Mainstreaming anti-Semitism on Turkey’s public broadcaster TRT: Examining Payitaht: Abdülhamid

Abstract

While conspiracy theories have traditionally received attention from the Turkish public and political elite, recently, however, they have proliferated when explaining complex situations. This paper examines conspiracy theories in Turkey and the role of entertainment media, specifically the popular period drama, Payitaht: Abdülhamid, in mainstreaming conspiracy theories. Payitaht: Abdülhamid, as an ideological state apparatus, repurposes anti-Semitism as salient conspiracy theories by creating scapegoats and existential others. This paper argues that the state uses entertainment media to disseminate conspiracy theories and, in effect, endorses anti-Semitism. As a result, anti-Semitism has transformed from a marginal movement to a mainstream movement.

Keywords

Anti-Semitism conspiracy theories Israel media populism television Turkey

Introduction

The Sultan’s carriage and entourage move through the old city amidst cheering crowds and chants of ‘Long live the Sultan’. The peaceful scene is interrupted with the signalling of what seems to be sinister forces hidden among the military and the crowd. The camera then turns to a man tossing a gold coin to a soldier who attempts to assassinate the Sultan. The camera zooms in and the audience can see the Star of David engraved on the gold coin.

This opening scene of Payitaht: Abdülhamid is one of many anti-Semitic representations in Turkey. One can find an abundance of conspiratorial non-fiction books that point to sinister forces. The list is long but not too different from widely employed conspiratorial claims in other parts of the world: the Illuminati, Knights Templar, Bilderberg, Freemasons, Rothschilds and the Rockefellers are used sporadically. Mastermind, CIA, Mossad and Zionists are almost always part of the conspiratorial rhetoric (Karaosmanoğlu, 2021). Bestsellers like Mind Games (Akıl Oyunları), Pope Benedict: Secret Agenda about Turkey (Papa Benedikt: Gizli Türkiye Gündemi) and The Children of Soros (Soros’un Çocukları) delve into perceived international threats against Turkey. With a fixation on ‘foreign powers’ or ‘foreign lobbies’, a vague signifier for an omnipotent enemy, they incite anxiety and feed off the fear in Turkish society. These publications appeal to a large base across the political spectrum (Bali, 2013a; Karaosmanoğlu, 2021; Korucu, 2019), offering simple explanations for otherwise complex problems. In Turkey one usually hears claims of ‘seeing the big picture’ (büyük resmi görmek) or ‘seeing the big game’ (büyük oyunu görmek).¹

This conspiratorial discourse in Turkey finds a receptive audience in television programmes such as political debate shows, news reports, and commentary as well as in the print media (Bali, 2016). Under the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) government, this conspiratorial discourse, encouraged by the political climate after the Gezi Park protests in 2013, gained popularity through pseudo-historians and self-acclaimed analysts mainstreaming such messages. Talking heads such as Ramazan Kurtoğlu and Erol Mütercimler are amongst dozens of ‘experts’ who insist that foreign powers are plotting against Turkey and that they have plans to stifle its rise in world affairs (Herzog, 2014). These ideas are also supported by pro-government documentaries such as Üst Akıl (2016, Mastermind), which portrays an ambiguous political and economic global power that controls the world through vague networks and has grand designs for Turkey (Göknar, 2020; Hoff, 2013; Karaosmanoğlu, 2021). These conspiracy theories are often concealed as implicit anti-Semitic tropes.

This conspiratorial line of thinking cannot be separated from the existing populist nationalism in Turkey spearheaded by the conservative AKP government (Akkoyunlu and Öktem, 2016; Çevik and Friedman, 2024; Selçuk, 2016). The perpetual fear of perceived enemies, adversarial states and external threats are not unique to the AKP era and traces its roots in Turkish nationalism (Göçek, 2011; Gürpınar, 2013, 2019). The fear of the other, the marginalization of internal others, and the imagination of external threats have been ingrained in Turkish nationalism and is reflected in education and other agents of socialization such as formal schooling and news reporting (Bali, 2013a, 2013b; Cohen Yanarocak, 2017). Although the rationalization of conspiracy theories has changed its character over the years, it has always found fertile ground, particularly in the face of the rising authoritarianism today.

In the early years of the AKP government, one of the emerging platforms for disseminating conspiracy theories was crime suspense dramas. Kurtlar Vadisi (Valley of the Wolves), a popular television series, was used to spearhead conspiracy theories and to explain issues and support the AKP’s foreign policy discourse (Carney, 2018a; Hintz, 2018). Furthermore, it represented stereotypical Jews and introduced the concept of the Israeli Jew (Balcı, 2011). The Valley franchise became an inspiration for more contemporary television series such as Payitaht: Abdülhamid and Teşkilat,² which employ similar conspiracy theories, and which gained a large following among the public. The fact that Turkey’s public broadcaster, Turkish Radio and Television (TRT), has been airing the historical television series Payitaht: Abdülhamid reflects the AKP’s historical revisionism. In doing so, TRT, as an avenue for promoting state ideology, has become a conveyor of the AKP’s Islamist nationalist values and projected the AKP’s version of history. Furthermore, the parallels with contemporary Turkish politics enable the audience to draw broad conclusions about current threats (Bulut and İleri, 2020; Carney, 2018b; Çevik, 2019, 2020).

This paper embarks from the idea that Payitaht: Abdülhamid holds agency as the ideological state apparatus of the AKP and was used to bolster the AKP’s populist agenda. I argue that Payitaht: Abdülhamid reinforces the existing anti-Semitic conspiracy theories in Turkey that have appealed to many Turks across the political spectrum. As a result, Payitaht: Abdülhamid is a state-sanctioned vehicle used to propagate anti-Semitism by portraying coded anti-Semitic tropes. Within this context, Payitaht: Abdülhamit exploits Turkish society’s fascination with conspiracy theories in order to galvanize support for AKP’s policies by heightening existential fears and, by extension, disseminating and instrumentalizing anti-Semitic propaganda. This paper posits that by bringing conspiracy theories into popular culture, Payitaht: Abdülhamid elevates conspiratorial thinking and anti-Semitism from a marginal movement to the mainstream. The paper attempts to find an answer to the following research question: What are the conspiratorial anti-Semitic tropes that are employed in Payitaht: Abdülhamid?

