Abstract
Prisoners increasingly appear in court from spaces of incarceration, linked by video technologies, and remote from the physical courtroom in which the legal proceedings take place. During these video-linked court appearances, prisoners are immersed within the oppressive aesthetics of detention, rather than in the dignified courtroom we idealize. This article examines prisoners’ sensorial experience of prison video studios and the impact such space has on their encounters with law. Video link technologies are examined as symptomatic of the sensory bias to sight that ignores the significance of the other senses, diminishing prisoners’ opportunities for engagement with and expressive participation in legal procedure.
I. Introduction
With the steady diffusion and assimilation of communication technologies into the criminal justice system, people in custody are increasingly appearing in court from spaces of incarceration, linked by video technologies and mediated by screens. Prisons, police stations, detention centers and mental health facilities in many jurisdictions are now networked with courtrooms, justice agencies and legal representatives. The associated legislative changes are effecting major conceptual shifts in how and where criminal justice is enacted and delivered. While much literature explores video links from the perspective of high-tech courtrooms, I examine video links as an emergent prison technology and one that ensures inmates’ physical exclusion from courtroom space. During video-linked court appearances, prisoners are immersed within the oppressive aesthetics of state detention, rather than in the more dignified space of a communal courtroom. In this article, I interrogate how video link technologies impact prisoners’ sensorial experiences of legal space and engagement with their own remote legal procedures. The arguments presented are grounded on fieldwork interviews and observations I undertook in 2012 with 31 prisoners in two New South Wales (NSW) correctional centers. Several scholars have identified the need for such research into prisoners’ experiences of video technologies. 1 I argue that there is a need to explore the phenomenological experience of video links from carceral space and how that impacts on prisoners’ engagement with law.
I commence with an explanation of video link technology – what it is, the rationale for its implementation, and how it is used in various jurisdictions. I move to introduce my research methodology and the empirical fieldwork I undertook with NSW prisoners to understand their experience of using video links. In this context, phenomenology is introduced as a means to analyse prisoners’ distinct spatial and sensorial experiences of courtrooms versus prison video studios. I focus on the nature of carceral space as a site for the administration of justice and how it qualitatively differs from the more formal ambience of a courtroom. From the perspective of the prison video studio, video links are then critiqued as a manifestation of the sensory bias towards sight – a technology that facilitates the visible appearance of a prisoner and the download of verbal content, but one that militates against a prisoner’s sense of immersion in their own legal proceedings.
II. The Technology and its Rationale
Video conferencing technology allows two or more people in separate sites to see, hear and interact with one another in real time. 2 Globally, the technology is referred to with differing terminologies including prison video link, telelaw, telejustice, technologically augmented courts, cyber courts, distributed courts and virtual courts systems. Video link technologies are being integrated into criminal courtrooms, police stations and prisons around Australia and the developed world. Several common law jurisdictions, including the United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK), have video conferencing systems in criminal justice. 3 In 2012 I observed the UK Virtual Court system for preliminary hearings in operation at Camberwell Green Magistrates’ Court. With this system, a live link is established between police stations and the Virtual Court so that a defendant remains in police detention. I also observed the Prison to Court Video Links system in operation at London’s Snaresbrook Crown Court.
Digital technologies, screens and enticing visual displays are proliferating in legal procedure. 4 The drive for technology-augmented criminal process primarily focusses on issues of expediency and increased court throughput, economic rationalization, cost reduction and improved security. As an example, integral to the UK Ministry of Justice’s goal of “swift and sure justice” is the use of Virtual Courts and the Prison to Courts Video Links. These technologies are seen as a means to improve productivity, accessibility and speed, as well as increase convenience and security for vulnerable witnesses and victims of crime. 5 The technology is considered by many to be an efficient and economical replacement for face-to-face legal conferences between lawyers and their incarcerated clients, and as a means to minimize the expense and discomfort of the transportation of prisoners to and from courts. 6 Certainly, all the prisoners I interviewed identified the minimization of prison transport with the associated strip-searches and disruptions to prison life as a major benefit. However, Ward argues that the significant reforms to the UK’s criminal justice system are a function of neoliberal economic policies that seek efficiency streamlining, but perhaps threaten to strip justice back to its bare bones and compromise due process. 7
In Australia, NSW is at the forefront of video link usage and this is the jurisdiction where I conducted my fieldwork. Video links operate in “411 courts, correctional centres and other justice agency sites” for civil and criminal proceedings. 8 In NSW the technology is referred to as audio visual link (AVL) pursuant to s. 3(1) Evidence (Audio and Audio Visual Links) Act 1998 (New South Wales) (“the Act”). AVL is defined to mean “facilities (including closed-circuit television) that enable audio and visual communication between persons at different places.” Pursuant to s. 5C of the Act, any premises where video link is used for giving evidence or making submissions under the Act, is considered to be part of the NSW court that is sitting at a courtroom, thereby intimately linking the disparate space of a courtroom with the non-judicial site of prison. A displaceable presumption in favor of video link appearance now operates for most bail, committal, sentencing and appeal procedures, so that both adults and children appear by AVL, unless the court directs otherwise or the proceedings are “physical appearance proceedings.” “Physical appearance proceedings” are defined in s. 3(1) as any trial or hearing, any inquiry into a person’s fitness to stand trial, and certain bail proceedings. Accordingly, 57.4 percent of court appearances and 100 percent of all parole hearings were conducted by AVL in NSW. 9 As a consequence of this new technologized regime, correctional centers are being fitted with video studios that can be connected with remote courtrooms, lawyers, legal aid, and health services such as psychologists. The technology is also used for “family video contact” sessions, a program aimed particularly at Aboriginal prisoners to encourage maintenance of family bonds. The family video visits program is still quite small with 192 documented sessions in the most recent annual report. By comparison, 38,996 court and parole appearances were facilitated by video link. 10
III. Research Methodology and Phenomenological Framework
Following ethics clearance from The University of Sydney and Corrective Services NSW (CSNSW), I conducted interviews in 2012 with 31 prisoners in two NSW correctional facilities: Dillwynia and Mid North Coast Correction (MNCC) Centres. The semi-structured interviews were audio-taped and based on open-ended questions designed to provide spontaneous narrative responses from the prisoners. I broke the interview questions into five sections. After introducing myself and going through the Participant’s Information Statement and Informed Consent, I asked each prisoner about their personal background including their age, gender, languages, ethnicity and inmate status (remand or convicted). My sample population included 17 female and 14 male prisoners, with 18 being held on remand, and nine identified as Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander. The average age of the female prisoners was 35.5 years, and 31.5 years for the male prisoners. In the second part of the interview, I gathered data regarding the length of their incarceration/remand, the number of video link sessions they had experienced in prison, as well as their familiarity with communication technologies in the “outside” world. For example, questions included: “Have you ever used AVL before? If not, have you used similar technology (e.g. Skype) in the general community?” “Was the use of such technology entirely new to you?” To an extent, these factors shape the prisoners’ experiences of prison video link technology. Seven prisoners had only used video links once in prison, while one third had used it many times. Fourteen participants had used AVL most recently for court appearance; four prisoners had used it for bail; four for parole; four for legal conferencing; three for sentencing, and the remainder had used it for family law matters and psychological assessments. Perhaps not surprisingly, the 20–29 year age group expressed the greatest familiarity and confidence in using communication technologies.
