Abstract
This is an extremely ambitious book. Not only does it aspire to offer a comprehensive overview of the liberal tradition in both theory and practice, as well as the most important critiques of liberalism from both the left and right, but it also seeks to advance a novel framework for thinking about rights discourse, distributive justice, and law. This framework draws from a wide array of theoretical sources but is rooted in critical legal theory and builds on the achievements of liberal societies while simultaneously addressing the (often conflicting) concerns raised by both progressives and conservatives. This is no small task to set for oneself; indeed, it is almost herculean. So, even though I do not think that McManus ultimately succeeds in accomplishing it, I nevertheless cannot help but admire him for trying. Moreover, the fact that this reader was not, in the end, convinced, does not detract from the erudition with which McManus writes, nor the stimulating and generative character of his analysis.
The book is divided into two parts. The first, “Liberalism and Its Critics,” is basically a sweeping overview of liberalism and the various critiques (internal and external) it has spawned. In Chapter 1, McManus traces the seeds of liberal thought to Natural Law and Renaissance theorists like Grotius and Mirandola, and proto-liberals such as Hobbes. He argues that liberalism as we know it begins with Locke and Madison, though given these thinkers’ anti-democratic inclinations, and their affinities for the propertied classes, the egalitarian potential of the liberal tradition remained latent until Kant. McManus then spends time outlining the tensions that exist between liberalism and utilitarianism (often erroneously considered synonymous), especially in the works of Bentham and Mill—the latter whom, McManus maintains, is utilitarian in name only. Finally, McManus discusses the development of right-wing liberal thought—that is, neoliberalism—associated with the work of von Mises, Hayek, and Friedman, lamenting its dominance in late modernity.
In Chapter 2, McManus considers a host of critiques launched against liberalism and (neo)liberal societies. On the left, the critique of liberalism (generally inspired by Marx) is that its promise of emancipation is betrayed by its naturalization of narrow property rights and the unwillingness to acknowledge either the social preconditions of freedom or how power functions. On the right (generally traced back to either Rousseau or Burke), the concern is with the anomic, atomistic, and ignoble character of liberal societies and selves, along with the loss of an overarching authoritative culture and tradition. While acknowledging their respective insights, McManus contends that liberal thought is not as irredeemable as these two schools of critique suppose. In addition, he rejects the leftist penchant for negative critique as well as its instinctual hostility to rights discourse, and he condemns the conservative rejection of universalism and skepticism of reason as reactionary. According to McManus, the left must be willing to abandon its “militant particularism” and preserve what is best in the liberal tradition (especially its dual commitments to freedom and moral equality) without endorsing “post-modern conservatism.” Instead, liberalism must seek to go beyond these commitments.
In Chapter 3, McManus distinguishes his approach from that of liberal egalitarians like Rawls, Dworkin, and Nussbaum. He thinks we need to give credit where credit is due, meaning that the left ought to acknowledge that egalitarian liberalism has done much to address progressives’ concerns about material inequality in neoliberal societies. However, in his view, where liberal egalitarians go wrong is in offering only a “thin” conception of democratic participation (155). Inspired by deliberative democrats like Habermas and Honneth, McManus argues that what plagues liberal societies is that ordinary citizens lack political power and are insufficiently civically engaged. He therefore endorses democratizing institutions, like the workplace and the family, which typically belong to the private sphere.
In part 2, “A Critical Legal Approach to Dignity, Law, and Rights,” McManus offers his positive account of justice. In Chapter 4, he contends that rather than in freedom, rights discourse should be grounded in the moral foundation of human dignity According to McManus, dignity should be understood as the ability to realize one’s authentic self or what McManus calls “self-authorship.”As individuals are entitled to self-authorship merely by virtue of being human, the right to dignity occupies a “quasi-deontological” status (176). Accordingly, it operates as a “mother right,” which it is the state’s duty to protect and uphold. Subsumed within this mother right are twin daughter rights: (1) the right to self- and democratic authorship, and (2) the right to an equality of expressive capacities, except in instances where inequalities are the result of morally significant choices or benefit the least well-off.