In this paper, Althusser’s concept of ideological state apparatuses is applied as an analytical lens to offer a textual analysis of Payitaht: Abdülhamid’s conspiratorial nature within Right-wing populism literature. The first section of the paper discusses the traits of Right-wing populism in order to explain the role of the state in disseminating an ideology. This section also explains the role of the media as a state apparatus. Secondly, the paper gives an overview of conspiracy theories and anti-Semitism in Turkey. The second section also provides the basis for understanding Payitaht: Abdülhamid’s content, with an emphasis on the more recent conspiracies that are also relevant to the AKP era. It demonstrates the intertwined nature of anti-Semitism and conspiracy theories in Turkey. The third section analyses the first season of Payitaht: Abdülhamid by providing a representative categorization of conspiracies and anti-Semitic tropes. Finally, the paper ends with concluding remarks on the function of Payitaht: Abdülhamid in maintaining the AKP’s authoritarianism, political ideology and mainstreaming anti-Semitism.

Although conspiracy theories in Turkey have been studied before (Baer, 2013; Bali, 2013; Carney, 2018b; Çaylı, 2018; Gürpınar, 2013; Hoyng and Es, 2017; Nefes, 2015), the conspiracy theories that have emerged in the recent years of the AKP rule have not been studied extensively. Recent studies scrutinizing the Üst Akıl discourse (Göknar, 2020; Karaosmanoğlu, 2021) are valuable contributions in understanding the role of conspiracy theories in the new Islamist nationalism emerging in Turkey. This paper offers an additional layer of analysis by highlighting the anti-Semitic nature of the entertainment media that has become indispensable in spreading these theories. Investigating the instrumentalization of television, an element of popular culture, in spreading conspiratorial discourse will also contribute to existing scholarship on conspiracy theories and anti-Semitism in Turkey and beyond.

Right-wing populism, conspiracy theories and the mass media

Populism is defined as ‘an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people’ (Canovan, 2004). Mudde (2004) defines populism as a thin-centred ideology that acts on the idea of ‘the general will of the people’. The discursive layer of populism, which emphasizes on aligning with ‘the pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt elite’, is central to understanding how populism operates on the basis of antagonisms (Panizza, 2005). Populism has a number of general characteristics that are helpful in understanding the role of conspiracy theories in societies. First, populism is anti-establishment and tries to dismantle existing institutions. Second, it aims to redistribute power and prestige to the excluded masses, or, in other words, the pure people. Third, it aims to unite the people against the existing elite order who are marginalized as enemies of the people (Weyland, 2001). Right-wing populism is an anti-elitist movement and sees multiculturalism and globalization as a threat against the nation (Wodak, 2015).

The creation of scapegoats in order to construe a group considered as a threat is a common phenomenon among Right-wing populists. The politics of fear is constructed on ethnic, religious, linguistic or political minorities. Thus, Right-wing populism offers simple answers to complex problems by constructing scapegoats or enemies as others who can be blamed for these problems (Wodak, 2015). Studies that examine populism in Turkey point to strong polarization in the society and attempts at labelling and scapegoating the opposition (Balta et al., 2022; Elçi, 2019; Selçuk, 2016; Yılmaz and Bashirov, 2018; Yılmaz and Erturk, 2021). Polarization in Turkey extends to trade unions and women’s organizations (Yabancı, 2016), while religious institutions (Öztürk, 2016) and media (2014) implement the ideology of the ruling elite. Mudde (2000) argues that both in Germany and the Netherlands, Right-wing ideologies explicitly and/or implicitly refer to conspiracies about evil forces that govern the world. In both countries, the extreme Right-wing perceives Jews as puppet masters and evil forces that aim to break the spirit of ethnic communities. The extreme Right in the USA after the 9/11 terrorist attacks have resorted to conspiracy theories or theories that emerged after President Barack Obama’s election that he was a socialist and a Muslim (Winter, 2014).

Anti-Semitism is prevalent ideology in Right-wing populism (Mudde, 2000). According to the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (2016), anti-Semitism is ‘a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of anti-Semitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities’. Anti-Semitism frequently charges Jews with conspiring to harm humanity, and it is often used to blame Jews for why things go wrong (CEJI, 2016). Anti-Semitism can manifest itself in various tropes, on which I will elaborate in the section where I provide examples from anti-Semitic tropes in Payitaht: Abdülhamid. Anti-Semitic prejudices have been flexibly adapted to numerous ideologies over thousands of years, and have thus been transformed. Traditional Right-wing anti-Semitism was the defining denominator for this ideology by labelling Jews as cosmopolitans. Since Right-wing populism is anti-intellectual and anti-globalization, it gives way to conspiracy theories. Old prejudices can be revived, and, by instrumentalizing anti-Semitic tropes, the agenda of the Right-wing populist parties dominate the media. By instrumentalizing anti-Semitic tropes, such provocations support the agenda of Right-wing populist parties (Wodak, 2018). For example, the Hungarian Jobbik party accused Jews of trying to dominate Hungary and its people, evoking the stereotype of the disloyal Jew. Jews are blamed for all of Hungary’s problems and economic disasters, even though the discourse may not explicitly point to Jews (Kalmar, 2020; Wodak, 2018). In particular, the Hungarian-American financier George Soros is seen as leading an international cabal that includes other Jews such as the Rothschilds, as well as Freemasons and the Illuminati (Kalmar, 2020). In fact, Victor Orban ran his campaign almost exclusively on the issue of migration, which he blamed Soros for orchestrating. Soros was represented as the hidden figure with banking connections who was behind all non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that fostered the agenda of multiculturalism and liberalism (Kalmar, 2020; Wodak, 2018). In this respect, the Soros myth invokes the infamous Protocols of the Elders of Zion and the Rothschild/Illuminati conspiracy.