The third part of the interviews focussed on preparations for the AVL session. This included logistical information, such as how they came to know about the AVL encounter, as well as their emotional responses leading up to the AVL. For example, I asked: “Did anyone explain the AVL process to you beforehand?” “Did you know who your solicitor was prior to the court matter being heard?” “How long have you had to wait today for your AVL session?” The fourth category of questions related to the practical and technical experience of AVL where I was keen to glean prisoners’ perceptions of the audio and visual qualities and how their communication and comprehension were positively or negatively impacted. For example, I asked: “Could you hear satisfactorily?” “Could you see satisfactorily?” “How was the eye contact?” “How did you know when you were ‘on’ and ‘off’?” “How was your presence acknowledged?” Finally, I asked the prisoners about their overall emotional experience of AVL, specifically requesting them to compare the AVL experience with being physically transported to court. I asked them how they felt about the level of privacy, how they felt about the distance between themselves and their lawyers and family members, and how they felt about “appearing” in court from prison wearing prison attire. Here I sought to gauge how respectful the prisoners felt the remote proceedings were, and whether they felt they were treated with human dignity. I also asked all prisoners for suggestions as to how the system could be improved and specifically asked those who identified as Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander if they felt that their specific needs were met. In essence, my interview questions sought to reveal an understanding of prisoners’ multi-sensorial and embodied experiences of using video links from the space of prison to “appear” in court or to consult with their legal representatives.
On completion of the prison fieldwork, the interview data were thematically coded and analysed using NVivo qualitative research software. Coding in NVivo entailed creating “nodes” that allowed the data to be organized and collected into themes, ultimately enabling relationships, patterns, hierarchies and ideas to emerge from the data. Through this process, I came to identify core themes, particularly the spatial, corporeal and visual impacts of video links from prison. For the purposes of this article, I reference the prisoners’ accounts of AVL and the qualitative attributes of carceral space, focussing on the visual, auditory and temporal elements. The selected comments represent the most articulate responses from prisoners regarding these issues. I acknowledge that my empirical data emerge from prisoners’ constructed and mediated experiences of using video links within a certain discourse, being a penal regime. The data do not represent a pure or objective form of reality. 11 Nevertheless, as a researcher, I am a “non-con” and, unlike convict criminologists, I cannot “tell it like it is.” 12 Convict criminologists insist on the need to ‘incorporate the voice of prisoners’ in prison research, 13 highlighting the significance of the prisoners’ verbatim accounts I have gathered and analysed.
In deference to convict criminologists’ privileging of the perceptions and experiences of prisoners, I have adopted a qualitative, phenomenological approach. Phenomenology presents a way of investigating prisoners’ subjective, “lived body” experiences of using video link technologies in prison space. It provides a means to disclose the world of incarceration and reveal prisoners’ perceptual experiences of video conferencing. I use phenomenology in my research to provide insights into how technologies in prisons transform spatial, corporeal and visual relationships for prisoners. Phenomenology is the study of the nature of experience, and seeks to describe original experience, 14 in this case, the experience of appearing in court from prison by video link. Phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty argues that our experience and perception of the world is through our whole body, not just the eye. 15 Human perception from a phenomenological standpoint is therefore an inter-sensory experience. In examining the subjective experience of using video link facilities in carceral space, Juhani Pallasmaa’s haptic notion of architecture may be applied. Pallasmaa, who references the work of Merleau-Ponty, suggests that every experience of architecture is multi-sensorial, providing us with a sense of space and scale, an awareness of the durable materials, surfaces embedded with authority and traditions of construction. 16 I apply this theoretical framework to examine the disparate spaces of courtroom and prison video studio, and to understand the distinct phenomenological qualities of each.
IV. Courtroom Space
Courtrooms are civic spaces filled with signifiers and finished in materials that resonate with ritual, state authority and a visible manifestation of the legitimacy of the law. 17 Courtroom space exudes meaning, semiotic resonance and spatial syntax 18 through its “elevations, ornamentation, and partitions.” 19 The built environment of the courtroom has aesthetic and sensory dimensions that “suffuse[s] our engagement with everything about us,” 20 evoking reverence and deference. 21 A courtroom is therefore more than just a site – it is a spatial representation of society’s conception of justice, providing dignity to legal process, 22 with its enclosed space symbolizing law’s independence. 23 The built environment of the courtroom is designed to facilitate the impartial administration of justice, yet the space encodes, structures and reflects inherent power relations and hierarchies in the law. In conjunction with courtroom procedure, the goal of “participatory parity” may be compromised. 24 Courtroom space is not neutral in the sense that it is partitioned into zones of segregation, zones of authority. 25 The separationist courtroom design specifies and codifies the distribution of participants, 26 and hierarchically arranges the proceedings, relationships and communications. 27 The segmentation of the space is generated by the material environment and the intangible sensorial environment. Visual and aural elements define accessibility, audibility and sight lines, 28 while the intangible senses of proximity and presence in a courtroom are the product of hapticity (relating to the sense of touch) and proprioception (the sense of one’s body, its movement, posture and spatial location). Courtroom space is therefore not just seen, it is experienced phenomenologically through the body, through the sensorial interactions of touch, smell, sound, and through human encounters within that space: “Whoever steps inside it is sacrosanct for the time being.” 29 Of course the boundaries of justice are tested by the increasing use of digital technologies and media broadcast. Mohr gives an example of the televised 1995 O.J. Simpson murder trial in California where the trial became “delocalized” in cyberspace: “a collage of courtroom, crime scene, television studio.” 30 Mohr considers that architecture is the medium of communication, and he defines “architecture” broadly to refer to both the built environment including “the foyers and corridors, video links, remote witness rooms and media facilities,” as well as the architecture, or legal framework, of the trial. 31 While, conceptually, due process is preoccupied with location, spatial arrangements and design, 32 clearly the physical boundaries of the space of legal adjudication are increasingly contested.
