The presence of hostile media phenomenon in Ethiopian private,federal and regional television channels

Abstract

Since Ethiopia’s 2018 transition, sporadic ethnic and political violence and conflict and inter-group divisions have brought the nation to its knees. This study aims to assess the presence of the Hostile Media Phenomenon (HMP) among audiences of Ethiopian private, regional and federal television channels. Survey data were gathered from 600 participants living in Addis Ababa City, Amhara and Oromia regional states and were purposely chosen based on their historical and political dominance in the country. The study examined six different television channels found in the three regions: Oromia Broadcast Network (OBN), Amhara Broadcast Corporation, Addis TV, Wlata TV, Fana Broadcast Corporation (FBC) and Ethiopian Broadcast Corporation (EBC). The results of this study indicate that the regional states’ television channels play a major role in intensifying the hostile media phenomenon as well as in motivating violence and conflict among different regional states and groups of people.

Keywords

Audiences Ethiopia federal state television channels hostile media phenomenon perception private television channels regional states television channels

Introduction

Hostile media effect (also known as hostile media perception or hostile media bias) is the perceptual reaction in mass communication to media reporting on ego-involving collective but potentially divisive issues resulting in both sides of the opinion spectrum feeling that their side has been cast in a bad light (Gunther, 2017; Perloff, 2015). The perception that this hostile media effect arises among not only highly involved partisans but even in the general population has been empirically supported (Dalton et al., 1998; Gunther and Christen, 2002; Hansen and Kim, 2011). The phenomenon also occurs among audiences in stable democracies as well as conflict-ridden nations, but is more likely to be rampant in multi-ethnic societies characterized by intercommunal tensions and threat of state collapse. The perceptual phenomenon seems to point to the role of the media as an enabler of division or at least as a mirror of societal polarization.

The proliferation of media choices globally, including in less developed parts of the world, seems to have led to pronounced dichotomous camps of hostile and friendly media. However, it seems the hostile media effect has received far more attention as a subject of enquiry than the construct of a friendly media. While the media may pride themselves on their editorial principles that uphold the cardinal principles of balance, fairness and objectivity, partisans of an oppositional ideological or issue camp are unlikely to agree. The hostile media effect suggests that partisans vigilantly over-analyse content originating from a perceived hostile camp and typically find coverage to be unfair to their side, regardless of the objectivity of the particular news or other content as judged by a more neutral party. In more divided communities, the hostile media phenomenon can be more pronounced and, in some cases, there may even be threats against journalists perceived to be hostile and protests may be lodged against media regulatory bodies as Ethiopia’s recent conflict would show (Woldearegay, 2022).

Since the pioneering landmark study of Vallone et al. (1985) on Israeli-Arab perceptual gaps, a number of studies have empirically supported the presence of the hostile media effect. Research has shown that the Republicans in the US are more prone to perceive hostile media bias than Democrats (Lee, 2005; Mutz and Martin, 2001), especially when they discuss politics with like-minded peers (Eveland and Shah, 2003). With regard to this, HMP appears to be especially significant in response to media reports about political and social conflicts such as the Middle East conflict (Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken, 1994; Perloff, 1989; Vallone et al., 1985), the war in Bosnia (Matheson and Dursun, 2001) or a labour strike (Christen et al., 2002). Perceptual explanation of media hostility is relevant because it has been linked to highly relevant political attitudes and behaviour: decrease of trust in media and political institutions (Hansen and Kim, 2011); anger and lowered political efficacy (Tsfati and Cohen, 2005); increased feelings of isolation (Mutz, 2002); reluctance to express views (Hwang et al., 2008); and political rallying by way of activating corrective actions designed to change a perceived hostile status quo (Rojas, 2010). Finding out and studying the audiences’ perceptions of mediated political messages is especially relevant in the current segmented and partisan media environments, where opportunities to self-select political content have proliferated (Feldman, 2011).