Althusser’s (2000) conceptualization of ideological state apparatuses (ISA) can be useful in explaining the spread of anti-Semitic conspiracy theories in populist governments. Originally developed to explain the reproduction of the means of production and labour under capitalism, ISA offers a valuable window of analysis for the reproduction of ideologies. Althusser argues that reproduction of labour power requires a reproduction of its skills as well as its submission to the other rules of the established ideology. Institutions such as religious institutions, schools, family and political systems serve as agents to reproduce the labour power and the relations of production. The communications ISA in particular is an integral element in disseminating ideology to citizens. Althusser argues that the communications ISA crams every citizens with daily doses of nationalism, chauvinism, liberalism and moralism by means of the press, the radio and television. Moreover, virtues are taught through film and television. For populist governments and authoritarian states, the role of communication has been indispensable in maintaining the state ideology. Wodak (2015) argues that Right-wing populism uses media extensively to create an atmosphere of constant fear. Hence, mass media is a fundamental apparatus for Right-wing populists to disseminate information in a way that blurs the lines between entertainment and information. According to Wodak (2010, 2015), the fictionalization of politics takes place when entertainment creates a reality for the audience presenting a deceptive and simple illusion of present-day societies. In this respect, media is a vehicle for the dominant political system to exercise power over the masses (Althusser, 2020). Based on an Althusserian understanding, media is used as an ISA to enable populist ideologies.

The role of the media is existential for countries like Turkey, which are governed by populists with authoritarian trends. Through coercive and non-coercive strategies, the AKP has created its own loyal media since coming to power in 2002. As a result, Turkey’s new media system is shaped by authoritarian state forms that demonstrate its state-dependent character (Yeşil, 2016, 2018). The pro-AKP media led by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s inner circle is utilized as a vehicle to disseminate the AKP’s ideology. Consequently, as the AKP cadres began to recognize the power of popular culture, they turned to spreading their Ottoman Islamist identity proposal through media forms such as television, films and books (Hintz, 2018). TRT’s entertainment content particularly has been instrumentalized to propagate this identity. In this respect, entertainment content is an ideological state apparatus for the Erdoğan administration in its quest to propagate all aspects of its ideology, including anti-Semitic views. While anti-Semitism always existed in Turkey, Hintz (2018) points out that it has become more acceptable by some supporters of Ottoman Islamism. Aviv (2017) details the rise of anti-Semitism under the AKP, the role of media in portraying negative stereotypes and the role of the political leadership in fuelling anti-Semitism. Although there have been more popular television series such as Kurtlar Vadisi, the state’s patronage of Payitaht: Abdülhamid enables the mainstreaming of anti-Semitism through conspiracy theories that garner a significant following.

Conspiracy theories and anti-Semitism in Turkey

Despite the common claim by Turkish officials and Turkish-Jewish official institutions that there is no anti-Semitism in Turkey, recent studies prove otherwise (Aviv, 2017; Baer, 2020 Bali, 2013; Nefes, 2015b; Valansi, 2018). Anti-Semitism in Turkey, particularly under the AKP, has been well documented in international rankings. According to the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) 100 index, 69 per cent of the surveyed adult Turkish society harboured anti-Semitic views in 2014. That number increased to 71 per cent in 2015. Furthermore, according to the Medyada Nefret Söylemi Raporu (Media Watch on Hate Speech), Jews were the main targets of hate speech, with 1251 instances that were predominantly within Islamist newspapers Yeni Akit, Milli Gazete, Yeni Mesaj, Yeniçağ and Milat (Hrant Dink Vakfı, 2018). Consequently, the public’s perception of Turkey’s foreign policy and its relations with its neighbour states is reflective of the existing conspiratorial mindset and anti-Semitism. To illustrate, a 2010 study indicated that Israel was one of the most prominent threats to Turkey and that Turkey’s relations with it was seen as a foreign policy problem. Furthermore, Israel has been ranked as Turkey’s biggest adversary and is perceived to be an obstacle to peace in the Middle East (Akgün et al., 2010; Aydın et al., 2013, 2016, 2019).

Mass media has been integral to the mainstreaming of anti-Semitism. The image of the Jew has never been favourable in Turkish theatre and film (Balcı, 2011), which has portrayed Jews as greedy, weak, evil and unethical, trying to make money off people. With the privatization of television and accessibility to higher quality productions, Turkish television started to produce its own drama series. This enabled anti-Semitic stereotypes and conspiracies to reach into people’s living rooms. Conspiracy theories, and anti-Semitism, have been spreading easily via television entertainment since the early 2000s. Conspiratorial thinking became normalized by way of mass entertainment, and media became an agent in spreading conspiracy theories (Hoyng and Es, 2017). Very popular action series such as Kurtlar Vadisi work to heighten paranoia and nationalism (Carney, 2018). Furthermore, they portray Jews in a negative light, as evil and as oppressors, and the line between Jews and Israel is blurred. The show had two main Jewish characters who were portrayed as evil, greedy and villainous. The Kurtlar Vadisi series, which aired 2003–2007, presented several Jewish characters. İplikçi Nedim (thread-maker Nedim) is a well-known middle-aged businessman who is in the textile industry. While publicly known for owning textile companies, he accumulated his wealth through money lending and dealing with the mafia. Based on the real-life Turkish-Jewish businessman, Nesim Malki, İplikçi Nedim is a coward, a greedy and stingy man who introduces a comedic element to the series. A second Jewish character in Kurtlar Vadisi is Samuel Vanunu, who portrays a businessman organizing the relationship between the mob council and Israel. Çoban (2016) argues that Samuel Vanunu represents a crossover between the local Jew and the Israeli Jew. The third Jewish character in the Kurtlar Vadisi series is Esther Hirsch, who is the wife of one of the mobsters and has close relations with Israel. Representing an Ashkenazi Jewish character, Hirsch is a hybrid character between local and foreign (Çoban, 2016). Kurtlar Vadisi: Pusu, the sequel to the original Vadisi series, had representations of Israeli Jews. For example, the head of Mossad operations in Turkey, Shamir, is self-confident, cruel and immoral. Another character, Benjamin Hazar, is a Turkish Jew who represents the ideal citizen through his belonging to the Turkish state and is portrayed as a fully integrated Turkish Jew. Kurtlar Vadisi makes a clear point of demeaning Jewish characters by portraying a host of common racist stereotypes. It casts Jews as chief conspirators in the global order (Carney, 2018).