V. The Courtroom Dock
Of the delineated zones in the courtroom, the custody dock especially challenges the adversarial system’s ideal of equality before the law.
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During criminal proceedings, the accused person is isolated within the custody dock, a key separationist structure that foregrounds the implicit power imbalance of the state versus the individual. The dock calls into question the presumption of innocence, being a space of pillory “where the defendant (often aptly called ‘the prisoner’) is incarcerated during his trial.”
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The courtroom custody dock has been critiqued as inherently intimidating for an accused person.
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Furthermore, the dock is complicit in generating a guilty image or impression of dangerousness,
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and can be interpreted as part of a ceremony of degradation of the accused person.
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One prisoner I interviewed, F14, discussed using AVL and compared it to her discomfort in being on public display in the space of the courtroom dock:
I feel that [AVL is] just the same as if you’re up on the stand, and … oh, tell you the truth, I feel a lot more comfortable in a video room than on the stand … because you’re totally focussed on that camera, on your solicitor, the judge, the magistrate and everything else … but in the court, you’ve got the whole room right looking at you … so video link, it cuts that out.
She appreciated the diminished public scrutiny and possible pillorying afforded by the video studio in prison, a shield from the courtroom gaze. This prisoner’s account suggests that the new location of the custody dock in prison may liberate prisoners from the prejudicial courtroom dock.
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However, I received many contrary accounts from prisoners suggesting that the relocation of the dock to prison, effected by AVL and discussed in the following section, results in alienation as well as further stigmatization of the prisoner. For example, M02 told me that he preferred to be physically in court as he could comprehend proceedings better when immersed in the courtroom dynamics: “I don’t really understand all the court, like what they say and that, you know. Umm, in person, I know what’s actually going on.” M13 expressed how the use of AVL made him feel disengaged and isolated from the world:
I was already in a cell on me own disconnected from the whole prison system, let alone the world … so the video link was just another [disconnect]… so nup, I didn’t feel connected to anything.
Within the courtroom dock, the accused person becomes a non-participating object that has justice done to her or him. 39 These harms are exaggerated by the increasing plexiglass encasement of courtroom docks and the spatial containment of risk, 40 and now, I argue, with the use of video links. Only a couple of the prisoners I interviewed had experienced being in a glass-enclosed dock in jurisdictions outside NSW (where they are rare). They likened the experience to video links from prison, identifying similar communication barriers. Recent case law has considered the potential prejudicial impression created by high security docks, as well as the ensuing communication problems. 41
While many theorists argue that there is a tension between the prisoner’s right to the presumption of innocence and the actual enjoyment of that right, with even the traditional, non-glass courtroom dock implicated in this friction, 42 there is, perhaps, a positive reading of the dock. The courtroom dock is symbolic not only of the alleged deviant but, I argue, it also symbolizes the potentiality for direct liberty from a civic space. The dock may be considered a liminal space (a threshold or transitional space) and inextricably linked to the rites of passage inherent in criminal justice. 43 From this space, the accused person may face expulsion from society through imprisonment, or may walk free and be reintegrated into society. When one considers the implications of relocating and confining the custody dock within a prison, as effected by video link technologies, this point is made explicit. Video links from prison present as the apotheosis of security and efficiency, succeeding in the complete spatial containment and exclusion of an incarcerated defendant.
VI. The Virtual Dock: Video Technologies in Carceral Space
NSW’s displaceable presumption in favor of video links means that prisoners “appear” in court broadcast live from prison for many criminal proceedings. The legislation effectively relocates the courtroom custody dock to the new conceptual court space located within prison space, thereby conflating courtroom space with the space of state prosecution and punishment. The relocated custody dock is fortified by prison walls, so defendants appear virtually in remote courtrooms, secured and digitally encased on screens. Video links represent the pinnacle of spatial partitioning by guaranteeing the accused person’s actual incarceration during legal procedures.
Much existing scholarship on communication technologies in justice focusses on the courtroom endpoint, whereas my research examines video links in criminal justice from the prison perspective. The video link systems at the prison endpoint are of a different configuration to the courtroom endpoint, given the disparity between courtroom and prison environments. According to one video conferencing vendor, prison video systems provide prisoners “remote but full access to their judicial rights, and the highly durable system also withstands the most taxing environments.” 44 My fieldwork afforded me the opportunity to see the prison video facilities. Within Dillwynia, these video link studios were adjacent to the spacious, carpeted and light-filled visitors’ area, complete with a Gloria Jeans Café, musak and sofas. MNCC was far more carceral than the relative luxury of Dillwynia – there were more security doors to pass, and before entering the sterile zone on the perimeter around the prison, I was fitted with a duress alarm. The AVL studios were contiguous to the prison officers’ room and a long, hot pink, concrete corridor. Holding cells and an exercise yard were also located off this corridor, all constructed with hard concrete surfaces and detention-grade fixed metal furnishings.
At both Dillwynia and MNCC, small video link studios were usually used for legal conferences and sometimes for court appearances. These acoustic-foam-tiled rooms were tight and narrow, barely larger than a broom closet.
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There was one chair placed in front of a timber console fitted with a camera lens, screen and desk area. This space affected prisoners, with some commenting on the features of the small studio and how it made them feel. F09 said the room was “a little scary ’cause I get claustrophobic.” F01 told me: “I didn’t expect it to be as small as it was, it’s only a very tiny room and I didn’t expect it to be that small.” M14 also found the studio too small and suggested: “I reckon you need more space, to walk around and that.” However, others were happy with the space. M07 said it was “good enough, does the job” and F05 described the space as:
It’s only just like a little room … a little box and you sit there and then it’s got the … prison name banner behind you … then the screen’s virtually in your face … the officers are out there so they’re not interfering, and they kind of give you your own little privacy and yeah, I was pretty much happy with that.
Larger video studios were used as “courtrooms” and had a telephone on the console to allow prisoners to speak to their remote lawyer throughout court proceedings. During my fieldwork at MNCC, I was given permission to observe three court proceedings. I sat at the back of the “courtroom,” a utilitarian space furnished with a simple desk and two chairs that faced a video camera and split screens, while the prisoner sat at the desk. The prisoner’s backdrop was a paper notice attached to a wall identifying the correction center. The prisoner was presented with a split screen showing four views of the distant courtroom – the judge, an empty witness stand, the bar table and a section of the public gallery. The view of the remote courtroom was partial and delineated by the pre-determined camera angles, devoid of natural peripheral vision. During my fieldwork interviews, prisoners raised issues concerning the restricted view. For example, I asked F09 if she could see her family in the remote courtroom:
I couldn’t see, I could only see a little tiny bit, I was told they were coming but I could not see them, which was, umm, depressing to me ’cause I would’ve loved to see my children.