In Ethiopia, media and politics are highly intertwined and most media are inclined to be political, often inviting controversy in the multi-ethnic media ecosystem. Although, currently, the fragmented media environment gives television viewers sufficient opportunities to tune out of television channels with which they disagree as well as the news altogether, oppositional media hostility is unavoidable (Arceneaux et al., 2012).

Ethiopia is a federal state where there are 11 regional states, also called states that constitute the Ethiopian federation. The country is described as a museum of peoples (Beshir, 1979; Wagaw, 1999) with its population characterized by a complex pattern of ethnic, linguistic, political and religious groups (Tronvoll, 2000) that have lived together peacefully for a long time. However, since April 2018, ethnic and religious-based conflicts have escalated alarmingly in Oromia, Amhara, Tigray, Addis Ababa and in several parts of the country affecting establishments ranging from universities to religious institutions (Ndiaye et al., 2020; Yusuf, 2019). Ethiopia has shown a marked boom not only in private media but also in state media, which are of two categories: the federal state media controlled by the central government and the regional state media owned by the regional state governments. There are also parastatal media, Walta and Fana, owned formerly by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and more recently by the Prosperity Party which replaced the EPRDF. Irrespective of the categorization, the Ethiopian media is blamed for playing a pivotal role in the turbulence which has erupted in various parts of the country since 2019 (Skjerdal and Moges, 2021; Woldearegay, 2022). The previous stronghold of the Ethiopian federal state media (which supported the EPRDF) has been overtaken by a fragmented state media structure and the growing significance of regional state mass media agencies. Most of the regional state media agencies, especially Oromia, Amhara and Tigray, are also highly conscious that they compete with the federal state media with regard to both audiences and political narratives. Hence, the media landscape today in Ethiopia is polarized as never before (Wilmot et al., 2021).

In addition, the Ethiopian media uses the approaches of annihilation and othering to frame stories which includes ignoring important aspects of an ethnic or political group that is perceived as an enemy and taking information from another outlet to expose what another ethnic group is doing wrong (Oluka, 2021). The attitudes conveyed have implications for studying HMP across audiences. Therefore, based on the above multiple reasons and facts, this study assessed the presence of HMP among the Ethiopian private, regional and federal state television channels. Thus, the research has specifically provided answers to the following questions:

RQ1: What is the audience’s perception of the presence of HMP on the Ethiopian regional state television channels?

RQ2: What is the audience’s perception of the presence of HMP on the Ethiopian regional state television channels?

RQ3: What is the audience’s perception of the presence of HMP on the Ethiopian private television channels?

RQ4: What is the audience’s perception of the presence of HMP on the Ethiopian private, regional and federal states’ television channels?

Literature review

Hostile media phenomenon

The hostile media perception (HMP) phenomenon was first noticed by Hastorf and Cantril (1954). In their experimental studies, two different groups were investigated: Dartmouth and Princeton. Both sides were asked to watch the film Particularly Rough Gridiron Struggle at the same time and were asked for their personal views on the film. The results explain that although the two groups watched the same movie, Dartmouth fans saw Princeton's cruel provocation, and Princeton fans saw the continued pattern of Dartmouth's atrocities. Vallone et al. (1985) were the first scholars to explicitly use the term ‘hostile media phenomenon’. When mass media report controversial issues, presenting both positive and negative arguments on an issue, highly involved partisans tend to perceive identical content as prejudiced because it appears less favourable to their own standpoint or more favourable to the opposing side. This phenomenon has been defined as the hostile media effect (Vallone et al., 1985). Since Vallone et al. (1985) first discussed this effect in the settings of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the US news coverage of the Beirut massacre, it has been constantly confirmed in a range of other contexts, including elections (Duck et al., 1998; Huge and Glynn, 2010); the Bosnian war (Matheson and Dursun, 2001); Arab citizens living in Israel (Tsfati, 2007); debates about abortion (Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken, 1994); national security laws (Choi et al., 2009) and genetically modified food (Gunther and Schmitt, 2004; Gunther et al., 2009).