An examination of conspiracy theories in Turkey reveals that they have emerged in tandem with local anti-Semitism in the wake of the 1908 Ottoman constitutional revolution and have appeared at different stages of Turkish history (Bali, 2013a; Nefes, 2015b). According to a widespread belief, particularly amongst Islamists, the fate of the Ottoman empire changed after Sultan Abdülhamid II denied Theodor Herzl’s request to give them the Ottoman province of Palestine for Jewish refugees from Europe. In response, this conspiracy claims that Herzl and the Zionist movement took their revenge by overthrowing the Sultan, which in turn brought about the end of the Ottoman empire. This conspiracy claims that Abdülhamid was overthrown by the Zionists, the dönmes (Jewish converts to Islam, crypto-Jews)³ and local Zionists who, it is claimed, controlled the revolutionary forces of the Young Turks/Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). The reasoning for this argument lies in the CUP’s ties to Salonika, a Jewish hub of its era, and Jewish parliamentarians such as Emmanuel Carasso-Emanuel Karasu (Aviv, 2017; Bali, 2013a). Thus, this conspiracy theory assumes that Jews were the masterminds behind bringing the Ottoman empire down and that the Ottoman Revolution led by the Young Turks was a product of Zionism. The establishment of modern Turkey by Turkish revolutionaries who were former CUP members led to the formation of additional conspiracy theories. Islamists claim that Mustafa Kemal, the founder of the Turkish Republic and its first president, was a dönme himself because of his birth in Salonika, which is why he abolished the caliphate and established a secular order in Turkey in order to create a Jewish state (Baer, 2010, 2013; Bali, 2013a; Nefes, 2015a). This conspiracy has been more recently brought to the fore in the popular publications of Leftist and nationalist opinion leaders (Bali, 2013b). Many of these bestsellers, such as Musa’nın Gülü (The Rose of Moses), Musa’nın Çocukları (The Children of Moses) and Efendi are explicitly anti-Semitic and have gone mainstream and gained mass popularity. Amongst the bestsellers at bookstores and supermarkets, one can find the complete version of Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf as well as The Protocols of the Elders of Zion (Bali, 2013a; Hoff, 2013).

The most salient conspiracy theory in Turkey across the political spectrum is with respect to the fall of the Ottoman empire. It is widely believed that foreign powers conspired to dismantle Turkey and that they continue to do so to this day, which, in turn, calls for Turks to be cautious of other nations. This fear, which stems from the Treaty of Sevres which partitioned the Ottoman empire, causing collective trauma, is often cited as the Sevres Syndrome or the Sevres Paranoia (Çaylı, 2018; Göçek, 2011; Gürpınar, 2013; Nefes, 2015a; Yılmaz and Erturk, 2021).⁴ The Sevres Syndrome resulted in a plethora of conspiracy theories that exaggerated the threats from neighbouring countries such as Greece and Armenia. First, it is a widespread belief that there is a big plot against Turkey. Second, it is believed that ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) are founded and supported by the US, Europe and Israel. Third, it is believed that the Republic of Armenia has expansionist policies and aims to create a larger Armenia. Fourth, it is believed that Greece has expansionist policies dubbed the Enosis.⁵ Fifth, it is believed that there is a mastermind that controls the world. Sixth, it is believed that the West does not want Turkey to prosper and therefore plots against its economic success. Many of these conspiracy theories are tightly linked to local anti-Semitism and they have references to Ottoman history (Nefes, 2015a, 2015b).

After the 2013 Gezi Park protests, there was a wave of anti-Western sentiments and discourse, which was often cloaked under anti-Semitism (Nefes, 2015a; Özbudun, 2014). The protests were labelled as the product of a vague conceptualization of interest lobbies, internal traitors and their external collaborators to marginalize the Turkish opposition (Nefes, 2017; Yılmaz, 2017). For example, the Hungarian businessman, George Soros, was at the centre of such accusations and was referred to by Erdoğan as ‘the famous Hungarian Jew’, inciting the classic anti-Semitic tropes (Karaosmanoğlu, 2021; Nefes, 2017). Soros was also accused by Turkey’s president of dividing nations. Beşir Atalay, deputy prime minister of Turkey from 2011 to 2014, said in an interview about the Gezi Park protests: ‘Foreign powers and the Jewish diaspora are behind these protests, they are working very hard on this and the international media is directing the protests’ (T24, 2013). The Turkish businessman and philanthropist, Osman Kavala, viewed as a domestic corroborator or ‘mastermind’, was accused of financing the Gezi Park protests and is currently in prison. Furthermore, some pro-government opinion leaders blamed Britain, the United States, Germany and Israel, and further antagonized international news outlets (Nefes, 2017; Onbaşı, 2016). Similarly, the ruling AKP claimed that the protests were the work of international news channels such as BBC and CNN, and airlines such as Lufthansa to bring Turkey to its knees (Gibbons, 2013). With the Gezi Park protests, any anti-government stances have been broadly labelled as the work of foreign powers, interest lobbies that target Turkey’s economic growth, and an invisible mastermind that invokes Western powers, Israel and NATO (Hoyng and Es, 2017).