Several prisoners mentioned that they could not even recognize their legal representative, did not know when they were “live,” or when they were being addressed by anyone in the remote court.
Conceptualizing the prison video studio as a part of the courtroom was challenging for me as an observer, given the lack of courtroom ambience or signifiers, and the overwhelmingly oppressive aesthetic of incarceration. The prison video studio is phenomenologically distinct from the physical courtroom in which the prisoner’s legal proceedings take place. My time interviewing prisoners and observing the system revealed a world far removed from the somber ambience of a courtroom. The video link studios I visited in NSW were located within the inner boundaries of the correctional facilities; inside the sterile zone and accessible only via several security measures and many heavy doors. This means that prisoners, who appear by video link for their legal procedures, are immersed within the severe aesthetic of incarcerating space, instead of within the relatively dignified and communal courtroom. Penal architecture is functional but harsh: “By definition [prisons] have a rigid architectural determinism built into their fabric.” 46 Of course, I acknowledge that not all courthouses provide the dignified space we idealize for legal proceedings. However, the expression of dignity and humanity in the administration of justice remains a legitimate aspiration. This is reflected in the extensive historical and contemporary discourse on courtroom design, and the highly symbolic role that courthouses have had in the Australian civic landscape. Prisons, on the other hand, are increasingly hidden from public view.
VII. Carceral Space
Prisons are “closed environments,” 47 encompassed by high perimeter fencing and rolls of razor wire, fabricated with hard surfaces and fitted with detention-grade furnishings. These institutions are highly symbolic in the sense that they manifest the power of the state and prosecutorial forces to deny liberty to citizens, an apparatus concerned with power relations and intended to render individuals docile. 48 In the historical shift of punishment regimes from public torture or shaming to private incarceration, 49 prisons are the most hidden part of criminal justice. 50 Extremes of power and powerlessness are apparent in prisons. Carceral space constructs an environment of surveillance and control creating a sense of inferiority and disempowerment. 51 Powerlessness is reinforced through the daily regimes, constant surveillance, the presence of uniformed officers and regulated communication within prison and to the outside world. Many of my interviewees expressed a fatalistic resignation to their situation. For example M10 stated: “You’re literally a nothing … you’ve got no authority … whatever happens to you, happens … it’s literally like you’re a ghost in here.” Some found video links added to their loss of agency. F07’s comment addresses the powerlessness of many prisoners during video link appearances: “They didn’t even give me a say … I usually just sit there and just sit there, motionless.” The possibilities of agency in such a coercive space are questionable. 52 The compressed and cellular built environment of prison impacts on behavior through sensorial deprivation: the “anaesthetics” of incarceration blunt the senses, and reinforce criminality. 53 It is “the fabric of the buildings” 54 that determines behavior and identity, and within prison there is a profound connection between spatiality, corporeality and human experience.
The common purpose of a prison is for the segregation of perceived transgressors from society 55 and the institution itself can be seen as a complete autonomous universe 56 or carceral archipelago. 57 Goffman examines “total institutions” – those places where like-situated individuals reside, isolated from society, and together lead an enclosed, controlled and administered life. 58 The ideological underpinnings of prisons vary: to punish, deter, rehabilitate and for the protection of society, 59 with a shift in emphasis from rehabilitation to punitiveness in some jurisdictions. 60 In NSW, CSNSW manages adult and juvenile inmates, both remand and sentenced as well as offenders in the community. In expressing its purposes, CSNSW seeks to maintain “required standards for a safe, secure and humane environment” and provide inmates with opportunities for rehabilitation, work skills and health programs. 61 Despite these positive aspirations, correctional buildings are nevertheless an evocative form of non-public architecture: enclosed and breach-resistant. A prison presents a highly controlled, surveilled, dehumanized and taxing environment that impacts on the spatial experience of prisoners who use video technology within the carceral world to interact with remote courtrooms and lawyers.
VIII. Video Links and the Hegemony of Vision
While video conferencing transmits audio, it is overwhelmingly a visual medium and an “ocularcentric” technology that privileges the sense of sight, constructs images, and reinforces the “hegemony of vision” 62 that various theorists challenge. Video conferencing vendors such as Polycom and Tandberg emphasize the visual communication and video qualities of their products. Polycom refers to the “life-like video,” “life-like appearance in court,” 63 and “true-to-life,” 64 while Tandberg stresses “justice communication must be visual.” 65 Here I examine video links as a manifestation of the sensory bias towards sight – a technology that facilitates a basic visibility of a prisoner and the download of spoken content, but one that militates against the transmission of nonverbal communication, and diminishes prisoners’ sensorial engagement and sense of immersion in legal proceedings.
Since the ancient Greeks, Western philosophy has privileged the sense of sight spawning a domination, or hegemony, of the visual. This predominance of sight is deeply embedded in philosophy and language. 66 Levin interrogates this “ocularcentric paradigm, a vision-generated, vision-centred interpretation of knowledge, truth and reality.” 67 How do these concepts relate to video link technologies? Several theorists and historians of technologies have investigated the extension of human vision through optical devices, much of this “imbued with a profound suspicion of vision and its hegemonic role in the modern era.” 68 Virilio interrogates regimes of the visual, those visual protheses and technologies that have extended the reach of natural eyesight and modes of perception. Through the accelerating speed of emergent vision machines and optical devices, distances collapse and material space evaporates. State institutions, law enforcement, judiciary, military and the media increasingly seek to control individual subjects’ viewpoint of the world. 69 The mediation of perception is being facilitated through new technologies and optical devices that “encourage us to perceive the world as if it were entirely made up of nothing more than appearances on a screen.” 70 These technological changes have wrought repercussions for criminal justice with virtual images and telepresence once again provoking the question of habeas corpus. 71 There is an “industrialisation of vision,” 72 and visual technologies are replacing “the human sensorium.” 73 Furthermore, technologies are “relocating vision to a plane severed from a human observer” and new technologized modes of visualization are becoming dominant. 74 Foucault examines the hegemony of vision through Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon. Panopticism is an optical metaphor for a disciplinary mechanism that controls vision and visibility through enclosed, hierarchical and partitioned space, and constant surveillance: 75 “vision has become supervision” intimately related to a hegemony of power. 76 Surveillant vision is asymmetrical and lacks reciprocity – it normalizes, disciplines and renders populations docile. 77
From a phenomenological perspective, vision is treated as embodied and entwined with all the senses. 78 With a focus on architecture, traditionally regarded as an art form of the eye, the hegemony of vision may be critiqued as suppressing multi-sensorial engagement, particularly the haptic sense, as architecture “articulates the experience of our being-in-the-world and strengthens our sense of reality and self.” 79 In contrast, computer images flatten our multi-sensorial experiences. Screens frame and focus our vision, denying natural peripheral vision. Peripheral vision is important in enveloping us in “the flesh of the world,” integrating us spatially and corporeally as immersed participants. 80 Focussed vision, such as presented by a video link screen, makes us mere spectators, distanced, detached and isolated, and devoid of empathy.
