Beyond ‘crude pragmatism’ in sports coaching: Insights from C.S. Peirce,William James,and John Dewey: A commentary

Introduction

Jenkins argues that the classical pragmatism of Peirce, James, Dewey, et al. is worthy of greater attention from practitioners and researchers in sports coaching. While acknowledging the differences among these classical pragmatists, Jenkins discusses common themes, methods, and attitudes of the classical pragmatists and suggests productive applications to coaching practice and research.

Central among the features of the classical pragmatism discussed by Jenkins are the following: (i) commitment to evaluating theories, and the concepts embedded in them, in terms of their applications in practice, (ii) rejection of a priori foundationalism, (iii) acceptance of fallibilism in place of a quest for certainty, (iv) commitment to a problem-driven process of inquiry instead of “academic” doubt, and (v) recognition of the essentially social character of inquiry. Jenkins correctly suggests that philosophical approaches embodying such features are indeed likely to apply productively to sports coaching.

What also struck me in reading the article was the connection to another body of philosophical literature that is likely to be similarly applicable to sports coaching. In particular, Jenkins’ discussions of Peirce’s method of abduction and Dewey’s theory of inquiry led me to see them, and classical pragmatism in general, as significantly allied with the method of reflective equilibrium articulated in the influential moral and political philosophy of John Rawls.^1,2. Although Rawls should not be read as a pragmatist, reflective equilibrium not only shares central features of Peirce’s and Dewey’s approaches but more importantly can be seen as sharing features (i) to (v) above that helped make classical pragmatism especially relevant to sports coaching. Thus, I want to suggest that the work of Rawls and others on reflective equilibrium may very well be similarly useful to practitioners and researchers in sports coaching.

Reflective equilibrium

The method of reflective equilibrium is a process of deliberation and justification in which we gradually bring into alignment with each other (A) our considered judgments about particular cases and (B) the general rules or principles we apply to such cases. For example, in moral reasoning, we justify ethical principles by applying them to particular cases, rejecting or modifying proposed principles when they clash with our considered judgments in particular cases. But we also can come to reject our judgments about particular cases, even strongly held considered judgments, when they conflict with principles we are unwilling to abandon—e.g. principles that apply successfully to a range of our other judgments. As Goodman says (in discussing this process as applied to competing systems of logic): “A rule is amended if it yields an inference we are unwilling to accept; an inference is rejected if it violates a rule we are unwilling to amend” (Goodman, ³ p. 67).

The process initially described by Goodman has come to be called narrow reflective equilibrium. When the process aims at coherence among these general principles and particular judgments together with the additional element of a wide-ranging set of empirical and philosophical beliefs (e.g. prevailing scientific theories and competing philosophical theories), the process is called wide reflective equilibrium.

Wide reflective equilibrium shares many core features with pragmatism, including (i) to (v) above. (i) Wide reflective equilibrium, as noted by Talisse and Godfrey, “requires an ongoing engagement between moral theory and moral practice, thereby preserving the pragmatist commitment to the idea that theories must be judged by their implications for practice” (Talisse and Godfrey, ⁴ p. 131). (ii) Wide reflective equilibrium is anti-foundational, since our considered judgments about particular cases have no special status as self-evident or self-justifying and are always open to revision, and also because justification is not simply “upwards” from cases to principles. (iii) Wide reflective equilibrium is fallibilistic, since new empirical discoveries or shifts in other relevant theories can always in principle upset the equilibrium and require further revision, generating/justifying different principles. (iv) Wide reflective equilibrium is a process that can occur in a non-trivial way only when there is some real conflict among our beliefs, e.g. when we discover that our theoretical commitments or general principles conflict with what we believe about particular cases. The kind of “mere Cartesian doubt” that Peirce criticized as an inauthentic and inappropriate starting point for inquiry simply does not generate the process of reflective equilibrium. (v) While narrow reflective equilibrium might only require one to make minor adjustments of one’s own principles and judgments in an isolated process, wide reflective equilibrium requires us to subject our beliefs to a broad range of critiques from competing frameworks and alternative conceptions. It is thus not a process that can be carried out in isolation, but is rather an essentially social process.

We can see these features of wide reflective equilibrium at work in the four themes discussed by Jenkins: Pragmatic Temperament, Communities of Inquiry, Mixed Methods Research, and Reflection.

Pragmatic temperament

In discussing Pragmatic Temperament, Jenkins points to Nicholson’s contrast between the flexible-minded (pragmatic) and the firm-minded temperaments (Nicholson, ⁵ p. 257). I would note that the characteristics inherently associated with wide reflective equilibrium correspond remarkably closely to those of the flexible-minded temperament. Wide reflective equilibrium holds beliefs lightly and regards them as hypotheses to be evaluated in terms of their consequences (i.e. applications to particular cases), uncertain and open to change, and only justifiable when taking others’ points of view into account, in a reflective process that “enables us to refine and deepen our ideals in the practice of ‘deliberative democracy’” (Nicholson, ⁵ p. 263).

Communities of inquiry

As Jenkins notes in his discussion of Communities of Inquiry, Peirce argued that inquiry must be grounded in actual problems and proceed as a shared process across a community of inquirers. The method of wide reflective equilibrium similarly begins with real problems (conflicts between beliefs) and locates the source of justification outside of the isolated individual; it requires people to subject their beliefs to mutual interrogation from the vantage points of others, and to adjust beliefs in light of that process. For the later Peirce, it is truth itself that is determined by the process of adjustment and eventual, theoretical agreement among inquirers. It should be noted that Rawls does not regard reflective equilibrium as an account of truth, but only of justification, so in that sense, he certainly departs from the classical pragmatism of at least Peirce and James (who also offered a type of coherence account of truth). But reflective equilibrium shares the commitment to belief as justifiable only as the outcome of an idealized, essentially social process.

Mixed methods research

In his discussion of Mixed Methods Research, Jenkins digs deeper into Peirce’s methods. As he notes, Peirce’s conception of abduction as a type of inference is contested ground, not the least because it appears to have changed throughout Peirce’s career, and simply characterizing it as “inference to the best explanation” (as many have) is inadequate. I was particularly impressed by the similarities between wide reflective equilibrium and the definition of abduction Jenkins cites from Morgan as a reasoning process in which one ‘moves back and forth between induction and deduction—first converting observations into theories and then assessing those theories through action” (Morgan, ⁶ p. 71). Jenkins goes on to discuss the issue of whether abduction for Peirce is a method of theory generation or a method of theory appraisal. Leading theorists of reflective equilibrium find it capable of playing both roles—e.g. Daniels, who says it “plays a role in both the construction and justification of Rawls's theory of justice.” ⁷ This is to be expected, since clashes between beliefs force revision or even wholesale change.

Reflection

Finally, in his discussion of Reflection, Jenkins compares at Dewey’s scientific reflection and Schön’s artistic reflection. I think that the elements of reflective equilibrium are attuned to both of these reflective methods. In particular, Schön’s suspicion of overly theoretical inquiry that is disengaged from the “swampy lowlands of practice,” as well as Dewey’s commitment to reflection as an interactive, problem-driven process of resolving conflicts with experience, both resonate deeply with reflective equilibrium.

Conclusion

Jenkins succeeds in suggesting directions in which sports coaching can draw ideas from the works of classical pragmatists and move beyond “crude pragmatism.” I have argued that many of the core features of classical pragmatism that make it useful to sports coaching are shared by the method of wide reflective equilibrium, and so we may expect that attention to reflective equilibrium may be similarly useful.