The hostile media effect has very broad and significant consequences. In addition to influencing the formation and perception of foreign policy, it contributes to feelings of political and social alienation (Tsfati, 2007), perceived negative coverage slant affects perceived public opinion (Gunther and Christen, 2002), reinforces a growing cynicism and disaffection from politics (Cappella and Jamieson, 1997), limits the ability of the news to inform public opinion (Miller and Krosnick, 2000), impacts advocacy behaviour (Choi et al., 2011) and alters behaviour (Tsfati and Cohen, 2005). However, objective, neutral, fair and professional journalists and media claim to (McCarthy and Dolfsma, 2014) have little control over how they are perceived. In the post-factual world, it is all in the eye of the beholder. In fact, globally, the trend shows that media credibility seems to be on the decline. More particularly, in polarized communities, the credibility problem can be high as there may be contested truths and deeply entrenched rivalries and interests that media will often mirror.

Woldearegay (2022) has shown that in Ethiopia’s most recent conflict, the media was mobilized as a weapon of offence and defence, adding fuel to the interethnic conflicts. The media’s inflammatory role was reported in other studies in Ethiopia (Skjerdal and Moges, 2021), which found that both journalists and audiences were polarized attitudinally, further exacerbating interethnic hostilities. Irrespective of content attributes, the same media outlet may draw polarized reactions as the most or least trusted. Not only are ethnic media considered hyper-partisan by the other but also hostile to an extreme to a rival collectivity. The psychological distance threatens the viability of a federal set-up that assumes that constituent ethnic groups have appreciable levels of a common bond. The mistrust of openly rival media extends to even mainstream federal media which may at times be considered biased in favour of or against a particular ethnic entity within a national set-up. The effect of mistrust is considerable because any meaningful national conversation on important issues, or national consensus, trust in democratic processes and institutions hinge upon a reasonable level of collective trust. Despite the overriding importance of hostile media effects, it is intriguing how little research interest it has received in Africa in general and Ethiopia in particular. However, the preponderance of intergroup hostility in Ethiopia makes hostile media effect research an important scholarly, national and regional interest considering the ramifications for state fragility, nation-building, peace and development. A review of the literature shows that HMP has not been investigated in the context of the Ethiopian media ecology despite its relevance to the widespread intercommunal and interregional conflicts in the country that have drawn global media attention.

Methodology

Research design

The study employed a cross-sectional research design. Cross-sectional research design is descriptive, exploratory and explanatory in nature and the observations are done at one or more point in time (Bethlehem, 1999; Creswell, 2014). The data was gathered using the quantitative research approach. The approach involved the collection of data so that information could be quantified and subjected to statistical analysis in order to support or disprove ‘alternate knowledge claims’ (Creswell, 2003: 153).

Sampling technique

The Amhara and Oromia regional states and Addis Ababa city were purposively selected because of their influence on Ethiopian politics in the past and present, their substantial populations and some evidence of ongoing attempts at mobilization (Yusuf, 2019). The Tigray region was the fourth area that was planned to be studied, but because of the war in Tigray and the borders of Amhara, gathering data there was found to be impossible. From the three places chosen for the study finally, only 600 participants were selected using convenience and the snowball sampling technique.

Two private television channels, one federal and two regional state television channels were selected as well as one capital city television channel: Fana Broadcast Corporation (FBC), Walta Television (WT), Ethiopian Broadcast Corporation (EBC), Oromia Broadcast Network (OBN), Amhara Broadcast Corporation (AMC) and Addis Television.

Data collection tools

A survey questionnaire was applied to collect data from the participants. Surveys provide a quantitative or numeric description of trends, attitudes and opinions of a population. The survey questionnaire was prepared to measure the HMP of the Ethiopian private, regional and federal state television channels using the Likert scale. The questions were adopted from previous studies and some questions were modified to fit the Ethiopians federal and regional television channels using a pilot study. Surveys have been widely used in HMP studies (Gunther and Chia, 2001; Gunther and Liebhart, 2006; McLemore et al., 2015; Perloff, 2015; Vallone et al., 1985).