IX. The Impacts of Ocularcentrism
Video links reflect the concept of ocularcentrism in myriad ways. Video conferencing systems in the justice sector are purchased by the state from major international companies, revealing an “industrialisation of vision” 81 and the control of individual subjects’ perceptual experience. The embedding of video link technology into prison infrastructure imposes a strict hierarchy of spatial relationships between those deemed worthy of being physically enveloped in the “flesh” of the courtroom world, and those who must remain incarcerated.
1 Asymmetries in the Screen Space of Justice
Video conferencing presents a framed viewpoint that creates an isolating space, making prisoners spectators rather than immersed participants in a spatial environment. 82 Many prisoners articulated an awareness of inhabiting the emergent “screen space” of justice, and several, such as F09, expressed how the AVL experience was “weird, strange,” and “like watching TV.” F12 commented that screen space was: “Surreal, umm you know, watching it on a screen, it’s surreal, gotta remind yourself, it’s talking about you.” For many prisoners, video links generate a non-immersive and alienating experience.
Asymmetry of vision is inherent between the courtroom and prison endpoints. Prisoners are often unaware of exactly who is observing them, subverting the social norm of reciprocity of vision, or “see/being seen dyad.”
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F11 expressed her concerns that she did not have a complete view of the remote public gallery:
You cannot see who’s sitting in the courtroom, ’cause it’s a public courtroom and I think I should be allowed to see who’s sitting in that courtroom, because they’re watching me. That’s the thing, you don’t know who else is in that courtroom.
The framed view of video conferencing “assures dissymmetry, disequilibrium, difference” 84 in the criminal justice system, heightening zones of demarcation and generating a subtle process of enmity and othering.
When video links from prison operate properly (they not infrequently fail), prisoners should be visible and audible by the remote courtroom participants. In turn, prisoners should have reciprocity of audio and vision, fulfilling the requirements of the common law “hearing rule.” 85 In theory, the basic common law requirements are met by video links. However, I argue that an ocularcentric approach ignores the distinct phenomenological, spatial and embodied experiences of each setting, and the significance of the full panoply of sensorial experience of each space. The prison video studio may be a legislated conceptual extension of the courtroom, nevertheless it remains in an enclosed, carceral site that is nothing like a court. Other jurisdictions, such as the Netherlands, apparently have sought to address this issue by decorating both the courtroom and the prison studio in an identical style. 86 However, my fieldwork indicated that the “coercive environment” 87 of incarceration is “hardly a replication of a courtroom,” 88 nor reflective of legal gravitas. 89 Courtroom space is “more than a mere location” and video links present “a poor substitute.” 90 There is an aesthetic and phenomenological disjuncture between courtrooms and prison video studios. The latter are utilitarian but drab, lacking in dignified courtroom ambience and “phenomenologically at odds with the social space” of the physical courtroom in which the prisoner’s legal proceedings actually takes place. 91 This has several implications for prisoners.
2 Web of Symbols
Video links generate heightened demarcations in criminal proceedings that weaken the ideal of equality before the law. Within the prison video studio, prisoners are enmeshed in a “web of symbols,”
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judged and constructed by the technological gaze. The overarching visuality of video links emphasizes the web of symbols obvious in carceral space. One potent symbol is clothing. During AVL appearances, prisoners wear their conspicuous, state-issued prison attire, referred to as prison “greens” in NSW. There is no opportunity to wear civilian clothes, as they could in a physical courtroom. Wearing “greens” constructs an image of criminality and “otherness,”
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adding to “the prosecution’s arsenal in a subtle manner.”
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The wearing of prison attire gives rise to the notion of “presumptive guilt,” that is, the uniform is “synonymous with culpability.”
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Many prisoners spoke to me about the psychological impact of wearing prison clothing during video links and their preference for civilian clothing. Combined with the screen-based appearance, M04 felt he was perceived as a generic, screen-based prisoner, indistinguishable from the last:
You’re only a bunch of pixels on a screen, if whether or not the judge is going to be able to look at you and actually feel who you are, rather than just see you wearing green, yeah, you can blend in to the crowd a little bit.
Prisoners appearing by video link are consequently “doubly trapped: framed within the screen and judged in context of their confinement.” 96 There is an acute awareness of the stigmatization generated by the ill-fitting and unflattering prison greens.
3 Comprehension Through the Human Sensorium
To focus on the visual capabilities of video links ignores the distinct embodied experiences of courtroom versus prison space. When appearing by video link, prisoners are corporeally isolated from their legal representatives, possibly compromising the quality of representation. F02 felt that she could not communicate effectively one-to-one with her lawyer during video linked appearances: “You don’t even see your lawyer do you really … you can’t tell him: I want to talk to you, no … it’s no good.” This experience left F02 feeling frustrated and angry that she was not being “represented right” during AVL. Corporeal and spatial segregation from court affects prisoners’ comprehension, participation, communication, legal access and family support. Human communication and interaction are ruptured, affecting the expression and reception of nonverbal behavior and eye contact.
97
From my fieldwork, I identified a nexus between space, participation and comprehension, and how being in an isolating space ruptures this relationship. For M09 everything “sinks in a bit better” when he is in courtroom space. Being in court would have assisted F07 in her comprehension as well:
I’d rather be there, you know, ’cause I couldn’t hear very much of what was going on either, yeah and they talk big words and stuff, and I don’t understand and they didn’t explain nothing to me.
When prisoners understand what legal process is happening, seemingly more readily in-person in court, they are more empowered to participate or, at least, happier that they are kept informed – directly. From a phenomenological perspective, there is an unquestionable nexus between our bodies, embodied sensorial experiences and making sense of the world.
98
The world can only ever be experienced and understood through the body, through the human sensorium.
99
M05 told me he could focus better when he appeared in court space and he preferred that option for instructing his lawyer:
I’ve noticed with myself I’m a bit more focussed when I’m in the courtroom ’cause … in the courtroom … I like speaking to people face-to-face, you know, if I had to explain myself to the judge or something like that, I’d like to do it face-to-face. And my lawyer – if she’s doing a shit job – I can tell her.
