citizenship, while the Kuwaiti media ran the risk of stirring up anger and hatred towards other nations, such as Iran, Iraq and Yemen. These results support H2, which states that ‘Social Responsibility Theory is applied positively in Oman and negatively in Kuwait when dealing with the issue of citizenship’.

Finally, the unexpected conclusion is drawn that in a state where the press is not considered to be free, namely Oman, the media very seriously and positively protected the concept of citizenship, while in a state where there is partial freedom of the press, namely Kuwait, the print media were less responsible about protecting citizenship. The results therefore support H3, which states that ‘The media are more socially responsible in a less free society (Oman) than they are in a freer society (Kuwait), with regard to the topic of citizenship’. This is not to say that a censored press is superior to a free press, but rather that, in the context of important issues, the press has a duty to differentiate between matters of greater and lesser importance and to report in a socially responsible manner. Protecting the concept of citizenship must take priority over the freedom of the press to report news. Therefore, press freedom should be encouraged, with an emphasis on social responsibility, because the aim of all media is to positively benefit society. The protection of citizenship comes under this responsibility, especially in the Gulf region.

Footnotes

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The authors received financial support for this research from KFAS reference: P115-11AM-02.

ORCID iD

Ali A Dashti

Notes

Author biographies

Ali A Dashti is an associate professor in the Mass Communication Department at the Gulf University for Science and Technology. He obtained his BA from Eastern Illinois University in 1990, his MS from Kansas State University in 1993, and his PhD in Journalism and Mass Media from the University of Stirling in Scotland in 2009. He has published numerous papers related to media studies, women’s studies, social media, public relations, and political communication. He is the author of Sergeant over One Week and How 0.10 Can Change Your Life, and the co-author of Media Law in Kuwait.

Hasan A Johar is the head of the Political Science Department at Kuwait University since 2014. He obtained his PhD in International Relations from Florida State University in 1989. He was member of Parliament in the Kuwait National Assembly from 1996 to 2012.

Saif Nasser Al-Maamari has published many articles in English and Arabic about the status of Citizenship Education and Global Citizenship in Oman and the Arab Gulf countries in both schools and at higher education levels.

Hamed H Alabdullah obtained his BA in Political Science and Economics from Kuwait University, his MPhil in Political Science from the University of Manchester in the UK, and his PhD in Political Science also from the University of Manchester. He is former cultural attaché in Dublin, Ireland. He is the author of more than 16 published articles and a book on various subjects on Islamic political movements, Middle Eastern affairs, women’s participation and media and politics.

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