All items were measured on a 5-point scale (1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree). The dependent variable, hostile media phenomenon (HMP), was measured with an index of seven items tapping opinion-hostile news coverage. The survey questionnaires were developed in English and the final version were translated into Amharic and Oromiffa versions by the researcher, and were reviewed by Amharic, Oromiffa and English language professors and experts. After the translation and review of the survey questionnaire, pilot tests among 200 purposively chosen respondents were conducted to measure the reliability and validity of the instrument. The first pilot tests were undertaken among 80 respondents from Bonga University students and staff members. The second pilot tests were undertaken among 70 employees found in different offices in the Kaffa Zone. The remaining 50 pilot tests were undertaken among students of Jimma University and employees from different sectorial offices in the Jimma zone. The respondents were requested to give their honest comments orally and in written. Only 170 of the 200 distributed forms were filled in properly. Cronbach consistency analyses were conducted to determine the consistency and internal reliability of the different constructs of the HMP study. Cronbach’s alpha of 0.70 is considered very reliable and above are sufficient to indicate the internal consistency of the items in the measures (Saunders et al., 2012; Schutte et al., 2000) So, the seven items included in the HMP study had a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.86.

Data collection procedure

To make the research participants cooperate with the researcher and other data collectors, a permission letter was shown to them which was taken from Addis Ababa University, Journalism and Communication School. For the purpose of data collection, experts who could collect data were hired and trained to make the data collection easy and manageable. The respondents’ confidentiality was assured – they were told that the information they provided would be used only as an input for the research. The data was gathered from 1 April to 27 June 2022 from all the three study areas (Bahir Dar, Adama and Addis Ababa). The participants were given 30–45 minutes to answer the questionnaire. Universities in the three places of study were used as the starting point for the data gathering.

Method of data analysis

To analyse the quantitative data, the latest version 26 of SPSS statistical data analysis software was employed. The study applied different means of tests to explore whether there was a relationship between two or more categorical variables. Because the data showed departure from normality, non-parametric methods were employed. The Mann Whitney U test, which is one of the most common non-parametric tests, was applied to investigate the difference in the means of a continuous variable between two independent groups. The Wilcoxon Signed Rank test was applied to compare two dependent samples with ordinal data and the Wilcoxon Rank Sum test was used to compare two independent samples. Also, for samples with more than two independent groups, the Kruskal-Wallis test was applied to find out whether there was any significant difference between the means of three or more independent (unrelated) groups.

Results

Profile of respondents

In this section, the participants’ background – sex, age, educational status, employment status and marital status – has been described. The data were collected from Addis Ababa city and the regional states of Amhara and Oromia. With reference to gender, 35.2 percent were male and 64.8 percent, female. Thus, the majority of the study participants were female.

With regard to age, 21.7 percent were 18–27 years old, 25 percent were 28–37 years old, 24.5 percent were 38–47 years old, 13.7 percent were 48–57 years old and 15.2 percent were 58 years old or more. This shows that the participants were generally young. With reference to educational background, 26.2 percent were high school students, 12.7 percent were college diploma holders, 40 percent had Bachelor’s degrees and 21.2 percent had Master’s degrees, indicating that the typical participant was a college graduate. Employment status showed that 26.3 percent were students, 49.5 percent were employed and the remaining 24.2 percent were unemployed. Of the participants, 36.7 percent were married and 63.3 percent were unmarried.

Audience’s perception of HMP in Ethiopian private, regional and federal TV channels

Audience’s perception of HMP in regional state TV channels

The Friedman test indicates that there is significant difference in the audience’s perceived hostility between regional state TV channels at 5% level of significance (0.03 < 0.05).

Table 1.

Significance of difference between the regional state television channels.

N	600
Chi-Square	6.732
Df	2
Asymp. Sig.	0.035

Table 2.