Feeling distanced and disconnected from courtroom space can result in disempowerment and frustration. F12 spoke of her dislocation from the space of the actual proceedings: “I’d rather be in the court myself, you know, like people are deciding your future and yeah, I’d like to be in the room.” M11 had an awareness of how his virtual presence led to disengagement: “I suppose you’re a bit withdrawn from the whole process really, it’s all going on there without yah and, umm, you’re just a face on a screen really.” Video link technology may enable the visible screen appearance of a prisoner and the download of verbal content, but it may also militate against a prisoner’s sense of immersion in their own legal proceedings.
4 Soundtrack of Incarceration
The focus on the visibility of the prisoner by AVL also downplays the audio component. Prisoners reported several audio problems to me including a lack of volume, buzzing noise and a complete lack of sound. Then there is the prison soundscape reverberating through the concrete corridors, and M08 told me: “there’s always noise going on.” A soundtrack of incarceration – yelling and slamming doors – even permeated my audio recorded interviews: “Prisons are hard, tough places, and they sound like it.”
100
This sonic world of prison often penetrates the prison video studios and may be unintentionally transmitted to remote courtrooms providing the auditory dimensions of the prisoner’s carceral environment, at odds with the more formal auditory aura of the courtroom.
101
Prisoners mentioned the sounds of banging doors, loud voices and brawling. M02 told me:
When I’m talking in the video link … it does bother you ’cause … [the court] can hear it, they can hear all the screaming and yelling that’s going on in these holding cells.
These penetrating sounds of incarceration generate an “auditory spatial orientation”
102
as a backdrop to a prisoner’s video linked court appearance. According to F08’s account, remote judicial officers may find the noise intrusive:
The only problem was the judge was asking what all the noise was, they could hear doors slamming in the background, the doors are real heavy at the gaols … so they could hear the doors slamming, but I just piped up and told him it was the gaol.
The soundscape of incarceration may frame perceptions of the prisoner who is obviously inhabiting a noisy and anti-social space. The sound bleed disturbed F12’s focus on her legal proceedings. She told me: “Oh this is lovely isn’t it you know; I’m at court and there’s a brawl going on behind me.” The noise from the contiguous holding cell made her anxious that something of the chaotic atmosphere was being transmitted from the prison to the remote courtroom.
5 Dead Time
A sense of time and duration is central to the embodied experience of incarceration
103
as well as to AVL schedules. Prior to and following a video link session, prisoners are kept in holding cells located near the video studios. Some prisoners were clearly impressed by the swiftness of procedures facilitated by AVL, and proponents and vendors of the technologies claim speed as a major advantage.
104
However, many prisoners find themselves waiting for hours and hours. The alleged benefits of AVL in minimizing disruptions to prisoners’ schedules may be negated by the long periods of time waiting in holding cells before and after AVL sessions.
105
M13 complained: “I’ve been here for 5 hours already, sitting there in a cell, everyone’s gone.” M07 related how he had to wait all day and “even the officers were wondering what was going on.” There is a relationship between the body, time and space, especially within prison. Temporal and spatial elements structure the carceral experience, and stretches of “dead time” spent waiting in cells involve embodied spatial and temporal deprivations.
106
There was universal condemnation by the prisoners of the state of holding cell space with M03 describing it as: “Umm, filthy [laughs], atrocious [laughs], so you don’t even want to sit down, let alone attempt to drink out of the bubbler.” Similarly M02 described the cells:
They’re just … metal seats but nothing else, they’ve got a toilet, a sink, a tap, that’s all. They’re pretty dirty, pretty dirty. People bleed and spit so … you’ve got to be pretty hygienic.
The holding cells were described as spaces of filth, and these men expressed a fear of contamination from other prisoners’ bodily fluids and the accumulated dirt. Video links, as a manifestation of the hegemony of vision, ignore these other sensorial experiences, and the profound impact that the “fabric” of the prison has on prisoners’ experiences of accessing justice.
X. Conclusion
While the basic content of legal procedure by video link may be the same as physical proceedings, the trend towards prisoners appearing by video link from prison is problematic.
In this article I have also sought to examine how video links are symptomatic of the sensory bias to sight that ignores the significance of the other senses. Video links enable a framed view of each video endpoint, as well as the download of verbal content. However, the technology profoundly alters how prisoners experience and access criminal justice. Many of the prisoners I interviewed expressed feelings of disengagement and isolation, becoming spectators rather than immersed participants in their own legal proceedings.
When video conferencing technologies become embedded into the infrastructure of prison, they fundamentally change the site of adjudication, the spatial dynamics and human interactions, and impact on prisoners’ embodied encounters with the law. I have examined how video links act as a conduit between the conceptually linked but the non-contiguous locations of prison and courtroom. In this, video links effect a conflation of the custody dock with the space of prosecution and punishment, compromising the perceived impartiality of proceedings, 107 and amplifying the hierarchical space for the prisoner. Notions of “equality of arms,” neutrality and impartiality are implicated when the defendant appears on a screen in court, locked firmly within the enclosed space of state control. Conflating the sealed space of state prosecution and incarceration with the administration of justice renders legal procedures opaque. The disparity between the court space and the taxing environment of prison is great in terms of aesthetics, acoustics and architecture. To conceptually collapse these spaces is fraught: prisoners should be afforded a just space, a civic and public space, not one contained within a regime of punishment.
Prisoners are increasingly appearing in legal procedure from these symbolic spaces of incarceration with their particular hardships, penal architecture, and oppressive carceral aesthetics. The prison video studio is phenomenologically distinct from the courtroom space. There is a significant variance between open, civic and relatively dignified courtroom space, versus the closed conditions of incarcerating space. In comparison with prison video studios, courtroom spaces exude a level of neutrality and transparency in their openness and accessibility to the public, and relative dignity in their furnishings. Human experience and behavior are intimately influenced by spatial settings and architectural features, and the environment itself may cue particular behaviors. 108 To be located within a particular space generates reactions, and there is “space consciousness or the sensation of space.” 109 On this basis, it is not surprising that “the space in which justice is done shapes what we think it means.” 110 For the video-linked prisoner, the experience and meaning of criminal justice is formed by the fabric of the prison. The traditional symbolic separation of the prisoner in the courtroom custody dock has become a literal banishment as prisoners appear from carceral space. If every engagement with architecture is a multi-sensory experience, then the prison video studio reinforces expulsion from the human world, exacerbates prisoners’ sensorial impoverishment, and diminishes opportunities for expressive participation in legal procedure. The prison video studio, as an ersatz courtroom, must symbolically express the ultimate demeaning spatial position in the criminal justice system.
