Beyond “crude pragmatism” in sports coaching: Insights from C.S. Peirce,William James,and John Dewey—A commentary

Introduction

American Pragmatism bills itself (among other things) as a response to the conflict between hard scientific ways of knowing and soft religious and axiological beliefs. In effect, it is a flexible approach to philosophy that takes both empirical and a priori knowledge into account and looks for meaning and truth in terms of practical outcomes and particular situations.

On the face of it, this approach seems to align with the need for coaches to be both scientists and educators (or, perhaps “philosophers”), as they pursue particular results in sport. Since their practice is inherently results oriented, a flexible approach that considers context and synthesizes diverse modes of knowledge seems ideal. The coach who relies solely on data is as handicapped as the coach who focuses exclusively on values or ideology.

Galen versus Philostratus during the Roman Empire

The demand that coaches be both scientists and philosophers may seem distinctively modern since advancements in exercise physiology, statistical analysis, and other empirical disciplines compete strongly with faith, values, and tradition in most coaches’ drive to achieve their goals. As it turns out, however, the conflict is ancient—going back as far as Pythagoras, mentioned specifically by Aristotle, and debated intensely by Galen and Philostratus during the Roman Empire. ^a

Galen was a medical doctor who would seem to favor the “scientific side” of athletic training, but he repeatedly denigrates the profession as practiced for its excesses and overemphasis on victory. In Protrepticus, he complains that athletic training not only neglects the rationality and moderation of a proper science (sophia), such as medicine, it hardly counts as a craft (technē) because its product is useless for life beyond sport. He worries that athletics deceives “our young men into preferring it to a genuine technē, through offering, as it does, bodily strength and popular fame and daily public payments … equal to those given to outstanding citizens.” ^b

Philostratus responded to Galen’s challenge in the most comprehensive ancient text on athletics to come down to us, an essay called On Gymnastics. ^c In this essay, Philostratus shoots back at Galen by claiming not only that coaching is indeed a sophia, comparable to philosophy, geometry, and music but it is inferior to no craft (technē) at all. There is more to athletic training, in other words, than technical know-how. ^d

Philostratus develops his argument by echoing an Aristotelian distinction between a paidotribēs (literally a masseuse, but used more generally to describe a person who trains athletes) and a gymnastēs, whom he interprets as a kind of master trainer. ^e Philostratus stipulates that the gymnastēs has all the technical knowledge of the paidotribēs, but also the wisdom (sophia) needed to apply it properly—that is, for the best benefit of the youth (Gym. 14–15).^f To illustrate his point, he cites a training technique called the “tetrad” that was misused by a coach lacking sophia in a way that caused the death of a young wrestler (Gym. 54).

Here, we have a case of scientific knowledge needing to be complemented by a “softer” kind of wisdom in order to achieve the desired results. But is Philostratus’ gymnastēs a pragmatic—or perhaps pragmatistic—coach? The first thing to observe would be the nature of the “result” Philostratus’ coach is seeking. I think many modern coaches simply assume that the practical results in question are contest results, or at least performance measures (i.e., improved times, increased endurance, etc.). Obviously, if we are to seek truth and meaning in results, we need to ask what kind of results we are looking for, and I think it may be too easily assumed that coaches are talking about sports results. This seems to be part of Jenkins’ criticism of “crude pragmatism” in coaching.

Asking about the nature of results pragmatic coaches should be pursuing raises an even bigger philosophical question about what the purpose of sport itself is. How can we evaluate meaning and truth in terms of results until we determine what kind of results we are looking for? Since most coaches are educators, contest results alone cannot predict whether their pedagogical goals have been met. In some cases, contest goals may be at odds with pedagogical goals. Pedagogical goals are no less practical than contest results, in the classic and especially Deweyan understanding of Pragmatism. Coaches who do whatever it takes to improve contest results, however, are not philosophical pragmatists. The meaning and truth they search for is within a closed system (namely, the contest), which must look beyond itself for meaning and truth.

Conclusion

The goal of athletic training in Philostratus’ view was the Hellenic ideal of aretē, a notion of personal excellence that had to apply beyond sport to be authentic. The gymnastēs, as opposed to the paidotribēs, was precisely the one who could apply technical knowledge in a way that cultivated aretē. It is noteworthy that this results-oriented approach leads Philostratus to invent sport mythologies (Gym. 3–12) and to praise a coach who lied to his athlete to motivate him to perform more nobly (Gym. 22). In historical context and with consideration of the end in question, such techniques may seem justified. Whether the practical ends can justify their means in coaching, however, requires serious theoretical questioning about what those ends should be.