In 2015, the conspiratorial mindset implying sinister forces found its way into mainstream mass media by way of a documentary (Baer, 2020; Göknar, 2020; Hintz, 2018; Karaosmanoğlu, 2021). The pro-government A Haber’s documentary, Üst Akıl (Mastermind), opened with the following statement by President Erdoğan:

I want to emphasize . . .. Do not ever think that these are operations against me. Do not ever think these operations are against the government or a certain party. My friends . . . These operations are a direct threat to Turkey and Turkey’s existence, its peace and stability and independence. I have said this before, behind all these operations there is a mastermind . . .. Who is this mastermind? You should do the research . . .. You know who they are . . ..

The opening scene then continues with a brief history about this so-called mastermind that took root 3500 years prior, and who has now been ruling the world since. This mastermind is none other than the people of Jewish faith as the narrator visually takes the audience to the era of Moses, the Exodus and the Torah to explain the beginning of this mastermind (Üst Akıl, 2015). The mastermind narrative has found ample support amongst high-level government officials. For example, a founding member of the AKP, Burhan Kuzu, said: ‘The scandalous report of the Freedom House which is on the payroll of Soros and the Israel lobby made certain people happy!’⁶ Explaining complex situations with the notion of a mastermind can be understood as the typical Right-wing populist response to provide easy explanations. To illustrate, in response to Turkey’s declining freedom of speech and US criticism of it, President Erdoğan said: ‘This is what I mean by mastermind. Mastermind is playing a big game on Turkey. To dismember Turkey, to break it apart, and if they can, to devour it . . .’ (Habertürk, 2016).

Conspiracy theories and polarizing rhetoric have become abundant following the coup attempt in the summer of 2016, and Western powers, particularly the USA, were accused of supporting and planning the coup. Taş (2018) called this post-truth politics and argued that by way of mediated reality, the AKP elite combined the popular liberation narrative of the secularists with Ottoman and religious sentiments. Pro-AKP opinion leaders argued that the 15 July coup attempt was a war between Turkey and the US to curb Turkey’s rise in world politics, and the AKP elite declared that the US was behind the coup attempt with the aim of imposing a regime change and invading Turkey (Ramoğlu, 2018; TCBB, 2016). This view is also shared by the pro-government Islamist NGO, Islamic Humanitarian Relief (IHH). At a public rally, the IHH president, Bülent Yıldırım, said:

Israel is attacking in the East and Southeast . . .. Investigate and you will find out who gave the guns, Israel, which provided guns in Iskenderun is also supporting these organizations. On July 15^th, Israel cheered at the coup attempt in Gaza. If the coup attempt was successful, they would have destroyed Gaza. You are saying the most important actor of the coup attempt is America, and this and that. But the most important actor is Israel, Zionism, and America is just their puppet.⁷

Turkey’s political elite have also accused the international community of destabilizing the Turkish economy in the summer of 2018. To illustrate, President Erdoğan claimed that dark powers were trying to manipulate Turkey’s economy (HDN, 2018) and the government argued that the US was behind the devaluation of the Turkish lira, which would provide an excuse to invade Turkey (Takvim, 2018).

Mainstreaming conspiracies and anti-Semitism

The very dramatic opening scene of Payitaht: Abdülhamid sets the antagonistic and conspiratorial tone of the historical television series that depicts the 33-year reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II. The show is explicitly endorsed and supported by the AKP and President Erdoğan as representing the original version of historical accounts. In respect to Payitaht: Abdülhamid, Erdoğan said: ‘To know history you should watch Payitaht’ (TRT Haber, 2017). Furthermore, he stated: ‘. . . all those political games in the show, and the insidious traps designed against Sultan Abdülhamid II. We watch them as a family and evaluate it on political terms and see that the same games are played on the contemporary world’s political scene. The very same game that the West is playing against us. Only the time period and the actors are different’ (Bulut and İleri, 2020).

Payitaht: Abdülhamid creates an illusionary effect that current events are a replication of those that took place in the Ottoman empire. Consequently, Payitaht: Abdülhamid helps galvanize the notion of us versus them, or the authentic people versus traitors, dichotomy, while simultaneously rewriting Ottoman history in the AKP’s image (Author, 2020; Bulut and İleri, 2020; Korucu, 2017). In other words, similar to another popular period drama, Resurrection Ertuğrul, history embodied in nostalgia is being restored and glorified as if it is the only truth (Carney, 2014), and this truth is the narrative that the AKP wants the audiences to embrace. The series carefully employs anti-Semitic tropes to deliver the AKP approved political rhetoric. There are three main Jewish characters in the series that are portrayed stereotypically, in line with Jewish portrayal in Turkish film and cinema. Theodor Herzl, the Austrian-Jewish journalist and political figure who is the founding father of Zionism, is portrayed as a greedy, immoral, conniving and conspiring man. Sara Hedeya, a British-Jewish spy and political figure, is portrayed as a power-hungry, greedy and conniving woman. Emanuel Carasso, the Ottoman-Jewish politician, is similarly portrayed as conspiring, disloyal and immoral. In what follows, I examine the anti-Semitic tropes in Payitaht: Abdülhamid’s first season, which are relayed to the audience via conspiracy theories through these three characters.