Footnotes
1.
Anne Bowen Poulin, “Criminal Justice and Videoconferencing Technology: The Remote Defendant,” Tulane Law Review 78 (2003), 1089–1167; Molly Treadway Johnson and Elizabeth C. Wiggins, “Videoconferencing in Criminal Proceedings: Legal and Empirical Issues and Directions for Research,” Law & Policy 28(2) (2006), 211–27; Anne Grunseit, Emily McCarron, Suzie Forell, and Law and Justice Foundation of New South Wales, Taking Justice into Custody: The Legal Needs of Prisoners, Access to Justice and Legal Needs, Sydney: Law and Justice Foundation of New South Wales, (2008); Susan Kluss, “Virtual Justice: The Problems with Audiovisual Appearances in Criminal Courts,” Law Society Journal 46(4) May (2008); Suzie Forell, Meg Laufer and Erol Digiusto, Legal assistance by video conferencing: what is known? Justice Issues Paper 15, Law and Justice Foundation of NSW, Sydney, (2011); Emma Rowden, “Remote Participation and the Distributed Court: an approach to court architecture in the age of video-mediated communications,” PhD Thesis, Architecture, Building and Planning, The University of Melbourne (2011).
2.
Eric T. Bellone, “Private Attorney-Client Communications and the Effect of Videoconferencing in the Courtroom,” Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology 8 (2013), 24–48, 26; Joyce Plotnikoff and Richard Woolfson, Preliminary Hearings: Video Links Evaluations of Pilot Projects (London: The Home Office (1999)), p. 11,
(accessed 20 March 2015); Anne Wallace, “Justice and the ‘virtual’ expert: Using remote witness technology to take scientific evidence,” PhD thesis, The University of Sydney, (2011), p. 145.
3.
Fredric Lederer, “Introduction: What Have We Wrought?” William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 12 (2004), 637–48; Linda Mulcahy, “The Unbearable Lightness of Being? Shifts Towards the Virtual Trial,” Journal of Law & Society 35(4) (2008), 464–89; Rowden, “Remote Participation”; Wallace, “Remote witness technology”; Forell, Laufer and Diguisto, “Legal assistance”; Emma Rowden, Anne Wallace, David Tait, Mark Hanson and Diane Jones, Gateways to Justice: Design and Operational Guidelines for Remote Participation in Court Proceedings (2013) University of Western Sydney: Sydney.
(accessed 23 September 2014); Jenni Ward, “Transforming ‘Summary Justice’ Through Police-Led Prosecution and ‘Virtual Courts’,” British Journal of Criminology 55(2) (2015), 341–58.
4.
Neal Feigenson, “The Visual in Law: Some Problems for Legal Theory,” Law, Culture and the Humanities 10(1) (2014), 13–23; Eamonn Carrabine, “Just Images Aesthetics, Ethics and Visual Criminology,” British Journal of Criminology 52(3) (2012), 463–89; Richard K. Sherwin, Visualizing Law in the Age of the Digital Baroque: Arabesques and Entanglements (London and New York: Routledge, 2011).
5.
Ministry of Justice, Swift and Sure Justice: The Government’s Plans for Reform of the Criminal Justice System (The Stationery Office, 2012), p. 45.
6.
Bellone, “Private Attorney-Client Communications.”
7.
Ward, “Transforming Summary Justice.”
8.
9.
Department of Police and Justice, p. 82.
10.
Department of Police and Justice, p. 82.
11.
Gail Mason, The spectacle of violence: Homophobia, gender and knowledge (Psychology Press, 2002), pp. 24–5.
12.
Stephen Richards, Michael Lenza, Greg Newbold, Richard Jones, Daniel Murphy and Robert Grigsby. “Prison as seen by convict criminologists,” Transnational Criminology Manual 3 (2010), 343–60, 348.
13.
Richards, Lenza, Newbold, Jones, Murphy and Grigsby, “Prison,” 343, 347, 349.
14.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962); Max Van Manen, “Practicing Phenomenological Writing,” Phenomenology & Pedagogy 2(1) (1984), 36–69, 38.
15.
Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception; Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception: And Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics (Northwestern University Press, 1964).
16.
Juhani Pallasmaa, The Eyes of the Skin: Architecture and the Senses (John Wiley & Sons, 2012), p. 45.
17.
Clare Graham, Ordering Law: The Architectural and Social History of the English Law Court to 1914 (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2003); Kathryn Lee Leader, Trials, Truth-Telling and the Performing Body, PhD Thesis, University of Sydney (2008),
; Kirsty Duncanson and Emma Henderson, “Narrative, Theatre, and the Disruptive Potential of Jury Directions in Rape Trials,” Feminist Legal Studies 22(2) (2014), 155–74.
18.
Rowden, “Remote Participation”; Julienne Hanson, “The Architecture of Justice: Iconography and Space Configuration in the English Law Court Building,” Architectural Research Quarterly 1 (1996), 50–59.
19.
Norman W. Spaulding, “The Enclosure of Justice: Courthouse Architecture, Due Process, and the Dead Metaphor of Trial,” Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 24 (2012), 311–43, 330.
20.
Desmond Manderson, Songs without Music: Aesthetic Dimensions of Law and Justice (University of California Press, 2000).
21.
Spaulding, “Enclosure of Justice.”
22.
Bellone, “Private Attorney-Client Communications.”
23.
Spaulding, “Enclosure of Justice,” 316.
24.
Judith Resnik and Dennis Curtis, Representing Justice: Invention, Controversy, and Rights in City-States and Democratic Courtrooms (Yale University Press, 2011), p. 303.
25.
Linda Mulcahy, Legal Architecture: Justice, Due Process and the Place of Law (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011); Resnik and Curtis, “Representing Justice,” 342.
26.
Hanson, “The Architecture of Justice”; Richard Mohr, “Enduring Signs and Obscure Meanings: Contested Coats of Arms in Australian Jurisdictions,” in Wagner, A., Summerfield, T. and Benevides, F. (eds), Contemporary Issues of the Semiotics of Law (Oxford: Hart, 2005), pp. 180–95; Linda Mulcahy, “Architects of Justice: the Politics of Courtroom Design,” Social & Legal Studies 16 (2007), 383–403; Spaulding, “Enclosure of Justice”; Victoria Brooks, “Interrupting the Courtroom Organism: Screaming Bodies, Material Affects and the Theatre of Cruelty,” Law, Culture and the Humanities (2014), 1–20.