Significance of difference among regional television state channels.

N	HMP between OBN and Amhara TV	HMP between Addis TV and Amhara TV	HMP between OBN and Addis TV
Z	−0.578	−4.588	−2.866
Asymp. Sig. (two-tailed)	0.563	0.000	0.004

The above Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test shows that there is statistically significant difference in the audience’s perceived hostility between Addis TV and Amhara TV as well as between OBN and Addis TV at 5% significance (p = 0.000 and 0.004, respectively), but there is no significant difference in perception of hostility between OBN and Amhara TV (p > 0.05).

To find out which television channel is nearest to the hostile media phenomenon, the mean rank comparisons for each television channel were undertaken.

Table 3.

Mean ranks comparison between the regional state television channels.

Ranks categories	N	Mean rank	Sum of ranks
HMP between AddisTV and Amhara TV
Negative ranks	187	195.16	36495.00
Positive ranks	253	239.23	60525.00
Total	600
HMP between OBN and Addis TV
Negative ranks	246	263.26	64762.00
Positive ranks	228	209.71	47813.00
Total	600

The above mean ranks results indicate that OBN TV (263.26) generated the highest scores based on the audience’s perceived hostile media phenomenon. The results further show that the television channel with the second highest score for the hostile media phenomenon is the Amhara television channel (AMC).

Audience’s perception of HMP in private and federal TV channels

The above Friedman test result indicates that there is significant difference in the audience’s perceived hostility among the private and federal TV channels (p = 0.000), which is less than the set p value of 0.005 level of significance.

Table 4.

Significance of difference among the Ethiopian private and federal television channels.

N	600
χ²	29.372
Df	2
Asymp. Sig.	0.000

Table 5.

Significance of difference among the Ethiopian private and federal television channels.

N	HMP between Fana and ETV	HMP between Walta and ETV	HMP between Walta and Fana
Z	−5.050	−0.511	−5.031
Asymp. Sig. (two-tailed)	0.000	0.609	0.000

The Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test was also conducted to show the significance of difference in the audience’s perceived hostility between all the television channels under study. The results indicate that there is significance of difference in hostility between Fana and Etv and between Walta and Fana at 5 percent level of significance. The level of significance of the difference between Fana and ETV and between Walta and Fana is 0.000, which is less than the p value 0.005 level of significance. But there is no significance of difference between Walta and ETV at 5 percent level of significance (p > 0.05).

To find out which Ethiopian private and federal state television channel is nearer to the audience’s perceived hostile media phenomenon, the Mean Ranks test was run.

Table 6.

The mean ranks difference among the Ethiopian private and federal television channels.

Ranks categories	N	Mean rank	Sum of ranks
HMP between Fana and ETV
Negative ranks	167	230.96	38570.00
Positive ranks	292	229.45	67,000.00
Total	600
HMP between Walta and Fana
Negative ranks	251	247.45	62,110.50
Positive ranks	191	187.40	35,792.50
Total	600

The Mean Ranks result indicates that the Walta television channel was perceived to be more hostile (247.45), followed by Fana (230.96), than ETV. This suggests that the audience marked the Walta and Fana television channels as contributing more to the hostile media phenomenon than ETV.

Table 7.

Significance of difference between the Ethiopian private, federal and regional state television channels.

N	HMP between regional state television channels – private and federal state television channels
Z	−6.818
Asymp. Sig. (two-tailed)	0.000

The above Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test result shows that there is significant difference in the audience’s perceived hostility between the federal and regional television channels at 5 percent level of significance. To further examine which state’s television channels are nearest to the hostile media phenomenon, the mean ranks were compared.

Table 8.

Mean ranks test between the regional state and private and federal television channels.

Ranks categories	N	Mean rank	Sum of ranks
HMP between regional state television channels and federal television channels
Negative ranks	365	301.18	109,932.50
Positive ranks	210	265.08	55,667.50
Total	600

The above Mean Ranks test result indicates that the regional states’ television channels were perceived to be closer to the hostile media phenomenon than the private and federal television channels. Generally, the audience perceived that the HMP on the regional states’ television channels was more than that on private and federal television channels.