Jewish world domination: ‘Jews control everything’

One of the many anti-Semitic conspiracy theories is the theory prediction that Israel or the Jewish people have an ultimate goal to ‘control’ or take over Europe, or the whole world. Connected to this is allegations of Jewish control over media that is rooted in the early 19th century and was repeated in the Protocols of the Elders of the Zion. In the 20th and 21st centuries, individuals of presumed or actual Jewish ancestry, who may have personal influence as a result of the position they hold within a particular media outlet, have been conflated with claims of general Jewish control over the entire media industry. (Addressing Anti-Semitism through Education: Guidelines for Policymakers (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2018), p. 41, <https://www.osce.org/odihr/383089).

The media domination accusation is particularly important in Payitaht: Abdülhamid, which has scenes taking place in Herzl’s office at his newspaper in Vienna. In one particular scene, the audience can see a secret note delivered to Sara by a ‘hidden hand’ that reads ‘Dead Emperor’. Then Herzl and Sara get ready to publish next day’s newspaper with that headline (S1 E2). This scene implies not only Jewish media domination but also the accusation of Jewish control over global events.

The series portrays Great Britain and Germany conspiring with the Zionists to topple the Sultan which gives the conspirators absolute agency in the demise of the Ottoman empire. Furthermore, it implicates Zionists as the masterminds working to shape global politics and dominate the world. The series’ first episode builds on the grandiose railway project that connects Europe to Hejaz and the competition of European superpowers with aims to establish an Israeli state to finance and control this massive railway. To illustrate, the Sultan says, ‘If we are able to build the railway as we want, we will cut access to European states who have their eyes on our lands’. This resonates with the conspiracy theory that the global powers do not want Turkey to be powerful. A dialogue between Abdülhamid, Tahsin Paşa and Senior Captain Celal, which is seen below, further explains this conspiracy of mystical global powers coupled with anti-Western and anti-Semitic tropes (S1 E4):

Abdülhamid (pointing to a map):

This is the world order that the British call the global monarchy. Their aim is to break down the Ottoman empire and establish a new world order. The capital of this new world order is Israel. There is only one thing that could add any meaning and strength to this Jewish state. That is its role in being the fortress of the global monarchy in the Middle East.

Tahsin Paşa:

Your Highness! Who will stop this from happening?

Abdülhamid:

It will be my people, as long as God almighty gives me strength and health.

Celal (referring to the game of chess before them): Your Highness, who is the king of this new world order?

Abdülhamid:

The Queen of England!

Celal (referring to the game):

Who is the queen?

Abdülhamid:

That is even more important than the queen!

The series continues to remind the audience of the anti-Semitic trope that Jews have ‘too much control’. The conspiracy that Jews are the masterminds of global politics are relayed on multiple occasions in the series. This message overlaps with the trope that accuses Jews of being conspirators and conniving. To illustrate:

Herzl:

Excellent! The Armenian demonstrations are going well.

Zaharov:

Herzl? Why do you Zionist Jews always complain about oppression but never demonstrate against it?

Herzl:

We are not the foot soldiers of the war but lead the war! (S1 E13)

In addition, the scene in which Herzl recruits opposition journalist Samir is an exemplar of blaming Jews for all the problems. Samir, an admirer of Herzl, is not aware that in fact it was Herzl who hired a hitman to only injure him and not Abdülhamid. The series portrays Herzl as the mastermind behind the attacks against journalists (S1 E5).

Jewish world conspiracy: ‘Conspiring Jew’

Jews were accused of poisoning wells in 14th-century Europe causing the Black Death, and in 21st century America, they were charged with being the ‘hidden hand’ responsible for the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Many conspiracy theories are rooted in the anti-Semitic myth that Jews are the ‘hidden hand’, plotting to take over and control the world (AJC Glossary, 2021).

Payitaht: Abdülhamid’s conspiratorial tone in portraying Jews as being behind a plot to dismantle the Ottoman empire is a focal point of the series (Cohen Yanarocak, 2017). The plotters behind all of the empire’s problems are depicted as a secretive Jewish conspiracy led by Theodor Herzl, the leader of the Zionist movement, in his hope to carve out an independent Jewish state. In line with the conspiracy that Jews were behind the fall of the Ottoman empire, a conspiracy theory that is widely held to this day in Islamist circles is seen when Payitaht: Abdülhamid portrays Jews as a dominating, sinister and conspiring force in the world. For example, scenes that depict the First Zionist Congress in Basel relay a sense of mysticism and evil and plotting against other people. In the scene where Herzl is depicted as speaking to Congress members, he says: ‘Humanity will survive only as long as they serve us!’ Herzl then draws the flag of the future Israel and says: ‘These stripes represent Tigris and Euphrates. They will be on its – Israel’s – flag and future’ (S1 E3).⁸ This particular scene is also an indirect reference to the anti-Semitic conspiracy theory in Turkey, which believes that Israel supports the Kurdish PKK insurgency in south-east Turkey. Bulut and İleri (2020) argue that the visual presentation of a secret hand in the scene where Herzl declares the greater Israel at the World Zionist Congress signifies world powers and the Jewish families, or, in other words, the ‘Jewish lobby’/Zionists who are believed to rule the world.

Payitaht: Abdülhamid portrays Jews as international conspirators who aim to control the Middle East, and, by extension, to dismantle Turkey. For example, Herzl says:

We believe the Jews who have been murdered for 2000 years will never be murdered again . . .. I explain this idea in the book I wrote. Today, we are establishing the World Zionist Congress and we are rebuilding the pathway to Jerusalem . . .. Today, we established a Jewish state, and people will laugh at us if they hear this news but in five or fifty years the whole world will know this as a fact and will accept it. Soon, the whole of humanity will only survive as long as they serve us Jews – the chosen people of Yehovah. (S1 E3)

The conversation between Abdülhamid II and Tahsin Paşa further demonstrates the ‘conspiring Jew’ trope (S1 E4):

Abdülhamid (looking at Herzl’s supposed map of a greater Israel):

Jerusalem, Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Diyarbakır, Antep and more . . .