Finally, in Chapter 5, McManus couches his account of liberalism in a revised conception of the ontology of law. Rather than maintaining order, the being of law is dynamic and therefore more open to radical social change than liberal legalism.
McManus does not deny that his account borrows from a multitude of theoretical sources. For instance, his expressivist conception of dignity owes much to thinkers like Rousseau, Mill, and Unger. The principle of moral equality embedded in his notion of dignity is fundamentally Kantian. His emphasis on democratic authorship derives from deliberative democratic thought. The structure and content of his twin rights reflect a sophisticated combination of liberal egalitarian (especially Rawlsian) and capabilities (Sen and Nussbaum) frameworks. And his ontology of law is indebted to the dynamic philosophy of Bergson and Deleuze. Still, despite these myriad sources, McManus assures us that his framework is greater than the sum of its parts, offering an original conception of justice that progressives (and perhaps even some conservatives) should be willing to sign on to. Should we be persuaded?
Answering this question satisfactorily requires far more space than I have here. But if forced to provide a shorthand answer, I would say no. And the reason for this is that I am not convinced that McManus’s proposal meaningfully differs from liberal egalitarianism, broadly understood—and to the extent that it does, I am not persuaded it offers an improvement. Let me explain.
As I understand it, the moral foundation of left-liberalism is the essential interest individuals have in leading good lives. For Rawls, Dworkin, and Kymlicka leading a good life requires two preconditions: (a) that we lead our lives autonomously, or from the inside, and (b) that we be free to revise our conceptions of the good. Now, it is not obvious that rooting rights discourse in “self-authorship” is meaningfully different from rooting it in the essential interest we as human beings have in leading a good life. And to the extent that there is a difference, I am not convinced that talk of self-authorship is preferable. For what McManus has done, it seems to me, is shift the discussion away from achieving an end (a good life), to achieving an identity (becoming the person I want to be). And I worry this potentially creates a number of problems which he does not adequately address.
For instance, if it is the state’s duty to protect and uphold self-authorship then it would seem to follow (after Hegel) that the state has a responsibility to ensure that citizens are recognized as they would wish to be. Of course, liberal multiculturalism is in some sense committed to this aim, but the difference is that it does not, as a matter of principle, make recognition the basis of the state’s legitimacy, and therefore does not flirt with being obliged to force private citizens to recognize their fellow citizens as the persons they wish to be recognized as in both public and private.
Furthermore, as McManus advocates democratizing the private sphere, it is not clear that, say, a conservative Christian or Jew can “be the person they wish to be and have the experiences they wish to have” in a society where the churches and the synagogues, like all other private institutions, have been “democratized.” When is “democratization” a political rather than a cultural project? Will all hierarchical authority structures be criminalized in McManus’s society?
I stress these points because it seems to me that the most significant way McManus deviates from liberal egalitarianism, if he does at all, is his championing a right to democratic authorship. And yet, even here it is not obvious how McManus’s account of liberalism actually differs from what left-liberals propose. For example, McManus contends that the right to democratic authorship would lead to more democratic forms of voting and a more militant defense of voting rights (197). Such a result is not incompatible with Rawlsian thought; in fact, liberal egalitarians would be happy to endorse these kinds of reforms. And this is especially noteworthy because in championing democratic authorship McManus seeks to respond to the communitarian critique of liberalism, placing his hopes in a renewed culture of civic participation through increased public dialogue. But he has not made clear how this is culture would necessarily come about. Is civil participation to be mandated by law? Such a move would likely conflict with McManus’s quasi-deontological commitment to self-authorship but unless he is willing to endorse such measures, I see no reason to think his approach would lead to a civic revival any more than what liberal egalitarians propose.
In the end, I would argue that one’s preference for McManus’s approach to liberalism over liberal egalitarianism, broadly understood, hinges on whether one thinks the workplace, the family, and other private institutions require democratizing (a process which, as mentioned above, remains somewhat opaque.) This reader would be willing to consider the workplace, but thinks that democratizing the rest (to the extent that this entails top-down state-sanctioned action) may well do more harm than good. Thus, I do not yet see a reason to shift allegiances. And yet, while I remain to be convinced, I cannot deny that McManus’s ambitious book deserves to be widely read and discussed.