Discussion

Starting from 2019, media coverage in Ethiopia was unfair, unbalanced and partial and aimed at encouraging the turbulence and conflict which has erupted in various parts of the country (Skjerdal and Moges, 2021). The media landscape in Ethiopia is polarized today as never before (Abbink, 2021). The statistical data indicates that the audiences from the three study areas (the Amhara and Oromia regional states and Addis Ababa city) considered the regional state television channels to be the main contributors to hostility in the country. According to Skjerdal and Moges (2021), media organizations, including the television channels in various parts of the country, were the key players in encouraging and advancing the conflict among the different regional states and ethnic and religious groups.

According to the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, the different Ethiopian media are known for ignoring important aspects of an ethnic or political group that is perceived as an enemy and taking information from another outlet to expose what another ethnic group is doing wrong (Oluka, 2021). According to the Mean Ranks test, the audiences indicated that the regional state television channels were more hostile than the federal television channels. The hostile media phenomenon theory suggests that highly partisan persons will perceive more bias in news media reports or consider news to be slanted or hostile to their views (Knobloch-Westwick and Meng, 2009). Having trust in news reports is central to political decision-making in a democracy (Tsfati and Cohen, 2005), and especially crucial for people who cannot rely on their own experience and knowledge (Kohring and Matthes, 2007). Unfortunately, globally, the trend is to view news media organizations with distrust.

The phenomenon of hostile media has substantial consequences. In addition to limiting the ability of news to inform public opinion (Miller and Krosnick, 2000), it influences the formation and perception of foreign policy, reinforces a growing cynicism and disaffection from politics (Cappella and Jamieson, 1997), contributes to feelings of political and social alienation (Tsfati, 2007), impacts advocacy behaviour (Choi et al., 2011) and changes behaviour (Tsfati and Cohen, 2005). Scholars in the area posit that the decline in media credibility is an outcome of the media’s political bias (Bagdikian, 1997; Goldberg, 2001). The polarized political environment in Ethiopia may have contributed to the control of the media by politicians to further their own political agenda. In this regard, the connection between journalists and politicians has been referred to as a ‘marriage de raison’ (Van Aelst and Aalberg, 2011), a relationship that is characterized by ‘love and hate, trust and distrust’ (Van Aelst and Aalberg, 2011). The hostile media phenomenon is certainly not without consequences. If politicians conclude that journalists are not receptive and friendly to their arguments, journalists may report their view in distorted ways and politicians may, therefore, see no point in presenting their views, revealing important background information or giving journalists the opportunity to ask important questions (Brants et al., 2010). The media in Ethiopia are a political instrument and politicians find alternative ways of voicing and gaining the attention of their public. That is, rather than coming up with their arguments to journalists in a formal manner, they depend on ways to intensify conflict and drama in order to be heard in a public debate. Conflict and drama are important news values that increase the chances of media coverage in gaining the attention of the public (Aalberg and Strömbäck, 2011; Strömbäck and Dimitrova, 2006). Without conflict and drama, politicians might think that their enemies’ arguments will be favoured. Consequently, the television channels were used as a weapon in worsening and consolidating exclusivity reflecting similar traits as media institutions in cracked states, at times directing ethnic cleansing and displacement of out-of-state residents (Woldearegay, 2022). As Kriesi (2012: 14) observes, ‘those organizations and politicians that rely on the expansion of conflict need to do so, because they are not paid enough attention to otherwise’. When citizens see the media as biased, they may conclude that the public is not adequately informed. This point of view is further explained by Tsfati and Cohen (2005: 33):

The perception that others are ill informed because the news media are not providing them with access to the truth (as one sees it) is frustrating and detrimental to the belief that political decisions are being made in a fair and just way. Hence, in situations of high involvement, trust in news media is an especially crucial component of trust in democracy.