Tahsin Paşa:

Your Highness, but why this region?

Sultan:

Paşa! It is to convince Jews of this promised land nonsense!

Tahsin Paşa:

Will this dream be actualized?

Abdülhamid:

I will make sure this dream of theirs becomes a nightmare, but I’m afraid if the Islamic world continues to sleep it will be the end of Muslims.

Tahsin Paşa:

Let’s say they establish a Jewish state finally, what is it they really want?

Abdülhamid:

Paşa! What Jews want with this dream is nothing but a dagger!

Tahsin Paşa:

What dagger, Your Highness?

Abdülhamid:

Those who look at this imagined map of a crescent all the way from Jerusalem to Diyarbakır will see this is not a crescent but a dagger. A dagger that is inserted into Muslim hearts very slowly by wars, dissent, hunger, poverty, and spread by the press with stories of freedom. Eventually that dagger will be stabbed in Muslims’ hearts!

Jews have dual loyalty to Israel: ‘Disloyal Jew’

One of the widely known accusations against Jews are that they conspire to shape policy for Jewish interests and that their primary loyalty is not with the state of which they are citizens. This claim manifests itself in the belief that Jews are less patriotic than other citizens. This trope dates back to the times of the New Testament in the Bible when Judas betrays Jesus. (Addressing Anti-Semitism through Education: Guidelines for Policymakers (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2018), p. 41, <https://www.osce.org/odihr/383089).

Payitaht: Abdülhamid also represents Jews as being more loyal to Israel, prioritizing Jews worldwide rather than the interests of their own nations. In other words, Jews are portrayed as having dual loyalties. For example, the show’s main villain, Theodor Herzl, wants to establish a Jewish state, whereas his father is loyal to the Sultan. In this respect, Jews are portrayed as people who are responsible for violence against other groups of people to achieve the goal of establishing a state of their own.

The trope of the disloyal Jew presents itself in Herzl’s disloyalty to his father, Jacob. Herzl holds Jacob hostage for opposing the formation of an Israeli state. Jacob says: ‘You cannot be my son, I don’t believe in a God that justifies the bloodshed of other people’s blood. My God is a merciful one. God has not promised Israel to us’ (S1 E1). In this scene, Jacob is portrayed as a righteous Jew and is being compared to the ‘undesirable’ Jew (Cohen Yanarocak, 2017). The scene further implies that a Jew will do anything, including harm his own family, to achieve the goal of establishing a Jewish state. Thus, the series propagates the trope of the untrustworthy and disloyal Jew.

Jews are cruel: ‘Immoral Jew’

Since ancient times, Jews have been falsely accused of killing Gentiles for ritual purposes. In Hellenistic Egypt, this was sometimes accompanied by accusations of cannibalism. In Medieval Europe, Jews were accused of using Christian blood to make matzah for the Jewish Passover (LDB).

By the same token, a conversation between Theodor Herzl and Emmanuel Carasso sheds light on how Jews are dehumanized by being portrayed as ruthless and violent. Herzl’s discussion with Emmanuel Carasso on the establishment of a Jewish state in Ottoman Palestine is exemplar (S1 E4):

Herzl:

Jewish kids . . . they will be happy.

Carasso:

Is the blood of the innocent children in Palestine necessary for this happiness?

Herzl:

Shut up. The whole world is created to serve us. Other nations are unimportant.

Carasso:

All Jews who say the world should serve us . . .. This war is a war with God.

Herzl:

Enough! I want the Jewish state for Sara and Sara’s descendants.

Carasso:

Yes! This is the truth!

The anti-Semitic stereotype that Jews are immoral and selfish is relayed in a scene in which Herzl and his father are talking (S1 E2):

Herzl:

I want to ask you a question. Does the commandment ‘You shall not kill’ in the Torah apply to everyone in every circumstance? Your son is about to murder an emperor but in the end all Jews will be saved. So remember this and respond to me accordingly. Do you think it’s worth it?

Jacob:

The most dangerous infidel is one who acts in the name of God despite the fact that God has forbidden such actions.

The trope that Jews are immoral and conniving is demonstrated in a conversation between Theodore Herzl and Emanuel Carasso that simultaneously references to the anti-Semitic trope that Jews control the media:

Herzl:

Innocent Jews are being slaughtered by cruel Muslims. Soon, the whole world will learn about this misfortune from the press and be startled.

Carasso:

And you’re saying all great powers will pity the Jews and help them establish a state? Listen, you’re dreaming, Herzl. We will take down the Ottoman empire by offering money, fame, the lies of freedom.

Hertzl’s exchange with Ottoman-Armenian protestors provide a further example of this trope. The accusation of Jews being selfish is also portrayed in the series. An Armenian protestor asks: ‘Why are you helping us?’ Herzl replies, ‘A Jew will do something only when it benefits him. This is just business’ (Bulut and İleri, 2020). Hence, the series highlights the Jewish stereotype as opportunistic, selfish and greedy.

Furthermore, Herzl is portrayed as a fraud who steals his father’s ideas and publishes his famous book, The Jewish State, which is claimed to be scribbled notes, according to the show. Herzl says to Sara (S1 E2): ‘History will write me in such a light, Sara. It will say Herzl, the founder of Zionism and Israel, wrote this book of new ideas without a penny when he couldn’t even pay his rent in Vienna’. Herzl’s father confirms this later in the series. Jacob explains to Abdülhamid: ‘My son is sick. He tied my hands and feet, held me in a cellar. Years ago, I scribbled this idea of a Jewish state on papers. He published a book out of my silly ideas’ (S1 E3). Jacob is simultaneously portrayed as a disloyal Jew, disloyal to his son, Zionism and the future state of Israel.