27.
Peter Goodrich, Languages of Law (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1990).
28.
Spaulding, “Enclosure of Justice,” 330.
29.
Richard Mohr, “In Between: Power and Procedure Where the Court Meets the Public Sphere,” in A Thousand Eyes: Media Technology, Law and Aesthetics, edited by Marit Paasche and Judy Radul (Oslo: Henie Onstad Art Centre and Sternberg Press, 2011), pp. 99–114, p. 108 citing J. Huizinga in Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element Culture (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1955), p. 77.
30.
Mohr, “Power and Procedure,” p. 102. A more recent example of the televisualization of criminal justice is the 2014 murder trial of Oscar Pistorius in South Africa.
31.
Mohr, “Power and Procedure,” p. 111.
32.
Spaulding, “Enclosure of Justice,” 315.
33.
Lionel Rosen, “The dock – Should it be abolished?” The Modern Law Review 29(3) (1966), 289–300; Pat Carlen, “The Staging of Magistrates’ Justice,” The British Journal of Criminology (1976), 48–55; Linda Mulcahy, “Putting the Defendant in Their Place: Why Do We Still Use the Dock in Criminal Proceedings?” British Journal of Criminology 53(6) (2013), 1139–56.
34.
Rosen, “The Dock,” 289; Mulcahy, “Putting the Defendant”; David Tait, “Glass Cages in the Dock?: Presenting the Defendant to the Jury,” Chicago Kent Law Review 86 (2011), 467–95; Duncanson and Henderson, “Narrative Theatre.”
35.
Rosen, “The Dock.”
36.
Mulcahy, “Putting the Defendant,” 1144.
37.
Harold Garfinkel, “Conditions of successful degradation ceremonies,” American Journal of Sociology (1956), 420–4, 420; Ngaire Naffine, Law & the Sexes: Explorations in feminist jurisprudence (North Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1990), p. 128.
38.
Rowden, ‘‘Remote Participation,” 19.
39.
Naffine, Law & the Sexes, pp. 128, 132.
40.
Mulcahy, “Putting the Defendant”; Jonathan Simon, “Punishment and the Political Technologies of the Body,” in Jonathan Simon and Richard Sparks (eds), The SAGE Handbook of Punishment & Society (Sage, 2013), pp. 60–89; Tait, “Glass Cages”; Resnik and Curtis, “Representing Justice,” 342.
41.
R v Benbrika & Ors (Ruling No. 12) [2007] VSC 524; R v Baladjam & Ors [No 41] [2008] NSWSC 1462.
42.
Rosen, “The Dock”; Tait, “Glass Cages”; Mulcahy, “Putting the Defendant.”
43.
Hanson, “The Architecture of Justice,” 16.
45.
Emma Rowden, Anne Wallace and Jane Goodman-Delahunty, “Sentencing by videolink: up in the air?” Criminal Law Journal 34(6) (2010), 363–84; Rowden, Wallace, Tait, Hanson and Jones, “Gateways.”
46.
Michael Fiddler, “Four walls and what lies within: the meaning of space and place in prisons,” Prison Service Journal 187 (2010), 3–8, 3.
47.
Bronwyn Naylor, “Human Rights and Respect in Prisons: The Prisoners’ Perspective,” in Bronwyn Naylor, Julie Debeljak and Anita Mackay (eds), Human Rights in Closed Environments (Annandale: The Federation Press, 2014), pp. 84–124.
48.
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), p. 231.
49.
Resnick and Curtis, “Representing Justice,” 222.
50.
Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 9.
51.
Erving Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Condition of the Social Situation of Mental Patients and other Inmates (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1961), p. 7.
52.
Phil Scraton and Linda Moore, “Degradation, harm and survival in a women’s prison,” Social Policy and Society 5(1) (2006), 67–78; Eamonn Carrabine, “Prison riots, social order and the problem of legitimacy,” British Journal of Criminology 45(6) (2005), 896–913; Phil Scraton, Joe Sim and Paula Skidmore, Prisons under Protest (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1991).
53.
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54.
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55.
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56.
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57.
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58.
Goffman, Asylums.
59.
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60.
Nicole Lacey, The prisoners’ dilemma: political economy and punishment in contemporary democracies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
61.
Department of Police and Justice Annual Report, p. 73.
62.
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71.
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72.
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73.
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74.
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75.
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76.
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77.
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80.
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81.
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82.
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83.
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84.
Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 202.
85.
It is a fundamental common law right that an accused person should have a case against him/her presented in his/her presence and hearing (R v McHardie and Danielson (1983) 2 NSWLR 733 at 739). However, this right is conditional: there is no absolute right at common law, nor any constitutional right to confrontation as there is in the US (R v Ngo (2003) NSWLR 55). See also s.20A Evidence (Audio and Audio Visual Links) Act 1998 (New South Wales).
86.
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95.
Grunseit, Forell and McCarron, Taking Justice, 253–4.
96.
Rowden, “Remote Participation,” 316.
97.
Poulin, “Criminal Justice”; Rowden, Wallace, Tait, Hanson and Jones, “Gateways.”
98.
Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology; Pallasmaa, Eyes of the Skin; Rowden, “Remote Participation.”
99.
Armitage, “Accelerated aesthetics”; Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology; Mariam Fraser and Monica Greco, The Body: A Reader (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005).
100.
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Carolyn McKay, “Video Links from Prison: Permeability and the Carceral World,” International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 5(1) (2016), pp. 21–37.
102.
Don Ihde, Listening and Voice: Phenomenologies of Sound (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2007), pp. 15, 194.
103.
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104.
105.
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106.
Diana Medlicott, “Surviving in the time machine: suicidal prisoners and the pains of prison time,” Time & Society 8(2–3) (1999), 211–30, 216; Moran, “Doing Time,” 313; Azrini Wahidin, “Time and the prison experience,” Sociological Research Online 11(1) (2006).
107.
Mulcahy, Legal Architecture, 72; Anne Wallace and Emma Rowden, “Gateways to Justice: The Use of Videoconferencing Technology to Take Evidence in Australian Courts,” in Proceedings of the 9th European Conference on e-Government (London: Academic Publishing International, 2009), pp. 653–60.
108.
Hancock and Jewkes, “Architectures,” 626; Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space. Translated by Maria Jolas (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1994); Rowden, “Remote Participation,” 244; Otto Bollnow, Human Space, 1963 Translated by Christine Shuttleworth, edited by Joseph Kohlmaier (London: Hyphen Press, 2011).
109.
Bollnow, Human Space’, 257.
110.
Spaulding, “Enclosure of Justice,” 343.