During the conflict among the Ethiopian regional states and groups, media organizations were not fair and balanced in their news reporting; rather, their news reporting served to initiate conflict and civil war in the country. The news media reports of the regional states focussed on blaming and criticizing the so-called bad deeds of other regional states, reiterating that their state and people were targets of hostile attacks (Reta, 2019). There was widespread use of victimhood narratives and additional engagement in competitive victimhood was in evidence (Woldearegay, 2022). These narratives were used to further create antagonisms and intractable conflict initiated and sustained by ethnic entrepreneurs. There is an array of practical evidence that suggests conflict leads citizens to decreased political trust at the individual, institutional and country level in addition to social and economic crises (Forgette and Morris, 2006; Mutz and Reeves, 2005). According to Woldearegay (2022), in addition to intensifying the civil war and conflict among different states and groups in various parts of Ethiopia, including identity-based attacks and displacement, it was obvious that the media were the major instruments of the ethnic elites in advancing their political interests.

The results of this study show that the hostile media phenomenon within news media is very important because they have great impact in understanding the social and political behaviour of citizens and, thus, they have received a reasonable amount of attention in recent years. Such studies and justifications are supported by several scholars who observe that the study of hostile media phenomenon fosters avoidance motivations with respect to political participation, interpersonal discussion or engaging in social activities (Eveland and Hively, 2009; Matthes, 2013).

Conclusion

This research lends support to the view that people can experience a biased and hostile perception depending on their personal and group opinion on a specific topic and organization or other groups that oppose their stance. The results of this research indicate that the Ethiopian regional state television channels are perceived to be more hostile than the private and federal state television channels. But further research is needed to find out to what extent the regional state television channels are considered hostile and the attendant factors that explain the phenomenon. Also, a study is needed to find out to what extent the private and federal state television channels are not perceived to be hostile by different ethno-national groups in the context of power, politics and ethnicity. In the present study, the results showed that the regional state television channels were perceived to be more hostile than the Ethiopian private and federal television channels. More specifically, the results also showed that the OBN, Amhara, Walta and Fana television channels are considered to be the biggest contributors to the hostile media phenomenon, which comes as no surprise given their reach and involvement in the ongoing rivalries and war of narratives between Ethiopia’s biggest ethno-national groups. Thus, this underlines the theoretical definition of the hostile media phenomenon of this article as well as Perloff’s (2015) definition, stating that a strong pre-existing opinion on a topic appears to be a requirement for the emergence of the hostile media phenomenon. Responsible bodies like the government, media organizations, media practitioners, future researchers and policy designers could use the results of this study to minimize the hostility among different ethnicities and groups of people and call for more constructive journalism and less partisan media.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to thank Dr Amanuel Gebru, without his supervision this study would have been impossible. His contributions were the backbone of this study and I thank him with great respect and love. I would also like to extend my thanks and appreciation to Addis Ababa University Journalism and Communication School for their cooperation, in particular the head of the school, Dr Abdulaziz Dino. Additionally, I would like to forward my thanks and appreciation to the staff members of Bonga Education College for their encouragement and kind support, especially Teferi Getahun and Getachew Robo. Finally, my thanks also go to all the respondents who invested time in answering the questionnaires and participating in the interviews.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Bereket Wondimu Wolde

Author biographies

Bereket Wondimu Wolde is a PhD candidate at Addis Ababa University, School of Journalism and Communication and Lecturer at Hawassa University, Journalism and Communication Department. His areas of interest include Media Studies, Advertising, Public Relations and Corporate Communication, Political Communication and Communication in general.

Amanuel Gebru Woldearegay is an Associate Professor at the School of Journalism and Communication at Addis Ababa University. His areas of interest include Media Studies, Organizational Communication, Public Relations and Clinical Communication. A graduate of the University of South Africa, more recently, Woldearegay has focussed on doctoral teaching, supervision and organizational communication research and consulting.

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