Money and criminality: ‘Finance lobby’

Some of the central myths animating the structure of anti-Semitism relate to Jews and money, and finance in particular. The stereotype of the Jewish moneylender goes back to when Jews were excluded from many occupations and the church banned Christians from usury. In fact, claims of Jewish control of and fascination with finance are as old as the New Testament. Therefore, Jews are occasionally portrayed as moneychangers engaged in unholy practices. In the medieval period, Jews were depicted as wealthy, powerful and menacing. This trope is found in references to ‘Rothschild money’ or the identification of a Jewish conspiracy in international banking and criminality. Dog-whistle descriptions of financial elites as cosmopolitan and globalists as well as in conspiracy theories about the control bankers and financiers like George Soros have over domestic and international politics are examples of this trope (Addressing Anti-Semitism through Education: Guidelines for Policymakers (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2018), p. 41, <https://www.osce.org/odihr/383089). For example, although there is no evidence of a finance lobby run by Soros, many Turks believe that any difficulties in the economy stem from the manipulation of a finance lobby bent on stopping Turkey’s rise to prominence (Carney, 2018). In this respect, the anti-Semitic trope of Jews and money is noticeable in Payitaht: Abdülhamid.

In the series, Theodor Herzl’s main objective is to establish a greater Israel after overthrowing Abdülhamid II by way of undermining the Ottoman economy (Bulut and İleri, 2020). Along these lines, stereotypical Jewish traits such as greed and stinginess are portrayed in Payitaht: Abdülhamid. One of the scenes in which Herzl is portrayed as greedy is when he says: ‘All I think of is money, the bank (establishing a Jewish bank) and Israel’ (S1 E6). Similarly, Sara Hedaya, who receives orders from the mastermind Parvus, an invisible character who orchestrates it all, says, ‘All I care about is money. Small profits will not suffice’ (Bulut and İleri, 2020).

The most memorable scene explicitly referring to the anti-Semitic trope of Jews and money not only employs well-known global families’ conspiracy but also the stereotype of Jews with money (S1 E2):

Sara:

What are you doing?

Herzl:

I am calculating the assets of rich Jews. Rothschild family has five hundred million worth of gold, Morgan family has four hundred and seventy five million worth of gold, DuPond family has three hundred and fifty million worth of gold, and Hersh family three hundred and twenty five million worth of gold. When they are added up, they make up half of the world’s wealth. Yet, Jews still don’t have a state.

Sara:

It is sad, of course, but they chose you to find a solution to this problem. If you get poor Jews behind your cause, then you can get the rich Jews on your side.

Conclusion

Today, together with the AKP’s monopoly over media and its vast propaganda machine that is comprised of pro-AKP media, Turkish society as a whole is indoctrinated in not only its ideology, but also its conspiratorial claims. Recognizing the need to consolidate its historical narrative and to maintain its authoritarian rule, Turkey’s current government turned to entertainment television by promoting period dramas. The eminent success of Diriliş Ertuğrul (Resurrection Ertuğrul) paved the way for Payitaht: Abdülhamid which is a convenient tool to remind the audience that a grand conspiracy against the Ottomans in the past equals to a grand conspiracy against Turkey now. Just as Kurtlar Vadisi had a ‘vast and sinister conspiracy’ united by a single overarching plot, so does Payitaht. Without a doubt, the audience recognizes the dark and sinister forces that are behind the attacks against the Ottoman empire and Turkey: Zionists, bankers, globalists. The three Jewish characters in the series all recycle the age-old anti-Semitic stereotype: ‘The disloyal, unethical, greedy, conniving and most importantly world conspirator Jew’. As such, Payitaht: Abdülhamid embodies the current-day populist nationalist discourse employed by the Right-wing AKP government that is disguised in entertainment and holds a role of agency in cultivating the public and recreating a historical interpretation in the AKP’s own image. In doing so, the implicit anti-Semitic coded messages in Payitaht are also reflective of the abundant anti-Semitic rhetoric in Turkish mass media which is also interconnected to conspiracy theories.

In late 2021, The Club, a period drama whose main protagonists are Turkish Jews, was released on streaming platform Netflix. The series received significant attention from the media and the society since it was the first television series to portray Jews as their main characters. Moreover, it was the first time Jews were portrayed favourably. Although The Club opened up discussion in Turkey with regard to minorities, and discrimination and policies towards religious minorities, the series was not able to penetrate the broader society due to limited access to Netflix (Çevik and Aydın Kılıç, 2023). While such efforts are encouraging, and have the potential to counter the narrative of serials such as Payitaht, they cannot by themselves undercut the streaming of anti-Semitism on the public broadcaster.

I argue that by cloaking anti-Semitism as entertainment, public broadcaster TRT is functioning as an ideological state apparatus that disseminates a world-view that polarizes the society on the basis of imagined existential threats. This enables the AKP to maintain its grip and reproduce its Ottoman Islamic identity. As a result, rather than being a radical ideology, anti-Semitism becomes mainstreamed. Although the Sevres Syndrome empowers anti-Semitic conspiratorial rhetoric in Turkey, the AKP’s historical revisionism further exacerbates the conspiratorial rhetoric and, by way of its media, provides a fertile environment to embed anti-Semitism in Turkish society.

Footnotes

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Senem B Çevik

Notes

Author biography

Senem B Çevik, PhD, is a communication scholar specializing in public diplomacy and strategic communication. Her research focuses on the intersection of identity, communication and psychology with an emphasis on Turkey. Her recent publications examine the role of media content in Turkish politics from a lens of identity politics. She has published in several journals, including Middle East Critique, Caucasus Survey, Turkish Studies, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies and International Journal of Applied Psychoanalytic Studies. She is the co-editor of Turkey’s Public Diplomacy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

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